responsibility. Accountability means that a man charged with the
performance of a task shall be held undividedly responsible for it.
Now the commissioners collectively legislate. They can not do this
without constantly and seriously intruding upon the work of the
several departments. The moment this is done, responsibility is
diffused. The Hume incident, mentioned by my colleague, is abundant
illustration of the way responsibility is fixed under a commission
form. Says Professor F.I. Herriot, head of the department of
political science in Drake University and statistician of the Iowa
board of control: "A commission form cuts at the very roots of
official accountability and responsibility and, strange enough, it
is because its friends believe that it enhances fixing of
responsibility that they propose it." This from a scholar who has
watched the plan in operation. A commission form does not fix
responsibility, but even granting for the sake of argument that it
does, are we to sacrifice representative government for the sake of
fixing responsibility? If so, then why not make it still more
definite and establish one-man power? Honorable Judges, we have
shown that responsibility is more effectively centered by
establishing uniform accounting and publicity.
The affirmative contend that the commissioners will furnish superior
legislation. Now we do not say that knowledge of administration is
of no benefit in legislation. But the necessary information can be
secured without confusing the functions in a small executive
cabinet. In Europe it is done by making the cabinet responsible to
the council. In the United States, for example, Baltimore, it is
done by having the cabinet meet and co-operate with the council.
Nothing can be done by withholding the information, and as a matter
of fact, the city secures all the benefit of the technical training
of its administrators without the disadvantage of confusion of
functions.
Mr. Clarence Coulter opened for the Affirmative:
It has been argued by the Negative that the success of the
commission form of government is based upon the assumption of
electing good men to office, and as an illustration, that the Des
Moines commissioners are inefficient members of the old city hall
gang. As it happens, however, one of the commissioners is a man with
a national reputation as a municipal expert, a man whose honesty and
integrity have never once been questioned. The commissioner of
public safety has been trained for his position by long experience
in municipal affairs and is a college graduate. Admitting, however,
for the sake of argument, that the gentleman's contention is true;
yet the unquestioned success of the Des Moines government proves the
wisdom of the commission plan, for it so centralizes individual
responsibility as to require honest and efficient performance of
duty on the part of each commissioner.
Now as to securing good men. In the first place, the negative did
not, and cannot, cite a single city in which the commission plan
has failed to secure good men. Better men are elected under the
commission plan, for the number of elective offices is greatly
decreased, while the responsibility and honor of the position is
relatively increased. Moreover, the government is put on a business
basis and the commissioners are given steady employment at a good
salary. They have an opportunity to make a genuine record for
themselves, as well as to serve the best interests of the city. On
the other hand, the fact that responsibility is definitely centered
on each commissioner will, in itself, prevent men of no ability or
grafting politicians from seeking office. Political parties no
longer have any opportunity of putting men of little ability into
office, but instead, competent men with a genuine interest in the
city affairs and with no party affiliations whatever, so far as
municipal affairs are concerned, will be attracted to the position
of commissioner.
The opposition go further and charge that, even though efficient men
may be elected to office, the commission plan makes impossible the
fixing of responsibility. They failed, however, to point out a
single instance in commission-governed cities to prove their point
and made no attempt to show how responsibility could be better fixed
under the present system. As a matter of fact, Honorable Judges, the
fixing of individual responsibility, under the present system, is
utterly impossible, as we have already shown, while it is the
strongest virtue of the commission plan. In matters of pure
administration it is absolutely impossible for the commissioner to
escape individual responsibility, for he has full charge of the
administration of his own department. In matters of legislation,
where the majority vote of the commission may determine a policy
affecting a certain commissioner, responsibility is not lost but is
fixed upon those few who voted for such policy.
It has been contended that the commission form of government is
unpopular and that this plan has been rejected in both Sioux City
and Davenport. That these cities rejected it is true. But why? Sioux
City turned it down because the constitutionality of the plan had
not, at that time, been determined. Davenport refused to accept it
because the grafting politicians and the political ring so dominated
the city's politics that they were able to defeat the new plan and
retain the old, which was best suited to the furtherance of their
own ends.
The gentlemen of the opposition have argued that the present
inefficiency of city government is due to the interference of the
state legislatures and contend that the ultimate solution of the
difficulty lies in greater municipal home rule. They are correct,
Honorable Judges! The state legislature has interfered. But why?
Simply because the city council has proved itself inefficient. New
York City's council was in full possession of its powers when the
state legislature began to interfere. Legislation by somebody was
necessary. The council failed, and now the negative say, give back
to the city its powers and let the council try again.
According to the gentlemen themselves, the end to be achieved is
less interference of state legislatures and more home rule. It is
obvious, however, that this can be accomplished only when the city
itself can put forth a capable and efficient legislative body.
Honorable Judges, in our second speech we proved to you, that the
commission provides a small but efficient legislative body, far
superior to that of an isolated council. If you want municipal home
rule, establish a form of government which makes it possible.
Mr. Charles Briggs replied for the Negative:
My colleague has proved that whatever the form of government, there
must be a body capable of wise legislation, in fact, that there must
be a body that is primarily legislative in character no matter what
its connection or relation with the other departments of government.
That a small commission, burdened with administrative and judicial
functions, is not a proper legislative body is at once apparent. My
colleague has demonstrated that this confusion of powers must result
in inefficiency. But further than this, it is our contention that a
body such as is the commission, without respect to the confusion of
powers, without regard to the administrative duties weighing upon
it, that this commission, of itself, is not suited to legislation.
There is no more reason for placing the legislation of the city of
Chicago in the hands of five men than that the state legislature of
Minnesota should be reduced to five members. It is true that, in
many respects, the legislation of a city differs from that of a
state, but it is, nevertheless, legislation, and in the larger
cities particularly it is necessary that there be a representative
legislative body. Five men no more constitute a proper legislative
body for 800,000 or a million people of a city than for that many
people outside the city. It is contrary to the fundamental
conception of a legislative body that it be composed of a few. In no
country of free institutions is a legislative body so constituted.
My colleague has proved, and it cannot be successfully controverted,
that in the city, as well as in the state, there is a large field
for legislation. Why, then, should there not be a legislative body
to perform the work of legislation? Why place the work in the hands
of a body that is primarily administrative in character?
This objection alone must forever prevent the larger cities of the
United States from adopting the commission plan. Or, if adopted, it
must, for this reason alone, prove itself a failure.
Mr. Robbins replied for the Affirmative:
The Negative argue that the mechanisms of government in Boston may
differ from those of San Francisco. This is not a discussion of the
mechanisms of government. It involves deep and fundamental
principles relative to a given form of city organization. The
gentlemen have not, nor cannot, cite one iota of evidence that the
underlying principles of organization in the governments of Boston
and San Francisco should be different. The allusion to changing
mechanisms is no excuse for their failure to set in operation a
definite and positive form of organization. Yet the gentlemen have
ingeniously endeavored to evade this duty. Why have they done so?
Because every system of municipal organization based upon the
separation of powers--for which the gentlemen are contending--has
proved an admitted failure.
Do not the citizens of Brooklyn and San Francisco, as the citizens
of every American city, like to drink pure water? Don't they desire
good transportation facilities, and aren't they glad when they have
clean streets and honest administration? Why, then, don't the
gentlemen come forward, as the Affirmative has done, with a specific
form of organization which provides for the successful
administration of the underlying features of city government?
Instead, the gentlemen seem to delight in wandering across the seas,
telling what might happen if we would be indulgent enough to pattern
our form of organization after that of France, Germany, or Bohemia.
Yet they glibly refuse to consider that the city problem of this
country is distinctly American and is due to conditions peculiar to
America.
As a matter of fact, the gentlemen have held before us the salient
features of a half dozen opposing forms of organization, none of
which have succeeded individually, and the combined features of
which can make nothing more than a conglomeration of theories and
dogmas. Yes, the gentlemen have been painfully careful not to put
their scheme into practical operation.
They talk blandly of more home rule, when it is evident that such a
matter is actually beside the question at issue. In the same way
they speak at length of the cabinet system of England, forgetting
that the form the Affirmative is advocating involves the underlying
features of the cabinet system altered to meet conditions peculiar
to America. The commission form, Honorable Judges, is an evolution
of the cabinet form.
Likewise they have talked much of the need for a separate reviewing
body, citing the insurance scandals of New York state legislature to
prove their contention. Why don't they give instances where a
municipal reviewing body has checked fraud? The reason is obvious.
As Henry Baldwin writes, "Never has there been an instance in
American municipal history where the council has stood out against
the corruption of the administrative department." Rather these
so-called "reviewing bodies" are hand in hand with graft. Look at
the shameful conditions of the "reviewing bodies" of Philadelphia,
St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh, with their hands in the city
treasury up to their elbows, and we realize something of the
absurdity of the argument for a separate reviewing body to preserve
efficiency and honesty in the city government. The people should be
the reviewing body of their government. Its organization should be
so simple, yet so complete, that every citizen from the educated
theorist to the humblest day laborer, can review its facts with ease
and understanding. This is the kind of government the commission
form supplies. Why don't the gentlemen come forward with an
organization equally as simple and complete?
Then the gentlemen go on to tell how they will compel the
administrative officials to confer with their isolated "reviewing
body," and thus secure a proper co-ordination that has failed for a
century. Automatic mechanism in government can never take the place
of simplicity and responsibility. Such schemes are futile. The men
who can make mechanisms can break them. What we must have is a
government that compels efficiency and honesty, not one which
attempts to produce such results through theoretical contrivances.
Finally, the gentlemen claim that the commission form has failed in
New Orleans and Sacramento. Will the gentlemen give their authority
for the statement that these cities had a commission government?
Every authority upon the subject which the affirmative has found
points to the conclusion, that the form of government employed by
these cities was not a commission form.
Mr. Starzinger closed for the Negative and said:
The Affirmative have mentioned our authority. What we have said in
regard to Sacramento, Cal., is based upon excerpts from an article
by the Hon. Clinton White, published in the Cedar Rapids _Evening
Times_. Most of our facts concerning the southern cities which
adopted the new plan are taken from the reports of the Des Moines
investigation committee, headed by the Hon. W.N. Jordan. We would be
glad to submit these pamphlets to the gentlemen for examination. The
mere fact that Des Moines adopted the commission form does not
disprove the integrity of the authorities.
It is claimed that our stand is indefinite. True, we have not
offered a panacea for all municipal ills. But we have advocated
numerous reforms and have pointed out countless instances of
municipal success under various forms, yet all based upon the same
fundamental principle, that there be separately constituted
departments of government. One of the fatal objections to the
gentlemen's proposition is that they are attempting to blanket the
whole country with one arbitrary form, regardless of differing
conditions. They have completely ignored our cases of successful
city government. We demand that they explain them.
The gentlemen have said that state interference has been
precipitated by the decay of the city council. Yet they advocate its
complete destruction. Nothing could be more incorrect than to say
that special legislation was brought on as a result of an inherent
weakness in council government. Under the early council system,
there was practically no state interference. About the middle of the
last century, the board system was introduced and the councils were
shorn of their dignity and much of their legislative power. Right
there state dominion in local affairs began. These are the unbiased
facts as given by Professor Goodnow in his book on city government.
In conclusion, Honorable Judges, the solution of the American city
problem will be best promoted by a program of reform which strikes
at the real causes of the evils, instead of the universal
overturning of all traditions and theories of government in the hope
of finding a short-cut road to municipal success. Give the city a
proper sphere of local autonomy. Co-ordinate the departments of
government, so as to establish responsibility and secure harmonious
action. Simplify present city organization without destroying the
two branches of government. Introduce new and improving methods,
such as non-partisan primaries, civil service, uniform municipal
accounting, and publicity of proceedings. Remedy bad social and
economic conditions. Arouse civic interest. Do this, and there is no
necessity for such a radical and revolutionary change as the
universal adoption of a commission form.
The new plan means, not alone a change in the form of government,
but a positive overturning of the working principle of successful
city organization the world over. Its experience has been in the
small towns for a short time, under unusual conditions, amid aroused
public sentiment. Even here it has shown fatal weaknesses which the
gentlemen have not satisfactorily explained. It was abandoned by the
only large city that ever tried it; and cast aside as an abject
failure by Sacramento, Cal., after fifteen years of operation. In
the face of these facts, the gentlemen would have all American
cities turn to this form as the final goal of municipal success; a
form which attempts to revive the old board system of selecting
administrative heads by popular vote; which, in addition, centers
the whole government of a city in a small executive cabinet, without
review or oversight; a form which, in the words of Professor
Fairlie, of the University of Michigan, "is in direct opposition to
the advancing idea of municipal home rule."
Mr. Luxford closed the debate for the Affirmative, and said:
The case for the Negative is now closed. It has been indefinite from
start to finish. They acknowledge the success of the commission form
but refuse to accept it as the proper form toward which American
cities should work. They have none to offer except a form which is
completely unknown in American cities and successful alone in Europe
under totally dissimilar conditions. We have shown that every vital
move for city improvement today is toward a commission form, both in
practice and theory. The gentlemen have sought to overthrow the
argument for the commission form, and yet suggest no possible
American substitute.
But the position is not only indefinite, but it is inconsistent. At
one time they say, "the commission form is working well in small
cities." In another they declare that the commission form ignores
the only principles which are at the basis of successful city
government the world over. Putting these statements together we must
conclude that the gentlemen who made the second statement failed to
hear the gentlemen who made the first. If they grant that the
commission form is successful anywhere in the world how can it be
that it is ignoring the only principles of successful city
government the world over?
But we would not be unjust to the gentlemen. They are not perhaps
altogether indefinite. They would keep the old mayor and council
plan but would have non-partisan primaries, uniform municipal
accounting, and publicity of proceedings. Non-partisan primaries and
publicity of proceedings they have stolen bodily from the
commission. We are grateful to the gentlemen for this hearty
indorsement of the material features of the commission form. As to
uniform municipal accounting, while it is just as possible under the
commission as under any other form of city government, its advocacy
by the gentlemen is inconsistent with their insistent demand for
municipal home rule. Who but the state can supervise a uniform
accounting of all cities? And the gentlemen have deplored state
interference.
Not only that, but the commission plan provides the necessary
responsibility whereby the citizens may know and participate in the
city government. In the first place the publication of monthly
itemized statements of all the proceedings is required. Every
ordinance appropriating money or ordering any street improvements,
or sewer, or the making of any contract shall remain on file for
public inspection at least one week before final passage. Franchises
are granted not by any legislative body but by direct vote of the
people. Similarly the citizens retain the right to reject any
ordinance passed, or to require the passage of any needed
ordinance. And finally, the citizens by direct vote may remove any
commissioner at any time.
Thus we see that the commissioners know both the legislative and
administrative side of the city's work, and the responsibility of
doing both is fixed upon them.
Lastly, Honorable Judges, the Affirmative rest their cases upon
these fundamental arguments: that the whole tendency in American
city government is toward centralization of power in one body; where
this concentration has been partial, city government has failed.
This failure is due largely to the fact that, while power has
centered, responsibility has been diffused. This unfortunate
condition has been obviated by the adoption of the commission form
which is found to be a success because it awakens civic interest,
secures competent officials, and provides in the best possible
manner for the legislative and administrative work of the city,
centering power and responsibility in one small body of men.
APPENDIX IV
MATERIAL FOR BRIEFING
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
SPEECH OF HON. CHARLES F. SCOTT, OF KANSAS, IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1911
(The House having under consideration the bill [S. 7031] to codify,
revise, and amend the laws relating to the judiciary.--From the
_Congressional Record_, March 3, 1911.)
_Mr. Speaker_: In the ten years of my membership in this House I have
seldom taken advantage of the latitude afforded by general debate to
discuss any question not immediately before the House. But there is a
question now before the country, particularly before the people of the
state I have the honor to represent in part upon this floor, upon
which I entertain very positive convictions, and which, I believe, is
a proper subject for discussion at this time and in this place. That
question, bluntly stated, is this: Is representative government a
failure? We are being asked now to answer that question in the
affirmative. A new school of statesmen has arisen, wiser than
Washington and Hamilton and Franklin and Madison, wiser than Webster
and Clay and Calhoun and Benton, wiser than Lincoln and Sumner and
Stevens and Chase, wiser than Garfield and Elaine and McKinley and
Taft, knowing more in their day than all the people have learned in
all the days of the years since the Republic was founded.
And they tell us that representative government is a failure. They do
not put this declaration into so many words--part of them because they
do not know enough about the science of government to understand that
the doctrines they advocate are revolutionary, and the rest of them
because they lack the courage to openly declare that it is their
intention to change our form of government, to subvert the system upon
which our institutions are founded. But that is in effect what they
propose to do.
Every school boy knows that in a pure democracy the people themselves
perform directly all the functions of government, enacting laws
without the intervention of a legislature, and trying causes that
arise under those laws without the intervention of judge or jury;
while in a republic, on the other hand, the people govern themselves,
not by each citizen exercising directly all the functions of
government, but by delegating that power to certain ones among them
whom they choose to represent them in the legislatures, in the courts
of justice, and in the various executive offices.
It follows, therefore, that to substitute the methods of a democracy
for the methods of a republic touching any one of the three branches
of government is to that extent to declare that representative
government is a failure, is to that extent subversive and
revolutionary.
Now, it does not follow by any means that because a proposed change is
revolutionary it is therefore unwise. Taking it by and large, wherever
the word "revolution" has come into human history it has been only
another word for progress. Because a nation has pursued certain
methods for a long time it does not at all follow that those methods
are the best, although when a nation like the United States, so bold
and alert, so little hampered by tradition, so ready to try
experiments, has clung to the same methods of government for 130
years, a strong presumption has certainly been established that these
methods are the best, at least for that particular nation.
But is the new system wiser than the old--in the matter of making
laws, for example? The old system vests the law-making power in a
legislative body composed of men elected by the people and supposed to
be peculiarly fitted by reason of character, education, and training
for the performance of that duty. These men come together and give
their entire time through a period of some weeks or months to the
consideration of proposed legislation, and the laws they enact go into
immediate effect, and remain in force until set aside by the courts as
unconstitutional or until repealed by the same authority that enacted
them.