Since the failure of Lockridge numerous agencies have been employed to

re-establish the line of American travel across the Isthmus of Nicaragua:

but all without avail. At the very time American youth was engaged in

the attempt to force open the Transit for the benefit of those holding

the Rivas grant of the 19th of February, 1856, these parties were

treacherously dealing with the government of Costa Rica and attempting

to secure the franchise from a power having no shadow of a right to

bestow it. There have been rumors of grants from Costa Rica and grants

from Nicaragua; and the authorities of the latter republic have actually

made bargains with several different companies to re-open the Transit.

The persons in Nicaragua who desire to keep the Americans out of the

country are well aware of the importance to them of keeping the “highway

of filibusterism” closed; and all their negotiations for transit grants

are “a delusion and a snare.” Often, too, it has been semi-officially

announced that the United States government was determined to force open

the road across Nicaragua; but as no justification for so violent an act

on the part of the United States has been presented, it must be presumed

that such declarations are intended merely for popular effect. In fact

the American authorities, by an arbitrary act of force, interrupted the

only effort which, since December, 1856, has promised successfully to

restore the passage across Nicaragua to citizens of the United States. In

December, 1857, Col. Anderson, at the head of forty-five men, took the

river boats and one lake steamer from the Costa Ricans and restored them

to the agent claiming for the American owners; and but for the acts of

the United States naval forces the transit across the Isthmus might have

been re-established in thirty days. It was the enemies of the naturalized

Nicaraguans who closed the Transit; and it is they also who keep it

closed.

But it is time for us to return to Rivas, and follow the course of events

on the Pacific side of the Isthmus.

Chapter Twelfth.

THE DEFENCE OF RIVAS.

On the 20th of December, 1856, nearly the whole body of Americans in

Nicaragua was concentrated at Rivas, and the health and moral condition

of the troops were favorably affected by the movement thither. The

hospital was established in a large building, situated on a slight

elevation near the edge of the town, known as the house of Maleaño. Under

the efficient administration of Dr. Coleman, acting surgeon-general, the

wards were kept clean, and the surgical attendance was good. The diet of

the patients was of the best sort, and although the number of wounded was

large, no disagreeable results followed from placing them all in the same

building. The supplies of medicine and surgical instruments were ample,

and the strength of the surgical staff was far greater than usual in any

armies either of the eastern or western continent. The fictions which

have been published concerning the want of medical and surgical attention

to the inmates of the hospital were created for the purpose of pandering

to a morbid public opinion, and of excusing the faults and crimes of

those who deserted their countrymen in Central America. The quarters of

the troops were comfortable, the subsistence varied and abundant, and the

spirits of the force were cheerful and buoyant.

The reports from the enemy also tended to increase the confidence of

the Americans. After the retreat of Henningsen from Granada was so

triumphantly achieved, Belloso sullenly retired to Masaya, and there

attempted to gather the remains of the shattered force which had

attempted to cut off the troops charged with the destruction of the

Legitimist stronghold. But the other Allied generals were no longer

willing to act under Belloso. Defeated in their efforts to destroy

Henningsen, the chiefs of the Allied army were naturally inclined to

throw the responsibility of their discomfiture on the Salvadorian

general. They accused Belloso not only of want of skill, but also of want

of courage; and they intimated that his hasty withdrawal toward Masaya,

soon after Waters reached the Guadalupe, was due to an over-anxiety for

his own personal safety. The dissensions which thus arose in the Allied

camp promised in a short time to dissolve the whole force, and the

charges then made against Belloso were afterward examined by a military

commission in his own State of San Salvador.

These dissensions were also increased by the disheartening effects on the

Allied officers of the great losses they had sustained in the campaign

against the Americans. It is difficult to estimate the numbers the Allies

had actually brought into the field before the retreat from Granada was

accomplished, but it is certainly no exaggeration to place the troops

they had employed from the beginning of October to the middle of December

at seven thousand. In addition to the losses at Granada on the 12th and

13th of October, on the Transit road, by the affairs of the 11th and

12th of November, and at Masaya, during the three days fighting there,

the Allies must have lost near two thousand men by the attack they made

on Henningsen. Reports concur in the fact that Belloso had not more than

two thousand under his command after he retired to Masaya. Thus, even

placing the deserters at fifteen hundred—and you must place these at a

high figure, considering the forced character of the service in Central

America—the enemy must have lost thirty-five hundred in killed and

wounded during the ten weeks immediately succeeding their march from Leon.

Nor did Belloso entirely escape the cholera after he reached Masaya.

Hence fear of the pestilence as well as of the deadly rifles of the

Americans, stimulated desertion among the Allies. So disorganized

did Belloso’s force become, that the propriety of a retreat on Leon

was discussed among the chiefs of the several contingents; and the

Salvadorian troops, particularly, were disposed to withdraw from the

contest. The Salvadorian cabinet were, it seems, not well pleased with

the censures some of the generals of the other States had passed on the

commander-in-chief; and a large portion of the Liberal party of that

State, unmoved by the passions which prompted Cabañas’ friends to revenge

themselves on the Americans for the refusal to re-establish his power

in Honduras, consistently refused to support the war waged against the

naturalized Nicaraguans.

Such was the general condition of the respective parties on the 2d of

January, 1857, when the steamer San Carlos, as heretofore narrated,

crossed the lake with the passengers from California to the Atlantic

States. The morning report of the troops at Rivas on the 3d will give an

accurate idea of the American force at that time. The total, including

those employed in the several departments, is reported at 919. Of these,

25 were employed in the ordnance department; 15 in the quartermaster’s

department; 20 in the commissary’s and 12 in the band; thus leaving

an aggregate in the line of 847. Of the aggregate 8 were of the post

and division field and staff, while 1 captain and 29 privates were on

detached duty; 3 captains, 3 lieutenants, and 2 privates, on furlough;

and 2 privates absent without leave. Thus the aggregate present was

reduced to 788; and of these 60 were on extra duty, and 197 sick. The

number for duty, officers and men, was 518; but many of those reported

sick had only chigoës in their feet, and were fully able to aid in the

defence of the town. Laziness and a disposition to shirk duty placed many

on the sick list, who in an emergency might have proved among the best

fighting men in the garrison.

Henningsen had been promoted to the rank of major-general, and Sanders

to that of brigadier; so that O’Neal had command of the First Rifles,

with Leonard as lieut.-colonel, and Dolan as major, while Jaquess was in

command of the Infantry, and Lewis of the Second Rifles. The Artillery,

as well as the Rangers were very much thinned by the hard service

through which they had passed; and Col. Schwartz, being in bad health,

soon after reaching Rivas, obtained leave of absence to visit California.

Col. Waters kept the small companies of Rangers under his command, riding

constantly in search of supplies and information.

In a few days after the San Carlos left Virgin Bay with the passengers,

uneasiness was felt on account of the non-arrival of the steamers from

the river. There were several causes which might be assigned for their

detention, one being the misunderstanding between the two agents of

the company, Scott and Macdonald. The improbabilities, too, of all the

steamers falling into the hands of the Costa Ricans were so many, that

in the event of the enemy’s appearance on the river, it was supposed

some news of the fact would soon reach Rivas. It was many days before

the steamers finally appeared on the lake, and then their movements

indicated that they were in the hands of the Allies. In the meantime, the

steamer Sierra Nevada, which had been waiting at San Juan del Sur for

the passengers, sailed for Panama; and it was not until her return on

the 24th of January, that Walker heard definitely the events which had

transpired on the river, and of Lockridge’s presence at Punta Arenas,

with a body of immigrants for Nicaragua.

Previous to the return of the Sierra Nevada from Panama, Capt. Finney

had been sent with about fifty Rangers as far as Nandaime, in order

to ascertain what news the people near Masaya had in reference to the

steamers; and also to learn whether or not the enemy were making any

movements of importance. Finney returned, reporting that he had gone as

far as Nandaime without seeing the enemy or hearing any news indicating

either an advance of Allies or a knowledge on their part of the capture

of the steamers. The country between Nandaime and Rivas was quiet; the

people were engaged in their usual domestic pursuits, and had not been

troubled by detachments of the Allies.

In the meantime Rivas was prepared for defence. Soon after occupying the

place, in December, Walker had given orders to Henningsen to strengthen

the natural advantages of the position, so that a small garrison might

be left there without risk to the military and other stores gathered in

the town. In fulfilment of these orders, Henningsen had burnt most of the

small huts on the edges of the town, and had cut away the thick tropical

undergrowth which might conceal and protect an attacking foe. The nature

of the ground in and about the place was well ascertained, and the

numerous trails and by-paths of the neighborhood were examined. Strobel

was, at the same time, engaged in surveying a more direct road than the

one usually travelled from Rivas to Virgin Bay; and for this service he

principally employed natives, who, with their machetes, are able to clear

away rapidly the dense brushwood of that luxuriant soil and climate.

A small schooner, which had once belonged to the chief of the Mosquitos,

was brought up the river and across the lake during the month of

December; and having been purchased by the government, this vessel was

undergoing repairs at the time the steamers made their appearance at

Omotepe. On the 16th of January, Walker sent for Fayssoux to come to

Rivas, in order to have his opinion as to the feasibility of using the

schooner for re-taking the steamers. Fayssoux, although suffering at

the time from fever, reached Rivas a few hours after he received the

message; and on his arrival he said he thought the schooner would be of

very little use for such a purpose. Afterward the vessel was burned, to

prevent her from falling into the hands of the enemy; to hold the vessel

securely it would have been necessary to keep a strong garrison at Virgin

Bay.

Of course, the knowledge that the enemy held the river and the lake,

diminished greatly the spirits and confidence of the troops at Rivas.

But, although difficulties appeared to gather about the Americans in

Nicaragua, they never for a moment relaxed their resolution to maintain

strict order and discipline wherever they held sway. An extract from the

log of the Granada for the 19th of January, shows the assistance her

commander gave to a vessel of the very power which in a few short weeks

manifested its gratitude for such services by capturing the Nicaraguan

schooner. The log reads: “Crew employed on ship’s duty. Sent five men and

an officer to assist the civil authorities to place the mutinous crew

of the Narraganset (an American ship) on board of her. Lent her four

hand-cuffs to iron them.” The fact may appear trifling, but, when read by

the light of after events, it becomes instructive and characteristic.

After Mora had secured the San Juan river and the lake steamers, he

established his headquarters at Fort San Carlos. Some days elapsed before

he communicated with the Allies across the lake. His object, probably,

was to get all the force he could command to the river, and so secure

his communications between San Carlos and San José, previous to taking

any step which might give Walker an opportunity of ascertaining the

occurrences on the San Juan. When, however, he had, as he supposed, put

the river in a proper state of defence, he crossed to Granada, and there

met the chiefs of the allied forces. By the success of Costa Rica on the

San Juan, she had obtained a preponderating influence in the counsels of

the confederates, and hence there was little difficulty in having Cañas

placed in command of the army at Masaya. The possession of the lake and

river, and the closing of the Transit, gave new life to the leaders of

the allied troops, and they determined to advance into the Meridional

Department.

On the 26th of January Walker received news of the advance of the Allies

toward Obraje, a small village on the south side of the Gil Gonzales,

and about three leagues distant from Rivas. The same afternoon O’Neal

with his Rifles, about 160 strong, and with a twelve-pound howitzer

and a small four-pound brass piece, went to meet the enemy, reported

as numbering 800 or 1,000 men. A company of Rangers also accompanied

O’Neal; and Finney riding to the edge of Obraje came suddenly on a strong

picket of the Allies and received their fire, himself mortally wounded,

almost before he was aware of their presence. When O’Neal ascertained

that the enemy held Obraje he halted for the night about a mile from the

village. The next morning he sent forward a skirmishing party to feel the

strength of the Allies, and the latter came out to meet the skirmishers

in such force that O’Neal judged it prudent to recall his riflemen. In

the skirmishing with the enemy O’Neal lost several men; and when his

report of the apparent strength and confidence of the Allies reached

Rivas, Henningsen was sent to Obraje to reconnoitre the position of the

enemy. After a short time Henningsen reported the Allies occupying the

principal square of the village, strongly barricaded and also protected

by earthworks; and that the place could not be carried without a loss

entirely disproportionate to its value and importance. On the receipt of

Henningsen’s report Walker ordered the Rifles to fall back to Rivas.

The enemy remained in Obraje during the morning of the 28th; but about

nightfall of that day some Americans from San Jorge brought the news of

small bodies of the Allies being seen in the outskirts of this village,

situated near the lake shore and about two miles to the east of Rivas.

By eight o’clock in the evening Cañas was in San Jorge, and his force

was busily engaged in building barricades and other defences. The

rapidity with which Central American troops throw up barricades is almost

incredible, and long practice has made them more expert at such work than

even a Parisian mob. Hence, in a few hours, all the streets leading into

the square of San Jorge, as well as the houses around the Plaza, were

strongly barricaded. The secrecy, however, of the march from Obraje, no

less than the rapidity with which the barricades at San Jorge had been

built, showed that the Allies were not disposed to meet the Americans

in the open field or to come to a decisive action. It was clear that

they desired to hold San Jorge in order to communicate with Mora on the

lake, and thus to secure more strength for future offensive operations.

Therefore, Walker determined to attack them at once.

On the morning of the 29th, Henningsen marched to San Jorge with the 1st

and 2d Rifles, Jaquess’ Infantry, some Rangers, a twelve-pound howitzer,

and a six-pounder. Next in command to Henningsen was Sanders. They soon

succeeded in driving the enemy behind the barricades of the Plaza; but

by some misunderstanding of Henningsen’s orders, Sanders, with a part of

Lewis’ Rifles, became separated from the rest of the command, and reached

a position to the north of the main square and near the road leading to

the lake. Confusion ensued; and as the Americans had suffered rather

severely from the enemy’s fire, they were drawn off to gain time for new

dispositions. It appears that several of the officers had taken too much

liquor during the morning, and did not apprehend clearly the purport of

the orders they received. Besides this, there was a jealousy on the part

of Sanders toward Henningsen, and the latter averred that the former

afterward admitted he had done all in his power to frustrate the attack

on San Jorge. It is certain Sanders was of a jealous disposition; and

though he denied having made the admission above referred to, there can

be little doubt that he was not altogether displeased at any incidents

which tended to diminish the confidence of the general-in-chief and of

the army in the skill and capacity of Henningsen.

After getting his force as far as possible out of the enemy’s fire,

Henningsen reconnoitred more exactly the position of the Allies with a

view of another attempt to carry their defences. Early in the afternoon,

and before Henningsen had prepared for a second attack, the enemy sallied

in strength from the barricades and made a vigorous effort to drive the

Americans out of some plantain patches they were occupying. The number of

riflemen among the plantains was not large at the time the Allies came

suddenly and rather unexpectedly upon them; but the 12-pound howitzer was

on the spot, and its discharges of cannister were very destructive to the

enemy. Nothing can be more effective than this arm for brushing away a

harassing foe from the plantain fields scattered around the edges of the

towns and villages of Central America. On the occasion of the sortie the

enemy made at San Jorge, the howitzer did the service—to make a moderate

estimate—of at least fifty riflemen.

The repulse of the enemy among the plantains raised the spirits of the

men; and late in the afternoon Henningsen again attacked the barricades.

Lewis was to attempt to get a foothold on the north and east side of

the Plaza, near the church, where the enemy kept its ordnance and other

stores, while Jaquess with the Infantry was to try to effect a lodgment

on the south side near the road leading toward Virgin Bay. Lewis’ men

could not be brought to advance nearer than within eighty or a hundred

yards of the barricades; but the Infantry made a gallant effort, though

an unsuccessful one, to perform the part assigned it in the general

assault. The Infantry had hitherto lacked opportunities for meeting the

enemy; and some jests had been passed at their expense among the other

corps of the army. Therefore Jaquess was now put on his mettle. He,

followed by Major Dusenberry, led the men up toward the barricade with

more courage than conduct; and for several seconds the Infantry received,

without wincing, a most galling fire from the Allies. Jaquess was struck

down by a ball in the loins, while Dusenberry fell at about the same

moment mortally wounded. Thus losing their chief officers, the Infantry

were checked at a critical moment and were obliged to retire, leaving

several killed near the barricades and bringing off a number of wounded.

From the reports Walker received he was led to suppose that the ill

success of the attack on San Jorge might be due in some degree to the

want of cordial co-operation on the part of Sanders and other officers

with Henningsen. There was always some little prejudice against the

latter because of his European birth and education; and it is impossible

even with the aid of long military habits to conquer or destroy such

prejudices. Therefore Henningsen was recalled; but as Walker had little

confidence in the capacity of Sanders for independent command, Waters

was sent to San Jorge with orders which gave him the real control of

the troops there. Soon, however, Waters reported that he thought it

impossible to carry the place with the force then before it; and Sanders

was accordingly ordered to return to Rivas.

The loss of the Americans on the 29th January was about eighty killed

and wounded. Captains Russell and Wilkinson, both valuable officers,

were killed; while Major Dusenberry died in a short time after he was

brought to Rivas. Jaquess’ wound made him unfit for duty for many

weeks; and Lieut. Col. Leonard was confined to his bed for months from

the effects of that day at San Jorge. The loss of the enemy was also

large, especially in the plantain patches where they met the howitzer.

But it was difficult to get even an approximative report of the losses

of the enemy. They kept their wounded carefully out of sight, sending

them to Omotope and other points, and scattering them so as to make the

numbers seem less than they were. So, too, when inquiries were made for

men who disappeared, instead of letting it be known they were killed,

the officers would represent that they had been ordered to some distant

point. Thus the lake steamers were very serviceable to the Allies by

enabling them to keep their wounded out of sight, and to prevent their

large losses from affecting the spirits of those who escaped the American

rifles.

On the afternoon of the 30th, Walker marched with the 1st and 2d

Rifles (about 250 men in all) and a 12-pound howitzer to San Juan del

Sur, with the double view of inspiring the troops with confidence by

showing them that the Allies feared to meet them in the open field and

of communicating with the steamer Orizaba, expected in port about the

first of February. The march to San Juan was made in good time and with

cheerful spirits, and no signs of the enemy appeared on the road. On the

evening of the 1st of February the Orizaba arrived from San Francisco,

bringing Captain Buchanan and some forty others for Nicaragua. The vessel

was coaled, as usual, by men in the service of the State; and without

aid from the government it might have been difficult for the steamers to

get labor at reasonable rates. A marginal note in the log of the schooner

Granada, written by Captain Fayssoux, shows whether or not American

commerce had reason to be thankful to the authorities then at San Juan.

In the body of the schooner’s log for the 2d of February we read, “Eleven

of the crew employed coaling the Orizaba;” while in the margin we find

the note: “M. Mars being drunk on board the Orizaba, and urging our crew

to strike for higher wages, which they did, the captain and he got into a

fight; I separated them, and sent Mars on shore, and persuaded the men to

go on coaling.”

About 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the 2d, Walker marched from San Juan

to Virgin Bay. At the latter place he ascertained that Cañas had been

there with some four or five hundred men, and had retired as soon as he

heard of the approach of the Americans. Early on the morning of the 3d

the steamer La Virgen appeared off Virgin Bay, and the troops then in the

village were carefully concealed, with the hope that the steamer might

come up to the wharf. When, however, she got within a few hundred yards

of the wharf, she stopped her engines, yet did not drop anchor, as if

regarding the aspect of affairs on shore. After a while several tried to

strike her pilot-house with the Minié musket; but their efforts were not

very successful; and in a short time the steamer turned away from the

wharf and proceeded toward San Jorge. Then the Americans resumed their

march and reached Rivas about midday of the 3d.

On their return to Rivas the Rifles were ordered to get as much rest as

possible during the afternoon and the early part of the night, since

their services might be required before daybreak of the 4th. Not long

after midnight of the 3d, Walker marched with about 200 of the Rifles

toward San Jorge; and near a mile from Rivas, taking a road to the left,

he entered the village, where the enemy lay, at 4 o’clock on the morning

of the 4th of February. The Allies were taken entirely by surprise, and

a select corps of volunteers, led on by Dr. McAllenny, penetrated to one

of the main barricades of the Plaza and fired over its top at the enemy,

running hither and thither across the square. But the main body could

not be brought to sustain the advancing party before the enemy recovered

from their surprise. Then it was too late to carry the barricades without

great loss, and the Americans were drawn off to the edge of the village

beyond the reach of the enemy’s small-arms. During the assault on the

barricade Lieutenants Blackman and Gray were mortally wounded; and

while the Americans were on the edge of the village O’Neal received his

death-wound. By eight o’clock A.M. on the 4th, the Americans had returned

to Rivas.

During this attack on San Jorge, Jerez was wounded in the face, and

for some days there were reports of his death; but the hurt was less

dangerous than represented, and he soon recovered from its effects. The

loss of O’Neil was a more severe blow to the Americans than any they

inflicted on the Allies. Young and enthusiastic, he was not without

the quick perception and rapid decision which fit a man for command in

moments of danger. He was almost a boy in age, not twenty-one, at the

time of his death; but the mind matures rapidly on the battle field,

and he had by nature the true sentiment of the soldier which tells him

that it matters little whether death comes soon or late, so it finds

him in the performance of duty. He lingered for several days after he

was carried back to Rivas, and probably his gallant spirit would have

preferred to go forth from the world amid the storm of battle. But

anxious eyes watched over his last agonies, and there was none in camp

who was not saddened when the news of his death spread through the town.

It was while Walker was at San Juan del Sur that printed proclamations

from Rafael Mora—promising deserters protection and free passage to

the United States—were first scattered in the suburbs of Rivas. At the

same time letters were addressed to Americans, signed by those who

had deserted from Granada and elsewhere, urging officers and men to

desert Walker and go over to the enemy. This was an entire change in

the policy of Costa Rica. Not a year before, Mora had declared a war of

extermination against the “filibusters;” now he attempted to make the

war one against a single person, and besought the Americans to desert

their leader. This change of policy, while it tacitly admitted that the

war had failed in its objects, was also indicative of new counsellors in

the cabinet of Costa Rica; it proved that other than Central American

heads were busy in plotting the removal of the naturalized Nicaraguans

from their adopted country. All Americans, however, are interested in

having the names of these counsellors remain in the obscurity their deeds

deserve.

While barricades were being built at Rivas and the town was more

thoroughly prepared for defence, Col. Swingle was engaged in labors which

added much to the efficiency of the artillery. The mechanical genius

of Swingle was extraordinary. Besides the well-organized work-shops he

established at Rivas, he got a small engine from San Juan del Sur and

succeeded in producing a blast of air which enabled him to smelt iron,

and thus he cast the first cannon-balls ever made in Central America. The

scanty supply of balls had been a serious obstacle to the employment of

the artillery, and for some time it was necessary to use such as could

be moulded with lead. As the supply of lead was limited, it would not do

to put a great deal of it into the shape of cannon balls. A number of

bells had been gathered from the towns and villages of the Meridional

Department, and from these Swingle cast round shot, more effective,

though also dearer, than those made of iron.

On the morning of the 7th of February, a supply of round shot having been

procured, Henningsen, supported by the Rifles, proceeded to San Jorge

to give the enemy a cannonade. He prepared some empty musket-boxes in

order to construct a breastwork rapidly and without annoyance from the

enemy. While it was yet dark he reached a point about six hundred yards

from the lines of the Allies, and before daybreak his work was so far

complete as to enable the men to proceed without interruption by the fire

from the Plaza. The breastwork being finished, the six-pounders were

fired rapidly and with much accuracy. The impression made on the Allies

was apparent, though they affected to say that the balls did small

damage. None of the Americans was hurt, and they returned to Rivas in

good spirits at the work which had been done with so little expense. The

object of these frequent attacks on the enemy was to keep them in a state

of constant alarm, and besides the actual loss of the Allies in killed

and wounded, the confusion into which they were thrown by the appearance

of the Americans always enabled a few of the soldiers to desert. It was

important, also, for Walker—while waiting the result of Lockridge’s

effort to open the Transit—to let his troops see that they were not

thrown entirely on the defensive.

It was necessary to inspire the Americans with confidence in their own

strength, and to show them the weakness of the enemy in order to cure,

if possible, the fearful epidemic—for it is a disease—of desertion which

had begun to demoralize the force at Rivas. Early in February a number

of Rangers, with a commissioned officer, deserted and took the road to

Costa Rica, carrying off their horses, saddles, and arms. The morning

report of the 6th of February shows twenty desertions in twenty-four

hours; that of the 8th of the same month shows six. Desertions at that

time were the result of pure fright and restlessness; for the subsistence

was unexceptionable, a large supply of flour and other provisions having

been received from California during the month of January. Besides, the

Rangers were then passing in bodies of ten and twelve through most parts

of the Meridional Department and were able to bring in supplies of corn,

tobacco, and sugar, for the troops. The spirit of desertion was rifest

among those who had been in California; and the wandering habits there

engendered made them restive under the restraints of military life.

Americans, too, are accustomed to discuss public affairs with entire

freedom; and it is difficult to cure them of the habit—most dangerous

in camp—of expressing their opinions about public acts and events. Such

discussions may often be fatal to the safety of an army; and thus, the

habits of freedom, while they add to the courage of the citizen, may also

diminish the fortitude unlicensed speech too often shakes. Foolish speech

and the spread of absurd reports did more to foster desertion among the

troops at Rivas than all the promises of the enemy or any privations to

which they may have been subjected. Unfortunately, many officers were not

much wiser than the men in this respect, and their discouraging remarks

produced most pernicious effects. Such military faults, too, on the

part of officers are hard to deal with; for the punishment of them may

increase the evils they produce.

On the 6th of February, the United States sloop-of-war St. Mary’s,

Commander Charles Henry Davis commanding, cast anchor in the port of

San Juan del Sur; and a few days thereafter, on the 10th, Her Britannic

Majesty’s steamer Esk, Commander Sir Robert McClure commanding, also

anchored in the same harbor. On the 11th the log of the Granada reads:

“At 9 A.M. the commander of the English ship sent on board to know my

authority for flying a flag. He was answered by the authority of our

government. At 6 P.M. he again sent on board using threats that he would

take me prize or sink me if I did not proceed on board of him with my

commission, which I refused to do. After making me three visits and

threatening everything, the lieutenant insisted on my making a friendly

visit to the commander, which I did.” As soon as the conduct of Sir

Robert McClure was known at Rivas, orders were sent to Fayssoux not to

hold or allow any of his officers or men to hold communication with

the English commander, his officers or crew, and not in any manner to

notice the presence of the Esk in port. In a few hours Sir Robert was in

Rivas; and when informed that his conduct should be properly reported

and brought to the attention of Her Majesty’s government, he was profuse

in his apologies, saying he had not intended any insult to Fayssoux or

his flag. After his apology, the order to Fayssoux was revoked. In the

schooner’s log for the 13th we find: “At 11 A.M. Capt. Davis of the

American sloop-of-war paid us an official visit. At 12 M. Capt. McClure

returned my friendly visit.” The course of Sir Robert McClure illustrates

the conduct of the British naval officers toward Nicaragua. Whenever they

were properly met and resisted in the first instance they would draw

back from their arrogant demands; but if they found only hesitation and

concessions they pressed their interference with more determination after

each successful act. On the 19th the Esk left for Punta Arenas.

Commander Davis, having sent word that he desired to visit Rivas on

business, an escort was ordered to conduct him to the town, and on the

18th he arrived at headquarters. He spent the afternoon and night in

Rivas, and in his conversations with Walker studiously addressed him

as President. During his stay the officers who accompanied him passed

freely through the camp, and seemed surprised at the cheerful aspect

of the place. The commander stated to Walker that the captain of the

Narraganset, a coal-ship at San Juan, would require her small boats, then

in Rivas, before going to sea. These boats had been brought from the

Transit some weeks previously, with a view of using them on the lake,

but as they were now useless for this service, Walker told Davis he did

not object to return them to the Narraganset. At the same time Walker

mentioned to Davis that the lake and river steamers, belonging to the

American owners of the ocean steamships between Nicaragua and the United

States, were precisely analogous to the boats of the Narraganset, and

if he asked for the latter he should also demand the former from the

Allies. Morgan and Garrison could no more carry on their business of

transporting passengers between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the

United States without the property then in the hands of the Allies, than

the Narraganset could go to sea without her small boats. Davis appeared

to see the analogy of the cases, and said he would visit San Jorge after

leaving Rivas, and speak with the Allied general on the subject.

From Rivas Davis went to San Jorge; but if he mentioned the lake and

river steamers it must have been casually, and it was certainly without

any result. He demanded to know from the Allied general whether the

Americans on the small steamers were held against their will, for such

was the current report through the country at the time. But he was

satisfied with the simple assurance that these men served the Allies

voluntarily. Of course any one familiar with the character and morals

of Spanish-American officers, know that such assurances are readily

given and really mean nothing. Davis, however, took no farther steps

to ascertain the facts in relation to the Americans on the steamer,

and this, with other facts, led Walker to see that the United States

commander was more desirous of pressing demands against him than against

the Allies. Hence, when the lieutenant of the St. Mary’s came up for the

Narraganset’s boats, Walker told him he could not give them up unless

Davis treated both parties to the war alike, and pressed his demands

against the Allies with as much vigor as those he might make on the

Nicaraguans.

During the latter part of February there were several encounters between

the Rangers and small parties of the enemy. A few riflemen, too, would go

out at night and alarm the camp of the Allies by firing on their pickets,

and the enemy would, in the same manner, scatter small parties through

the plantain patches and fire up the streets of Rivas. The Rangers in the

employ of the commissary (of whom at one time there were about thirty)

had some skirmishes with the Allies while the former were collecting

subsistence for the Americans, and on the afternoon of the 4th of March

the enemy took two wagons, several carts, and a number of oxen which had

been sent out, in charge of the Rangers, for corn. This capture was made

not more than a mile from Rivas, and on an estate belonging to the family

of an officer in the Allied army.

On the evening of the 4th of March, Caycee, with some forty Rangers, was

sent to San Juan del Sur as an escort to Col. Jaquess, Mrs. Dusenberry,

the widow of the major mortally wounded at San Jorge, and others going

to the United States. They arrived at San Juan without seeing the enemy;

but on the 5th, as Caycee was returning to Rivas, he found himself

unexpectedly in the presence of 200 of the Allies, just after he passed

the Half-way House, and was about to leave the Transit road. The enemy

took Caycee by surprise, and he lost six of his men, four killed and

two wounded, before he was able to extricate himself from the fire of

the Allies. He fell back to San Juan, and remained there until the 7th.

In the meantime, Walker having learned, through a native boy, that a

Costa Rican force had left San Jorge, and was on the way to the Transit,

ordered Sanders to get the Rifles ready for marching. The boy who brought

the information to Walker had seen the Costa Ricans pass along the

hill-side while he lay hid in the bushes, and he had thus been able to

count almost every man. He reported them about 200 strong, and Sanders

was sent out to join Caycee with 160 of the Rifles. In the afternoon of

the 5th, Sanders, while on the march toward the Transit, met the enemy

near a league from the Jocote farm. The Rifles were much scattered when

the Costa Ricans first appeared, and Captains Conway and Higley were

engaged in deploying their companies on either side of the road when

they received the enemy’s attack. The Costa Ricans came on briskly and

with confidence; the Rifles, on the contrary, hesitated, and in spite of

the efforts of their officers began to give way. Waters, who was with

Sanders, made several ineffectual attempts to check the disorder into

which the Americans fell, but he could not get the Rifles to make head

against the Costa Ricans, and the latter continued to press the rear of

the Americans until they reached the point where the road forked—one

fork leading to Rivas, the other to San Jorge. The enemy took the road

leading to San Jorge; and no doubt the idea that they were cut off from

their main body, and the necessity of forcing their way back to Cañas,

increased the vigor of their attack, and made them fight with more

appearance of courage than was usual to them. Sanders’ loss was 28, of

which there were 20 killed and 8 wounded. The large proportion of killed

is explained by the fact that a number of the wounded were left on the

field, and the enemy killed these when they came up. Higley and Conway,

both excellent officers, were among the killed. For many hours there were

numbers both of men and officers missing, but the most of these came into

Rivas during the next day.

The Allies, elated by the result of the conflict with Sanders, marched a

strong body into the plantain patches, to the east of Rivas and near the

Plaza, about ten o’clock P.M. of the 5th. A deserter, who was with them,

called out to the sentry not to fire as “they were Rangers;” but the

fellow’s over-anxious tone betrayed his plans and the alarm was given.

Some rounds of canister fired among the plantains soon scattered the

allied force stationed there; and though the bugles continued to sound

the charge, the spirit of the enemy did not seem equal to the attempt.

The fire into the town had been short and rambling; but a musket-ball

struck Dulaney, of the Artillery, in the throat, inflicting a painful

though not dangerous wound.

On the afternoon of the 7th Caycee returned to Rivas with his Rangers

and 70 footmen from California, in charge of Capt. Stewart. Arms had

been furnished to the new men from the supply aboard of the Granada;

and the steamer which brought these immigrants from California, also

bore a quantity of arms and ammunition for the service of Nicaragua.

Stewart’s men were formed into a corps called the Red Star Guard, and

they were put under the command of Major Stephen S. Tucker, formerly

of the U. S. Mounted Rifles. Tucker was an excellent officer, punctual

in the discharge of his duties, and rigid in exacting from others

the performance of theirs. The captain of the Guard, Stewart, was

a noisy, talkative man, whose ideas about public affairs had been

derived principally from grogshop assemblies in the mining villages

of California; and Tucker’s ideas of discipline and duty were quite

distasteful to a man whose habit it was to fawn on people in order to

secure their good-will and favor. From the beginning, Tucker was strict

with his men, and aspired to make them the best soldiers in Rivas. For a

time he succeeded admirably; and it is probable he might have done more

with the Guard in the end, had it not been for the foolish talkativeness

of its captain.

The day after Stewart and his men arrived, the whole force in Rivas was

paraded on the Plaza, and Walker addressed them with a view of raising

their spirits after the depression of Jocote, and Caycee’s mishap on the

Transit. He reviewed the course the Costa Ricans took in the opening of

the war, and contrasted it with the policy the Allies had since adopted,

thereby showing that they had been humbled in their conflict with the

Americans. He also alluded to the efforts made to seduce the troops from

their allegiance to the flag, by representing their chief as selfish and

ungrateful. It was, he said, an insult to Americans to suppose, that they

served a chief; they served a cause and not a man; and when the Allies

asked, what reward they had received or what thanks had been bestowed for

the sufferings at Rivas, at Masaya, and at Granada, they recalled names

that should fill the souls of soldiers with devotion and enthusiasm to

the cause in which they were engaged. The address was brief; but it had

an effect on those who heard it, and for several days the spirit of the

garrison was better than it had been.

On the 13th, Caycee, with his Rangers, went to San Juan for the purpose

of bringing to Rivas the letters and papers brought by the Sierra

Nevada from Panama. Titus was a passenger on the steamer, and had been

intrusted, so Lockridge afterward said, with the official report of

events on the river; but Walker did not get this report until many days

after Titus’ arrival at Rivas, and then in the shape of duplicates by the

next vessel with mails from San Juan del Norte. Hence, for some time, the

chief information as to affairs on the San Juan was derived from Titus,

and this, as may be readily imagined, was of very inaccurate character.

This person, Titus, had not been at Rivas long, before his reports were

regarded as wholly worthless; for, during the sickness of one of Walker’s

aides, Titus was requested to act, for the time, on the staff of the

general-in-chief. The first duty on which he was sent, required him to

approach a point where the Allies and Americans were in presence of

each other; and Titus, not venturing within range of the enemy’s fire,

received a statement from a soldier and brought it to headquarters as

a report of facts. A moment after Titus’ return, Henningsen rode up,

and reported to Walker a state of facts entirely the reverse of Titus’

report. Of course, the services of Titus were immediately dispensed with.

From the first, Walker placed no confidence in the statements of Titus

about affairs on the river. No commission was given to Titus; on the

contrary, when he requested to be sent to the United States with

authority to act for Nicaragua, his application was refused. Although

possessed of some plausibility, he could lead only superficial observers

astray as to his real character. He had too much the air of the bully, to

gain credit for either honesty or firmness of purpose. His future conduct

will hereafter be related; and from it may be learned something of the

man who, when he left New-Orleans, boasted that in not many days the San

Juan river would be open to the Americans.

At two o’clock on the morning of the 16th, Walker marched for San Jorge,

with about 400 effective men, two iron six-pounders, one twelve-pound

howitzer, and four small mortars. Henningsen accompanied the force with

the view of directing the operations of the artillery. The force of the

enemy had been swelled to upward of 2,000 men, by fresh troops from

Guatemala and Costa Rica; and only the day before a body of 400 or 500

had been carried on the lake steamer from Tortugas, about ten leagues

south of Virgin Bay, to the camp at San Jorge. By daybreak, however, the

Americans had possession of a small church, about six hundred yards from

the Plaza, where the enemy lay. Soon after the position was secured, the

six-pounders opened on the Allies, men being stationed in the trees so

as to watch where the balls struck; for the dense vegetation about the

town made it impossible to get an open view of the square, and thus the

pointing of the guns was to some extent conjectural. Twelve-pound shells

were also thrown from the mortars; and had there been a larger supply of

shells, the fire of the mortars would have accomplished much. Even the

small number of shells thrown were not without effect on the enemy. As

one of the characteristic incidents of the day, it may be mentioned, that

while the artillery firing was going on, Col. Henry, who had been left in

bed at Rivas, rode up on his mule, and received another bullet from the

enemy before the day was over.

While the artillery was engaged in pouring round shot and shell into the

Plaza, Tucker, with the Red Star Guard, was throwing up a breastwork some

seventy or eighty yards to the left, and in advance of the church Walker

occupied. The ground where Tucker was at work touched the road leading

straight into the Plaza; and he was preparing it for the reception of

a gun which might thence have told with much effect on the Allies. The

enemy, however, observed Tucker’s men, and before the breastwork was

complete, several hundred of the newly-arrived Costa Ricans sallied from

the Plaza, and advancing through the plantain walks, fell with fury on

the Red Star Guard. Tucker fought fiercely for several minutes, his men

showing fine spirit, and doing good work with their Minié muskets. But

the strength of the enemy was such, as to force him to retire to the

church, after the loss of several killed and wounded.

The several roads and bye-paths in the rear, and on the flanks of the

American main position at the church, were well watched and guarded

by the Rangers, as well as by some companies of Infantry and Rifles.

Captain Northedge’s company on the left, was assailed about the same

time with Tucker; but he held his position, and the enemy retired. There

was more or less skirmishing on the flanks and rear, while the Artillery

was exhausting its supplies of shot; after some three hundred and fifty

rounds had been fired, it was clear that few of the enemy remained in the

Plaza, and that they were taking positions on the road between San Jorge

and Rivas, with a view of harassing, if not of preventing the return of

the Americans to the latter place. The delay in the re-appearance of some

Rangers sent to Rivas to ascertain whether the road to that place was

open, showed that the Allies were attempting to occupy it. The enemy thus

having almost entirely deserted San Jorge, and offering action along the

road to Rivas, Walker decided to accept the offer.

Placing, then, Waters with the Rangers in front, and Henningsen with the

twelve-pound howitzer in the rear, while the wounded and the six-pounders

occupied the centre of the column, Walker took the main road from San

Jorge to Rivas. As he approached a small rise in the road, near a mile

from San Jorge, the general-in-chief found Waters engaged with the enemy,

posted some hundred and fifty or two hundred yards in advance, on each

side of a deep cut in the road. The Rangers had been engaged for several

minutes when the general-in-chief came up; and when Walker saw how the

Allies were posted, taking the nearest company, which happened to be that

of Captain Clark of the Infantry, he made a detour to the right, and

coming suddenly on the enemy’s left flank, drove them across the road,

and then from their whole position. Thus sweeping the road as they passed

over it, the Americans reached the point known as Cuatro Esquinas, near

half a mile from Rivas, without further serious interruption from the

Allies. Several times they tried to close on the rear but the resolute

and defiant air of Henningsen, kept them at a safe distance.

While Walker was at San Jorge, Swingle remained in command at Rivas; and

the enemy had once during the day approached the barricades, thinking

they might enter the town with small risk. But Swingle was not a man

to be trifled with; and the Allies soon gave up their efforts to get a

foothold in the place. Then they occupied a house some six hundred yards

from the Plaza of Rivas, and near the road between the town and the

Cuatro Esquinas. The enemy had, during the afternoon, strongly barricaded

this house, and as the head of the American column approached it, the

Allies opened a sharp fire of musketry from the loop-holes they had cut

through the walls of the building. The Americans were, to some extent,

protected by the shelving ground between the house and the road, and

many of them thus passed without much danger from the enemy’s fire; but

several were hurt before they got under a steep bank which entirely

screened them from the balls of the Allies. Walker himself pushed on to

Rivas, and ascertaining that the road to the left from Cuatro Esquinas

was clear of the enemy, sent orders to Henningsen to have the wounded

brought in by that road. He also sent orders to have the guns brought

in the same way; but before these orders reached Henningsen, the guns

were already on the narrow road the main body had taken, and could not

be withdrawn. After the general-in-chief passed the house the Allies

occupied, Dolan, coming up with his Rifles, rode almost on to the

muskets of the enemy, calling to his men to follow. His characteristic

impetuosity carried him too far; he fell bleeding and apparently nigh

dead, from several severe wounds; and he is indebted to a remarkably

tough body for his recovery from the effects of that day’s rashness. Soon

after dark nearly all the American force had reached the Plaza of Rivas;

but it was not before morning of the 17th that the guns and mortars were

safely within the barricades.

The loss of the Americans on the 16th of March was thirteen killed and

sixty-three wounded, four of the latter mortally. Among the mortally

wounded was Lewis, of the Second Rifles. He received a musket-ball

through the chest as he rode into the midst of the enemy near San Jorge;

and among his last words were, “Tell my mother that I died as I have

always wished to die.” Tucker was wounded in the sword hand; but not so

seriously as to prevent him from reporting for duty a few days afterward.

The Red Star Guard suffered severely, they reporting on the 17th two

killed, four mortally wounded, and nearly half their number more or

less hurt. The loss of the Allies was, according to the reports of their

own officers, five hundred killed and wounded. An Italian, acting as an

officer with the Allies, and afterward taken prisoner, put their loss at

this figure; and a Costa Rican officer, who arrived at San Jorge on the

17th, and was made prisoner by the Americans on the 11th of April, stated

that the sight of the numerous wounded being carried to the lake steamer,

as the new men from Tortugas landed, made a deep and gloomy impression on

the minds of the latter.

On the 19th, Colonel Waters, with fifty Rangers, marched to San Juan del

Sur to communicate with the steamer Orizaba, which arrived that day from

San Francisco. The steamer brought Captain Chatfield, with twenty others,

for Nicaragua, and also some arms and five hundred 6lb. shot. Waters had

three hundred of the shot carried to Rivas; and Chatfield, with his men,

accompanied the Rangers on their return. By the Orizaba, Walker also

received letters from his California correspondents, more than intimating

doubts of Garrison’s fidelity to his contracts and compromises. The

regular day for the sailing of the Orizaba was the 20th of March; and

the friends of Nicaragua in San Francisco had made their arrangements

expecting she would sail at that time. Two or three days, however, before

the 5th of March, letters were received from Morgan and Garrison by their

agents at San Francisco, ordering the Orizaba to be despatched two weeks

in advance of her regular day. The change was damaging to the plans of

Walker’s friends in California; and the inference was that the Transit

contractors were about to play false with the men who had risked much to

advance their interests.

The day after the action at San Jorge and along the road between that

town and Rivas, the Allies received fresh troops, and also brought

across the lake one of the old 24-pound pieces the Spaniards left in the

country. They took a position on a slight eminence, about 1,200 yards

from Rivas, just beyond the Cuatro Esquinas; and, on the 22d of March,

planting the twenty-four pounder there, they opened a scattering and

irregular fire on the town. The 24-pound balls were, at long intervals,

sent into the place, doing, however, little or no damage. They were

picked up by the men and carried to the arsenal; and Swingle afterward

melted them into 6-pound balls and sent them back to the enemy. But the

cannonade—if such it might be called—of the 22d, was preliminary to an

attack the Allies made early on the morning of the 23d.

On Monday, the 23d, just before daybreak, a body of some four or five

hundred of the enemy crept under the thick shades of the cacao walks,

behind the Maleaño house, and getting almost to the back gate of the

hospital before they were discovered, made a vigorous attempt to get

within the building. But Dr. Dolman, with a few half-sick men, resisted

the enemy with such firmness and composure, that time was afforded Dr.

Callaghan, who had charge of the point, to get the hospital ready for

defence. The Allies thus foiled in their efforts to surprise the Maleaño

house, were driven back with much loss and more disgrace: for they had

unsuccessfully, no less than cruelly, attacked a building occupied

almost exclusively by the sick and wounded.

The attack on the hospital was, however, part of a general assault on

the positions held by the Americans. On the north side of the town,

Cañas, with some six or seven hundred men, tried to get up to the houses

near the barricades, but his men were driven back by the deadly fire of

the riflemen stationed behind the adobe defences. Finding the efforts

of the infantry to approach the barricades ineffectual, Cañas had a

four-pounder, in charge of an Italian, pushed within less than two

hundred yards of the American lines. This was a bolder movement than the

enemy were in the habit of making with their artillery, and it was the

result of a mistake rather than of design. The gun was fired two or three

times; but when it got within range of the Mississippi Rifles the men at

the piece began to fall rapidly, and finally abandoned it. The Italian

commanding the piece was dangerously wounded and made prisoner; and

Rogers, with a few of the native Nicaraguans, took the gun and dragged it

into the town. Cañas was forced to retire, leaving many of his wounded,

as well as a large number of his dead, on the field.

The south side of the town was attacked by Fernando Chamorro with some

six hundred men. He succeeded in getting possession of some empty houses

not more than a square from the Plaza, and commenced with the usual

rapidity to raise barricades at the points he occupied. The Red Star

Guard was defending the portion of the town attacked by Chamorro, and

Tucker was kept busy in repelling the advances of the enemy. At one time

a company of the Allies actually got possession of a house which had been

occupied by the Guard; but though a bold, it was a mistaken movement on

their part, for the Guard cut them off from their main body, and killing

several, and wounding others, as they attempted to leave the house,

Tucker’s men took the rest of the company prisoners. With some difficulty

Henningsen succeeded with the six-pounders in driving Chamorro from the

houses he had occupied early in the day, and after this was accomplished

the fire of the enemy almost entirely ceased.

The loss of the Americans on the 23d was slight; three killed and six

wounded was the report made immediately after the action. The loss of the

enemy must have been near 600. They left between 40 and 50 dead on the

field; and the wells about the houses Chamorro occupied were filled with

freshly-slain bodies. The wounded taken by the Americans were sent to the

hospital, and received the same attentions as the other patients. The

other prisoners were set to work burying the dead of the enemy, building

barricades, and doing the police duty of the town.

After the action of the 23d, the Allies took possession of the house of

D. José Maria Hurtado, a fine large building, less than half a mile from

Rivas, on the road to Granada; and on the morning of the 24th, a body of

the enemy, probably belonging to the troops stationed at Hurtado’s house,

attempted to set fire to the building of Santa Ursula, occupied by some

of the Infantry. They used for this purpose some combustibles covered

with resinous matter, and stuck on a bayonet fixed to the end of a long

pole. Approaching the rear of the building, the enemy thrust the bayonet

between the tiles of the roof into the cane on which they are placed, and

thus the fire partially caught. But the Infantry drove off the troops

which applied the fire, killing several and wounding others, and the

flames were soon extinguished.

During the afternoon of the 25th Henningsen used a safer and more

effectual method for setting fire to the enemy’s barricades, made partly

of wood and plantain stalks. He threw a number of hot shot from one of

the six-pounders into the wood-work of the barricades, and the smoke

which arose showed that the shot had been effectual. As a supply of

round shot had been received from California, and Swingle was engaged

in casting others, the Americans could afford to reply with their

six-pounders to the fire of the enemy’s guns, and yet retain a reserve

of balls for any pressing emergency. This, of course, much increased the

effectiveness of the artillery, and enabled it to keep the Allies at a

safe distance from the lines of Rivas. After the repulse of the 23d, the

enemy evidently aimed to invest the town and cut off its supplies; and,

in addition to the occupation of Hurtado’s house, they took a position

on the San Juan road. This last position was taken on the morning of the

26th, and in an unsuccessful effort made by some Infantry and Rifles,

Capt. E. H. Clark was unfortunately lost. With their ranks already

thinned by desertion, the Americans could ill afford to spare the lives

necessarily lost in driving the Allies from their barricaded positions

with small arms; and the artillery, forcing the enemy to extend their

lines, thereby prevented the investment from becoming complete. Hence

Walker had no difficulty in constantly sending native couriers through

the allied lines, in order to get the news circulating in the country.

The Allies were, however, strong enough to prevent detachments from

bringing cattle and other supplies from a distance into the American

camp. Col. Natzmer, who acted as commissary-general after Walker occupied

Rivas in December, had been actively employed during January and

February, and had brought in a supply of subsistence which, considering

the means at his disposal, was creditable to his skill and efficiency.

The post commissary, also, Capt. J. S. West, had much aided his chief

in the duties of the commissariat; and even after the enemy had cut off

supplies from a distance, West, by his cool, deliberate courage, did

much to gather rations of plantains from the debateable and dangerous

ground between the American and Allied lines. But on the 27th of March,

it became necessary for the commissary to have two quartermaster’s oxen

killed; and these, with a slight mixture of mule meat, furnished the

rations for the next morning. The mule meat was eaten by the troops as

beef; and in two or three days none but horse or mule flesh was issued as

the meat ration. The large number of horses and mules belonging to the

Rangers and to the quartermaster, furnished full rations to the whole

camp for more than a month, and the leaves of the mango trees, many of

which grew around Rivas, furnished excellent forage for the animals.

In order not to place Lockridge in a false position, should he succeed

in reaching Rivas from the river, Walker was determined to hold the

town as long as his provisions lasted. Besides this, although Cañas, in

return for the care taken of his sick and wounded, after his retreat in

April, 1856, had been placed under obligations to see that the Americans

were treated in the same manner, Walker was averse, unless in the last

extremity, to leaving his hospital to the tender mercies of the Allied

generals.

During the last days of March and the first ten days of April, the

enemy, having brought up another twenty-four-pound gun and placed it on

the south side of the town, kept up an irregular fire with their large

pieces, and from time to time they would fire volleys of musketry at

random, the balls dropping on the houses and in the streets of the place.

Few men were hurt by this irregular fire. Two officers, Capt. Mann and

Lieut. Moore, were killed by twenty-four pound balls, and the officer of

the day, on the 29th of March, Lieut. Graves, had his arm broken by a

Minié ball, while he was visiting on horseback the several points on the

edge of the town. The aides of the general-in-chief, Hooff and Brady,

who were constantly, day and night, passing through different exposed

quarters of the place—Brady, too, on a fine spirited white horse, which

necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy—escaped untouched. Every

now and then, small parties of Americans were sent beyond the lines, and

getting close to the enemy’s pickets would drive them in, nearly always

killing or wounding some of the sentries of the Allies. So, too, the

enemy would sometimes meet the Americans when they ventured outside to

gather plantains, and skirmishes, with more or less loss to each side,

would ensue.

But it was not the scanty rations or the fire of the Allies which did

most injury to the American force; it was the shameful desertion which

most affected the spirits and the strength of the defenders of Rivas.

As long as the desertion was confined principally to those of European

birth, it did not so seriously sap the confidence men had in each other;

but when the fatal infection spread among the Americans, it wrung bitter

tears of agony from every true-hearted man who witnessed the shame and

dishonor of his countrymen. Sometimes the deserters left in bodies of ten

or twelve, and the sentries and pickets would leave with the countersign

for the night. Let us pass the names of these with sorrow for the

weakness of human nature, nor taint the air with the narration of their

crimes and degradation. There is shame and infamy enough in the world

without seeking for them on fields where glory should be won and honor

achieved.

A day or two before the 10th of April the Allies received a body of

fresh troops from Guatemala, and the quiet of the enemy on the 10th led

to the surmise that they might select the anniversary of the action at

Rivas, in April, 1856, for another general attack on the American lines.

They supposed that the force in Rivas, weakened by its unusual food and

disheartened by desertions might yield readily to a vigorous assault made

on all sides at the same moment. But they underrated the spirit of their

adversaries. The Nicaraguans really hoped that the Allies would find

courage to attack them, and they were vigilant and well prepared during

the night of the 10th and on the morning of the 11th.

As expected, the enemy came up a little before daybreak of the 11th, and

made their first dash at a house on the south side of the Plaza, occupied

by a couple of American ladies. The latter had been frequently warned of

the danger of their position, but they persisted in remaining where they

were against the remonstrances of several officers. This attempt of the

enemy to gain a foothold on the Plaza was made by a body of Costa Ricans,

and guided by a Legitimist, Bonilla, familiar with the ground, they got

close to the house and were within it before the alarm was given. But as

they opened the door fronting on the Plaza, with a view of getting to

the house next on their right, and held by some of the quartermaster’s

men, Sevier, of the Artillery, ran out a twelve-pound howitzer, not

thirty yards from the Costa Ricans, and one round of canister drove the

enemy behind the adobes. Thus the advance of the Allies was checked on

the south side, and the company in the house, fronting the Plaza, was

completely cut off by the quartermaster’s men on one flank, Williamson

with his company on the other, and by Pineda with Buchanan’s Rangers in

the rear. In a few moments Henningsen began to riddle the house with

six-pound shot, and the Costa Ricans, crouching on the ground, knew

not how to escape the danger which surrounded them. Finally Pineda,

addressing them in Spanish, called on them to surrender, and those who

escaped death were taken prisoners.

But while the round shot were riddling the house held by the Costa

Ricans, the fresh Guatemalan troops, half drunk with aguardiente, were

driven up by their officers close to the American lines. These soldiers,

probably never before in action, and not aware of the danger from rifles,

exposed themselves without reason, at a distance of sixty or seventy-five

yards from the positions held by McEachin and McMichael. The men under

these two officers poured a deadly fire into the foolish and ignorant

Indians Carrera had sent to Nicaragua; and it was with a feeling almost

of pity for these forced levies that the Americans were obliged to shoot

them down like so many cattle. The Guatemalan officers cared no more for

their men than if they were sheep; and when they finally drew off their

troops the ground was thickly strewn with the dead and the wounded.

The third point of attack on the 11th was the house of Santa Ursula.

Martinez directed the Allies on that side; but he was not more fortunate

than Mora—for José Joaquin Mora was now commander-in-chief of the

Allies—on the south or than Zavala on the north. The men Martinez sent

against Santa Ursula did not make as bold a dash as did the Costa

Ricans at the house on the south side of the Plaza, nor did they expose

themselves as unnecessarily as the Guatemalans in front of McMichael

and McEachin; but the number of dead they left on the field when they

retired showed that Chatfield and the men at Santa Ursula had not missed

opportunities for weakening the enemy. The repulse of the Allies was

complete on all sides; and when they fell back, it was clear that they

were much exhausted and demoralized.

The loss of the Americans on the 11th of April was small, being the same

as on the 23d of March three killed and six wounded. The loss of the

Allies was even greater than at the previous attack. After the enemy

retired 110 of their dead were buried by the Americans; the wounded

prisoners were sent to the Allied camp under a flag of truce, and upward

of 70 unhurt prisoners retained. In addition to the dead found by the

Nicaraguans, nearly one hundred bodies were seen the day after in the

Allied camp, so that the killed exceeded 200. The whole loss must have

amounted to 700 or 800; and the weakness of the enemy for several days

was very apparent to the troops in Rivas. In addition to the prisoners

taken by the Americans, 250 small arms, many of them Minié muskets, and

some ammunition, were picked up on the field. The Minié muskets were

those which had been taken from the steamer La Virgen at the time of her

capture by Spencer; and the ammunition also was of that the Costa Ricans

had got with the Minié muskets.

The night of the 11th, Capt. Hankins, with two native boys, was sent to

San Juan del Sur to get the correspondence brought from Panama by the

Orizaba. On the night of the 14th he returned to Rivas, and added to the

commissary stores by riding in on horseback. The letters from the San

Juan river gave the news of the arrival of Capers and Marcellus French

with their respective commands; while those from New-York too well

confirmed the surmises of Walker’s friends in California, for they gave

notice of the intention of Garrison and Morgan to cease running their

steamers. It is unnecessary to go into the reasons which induced these

men to the course they took; for it would involve an investigation into

transactions uninteresting if not positively distasteful. Suffice it

to say that their conduct was the result of weakness and timidity. As

to their treachery, Walker had expected them to remain faithful to the

Americans in Nicaragua only as long as their interests required fidelity;

he expected them, however, to show more commercial nerve and sagacity

than they displayed. Their course evinced as much folly as timidity,

and jeoparded their reputation of skilful merchants fully as much as it

damaged their character for honesty and integrity.

From the 14th to the 23d, a number of skirmishes took place between

parties of the enemy and small bodies of the Americans who went out to

gather plantains; but none of these was serious or deserving of special

notice. One of these skirmishes occurred on the morning of the 23d;

and in the afternoon of the same day, a flag of truce brought letters

to Walker announcing that Lieut. Huston, of the St. Mary’s, was at the

headquarters of the Allies, and was ready, under the United States

flag, to conduct the women and children in Rivas to San Juan del Sur. A

letter from Mora to Walker proposed to send two of his aides with Lieut.

Huston to a convenient-point between the camps, where the United States

officer might be met by two of Walker’s aids, and be thus conducted into

Rivas. In accordance with this proposition, Hooff and Brady accompanied

the native boy who bore the letters from Mora to a point about half way

between the camps, and there halted, waiting the approach of Lieut.

Huston. While these two officers waited, a couple of deserters approached

and attempted to address them; but Hooff, drawing his pistol, warned the

fellows off under peril of their lives. Then, indignant at the Allies

for permitting such an insult as the approach of deserters to officers

bearing a flag of truce, Hooff and Brady returned to Rivas without

waiting longer the arrival of Lieut. Huston. Soon after, however, Lieut.

Huston entered the town, accompanied by a corporal of marines.

Immediately after Lieut. Huston entered the Nicaraguan camp, he was told

to forbid his corporal to speak with the soldiers about facts or events

at San Juan del Sur. In spite of this injunction the marine told the

most exaggerated stories about the number of men the Allies had at San

Juan, and about their strength generally. Lieut. Huston remained in Rivas

during the night of the 23d, and he frequently expressed his surprise at

the cheerful and confident aspect of affairs in the place. Before leaving

with the women, he informed Walker that Commander Davis had ordered him

to say any communications he had to make to Macdonald, the agent of

the Transit contractors at San Juan, should be faithfully delivered.

Walker replied, “he did not desire to write to Macdonald”; but added

that Lieut. Huston might say to Commander Davis—and as a communication

for Macdonald—“he considered his position at Rivas impregnable to the

force at the disposal of the enemy so long as his provisions lasted; if

Lockridge did not join him in Rivas by the time his commissary stores

were exhausted, he would abandon the place and join the force on the

San Juan; and he considered himself wholly able to carry out such a

movement.” Macdonald afterward told Walker that he never received this

message. From this fact, it would appear that Davis’ offer was a mere

effort to entrap Walker into writing something which might seem to

justify the former in the course he afterward took.

On the morning of the 24th the women and children left Rivas in charge of

Lieut. Huston and under the protection of the United States flag. Among

them were several ladies who had encountered the dangers and privations

of the camp with a courage and fortitude which might have made many

of the men blush. Their departure was a great relief to Walker, as it

removed one of the most serious obstacles to a movement from Rivas; and

it was reasonable to suppose that their absence would inspire new spirit

and resolution into the troops thus relieved of an anxious burden. Far

from this, however, desertions, which had almost ceased since the 11th,

re-commenced after the 24th; and by the 26th Johnson and Titus and

Bostwick had disappeared from Rivas. Late in the afternoon of that day

it was reported to Walker that Bell, commanding at Santa Ursula, had

not been seen for several hours; and when he did re-appear, his orders

in regard to the change of the sentries’ post, were suspicious. He was

ordered to headquarters; but soon after the aid communicated the order,

Bell mounted his mule, and riding hastily past the sentries, fled to the

Allied camp.

But while Americans were thus proving false to themselves and false to

their countrymen, the native Nicaraguans in Rivas were giving an example

of fidelity and fortitude worthy the race which had been naturalized

in their midst. The natives in Rivas were mostly Democrats from San

Jorge, and they were there by families—fathers and sons fighting together

against the Allied foes who had violated their fields and their homes.

They bore the scanty fare of the camp with patience and cheerfulness,

saying they had not as much need of meat rations as the Americans,

who were accustomed to have beef every day. During the frequent

conversations, too, which occurred between the men at the barricades

of the respective forces, Pineda reminded the native Nicaraguans who

were with the Allies that he saw the flag of his country flying on the

walls of Rivas, while only the Costa Rican colors floated over the camp

without. Some of the soldiers would reply to Pineda that they were

“agarrados”—caught up—and were tied to their barricades; and it was

noticed that the Americans were never annoyed by the fire from the points

at which the Leoneses were stationed. On the 27th, Pineda threw among

the Leoneses an address which, while it indicates the loftiness of his

character, also shows his opinion as to the conduct of the Americans in

Nicaragua. “Born,” so the address read, “a citizen of Nicaragua like

yourselves, fond of liberty, and desirous of seeing its flag waving over

our country, I early enlisted under that standard. All the hardships

tyranny can heap upon a man, all the horrors of the civil war, which for

so many years has been our plague, I have suffered without complaint.

The scars I bear with pride are the best proof of what I say. I feel my

enthusiasm yet more strengthened by the testimony I find in my heart

that none of the heavy sacrifices I have made were made for low or

selfish interest. Never, I believe, never have I been found guilty, at

your hands, of any misconduct; and I call upon you to bear witness to

the correctness of my words. You were my fellow-soldiers, and bestowed

upon me your confidence. Under these circumstances, what other object

than your happiness and welfare could nerve me? My own happiness, my

reputation, my private feelings, and all that is mine, are involved in

this struggle for liberty. Yes, and I call upon those leaders who drag

you into this murderous war of extermination, to say if they have not

been indemnified, if they have not accumulated profits by it, while

you and I have received nothing. The flag of Nicaragua waves over this

city, and it is a painful disgrace to see it besieged by the armies of

Costa Rica and Guatemala, and you, my fellow-countrymen, assault it

with them.” Then, reminding them of the services they had received at

the hands of Walker, the address adds: “How is it that you, my friends,

should fight against him, thus giving a most striking instance of perfidy

and ingratitude? No: it cannot be. My heart is filled with gloom, and,

fellow-soldiers, believe me when I say that tears fell from my eyes on

hearing the voices of those who used to take my hand with heartfelt

demonstrations of friendship. When I see you where you are, I dare tell

you to awake from your slumber, and fly from the enemy’s ranks to the

only man who will bring us in safety to the bosom of peace and happiness,

by putting an end to this desolating war. But if you continue in your

present course, and remain the tools of barbarism, you will meet reproof,

though war may last some time and your own acts obstruct its termination.”

Little occurred between the 27th and 30th to change the condition of the

respective parties. In order, however, to understand the events of the

30th, it will be necessary to relate occurrences at San Juan del Sur

previous to that date. Then may we perceive how efficiently the U. S.

naval forces, on the Pacific side, co-operated in the policy the British

ships pursued toward parties on the San Juan river.

For the facts which transpired at San Juan del Sur, the log of the

schooner Granada will be principally relied on, and full extracts from

the log will furnish the clearest and most accurate narrative. On

Wednesday, the 8th of April, the schooner lying in the port of San Juan,

we find: “At 9 A.M., 100 of the enemy came into the town and fired some

few shots at the schooner and at one or two of the citizens, doing no

damage; we did not return their shots, on account of the steamer being in

range full of passengers, but slipped our chain and dropped out of reach.

Through the intercession of Captain Davis, of the U. S. sloop-of-war

St. Mary’s, we agreed to not fire upon each other, as we might endanger

American life and property. At 2 P.M. the Orizaba left for California. At

9 P.M. the enemy left San Juan.” Then, on the margin of the log for April

15th, we find: “At 9 A.M. one of the enemy came in and met Gottell.” This

Gottell was a German, claiming to be a naturalized citizen of the United

States. On the margin for the next day Fayssoux remarks: “In conversing

with Gottell he acknowledged that the above man came from the enemy’s

camp on Tuesday.” On the 17th, in the body of the log: “Made a formal

charge to Captain Davis, of the U. S. sloop-of-war, St. Mary’s, against

Gottell, for his violating his neutrality, and received his assurance

that Gottell should be punished if it occurred again. Mora requested

Davis to go up and speak to the troops at Rivas, to get them to desert

General Walker.” Then in the margin for the same day: “Captain Davis

read to me letters from Mora. Later in the day we heard that about 150

of the enemy were in and about town. Lieutenant McCorkle, of the St.

Mary’s, came on board and said that Colonel Estrada wished the former

truce continued.” On the 18th, the log says: “At 10 P.M. received a

communication from shore, to the effect that Jerez was coming in with

200 more troops, and that they were going to fire on the schooner at

daylight; slipped my chain and dropped out of their reach.” In the

margin, for the same day: “The enemy offered Michael Mars $2,000 to place

the schooner in their hands.” On the 21st: “The enemy negotiating with

Thomas Edwards to deliver up the schooner.”

On the 22d Fayssoux notes in the log: “I met Col. Estrada, the commander

of the enemy, on board of the U. S. sloop St. Mary’s; he expressed

great gratitude for my treatment of his countrymen that I had taken

prisoners, and offered his services to me.” On the 23d: “Saw a letter

from ex-Captain James Mullen, in which he stated that Roman Rivas wished

him to see me, and offer $5,000 if I would deliver the schooner to the

enemy. Colonel Garcia, second in command, requested an interview with

me on board of the U. S. sloop, St. Mary’s, to communicate something

of importance—I suppose another attempt to bribe.” Then, on Friday,

the 24th, we have an account of a most singular scene aboard of the St.

Mary’s. Fayssoux’s object in permitting the interview may be readily

imagined, but it is more difficult to divine why Davis should permit his

ship to be made the theatre of an attempt to seduce an officer from his

allegiance. But to the log: “I met Colonel Garcia on board of the St.

Mary’s. He stated that Jerez had written to him (by order of General

Mora), to see me and try to make some arrangement to bring the war to a

speedy close; that the schooner being in port, under General Walker’s

orders, she was much dreaded and might delay the close of the war. He

asked if I had any proposition to make; I told him that he had sought the

interview, and that I was waiting to hear for what purpose. He then said

that they wished the schooner taken from the port or given up to them.

I asked upon what terms: he said that he was not prepared to offer any,

but that a commissioner would be appointed for that purpose; that his

object was to see if I could be approached. I said that I would listen

to any proposition from General Mora; that the present interview had not

effected anything; that he had not proposed any mode of closing the war;

that we stood as we had done previously. I acted on the above occasion

with the knowledge and approval of Captain Davis and Colonel Macdonald,

and at no time lost command of my temper, although seeing the full extent

of the dishonor offered me, and the insult of their sending such a noted

thief and traitor to confer with me.”

For the 25th, we find: “Sent word by Capt. Charles H. Davis to Col.

Estrada that if he did not discontinue erecting barricades which could

be commanded by my guns that I would fire upon him; he agreed to do so

until Lieut. Huston of the St. Mary’s should arrive from Rivas, where he

had gone to escort the American ladies who were there, to San Juan. Col.

Estrada said that in erecting barricades he had nothing in view against

this schooner, but put them up to prevent the landing of troops; that he

did it in ignorance, not meaning to violate the agreement between him and

myself. At 4 P.M. some thirty women and children arrived at the Pacific

hotel. The barricades not worked upon.” Then on the 26th: “Capt. Davis

spoke again to Col. Estrada in regard to the barricades; he said he would

not do anything on them until he heard from Rivas. Capt. Davis wrote to

General Mora asking him to confirm the truce, as the number of women

had largely increased, and that I felt it my duty to fire upon their

barricades, if in reach of my guns. The enemy mounted and brought to the

beach an old gun that they found lying in the street Capt. Davis says

that General Mora has written to him several times, appearing anxious for

him to come to him and open a treaty with General Walker.” And in the

margin: “I had to urge Capt. Davis at all times to interfere about the

barricades.”

On the 27th: “At 10ʰ 45′ saw the enemy erecting a barricade in the

Columbia hotel; I immediately prepared to haul in shore. At the same

time I sent to Capt. Davis, and said that as the enemy were acting in

bad faith I would fire upon them. He sent First Lieut. Maury to me to

ask if I would not wait until he heard from Rivas. I replied that I

would if Capt. Davis would then go on shore and destroy them (meaning the

barricades). Lieut. Maury could not answer that question. I then told

him that if they did not stop that in half an hour I would fire. Lieut.

Maury then went to Colonel Estrada and said that Capt. Davis looked on

the truce as at an end, and that I would fire in half an hour. Colonel

Estrada wished to debate the question, and again pleaded ignorance; but

Lieut. Maury said that he had nothing more to say, that I would fire.

Estrada then agreed to let the barricade alone, and that the truce should

be observed. The first note was sent to Col. C. J. Macdonald, and shown

by him to Capt. D., who said that he would take me if I did fire, as he

thought it would be his duty. Macdonald was asked to come on board and

say that I must not fire, as Davis would take me; Macdonald asked for

that threat in writing; Davis offered to give it, but after some more

conversation on the subject, he sent the above message to Estrada. Capt.

D. acknowledged to Macdonald that it would be my duty to fire if the

enemy did not desist; his reasoning was entirely incomprehensible to me.”

And the reasoning is incomprehensible to any one, on the supposition

of Davis’ neutrality. The marginal note on the log for the 27th, says:

“Although being perfectly aware of the treachery of the enemy at all

times, and their violation of the truce in building barricades in reach

of my guns, I permitted them to go to a certain extent, hoping to turn

them to our advantage. And thinking it policy, I did not urge upon Capt.

Davis his duty to destroy those already started or completed, though I

took occasion to let his officers know my views on the subject, and that

I thought he was easily satisfied with promises which were constantly

broken; that I had had opportunities of gaining advantages, but had

scrupulously kept the truce.”

Tuesday, April 28th: “Saw the enemy putting up a barricade on the

Transit road. Although the fact was mentioned to Capt. Davis, he did

not take any action upon it, but told me that General Mora, in reply to

a letter from him, said that though he looked upon it as a matter of

great importance to fortify San Juan, as Davis requested it, he would

not put up barricades under my guns. Lieut. McCorkle visited the enemy’s

camp, to ascertain if reports brought by a man by the name of Titus from

General Walker’s camp were true, he, Titus, being thought a traitor.” On

the 29th: “At 2 P.M. Lieut. McCorkle returned from the Allied camp. He

reports our men deserting in large bodies; that General Mora says that

General Walker will not be included in any treaty that may be made.” Then

on the 30th: “Capt. Davis visited the camp of the Allies for the purpose

of treating between them and General Walker.”

The facts plainly and simply told by the log of the schooner show that

Davis was in constant communication with Mora, and that he was fully

aware of the value of the Granada to Walker, and of the importance the

Allies attached to her presence at San Juan del Sur. It was with a full

and thorough knowledge of the ineffectual efforts Mora had made to get

the schooner that Davis reached the headquarters of the Allies, whence on

the afternoon of the 30th, he sent a letter to Walker by an aide-de-camp

of the Costa Rican general-in-chief. The latter proposed that Walker

should abandon Rivas and go aboard of the St. Mary’s to Panama, Davis

undertaking to guarantee his personal safety. Although the tone of the

letter was offensive, Walker, thinking Davis might have some information

he did not possess, and unwilling to let slip an opportunity of gaining

knowledge as to what was passing between Davis and the Allies, replied

that the proposition of the United States commander was vague, and

suggested a visit on his part to Rivas. Davis answered that he was sorry

Walker found his proposition vague; that he proposed the latter should

“abandon the enterprise and leave the country;” that Walker might rely

on the fact of Lockridge having left San Juan river; and finally that he

had maturely considered the invitation to enter Rivas, and had decided,

unreservedly, not to take such a step. Thus did the United States

commander refuse to see for himself the state of the force in Rivas

before he determined on the course he should pursue. In reply to the

second letter of Davis, Walker proposed to send two officers, Henningsen

and Waters, to confer with the United States commander, provided they

had safe conduct from Mora. The required safe conduct was forthwith

sent, and with a short note in the handwriting of Zavala, but signed

by Davis, saying that Henningsen and Waters should proceed at once to

the headquarters of the Allies, as the commander of the St. Mary’s was

obliged to return speedily to San Juan del Sur.

Accordingly, Henningsen and Waters proceeded to the headquarters of the

Allies, and what there passed may be best told in the words of the

written report Henningsen made to Walker on the 2d of May. The report

says:—

“In conformity with your instructions on the night of the 30th of April,

I proceeded with Col. Waters to the enemy’s camp at Cuatro Esquinas, to

confer on your behalf with Capt. Davis of the U. S. sloop-of-war St.

Mary’s. Capt. Davis remarked that he was in possession of information,

which, in his opinion, rendered your position at Rivas untenable, and

that he had, therefore, with the view of saving further useless effusion

of blood, opened negotiations with the Allies for the evacuation of that

place, in the event of his being able to obtain your concurrence.

“This information was, firstly, that Col. Lockridge had retired with all

your forces to the United States, leaving the enemy in possession of

the San Juan river; secondly, that the Transit Company intended to send

no more steamers to San Juan del Sur; thirdly, that you were reduced to

a few days’ provisions, and that your ranks were being rapidly thinned

by desertion. Under these circumstances, considering your position as

desperate in Rivas, he had to propose that you should surrender Rivas to

him, that you and your staff should accompany him to San Juan del Sur,

to be transported by the St. Mary’s to Panama; that the rest of the army

and citizens should be likewise transported via Tortugas and Punta Arenas

to Panama, after surrendering their arms to him, the officers retaining

their side-arms. I replied that your entertaining such a proposition

would depend on your being satisfied with regard to the evacuation of

the river by Col. Lockridge and his command, as your principal motive for

holding Rivas to the last moment was the fear that he might arrive and

find it occupied by the enemy: that with regard to your position being

desperate, it was true that you could not, from want of provisions, hold

Rivas much longer, but that you could break through the enemy’s lines

and march in any direction at present: that, if further enfeebled, you

could always cut your way to the Pacific, and embark either at San Juan

or at some other point on the coast, on your schooner Granada, which

had on board two six-pounders and a store of arms, cartridges, cannon

ammunition, powder and lead. On this Capt. Davis remarked, that he must

at once inform me that it was his unalterable determination not to allow

the schooner Granada to leave the port, and to take possession of her

previous to his sailing from San Juan del Sur, which must take place in

a few days; that he was acting on instructions from his superior—from

his commander-in-chief;[6] that, since the outgoing of the late

administration at Washington, instructions had been received from the

new, which contained nothing to induce him to alter the course which

he intended to pursue; but that he preferred I would consider all this

as unsaid, and that you would regard him as acting on his own and sole

responsibility. I remarked, that his resolution was a most important one

and would probably prove a determining fact, and therefore asked him

deliberately to repeat whether it was his fixed determination to seize

the schooner Granada. He replied that it was his unalterable resolution

not to allow the Granada to leave the harbor of San Juan, and to take

possession of her before he sailed. With regard to the evacuation of the

San Juan river by Col. Lockridge and his command, he said, that he had

entirely satisfied himself of the fact, both by the investigations of his

Lieut. McCorkle, and by perusal that morning of a contract for passage

to the United States, signed by Scott and by officers of the British

squadron, besides other corroborative evidence. I observed that he might

have been imposed upon by a forgery, and asked whether his conviction was

shared by C. J. Macdonald, agent of the Transit Company, whose experience

rendered his opinion valuable. Capt. Davis replied that Mr. Macdonald

had been satisfied of the fact by Lieut. McCorkle’s report, but that he

(Capt. Davis), fully aware of the responsibility he was assuming, pledged

himself for the authenticity of this statement. I thereupon agreed to

communicate to you this conversation, and to submit the following offers

from Capt. Davis, as the only propositions likely to be admissible, viz:

That, under the guarantee of the American flag, you should, with sixteen

officers of your selection, with their arms, horses and effects, leave

Rivas to embark at San Juan for Panama; that Rivas with its garrison,

should be surrendered to Capt. Davis; that the privates should deliver up

their arms, and, together with the officers, employees and citizens, be

transported by another route to Panama, accompanied by a United States

officer, and under guarantee of the United States flag. At 2 o’clock,

A.M., 1st May, I returned to Rivas, promising your answer at 10 o’clock,

and personally to come back, if the negotiation was not broken off.”

In the offers thus submitted by Henningsen, nothing was said of the

native Nicaraguans then in Rivas. Walker, therefore, informed Henningsen

that he would sign nothing, or agree to nothing, unless ample guarantees

were given for the safety, both in person and property, of the native

Nicaraguans. Hence, when Henningsen returned at 10 o’clock, A.M., on the

first of May, with the draft of an agreement to be signed by Walker and

Davis, it contained a clause protecting all natives of Central America

then in Rivas. The convention submitted to Davis, and signed by him,

reads as follows:

“RIVAS, May 1, 1857.

“An agreement is hereby entered into between Gen. William

Walker, on the one part, and Commander H. Davis, of the U. S.

Navy, on the other part, and of which the stipulations are as

follows:

“Firstly, Gen. Wm. Walker, with sixteen officers of his staff,

shall march out of Rivas with their side-arms, pistols, horses,

and personal baggage, under the guarantee of the said Capt.

Davis, of the U. S. Navy, that they shall not be molested by

the enemy, and shall be allowed to embark on board the U. S.

vessel-of-war, the St. Mary’s, in the harbor of San Juan del

Sur, the said Capt. Davis, undertaking to transport them safely

on the St. Mary’s to Panama.

“Secondly, The officers of Gen. Walker’s army shall march

out of Rivas with their side-arms, under the guarantee and

protection of Capt. Davis, who undertakes to see them safely

transported to Panama, in charge of a United States officer.

“Thirdly, The privates and non-commissioned officers, citizens,

and employees of Departments, wounded or unwounded, shall be

surrendered with their arms to Capt. Davis, or one of his

officers, and placed under his protection and control, he

pledging himself to have them safely transported to Panama, in

charge of a United States officer, in separate vessels from

the deserters from the ranks, and without being brought into

contact with them.

“Fourthly, Capt. Davis undertakes to obtain guarantees, and

hereby does guarantee that all natives of Nicaragua, or

of Central America, now in Rivas, and surrendered to the

protection of Capt. Davis, shall be allowed to reside in

Nicaragua, and be protected in life and property.

“Fifthly, It is agreed that such officers as have wives and

families in San Juan del Sur, shall be allowed to remain there

under the protection of the U. S. Consul, till an opportunity

offers of embarking for Panama or San Francisco.

“Gen. Walker and Capt. Davis mutually pledge themselves to each

other that this agreement shall be executed in good faith.”

It will be noticed that this agreement was made entirely between Walker

and Davis, and the Allies were not mentioned in it except as “the enemy.”

Nor would it be necessary, unless for the singular conduct of Commander

Davis afterward, to say that no other agreements were made or entered

into, except the one which was signed by the respective parties.

After Davis had agreed to the terms of the convention, Henningsen

returned to Rivas, and ordered the cannon, foundry, and ammunition to be

destroyed, by breaking the trunnions, and sawing through the carriages

of the former, by breaking up the steam-engine, fan, and cupola of the

foundry, and throwing the ammunition and powder into the arsenal-yard

wells. “In this manner were destroyed,” according to Henningsen’s report,

“in the arsenal, two twelve-pounder brass howitzers, three six-pounder

iron guns, four light iron twelve-pounder mortars, four brass guns

taken from the enemy, viz.: one four-pounder, and three five-pounder

guns; in the ordnance office, fifty-five thousand cartridges, three

hundred thousand caps, fifteen hundred pounds of powder. There remained

undestroyed: fifty-five shell, three hundred and twenty twenty-four-pound

shot—fired into Rivas by the enemy—two hundred and forty six-pound shot,

of iron cast from the enemy’s shot, from bell-metal, or from lead.”

While Swingle and Potter were, under Henningsen’s direction, executing

the orders for the destruction of the articles in the arsenal and

ordnance, Walker sent for the surgeon-general, Coleman, and informing

him of the agreement made with Davis, instructed him to remain in charge

of the hospital, and see that the sick and wounded were properly cared

for. He then made out a list of the officers who were to accompany him

on board the St. Mary’s, and notified them to prepare forthwith to

proceed to San Juan del Sur. The officers thus selected were, Henningsen,

Hooff, Brady, Natzmer, Waters, Henry, Swingle, Rogers, Tucker, Kellum,

McAllenny, West, Williamson, McEachin, McMichael, Hankins, and Bacon.

About five o’clock in the afternoon, Commander Davis, with Zavala,

arrived at Walker’s quarters; and Henningsen and Davis repaired to the

Plaza, where all the troops of the garrison were formed. The order of the

day, containing the agreement between Walker and Davis, was then read to

the troops, and the garrison was delivered to the commander of the St.

Mary’s. The state of the garrison, when given over to the United States

officer, was: Wounded and sick in and out of hospital, surgeons, and

hospital attendants, 173; prisoners, 102; officers, non-commissioned,

and privates, exclusive of the 16 going to San Juan, 148; employees of

departments and armed citizens, 86; native troops, 40. While Henningsen

was turning over the garrison to Davis, Walker, accompanied by the

officers he had selected, and by Gen. Zavala, rode out of Rivas, and took

the road for San Juan del Sur. On the night of the first of May, a few

hours after leaving Rivas, the Nicaraguan officers were aboard the St.

Mary’s.

Commander Davis did not reach the St. Mary’s until the morning of the

2d. Soon after he came aboard the sloop he proposed to Walker that the

schooner Granada should be given into his hands without the use of force.

Of course the proposal was rejected. He then said to Walker that the

latter might keep the arms and ammunition on the schooner if he would

give up the vessel. This was a proposition to sell the Granada, with all

the glories of the 23d of November, for the paltry cargo aboard of her;

and there was not a lieutenant in the service of Nicaragua who would

not have rejected it, with scorn and contempt for the officer, so far

forgetful of his own honor as to utter the proposal. Just before dinner,

on the 2d, Davis went ashore, leaving written orders with his first

lieutenant to take the schooner. The log of the Granada, for the 2d,

says: “At 4 P.M. Lieut. Maury came on board the schooner, and requested

me to turn over the schooner to Capt. Davis. I asked why I should do

so. He answered that Capt. Davis considered it his duty to seize her if

I did not give her up, as he looked upon her as included in the treaty

between himself and Gen. Walker. I refused to give her up.” Then Maury

returned to the St. Mary’s, and requested Walker to give an order to

Fayssoux to turn over the schooner to him. Walker replied he would not

give the order, unless there was a demonstration of overwhelming force

on the part of the St. Mary’s. Maury brought the broadside of the sloop

to bear on the Granada, and then he received the order of surrender.

The log continues: “He (that is Maury) returned in half an hour, with

an order from Gen. Walker to turn her over to the United States; he was

accompanied by 100 armed men and a howitzer. At 4.30 P.M. the Nicaraguan

flag was hauled down, and the United States’ run up in its place, and my

crew sent on shore.” Finally, on the 4th of May, the Granada was turned

over to Costa Rica, and the person who received her for that republic was

an aid of Cañas, a Jamaica negro, known by the name of Captain Murray.

This was a fit conclusion to the combined efforts of the British and

United States naval forces to get the Americans out of Nicaragua. The

descendant of revolutionary ancestors,[7] bearing, in his own name of

Irvine that of a grandsire who was a general officer in the war of

Independence—himself fitted by the purity and integrity of his character

to adorn the service of any power on either continent—was forced to give

way to a negro subject of Her Britannic Majesty holding a commission from

the Republic of Costa Rica. The poet could not have imagined aught more

striking or more characteristic.

Thus have I, during a leisure thrust on me against my will, tried to tell

clearly and concisely the story of the rise, progress, and close, for a

time, of the War in Nicaragua. Doubtless many brave deeds and some worthy

names have escaped the notice they deserve, for I have been obliged

to write almost entirely from memory, with few papers or documents to

refresh my recollection of events now some time past. My main effort has

been to trace as distinctly as I could the causes of the war, the manner

in which it was waged, and the circumstances attending its conclusion.

As I said in the last general order published at Rivas: “Reduced to our

present position by the cowardice of some, the incapacity of others,

and the treachery of many, the army has yet written a page of American

history which it is impossible to forget or erase. From the future,

if not from the present, we may expect just judgment.” That which you

ignorantly call “Filibusterism” is not the offspring of hasty passion or

ill-regulated desire; it is the fruit of the sure, unerring instincts

which act in accordance with laws as old as the creation. They are but

drivellers who speak of establishing fixed relations between the pure

white American race, as it exists in the United States, and the mixed

Hispano-Indian race, as it exists in Mexico and Central America, without

the employment of force. The history of the world presents no such

Utopian vision as that of an inferior race yielding meekly and peacefully

to the controlling influence of a superior people. Whenever barbarism and

civilization, or two distinct forms of civilization, meet face to face,

the result must be war. Therefore, the struggle between the old and the

new elements in Nicaraguan society was not passing or accidental, but

natural and inevitable. The war in Nicaragua was the first clear and

distinct issue made between the races inhabiting the northern and the

central portions of the continent. But while this contest sprang from

natural laws, I trust the foregoing narrative shows that the stronger

race kept throughout on the side of right and justice; and if they so

maintained their cause in Central America let them not doubt of its

future success. Nor kings nor presidents can arrest a movement based on

truth and conducted with justice; and the very obstacles they place in

the way merely prepare those who are injured for the part they are to

play in the world’s history. He is but a blind reader of the past who has

not learned that Providence fits its agents for great designs by trials,

and sufferings, and persecutions. “By the cross thou shalt conquer” is

as clearly written in the pages of history as when the startled emperor

saw it blazing in letters of light athwart the heavens. In the very

difficulties with which the Americans of Nicaragua have had to contend

I see the presage of their triumph. Let me, therefore, say to my former

comrades, be of good cheer: faint not, nor grow weary by the way, for

your toils and your efforts are sure in the end to win success. With us

there can be no choice; honor and duty call on us to pursue the path we

have entered, and we dare not be deaf to the appeal. By the bones of

the mouldering dead at Masaya, at Rivas, and at Granada, I adjure you

never to abandon the cause of Nicaragua. Let it be your waking and your

sleeping thought to devise means for a return to the land whence we were

unjustly brought. And, if we be but true to ourselves, all will yet end

well.

THE END.

[Illustration: COLTON’S NICARAGUA

GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, SAN SALVADOR & COSTA RICA.

_Revised, Enlarged_ AND PUBLISHED BY S. H. GOETZEL & Co. Mobile, Ala.]

FOOTNOTES

[1] It may be proper to say that these passages were written before Mr.

Seward delivered in the Senate, his masterly speech of the 29th February,

1860. However much a person may differ from the Senator’s views, it

is impossible not to approve the force and vigor of his thoughts and

language. The writer deems it a great error, on the part of Southern men,

to attempt to belittle the intellect, or depreciate the motives of the

leaders of the anti-slavery party. The higher their intellects, the purer

their motives, the more dangerous are they to the South.

[2] The resolutions were written by Hon. P. Soulé.

[3] Hon. A. H. Stephens was among the few public men of the South who

clearly perceived the full importance of the Nicaraguan movement.

[4] The writer is principally indebted for the incidents of the

operations at Granada between the 24th November and 12th of December to

the “_Personal Recollections of Nicaragua,” by Gen. C. F. Henningsen,

author of “Recollections of Russia,” and “Twelve Months’ Campaign in

Spain_.”

[5] His Excellency James Buchanan.

[6] The commander-in-chief referred to was probably Commodore Mervine.

The latter was an old and intimate friend, as the author has been told,

of Secretary Marcy; and both he and Davis were sent to the Pacific in

January, 1857. Undoubtedly both of them received verbal instructions far

more precise and definite, than their written orders. Soon after Davis

reached Panama, direct from New-York, he took command of the St. Mary’s

and sailed for San Juan del Sur.

[7] The paternal grandfather of Captain Fayssoux was chief surgeon of the

Carolina forces during the war of Independence; his maternal grandfather

was General Irvine, who commanded a division under Washington at the

crossing of the Delaware.

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