allowed greater freedom of action in local affairs, that municipal
home rule is indispensable. The governments of our large cities have
been dominated to such an extent by the state legislatures, usually
partisan and irresponsible to the locality concerned, that in many
cases self-government has become a term, hollow and without meaning.
The gentlemen condemn the city council, yet they pass over the real
cause for its decay. Restore to the city its proper legislative
powers, confine the work of the council to legislation instead of
allowing it to go into details of administration, reduce the number
of councilmen, if necessary, adjust the method of representation,
introduce needed electoral and primary reform, establish
responsibility by means of uniform municipal accounting and
publicity of proceedings, and we ask the gentlemen in all
earnestness why American city councils will not take on new life
just as the city councils of every other country have done in the
past.
The two great problems of American city government are: first,
administration; secondly, municipal home rule. The solution of both
depends upon the existence of two separately constituted departments
of government. This principle is being emphasized by the leading
scholars of political science, as illustrated by the program of the
National Municipal League. In fact, Honorable Judges, every
deep-seated reform in our large cities for the past quarter of a
century has tended toward this cardinal doctrine of municipal
success. The Ohio Municipal Code Commission, after two years of
careful study and observation, presented a bill based upon the
principles which we defend tonight, namely, a separation of
administration from legislation, and secondly, municipal home rule.
In direct opposition to this, the gentlemen present and advocate as
a permanent scheme for the organization of American cities, both
large and small, a commission form, a quasi-legislative and
administrative board patterned to give mediocrity in the performance
of both functions, success in neither; a form which destroys forever
the possibility of developing an efficient executive cabinet and is
entirely out of harmony with the advancing idea of municipal home
rule.
Mr. George Luxford, the third speaker on the Affirmative, said:
It has been made very clear by my colleagues that the present
shameful condition of many of our American cities is due in large
measure to the peculiar form of the government patterned after a
scheme which is adapted to a sovereign government like the state or
nation. The Negative demand an isolation which history shows, so far
as our American cities are concerned, leads to a complete confusion
of functions, with a consequent loss of responsibility. Knowing the
inadequacy of the scheme they then demanded municipal home rule; but
we have shown that the Affirmative are thoroughly committed to
municipal home rule which under the commission form alone can be
safely intrusted to cities. State interference in city government is
the child of the form of government for which our friends of the
Negative are sponsors. Thus far the gentlemen have failed to
disprove the points which we have presented that the theory of
checks and balances when applied to American cities has failed; that
the plan of concentrating municipal authority under one head as
advocated by the commission plan is in complete harmony with modern
industrial and social development, and that the plan is superior
from a legislative standpoint. It shall be my purpose to show that
it is superior from the standpoint of administration. We believe
this because the commission lends itself to the application of
business methods. The plan provides for a comparatively small body
of men who meet in daily session and who give their whole time to
the work of governing the city. At present, too often the real
business of the officials is anything else. They give their spare
time to the city and we have seen the results. Honorable judges, we
claim that there is a special virtue in the very smallness of the
number inasmuch as they are properly paid, devote all their time to
their work, and are made in fact governors of the city. They have a
great deal of work to do and they do it, while under our present
systems the councilmen have comparatively little to do and they fail
to do that little efficiently.
The reason why this small body can administer with dispatch and
efficiency is seen at a glance. Each commissioner is the head of a
department for which he is personally responsible. He is not
hindered as is the executive at present by an inefficient and
meddling council which has more power, often, than the executive
himself. He knows the laws for he has helped to make them. It is his
business to see that they are executed, and if they are not, he
cannot escape blame. He cannot plead ignorance, lack of
responsibility, or lack of power as do present administrative
officers.
Moreover, this body is admirably constituted for effective carrying
out of city business. It is larger than the single headed executive
and possesses, therefore, a division of work which makes the
administration far more effective. At the same time it is smaller
than the old council and for that reason is more efficient in
enacting the city's peculiar kind of legislation. In actual
practice, and that seems to be the real test of city government,
both administration and legislation are accomplished with accuracy
and dispatch. For instance, every spring for the last decade
carloads of "dagoes" with their dirt and disease have come to Cedar
Rapids. Every year protests have gone up to both mayor and council,
but without result. Cedar Rapids has adopted a commission form of
government. Last spring when the "dagoes" came the same complaints
went up as usual, that because of their insanitary methods these
people carried with them filth and disease. But the petitioners did
not go to the city council which met once in two weeks, nor were
they referred to a committee which met less often. They went
directly to the commissioners who had charge of the city health and
in less than twenty-four hours the "dagoes" had been notified to
either clean up or leave, and they left the city. But, say the
opponents of this plan, this could have been done under the old
system. To be sure, but the burning fact remains that in spite of
the protests of the people, it was not done.
In Houston the government was both inefficient and dishonest. For
years the annual expenditures had exceeded the income a hundred
thousand dollars. The city adopted a commission form and a four
hundred thousand dollar floating debt was paid off in one year out
of the ordinary income of the city. At the same time the city's
taxes were reduced ten per cent. In the health department alone
there is a saving of from $100 to $150 per month, while a
combination in the operation of the garbage crematory and pumping
station saves the city $6,000 annually. These results have been
accomplished under a commission plan by the application of common,
everyday business principles.
Galveston adopted a commission plan, and although its taxable values
were reduced twenty-five per cent by the storm of 1900, yet within
six years its commissioners not only put the city on a cash basis,
made improvements costing $1,000,000 annually, but actually paid off
a debt of $394,000 which had been incurred by the old council, and
all this was accomplished without borrowing a dollar, issuing a
bond, or increasing the rate of taxation. Other cities which have
adopted a commission plan are accomplishing equally as beneficial
results. Hence, we maintain that the commission form of city
government is superior from the standpoint of efficiency in
administration.
The commission plan is superior in administration for it is adapted
to the city's financial problem. The same body of men are held
responsible for the levying and collecting of taxes and for the
spending of the money. This is desirable because the administrative
body which is to spend money knows, accurately, the city's need of
revenue. They are in a position to know; it is their business. A
legislative body, whether council or a board, cannot know the city's
needs for money without getting the facts from the administrative
body. F.R. Clow says the council does not pretend to know the city's
revenue problem and they adopt the recommendation of the
administrative departments. The Negative's system of division of
powers simply divides the responsibility between the legislative and
administrative departments for the thing which in fact has been done
by the administrative department itself. Since the administrative
department really dictates the budget, it should be held directly
responsible for it. Therefore, we contend that the commissioners,
knowing best what the budget should contain because as
administrators they know the city's need for money, are the body of
men preeminently fitted to handle the city's budget.
The commission plan is adapted to the city's financial problem
because it fosters economy. Economy is the result of understanding.
The commissioners knowing the city's government, not from the
administrative side alone, but from the legislative side as well,
are in a position to economize and in practice they have done so.
The running expenses of Galveston under the commission plan have
been reduced one-third. In Houston it costs $12,800 a year less to
run the water and light plants than formerly, while by a combination
of work in the different departments there is a saving of $9,000
annually. In Cedar Rapids, since the adoption of the commission
plan, there has been a reduction in the paving contracts let of ten
and one-fifth per cent, in sewerage contracts, fourteen and
two-sevenths per cent, and in water contracts, twenty per cent.
Immediately after the adoption of the commission plan in Des Moines
the annual cost of each arc-light was reduced five dollars. Reports
from all the cities using the commission plan show that by the use
of business principles the commissioners have economized in the
administration of the city's government.
The commission plan is adapted to the city's finances because it
provides a superior safeguard. Legislative bodies in our cities have
been depended upon to represent the citizens' best interest. In
practice, as we have pointed out, they have not done so. Never in
the history of our municipal affairs, says Henry D.F. Baldwin, has a
legislative body stood out as the representatives of the people
against the administrative department. Why then continue a
representative body which does not in fact represent? Instead of the
withered form of a council or legislative body standing between the
citizen and his government the commission plan simply removes this
useless obstacle and allows the citizen to participate directly in
the government. This is directly in harmony with the
well-established economic principle that the self-interest of the
taxpayer will control where responsibility is fixed.
Mr. Charles Briggs, the third speaker on the Negative, said:
It will be well while the matter is fresh in our minds, Honorable
Judges, to make a brief examination of one matter of which the
Affirmative are making a feature, that the commission form affords
unusual safeguards for the financial and economic interests of the
city. Now, in all fairness to the scheme which is doing quite well
in a very few of our smaller cities, the question ought to be raised
as to what other form of city government could be devised which
would provide greater opportunities for graft and corruption. A
little group of autocrats is the ideal form for which the ardent
corruptionists might pray. They have it in the commission form.
Exemplary men in office or a constant civic interest, may prevent
the commissioners from becoming a band of robbers; but are these two
preventives likely always to exist? Human experience says "No." The
history of New Orleans and Sacramento confirm that decision. Civic
interest is bound to subside; corrupt men are sure to become
commissioners. Then the oligarchy advocated by the Affirmative
becomes not a "safeguard" but a band of raiders equipped by the very
form of government to loot the treasury. We must insist, at this
point, that our opponents have failed in their assault upon our main
contention:
First, that the evils in American city government are not
attributable to the fundamental principles of that government;
second, that the principles underlying the proposed form are in
themselves wrong and are not consonant generally with American
ideals. It remains to be shown that the commission form is
impracticable as a general scheme for the government of all American
cities.
We can very well agree that where the commission form of government
has been tried it has been productive of some good results, and
further, that in certain homogeneous communities of high culture and
intelligence it might work with considerable success; but that the
result obtained in cities where the commission form has been tried
would warrant the universal adoption of it by American cities we
must deny.
We deny the wisdom of adopting the commission form for it results in
inadequate responsibility; third, it could never work in the vast
majority of American cities. These reasons are apparent from
examinations of the commission form where it has been and is being
tried, and are inherent in the plan itself.
The tremendous centralization of power under this form of city
government cannot escape a critical observer. A small body of men
have absolute sway over the destiny of the city. They make all laws
from the minutely specified contract for a water system to all
important school legislation. All franchises are engineered by
them. All contracts, great and small, are let by them. The city's
bonded debt is in their hands; by them the city is taxed and
incumbered. Parks, police, streets, education, public buildings,
engineering, finance--everything from the smallest administrative
duty to the all-engrossing functions of legislation devolves upon
this commission. They can vacate any office, can create any office,
and without limit fix any salary they choose. The entire
officialdom, outside of the commission itself, and all the employes
and the servants of the city are by law made the agents, servants,
and dependents of the council. The possibilities for machine power
with this autocratic centralization of authority are without
condition. We can demonstrate this best by giving practical
illustrations taken from the active operation of the commission
form. We may preface these by saying that there is nothing inherent
in the commission form or any of its attributes which can insure the
selection of better men for office. The members of the commission
will be about the same kind of men as the ordinary city official.
Minneapolis by an election at large placed in the mayor's chair its
most notorious grafter. This is proved by the personnel of the
commissions where the system is being tried. The investigating
committee appointed by the city of Des Moines, quoting their exact
words, say that in Houston, where the commissioners are required to
stay in the city hall every day, business men do not hold those
positions, although the salaries are higher than the proposed
salaries of the Des Moines commissioners. One commissioner was
formerly a city scavenger, another a blacksmith, justice of the
peace and alderman, a third a railway conductor, fourth a dry-goods
merchant, and the mayor, a retired capitalist. Mr. Pollock of Kansas
City says of the Des Moines commission, "The commission as elected
consists of a former police judge and justice of the peace who is
mayor-commissioner at the salary of $3,500; a coal miner, deputy
sheriff; the former city assessor, whose greatest success has been
in public office; a union painter of undoubted honesty and
integrity, but far from a $3,000 man; an ex-mayor and politician,
who is perhaps the most valuable member of the new form of
government, but whose record does not disclose any great business
capacity aside from that displayed in public office." The Des Moines
committee says of the Galveston commission: "This is a perpetual
body, a potentially perfect machine." There has been no change in
the membership of the Galveston commission since it was organized.
The extensive power of the commissioners have enabled them to
control all political factions and to completely crush the
opposition. The commissioners' faction is in complete control and
even goes so far as to dictate nominations for the legislature and
the national congress. In Des Moines we find evidences of this
machine power in the very first session of the commission. Mr. Hume
was appointed chief of police because he had delivered the labor
vote to Mr. Mathis. The _Daily News_, the only Des Moines paper that
supported the plan, was rewarded by having three of its staff
appointed to responsible positions. Mr. Lyman was appointed
secretary to Commissioner Hammery, Neil Jones secretary to Mayor
Mathis. Another man was appointed to an important technical
position. A brakeman was appointed street commissioner because he
delivered the vote of the Federation of Labor.
These are but a few of the instances where this great centralization
of power has shown itself in practice to be a system permitting of
unrestricted machine power and political grafting. New Orleans tried
the system and abandoned it over 20 years ago because of this very
reason. The inhabitants were afraid of this tremendous
centralization of power.
The friends of the commission idea claim for it the advantage of
centered responsibility; but practice has proved that this form of
city government is actually formulated to defeat responsibility. By
the construction of this governing body each commissioner is held
responsible for his respective department. But regulation for each
department is made not by the commission as a whole but by the whole
commission. This results in a confusion of powers. Thus in the city
of Des Moines, Mr. Hume, the personal enemy of Commissioner Hammery
was made chief of police by three other members of the commission
for political reasons.
Who is responsible for the mistakes of Mr. Hume? The people say
Hammery. But Hammery says: "I had nothing to do with his
appointment." It has actually happened time and again at the
commission table in Des Moines that regulations for the financial
department were made by the police commission, the street
commissioner and the commissioner of parks and public buildings;
that the police commissioner would have the deciding vote on some
important school legislation; or the commissioner of education
control the appointment of policemen. This defect has given rise to
log-rolling. Bridges have been built as a personal favor to one
commissioner whose vote is needed to construct a new schoolhouse.
Large paving and building contracts are let simply because the
police commissioner wanted to oust some unfaithful political
dependent. In this way each commissioner gains great favor with the
voters and at the same time can escape personal responsibility for
technical mistakes by shouldering the blame onto the whole
commission where his identity is lost. This department trading has
found its way into the Galveston commission, claimed to have the
best commission of any city under this form of government. Here we
find that at the same time the prosecutor of the city cases in the
police court is allowed the right to collect a fee of $10 for every
criminal, drunk, or vagrant convicted, and $5 for every one who
pleads guilty; a 50-year franchise is granted to the Galveston
Street Railway Co. without a vote of the people, the city not to
receive one cent of tax and no compensation.
So, Honorable Judges, we must consider that, while the commission
form may be a temporary success in a few small cities, its permanent
success there is in grave doubt. Under these conditions we do not
ask that it be abolished, but that under no circumstances its
application be made general in this country where other forms of
city government are in practice more successful and in theory more
correct.
REBUTTAL
Mr. Earl Stewart opened for the Negative:
The gentlemen contend that the work of the city is almost wholly of
a business nature. Honorable Judges, if the city does not have
important legislative duties, what do we mean by local
self-government? The courts have held again and again that the work
of the city is primarily governmental. Says Judge Dillon: "The city
is essentially public and political in character." Not a business
corporation in this country could place vast sums of money in the
hands of four of five men without the safeguard of some supervising
body. Yet New York City has an annual expenditure of $150,000,000,
equaled by the aggregate of seven other American cities of 400,000
population; more than that of nations; three times that of the
Argentine Republic; four times that of Sweden and Norway combined.
Honorable Judges, the American people are too business-like ever to
place the entire raising, appropriating, and extending of such vast
sums of money, or the half, or the quarter, or the tenth of such, in
the hands of five men without the adequate check and safeguard of
some supervising and reviewing body, call it congress, legislature,
or council.
The gentlemen condemn divisions of powers because the city's
functions are of such a mixed nature and no strict line of
separation can be drawn. Granted. We have emphasized repeatedly that
we are not standing for division of powers; we are standing for
separately constituted bodies, which shall co-operate. We are
defending no system of disconnected committees which the gentlemen
have spent a whole speech in attacking, and we have shown,
furthermore, that the evils are only augmented by going to the other
extreme and completely confusing the functions in one small body.
The gentlemen see no difference between principles of government and
the form or mechanism which embodies, adequately or inadequately,
those principles. They forget that the National Municipal League
debated for three years over detail of form, never once disagreeing
as to the essential principle of distinct bodies for legislation and
administration. They forget that the model charter, which is
efficient because it has a proper co-ordination of departments, is
based upon the same principle of separately constituted bodies as
the old board system with its disconnected departments and
complicated machinery. Because the machinery has been inadequate,
owing to causes which the gentlemen have ignored, they would abolish
the working principle which is proved correct in every instance of
successful city organization, wherever found.