part, to undesirable immigrants, the prey to the boss, and utterly
lacking in inherited traditions so essential to the capacity of
self-government. Another instance: the mutual taxing system has
fostered public extravagance and loss of interest on the part of the
taxpayer. Again, favor-seeking corporations have continually
employed corrupt methods. James Bryce says that in the development
of a stronger sense of civic duty rather than any change in the form
of government lies the ultimate hope of municipal reform.
A third cause of municipal ills is that of poor business methods.
First, unjust election laws and lack of proper primaries have
permitted the corrupt arts of the caucus politician. Second, lack of
a uniform system of accounting has served only to conceal the facts,
resulting in apathy on the part of the people, diffusion of
responsibility, and widespread corruption among officials. Third,
lack of publicity of proceedings has protected graft. Fourth, lack
of civil service has perpetuated the spoils system.
All these can and are being remedied. The Bureau of Municipal
Research shows plainly that it is not necessary to change
fundamental principles to secure business efficiency. It reorganized
the Real Estate Bureau of New York that eluded all graft charges and
made 100 per cent profits. The Department of Finance, heretofore
unable to tell whether taxes were collected, is reorganized from top
to bottom. Through the glaring light of publicity, the bureau
collected more than a million dollars for paving done at the
public's expense between the street-car company's rails. The old
conditions, where examination of the books of any department
involved weeks of labor, have given way to a uniform system of
public accounting. In the words of the Springfield, Mass.,
_Republican_, "The work of the Bureau of Public Research is far more
fundamental than the question of substituting city organization with
a commission."
A fourth cause of evils is that of state interference in purely
local affairs.
In the United States the city may not act except where authorized
expressly and especially by the state. In Europe the city may do
anything it is not forbidden to do, and municipal success there is
based on this greater freedom. The European city, though subject to
general state law, makes its own local laws, not in conflict with,
but in addition to, state law. But in the United States the state
legislature, accustomed to interfere in matters of interest to the
state government, failed to distinguish between such matters and
those of exclusive interest to the cities themselves. To illustrate:
The Cleveland Municipal Association reported in 1900 that
legislators from an outside county had introduced radical changes in
almost every department of their city government. In Massachusetts
the police, water works, and park systems are directly under the
state, and the only part the cities have is to pay the bills. In
Pennsylvania for thirty-one years the state kept upon the statute
books an act imposing upon Philadelphia a self-perpetuating
commission, appointed without reference to the city's wishes, and
with all power to erect a city hall and levy taxes to collect the
twenty-million-dollar cost.
State and national political parties, controlling the legislature,
have meddled in the private affairs of the city, resulting in the
decay of the city council and the destruction of the local autonomy.
Professor Goodnow says that under these conditions a scientific
solution of the vexed question of municipal organization has been
impossible.
The remedy lies in restoring to the city its proper field of
legislation. Already thirty states have passed constitutional
amendments granting greater legislative powers to the cities. Five
states now allow cities to amend their own charters. But in direct
opposition to this movement for municipal home rule, the commission
form takes the last step in the destruction of the city's
legislative body and fosters continued state interference. President
Eliot says that the functions of the commissioners will be defined
and enumerated by the state.
Now, Honorable Judges, the basic principle of city government the
world over is division of functions. It is the principle that the
commission form attempts to annihilate. But we have pointed out the
real causes of municipal evils and have shown they are to be
remedied without tampering with the fundamental principles which
time and experience have shown to be correct in every instance of
successful city organization. The Affirmative say: change the
fundamental principle; all changes in form and other remedies are
insufficient. The Negative say: retain the principle of distinct
legislative and administrative bodies, but observe a proper
correlation between them which is done in countless instances as we
have shown. We would remedy bad social and economic conditions,
introduce better business methods, and, most important of all, give
the city greater freedom in powers of local self-government.
Mr. Clyde Robbins, the second speaker of the Affirmative, said:
It should be understood at the outset that the Affirmative desire
all the local self-government for American cities that the Negative
can induce the state legislatures to give them. But just what is
home rule for cities? It is simply granting additional functions to
the city by the state legislature. The only possible way home rule
can affect the question under discussion is a consideration of which
form of government is best suited to perform additional functions
granted by the government. We maintain that the commission form can
do this better because, first, it furnishes superior legislation,
and second, it furnishes superior administration.
The gentleman blandly assumes that the commission form is
fundamentally wrong, because it fails to provide a separate
legislative body as do the governments of the state and nation. An
isolated legislative body is desirable for state and national
governments. Is that a reason for applying it to city government?
Here, social, economic, and political conditions are entirely
different from those of either state or nation. The city is not a
sovereign body. Its powers are exclusively those delegated to it by
the state legislature. They are confined wholly to matters of local
concern. Furthermore, we do not deny the legislative functions of
the city, nor does the plan we advocate contemplate the destruction
of the city's legislative body. It simply means that in place of the
present notoriously inefficient, isolated council, we establish a
commission council composed of the heads of the various
administrative departments. The question at issue is not whether we
shall have a city council, either system provides for that; but
whether a commission council, or an isolated council will furnish
better ordinances. We are contending that the commission council
must furnish superior measures, because in the making of city
ordinances there are at least three great essentials for which this
commission council alone makes adequate provision.
First the legislative and administrative work of the city must be
unalterably connected;
Second, the councilmen must have a direct and technical knowledge of
the city affairs;
Third, the councilman must be representative of the whole city.
Consider, first, how the legislative and administrative work are
connected. State and national legislation are general in their
nature and scope. The extent of territory, and the variety in local
needs have naturally created a separate law-making body. But in the
city such conditions do not exist. The legislative acts of the
council are specific in their nature. The very name reveals their
distinctive character. They are ordinances as distinguished from
other laws, and are designed to meet a particular kind of
administration. The specific act and the particular administration
of it go hand in hand. Hence, satisfactory measures can be enacted
only when they come from the hands of a commission council.
President Eliot recognized this fact when he said that the work of
the city council is not concerned with far-reaching policies of
legislation. There is no occasion for two or even one separate
legislative body. Dr. Albert Shaw writes, that so indistinguishably
blended are the legislative and administrative departments of the
city, that it is impossible to separate one from the other.
Second, a commission council is more effective because it furnishes
a direct and technical knowledge of city affairs. An investigation
in Des Moines showed that out of 370 acts performed by the council,
32 were granting of saloon licenses and similar permits; 338
concerned matters demanding technical knowledge. To have a street
paved, shall one body legislate; a second group administer; and a
third pass upon the validity of the whole thing? Rather the
councilmen should know good paving; they should know how to draw up
and enforce a business contract. These are the vital necessities.
The commission council secures such results. Its membership is
comparatively small. Its sessions are held daily. Its members have a
direct knowledge of the city's needs for each one serves as the head
of a department. Satisfactory legislation then becomes a mere
business proposition. It is but carrying forward the work of each
commissioner, for successful administration is impossible without
competent legislation. Hence, a city commissioner would no more
think of passing improper legislation than a bank director would
think of advising unsound loans.
The Cedar Rapids commission met to legislate on replacing an old
bridge. The commissioner of public safety told in what respects the
old structure was unsafe. The commissioner of public property knew
how much land the city owned abutting the bridge. The commissioner
of streets explained what alterations should be made in the
approaches, and the commissioner of finance knew in just what way
the city could best pay for the improvement. Honorable Judges, such
men are in a position to legislate with thoroughness. They are a
commission council, the very nature of which makes it inevitable
that they act with intelligence and efficiency.
Contrast now, the commission council with the isolated council. Here
we find positively no co-ordination between the legislative and
administrative branches, while a century of experience with the
scheme of checks and balances has proved conclusively that it can
not prevent municipal corruption. Moreover, legislation by the
isolated council is not only chaotic in form but it is
irresponsible, while in the case of the commission council the very
fact that the head of each department possesses necessary
information not only secures adequate legislation but fixes with
certainty the entire responsibility.
The isolated council is a large and unwieldy body. Each member of it
has his own private occupation. Without special preparation of any
kind he attends council not oftener than once a week. Intelligent
action under such conditions is simply impossible. The only way this
council has of securing reliable information is from the heads of
the administrative departments. But even then responsibility is
still divided between the legislative and administrative branches.
This deplorable state of affairs has been synchronous with the
growth of the isolated council in America.
Is it any wonder that the old Des Moines council voted to construct
a bridge only to find when the work was completed that the city did
not even own the approaches, or that the old Cedar Rapids council
let a similar contract at an exorbitantly high price, only to find,
when the work was completed, that the contract called for no
protecting wings or abutments, and the city was compelled to spend
many thousands of dollars additional in order to make the structure
safe? Such nonsensical legislation is a direct result of the
isolated council. It fails to provide information essential to
intelligent action. It does not permit a proper co-ordination of
departments so vitally necessary in successful city government.
Lastly, city legislation demands unbiased representation. In this
respect a commission council is superior to an isolated council.
In the commission council each member represents the entire city.
Hence, there is no incentive to favor one ward at the expense of
another. In fact, any such an attempt could result only in disaster
to the commissioner himself. Furthermore, each commissioner is held
individually responsible for his department. Consequently he is
forced to insist upon an impartial representation of the entire
city. This is well illustrated by the present situation in New York
City. The Bureau of Municipal Research, admittedly the most
practical organization of its kind in the country, is conducting its
work along the line of effective competency in city departments. As
a result of its investigations, the citizens of New York have been
forced to the conclusion to which my colleague has already referred,
namely, that the ultimate solution of their municipal difficulties
will be reached only when they have disposed of their present
inefficient and useless ward council and created in its place a
commission council.
Under the isolated council a member is elected to represent a
certain section of the city. He must do this, no matter what may be
the effect upon the rest of the city. For example, in legislating on
the annual budget, each ward boss brings pressure to bear upon his
own councilman to have certain levies reduced, and to secure
stipulated appropriations for his own ward. In New York City last
spring, Bird S. Coler, representing a part of Brooklyn, blocked
every appropriation until he secured certain selfish measures for
his own district. What is true of New York is an annual occurrence
in practically every other ward-ruled American city.
Furthermore, councilmen from one ward are shamefully unresponsive to
the needs and desires of citizens in other wards. Just this summer
the council of Duluth, Minn., granted saloon licenses for a ward in
which 90 per cent of its citizens signed a written protest against
such action. The councilmen representing that district were helpless
to prevent the legislation and the citizens themselves had no
recourse whatsoever. The grand jury in St. Louis reported that the
wards of that city were an actual menace to decency and good
government.
With these instances before us it is well to remember that the
scheme of ward representation is a necessary part of the practical
operation of the separation of powers in government. This is
exemplified in our national, state, and city organizations. In fact,
the principal reason for an isolated legislative body is that the
sentiments of the different localities may be expressed in
legislation. The practical result is that 95 per cent of our city
governments are based upon ward representation, nor can an instance
be cited in all American political theory which shows the creation
of a successful political organization based upon an isolated
legislative body in which there has not been an accompanying
representation by territorial districts. This principle is always
the same no matter whether it be a congressional district of the
national government or a ward of the city government. Hence, it is
for this principle that the gentlemen must contend if they wish to
argue for an isolated council in city government.
In conclusion, Honorable Judges, a commission council is superior to
an isolated council, because the work of city legislation and
administration must be unalterably connected; because the councilmen
must have a direct and technical knowledge of city affairs; and,
because the councilmen must be representative of the whole city.
Mr. Vincent Starzinger, the second speaker on the Negative, said:
The Affirmative continue to direct their attack against the "old
form." Yet my colleague has suggested substantial changes in present
city organization, changes which have brought about success
wherever tried. Moreover, we wish to make it clear that we are not
necessarily standing for a division of power. There may be
separately constituted departments of government, one primarily for
administration, the other primarily for legislation, yet a
concentration of authority in one of them, as in the case under the
cabinet system of Europe. The gentlemen of the opposition are
advocating not only a concentration of power, but a fusion of
functions as well. Their commission is at once the executive cabinet
and the legislative body.
We have heard much about the practical working of the new plan. Upon
this matter, the Negative shall have a few words to say before the
close of the debate. But granting for the sake of argument that the
commission form has operated with some degree of success in a few
small towns, especially when compared with the admitted inefficient
machinery of government in vogue before its adoption and when
favored by an aroused civic interest, nevertheless, it does not
follow that it is adapted to the needs of the typical American city.
There, administration is a matter of great complexity and of vital
importance. Boston has pay-rolls including 12,000 and annual
expenditure of $40,000,000. Successful administration under such
conditions has necessitated the growth of city departments. The
heads of the various departments constitute an executive cabinet.
Under the commission form, this cabinet is established by popular
election and made the single governmental body for the performance
of both the legislative and the administrative functions.
Such a fusion of functions must necessarily result: in poor
administration; in the sacrifice of legislation; and in the ultimate
destruction of local self-government.
Consider the problem of administration.
An efficient cabinet cannot, as a rule, be secured by popular
election. Men who possess the ability to direct a city department
acquire such capacity only after years of preparation, and such men
will not endure the uncertainties of a career dependent upon the
favor of the public. The commissioner of finance who understands the
intricate problems of accounting will not coddle the people to
insure his election. Popular judgment, no matter how enlightened,
cannot be entrusted with the selection of such men. The old board
system proves this conclusively. Here, the choosing of the heads of
the important city departments was placed in the hands of the
people. The system stands condemned.
A commission form makes the additional blunder of uniting completely
the two functions of legislation and administration in the same
body. This makes the commissioners representative in character. But
this condition is disastrous to successful administration. Whenever
the people desire even the slightest change in their local policy,
the stability and continuity of the city departments must be upset.
Representation is secured at the expense of efficiency.
Administration becomes saturated with politics.
Again, Honorable Judges, the management of a city should be
subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body. Both the
welfare of the people and the interests of good administration
demand it. Administrators, no matter how valuable their technical
knowledge, make poor legislators. Being interested in their work,
they very naturally exalt and magnify their departments. Just a few
years ago, the city of Cleveland found it necessary to take even the
preparation of the budget from the heads of the departments
concerned and to place it with a board which could view with
impartiality the demands of the various department chiefs. Think of
turning over all the functions of a city like St. Louis to an
executive cabinet without even the oversight or criticism of an
impartial body.
And, Honorable Judges, the whole experience of government proves the
absolute necessity for a separate legislative department. Look where
you will, and in each case there is an executive cabinet, based upon
appointment, untrammelled by the burdens of legislation, and
subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body. In
Europe, the city councils are elected by the people, and the
administrative departments are made up through a process of
selection and appointment, together with the assurance of reasonable
permanence of tenure, responsibility, and adequate support. Likewise
in America, the larger cities are already organizing their cabinets
upon a somewhat similar basis. The six largest cities of New York,
all of the cities of Indiana, Boston, Chicago, Baltimore, and many
others are securing their important administrative officials through
appointment by the mayor. This is the general plan advocated by the
National Municipal League. It centers responsibility for the
administration in one man. On the other hand, some of the cities of
Canada follow more closely to the German system. There the cabinet
is selected by a representative council. In practically all of these
instances, men of special ability have been obtained, the
departments of administration have been properly correlated,
responsibility has been concentrated, and the general principle,
that successful administration depends upon a separately constituted
legislative body, has been firmly established.
It is plain then that a commission form violates the fundamental
principles of successful administration. It first attempts to secure
a cabinet by popular vote. It then upsets the stability of the city
departments by completely uniting both the legislative and the
administrative functions. Finally, it destroys the responsibility of
that prime essential of successful administration, namely, a proper
reviewing body.
In the second place, Honorable Judges, the permanent adoption of a
commission form must necessarily mean a sacrifice of legislation and
the ultimate destruction of local self-government. Even though the
city may be subordinate to the state, nevertheless, it has a broad
field of independent action. Otherwise, why give it a separate
personality and a separate organization? Cities are permitted to
exercise vast powers of police and of taxation. It is idle to say
that a few commissioners can give satisfactory legislation. They
cannot represent community interests. Their executive functions will
naturally bias their judgment. Moreover, each commissioner, knowing
little of the needs of the other departments, will naturally take
the word of its administrative head, especially since he desires the
same freedom. This was actually the case in Sacramento, Cal., where
the commission plan was tried for fifteen years and given up as an
abject failure. Says the Hon. Clinton White of that city: "In almost
every instance, the board soon came to the understanding that each
man was to be let alone in the management of the department assigned
to him. This resulted in there being in fact no tribunals exercising
a supervisory power over the executive of a particular department."
Honorable Judges, a reviewing and legislative body is indispensable
in city government and a commission makes no such provision. Weak in
administration, wholly lacking in matters of legislation, dangerous
as a theory of government, it cannot help but result in the complete
subjection of local government to the state. The inevitable result
of its permanent adoption will be that the important local
legislative functions will become a mere administrative board with
discretionary power as in the case of Washington, D.C. In the words
of Professor Goodnow: "The destruction of the city council has not
destroyed council government. It has simply made local policy a
matter of state legislative determination." If we wish to destroy
the life of the city, make it impotent to discharge the functions
for which it was organized, then, and then only, it might be
feasible to place over it a commission.