from Rome to other parts of Italy, the Romans again took courage and
sent out armies and generals. Of those the most remarkable were Fabius
Maximus and Claudius Marcellus, both equally admirable, but from an
entirely different point of view. Marcellus, as has been related in his
Life, was a man of activity and high spirit, rejoicing in a hand-to-hand
fight, and just like the lordly warriors of Homer. With a truly
venturesome audacity, he in his first battles outdid in boldness even
the bold Hannibal himself; while Fabius, on the other hand, was
convinced that his former reasoning was true, and believed that without
any one fighting or even meddling with Hannibal, his army would wear
itself out and consume away, just as the body of an athlete when
overstrained and exerted soon loses its fine condition. For this reason
Poseidonius calls Fabius the shield, and Marcellus the sword of Rome,
because the steadiness of Fabius, combined with the warlike ardour of
Marcellus, proved the saving of the state. Hannibal, frequently meeting
Marcellus, who was like a raging torrent, had his forces shaken and
weakened; while Fabius, like a deep quiet river kept constantly
undermining them and wasting them away unperceived. Hannibal was at
length reduced to such extremities that he was weary of fighting
Marcellus, and feared Fabius even though he did not fight: for these
were the persons whom he generally had to deal with, as praetors,
consuls, or pro-consuls, for each of them was five times consul. He drew
Marcellus, when consul for the fifth time, into an ambuscade; but
although he tried every art and stratagem upon Fabius he could effect
nothing, except once, when he very nearly succeeded in ruining him. He
forged letters from the leading citizens of Metapontum, and then sent
them to Fabius. These letters were to the effect that the city would
surrender if he appeared before it, and that the conspirators were only
waiting for his approach. Fabius was so much moved by these letters as
to take a part of his army and commence a night march thither; but
meeting with unfavourable omens on the way he turned back, and soon
afterwards learned that the letters were a stratagem of Hannibal's, who
was waiting for him under the city walls. This escape one may attribute
to the favour of Heaven.
XX. In the case of revolts and insurrections among the subject cities
and allies, Fabius thought it best to restrain them and discountenance
their proceedings in a gentle manner, not treating every suspected
person with harshness, or inquiring too strictly into every case of
suspected disloyalty. It is said that a Marsian soldier, one of the
chief men of the allies for bravery and nobility of birth, was
discovered by Fabius to be engaged in organizing a revolt. Fabius showed
no sign of anger, but admitted that he had not been treated with the
distinction he deserved, and said that in the present instance he should
blame his officers for distributing rewards more by favour than by
merit; but that in future he should be vexed with him if he did not
apply directly to himself when he had any request to make. Saying this,
he presented him with a war horse and other marks of honour, so that
thenceforth the man always served him with the utmost zeal and fidelity.
He thought it a shame that trainers of horses and dogs should be able to
tame the savage spirit of those animals by careful attention and
education rather than by whips and clogs, and yet that a commander of
men should not rely chiefly on mild and conciliatory measures, but treat
them more harshly than gardeners treat the wild fig-trees, wild pears,
and wild olives, which they by careful cultivation turn into trees
bearing good fruit. His captains informed him that a certain soldier, a
Lucanian by birth, was irregular and often absent from his duty. He made
inquiries as to what his general conduct was. All agreed that it would
be difficult to find a better soldier, and related some of his exploits.
Fabius at length discovered that the cause of his absence was that he
was in love with a certain girl, and that he continually ran the risk of
making long journeys from the camp to meet her. Without the knowledge of
the soldier, he sent and apprehended this girl, whom he concealed in his
own tent. Then he invited the Lucanian to a private interview, and
addressed him as follows:--"You have been observed frequently to pass
the night outside of the camp, contrary to the ancient practice and
discipline of the Roman army: but also, you have been observed to be a
brave man. Your crime is atoned for by your valiant deeds, but for the
future I shall commit you to the custody of another person." Then, to
the astonishment of the soldier, he led the girl forward, joined their
hands, and said: "This lady pledges her word that you will remain in the
camp with us. You must prove by your conduct that it was not from any
unworthy motive, for which she was the pretext, but solely through love
for her that you used to desert your post." This is the story which is
related about him.
XXI. Fabius obtained possession of Tarentum by treachery in the
following manner. In his army was a young man of Tarentum whose sister
was devotedly attached to him. Her lover was a Bruttian, and one of the
officers of Hannibal's garrison there. This gave the Tarentine hopes of
effecting his purpose, and with the consent of Fabius he went into the
city, being commonly supposed to have run away to see his sister. For
the first few days the Bruttian remained in his quarters, as she wished
her amour with him not to be known to her brother. He then, however,
said: "There was a rumour in the army that you were intimate with one of
the chiefs of the garrison. Who is he? for if he is as they say, a man
of courage and distinction--war, which throws everything into confusion,
will care little what countryman he may be. Nothing is disgraceful which
we cannot avoid; but it is a blessing, at a time when justice has no
power, that we should yield to a not disagreeable necessity." Upon this
the lady sent for her Bruttian admirer and introduced him to her
brother. He, by encouraging the stranger in his passion, and assuring
him that he would induce his sister to look favourably on it, had no
difficulty in inducing the man, who was a mercenary soldier, to break
his faith in expectation of the great rewards which he was promised by
Fabius. This is the account given of the transaction by most writers,
though some say that the lady by whose means the Bruttian was seduced
from his allegiance was not a Tarentine, but a Bruttian by race, who was
on intimate terms with Fabius; and that as soon as she discovered that a
fellow-countryman and acquaintance of hers was in command of the
Bruttian garrison, told Fabius of it, and by interviews which she had
with the officer outside the walls gradually won him over to the Roman
interests.
XXII. While these negotiations were in progress, Fabius, wishing to
contrive something to draw Hannibal away, sent orders to the troops at
Rhegium to ravage the Bruttian country and take Caulonia by storm. The
troops at Rhegium were a body of eight thousand men, mostly deserters:
and the most worthless of those disgraced soldiers whom Marcellus
brought from Sicily, so that their loss would not cause any sorrow or
harm to Rome; while he hoped that by throwing them out as a bait to
Hannibal he might draw him away from Tarentum, as indeed he did.
Hannibal at once started with his army to attack them, and meanwhile, on
the sixth day after Fabius arrived before Tarentum, the young man having
previously concerted measures with the Bruttian and his sister, came to
him by night and told him that all was ready; knowing accurately and
having well inspected the place where the Bruttian would be ready to
open the gate and let in the besiegers. Fabius would not depend entirely
upon the chance of treachery; but though he himself went quietly to the
appointed place, the rest of the army attacked the town both by sea and
land, with great clamour and disturbance, until, when most of the
Tarentines had run to repel the assault, the Bruttian gave the word to
Fabius, and, mounting his scaling ladders, he took the place. On this
occasion Fabius seems to have acted unworthily of his reputation, for he
ordered the chief Bruttian officers to be put to the sword, that it
might not be said that he gained the place by treachery. However, he
did not obtain this glory, and gained a reputation for faithlessness and
cruelty. Many of the Tarentines were put to death, thirty thousand were
sold for slaves, and the city was sacked by the soldiers. Three thousand
talents were brought into the public treasury.
While everything else was being carried off, it is said that the clerk
who was taking the inventory asked Fabius what his pleasure was with
regard to the gods, meaning the statues and pictures. Fabius replied,
"Let us leave the Tarentines their angry gods." However, he took the
statue of Hercules from Tarentum and placed it in the Capitol, and near
to it he placed a brazen statue of himself on horseback, acting in this
respect much worse than Marcellus, or rather proving that Marcellus was
a man of extraordinary mildness and generosity of temper, as is shown in
his Life.
XXIII. Hannibal is said to have been hastening to relieve Tarentum, and
to have been within five miles of it when it was taken. He said aloud:
"So then, the Romans also have a Hannibal; we have lost Tarentum just as
we gained it." Moreover in private he acknowledged to his friends that
he had long seen that it was very difficult, and now thought it
impossible for them to conquer Italy under existing circumstances.
Fabius enjoyed a second triumph for this success, which was more
glorious than his first. He had contended with Hannibal and easily
baffled all his attempts just as a good wrestler disengages himself with
ease from the clutches of an antagonist whose strength is beginning to
fail him; for Hannibal's army was no longer what it had been, being
partly corrupted by luxury and plunder, and partly also worn out by
unremitting toils and battles.
One Marcus Livius had been in command of Tarentum when Hannibal obtained
possession of it. In spite of this, he held the citadel, from which he
could not be dislodged, until Tarentum was recaptured by the Romans.
This man was vexed at the honours paid to Fabius, and once, in a
transport of envy and vain glory, he said before the Senate that he, not
Fabius, was the real author of the recapture of the town. Fabius with a
smile answered: "Very true; for if you had not lost the place, I could
never have recaptured it."
XXIV. The Romans, among many other marks of respect for Fabius, elected
his son consul. When he had entered on this office and was making some
arrangements for the conduct of the war, his father, either because of
his age and infirmities or else intending to try his son, mounted on
horseback and rode towards him through the crowd of bystanders. The
young man seeing him at a distance would not endure this slight, but
sent a lictor to bid his father dismount and come on foot, if he wanted
anything of the consul. Those present were vexed at this order, and
looked on Fabius in silence, as if they thought that he was unworthily
treated, considering his great reputation: but he himself instantly
alighted, ran to his son, and embracing him, said: "You both think and
act rightly, my son; for you know whom you command, and how great an
office you hold. Thus it was that we and our ancestors made Rome great,
by thinking less of our parents and of our children than of the glory of
our country." It is even said to be true that the great grandfather of
Fabius, although he had been consul five times, had finished several
campaigns with splendid triumphs, and was one of the most illustrious
men in Rome, yet acted as lieutenant to his son when consul in the
field, and that in the subsequent triumph the son drove into Rome in a
chariot and four, while he with the other officers followed him on
horseback, glorying in the fact that although he was his son's master,
and although he was and was accounted the first citizen in Rome, yet he
submitted himself to the laws and the chief magistrate. Nor did he
deserve admiration for this alone.
Fabius had the misfortune to lose his son, and this he bore with
fortitude, as became a man of sense and an excellent parent. He himself
pronounced the funeral oration which is always spoken by some relative
on the deaths of illustrious men, and afterwards he wrote a copy of his
speech and distributed it to his friends.
XXV. Cornelius Scipio meanwhile had been sent to Spain, where he had
defeated the Carthaginians in many battles and driven them out of the
country, and had also overcome many tribes, taken many cities, and done
glorious deeds for Rome. On his return he was received with great honour
and respect, and, feeling that the people expected some extraordinary
exploit from him, he decided that it was too tame a proceeding to fight
Hannibal in Italy, and determined to pour troops into Africa, attack
Carthage, and transfer the theatre of war from Italy to that country. He
bent all his energies to persuade the people to approve of this project,
but was violently opposed by Fabius, who spread great alarm through the
city, pointing out that it was being exposed to great danger by a
reckless young man, and endeavouring by every means in his power to
prevent the Romans from adopting Scipio's plan. He carried his point
with the Senate, but the people believed that he was envious of Scipio's
prosperity and desired to check him, because he feared that if he did
gain some signal success, and either put an end to the war altogether or
remove it from Italy, he himself might be thought a feeble and dilatory
general for not having finished the war in so many campaigns.
It appears that at first Fabius opposed him on grounds of prudence and
caution, really fearing the dangers of his project, but that the contest
gradually became a personal one, and he was moved by feelings of
jealousy to hinder the rise of Scipio; for he tried to induce Crassus,
Scipio's colleague, not to give up the province of Africa to Scipio, but
if the expedition were determined on, to go thither himself, and he
prevented his being supplied with funds for the campaign. Scipio being
thus compelled to raise funds himself, obtained them from the cities in
Etruria which were devoted to his interests. Crassus likewise was not
inclined to quarrel with him, and was also obliged to remain in Italy by
his office of Pontifex Maximus.
XXVI. Fabius now tried another method to oppose Scipio. He dissuaded the
youth of the city from taking service with him by continually
vociferating in all public meetings that Scipio not only was himself
running away from Hannibal, but also was about to take all the remaining
forces of Italy out of the country with him, deluding the young men
with vain hopes, and so persuading them to leave their parents and
wives, and their city too, while a victorious and invincible enemy was
at its very gates. By these representations he alarmed the Romans, who
decreed that Scipio should only use the troops in Sicily, and three
hundred of the best men of his Spanish army. In this transaction Fabius
seems to have acted according to the dictates of his own cautious
disposition.
However, when Scipio crossed over into Africa, news came to Rome at once
of great and glorious exploits performed and great battles won. As
substantial proof of these there came many trophies of war, and the king
of Numidia as a captive. Two camps were burned and destroyed, with great
slaughter of men, and loss of horses and war material in the flames.
Embassies also were sent to Hannibal from Carthage, begging him in
piteous terms to abandon his fruitless hopes in Italy and come home to
help them, while in Rome the name of Scipio was in every man's mouth
because of his successes. At this period Fabius proposed that a
successor to Scipio should be sent out, without having any reason to
allege for it except the old proverb that it is dangerous to entrust
such important operations to the luck of one man, because it is hard for
the same man always to be lucky. This proposal of his offended most of
his countrymen, who thought him a peevish and malignant old man, or else
that he was timid and spiritless from old age, and excessively terrified
at Hannibal; for, even when Hannibal quitted Italy and withdrew his
forces, Fabius would not permit the joy of his countrymen to be unmixed
with alarm, as he informed them that now the fortunes of Rome were in a
more critical situation than ever, because Hannibal would be much more
to be dreaded in Africa under the walls of Carthage itself, where he
would lead an army, yet reeking with the blood of many Roman dictators,
consuls and generals, to attack Scipio. By these words the city was
again filled with terror, and although the war had been removed to
Africa yet its alarms seemed to have come nearer to Rome.
XXVII. However Scipio, after no long time, defeated Hannibal in a
pitched battle and crushed the pride of Carthage under foot. He gave
the Romans the enjoyment of a success beyond their hopes, and truly
"Restored the city, shaken by the storm."
Fabius Maximus did not survive till the end of the war, nor did he live
to hear of Hannibal's defeat, or see the glorious and lasting prosperity
of his country, for about the time when Hannibal left Italy he fell sick
and died.
The Thebans, we are told, buried Epameinondas at the public expense,
because he died so poor that they say nothing was found in his house
except an iron spit. Fabius was not honoured by the Romans with a
funeral at the public expense, yet every citizen contributed the
smallest Roman coin towards the expenses, not that he needed the money,
but because they buried him as the father of the people, so that in his
death he received the honourable respect which he had deserved in his
life.
COMPARISON OF PERIKLES AND FABIUS MAXIMUS.
I. Such is the story of these men's lives. As they both gave many proofs
of ability in war and politics, let us first turn our attention to their
warlike exploits. And here we must notice that Perikles found the
Athenian people at the height of their power and prosperity, so that
from the flourishing condition of the State it could scarcely meet with
any great disaster, whereas Fabius performed his great services to Rome
when it was in the last extremity of danger, and did not merely, like
Perikles, confirm the prosperity of his country, but greatly improved
it, having found it in a lamentable condition. Moreover, the successes
of Kimon, the victories of Myronides and Leokrates, and the many
achievements of Tolmides rather gave Perikles when in chief command an
occasion for public rejoicing and festivity, than any opportunity for
either conquests abroad or defensive wars at home. Fabius, on the other
hand, had before his eyes the spectacle of many defeats and routs of
Roman armies, of many consuls and generals fallen in battle, of lakes,
plains and forests filled with the bodies of the slain, and of rivers
running with blood. Yet with his mature and unbending intellect he
undertook to extricate Rome from these dangers, and as it were by his
own strength alone supported the State, so that it was not utterly
overwhelmed by these terrible disasters. Nevertheless it would appear
not to be so hard a task to manage a State in adversity, when it is
humble and is compelled by its misfortunes to obey wise counsellors, as
it is to check and bridle a people excited and arrogant with good
fortune, which was especially the case with Perikles and the Athenians.
On the other hand, considering the terrible nature of the blows which
had fallen on the Romans, Fabius must have been a great and
strong-minded man not to be disconcerted by them, but still to be able
to carry out the policy upon which he had determined.
II. We may set the capture of Samos by Perikles against the retaking of
Tarentum by Fabius, and also the conquest of Euboea by the one against
that of the Campanian cities by the other, though Capua itself was
recovered by the consuls, Fulvius and Appius. Fabius seems never to have
fought a pitched battle, except that one which gained him his first
triumph, while Perikles set up nine trophies for victories by sea and
land. But again, there is no action of Perikles which can be compared to
that of Fabius when he snatched away Minucius from the grasp of
Hannibal, and saved an entire Roman army from destruction. That was an
exploit glorious for the courage, generalship, and kindness of heart
displayed by Fabius; but, on the other hand Perikles, made no such
blunder as did Fabius, when out-generalled by Hannibal with the cattle.
Here, although Fabius caught his enemy in a defile which he had entered
by chance, yet he let him escape by night, and next day found his tardy
movements outstripped, and himself defeated by the man whom he had just
before so completely cut off. If it be the part of a good general, not
merely to deal with the present, but to make conjectures about the
future, we may remark that the Peloponnesian war ended just as Perikles
had foretold, for the Athenians frittered away their strength; whereas
the Romans, contrary to the expectation of Fabius, by sending Scipio to
attack Carthage gained a complete victory, not by chance, but by the
skill of their general and the courage of their troops, who overthrew
the enemy in a pitched battle. Thus the one was proved to be right by
the misfortunes of his country, and the other proved to be wrong by its
success, indeed it is just as much a fault in a general to receive a
check from want of foresight as to let slip an opportunity through
diffidence; and both these failings, excess of confidence and want of
confidence, are common to all except the most consummate generals. Thus
much for their military talents.
III. In political matters, the Peloponnesian war is a great blot upon
the fame of Perikles; for it is said to have been caused by his refusal
to yield the least point to the Lacedaemonians. I do not imagine,
however, that Fabius Maximus would have yielded anything to the
Carthaginians, but would have bravely risked any danger in defence of
the Roman Empire. The kind treatment of Minucius by Fabius and his
mildness of character contrast very favourably with the bitter party
feud of Perikles with Kimon and Thucydides, who were men of good birth,
and belonging to the conservative party, and whom Perikles drove into
exile by the ostracism. Then, too, the power of Perikles was much
greater than that of Fabius. Perikles would not permit the State to
suffer disaster because of the bad management of her generals. One of
them alone, Tolmides, succeeded in having his own way, against the
wishes of Perikles, and perished in an attack on the Boeotians, while
all the rest, because of his immense influence and power, submitted
themselves to his authority and regulated their proceedings by his
ideas. Whereas Fabius, although he could avoid any error in managing his
own army, was thwarted by his being powerless to control the movements
of other generals.
For the Romans would not have suffered so many defeats if Fabius had
enjoyed the same power that Perikles did in Athens. As to their
generosity with regard to money, the one was remarkable for never
receiving bribes, while the other spent much on ransoming prisoners at
his own expense; although this was not much above six talents, while it
is hard for any one to tell the amount of money which Perikles might
have taken from foreign princes and Greek allied states, all of which he
refused and kept his hands clean. As to the great public works, the
construction of the temples, and of the public buildings with which
Perikles adorned Athens, the whole of the edifices in Rome together,
before the time of the emperors, are not worthy to be compared to them,
for they far surpassed them both in largeness of scale and in beauty of
design.
LIFE OF ALKIBIADES.