At the same time the charters of the companies were revoked, three

commissioners, D. Cleto Mayorga, E. J. C. Kewen, and George F. Alden,

were appointed to ascertain the amount due from the Canal Company to the

State; and for this purpose they were ordered by the decree to notify

the agents of the companies to appear before them forthwith. They were

also commanded to cause all the property of the companies to be seized

and held by responsible persons, subject to the order of the Board.

Ignorant and prejudiced people have said the property of the companies

was confiscated; but this is untrue. The seizure was in the language

of the civil law prevailing in Nicaragua, a provisional one for the

purpose of securing the payment of the debt due from the company to

the government. And, in order to preserve the property, it was in the

meantime placed in the hands of persons giving the necessary bonds. Nor

was the condition that the property be forthcoming when called for by the

Board of Commissioners the sole agreement of the undertakers on the bond.

In order that the transit of passengers might not be interrupted, they

were required to transport the passengers who might arrive on the sides

of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the expenses of such transportation

to be charged against the companies.

After the decree of revocation was drawn up in English, Walker broached

the subject to the Provisional President, and to D. Fermin Ferrer, then

acting as Minister General; and neither of them made any objections

to the measure. In fact, there was a general prejudice on the part of

the Nicaraguans against the Accessory Transit Company, because of the

arrogant tone it had used on all occasions toward the authorities of the

Republic. As collector of customs at San Carlos, D. Patricio Rivas had

frequent opportunities to observe the haughty and overbearing character

of the company, and he was gratified at the proposal to take away its

privileges. Accordingly, the decree was translated from English into

Spanish by Walker, the minister correcting the language of the rough

translation. The President signed the decree, not only without hesitation

but with undisguised pleasure.

After the decree of revocation was signed, the decree for a new charter

to Randolph and his associates was submitted to the President; but there

was much difficulty in obtaining his approval of this act. Even at this

time the mind of Rivas had been poisoned by evil-disposed persons; and

in discussing with D. Fermin Ferrer the new contract, he said it was

“a sale of the country,” meaning thereby that it placed the government

entirely in the hands of the American element. In consequence of Don

Patricio’s feelings, the translation of the decree for the new charter

was so made as to deprive the grantees of many privileges they required;

and it became necessary to have the first draught of the Spanish decree

materially modified. With much difficulty the signature of Rivas was

finally obtained to the decree for the new charter, and it bore date

the 19th of February, 1856, the day after the date of the decree of

revocation.

Although copies of the decrees had been signed and delivered to Randolph

and his associates on the 18th, the publication was delayed until the

day after the passengers from California crossed the Lake for San Juan

del Norte. Thus Morgan and Garrison had news of the acts before they

were known to the companies; and it was an object to give the former as

much time as possible, to get ready for running their steamer before the

old grantees stopped their line. The advantage of this course was shown

some days afterward; for, on the steamer of the Accessory Transit Company

which left New-Orleans on the 27th of February, more than two hundred

and fifty passengers for the service of Nicaragua were carried to San

Juan del Norte, their passages being paid with drafts of D. Domingo de

Goicouria on Cornelius Vanderbilt, the president of the company. Had the

decree of the 18th gone to New-Orleans before these passengers left—as

it might have done if published a day earlier—they would certainly not

have been carried to Nicaragua at the expense of Mr. Vanderbilt or of the

company. As it was, the price of these passages was so much secured by

the State on the indebtedness due from the corporation.

The necessity for the American element to predominate in the government

of Nicaragua sprang from the clauses in the treaty of peace. In order

to carry out the spirit of that treaty—to secure to the Americans in

the service of the Republic the rights guaranteed to them by the full

sovereign power of the State—it was requisite to get into the country a

force capable of protecting it, not only from domestic but from foreign

enemies. Hence the “sale of the country,” in Rivas’ use of the term, was

a foregone conclusion after the 23d of October. Walker had sworn to have

the treaty observed in all respects. He was responsible before Nicaragua

and before the world for the faithful execution of it, and above all he

was bound to the Americans on the Isthmus to gain for them the strength

requisite for the maintenance of their privileges. And for this object it

was of the first importance to place the Transit in the hands of those

pledged by every consideration of interest to secure the permanence of

the new order of things. The old Transit Company aimed at being master of

the government; the new charter made the owners of the grant the servants

of the State and the agents of its policy. The control of the Transit

is, to Americans, the control of Nicaragua: for the lake, not the river

as many think, furnishes the key to the occupation of the whole State.

Therefore, whoever desires to hold Nicaragua securely, must be careful

that the navigation of the lake is controlled by those who are his

stanchest and most reliable friends.

The commissioners proceeded, under the decree, to seize the property of

the companies, and place it in the keeping of Joseph N. Scott, after he

had given a full and satisfactory bond. The subsequent proceedings of the

commissioners, and the conduct of the grantees under the new charter,

will be hereafter related. In this connection the main object is to show

how the policy of Rivas toward the Accessory Transit Company was, as it

were, the keystone of the arch supporting his administration. With a

different policy the Provisional President would have found himself with

a very small force to oppose the combination which threatened him almost

from the day he was inaugurated.

Under the influence of these measures of the government, the number of

Americans had been rapidly increasing since the first of November, 1855.

Mr. Fabens, who was in Granada at the time Walker entered the city, went,

soon after the treaty was signed, to San Juan del Norte, and induced

many of the Americans with Kinney to join the army of Nicaragua. On the

7th of November Capt. R. W. Armstrong, with a company from San Francisco,

arrived at Granada, and thus the American force was swelled to upward

of two hundred men. After this, until the arrival of Capt. Anderson on

the 17th of December, the increase was by small numbers at a time, and

in the meanwhile the cholera had appeared at Granada. The disease seemed

to select those officers who were most capable and useful, and there

were suspicions that the people of the town, mostly Legitimists, were

not entirely ignorant of the cause which produced the deaths of leading

Americans. Among the first victims of the disease were Capt. Davidson

and Col. Gilman; and the death of the latter was a severe loss. Then

Capt. Armstrong and Major Jesse Hambleton passed away. The deaths finally

became daily, and the frequent sound of the dead march, as the funeral

escorts passed through the streets, began to exercise a depressing effect

on the troops. The surgical staff was inexperienced, and the services of

some volunteers were valuable. Dr. James Nott was the most efficient of

these, and many a Nicaraguan, who owed his life to this surgeon’s kind

and skilful attention, regretted his departure and mourned his death,

which occurred on the passage from San Juan del Norte to New-Orleans. It

was only after the arrival of Dr. Israel Moses, early in February, 1856,

that the surgical staff was well organized and its duties well performed.

He gave such order and system to this department of the army that the

good effects of his administration were felt long after he ceased to act

as surgeon-general. Indeed, it is safe to say that after the appointment

of Dr. Moses few military hospitals were better administered than the

hospitals at Granada and Rivas.

In spite, however, of the fearful ravages of disease, the number of

Americans continued to increase, most of the immigrants coming from

California until the month of March, 1856. A few, during January and

February, had come from New-York and New-Orleans, but it was not until

Goicouria arrived, early in March, that any numbers were received from

the Atlantic side. So successful had been the policy of the Rivas

administration for the introduction of the new element, that on the 1st

of March, 1856, there were upward of twelve hundred Americans, soldiers

and citizens, in the Republic, capable of bearing arms. It remains,

now, for us to see what effect this domestic policy of the Provisional

Government had produced in its foreign relations.

Immediately on the organization of the Rivas Government, the Minister

of Relations, Jerez, sent circulars to the several States of Central

America, announcing the terms of the treaty of the 23d of October, and

expressing friendly feeling for the respective governments to which

the circulars were addressed. The State of San Salvador gave an early

reply, declaring the gratification of that cabinet in the peace secured

to Nicaragua. No replies were received from the other States, and the

silence was expressive. It was clear that the clauses in the treaty

which secured and encouraged the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua

were not acceptable to the neighboring Republics, and the journals of

Costa Rica were particularly virulent in their remarks on the course

of events in Granada. Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, were at that

time governed by the adherents of the old servile or aristocratic party,

while San Salvador was under liberal influences. Gen. Cabañas, driven

from Comayagua by the assistance of Guatemala, had found refuge at the

mines of Los Encuentros, near the borders of Honduras and San Salvador,

and Guardiola was canvassing for the Presidency of the former State, in

place of his exiled rival, whose legal term was to expire on the 31st of

January, 1856.

General Trinidad Cabañas was the oldest and most respected among

the Liberals of Central America. He had been the faithful companion

of Morazan in his efforts to preserve the Confederacy, and although

generally unfortunate as a soldier, none doubted his courage or his

devotion to the principles he professed. Americans who had met him

pronounced him the most honest public man within the limits of the five

Republics, and his conduct toward the Nicaraguan Democrats had certainly

been that of a self-sacrificing man. The aid he gave to Castellon was

undoubtedly the cause of his losing power in Honduras, and Walker was

easily induced, after the news of the retirement of Cabañas to San

Salvador arrived at Granada, to invite the ex-President to visit the

capital of Nicaragua.

Cabañas arrived at Leon in the latter part of November, and when it

was known that he was on his way to Granada, Col. Hornsby was ordered

to Managua to conduct the ex-President to the capital. On the 3d of

December he was received by Walker with every mark of respect, and he

was entertained as the guest of the State. A guard of honor was placed

at his orders, and the attention due a good man in fallen fortunes

was scrupulously bestowed. But the Honduranian desired assistance to

regain his power in his own State; he asked that a body of Americans

might be given him to re-enter the capital from which he had not long

been expelled. Jerez urged that the request of Cabañas be granted; he

recalled the signal services the ex-President had rendered Castellon and

the democratic army. Rivas, however, was not disposed to hearken to the

prayers of Cabañas. He saw clearly that if assistance were given to the

exiled General-President and an American force entered Honduras, it would

be the signal for a coalition of the other four States against Nicaragua.

Walker regarded the plans of Cabañas with the same eye as Rivas. It was

easy to perceive that sooner or later there was to be a struggle of force

between the American policy of the Nicaraguan cabinet and the other

governments by which it was surrounded. But it was expedient and proper

to make the enemies of the Americans strike the first blow. To have sent

troops to Honduras, even with the design of reëstablishing Cabañas,

would have afforded a pretext for the declaration that the Americans of

Nicaragua were aggressive in their nature. It was only necessary for the

Americans to wait in order to have their enemies move, and it would have

been unwise to hasten the struggle by seeking to restore a man, however

worthy, who had just been driven from his own State.

Jerez admitted the reasonableness of the views of Rivas, yet he

continued to insist on the aid Cabañas sought. The ex-President was a man

of narrow mind, strong prejudices, and bitter animosities, and seemed

to have his heart set on getting back to Honduras before the 31st of

January. The very obstinacy with which he asked to be restored before the

expiration of his time, was a proof of the tendency of his mind to dwell

on unimportant points. Incapable of looking at the affairs of Central

America with general views, he seemed a Morazan federalist dwindled by

age to a Honduras official. But as his opinions had been contracted with

time they had hardened also, and with the dull perceptions of age he

had its obstinacy and its hatred of new things. Not understanding the

American movement, he was disposed to regard it as an evil unless it

could be converted to an agency for driving Guardiola and Lopez out of

Honduras. The past reputation of Cabañas, however, his long service in

the ranks of the Liberal party, together with the feeling of gratitude

for the treatment the Nicaraguan Democrats received in Honduras, wrought

on the mind of Jerez. The Minister of Relations was readily moved by

generous sentiments, and it was not difficult to lead him on a false

course through his emotions. His head, too, as one of his friends often

said, was filled with the legends Plutarch has palmed off on the world

as the lives of his Greek and Roman heroes; and Jerez was constantly

imagining somebody was plotting against the Republic, and that it was his

function to save the State. Vega, one of the leading Legitimists, soon

after the organization of the Rivas cabinet, sent to Walker a printed

paper, on the margin of which there was a sketch of all the ministers,

and the shrewd old Granadino described Jerez as a conspirator by nature.

It may be readily imagined how Cabañas would act on Jerez after he saw

that Walker was determined not to send any of the Americans to Honduras.

After a sojourn of some twenty days at Granada, the ex-President went

to Leon accompanied by the minister, Jerez. He would wait at Leon, he

said, the final decision of the government in regard to his requests.

When Jerez returned, the mind of Rivas was fixed in opposition to the

propositions of Cabañas, and then Jerez resigned his place in the

ministry. About the same time, D. Buenaventura Selva resigned the

ministry of war, because a Legitimist, Arguëllo, was put in office. Jerez

retired to Leon; Selva went first to Rivas and San Juan del Sur, whence

he sailed for San Salvador to remain, as he said, until “hombres de bien”

were restored to power in Nicaragua. As many Legitimists had been put in

office by Rivas before the appointment of Arguëllo, it was probably the

private enmity of Selva toward the latter which led to his resignation;

and thus, by the friendship of one Minister for Cabañas, and the hatred

of another toward Arguëllo, Ferrer was, for a time, sole minister.

It was not enough, however, that Nicaragua showed, by her course toward

Honduras, the policy she sought to follow in relation to Central America.

On the 12th of January, 1856, a circular was addressed to the several

Republics, declaring the peaceful intentions of Nicaragua, and requesting

the appointment of commissioners to discuss and arrange the terms of a

union of the separate States. The latter proposition was made because

the old serviles, who had always been against Federalism, were now

zealously discussing a union, for the purpose of affording pretexts to

interfere against the Americans of Nicaragua. It was thus made manifest

that the Rivas government, satisfied of the honor and straightforwardness

of its intentions, was not afraid of placing itself in closer relations

with the other States of the old confederation.

The only response given to this circular was that of the Honduras

commissioner, D. Manuel Colindres, who did not get beyond Leon. He had

been sent by the government of Honduras to assure Nicaragua of its

peaceful purposes; though it is possible his secret design may have been

to watch the movements of Cabañas. On the 24th of January, however,

Señor Colindres, in acknowledging the receipt of a printed copy of the

circular, said he had no doubt his government would reply favorably to

that of Nicaragua. But no such answer as the commissioner anticipated

was ever received. After Guardiola, however, was elected President of

Honduras, he showed little disposition to interfere with the domestic

policy of Nicaragua; and the thirst for war his enemies attributed to him

was not manifested in his course toward the Central American coalition.

The most violent invectives against the domestic policy of Nicaragua

had been published in the official journal of Costa Rica. Besides this,

a large number of the Legitimists had fled to Guanacaste, and were

thence threatening the tranquillity of the Meridional Department. To

remonstrate against the presence of the Legitimists on the frontier,

and at the same time to endeavor to correct some of the errors which

had spread in Costa Rica, it was decided to send a commissioner to that

Republic. Accordingly, on the 4th of February, Louis Schlessinger and

Manual Arguëllo, accompanied by Captain W. A. Sutter, left Granada for

Virgin Bay, with instructions to proceed to San José. Schlessinger had

been selected because he was one of the few among those attached to

the American force possessed of any knowledge of Spanish; nor were his

previous career and character as well known then as afterward. In fact,

he had come to Nicaragua with excellent recommendations from people of

repute; and as he had some tact and address, it was thought he might

accomplish some of the objects of the commission. D. Manuel Arguëllo was

joined with Schlessinger because, being a Legitimist, he might remove

prejudices, and probably induce many of his old party to leave Guanacaste

and return to their homes and estates near Rivas.

D. Rafael Mora, however, had made up his mind to act at once against

Nicaragua. Schlessinger and Sutter were, therefore, ordered out of the

Republic; and Arguëllo remained in Costa Rica only to join its army. On

the 1st of March, 1856, President Mora formally declared war against the

“filibusters,” as he styled the Americans of Nicaragua. And in order

to trace some of the causes which led to this step, it is necessary to

examine events outside of Central America. This brings us to the course

the United States and Great Britain pursued in reference to Nicaragua.

Not long after the recognition of the Rivas government by the American

Minister at Granada, French was sent as minister from Nicaragua to the

United States. He was appointed to that office with a view of getting him

out of the Hacienda Department and out of the country. He was utterly

unfitted for the administration of the hacienda, having little knowledge

of either the principles or details of public business, and not having

either the modesty to be sensible of his defects or the patience to

overcome them. Moreover, his rapacity made him dreaded by the people

of the country, and, as a measure of policy, it was necessary for the

Americans to get rid of him. He was, however, of not less character

than Marcoleta, a Spaniard, who at the time represented Nicaragua at

Washington; for French had not been ordered out of the State Department

for pilfering papers from its archives. On his arrival in the United

States it was generally reported that the federal government would

not receive the new minister because of his previous history. After

waiting for some time French presented his credentials and was refused

recognition because it was impossible for the American Secretary

of State, Mr. Marcy, to determine whether or not the government he

represented was the government of the people of Nicaragua. When it is

remembered that Mr. Marcy, in a conversation with Mr. J. W. Fabens,

placed Nicaragua among the South American Republics, his inability to

decide whether the government of Rivas was in existence or not, need

create little surprise. His entire ignorance or wilful misrepresentation

of Nicaraguan affairs appears to much advantage in his correspondence

with Mr. Wheeler.

From the beginning of the movement Mr. Marcy had set his face against the

introduction of Americans into Nicaragua. In one of his first despatches

on the subject he spoke of the entrance of Americans into the country as

an invasion, and with him the establishment of peace and the provisional

government of Rivas was “a successful foray of arms.” He censured Mr.

Wheeler for his visit to Rivas at the instance of the people of Granada,

and intimated that the danger he incurred was the due reward of the

minister’s efforts to act as mediator between the parties. Hence, it is

an error to suppose that the refusal to receive French was owing in any

manner to the character of that person. Nor is it more correct to assign

the interest certain parties near the President had in the Shepard and

Haley grant and in Kinney’s schemes, as the reason for the action of

the Secretary of State. At that time it was scarcely known what policy

the Rivas administration would pursue in reference to the claims on the

Mosquito shore. The causes for Mr. Marcy’s conduct were far deeper than

such as were suggested at the time, and they will probably be seen more

clearly in the sequel.

The refusal of the United States government to recognize the Rivas

administration created great surprise in Nicaragua, and encouraged the

enemies of the Americans in Costa Rica. The public men of Nicaragua,

ignorant of the internal machinery of the federal government at

Washington, and of the secret springs controlling the actions of parties

in the United States, were unable to divine the motives of the cabinet of

Mr. Pierce. It was an enigma they could not solve; and while some of the

native Nicaraguans attributed the course of the Republic of the north to

fear of England, others resorted to the common ground on which political

action is always put when it cannot be otherwise reasonably explained,

and traced the conduct of the federal cabinet, and more particularly

of the Secretary of State, to personal prejudices and passions. All

the Nicaraguans saw, however, the effect of the Marcy policy on the

neighboring States; for while it furnished them with an excuse for

withholding diplomatic intercourse it also encouraged them to take active

and decided measures against the Rivas government.

But while the policy of the United States appeared inexplicable

to the people of Central America, that of the British government

excited no surprise. From long familiarity with British diplomacy the

Spanish-American States are generally able to divine what its course

will be, though they scarcely take the trouble to analyze its motives or

to arrive at the objects of its policy. Before examining, however, the

course of the British cabinet toward the Rivas administration, it may aid

us to ascertain, if we can, the motives of English policy in reference to

all the Spanish American States. There is a unity in this policy which

must spring from a simple motive.

The English policy is as old as the time of Elizabeth, and sprang

immediately from the contests of that sovereign with Philip the Second.

The privateers, in the habit of plundering the towns of the Spanish main,

were the first fruits of the policy. England, shut out from a large

portion of America by the jealous colonial regulations of Spain, sought

to make profit out of these countries by the double means of buccaneering

and of contraband trade. This system continued during the whole time of

the Spanish dominion on the continent; and traces of it yet remain in the

settlements at Balize—named after the freebooter and smuggler Wallis—and

in the relations of England to the Indians on the Mosquito shore. The

object of the policy was not to acquire colonies, but to acquire trade;

hence the wood-cutters at Balize were not colonists, but mere floating

settlers, with a right to cut mahogany and dye-woods, yet without the

right to organize for themselves a society or a government. And in the

same manner it was sought to raise the roving tribes of the Mosquito

shore into a community claiming, as did the wood-choppers at Balize, the

protection of the British crown. The settlers at Balize, and the Indians

and Zambos of the Mosquito shore, might be called, in one of the elegant

cant phrases of the day, “squatter sovereigns.”

When the Spanish colonies declared their independence, the relations

between Spain and England were vastly different from what they had been

in the time of Elizabeth; and the Peninsula, just emerging from the

struggle with Napoleon, supposed her alliance with Great Britain would

secure the neutrality of her old rival in the contest between herself and

her rebellious subjects. But England, true to her traditional policy,

favored by all possible means the independence of the colonies. British

arms, British soldiers, and British counsels, were freely furnished to

several Spanish-American States, and their independence was speedily

acknowledged by the British crown. Then British merchants flocked to the

new fields opened to their enterprise, and organized everywhere the old

system of the buccaneers and smugglers. They found the new governments

fit tools of their system. Open and general bribery of custom-house

officers supplanted, it is true, the plain and less corrupt smuggling of

former times, and British men-of-war, sent to collect British claims for

advances made to revolutionary governments at most usurious rates, took

the place of the old buccaneers; but in reality the substance of things

was the same as before.

By this system England derives from the Spanish-American States all the

advantages of trade she receives from her colonies; and yet she has not

the expense or the trouble of governing them. And it is her interest

to keep them in this condition. Now they furnish her with an excellent

market for her fabrics; and, through her merchants, scattered over the

central and southern portions of the continent, she manages to control

the distribution of the products of these countries. Thus her shipping

is swelled, her sailors educated, and an opportunity is offered for

scattering her men-of-war like sentries along the coasts of both oceans,

from Mexico to Patagonia. Her aim is to maintain the _status quô_, for

she could scarcely hope to better herself by any change that might be

attempted.

The British consul at Realejo, Thomas Manning, was a type of the class of

English merchants in the Spanish-American States. Arriving in Nicaragua

without means—a sailor, it is said, on a merchant vessel—he had married

a woman of the country, and soon built the foundations of a fortune.

Without any education, or any habit of regarding political events in the

light of principle or of fixed policy, he yet had that keen instinct for

property and his own interests which enabled him to use British power

to aid his trading adventures. He sometimes lent money to the Republic,

only, however, when it was in great straits and promised extravagant

interest; and when the principal and interest had accumulated to a

suitable sum, he would call on the British fleet to blockade the ports

of the States until the debt was paid. As early as 1849, Manning had

foreseen the danger of Americans passing in numbers through Nicaragua;

and while the Californians were crossing the Isthmus, on their way to

and from the land of gold, he had written to Lord Palmerston that unless

England averted the calamity, in ten years the country would be “overrun

by North American adventurers.” It is wise for England to make her

merchants consuls, and to intrust them somewhat with diplomatic business;

the sting of self-interest keeps the sentry from sleeping on his post.

Manning had houses both at Leon and at Chinandega, and his commercial

and social relations were mainly with the residents of the Occidental

Department. Hence, in the revolution of 1854, he naturally favored

Castellon and his adherents, though his notions about government, if he

could be said to have any, inclined him more toward the Legitimists.

Besides, however, his personal relations with some of the leading

Democrats, the all-subduing sense of interest led him with the Leoneses.

The rivalry between the towns of Leon and Granada was a rivalry of trade

and of interests as well as of social and political power. True, the

political principles prevalent at Granada naturally led to high tariffs,

while those of Leon tended to free trade; but the geographical position

of the two towns did most to beget the commercial contest between them.

Granada received its goods from the Atlantic, by the way of the lake and

San Juan river, while Leon was supplied from vessels obliged to pass Cape

Horn. It was difficult, however, to carry on smuggling by the river,

while the facilities for contraband on the Pacific side were great. Thus

Leon was able to compete with Granada by making up in smuggling what she

lost by the voyage round the Horn. It may thus be readily conceived how

the British consul’s interests induced him to wish for the success of the

Leoneses, not only in the Occidental Department but throughout the State.

Their success would necessarily aggrandize Leon and depress the trade of

Granada.

Of course Manning’s relations with the Castellon government were

intimate, and especially with the Minister of Hacienda, D. Pablo

Caravajal. It was through the officers of the hacienda that all

arrangements had to be made for landing goods at Realejo; and the

interests of the minister might sometimes be opposed to the interests of

the government he served. So, too, it was with the hacienda Don Tomas—as

the people called Manning—treated, when he was so kind as to advance a

little money at the rate of one and a half or two per cent. a month. And

as Caravajal was the minister who countersigned the first contract of

Castellon with Cole, and none besides himself and the director knew its

character, he was probably obliging enough to drop a copy of it where

Don Tomas might find it. At any rate Manning heard of the Cole contract

soon after it was made, and he immediately remonstrated with Castellon as

to the policy he was pursuing. The director, however, had been in England

to negotiate on the part of Nicaragua concerning the Mosquito coast, and

was sagacious enough to perceive the drift of British policy and the

subjection in which it sought to retain his country. The remonstrances of

Manning were, therefore, of little avail.

It is then probable that the British cabinet was, from the beginning,

well informed as to the American movement in Nicaragua. While the

government of the United States had merely newspaper reports of events

in Nicaragua, previous to the surprise of Granada, Lord Clarendon was

undoubtedly receiving minute and detailed statements from official

sources. Hence, when we can get at the facts, it is not strange to

see that Lord Clarendon is deeply interested in the events of Central

America, and that, by act as well as words, he is urging Costa Rica to

make war on the Americans in Nicaragua.

The sources of information on this subject are exclusively Costa Rican,

and the only published facts are those contained in certain letters

taken from the English mail for San José, in the month of March, 1856.

Among this intercepted correspondence was the copy of a note from

the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. E. Hammond, to

E. Wallerstein, consul-general for Costa Rica at London. The note is

dated from the Foreign Office, February 9th, 1856, and acquaints

the consul-general that Lord Clarendon has been informed by the War

Department “two thousand smooth bore muskets (Witton’s), which are not

so highly finished as the Line pattern muskets of 1842, can be supplied”

to the government of Costa Rica, “at £1, 3s. each; or, if it should

be preferred, two thousand of the Line pattern muskets of 1842 can

be furnished at 56s. 8d. each.” Then a letter from Wallerstein to D.

Bernardo Calvo, Minister of Relations for Costa Rica, advising him of the

offer of Lord Clarendon, says: “I have written a private letter to the

secretary, entreating him to send me an order to examine the two kinds.

After seeing them I will still consider if it is proper to take the

muskets without positive instructions from his Excellency, the President;

but, in the meantime, I am persuaded his Excellency will see, in the

promptness with which H. B. M.’s government has complied with my request,

a strong proof of its sympathy and good will toward the Republic. Nothing

is said, it is true, about the time the money should be paid; this shows

it is for your government to decide that point.” And while writing

officially to his chief in the cabinet, Mr. Wallerstein does not forget

to send a private letter for his esteemed friend, D. Juan Rafael Mora.

After telling the President, “The pleasure I felt was such, on receipt

of Mr. Hammond’s letters, I could not sleep at all that night;” the

complacent consul-general goes on: “I have letters from Guatemala and San

Salvador, requiring me to request from this government help and succor;

but what can be done for republics or people who cannot help themselves?

When I was telling Lord Clarendon Costa Rica had already an army of eight

hundred men on the frontiers, he was much pleased, and said that was a

right step; and I am persuaded my having made that intimation is the

reason for their giving us the muskets.”

Through these letters we can perceive the prudence and yet the decision

with which the British cabinet acted in reference to the Rivas

administration. There is no doubt or hesitation in its conduct, because

it acts in accordance with a traditional policy. England does not desire

firm and steady government in Central America, because her merchants

would thus be restricted to the common profits of legitimate trade; and

she is, above all, opposed to the establishment of such governments there

by American influences, for fear other goods than her own would be thrown

into the markets of those countries.

Urged on, therefore, by Great Britain, tacitly encouraged by the United

States, Costa Rica declared war against the Americans in the service of

Nicaragua. Mora is careful to make the issue clearly and distinctly.

He does not declare war against the Republic of Nicaragua, but against

certain persons in her service. And as the manner in which the war is

declared defies the restraints of public law, so the way in which it is

to be waged points not to the rules adopted by Christian nations. The

same day war was declared, a decree was published ordering all prisoners

taken with arms in their hands to be shot. Yet there have been found

Christian people unblushing enough to praise the conduct and the policy

of Juan Rafael Mora. And in the blindness of party passion Americans have

not been ashamed to support the man who distinctly enounced the principle

that they were to be excluded from Central America, and if venturing

there against his will, they should be shot.

On whom, then, rests the responsibility of the war which for more than a

year drained the resources of Nicaragua and made her fields the scenes

of deadly conflict rather than of abundant harvests? Not surely on those

who exhausted every effort in order to maintain peace and bring about a

diplomatic discussion rather than armed arbitrament of the questions at

issue. Costa Rica scorned to discuss the right of Nicaragua to employ

Americans in her military service. Mora refused to listen to the voice of

reason, and defiantly seizing the clarion, blew the note of war. If it

is permitted, however, to anticipate events not yet narrated—if we may

“see the future in the instant,” in order to gather therefrom a lesson

of justice and of right—it may not be inappropriate to say that Costa

Rica has derived nothing from the war except a scarcity of labor for her

fields, a heavy debt to embarrass her treasury, and the prospect of civil

commotions to disturb her industry. Mora, too, reaps in exile the fruits

of his policy; but let us pass Mora in exile, as Ugolino in hell, afar

off and with silence.

Chapter Sixth.

THE COSTA RICAN INVASION.

On the first of March, 1856, the regular American force in the service of

Nicaragua was about six hundred men. It was organized in two battalions,

one denominated the Rifle and the other the Light Infantry Battalion. The

first was commanded by Colonel M. B. Skerrett, with E. J. Saunders as

lieutenant-colonel and A. S. Brewster as major. The light infantry was

commanded by Colonel B. D. Fry, with J. B. Markham as major. Nearly all

the rifle companies were then stationed at Leon, a single company under

Captain Rudler being at Rivas, where Major Brewster acted as commandant.

The light infantry was at Granada. Since the appointment of Colonel P.

R. Thompson as adjutant-general early in February, more system and order

had been given to the army organization. The medical staff was well

directed by the surgeon-general, Dr. Moses; and Colonel Thomas F. Fisher

had charge of the quarter master’s department. W. K. Rogers had been

recently appointed assistant commissary-general with the rank of major,

and was then at the head of the commissariat. Colonel Bruno Von Natzmer

was inspector-general; but was, at that time, stationed at Leon, having

general and indefinite powers to regulate the civil administration there

and to see that the wants of the American force were properly provided

for. His knowledge of the people in the Occidental Department made his

services valuable, inasmuch as there were constant rumors of trouble and

difficulties on the part of the natives at Leon.

During the four months which had elapsed since the establishment of

the provisional government, the Americans had been, for the most part,

stationed in Granada. But the sickness prevailing there, as well as the

partial necessity for a force elsewhere, had caused small bodies to be

sent in several directions through the Republic, thus familiarizing the

people of the remote districts with the appearance of the Americans, and

furnishing the latter with a knowledge of the roads and local prejudices

of the inhabitants. Thus Colonel Fry, with a party of voltigeurs,

had spent several weeks in the neighborhood of Matagalpa, proceeding

even as far as Juigalpa in order to quell certain disturbances the

Legitimists were creating among the Indians. It would have been better

for the discipline and spirit of the troops if they had remained less

and in smaller bodies at Granada; but this being the depot of arms and

the seat of government by the terms of the treaty, the disposition of

the Legitimists of the town made it necessary to keep a strong force

in the place. The quantity of liquor there, and the fondness of many

officers for drink, not only injured the health of the troops, but tended

materially to prevent its growth in military virtue.

In addition to the regular force of the Americans there were more than

five hundred men capable of bearing arms engaged in civil business either

at Granada or along the line of the Transit. At the capital there were

numbers of Americans employed in the civil offices, besides the laborers

engaged in building a wharf at the old fort; and at Virgin Bay and San

Juan del Sur, the Transit Company had scores of persons engaged in the

construction of their works at these two places. Some of these were

organized as volunteer companies, and at Virgin Bay a company of this

description, with a good uniform, and commanded by George McMurray, had

nearly fifty members. Many persons supposed these men could be relied

on, in case of disturbance, with as much certainty as the regular force,

and hence it was estimated that in the event of invasion nearly twelve

hundred Americans could be brought into action for the defence of

Nicaragua.

A few days afterward, on the 9th of March, the regular force was largely

increased by the arrival at Granada of more than two hundred and fifty

men, under the direction of D. Domingo de Goicouria. The night before

these recruits arrived a bearer of despatches from San Salvador, Col.

Padilla, had reached Granada; and on the morning of the 9th, dressed in

a ludicrous uniform, and wearing a cocked hat he had brought all the

way over the mountains from Cojutepeque, he sallied forth on a visit to

the general-in-chief. The new men had just reached the Plaza, and were

drawn up so as to show their numbers to the best advantage, when Padilla

entered the general’s quarters. The surprise of the San Salvadorian, at

the sight of so many strange-looking men, was equal to the amazement the

Americans found in his long, lank person, run into trowsers too short for

his legs, and with the chest and arms tightly encased in a small military

coat, buttoned up to the throat, and obstinate in the habit of slipping

its lower edges above the pit of the stomach. As Padilla had brought

despatches from the Minister of Relations at Cojutepeque, Señor Hoyos,

asking why Americans were being introduced into Nicaragua, the arrival of

Goicouria and his recruits was not inopportune.

Schlessinger had, in the meanwhile, returned from Costa Rica with an

account of his treatment there. Manuel Arguëllo, for whose sake Selva

left the cabinet, remained with his Legitimist friends near Mora, and

his conduct was a sample of the actions of the old Granada faction. On

the 11th, therefore, the new recruits were organized in a battalion

of five companies, under the command of Schlessinger, and Capt. J. C.

O’Neal was raised to the rank of Major, and attached to the corps. The

same day a proclamation was issued by the general-in-chief, closing

with the order to the troops to assume and wear the red ribbon. The

object of the proclamation was to secure the zealous co-operation of the

Nicaragua Democrats as well as of the liberals of the other States in

the war immediately impending, and the cause assigned for resuming the

red ribbon was the course of the Nicaragua Legitimists. “The self-styled

Legitimist party of Nicaragua,” so the proclamation ran, “has repelled

our efforts at conciliation. They have maintained communication with

their fellow serviles in the other States. They have, by all means in

their power, attempted to weaken the present provisional government, and

have given aid and encouragement to the enemies of Nicaragua outside of

the Republic.... They owe us for the protection they have had for their

lives and property—they have paid us with ingratitude and treachery.”

A few hours after Walker wrote this proclamation he received the Mora

decree of the 1st of March, declaring war against the Americans in

Nicaragua. As soon as this decree was read, the Provisional President

published a proclamation of war against Costa Rica, and on the 13th the

general order was issued: “The Supreme Provisional Government of the

Republic of Nicaragua having formally declared war, by decree of March

11th, 1856, against the State of Costa Rica, the army will be held in

readiness to commence active operations.”

Col. Schlessinger, after organizing his battalion and receiving muskets

for the several companies, was ordered to prepare for marching. He

proceeded with his command to Virgin Bay, and, according to instructions,

sent the weakest of his companies, under Lieut. Colman, to Rivas,

while Capt. Rudler, with Co. F of the Rifles, was ordered to report to

Schlessinger. The four full companies of the new battalion were commanded

respectively by Capt. Thorpe, Capt. Creighton, Capt. Prange, and Capt.

Legeay. The companies of these two latter officers consisted entirely the

one of German and the other of French, and Schlessinger’s familiarity

with the languages of these companies, no less than his acquaintance

with Spanish and with the Department of Guanacaste, was the cause of

his selection for the service on which he was about to be sent. After

Rudler’s company reported, Schlessinger’s command numbered about two

hundred and forty men.

Walker ordered Schlessinger to march with this force into the Department

of Guanacaste. His object was to strike the first blow of the war on

the territory held by the enemy, and also to have a strong outpost at

some distance south of the Transit, to guard against any surprise on the

line of American travel across the Isthmus. With the same view companies

were occupying Castillo and Hipp’s Point, at the mouth of the Serapaqui.

It was necessary to hold the Transit with more tenacity than any other

part of the State, not only because the property there had more need of

protection than any other in the Republic from the foreign enemy, but

also because of the new arrangements made it was from the Transit the

Nicaragua force was to be fed and supplied with new troops. As there are

very few people between the Transit road and the line of Guanacaste,

the necessity for a corps of observation toward the south was the more

urgent. The greatest difficulty in war, that of knowing accurately

your enemy’s movements, is increased in Central America by the want of

facilities for communication, and by the habit frequent revolutions have

begot of spreading the most exaggerated reports about most trifling

facts. You can always get some facts, however, from any report; so that,

all things considered, it requires more labor to get facts from thinly

settled than from populous districts.

On the 16th, Schlessinger marched from San Juan del Sur toward the La

Flor, a small stream which separates Guanacaste from the Meridional

Department. Before leaving he had much irritated Major Brewster, who was

commanding at Rivas, by the numerous irregularities he practised, but

with natural reluctance that officer was slow in reporting such facts

at headquarters. The march to the La Flor and beyond it to Salinas was

characterized by the same irregularity which marked the command while

on the Transit; and so great was the disorder that the surgeon of the

command, a new-comer, and ignorant of the grave fault he was committing,

left the force and returned to Granada with letters from Schlessinger.

This fact, all too late, revealed the weakness of the commander who

had permitted his only surgeon to leave at a time when he might any

day engage the enemy. With such ignorance of duty, on the part of both

commander and surgeon, it was necessary to carry on the war in the best

manner possible. This instance of Schlessinger and his surgeon, one out

of many, illustrates a difficulty which beset the Americans during the

whole war.

It was not until late at night on the 20th that Schlessinger arrived

at the country-house of Santa Rosa, the men hungry and exhausted by

the long and weary march. The guard seems to have been properly posted

during the night, and the next morning mounted men were sent to get news

and, if possible, guides. An inspection of arms had been ordered first

for two and afterward for three o’clock in the afternoon; and the men

were lounging in all directions in and around the camp, when, shortly

before the inspection was to take place, the alarm was given and the

cry of “Here they come,” was uttered by a mounted rifleman as he rode up

to the main building where the colonel was quartered. Schlessinger was

taken entirely by surprise, and, in the confusion, could not be found

by the adjutant. Capt. Rudler with his rifles seized a corral near the

main house with a view of protecting the American flank; but the fire

of the advancing enemy soon forced him to leave it. In the meanwhile

Capt. Creighton, aided by Major O’Neal, had formed his company, its

right resting on the house, and fired a few volleys at the Costa Ricans;

but the German company had broke and left the field, while the French

under Legeay retired from the hilly, broken ground, they had attempted

to occupy. In five minutes, the whole command, led by its colonel, was

in full and most disorderly retreat. Major O’Neal, with several other

officers, strove in vain to turn the men and carry them back toward the

enemy; but the panic was such that they found few willing to listen or to

follow.

The Costa Rican force attacking at Santa Rosa was the advance guard

of the whole army, then on its march toward the northern frontier. It

consisted of about five hundred men, and among its officers was Manuel

Arguëllo, the Legitimist. They wore the red ribbon, with the view both

of deceiving the Americans and of conciliating the Nicaraguan Democrats.

After the main body of the army, with the President, Rafael Mora, at its

head, reached Santa Rosa, the Nicaraguan prisoners, many of them wounded,

were tried by court martial and ordered to be shot. The cruel sentence

was too faithfully executed.

After wandering for some time between Santa Rosa and the lake of

Nicaragua, the disorganized remains of Schlessinger’s force arrived at

a point near Tortugas, whence they found their way to Virgin Bay. They

came to the latter place by squads rather than by companies, some without

hats and shoes, and some even without arms. In their flight many had been

torn by the thorns through which they had been forced, and it was days

and even weeks before straggling men of the expedition ceased to arrive.

The depression of spirits was great, and some of the soldiers, in order

to diminish the shame of their retreat, were but too ready to exaggerate

among their comrades the disciplined air, fine military conduct, and

excellent arms and equipment of the enemy they so hastily saw at Santa

Rosa.

Meanwhile Walker was concentrating the American force at Granada, and

preparing for the war in which, it was probable, the other three Central

American States would join Costa Rica. The Rifles were ordered from Leon;

and about the time they entered Granada, a company of recruits arrived

from San Juan del Norte under the command of Capt. Mason. With this

company came Turnbull and French; but both those persons, finding their

services were not required, soon left the Republic. While the Rifles were

marching into the capital, the general-in-chief was in bed with a violent

attack of fever; but thanks to good medical attendance and a strong

constitution, he was able, on the next day, Sunday the 23d, to go to the

dinner-table. Scarcely able to sit up, he had a note from Major Brewster

put in his hands, bearing the first hasty news of the reverse at Santa

Rosa. The same evening he managed to get aboard the steamer, and was, on

the morning of the 24th, at Virgin Bay. The news of the stragglers from

Santa Rosa was a better tonic than a cold bath. The necessity for mental

and moral action has a wonderful effect in driving the reluctant body to

perform the tasks the will imposes.

The disaster in Guanacaste made Walker determine to move the main

strength of the Americans to Rivas. He did not know what effect the

rout at Santa Rosa might have on the native Nicaraguans, or how far it

might shake their confidence in the ability of the Americans to protect

the State from its enemies. Orders were given accordingly; and in the

meanwhile arrangements had been made for removing the government to Leon.

Rivas was anxious to fill the vacancies in his cabinet; and Jerez had

intimated that if the President would go to Leon he might resume his

place in the government. Before leaving Granada, however, the President

issued a decree whereby the Oriental and Meridional Departments were put

under martial law, and the general-in-chief was invested with absolute

power over these portions of the Republic. The Minister of Public Credit,

Ferrer, remained at Granada as commissioner, to co-operate with the

general, as far as the latter might require, in supplying means for

carrying on the war, and for ministering to the wants of the army.

The day Walker established his headquarters at Rivas, Schlessinger

arrived to report in person the incidents of his march and retreat. He

urged the inexperience of the men, and their want of disciplined courage

as the cause of his misfortune; and he forthwith proposed to organize

a new force for the occupation of Guanacaste. But the officers of the

expedition who began to arrive all agreed as to the incapacity and

cowardice shown by their late commander. Some, indeed, hinted that he had

sold his command; but such conduct was not suited to his timid nature.

Had he sold his men, he would never have returned to Nicaragua. The

charges, however, made against him required a court of inquiry; and the

report of the court of inquiry led to his arrest and trial before a court

martial on the charges of neglect of duty, of ignorance of his duties of

commanding officer, and of cowardice in the presence of the enemy. To

these was afterward added the charge of desertion.

The movement of the army from Granada to Rivas by Virgin Bay had

developed the necessity for more vigor in its means of transportation.

Therefore C. J. Macdonald was appointed quartermaster-general with the

rank of colonel; but this office he held only a few days for causes which

will soon appear. Up to the 30th, the re-organization of the men who had

returned from Costa Rica was going on, and efforts were being made to

increase in several respects the efficiency of the army. But a general

depression seemed to pervade officers as well as men. Applications were

constantly made for furloughs to return to the United States; and the

spirit of the troops was yet more depressed by the Americans outside

of the army thronging to headquarters in order to get passports to

leave the country. Two or three ladies—Mrs. Thompson, the wife of the

adjutant-general, and Mrs. Kewen, the wife of Mr. E. J. C. Kewen, a civil

officer of the State—aided to keep up the courage of the men by the

cheerfulness with which they met all forms of fatigue and danger. But the

sphere of such influences was necessarily narrow, and it was requisite to

infuse some enthusiasm into the army or let it dissolve from the effects

of one shameful panic.

Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 30th, the force in Rivas was paraded

on the main Plaza, and the general-in-chief addressed them a few minutes

in such words as he could find for the occasion. He endeavored to place

before them the moral grandeur of the position they occupied. Alone in

the world, without a friendly government to give even its sympathy, much

less its aid, they had nothing to support them in the struggle with the

neighboring States save the consciousness of the justice of their cause.

Maligned by those who should have befriended them, and betrayed by those

they had benefited, they had to choose between basely yielding their

rights and nobly dying for them. Nor did their general seek to hide from

them the peril in which they stood; but from the urgency of the danger

arose the greater necessity for becoming conduct. The words were few and

simple, and drew little force from the manner of him who uttered them;

but they had the desired effect and created a new spirit among the men.

It is only by constant appeals to the loftier qualities of man that you

can make him a good soldier; and all military discipline is a mere effort

to make virtue constant and reliable by making it habitual.

On the 1st of April the arrival of the steamer Cortes from San Francisco

at San Juan del Sur was announced. W. R. Garrison had come as passenger

with a view of making arrangements for the new transit; but no men had

come for the service of Nicaragua. Soon after news reached Rivas of the

arrival of the steamer, Walker received intelligence that she had again

put to sea, towing out the coal-ship then in the harbor. The up-going

steamer of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company had spoken the Cortes

before she entered the port of San Juan, and had borne to her commander

the orders of his principals in New-York. Captain Collens, of the Cortes,

had, however, left Mr. Garrison ashore; and the latter, when he got to

Rivas, informed Walker that this sudden movement of the old company had

not been provided for, and that it might be several weeks, at least

six, before another steamer would come from California. Thus one motive

for holding fast to the Transit was, for the moment, taken away. Thus,

at the very outset, the new contractors, Morgan and Garrison, by their

timidity—to use no harsher word—jeoparded the welfare of those who had

acted on the faith of their capacity and willingness to fulfil their

agreements.

At the same time that Garrison and Morgan were embarrassing Walker’s

communications with the United States by the hesitation and weakness of

their conduct, Rivas was writing that news every day reached Leon of

an intention on the part of Guatemala and San Salvador to join in the

war against Nicaragua. It was clear that the people in the Occidental

Department began to shake at the idea of an invasion from the northern

States. As the Transit was, for the time being, made useless by the

action of persons having an interest in the property on the line of

travel, the general-in-chief decided to move northward so as to restore

confidence to the Leoneses. He was not then aware of the large force

Mora had on the frontier. Scouting parties of the enemy had come as

far as Peña Blanca, a point on the southern boundary of the Meridional

Department; but these were not of such force as to indicate the presence

of the numbers Mora was leading through Guanacaste.

Just as orders were being issued to prepare the army for its movement to

Virgin Bay, Col. Macdonald resigned the office of quartermaster-general.

At the time, Walker attributed this act to the projected departure of the

troops from the Transit, Macdonald then being on the Isthmus to watch

the interests of Garrison and Morgan. But after events showed that his

conduct was more the result of mortification at the apparent bad faith

of his principal at San Francisco, than of any disaffection toward the

cause of the Americans in Nicaragua. His resignation was, however, a loss

at the time; for his clear head and energetic action were much needed in

the coming crisis. At that time the general-in-chief knew something of

the value of Macdonald’s head; but it was only at a later period that

he had the opportunity of discovering other admirable qualities the

sturdy Scotchman possessed. With the Highland blood, he had the Highland

loyalty; but his dogged tenacity of purpose was that of the Lowland

borderer.

After Macdonald’s resignation, D. Domingo de Goicouria was appointed

intendente-general with the rank of brigadier-general. He was a Cuban,

and had been engaged with the patriots of that island in some efforts

to gain its independence. Before going to Nicaragua, Goicouria had

sent a pure-hearted and devoted son of the island, Lainé, to negotiate

with Walker for future assistance against the Spanish dominion. And the

latter, while pledging his personal efforts to the Cuban cause, had been

careful not to involve the relations of Nicaragua by such promises. On

his part, Goicouria had promised much help in the way of money, arms,

and clothing; and his manner and conversation, more mercantile than

military, were calculated to make you imagine him capable of inspiring

capitalists with confidence in his commercial ability. As many persons

concurred in representing Goicouria’s credit to be good, his desire for

rank was gratified by the appointment, and it was hoped thus to secure

some recompense in the shape of shoes, jackets and equipments for the

soldiers. The duties of the quartermaster’s department were devolved

on the intendencia; and the chief, Goicouria, recommended for first

and second assistants Fisher and Byron Cole—who had lately returned to

Nicaragua—with the ranks respectively of colonel and lieutenant-colonel.

These appointments were accordingly made.

The intendencia, thus hastily organized, received immediate orders to

prepare transportation for the whole force then in Rivas, with all the

property of the army there, to Virgin Bay. Walker himself repaired to

the latter point to see that everything was ready to embark the troops

on one of the lake steamers. After reaching Virgin Bay he was called up

about midnight by the new intendente-general, who had rode all the way

from Rivas to propose that he should be left with a few Americans and

some native troops in charge of the Meridional Department. The conceit

of Goicouria, excited by his new rank and title, had turned his head;

and although he had scarcely been a month in the country, he foolishly

presumed to thrust his opinion unasked on his general-in-chief. Of course

he got a short answer; and Walker began to think the shoes and shirts

might be too dearly purchased by the appointment of Don Domingo.

By the evening of the 5th of April, all were at Virgin Bay, and the

embarkation was commenced. Most of the American residents about the

Transit road, thinking from the preparations that the Meridional

Department was to be abandoned, flocked with the troops aboard the San

Carlos. When all were on the steamer she was ordered to the San Juan

river, and the morning of the 6th found her off San Carlos Fort. Captain

Linton’s company stationed at that point was embarked, and the steamer

proceeded down the river to Toro Rapids. A company intended to garrison

Castillo Viejo was sent down to relieve the force previously there; and

when the returning company had reached the San Carlos, she was ordered

to Granada. On the morning of the 8th, the steamer anchored off Granada,

and the troops were rapidly disembarked. Thus the movement northward was,

for a time, concealed from the people of the Meridional Department, among

whom the enemy had numerous spies, and the impression was temporarily

created, that the Americans intended to move either out of the country or

toward San José. The enemy seems to have adopted the former opinion.

It seems that Mora, after his success at Santa Rosa, was pressing on

toward the frontier; but hearing Walker had occupied Rivas in force,

he stopped to watch his adversary. Then seeing the preparations for

abandoning the department, he allowed the embarkation of the Americans

almost in his very presence. Of course, with the Legitimists in and

about Rivas, it was far easier for Mora to get reliable news than for

the Nicaraguan general. As no villages or even country-houses were to be

passed, it was not difficult to bring a force of three thousand men to

the neighborhood of the Transit road, without its being at all known in

the department. Walker had no sooner left Virgin Bay, than Mora moved

forward with a view of occupying Rivas and the Transit road.

Early on the morning of the 7th, according to the testimony of sworn

witnesses, examined by the American minister, Mr. Wheeler, the Costa

Rican troops entered Virgin Bay and surrounded the office of the Transit

Company. The officer in command gave the order to fire, and nine American

citizens, mostly laborers in the service of the company, and all of them

entirely unarmed, were killed or wounded by the first volley. The wounded

were immediately run through with the bayonets of the soldiers and

swords of the officers. Then the doors of the building were broken open,

the trunks stored in it were rifled, and the persons of the murdered

Americans were robbed of the money, watches, and jewelry, found on

them. Nor were the brutal passions of the invaders satisfied with these

acts. They afterward set fire to the wharf the Transit Company was just

completing, and declared their intention to exterminate every American

on the Isthmus. They commenced the work of destruction by burning to the

water’s edge the wharf which American capital had constructed for the

use and advantage of Nicaraguan labor and Nicaraguan products.

To San Juan del Sur and to Rivas, the entrance of the Costa Ricans

was more orderly. At Rivas, particularly, Mora made every effort to

conciliate the people of the country. A prefect was appointed, and D.

Evaristo Carazo, who for several years had been accumulating a fortune

from the transit of Americans across the Isthmus, accepted the office.

Orders were also issued prohibiting the impressment of men for military

service; but urgent invitations were made to the people to join those

who professed to have come for their liberation from the yoke of the

Americans. Few, however, if any, accepted the invitation; and the

President of Costa Rica did not fail to express his disappointment at

the backwardness of the people to join his ranks. He had trusted too

much to the partial representations of the Legitimists, and he afterward

complained bitterly of the deception practised on him.

An hour or two after Walker landed at Granada, on the morning of the 8th,

an American from the Transit came to inform him of the events occurring

there. At the same time the letters from Leon indicated that the alarm

there had subsided. Hence orders were at once issued to have the whole

marching force then in Granada, with the exception of two companies to

garrison that place, ready to move the next morning by daylight.

The American force had been sensibly diminished by the expedition to

Santa Rosa, and after the return from that disastrous field the French

and German companies were disbanded and all who could not speak English

were discharged from the army. Thus, on the morning of the 9th, not more

than five hundred and fifty men marched out of Granada toward Rivas.

The men were, however, in good spirits and went at a brisk pace, so

that early in the afternoon they were halted for dinner a league to the

southward of Nandaime. Here they met Col. Machado, a Cuban, who had been

left at Rivas with a few native troops when Walker marched the American

force thence. The officer commanding at Rivas was José Bermudez, who

remained and took service under Mora, but the rank and file of the native

Nicaraguans forsaking Bermudez had followed Machado, and left Rivas

some hours before the Costa Ricans entered. Thus was it generally in

Nicaragua; the people adhered to the Americans; the _calzados_, those

wearing shoes, deserted to the enemies of the Republic.

After rest and dinner, the command strengthened by Machado’s men,

marched to the Ochomogo, where it encamped for the night. Then it was

ascertained that Mora had entered Rivas the day before with a large

army, the woman, who brought the story, saying at least three thousand.

But as the ideas of the people of the country about numbers are rather

vague, not much confidence was put in the report. On the 10th, the march

was slow and toilsome, owing to the heat of the day and to the long

stretches of dry and dusty road without any shade to protect the men

from the fierce tropical sun. During the morning a native from Rivas was

taken, carrying proclamations from Mora to his Legitimist friends about

Masaya, and, after some threats, much information was educed from the

messenger concerning the position and strength of the enemy. As the force

approached the Gil Gonzales, a body of rangers, under command of Capt.

Waters, was sent on to the point where the main road to Rivas crosses the

river, and there exchanged shots with an outpost of the enemy placed near

Obraje. The main body of the Americans, however, left the high road half

a league from the river, and taking a trail to the left struck the Gil

Gonzales some distance below the point where Waters had encountered the

enemy. About sunset Walker camped for the night on the south bank of the

Gil Gonzales, and due silence was kept in order to prevent the enemy from

perceiving his presence there.

Just before reaching camp a herdsman, hunting cattle for the Costa

Ricans, had been made prisoner, and the soldiers had scarcely reached

the several points in the camp assigned to them, before a man, found

skulking near the river, was brought to the general-in-chief. At first

he denied all knowledge of the enemy at Rivas, but a rope thrown around

his neck and cast over a limb of the nearest tree brought him the use of

his memory, and he gave an accurate and detailed account of the several

points at which the Costa Ricans were posted. He stated the houses

in which Mora and the principal officers quartered, the place where

the ammunition was stored together the quantity of it, not forgetting

two pretty little pieces of artillery commanding some of the streets.

Unfortunately for himself, he let out the fact that he had been sent to

gather news of the Americans, and hence was punished as a spy. But his

information was so full, and, after severe cross-examination there was

so little contradiction in his story, that Walker formed his plan of

attack on the facts thus obtained. The result showed that the statements

of the spy were entirely accurate. The fear of death had so discomposed

his mind that he could not invent a lie.

Before retiring for the night, Walker sent for the principal officers,

and explaining the plan of attack for the next day, assigned to each his

separate duty. Lieut.-Col. Sanders, with four companies of Rifles, was to

enter by the streets running along the north side of the Plaza, and was

to keep his men in full charge, if possible, until they reached the house

where Mora was quartered, about eighty yards from the main square. Major

Brewster, with three companies of Rifles, was to enter by the street

on the south side of the Plaza and was, also, to attempt to reach the

headquarters of the enemy. As Walker expected to surprise Mora, he hoped

to get possession of his person before he could escape; and at any rate

as his headquarters were opposite the magazine, the occupation of the

former would command the latter. Hence the object in ordering the Rifles

to strike for the house Mora was known to occupy. Col. Natzmer, with

Major O’Neal and the Second Rifles—as his command was called—although

then armed with muskets, was to pass to the extreme left of the town thus

threatening the right of the enemy and yet being within easy distance of

Brewster. Machado with the natives was to pass by a road which enters the

Plaza from the north, and would thus find himself on Sanders’ right. Col.

Fry was to hold his companies of light infantry as a reserve.

Between two and three o’clock in the morning, the several companies were

formed and the march toward Rivas began, Dr. J. L. Cole acting as guide.

Owing to the darkness of the night and the obscurity of the trail, the

march was for a time slow and interrupted by frequent halts; but when day

broke, and the command fell into the road through Potosi, the pace of

the men became brisk and lively. The quick yet firm step of the soldiers

showed that their spirit was good, and the dust of the road, though thick

and heavy, affected them little. The deep silence of the expectant ranks

was only broken by the low voice of one asking his comrade for a drop

of water from his gourd; and the bark of the watch-dogs, common in the

huts along the roadside, was passed unheeded, save with the half-uttered

hope that the noise of the brute might not give the enemy notice of their

approach. Soon after they passed Potosi the sun rose in all the splendor

of his southern skies, and when the Americans, making a detour toward the

lake, fell into the road from San Jorge to Rivas, about a mile from the

latter place, it was near eight o’clock.

Not more than half a mile from the edge of the town Walker met some

market-women, who told him the enemy were not aware of his approach;

they had left the Plaza only a few minutes previously, and the Costa

Ricans—_hermaniticos_, as the San Jorge women called them—were as

careless and indifferent as if they were in their own country. A short

halt was made at the Cuatro Esquinas to give the rear time to close up;

and when the rear-guard appeared the order was given for the several

divisions of the force to advance in the manner indicated the night

before.

Sanders, being in the advance, drove in a small picket near the edge

of the town, and proceeding at a double quick step, entered the Plaza

and rushed up the street toward Mora’s quarters. The enemy, taken by

surprise, had scarcely commenced to return the fire of the Rifles when

the latter reached a small brass gun standing in the street, about half

way between the Plaza and the magazine of the Costa Ricans. Sanders’

men, shouting over the gun they had taken, carried it to the Plaza;

but in the meantime they had given the enemy time to recover from the

first shock and the Costa Ricans’ fire now became galling. Brewster had

succeeded also in clearing his side of the Plaza of the enemy, and, with

Captain Anderson’s company in front, was urging his command on toward the

houses occupied by the Costa Ricans. A few sharp-shooters, however, of

the enemy, French and Germans, got possession of a tower in front of the

Rifles, and so annoyed them that they were finally forced to seek cover.

Natzmer and O’Neal got possession of the houses on Brewster’s left and

were doing good execution, keeping their men well protected and pouring a

sharp fire into the enemy’s ranks. While Machado, leading on his natives

in the most gallant manner, had himself fallen; and his soldiers, after

his death, took small part in the engagement.

Thus, in a few moments, the Americans had possession of the Plaza and

all the houses around it, while the enemy shutting themselves up in the

buildings in the western part of the town, kept up an irregular fire from

the doors and windows, as well as from the loop-holes they soon began

to cut through the adobe walls. As for the Americans, after the first

enthusiasm of the attack had died away, it was impossible to get them to

storm the houses where the Costa Ricans were hiding from the deadly aim

of the riflemen. Many of the men, exhausted by the first charge, actually

set their muskets against the walls, and throwing themselves on the

ground, could scarcely be driven to any active exertion. When Col. Fry

came up with his reserve an effort was made to get them to charge down

the street to Mora’s house; but Fry and then Kewen—who as volunteer aid

acted gallantly during the day—urged the men in vain to the attack. The

depression of the companies, blown by the first onset, had its effect on

the fresh men; and it was impossible to get any portion of the force to

renew the attack with the vigor which marked its commencement.

The few Rangers, under Captain Waters, had dismounted early in the action

and had taken part in the conflict. Young Gillis, an impetuous lieutenant

under Waters, had already fallen; while the captain taking possession

of the tower of the church, on the east side of the Plaza, was able to

observe to advantage the movements of the enemy and to annoy them with

his rifles. Some of Sanders’ men were also placed on the roofs of the

houses to the west of the square, and were able to do execution from this

position. It soon became evident, however, that it might require days to

drive the Costa Ricans from the houses they occupied after their first

surprise was over, especially as the Nicaraguan force had no artillery,

and would have to depend on the pick and crow-bar for working through

the thick adobe walls of the town. Mora, it was clear, was closely

pressed, for at different times during the day the Costa Rican troops

from San Juan and Virgin Bay were observed entering Rivas. The president

had concentrated all the strength he had in the department to repel the

attack of the Americans.

But when the enemy saw the Nicaraguans made no advance, they assumed the

offensive and undertook to get into a house to the north of the Plaza,

whence they might pour a destructive fire into the American flank. This

movement was defeated by Lieutenant Gay with a number of others, officers

principally, who volunteered for the service. The gallantry of those

who went with Gray was, in its spirit, more like that of the knights of

feudal times than of the officers and soldiers of regular armies. Among

those with the young lieutenant were Rogers of the commissary department,

bearing the rank of major, Captain N. C. Breckenridge and Captain Huston.

There was no thought of rank, but each one went forth with his revolver,

ready to do the part of a true man in the fray. Not more than a dozen

went out to drive away upward of a hundred, and their charge swept the

enemy completely away. Gray and Huston fell, and Breckenridge received a

slight wound in the head; but the remainder of the party came off unhurt.

During the afternoon the enemy set fire to some of the houses held by

the Americans, and the fire of their rifles from a tower, in front of

Brewster’s command, interfered somewhat with free communication between

the east and west sides of the Plaza. As night, too, approached, the fire

from both sides slackened, each apparently exhausted by the excitement

and strife of the day. In the meanwhile, Walker was preparing to

withdraw, and after dark the wounded and disabled were moved over to

the church on the east side of the square. Then the several companies

were gradually gathered toward the same point, a few men being still

left in the burning houses to keep the enemy from embarrassing the

American movement. The surgeons examined the wounded, and those declared

mortally hurt were left in the church near the altar, while the others

were provided with horses for the march. It was past midnight when all

arrangements were completed, and the command slowly and silently defiled

from the town, the wounded in the centre, and Major Brewster commanding

the rear-guard.

Soon after daylight, the little force, weary and foot-sore, ragged, but

resolute, crossed the Gil Gonzales near Obraje, and halted for a short

rest. Their guide, Dr. Cole, and Macdonald, who had gone to Rivas as

a volunteer, were missing, although they had left the town with the

command. Nor was Captain Norvell Walker anywhere to be found. The rear

guard had been well commanded by Brewster, and his coolness and firmness

conduced much to the orderly character of the march. It was not until the

Americans were some miles beyond the Gil Gonzales that Captain Walker,

marching by himself, overtook the rear-guard, and showed by his story

that his absence was not due to any laxity of the guard in keeping up

stragglers. He had fallen asleep in the tower of the church on the Plaza

at Rivas, and not waking until daylight, was surprised to find himself

alone in a town occupied by the enemy. But the Costa Ricans had not, up

to the time he left, discovered that the Americans had retired: hence he

was able to escape with safety. Cole and Macdonald, overcome by fatigue,

wandered into a bye-path near Rivas to take rest. Finding themselves

separated from the Nicaraguan force they sought and obtained refuge from

a poor native, who kept them hid near San Jorge for a week. They did not

re-appear in Granada until ten days after the action.

On the night of the 12th the camp was again on the banks of the Ochomogo.

Col. Natzmer was sent forward to Granada with orders to have all the

disposable horses and mules, together with some provisions, brought to

Nandaime; and about noon of the 13th the force had reached the latter

village. Here the first report of the losses at Rivas was made by the

adjutant-general. The official report showed 58 killed, 62 wounded, and

13 missing. Most of the latter afterward came in; so that the whole loss

may be put at 120. A very large proportion of both the killed and wounded

were officers. Among the former were Captains Huston, Clinton, Horrell

and Linton, Lieutenants Morgan, Stoll, Gray, Doyle, Gillis and Winters;

of the latter were Captains Cook, Caycee and Anderson, Lieutenants Grist,

Jones, Jamieson, Leonard, Potter, Ayers, Latimer, Dolan and Anderson. The

loss of the enemy is difficult to determine: for the Central Americans

never, even to their own officers, state their losses accurately. But

there were probably near six hundred of the Costa Ricans put hors de

combat; two hundred killed and four hundred wounded. Their force at the

beginning of the action was upward of three thousand; and their losses

may be estimated by the wounded they afterward took away from Nicaragua.

From Nandaime to Granada the march was long and wearisome, in spite of

the additional facilities of transportation. Hence, it was near midnight

when the shattered forces of the Republic entered the capital. The

friends of the government in Granada were, however, awake, in order to

receive the force with every demonstration of respect and confidence. The

bells rang forth a joyful peal, rockets were sent up into the air, and

all appeared thankful for the services the army had rendered the State.

Although the Americans had not succeeded in driving the Costa Ricans

from Rivas, they had struck a blow which paralyzed the enemy. Mora was

surprised by the suddenness and the force of the attack made on him;

and the sight of the crowded hospitals at Rivas depressed the spirits

of his soldiers, new to the trials and sufferings of war. The people,

too, of the Meridional Department, as well as those of the Oriental and

Occidental, seeing the Americans were not intimidated by the numbers

brought against them, regained their confidence, somewhat lost by the

disgrace of Santa Rosa.

While Mora had marched into the Meridional Department, a body of 250

Costa Ricans had been sent to the Serapaqui in order to cut off Walker’s

communications by the San Juan river. Capt. Baldwin, a vigilant and

intelligent officer, was at Hipp’s Point when he ascertained the enemy

were cutting a road toward the river. He did not wait for the enemy to

reach him; but, ascending the Serapaqui, he vigorously assailed the

Costa Ricans while they were cutting the road, and drove them back with

large loss and in extreme confusion. He himself lost one killed, Lieut.

Rakestraw, and two wounded; while the enemy left more than twenty dead on

the field. This affair of the Serapaqui took place on the 10th of April;

and the routed Costa Ricans did not stop in their flight until they had

fallen back to San José.

Immediately on reaching Granada the general-in-chief wrote to the

President at Leon a detailed statement of the action at Rivas; and a

day or two afterward he sent Mr. Fabens with letters to Don Patricio,

suggesting the appointment of Father Vigil as Minister to the United

States. The President replied to the letter concerning the engagement

with the Costa Ricans, thanking the army, in the name of the Republic,

for the courage and the conduct it had shown in the attack on the

invaders of Nicaragua; and Mr. Fabens brought back with him the

credentials and instructions of Vigil as Minister. The latter forthwith

got ready to leave for San Juan del Norte in company with Mr. John P.

Heiss. The priest agreed to leave his easy home in the tropics for the

purpose of explaining properly to the cabinet at Washington the nature of

the events occurring in Central America.

During the absence of the main body of the army on the expedition

to Rivas, Schlessinger had been left at Granada on parole. He had

an opportunity to regain, to some extent, his lost character, by

volunteering to march with the Americans against the enemy. But he

did not take advantage of the occasion; on the contrary, he remained

to acquire, if possible, new infamy by adding desertion to his former

crimes. The court martial which was ordered to try him, found him guilty

of all the charges brought against him; and he was sentenced to be shot,

and to be published throughout the civilized world. He afterward joined

a body of the Legitimists acting against the Americans, and in such

society he sank, by the way he permitted himself to be treated, beneath

the contempt of the lowest soldier in even a Central American army. He is

now fallen so far that it would be an unworthy act to execute on him the

sentence of an honorable court.

After the return of the Americans to Granada an enemy fiercer and more

malignant than the Costa Ricans began to ravage their thinned ranks.

The fever which had before carried off many, re-appeared in an even

aggravated form. Major Brewster was one of its first victims; and few

could have been more missed than he. He had the calmness of spirit no

danger disturbed; and it was only in the hour of trial and misfortune

his full value could be known. It was the loss of officers—dying just as

they began to be formed, and as their character and value began to be

known—which prevented the American force from acquiring the discipline

and steady virtue it might otherwise have attained. During the earlier

as well as the later stages of the war in Nicaragua, it was the officer,

ambitious of gaining a knowledge of his profession, and zealous in the

pursuit of duty, who was most apt to seek the post of danger, and was

therefore most likely to fall by the bullets of the enemy; and at times,

too, it seemed as if disease also seized on such with more avidity than

it did on others who might have been better spared.

New-comers, however, began to arrive to take the place of those cut off

by battle and disease. On the morning of the 21st of April the steamer

arrived at Granada with about two hundred men in charge of General

Hornsby, who had been absent on business in the United States. As the

Americans had been re-organized after the 13th in two battalions, one

rifle, the other light infantry, the new recruits were formed into a

second infantry battalion, with Leonidas McIntosh as major, and James

Walker and James Mullen as captains. Upward of twenty men had come at

their own expense to Granada, and they were enlisted for four months,

and put into the rangers under Captain Davenport. This addition to the

numbers of the army of course re-animated the old troops—for some of

them, considering the services they had seen, might with propriety be

called old troops; and after the arrival of the new men all were as eager

as ever to march against the enemy at Rivas.

And while the Nicaraguan force was increasing, that of Costa Rica was

rapidly sinking from the double cancers of cholera and desertion.

When the Americans retired from Rivas, the Costa Ricans were encumbered

with so many dead that instead of regularly burying the bodies they threw

them into the wells of the town. Their surgical staff, too, was weak;

and the hospitals being crowded and ill-regulated, the festering sores

of the wounded soldiers tended to produce disease even if the cholera

had not appeared. The epidemic which began to prey on their camp soon

after the 11th of April, was probably the same _colerin_ that attacked

the Democrats at San Juan del Sur the year before, and afterward troubled

the Americans at Virgin Bay. The spasms of this form of disease are not

so violent as those of the Asiatic cholera, nor does the patient sink so

rapidly. Its fatal effects were increased in the Costa Rican camp by the

general depression of spirits which pervaded the officers as well as the

men after they saw the results of the first conflict with the enemy they

had come to drive, as they imagined, by easy marches, and by the mere

force of their numbers, out of Central America.

Walker soon heard, through the people of San Jorge, the condition of the

Costa Rican camp. Far from receiving recruits from the Nicaraguans, all

fled the infected town. Mora began to build barricades as soon as the

Americans retired; and this of itself showed fear of another attack.

But when cholera and desertion supervened, the invader lost the hope of

holding his ground even behind the adobes of Rivas. Nor was it possible

for the Costa Rican officers to conceal from the soldiers the fact

that the Americans were receiving reinforcements. Increased depression

followed the growing apprehension of attack; and the pestilence found

its victims each day yielding more readily to his deadly grasp. Then,

too, there were vague rumors of movements in Costa Rica against the rule

of the Moras. The people, beginning to feel the burden of the war, were

asking why it was made; and the party which had for years been banished

from the business of the State, was heard to raise its voice against the

unjust war an ambitious executive was waging for the increase of his own

personal power. D. Rafael Mora saw he must leave Rivas and return to San

José; so, placing his brother-in-law, General José Maria Cañas, in charge

of the army, with orders to lead it back to Costa Rica, the troubled

President mounted his horse, and almost alone took the road to Guanacaste.

It was no part of the Nicaraguan general’s plan to waste his strength on

an army which was being effectually destroyed by other causes; so he did

not move from Granada until he heard the Costa Ricans were preparing to

abandon Rivas. Then putting the rifle and light infantry battalions on

the lake steamer, he proceeded with them to Virgin Bay. The battalions

were landed as quickly as the charred and ruined state of the wharf

admitted; and the order was given to advance along the familiar Transit

road toward San Juan del Sur. But the force had gone not quite a league

when a breathless messenger rode up to inform the general that Cañas was

already marching with rapid and disorderly steps toward the La Flor.

At the same time the messenger bore a letter addressed to “Wm. Walker,

General-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Army,” signed “José Maria Cañas,

General-in-chief of the Costa Rican Army,” and couched in the following

terms: “Obliged to abandon the Plaza of Rivas, on account of the

appearance of the cholera in a most alarming form, I am forced to leave

here a certain number of sick it is impossible to carry away without

danger to their lives; but I expect your generosity will treat them with

all the attention and care their situation requires. I invoke the laws of

humanity in favor of these unfortunate victims of an awful calamity, and

I have the honor of proposing to you to exchange them when they get well,

for more than twenty prisoners who are now in our power, and whose names

I will send you in a detailed list for making the exchange. Believing

that this, my proposal, will be admitted, according to the laws of war,

I have the honor of subscribing myself, with feelings of the highest

consideration, your obedient servant.” It is needless to add, that the

surgeons immediately received orders to take charge of the sick of the

enemy wherever found.

Such, then, was the conclusion of the first act in the war of

extermination. Had the Nicaraguan chief been a proud man, or one capable

of rejoicing in the humiliation of a foe, he might have been excused for

some elation of spirit at receiving the letter of Cañas. The enemy which,

not two months before, had declared war against the “filibusters,” and

ordered all taken with arms in their hands to be shot, now supplicated

the commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan army to spare the lives of the

suffering soldiers left behind at Rivas. The victims of the murderous

court-martial at Santa Rosa, the bayonet stabs inflicted on the wounded

prisoners found near the altar of the church at Rivas, the insults to the

bodies of the brave dead who gave up their lives on the 11th of April,

for a country theirs only by adoption, were to be avenged by mercy, and

care, and attention, bestowed on the sick and wounded of those who had

done the wrongs. It was a revenge such as the Americans might well be

proud of—not unworthy either of the cause they advocated, or of the race

from which they sprang.

It is scarcely necessary to follow the Costa Ricans in their sad and

dreary march from San Juan to San José. The path to the La Flor was

blocked with the bodies of stragglers who had fallen behind when the

fatal spasms seized them, and prevented them from returning with their

comrades. Nor did the scourge cease to pursue them when they entered the

territory of Guanacaste. It tracked them to San José, and so well was its

work of destruction done, that not more than five hundred of the brave

array which had gone forth to exterminate the “filibusters,” returned to

the capital of the Republic. Then the pestilence turning from the army it

had almost wholly devoured, sought its prey among the peaceful families

of the land. Young and old, women and children, succumbed to the disease,

and some estimate that as many as fourteen thousand died from its

effects. Probably, however, the more moderate estimate of ten thousand

might cover all the loss to the population of the State.

While the Costa Ricans were occupying Rivas, it was reported that the

Legitimists were attempting to raise men in the District of Chontales,

and in the departments of Matagalpa and Segovia. Goicouria was sent with

Captain Raymond’s company to scour the hills of Chontales; and meeting

a small collection of the old Granadinos at Acoyapa, he scattered them

in the course of a few moments. Then traversing the greater part of the

district, he returned to Granada, and reported all quiet on the other

side of the lake. Valle, who was military governor of Segovia, readily

dispersed the Legitimists who made some show of a movement near Somoto

Grande; while Mariano Salazar, sent by the government as commissioner

to Matagalpa, pacified the Indians of that region, and returned with his

command to Leon. Thus, in a few weeks, order and quiet were restored to

the whole Republic, and the commands of the provisional government were

respected in all parts of the State.

In the Meridional Department it was necessary to make examples of some

Legitimists who had marched with the Costa Ricans from Guanacaste to

invade the Republic. A principal one of these was Francisco Ugarte, who

had been married to a sister of Dr. Cole’s wife. The general-in-chief

heard that Ugarte remained in the department after the departure of the

enemy; and a detachment sent in search of the traitor, found him and

brought him to headquarters. He was tried by a military commission, and

ordered to be hung. This mode of punishment for such offenders being

unusual in the country—shooting being resorted to rather than hanging—the

execution of Ugarte made a strong impression on the people, and infused

a salutary dread of American justice among the plotting Legitimists. As

there had been some questions concerning the guardianship of Ugarte’s

children, and the administration of their mother’s estate between him

and his connections, the natives generally attributed the arrest of the

criminal to information derived from his wife’s brother-in-law, Dr. Cole;

and the prevalence of the suspicion indicates that the people were not

unaccustomed to see adherence to a party, or proposed devotion to the

public interests, made the stalking-horse for the gratification of family

feuds and personal passions.

For two or three weeks after the departure of Cañas from Rivas, the

main body of the Americans were kept at Virgin Bay, detachments being

constantly sent to different points of the department, with a view of

restoring confidence in the strength of the Rivas administration. The

fever was fierce at Granada, carrying off many of those who had lately

reached the country. After some days, too, the cholera or colerin

appeared at Virgin Bay, and numbers died from it there. Nor were the

resident Americans or the soldiers the only victims of fever and

cholera at this time. The owners of the Transit not having made proper

arrangements for their line, the passengers for California who had come

to San Juan del Norte, in April, were obliged to remain in Nicaragua

a whole month. Many of these passengers being destitute of means, and

irregular in their course of life, readily yielded to the fever then

prevailing at Granada; and the reports they gave of the country, thrown

into it as they were without any of the common comforts of civilization,

prevented many from going thither. It was not until the 19th of May,

that the steamer arrived at San Juan del Sur, and gave these suffering

passengers a chance to go to San Francisco.

In spite, however, of the sickness which prevailed among the Americans,

their spirits were good and their hopes high. To the casual observer the

political elements appeared at rest, and all seemed more tranquil than at

any time since the treaty of the 23d of October. The common people, with

their strong religious instinct, thought that Providence had sent the

cholera in order to drive the Costa Ricans from the soil. The Americans

with that faith in themselves which has carried them in a wonderfully

short period from one ocean to another, regarded their establishment in

Nicaragua as fixed beyond the control of casualties. But to him who knows

that great changes in states and societies are not wrought without long

and severe labor, the difficulties of the Americans in Nicaragua might

appear to be only beginning. To destroy an old political organization is

a comparatively easy task, and little besides force is requisite for its

accomplishment; but to build up and re-constitute society—to gather the

materials from the four quarters, and construct them into an harmonious

whole, fitted for the uses of a new civilization—requires more than

force, more even than genius for the work, and agents with which to

complete it. Time and patience, as well as skill and labor, are needed

for success; and they who undertake it, must be willing to devote a

lifetime to the work.

At that time there was one man at least in Nicaragua who saw that the

path of the Americans was even then beset with thorns. Edmund Randolph,

who since the beginning of April, had been in the Occidental Department,

came down to Virgin Bay to take passage for New-York. During his stay

at Leon and Realejo he had been very ill, almost dead at one time,

from an affection of the liver; but in the intervals of his painful

sickness, his quick eye had seen an under-current in the affairs of the

provisional government. On the 20th of May, just before leaving for San

Juan del Norte, he told Walker there was something wrong at Leon; but

that confined as he was to his bed he had not the means of ascertaining

precisely what was the nature of the evil.

Nor was the information given by Randolph unsupported by other facts. A

day or two before the Costa Ricans evacuated Rivas, a courier from Leon

had been brought to Granada, and on him were found letters directed to

His Excellency, D. Juan Rafael Mora. Walker, on opening these letters,

was surprised to find them signed by Patricio Rivas; and one was an

official communication from the government stating that it desired to

send a commissioner to treat for peace. Of course the general-in-chief

detained the courier and the letters, he well knowing that Mora was about

to abandon the town of Rivas. The Provisional President in his letters to

Walker from Leon, said nothing about these communications with the enemy

for some days; and the fact that he had sent such letters to Mora without

advising with the general-in-chief was suspicious.

It became, therefore, highly important for the Americans to ascertain

the state of affairs at Leon. Hence as soon as the mails for California

and the Atlantic States had been despatched, Walker determined to repair

to the Occidental Department. The events which transpired at Leon in

consequence of that visit present another and a new phase of the war in

Nicaragua.

Chapter Seventh.

THE DEFECTION OF RIVAS.

One of the avowed objects of Jerez in desiring the Provisional President

to remove to Leon was to establish friendly relations with the states

to the north and particularly with San Salvador. Accordingly, even

before the departure of Rivas from Granada, commissioners were sent to

Cojutepeque for the purpose of explaining to the cabinet of San Salvador

the actual condition of affairs in Nicaragua. But the commissioners

met with a cold reception; and on the 7th of May the government of San

Salvador sent a communication to the Provisional President declaring that

the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua threatened the independence

of Central America. The tone of the communication was so insulting that

D. Patricio Rivas refused to make any reply. After, however, the retreat

of the Costa Ricans from Rivas was known at Cojutepeque the news from

San Salvador became more pacific; but soon came news that Guatemala

was preparing troops to march against Nicaragua. So frequent and so

circumstantial did these reports become, that on the 3d of June Rivas

published a proclamation to the people declaring that the troops of

Carrera were marching against the State, and calling on all to take up

arms for the Republic.

On the 31st of May, Walker, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson in

command of two hundred Rifles, and by Captain Waters with two companies

of Rangers, left Granada for Leon; and Gen. Goicouria, who fancied

he understood native character because he spoke Spanish, joined the

general-in-chief in the excursion to the north. Not far from Masaya the

party was met by D. Mariano Salazar, who came to inform Walker of the

authenticity of the reports from Guatemala and of the necessity for a

portion of the American force to protect the northern frontier. Salazar

represented that the people of the Occidental Department were bitter in

their hostility to the troops of Carrera and might be depended on for

resisting their entrance into the State; but as the Guatemalan force was

said to be large and well organized, it was necessary to have some of the

Rifles at Leon ready to meet it.

Walker arrived at Leon on the 4th of June, and was received in the most

enthusiastic manner. At the entrance to the town, he was met by all

the dignitaries of the government and of the department. The streets

through which he passed were filled with crowds of the people, shouting

a welcome to their deliverers, as they styled the Americans; and the

doors and windows of the houses were thronged with women dressed in all

the colors of the rainbow. A feast had been prepared for the occasion;

but before taking his seat at table the general-in-chief was called

to the court-yard of the house where he was quartered, and there had

gathered the women of every age and every condition to thank him for

the protection the Americans had given to their homes. In the evening

the musicians came to sing songs in praise of American valor, and the

local rhymsters of the place—of whom there were not a few—poured forth

the sonorous sounds of Castilian verse in glory of the strangers who

had delivered Nicaragua from the oppressions of her enemies. All seemed

to vie with each other in their demonstrations of respect and good-will

toward the Rifles and Rangers.

But in the midst of the general joy, it was easy to see that some

of those connected with the government were not well pleased at the

enthusiasm shown by the people. The face of Jerez had a cloud over it,

and he appeared anxious and nervous; nor did Rivas seem as much at ease

in the presence of Walker as he had formerly been. The threatening

attitude of San Salvador and the rumored march of the troops of Carrera

alarmed the Provisional President, and it was evident that Jerez did

not strive to diminish the apprehensions of Rivas. Soon after Walker

reached Leon the President told him the cabinet of Cojutepeque had

proposed the reduction of the American force in the service of Nicaragua

to two hundred men, and had intimated that if the proposal were accepted

relations would be established with the provisional government. The

manner in which Rivas spoke of the proposal indicated that he was not

averse to the plan, but the reply of Walker that such a proposition

could be entertained only when the State was ready to pay the men it

discharged, showed the President he need not expect the general-in-chief

to co-operate in the policy suggested by San Salvador.

During the month of April an election had been called for president as

well as for senators and representatives. An election had taken place

at different times during the month of May, in several of the districts

of the State, but the irregularity in the voting had been such and the

condition of the Republic was so disturbed that all parties considered

the election as invalid. Little or no attention was paid to it, and as

quiet now prevailed throughout the State, the propriety of a decree for

a new election was being discussed at the time Walker left Granada for

Leon. The votes polled in May were mostly in the Occidental Department,

and were divided between Jerez, Rivas, and Salazar. The Granadinos,

alarmed at this and fearful that the seat of government might be

permanently fixed at Leon, were speaking of Walker as the fit person for

the presidency, while the Republic was threatened with invasion by the

adjacent States. When the general-in-chief reached Leon the question of

calling an election was also discussed there, and he was surprised to

find the President and Jerez, who had a few weeks before insisted on an

election, now hostile to the measure. The only minister who seemed at all

friendly to the proposition for a new election was D. Sebastian Salinas,

then holding the portfolio of Relations. Walker urged the President

to call the election, for he saw that Don Patricio was frightened

by appearances in the north, and could not be relied on to face the

coalition preparing against Nicaragua, and he thought it prudent to have

the election called while the State was comparatively quiet and before it

was more seriously menaced.

While this decree was being discussed news reached Leon of the

reception of Father Vigil by the United States government as Minister

from Nicaragua. At the same time the arrival of Col. Jaquess at Granada

with about one hundred and eighty men, was announced. Hereafter it may

be necessary to examine the manner of Vigil’s reception and the causes

which led to it; at present the fact is merely stated in order to show

the effect it had on the deliberations at Leon. Of course it strengthened

the American influence in Nicaragua, and while it tended to make the

prospect of hostilities from San Salvador more remote, it gave an

additional reason for fixing the government on affirm basis by an appeal

to the popular will; attended, too, by an addition to the numbers of the

Americans, it made the friends of the election stronger than before.

Several circumstances, in the meanwhile, occurred to show the

disaffection of many of the principal men toward the Americans. D.

Mariano Salazar, as Walker ascertained after reaching Leon, had made

a sale of some brazil-wood he owned to the government, on terms

advantageous to himself, and tending to diminish the receipts of the

customs at Realejo. In the actual condition of affairs it was necessary

for the State to get every cent of revenue possible; and hence it was

reprehensible for a friend of the government, and especially for a

military officer, to speculate on the necessities of the Republic. Under

the army regulations derived from the old Spanish service, it was not

permitted for an officer to contract with the State, unless with the

permission of the general-in-chief. Hence Walker, to rebuke the act

of Salazar, put him under arrest, and kept him in his house for some

hours. Several of the leading persons of the city came to intercede for

Salazar during his short arrest, and endeavored to excuse his act as

not unusual in the country; and it was easy to see that they were not

at all favorable to an authority which aimed to protect the State from

contractors and speculators.

The Sunday after reaching Leon, Goicouria proposed to call together

the chief persons of the city and converse freely with them about the

state of affairs. He constantly labored under the delusion that he

knew the natives, whereas he always under-estimated the capacity of

the leaders and the virtues of the people. But he got a number of the

prominent politicians together, and gave them a rambling discourse on his

ideas—most crude they were—of re-organizing the country. He touched on

the ecclesiastical authority, and suggested an application to the Pope

for the appointment of a Bishop who might be free from the metropolitan

of Guatemala. The suggestion was innocent enough in itself, but D.

José Guerrero, a wily intriguer who once, while Director, had got up a

revolution against his own government as an excuse for prolonging his

authority, distorted Goicouria’s suggestion into such a shape that it

was soon reported through the city the Americans aimed to draw Nicaragua

from the jurisdiction of the Roman See. Goicouria expected to influence

the ambition of the higher clergy, by placing before them visions of

the mitre and the crosier, but a more dexterous politician than himself

managed to turn his suggestion to his own disadvantage. The fact is,

the natives disliked Goicouria because they took him for a Spaniard,

and the Nicaraguans hate the Spaniards more than they do any other

foreigners. Of course the general-in-chief knew nothing of Goicouria’s

suggestion until after it was made; his policy had always been to leave

the church entirely to the management of its own affairs. But it was easy

for the disaffected to make Goicouria’s speech appear the inspiration

of his commanding officer; and the reports circulated about this silly

meeting showed Walker that there were many in Leon desirous of exciting

popular passions and prejudices against the Americans. Those, too,

whose loyalty to the Americans was beyond doubt, were every day telling

the general-in-chief that certain agencies were at work to destroy the

confidence of the people in the naturalized Nicaraguans. Valle, who was

rather superciliously treated by the educated leaders, because he could

not read or write, insisted that no faith was to be put in the friendly

professions of many who owed power to the will of the general-in-chief.

D. Nasario Escoto, also, who had succeeded Castellon in the provisional

government, previous to the treaty of peace, said no reliance should be

placed on the firmness of the persons then directing the government. In

fact, all things tended to show that, in case Nicaragua were invaded by

San Salvador and Guatemala, the Americans might find the machinery of

the government they had created and sustained turned against themselves.

Hence, unless disposed to carry off Rivas as a prisoner—and thereby the

whole moral force of his government would have been lost—it was necessary

for the welfare of the Americans that a new election should be called.

Finally, after much deliberation, the decree calling an immediate

election was drawn up in full cabinet session, and was signed on Tuesday

the 10th of June. Walker proposed to leave for Granada early on the

morning of the 11th. The evening before his departure he was visited

several times by Jerez, who had an anxious and nervous manner not unusual

with him. Three or four times he called in the course of as many hours;

and there was much conversation between him and the general-in-chief

relative to another minister to the United States, as it was thought

Father Vigil would prefer returning to Nicaragua. Jerez himself had been

spoken of for the place, and Walker mentioned to him that if he desired

it the appointment might be urged on Don Patricio. Afterward the minister

remarked, “My visit to the United States is then decided on;” but in

such a tone as intimated it might be an excuse to get rid of him. The

immediate reply was, his appointment should be pressed only in case he

desired it. This incident serves to show the temper of Jerez, and points

out the influences which wrought on the pliable mind of Rivas.

Early on the morning of the 11th Walker left Leon escorted by the

Rangers and leaving Anderson’s Rifles with Col. Natzmer in the city.

The President and many others of the chief citizens of the department

accompanied him several miles on his journey; and at parting Don Patricio

affectionately embraced the general-in-chief, remarking with moist eyes

that he might be depended on in every emergency. Salazar, in spite of

the arrest, was also of the party; but Jerez was absent. All cordially

saluted the general; and the latter proceeded to Managua where he

remained over night, and the next day arrived at Masaya early in the

afternoon.