CHAPTER X.

THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO.

There was a moment of hesitation in Gordon's mind as to whether he

would come home or not. His first project on laying down the Indian

Secretaryship had been to go to Zanzibar and attack the slave trade

from that side. Before his plans were matured the China offer came,

and turned his thoughts in a different channel. On his arrival at

Aden, on the way back, he found that the late Sir William Mackinnon, a

truly great English patriot of the type of the merchant adventurers of

the Elizabethan age, had sent instructions that the ships of the

British India Steam Packet Company were at his disposal to convey him

whereever he liked, and for a moment the thought occurred to him to

turn aside to Zanzibar. But a little reflection led him to think that,

as he had been accused of insubordination, it would be better for him

to return home and report himself at headquarters. When he arrived in

London at the end of October 1880, he found that his letters, written

chiefly to his sister during his long sojourn in the Soudan, were on

the eve of publication by Dr Birkbeck Hill. That exceedingly

interesting volume placed at the disposal of the public the evidence

as to his great work in Africa, which might otherwise have been buried

in oblivion. It was written under considerable difficulties, for

Gordon would not see Dr Hill, and made a stringent proviso that he was

not to be praised, and that nothing unkind was to be said about

anyone. He did, however, stipulate for a special tribute of praise to

be given to his Arab secretary, Berzati Bey, "my only companion for

these years--my adviser and my counsellor." Berzati was among those

who perished with the ill-fated expedition of Hicks Pasha at the end

of 1883. To the publication of this work must be attributed the

establishment of Gordon's reputation as the authority on the Soudan,

and the prophetic character of many of his statements became clear

when events confirmed them.

After a stay at Southampton and in London of a few weeks, Gordon was

at last induced to give himself a short holiday, and, strangely

enough, he selected Ireland as his recreation ground. I have been told

that Gordon had a strain of Irish blood in him, but I have failed to

discover it genealogically, nor was there any trace of its influence

on his character. He was not fortunate in the season of the year he

selected, nor in the particular part of the country he chose for his

visit. There is scenery in the south-west division of Ireland, quite

apart from the admitted beauty of the Killarney district, that will

vie with better known and more highly lauded places in Scotland and

Switzerland, but no one would recommend a stranger to visit that

quarter of Ireland at the end of November, and the absence of

cultivation, seen under the depressing conditions of Nature, would

strike a visitor with all the effect of absolute sterility. Gordon was

so impressed, and it seemed to him that the Irish peasants of a whole

province were existing in a state of wretchedness exceeding anything

he had seen in either China or the Soudan. If he had seen the same

places six months earlier, he would have formed a less extreme view of

their situation. It was just the condition of things that appealed to

his sympathy, and with characteristic promptitude he put his views on

paper, making one definite offer on his own part, and sent them to a

friend, the present General James Donnelly, a distinguished engineer

officer and old comrade, and moreover a member of a well-known Irish

family. Considering the contents of the letter, and the form in which

Gordon threw out his suggestions, it is not very surprising that

General Donnelly sent it to _The Times_, in which it was published on

3rd December 1880; but Gordon himself was annoyed at this step being

taken, because he realised that he had written somewhat hastily on a

subject with which he could scarcely be deemed thoroughly acquainted.

The following is its text:--

"You are aware how interested I am in the welfare of this

country, and, having known you for twenty-six years, I am sure I

may say the same of you.

"I have lately been over to the south-west of Ireland in the hope

of discovering how some settlement could be made of the Irish

question, which, like a fretting cancer, eats away our vitals as

a nation.

"I have come to the conclusion that--

"1. A gulf of antipathy exists between the landlords and tenants

of the north-west, west, and south-west of Ireland. It is a gulf

which is not caused alone by the question of rent; there is a

complete lack of sympathy between these two classes. It is

useless to inquire how such a state of things has come to pass. I

call your attention to the pamphlets, letters, and speeches of

the landlord class, as a proof of how little sympathy or kindness

there exists among them for the tenantry, and I am sure that the

tenantry feel in the same way towards the landlords.

"2. No half-measured Acts which left the landlords with any say

to the tenantry of these portions of Ireland will be of any use.

They would be rendered--as past Land Acts in Ireland have

been--quite abortive, for the landlords will insert clauses to do

away with their force. Any half-measures will only place the

Government face to face with the people of Ireland as the

champions of the landlord interest. The Government would be bound

to enforce their decision, and with a result which none can

foresee, but which certainly would be disastrous to the common

weal.

"3. My idea is that, seeing--through this cause or that, it is

immaterial to examine--a deadlock has occurred between the

present landlords and tenants, the Government should purchase up

the rights of the landlords over the whole or the greater part of

Longford, Westmeath, Clare, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Leitrim,

Sligo, Mayo, Cavan, and Donegal. The yearly rental of these

districts is some four millions; if the Government give the

landlords twenty years' purchase, it would cost eighty millions,

which at three and a half per cent. would give a yearly interest

of £2,800,000, of which £2,500,000 could be recovered; the lands

would be Crown lands; they would be administered by a Land

Commission, who would be supplemented by an Emigration

Commission, which might for a short time need £100,000. This

would not injure the landlords, and, so far as it is an

interference with proprietary rights, it is as just as is the law

which forces Lord A. to allow a railway through his park for the

public benefit. I would restrain the landlords from any power or

control in these Crown land districts. Poor-law, roads, schools,

etc., should be under the Land Commission.

"4. For the rest of Ireland, I would pass an Act allowing free

sale of leases, fair rents, and a Government valuation.

"In conclusion, I must say, from all accounts and my own

observation, that the state of our fellow-countrymen in the parts

I have named is worse than that of any people in the world, let

alone Europe. I believe that these people are made as we are,

that they are patient beyond belief, loyal, but, at the same

time, broken-spirited and desperate, living on the verge of

starvation in places in which we would not keep our cattle.

"The Bulgarians, Anatolians, Chinese, and Indians are better off

than many of them are. The priests alone have any sympathy with

their sufferings, and naturally alone have a hold over them. In

these days, in common justice, if we endow a Protestant

University, why should we not endow a Catholic University in a

Catholic country? Is it not as difficult to get a £5 note from a

Protestant as from a Catholic or Jew? Read the letters of ----

and of ----, and tell me if you see in them any particle of kind

feeling towards the tenantry; and if you have any doubts about

this, investigate the manner in which the Relief Fund was

administered, and in which the sums of money for improvements of

estates by landlords were expended.

"In 1833 England gave freedom to the West Indian slaves at a cost

of twenty millions--worth now thirty millions. This money left

the country. England got nothing for it. By an expenditure of

eighty millions she may free her own people. She would have the

hold over the land, and she would cure a cancer. I am not well

off, but I would offer ---- or his agent £1000, if either of them

would live one week in one of these poor devil's places, and feed

as these people do. Our comic prints do an infinity of harm by

their caricatures--firstly, the caricatures are not true, for the

crime in Ireland is not greater than that in England; and,

secondly, they exasperate the people on both sides of the

Channel, and they do no good.

"It is ill to laugh and scoff at a question which affects our

existence."

This heroic mode of dealing with an old and very complicated

difficulty scarcely came within the range of practical achievement.

The Irish question is not to be solved by any such simple

cut-and-dried procedure. It will take time, sympathy, and good-will.

When the English people have eradicated their opinion that the Irish

are an inferior race, and when the Irish realise that the old

prejudice has vanished, the root-difficulty will be removed. At least

Gordon deserves the credit of having seen that much from his brief

observation on the spot, and his plea for them as "patient beyond

belief and loyal," may eventually carry conviction to the hearts of

the more powerful and prosperous kingdom.

The Irish question was not the only one on which he recorded a written

opinion. The question of retaining Candahar was very much discussed

during the winter of 1880-81, and as the Liberal Government was very

much put to it to get high military opinion to support their proposal

of abandonment, they were very glad when Gordon wrote to _The Times_

expressing a strong opinion on their side. I think the writing of that

letter was mainly due to a sense of obligation to Lord Ripon, although

the argument used as to the necessity of Candahar being held by any

_single_ ruler of Afghanistan was, and is always, unanswerable. But

the question at that time was this: Could any such single ruler be

found, and was Abdurrahman, recognised in the August of 1880 as Ameer

of Cabul, the man?

On 27th July 1880, less than eight weeks after Gordon's resignation of

his Indian appointment, occurred the disastrous battle of Maiwand,

when Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, gained a decisive victory over a

British force. That disaster was retrieved six weeks later by Lord

Roberts, but Ayoob remained in possession of Herat and the whole of

the country west of the Helmund. It was well known that the rivalry

between him and his cousin Abdurrahman did not admit of being patched

up, and that it could only be settled by the sword. At the moment

there was more reason to believe in the military talent of Ayoob than

of the present Ameer, and it was certain that the instant we left

Candahar the two opponents would engage in a struggle for its

possession. The policy of precipitate evacuation left everything to

the chapter of accidents, and if Ayoob had proved the victor, or even

able to hold his ground, the situation in Afghanistan would have been

eminently favourable for that foreign intervention which only the

extraordinary skill and still more extraordinary success of the Ameer

Abdurrahman has averted. In giving the actual text of Gordon's letter,

it is only right, while frankly admitting that the course pursued has

proved most successful and beneficial, to record that it might well

have been otherwise, and that as a mere matter of argument the

probability was quite the other way. Neither Gordon nor any other

supporter of the evacuation policy ventured to predict that

Abdurrahman, who was then not a young man, and whose early career had

been one of failure, was going to prove himself the ablest

administrator and most astute statesman in Afghan history.

"Those who advocate the retention of Candahar do so generally on

the ground that its retention would render more difficult the

advance of Russia on, and would prevent her fomenting rebellion

in, India, and that our prestige in India would suffer by its

evacuation.

"I think that this retention would throw Afghanistan, in the hope

of regaining Candahar, into alliance with Russia, and that

thereby Russia would be given a temptation to offer which she

otherwise would not have. Supposing that temptation did not

exist, what other inducement could Russia offer for this

alliance? The plunder of India. If, then, Russia did advance, she

would bring her auxiliary tribes, who, with their natural

predatory habits, would soon come to loggerheads with their

natural enemies, the Afghans, and that the sooner when these

latter were aided by us. Would the Afghans in such a case be

likely to be tempted by the small share they would get of the

plunder of India to give up their secure, independent position

and our alliance for that plunder, and to put their country at

the mercy of Russia, whom they hate as cordially as they do us?

If we evacuate Candahar, Afghanistan can only have this small

inducement of the plunder of India for Russia to offer her. Some

say that the people of Candahar desire our rule. I cannot think

that any people like being governed by aliens in race or

religion. They prefer their own bad native governments to a

stiff, civilized government, in spite of the increased worldly

prosperity the latter may give.

"We may be sure that at Candahar the spirit which induced

children to kill, or to attempt to kill our soldiers in 1879,

etc., still exists, though it may be cowed. We have trouble

enough with the fanatics of India; why should we go out of our

way to add to their numbers?

"From a military point of view, by the retention we should

increase the line we have to defend by twice the distance of

Candahar to the present frontier, and place an objective point to

be attacked. Naturally we should make good roads to Candahar,

which on the loss of a battle there--and such things must be

always calculated as within possibility--would aid the advance of

the enemy to the Indus. The _débouché_ of the defiles, with good

lateral communications between them, is the proper line of

defence for India, not the entry into those defiles, which cannot

have secure lateral communications. If the entries of the defiles

are held, good roads are made through them; and these aid the

enemy, if you lose the entries or have them turned. This does not

prevent the passage of the defiles being disputed.

"The retention of Candahar would tend to foment rebellion in

India, and not prevent it; for thereby we should obtain an

additional number of fanatical malcontents, who as British

subjects would have the greatest facility of passing to and fro

in India, which they would not have if we did not hold it.

"That our prestige would suffer in India by the evacuation I

doubt; it certainly would suffer if we kept it and forsook our

word--_i.e._ that we made war against Shere Ali, and not against

his people. The native peoples of India would willingly part with

any amount of prestige if they obtained less taxation.

"India should be able, by a proper defence of her present

frontier and by the proper government of her peoples, to look

after herself. If the latter is wanting, no advance of frontier

will aid her.

"I am not anxious about Russia; but, were I so, I would care much

more to see precautions taken for the defence of our Eastern

colonies, now that Russia has moved her Black Sea naval

establishment to the China Sea, than to push forward an

outstretched arm to Candahar. The interests of the Empire claim

as much attention as India, and one cannot help seeing that they

are much more imperilled by this last move of Russia than by

anything she can do in Central Asia.

"Politically, militarily, and morally, Candahar ought not to be

retained. It would oblige us to keep up an interference with the

internal affairs of Afghanistan, would increase the expenditure

of impoverished India, and expose us chronically to the reception

of those painfully sensational telegrams of which we have had a

surfeit of late."

During these few months Gordon wrote on several other subjects--the

Abyssinian question, in connection with which he curiously enough

styled "the Abyssinians the best of mountaineers," a fact not

appreciated until their success over the Italians many years later,

the registration of slaves in Egypt, and the best way of carrying on

irregular warfare in difficult country and against brave and active

races. His remarks on the last subject were called forth by our

experiences in the field against the Zulus in the first place, and the

Boers in the second, and quite exceptional force was given to them by

the occurrence of the defeat at Majuba Hill one day after they

appeared in the _Army and Navy Gazette_. For this reason I quote the

article in its entirety:--

"The individual man of any country in which active outdoor life,

abstinence, hunting of wild game, and exposure to all weathers

are the habits of life, is more than a match for the private

soldier of a regular army, who is taken from the plough or from

cities, and this is the case doubly as much when the field of

operations is a difficult country, and when the former is, and

the latter is not, acclimatised. On the one hand, the former is

accustomed to the climate, knows the country, and is trained to

long marches and difficulties of all sorts inseparable from his

daily life; the latter is unacclimatised, knows nothing of the

country, and, accustomed to have his every want supplied, is at a

loss when any extraordinary hardships or difficulties are

encountered; he has only his skill in his arms and discipline in

his favour, and sometimes that skill may be also possessed by his

foe. The native of the country has to contend with a difficulty

in maintaining a long contest, owing to want of means and want of

discipline, being unaccustomed to any yoke interfering with

individual freedom. The resources of a regular army, in

comparison to those of the natives of the country, are infinite,

but it is accustomed to discipline. In a difficult country, when

the numbers are equal, and when the natives are of the

description above stated, the regular forces are certainly at a

very great disadvantage, until, by bitter experience in the

field, they are taught to fight in the same irregular way as

their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost. I

therefore think that when regular forces enter into a campaign

under these conditions, the former ought to avoid any unnecessary

haste, for time does not press with them, while every day

increases the burden on a country without resources and

unaccustomed to discipline, and as the forces of the country,

unprovided with artillery, never ought to be able to attack

fortified posts, any advance should be made by the establishment

of such posts. All engagements in the field ought, if possible,

to be avoided, except by corps raised from people who in their

habits resemble those in arms, or else by irregular corps raised

for the purpose, apart from the routine and red-tape inseparable

from regular armies. The regular forces will act as the back-bone

of the expedition, but the rock and cover fighting will be done

better by levies of such specially raised irregulars. For war

with native countries, I think that, except for the defence of

posts, artillery is a great incumbrance, far beyond its value. It

is a continual source of anxiety. Its transport regulates the

speed of the march, and it forms a target for the enemy, while

its effects on the scattered enemy is almost _nil_. An advance of

regular troops, as at present organised, is just the sort of

march that suits an active native foe. The regulars' column must

be heaped together, covering its transport and artillery. The

enemy knows the probable point of its destination on a particular

day, and then, knowing that the regulars cannot halt definitely

where it may be chosen to attack, it hovers round the column like

wasps. The regulars cannot, from not being accustomed to the

work, go clambering over rocks, or beating covers after their

foes. Therefore I conclude that in these wars[1] regular troops

should only act as a reserve; that the real fighting should be

done either by native allies or by special irregular corps,

commanded by special men, who would be untrammelled by

regulations; that, except for the defence of posts, artillery

should be abandoned. It may seem egotistical, but I may state

that I should never have succeeded against native foes had I not

had flanks, and front, and rear covered by irregular forces.

Whenever either the flanks, or rear, or front auxiliaries were

barred in their advance, we turned the regular forces on that

point, and thus strengthening the hindered auxiliaries, drove

back the enemy. We owed defeats, when they occurred, to the

absence of these auxiliaries, and on two occasions to having

cannon with the troops, which lost us 1600 men. The Abyssinians,

who are the best of mountaineers, though they have them, utterly

despise cannon, as they hinder their movements. I could give

instance after instance where, in native wars, regular troops

could not hold their own against an active guerilla, and where,

in some cases, the disasters of the regulars were brought about

by being hampered by cannon. No one can deny artillery may be

most efficient in the contention of two regular armies, but it is

quite the reverse in guerilla warfare. The inordinate haste which

exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids

which would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was

taken to do the work, and far greater expense is caused by this

hurry than otherwise would be necessary. All is done on the

'_Veni, vidi, vici_' principle. It may be very fine, but it is

bloody and expensive, and not scientific. I am sure it will occur

to many, the times we have advanced, without proper breaches,

bridges, etc., and with what loss, assaulted. It would seem that

military science should be entirely thrown away when combating

native tribes. I think I am correct in saying that the Romans

always fought with large auxiliary forces of the invaded country

or its neighbours, and I know it was the rule of the Russians in

Circassia."

[1] In allusion more particularly to the Cape and China.

Perhaps Gordon was influenced by the catastrophes in South Africa when

he sent the following telegram at his own expense to the Cape

authorities on 7th April 1881: "Gordon offers his services for two

years at £700 per annum to assist in terminating war and administering

Basutoland." To this telegram he was never accorded even the courtesy

of a negative reply. It will be remembered that twelve months earlier

the Cape Government had offered him the command of the forces, and

that his reply had been to refuse. The incident is of some interest as

showing that his attention had been directed to the Basuto question,

and also that he was again anxious for active employment. His wish for

the latter was to be realised in an unexpected manner.

He was staying in London when, on visiting the War Office, he casually

met the late Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, an officer of his own

corps, who began by complaining of his hard luck in its just having

fallen to his turn to fill the post of Engineer officer in command at

the Mauritius, and such was the distastefulness of the prospect of

service in such a remote and unattractive spot, that Sir Howard went

on to say that he thought he would sooner retire from the service. In

his impulsive manner Gordon at once exclaimed: "Oh, don't worry

yourself, I will go for you; Mauritius is as good for me as anywhere

else." The exact manner in which this exchange was brought about has

been variously described, but this is the literal version given me by

General Gordon himself, and there is no doubt that, as far as he could

regret anything that had happened, he bitterly regretted the accident

that caused him to become acquainted with the Mauritius. In a letter

to myself on the subject from Port Louis he said: "It was not over

cheerful to go out to this place, nor is it so to find a deadly sleep

over all my military friends here." In making the arrangements which

were necessary to effect the official substitution of himself for

Colonel Elphinstone, Gordon insisted on only two points: first, that

Elphinstone should himself arrange the exchange; and secondly that no

payment was to be made to him as was usual--in this case about

£800--on an exchange being effected. Sir Howard Elphinstone was thus

saved by Gordon's peculiarities a disagreeable experience and a

considerable sum of money. Some years after Gordon's death Sir Howard

met with a tragic fate, being washed overboard while taking a trip

during illness to Madeira.

Like everything else he undertook, Gordon determined to make his

Mauritius appointment a reality, and although he was only in the

island twelve months, and during that period took a trip to the

interesting group of the Seychelles, he managed to compress an immense

amount of work into that short space, and to leave on record some

valuable reports on matters of high importance. He found at Mauritius

the same dislike for posts that were outside the ken of headquarters,

and the same indifference to the dry details of professional work that

drove officers of high ability and attainments to think of resigning

the service sooner than fill them, and, when they did take them, to

pass their period of exile away from the charms of Pall Mall in a

state of inaction that verged on suspended animation. In a passage

already quoted, he refers to the deadly sleep of his military friends,

and then he goes on to say in a sentence, which cannot be too much

taken to heart by those who have to support this mighty empire, with

enemies on every hand--"We are in a perfect Fools' Paradise about our

power. We have plenty of power if we would pay attention to our work,

but the fault is, to my mind, the military power of the country is

eaten up by selfishness and idleness, and we are trading on the

reputation of our forefathers. When one sees by the newspapers the

Emperor of Germany sitting, old as he is, for two long hours

inspecting his troops, and officers here grudging two hours a week for

their duties, one has reason to fear the future."

During his stay at Mauritius he wrote three papers of first-rate

importance. One of them on Egyptian affairs after the deposition of

Ismail may be left for the next chapter, and the two others, one on

coaling stations in the Indian Ocean, and the second on the

comparative merits of the Cape and Mediterranean routes come within

the scope of this chapter, and are, moreover, deserving of special

consideration. With regard to the former of these two important

subjects, Gordon wrote as follows, but I cannot discover that anything

has been done to give practical effect to his recommendations:--

"I spoke to you concerning Borneo and the necessity for coaling

stations in the Eastern seas. Taking Mauritius with its large

French population, the Cape with its conflicting elements, and

Hongkong, Singapore, and Penang with their vast Chinese

populations, who may be with or against us, but who are at any

time a nuisance, I would select such places where no temptation

would induce colonists to come, and I would use them as maritime

fortresses. For instance, the only good coaling place between

Suez and Adelaide would be in the Chagos group, which contain a

beautiful harbour at San Diego. My object is to secure this for

the strengthening of our maritime power. These islands are of

great strategical importance _vis à vis_ with India, Suez, and

Singapore. Remember Aden has no harbour to speak of, and has the

need of a garrison, while Chagos could be kept by a company of

soldiers. It is wonderful our people do not take the views of our

forefathers. They took up their positions at all the salient

points of the routes. We can certainly hold these places, but

from the colonial feelings they have almost ceased to be our own.

By establishing these coaling stations no diplomatic

complications could arise, while by their means we could unite

all our colonies with us, for we could give them effective

support. The spirit of no colony would bear up for long against

the cutting off of its trade, which would happen if we kept

watching the Mediterranean and neglected the great ocean routes.

The cost would not be more than these places cost now, if the

principle of heavily-armed, light-draught, swift gunboats with

suitable arsenals, properly (not over) defended, were followed."

Chagos as well as Seychelles forms part of the administrative group of

the Mauritius. The former with, as Gordon states, an admirable port in

San Diego, lies in the direct route to Australia from the Red Sea, and

the latter contains an equally good harbour in Port Victoria Mahé. The

Seychelles are remarkably healthy islands--thirty in number--and

Gordon recommended them as a good place for "a man with a little money

to settle in." He also advanced the speculative and somewhat

imaginative theory that in them was to be found the true site of the

Garden of Eden.

The views Gordon expressed in 1881 as to the diminished importance of

the Mediterranean as an English interest, and the relative superiority

of the Cape over the Canal route, on the ground of its security, were

less commonly held then than they have since become. Whether they are

sound is not to be taken on the trust of even the greatest of

reputations; and in so complicated and many-sided a problem it will be

well to consider all contingencies, and to remember that there is no

reason why England should not be able in war-time to control them

both, until at least the remote epoch when Palestine shall be a

Russian possession.

"I think Malta has very much lost its importance. The

Mediterranean now differs much from what it was in 1815. Other

nations besides France possess in it great dockyards and

arsenals, and its shores are backed by united peoples. Any war

with Great Britain in the Mediterranean with any one Power would

inevitably lead to complications with neutral nations. Steam has

changed the state of affairs, and has brought the Mediterranean

close to every nation of Europe. War in the Mediterranean is _war

in a basin_, the borders of which are in the hands of other

nations, all pretty powerful and interested in trade, and all

likely to be affected by any turmoil in that basin, and to be

against the makers of such turmoil. In fact, the Mediterranean

trade is so diverted by the railroads of Europe, that it is but

of small importance. The trade which is of value is the trade

east of Suez, which, passing through the Canal, depends upon its

being kept open. If the entrance to the Mediterranean were

blocked at Gibraltar by a heavy fleet, I cannot see any advantage

to be gained against us by the fleets blocked up in it--at any

rate I would say, let our _first care_ be for the Cape route, and

secondly for the Mediterranean and Canal. The former route

entails no complications, the latter endless ones, coupled with a

precarious tenure. Look at the Mediterranean, and see how small

is that sea on which we are apparently devoting the greater part

of our attention. Aden should be made a Crown colony. The

Resident, according to existing orders, reports to Bombay, and

Bombay to _that_ Simla Council, which knows and cares nothing

for the question. A special regiment should be raised for its

protection."

While stationed in the Mauritius, Gordon attained the rank of

Major-General in the army, and another colonel of Engineers was sent

out to take his place. During the last three months of his residence

he filled, in addition to his own special post, that of the command of

all the troops on the station, and at one time it seemed as if he

might have been confirmed in the appointment. But this was not done,

owing, as he suggested, to the "determination not to appoint officers

of the Royal Artillery or Engineers to any command;" but a more

probable reason was that Gordon had been inquiring about and had

discovered that the colonists were not only a little discontented, but

had some ground for their discontent. By this time Gordon's

uncompromising sense of justice was beginning to be known in high

official quarters, and the then responsible Government had far too

many cares on its shoulders that could not be shirked to invite others

from so remote and unimportant a possession as the Mauritius.

Even before any official decision could have been arrived at in this

matter, fate had provided him with another destination.

Two passages have already been cited, showing the overtures first made

by the Cape Government, and then by Gordon himself, for his employment

in South Africa. Nothing came of those communications. On 23rd

February 1882, when an announcement was made by myself that Gordon

would vacate his command in a few weeks' time, the Cape Government

again expressed its desire to obtain the use of his services, and

moreover recollected the telegram to which no reply had been sent. Sir

Hercules Robinson, then Governor of the Cape, sent the following

telegram to the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley:--

"Ministers request me to inquire whether H.M.'s Government would

permit them to obtain the services of Colonel Charles Gordon.

Ministers desire to invite Colonel Gordon to come to this Colony

for the purpose of consultation as to the best measures to be

adopted with reference to Basutoland, in the event of Parliament

sanctioning their proposals as to that territory, and to engage

his services, should he be willing to renew the offer made to

their predecessors in April 1881, to assist in terminating the

war and administering Basutoland."

Lord Kimberley then sent instructions by telegraph to Durban, and

thence by steamer, sanctioning Gordon's employment and his immediate

departure from the Mauritius. The increasing urgency of the Basuto

question induced the Cape Government to send a message by telegraph to

Aden, and thence by steamer direct to Gordon. In this message they

stated that "the services of some one of proved ability, firmness, and

energy," were required; that they did not expect Gordon to be bound by

the salary named in his own telegram, and that they begged him to

visit the Colony "at once"--repeating the phrase twice. All these

messages reached Gordon's hands on 2nd April. Two days later he

started in the sailing vessel _Scotia_, no other ship being

obtainable.

The Cape authorities had therefore no ground to complain of the

dilatoriness of the man to whom they appealed in their difficulty,

although their telegram was despatched 3rd of March, and Gordon did

not reach Cape Town before the 3rd of May. It will be quite understood

that Gordon had offered in the first place, and been specially invited

in the second place, to proceed to the Cape, for the purpose of

dealing with the difficulty in Basutoland. He was to find that, just

as his mission to China had been complicated by extraneous

circumstances, so was his visit to the Cape to be rendered more

difficult by Party rivalries, and by work being thrust upon him which

he had several times refused to accept, and for the efficient

discharge of which, in his own way, he knew he would never obtain the

requisite authority.

Before entering upon this matter a few words may be given to the

financial agreement between himself and the Cape Government. The first

office in 1880 had carried with it a salary of £1500; in 1881 Gordon

had offered to go for £700; in 1882 the salary was to be a matter of

arrangement, and on arrival at Cape Town he was offered £1200 a year.

He refused to accept more than £800 a year; but as he required and

insisted on having a secretary, the other £400 was assigned for that

purpose. In naming such a small and inadequate salary Gordon was under

the mistaken belief that his imperial pay of £500 a year would

continue, but, unfortunately for him, a new regulation, 25th June

1881, had come into force while he was buried away in the Mauritius,

and he was disqualified from the receipt of the income he had earned.

Gordon was very indignant, more especially because it was clear that

he was doing public service at the Cape, while, as he said with some

bitterness, if he had started an hotel or become director of a

company, his pay would have gone on all the same. The only suggestion

the War Office made was that he should ask the Cape Government to

compensate him, but this he indignantly refused. In the result all his

savings during the Mauritius command were swallowed up, and I believe

I understate the amount when I say that his Cape experience cost him

out of his own pocket from first to last five hundred pounds. That sum

was a very considerable one to a man who never inherited any money,

and who went through life scorning all opportunities of making it.

But on this occasion he vindicated a principle, and showed that

"money was not his object."

As Gordon went to the Cape specially for the purpose of treating the

Basutoland question, it may be well to describe briefly what that

question was. Basutoland is a mountainous country, difficult of

access, but in resources self-sufficing, on the eastern side of the

Orange Free State, and separated from Natal and Kaffraria, or the

Transkei division of Cape Colony, by the sufficiently formidable

Drakensberg range. Its population consisted of 150,000 stalwart and

freedom-loving Highlanders, ruled by four chiefs--Letsea, Masupha,

Molappo, and Lerothodi, with only the three first of whom had Gordon

in any way to deal. Notwithstanding their numbers, courage, and the

natural strength of their country, they owed their safety from

absorption by the Boers to British protection, especially in 1868, and

they were taken over by us as British subjects without any formality

three years later. They do not seem to have objected so long as the

tie was indefinite, but when in 1880 it was attempted to enforce the

regulations of the Peace Preservation Act by disarming these clans,

then the Basutos began a pronounced and systematic opposition. Letsea

and Lerothodi kept up the pretence of friendliness, but Masupha

fortified his chief residence at Thaba Bosigo, and openly prepared for

war. That war had gone on for two years without result, and the total

cost of the Basuto question had been four millions sterling when

Gordon was summoned to the scene. Having given this general

description of the question, it will be well to state the details of

the matters in dispute, as set forth by Gordon after he had examined

all the papers and heard the evidence of the most competent and

well-informed witnesses.

His memorandum, dated 26th May 1882, read as follows:--

"In 1843 the Basuto chiefs entered into a treaty with Her

Majesty's Government, by which the limits of Basutoland were

recognised roughly in 1845. The Basuto chiefs agreed by

convention with Her Majesty's Government to a concession of land

on terminable leases, on the condition that Her Majesty's

Government should protect them from Her Majesty's subjects.

"In 1848 the Basuto chiefs agreed to accept the Sovereignty of

Her Majesty the Queen, on the understanding that Her Majesty's

Government would restrain Her Majesty's subjects in the

territories they possessed.

"Between 1848 and 1852, notwithstanding the above treaties, a

large portion of Basutoland was annexed by the proclamation of

Her Majesty's Government, and this annexation was accompanied by

hostilities, which were afterwards decided by Sir George Cathcart

as being undertaken in support of unjustifiable aggression.

"In 1853, notwithstanding the treaties, Basutoland was abandoned,

leaving its chiefs to settle as they could with the Europeans of

the Free State who were settled in Basutoland and were mixed up

with the Basuto people.

"In 1857, the Basutos asked Her Majesty's Government to arbitrate

and settle their quarrels. This request was refused.

"In 1858 the Free State interfered to protect their settlers, and

a war ensued, and the Free State was reduced to great

extremities, and asked Her Majesty's Government to mediate. This

was agreed to, and a frontier line was fixed by Her Majesty's

Government.

"In 1865 another war broke out between the Free State and the

Basutos, at the close of which the Basutos lost territory, and

were accepted as British subjects by Her Majesty's Government for

the second time, being placed under the direct government of Her

Majesty's High Commissioner.

"In 1871 Basutoland was annexed to the _Crown_ Colony of the Cape

of Good Hope, without the Basutos having been consulted.

"In 1872 the _Crown_ Colony became a colony with a responsible

Government, and the Basutos were placed virtually under another

power. The Basutos asked for representation in the Colonial

Parliament, which was refused, and to my mind here was the

mistake committed which led to these troubles.

"Then came constant disputes, the Disarmament Act, the Basuto

War, and present state of affairs.

"From this chronology there are four points that stand out in

relief:--

"1. That the Basuto people, who date back generations, made

treaties with the British Government, which treaties are equally

binding, whether between two powerful states, or between a

powerful state and a weak one.

"2. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos lost land.

"3. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos, without being

consulted or having their rights safeguarded, were handed over to

another power--the Colonial Government.

"4. That that other power proceeded to enact their disarmament, a

process which could only be carried out with a servile race, like

the Hindoos of the plains of India, and which any one of

understanding must see would be resisted to the utmost by any

people worth the name; the more so in the case of the Basutos,

who realised the constant contraction of their frontiers in

defiance of the treaties made with the British Government, and

who could not possibly avoid the conclusion that this disarmament

was only a prelude to their extinction.

"The necessary and inevitable result of the four deductions was

that the Basutos resisted, and remain passively resisting to this

day.

"The fault lay in the British Government not having consulted the

Basutos, their co-treaty power, when they handed them over to the

Colonial Government. They should have called together a national

assembly of the Basuto people, in which the terms of the transfer

could have been quietly arranged, and this I consider is the root

of all the troubles, and expenses, and miseries which have sprung

up; and therefore, as it is always best to go to the root of any

malady, I think it would be as well to let bygones be bygones,

and to commence afresh by calling together by proclamation a

Pitso of the whole tribe, in order to discuss the best means of

sooner securing the settlement of the country. I think that some

such proclamation should be issued. By this Pitso we would know

the exact position of affairs, and the real point in which the

Basutos are injured or considered themselves to be injured.

"To those who wish for the total abandonment of Basutoland, this

course must be palatable; to those who wish the Basutos well, and

desire not to see them exterminated, it must also be palatable;

and to those who hate the name of Basutoland it must be

palatable, for it offers a solution which will prevent them ever

hearing the name again.

"This Pitso ought to be called at once. All Colonial officials

ought to be absent, for what the colony wants is to know what is

the matter; and the colony wishes to know it from the Basuto

people, irrespective of the political parties of the Government.

"Such a course would certainly recommend itself to the British

Government, and to its masters--the British people.

"Provided the demands of the Basutos--who will, for their own

sakes, never be for a severing of their connection with the

colony, in order to be eventually devoured by the Orange Free

State--are such as will secure the repayment to the colony of all

expenses incurred by the Colonial Government in the maintenance

of this connection, and I consider that the Colonial Government

should accept them.

"With respect to the Loyals, there are some 800 families, the

cost of keeping whom is on an average one shilling per diem each

family, that is £40 per diem, or £1200 per month, and they have

been rationed during six months at cost of £7200. Their claims

may therefore be said to be some £80,000. Now, if these 800

families (some say half) have claims amounting to £30 each

individually (say 400 families at £30), £12,000 paid at once

would rid the colony of the cost of subsistence of these

families, viz. £600 a month (the retention of them would only add

to the colonial expenditure, and tend to pauperise them).

"I believe that £30,000 paid at once to the Loyals would reduce

their numbers to one-fourth what they are now. It is proposed to

send up a Commission to examine into their claims; the Commission

will not report under two months, and there will be the delay of

administration at Cape Town, during all which time £1200 a month

are being uselessly expended by the colony, detrimentally to the

Loyals. Therefore I recommend (1) that the sum of £30,000 should

be at once applied to satisfy the minor claims of the Loyals; (2)

that this should be done at once, at same time as the meeting of

the National Pitso.

"The effect of this measure in connection with the meeting of the

National Pitso would be very great, for it would be a positive

proof of the good disposition of the Colonial Government. The

greater claims could, if necessary, wait for the Parliamentary

Commission, but I would deprecate even this delay, and though for

the distribution of the £30,000 I would select those on whom the

responsibility of such distribution could be put, without

reference to the Colonial Government, for any larger sums perhaps

the colonial sanction should be taken.

"I urge that this measure of satisfying the Loyals is one that

presses and cannot well wait months to be settled.

"In conclusion, I recommend (1) that a National Pitso be held;

(2) that the Loyals should at once be paid off.

"I feel confident that by the recommendation No. 1 nothing could

be asked for detrimental to colonial interests, whose Government

would always have the right of amending or refusing any demands,

and that by recommendation No. 2 a great moral effect would be

produced at once, and some heavy expenses saved."

Attached to this memorandum was the draft of a proclamation to the

chiefs, etc., of Basutoland, calling on them to meet in Pitso or

National Assembly without any agent of the Colonial Government being

present. It was not very surprising that such a policy of fairness and

consideration for Basuto opinion, because so diametrically opposite to

everything that Government had been doing, should have completely

taken the Cape authorities aback, nor were its chances of being

accepted increased by Gordon entrusting it to Mr Orpen, whose policy

in the matter had been something more than criticised by the Ministers

at that moment in power at the Cape. Gordon's despatch was in the

hands of the Cape Premier early in June, and the embarrassment he felt

at the ability and force with which the Basuto side of the question

was put by the officer, who was to settle the matter for the Cape

Government, was so great that, instead of making any reply, he passed

it on to Lord Kimberley and the Colonial Office for solution. It was

not until the 7th of August that an answer was vouchsafed to Gordon on

what was, after all, the main portion of his task in South Africa. In

the interval Gordon was employed on different military and

administrative matters, for he had had thrust on him as a temporary

charge the functions of Commandant-General of the Cape forces, which

he had never wished to accept, but it will be clearer to the reader to

follow to the end the course of his Basuto mission, which was the

essential cause of his presence in South Africa.

On the 18th July the Ministers requested Gordon to go up to

Basutoland. At that moment, and indeed for more than three weeks

later, Gordon had received no reply to the detailed memorandum already

quoted. He responded to this request with the draft of a convention

that would "save the susceptibilities of Mr Orpen between whom and

Masupha any _entente_ would seem impossible." The basis of that

convention was to be the semi-independence of the Basutos, but its

full text must be given in order to show the consistency, as well as

the simplicity, of Gordon's proposed remedy of a question that had

gone on for years without any prospect of termination.

CONVENTION BETWEEN COLONY, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, AND THE CHIEF AND

PEOPLE OF BASUTOLAND.

"The Colonial Government having nominated as their

representatives, Colonel C. Griffiths and Dr J. W. Matthews, the

Basuto nation having nominated the Chief Letsea Moshesh and

Masupha Moshesh as their representatives, the following

convention has been agreed upon between these representatives:--

"Art. 1. There shall be a complete amnesty on both sides to all

who have taken part in the late hostilities.

"Art. 2. The question of the succession to Molappo Moshesh's

chieftainship shall be decided by the Chief of the Basuto Nation.

"Art. 3. The Colonial Government engages to respect the integrity

of the Basuto nation within the limits to be hereafter decided

upon, and also to use its best endeavours to have these limits

respected by the Orange Free State.

"Art. 4. The Colonial Government will appoint a Resident to the

Basuto nation, with two sub-residents. The Resident will consult

with the leading Chief of the Basuto Nation on all measures

concerning the welfare of that country, but the government of the

Basutos in all internal affairs will remain under the

jurisdiction of the chiefs.

"Art. 5. The Supreme Council of Basutoland will consist of the

leading chiefs and the Resident; the minor chiefs of Basutoland

will form a council with the sub-residents. These minor councils

can be appealed against by any non-content to the Supreme

Council.

"Art. 6. A hut-tax will be collected of 10s. per hut by the

chiefs, and will be paid to the Resident and sub-resident. The

sum thus collected will be used in paying the Resident £2000 a

year, all included: the sub-residents £1200 a year, all included;

in providing for the education of people (now costing £3320 a

year); in making roads, etc.

"Art. 7. The chiefs collecting hut-tax will be paid 10 per cent.

of the sums they collect.

"Art. 8. The frontier line will be placed under headmen, who will

be responsible that no thieving be permitted, that spoors are

followed up. For this these headmen will be paid at the rate of

£20 to £60 per annum, according to the length of frontier they

are responsible for.

"Art. 9. All passes must be signed by Residents or sub-residents

for the Orange Free State, or for the Cape Colony.

"_Query_--Would it be advisable to add chiefs and missionaries

after sub-residents?

"Art. 10. Colonial warrants will be valid in Basutoland, the

chiefs being responsible that prisoners are given up to Resident

or sub-residents.

"Art. 11. All communications between Basutoland and the Orange

Free State to be by and through the Resident.

"Art. 12. This Convention to be in quadruplicate, two copies

being in possession of the Colonial Government, and two copies in

possession of the Basuto chiefs.

"Art. 13. On signature of this Convention, and on the fulfilment

of Art. 1, amnesty clause, the Colonial Government agrees to

withdraw the military forces and the present magisterial

administration."

To this important communication no answer was ever vouchsafed, but on

7th August, long after it was in the hands of Ministers, Mr Thomas

Scanlan, the Premier, wrote a long reply to the earlier memorandum of

26th May. The writer began by quoting Lord Kimberley's remarks on that

memorandum, which were as follows:--

"I have received the memorandum on the Basuto question by

Major-General Gordon. I do not think it necessary to enter upon a

discussion of the policy suggested in this memorandum, but it

will doubtless be borne in mind by your Ministers that, as I

informed you by my telegram of the 6th of May last, H.M.'s

Government cannot hold out any expectation that steps will be

taken by them to relieve the colony of its responsibilities in

Basutoland."

The interpretation placed, and no doubt correctly placed, on that

declaration of Government policy was that under no circumstances was

it prepared to do anything in the matter, and that it had quite a

sufficient number of troubles and worries without the addition of one

in remote and unimportant Basutoland. Having thus got out of the

necessity of discussing this important memorandum, under the cloak of

the Colonial Office's decision in favour of inaction, the Premier went

on to say that he was "most anxious to avoid the resumption of

hostilities on the one hand or the abandonment of the territory on the

other." There was an absolute ignoring in this statement of Gordon's

deliberate opinion that the only way to solve the difficulty was by

granting Basutoland semi-independence on the terms of a Convention

providing for the presence of a British Resident, through whom all

external matters were to be conducted. At the same time Mr Scanlan

informed Gordon that he was sending up Mr Sauer, then Secretary for

Native Affairs, who was a nominee of Mr Orpen, the politician whose

policy was directly impugned.

On Mr Sauer reaching King William's Town, where Gordon was in

residence at the Grand Depôt of the Cape forces, he at once asked him

to accompany him to Basutoland. Gordon at first declined to do this on

two grounds, viz. that he saw no good could ensue unless the

convention were granted, and also that he did not wish Mr Sauer, or

any other representative of the Cape Government, as a companion,

because he had learnt that "Masupha would only accept his proposed

visit as a private one, and then only with his private secretary and

two servants."

After some weeks' hesitation Gordon was induced by Mr Sauer to so far

waive his objection as to consent to accompany him to Letsea's

territory. This Basuto chief kept up the fiction of friendly relations

with the Cape, but after Gordon had personally interviewed him, he

became more than ever convinced that all the Basuto chiefs were in

league. Mr Sauer was of opinion that Letsea and the other chiefs might

be trusted to attack and able to conquer Masupha. There was no

possibility of reconciling these clashing views, but Gordon also

accompanied Mr Sauer to Leribe, the chief town of Molappo's territory,

north of, and immediately adjoining that of, Masupha. Here Gordon

found fresh evidence as to the correctness of his view, that all the

Basuto leaders were practically united, and he wrote a memorandum,

dated 16th September, which has not been published, showing the

hopelessness of getting one chief to coerce the others.

Notwithstanding the way he had been treated by the Cape Government,

which had ignored all his suggestions, Gordon, in his intense desire

to do good, and his excessive trust in the honour of other persons,

yielded to Mr Sauer's request to visit Masupha, and not only yielded

but went without any instructions or any prior agreement that his

views were to prevail. The consequence was that Mr Sauer deliberately

resolved to destroy Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure

the triumph of his own policy by an act of treachery that has never

been surpassed.

While Gordon went as a private visitor at the special invitation of

Masupha to that chief's territory, Mr Sauer, who was well acquainted

with Gordon's views, and also the direct author of Gordon's visit at

that particular moment, incited Letsea to induce Lerothodi to attack

Masupha. At the moment that the news of this act of treachery reached

Masupha's ears, Gordon was a guest in Masupha's camp, and the first

construction placed upon events by that chief was, that Gordon had

been sent up to hoodwink and keep him quiet, while a formidable

invasion was plotted of his territory. When Masupha reported this news

to Gordon, he asked what he advised him to do, and it has been

established that the object of the question was to ascertain how far

Gordon was privy to the plot. Gordon's candid reply--"Refuse to have

any dealings with the Government until the forces are withdrawn," and

his general demeanour, which showed unaffected indignation, convinced

Masupha of his good faith and innocence of all participation in the

plot.

A very competent witness, Mr Arthur Pattison (letter in _The Times_,

20th August 1885), bears this testimony: "Gordon divined his character

marvellously, and was the only man Masupha had the slightest regard

for. Masupha, if you treat him straightforwardly, is as nice a man as

possible, and even kind and thoughtful; but, if you treat him the

other way, he is a fiend incarnate."

Had Masupha not been thus convinced, Gordon's death was decided on,

and never in the whole course of his career, not even when among the

Taepings on the day of the Wangs' murder in Soochow, nor among

Suleiman's slave-hunters at Shaka, was he in greater peril than when

exposed by the treacherous proceedings of Sauer and Orpen to the wrath

of Masupha. On his return in safety he at once sent in his

resignation, but those who played him false not merely never received

their deserts for an unpardonable breach of faith to a loyal

colleague, but have been permitted by a lax public opinion at the Cape

to remain in the public service, and are now discharging high and

responsible duties.

Gordon's mission to the leading Basuto chief, and the policy of

conciliation which he consistently and ably advocated from the

beginning to the end of his stay at the Cape, were thus failures, but

they failed, as an impartial writer like Mr Gresswell says, solely

because "of Mr Sauer's intrigues behind his back." It is only

necessary to add what Gordon himself wrote on this subject on his

return, and to record that practically the very policy he advocated

was carried into force, not by the Cape Government, but over its head

by the British Government, two years later, in the separation of

Basutoland from the Cape Colony, and by placing it in its old direct

dependence under the British Crown.

"I have looked over the Cape papers; the only thing that is

misrepresented, so far as I could see in a ten minutes' glance at

them, is that Sauer says I knew of his intentions of sending an

expedition against Masupha. He puts it thus: 'Gordon knew that an

expedition was being organised against Masupha.' He gives

apparently three witnesses that I knew well. It is quite true;

but read the words. _I knew Sauer was going_ to try the useless

expedient of an expedition against Masupha, and _before he did

so_ we _agreed I should go and try and make peace_. While

carrying on this peace mission, Sauer sends the expedition. So

you see he is verbally correct; yet the deduction is false; in

fact, who would ever go up with peace overtures to a man who was

to be attacked during those overtures, as Masupha was? Garcia

knew well enough what a surprise it was to him and me when we

heard Sauer was sending the expedition. Garcia was with me at the

time."

And again, when at Jaffa, General Gordon adds further, on the 27th of

July 1883:--

"I saw Masupha one day at 10 A.M., and spoke to him; Sauer was

twenty miles away. At 1 P.M. I came back, and wrote to Sauer an

account of what had passed; before I sent it off I received a

letter from Sauer. I believe it is wished to be made out that

Sauer wrote this letter after he had heard what had passed

between Masupha and me. This is not the case, for Sauer, having

let me go to Masupha, changed his mind and wrote the letter, but

this letter had nothing to do with my interview with Masupha."

With this further quotation of Gordon's own words I may conclude the

description of the Basuto mission, which, although deemed a failure at

the time, was eventually the direct cause of the present

administrative arrangement in that important district of South Africa.

"In order you should understand the position of affairs, I recall

to your memory the fact that Scanlan, Merriman, and yourself all

implied to me doubts of Orpen's policy and your desire to remove

him; that I deprecated any such change in my favour; that I

accepted the post of Commandant-General on Merriman's statement

that the Government desired me to eradicate the red-tape system

of the colonial forces; that I made certain reports to the

Government upon the settlement of the Basuto question in May and

July, showing my views; that the Government were aware of the

great difference between my views and those of Orpen, both by

letter and verbally to Merriman; also to my objections to go up.

Sauer was told by me the same thing. I conversed with him _en

route_, and I told him if I visited Masupha I could not

afterwards fight him, for I would not go and spy upon his

defences. Sauer asked me to go to Masupha; he knew my views; yet

when I was there negotiating, he, or rather Orpen, moved

Lerothodi to attack Masupha, who would, I believe, have come to

terms respecting the acceptance of magistrates, a modified

hut-tax, and border police. The reported movement of Lerothodi

prevented my coming to any arrangement. I told Masupha, when he

sent and told me of Lerothodi's advance, not to answer the

Government until the hostile movements had ceased. The Government

sent me up, knowing my views, and against my wish, and knowing I

was not likely to mince matters. There are not more than two

Europeans in Basutoland who believe in Orpen or his policy, while

the natives have lost all confidence in him. Sauer shut his eyes

to all this, and has thrown in his lot with Orpen. Masupha is a

sincere man, and he does not care to have placed with him

magistrates, against whom are complaints, which Sauer ignores. To

show you I was in earnest, I offered to remain as magistrate with

Masupha for two years, so much did I desire a settlement of the

Basuto question. I did not want nor would I have taken the post

of Governor's Agent. The chiefs and people desire peace, but not

at any price. They have intelligence enough to see through

wretched magistrates like some of those sent up into the native

territories. They will accept a convention like the one I sent

down to the Colonial Secretary on the 19th of July, and no other.

I do not write this to escape being a scapegoat--in fact, I like

the altar--only that you may know my views. As long as the

present magistrates stay there, no chance exists for any

arrangement. As to the Premier's remark that I would not fight

against Masupha, is it likely I could fight against a man with

whom I am life and soul? Would I fight against him because he

would not be controlled by some men like ---- and ----? Even

suppose I could sink my conscience to do so, what issue would

result from the action of undisciplined and insubordinate troops,

who are difficult to keep in order during peace-time, and about

whom, when I would have made an example of one officer, a

Minister telegraphs to me to let him down easy. I beg to recall

to you that Her Majesty's Government disapproved of the former

Basuto war; therefore, why should I, who am an outsider to the

colony, even pretend I could make war against a noble people, who

resist magistrates of no capacity? The Government were well

warned by me, and they cannot, therefore, plead being led

astray."

Intimately connected with the Basuto question was the larger one of

the right treatment to be generally extended to the natives, and on

that subject General Gordon drew up, on 19th October 1882, the

following masterly note, which elicited the admiration of one of the

Cape Premiers, Mr Merriman, who said--"As a Colony we must try to

follow out the ideas sketched by General Gordon."

The following is the full text of this interesting and valuable state

paper:--

THE NATIVE QUESTION.

"1. The native question of South Africa is not a difficult one to

an outsider. The difficulty lies in procuring a body of men who

will have strength of purpose to carry out a definite policy with

respect to the natives.

"2. The strained relations which exist between the colonist and

the native are the outcome of employing, as a rule, magistrates

lacking in tact, sympathy, and capacity to deal with the natives,

in the Government not supervising the action of these

magistrates, and in condoning their conduct, while acknowledging

those faults which come to their cognisance.

"3. The Colonial Government act in the nomination of native

magistrates as if their duties were such as any one could

fulfil, instead of being, as they are, duties requiring the

greatest tact and judgment. There can be no doubt but that in a

great measure, indeed one may say entirely, disturbances among

the natives are caused by the lack of judgment, or of honesty, or

of tact, on the part of the magistrates in the native

territories. There may be here and there good magistrates, but

the defects of the bad ones re-act on the good ones. Revolt is

contagious and spreads rapidly among the natives.

"4. One may say no supervision, in the full sense of the term,

exists over the actions of magistrates in native territories.

They report to headquarters what suits them, but unless some very

flagrant injustice is brought to light, which is often condoned,

the Government know nothing. The consequence is that a continual

series of petty injustices rankle in the minds of the natives,

eventually breaking out into a revolt, in the midst of which

Government does not trouble to investigate the causes of such

revolt, but is occupied in its suppression. The history of the

South African wars is essentially, as Sir G. Cathcart puts it,

"Wars undertaken in support of unjustifiable acts." Sir Harry

Smith was recalled for supporting an inefficient official of the

now Free State Territory. Any one who chooses can investigate the

causes of the late wars, and will find out that they arose in a

great measure from the ignorance of the Government, their support

of incapable officials, and their weakness in not investigating

causes before they proceeded to coercion.

"5. Government by coercion is essentially rotten. The Duke of

Wellington said that any fool could govern by that means. And it

is still more rotten when Government governs by the rule of

coercion without the power of coercion except at great expense.

"6. A properly constituted Commission of independent men

proceeding to the native territories, not accepting the

hospitality of those whose conduct they _go_ to investigate, not

driving through the territories in hot haste, as is the manner of

some Ministers, but a Commission who would patiently and

fearlessly inquire into every detail of administration, into

every grievance, is the _sine quâ non_ of any quiet in the native

territories. This Commission should detail on brass plates the

_modus vivendi_, the limits of territory of each district chief,

and a body of trustees should be appointed to watch over any

infraction of such charter.

"7. It must be borne in mind that these native territories cost

the Colony for administration some £9000 per annum for

administration of magistracies; the receipts are some £3000,

leaving a deficit of some £6000 per annum. To this deficit has to

be added some £150,000 for regular troops. The last rebellion of

Transkei ended in capture of some £60,000 worth of cattle, and

that from natives of Colony driven into rebellion, and cost

Government of Colony with Basuto war nearly £4,000,000. It is

surely worth while, from a financial point of view, to

investigate the administration of the Transkei.

"8. The present state of the Transkei is one of seething

discontent and distrust which the rivalry of the tribes alone

prevents breaking out into action, to be quelled again at great

expense and by the ruin of the people, and upset of all

enterprise to open up the country. Throughout the Transkei is one

general clamour against the Government for broken promises, for

promises made and never kept. Magistrates complain no answers are

given to their questions; things are allowed to drift along as

best they can. A fair open policy towards the Pondos would obtain

from them all the Colony could require, but as things are now,

the Pondos are full of distrust, and only want the chance to turn

against the Colony. There are in Transkei 399,000 natives, and

2800 Europeans. Therefore, for the benefit of these 2800

Europeans, 399,000 natives are made miserable, and an expenditure

of £210,000 is incurred by the Colony with the probability of

periodical troubles.

"9. However disagreeable it might be, the Commission of

Investigation should inquire into the antecedents of each

magistrate, and also his capabilities.

"10. With respect to Basutoland, it is understood that no revenue

from that country is to go to the Colony, therefore it can be no

object to Colony to insist on the installation of magistrates in

that country. If the magistrates of Transkei are the cause of

discontent among the natives, then what object is there in

insisting on their installation in Basutoland? The Pondos, a far

inferior people, are happy under their own chiefs--far happier

than the natives of Transkei. Why should the Colony insist on

sending men who are more likely to goad the Basutos into

rebellion than anything else? The administration of Basutoland is

on a scale costing £30,000 per annum.

"11. It is argued that should the Colony go to war with Masupha

the other chiefs would hold aloof. This is quite erroneous. A war

with Masupha means a war with the Basuto nation, with a rising in

the Transkei, and perhaps in Pondoland, and would affect Natal

and Her Majesty's Government.

"12. The only remedy is the sending up of his Excellency the

Governor, or of some high neutral officer, to Basutoland, and the

calling together of the people to decide on their future

government and connection with Colony. Or, should the British

Government refuse this small concession, which could not involve

it, then the Colony should send up an independent Commission to

meet the Basuto people, and arrange a _modus vivendi_. Whichever

course is followed it is a _sine quâ non_ that the present

officials in Basutoland should be relieved at once, as they have

lost the confidence both of Europeans and natives. The Basutos

desire peace, and it is an error to describe their demeanour as

aggressive. It is not unnatural that after what they have

suffered from the hands of Colonial Government they should desire

at least as nearly as much self-government as the Pondos enjoy.

Certainly the present magisterial administration of the Transkei

is very far from being a blessing, or conducive to peace.

"13. Nothing can possibly be worse than the present state of

affairs in native administration, and the interests of the Colony

demand a vertebrate government of some sort, whoever it may be

composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now

called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own

difficulties.

C. G. GORDON.

"October 19, 1882.

"_P.S._--Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with

Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could

be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."

The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission,

and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other

matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General,

apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the

Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him

in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined

urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman, then

Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post

thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of

work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system,

and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still

that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in

a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of

insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to

cashier a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while

matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry

went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The

measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and

Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the

Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out,

was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew

up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular

forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in

efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced.

This document shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most

striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape

would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it

already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed

the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by

administrative alterations in the Transkeian provinces, its cost might

be diminished and most conveniently discharged. Although I do not

quote these two documents, I cannot help saying that Gordon, in the

whole course of his life, never wrote anything more convincing than

the advice he gave the Cape Government, which, owing to local

jealousies and the invincible bulwark of vested interests, was never

carried into effect, although the Basuto question was subsequently

composed on Gordon's lines by the Imperial Government, and there has

been peace there during all the other South African troubles.

The closing passages between Gordon and the Cape Ministers need only

be briefly referred to. Gordon resigned because he saw he could do no

good in Basutoland; the Cape Premier accepted his resignation because

Gordon "would not fight the Basutos." The intercommunications were

much more numerous, but that is their pith. Gordon came down to Cape

Town and sailed for England on 14th October, after having been five

and a half months in South Africa. He had been treated by the Cape

authorities without any regard for justice, and little for courtesy.

The leading paper even admitted this much when it observed that "at

least General Gordon was entitled to the treatment of a gentleman."

But the plain truth was that Gordon was summoned to South Africa and

employed by the Government, not as was ostentatiously proclaimed, and

as he himself believed, for the attainment of a just solution of the

Basuto difficulty, and for the execution of much-needed military

reforms, but in order that his military experience and genius might be

invoked for the purpose of overthrowing Masupha and of annexing

Basutoland, which two years of war and five millions of money had

failed to conquer. Hence their disappointment and resentment when

Gordon proclaimed that justice was on the side of Masupha; that under

no circumstances would he wage war with him; and that the whole origin

of the trouble lay in the bad policy, the incompetent magistrates, and

the insubordinate military officers of the Cape Government. The

indictment was a terrible one; it was also true in every line and

every particular.

Having thus vindicated his own character, as well as the highest

principles of Government, Gordon left the Cape a poorer and a wiser

man than he was on his arrival. I have explained the personal loss he

incurred through the inadequacy of his pay and the cutting-off of his

army allowance. It has been stated that when he had taken his passage

for England he was without any money in his pocket, and that he

quaintly said to a friend: "Do you think it is right for a

Major-General of the British Army to set out on a journey like this

without sixpence in his pocket?" There is nothing improbable in such

an occurrence, and it was matched only sixteen months later, when he

was on the point of starting for Khartoum in the same impecunious

condition.

Gordon arrived in England on 8th November, and after some

correspondence with the King of the Belgians, which will be referred

to later in connection with the Congo mission, he again left England

on 26th December. On this occasion he was going to carry out a

long-cherished desire to visit and reside in the Holy Land, so that he

might study on the spot the scenes with which his perfect knowledge of

the Bible--his inseparable companion--had made him in an extraordinary

degree familiar. In the best sense of the word, he was going to take a

holiday. There was to be absolute quiet and rest, and at the same time

a congenial occupation. He sailed for Jaffa as a guest on one of Sir

William Mackinnon's steamers, but he at once proceeded to Jerusalem,

where he lived alone, refusing to see any one, with his books as

companions, and "mystifying people as to what he was doing." During

his stay at Jerusalem he entered with much zest and at great length

into the questions of the various sites in the old Jewish capital. I

do not propose to follow the course of his labours in that pursuit, as

several works contain between them, I should say, every line he wrote

on the subject, and the general reader cannot be expected to take any

interest in abstruse and much-debated theological and topographical

questions. But even in the midst of these pursuits he did not lose his

quickness of military perception. After a brief inspection he at once

declared that the Russian Convent commanded the whole city, and was in

itself a strong fortress, capable of holding a formidable garrison,

which Russia could despatch in the guise of priests without any one

being the wiser. From Jerusalem, when the heat became great, he

returned to Jaffa, and his interest aroused in worldly matters by the

progress of events in Egypt, and the development of the Soudan danger,

which he had all along seen coming, was evoked by a project that was

brought under his notice for the construction across Palestine of a

canal to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. In a letter to myself he thus

dilates upon the scheme:--

"Here is the subject which I am interested in if it could be

done. The reasons are:--

"1. We are in Egypt supporting an unpopular sovereign, whose

tenure ends with departure of our troops. We offer no hope to the

people of any solace by this support, and by the supporting of

the Turco-Circassian Pashas, who I know by experience are

_hopeless_. We neither govern nor take responsibility; yet we

support these vampires.

"2. We are getting mixed up with the question of whether the

interest of £90,000,000 will be paid or not.

"3. We are mixed up with the Soudan, where we provoked the

rebellion, and of the responsibility of which government we

cannot rid ourselves.

"4. We are in constant and increasing hot water with the French,

and we gain no benefit from it, for the Canal will remain theirs.

* * * * *

"On the other hand, if we get a Firman from Sultan for the

Palestine Canal--

"1. We lose the sacred sites of Jordan River, Capernaum,

Bethsaida, and Tiberias, Jericho, not Engedi.

"2. We swamp a notoriously unhealthy valley, where there are no

missions.

"3. We cut off the pest of the country of Palestine, the

Bedouins.

"4. We are free of all four objections _in re_ occupation of

Egypt.

"5. We gain the fertile lands of Moab and Ammon.

"6. Cyprus is 150 miles from the Mediterranean _débouché_.

"7. We get a waterway for large ships to within fifty miles of

Damascus.

"8. We can never be bothered by any internal commotion, except

for the twenty-five miles from Haifa to Tiberias, for the

waterway of the Canal would be ten miles wide, except in Arabah

Valley, where there are on both sides wastes and deserts.

"9. We get rid of unhealthiness of a narrow cut with no current,

which is the case with Suez Canal now, where the mud is

pestilential from ships' refuse and no current.

"10. It would isolate Palestine, render it quiet from Bedouins;

it would pave the way to its being like Belgium, under no Great

Power, for religious views would be against Palestine ever being

owned by a Great Power.

"11. Up the ladder of Tyre to Gaza would be 10,000 square miles;

population 130,000, quite a small country.

"Do not quote me if you write this. Oddly enough, Ezekiel xlvii.

10 seems to say the Dead Sea shall have fish like the great Sea

(_i.e._ Mediterranean). Zechariah xiv. speaks of two rivers, one

going to Dead Sea, the other to Mediterranean.

"The cost would be--

Canal from Haifa to Jordan, £2,000,000

Compensation to Jordan peoples, 1,000,000

Canal through Akabah, 6,000,000

Ports at Haifa, 1,000,000

Ports at Akabah, 500,000

___________

£10,500,000

===========

say, twelve to fifteen millions, and what a comfort to be free of

Egypt and Soudan for ever!

"Revenue, Palestine, £120,000, of which £80,000 goes to Sultan.

Do not quote _me_, for I have written part of this to Mr W. (the

late Sir William) Mackinnon of B.I.S.N.C., besides which H.M.

Government may object. You may say you had a letter from a

correspondent."

He wrote in a similar strain to other correspondents, but I have never

succeeded in discovering whether, from an engineering point of view,

the scheme was at all feasible. It seems to me that its suggestion is

somewhat destructive of Gordon's own declarations as to the superior

merits of the Cape route, nor does Sir Henry Gordon much strengthen

the case when, perceiving the inconsistency, he goes out of his way to

declare that Gordon only meant the Palestine canal to be a commercial

route. Any attempt to limit its usefulness could not destroy the

character claimed for it by its promoters, as an equally short and

more secure route than that by Suez. Yet it needs no gift of second

sight to predict that when any project of rivalry to the masterpiece

of Lesseps is carried out, it will be by rail to the Persian Gulf,

whether the starting-point be the Bosphorus or the Levant.

In the midst of his interesting researches near Mount Carmel, a

summons from the outer world reached Gordon in the form of a letter

from Sir William Mackinnon, telling him that the King of the Belgians

now called on him to fulfil a promise he had made some years before.

When Gordon first returned from the Cape the King of the Belgians

wrote, reminding him of his old promise, dating from 1880, to enter

into his service on the Congo, and stating that the difficulty of

having an internationally recognised Congo flag, which Gordon had made

a _sine quâ non_ of his appointment, could be most speedily solved by

Gordon joining him as counsellor at once. This Gordon could not agree

to, and he went to Palestine, there to await the King's summons,

which came by Sir William Mackinnon's note in October 1883. It then

became necessary for Gordon to obtain the official permission of his

Government to take up this post, of the exact nature of which the

Foreign Office had been already informed, both by General Gordon and

King Leopold.

Gordon at once telegraphed to the War Office for the leave rendered

necessary by his being on the active list, and that Department

replied, asking for particulars. When these were furnished through the

Foreign Office the decision was announced that "the Secretary of State

declines to sanction your employment on the Congo." The telegraph

clerk, more discerning or considerate than Her Majesty's Government,

altered "declines" into "decides," and Gordon, in happy ignorance of

the truth, proceeded with all possible despatch _via_ Acre and Genoa

to Brussels, which he reached on New Year's Day, 1884. That very night

he wrote me a short note saying, "I go (_D.V._) next month to the

Congo, but keep it secret." Such things cannot be kept secret, and

four days later a leading article in _The Times_ informed his

countrymen of Gordon's new mission.

On reaching Brussels the mistake in the telegram was discovered, and

Gordon here learnt that his Congo mission was vetoed. Then came the

difficulty to know what was to be done. Without leave he could not go

anywhere without resigning his commission; he was not qualified for a

pension, and there were engagements he had voluntarily contracted that

he would not see broken, and persons who would suffer by his death,

whose interests he was in every way bound to safeguard. Therefore, if

he was to carry out his engagement with the King of the Belgians, it

was obviously necessary that he should resign the British Army, and

that the King should compensate him for his loss. The King said at

once: "Retire from the army and I will compensate you," but in a

matter of such importance to others Gordon felt nothing should be left

to chance, and that a definite contract should be made. For this he

had neither the patience nor the business knowledge, and he delegated

the task of arranging the matter to his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, who

negotiated with the late Sir William Mackinnon as representing the

King. They agreed that the value of Gordon's pension if commuted would

be £7288, and the King of the Belgians was to provide that sum, which

was to be paid into a trust fund. In this and every other matter the

King behaved towards Gordon in the most generous and cordial manner,

furnishing a marked contrast with the grudging and parsimonious spirit

of the British Government towards Gordon in China, at the Cape, and

now again when destined for the Congo.

All the arrangements connected with this subject were made in three

days, and while Gordon gave instructions for his will to be prepared

for the disposal of the trust fund after his death, he wrote the same

day (6th January) to Mr H. M. Stanley, then acting for the King on the

Congo, announcing his own appointment, offering to "serve willingly

with or under him," and fixing his own departure from Lisbon for 5th

of February. _Dis aliter visum._ For the moment he worked up some

enthusiasm in his task. "We will kill the slave-traders in their

haunts"; and again, "No such efficacious means of cutting at root of

slave trade ever was presented as that which God has, I trust, opened

out to us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty," are

passages in the same letter, yet all the time there is no doubt his

heart and his thoughts were elsewhere. They were in the Soudan, not on

the Congo.

The night of this letter he crossed from Brussels, and went straight

to his sister's house, long the residence, and, practically speaking,

the home of his family, 5 Rockstone Place, Southampton. On the 7th of

the month--that is, the same day as he arrived--he wrote the formal

letter requesting leave to resign his commission in the Queen's army,

and also stating, with his usual candour, that King Leopold II. had

guaranteed him against any pecuniary loss. To that letter it may at

once be stated that no reply was ever sent. Even the least sympathetic

official could not feel altogether callous to a voluntary proposition

to remove the name of "Chinese" Gordon from the British army list, and

the sudden awakening of the public to the extraordinary claims of

General Gordon on national gratitude, and his special fitness to deal

with the Soudan difficulty warned the authorities that a too rigid

application of office rules would not in his case be allowed. By no

individual effort, as has been too lightly granted by some writers,

but by the voice of the British people was it decided that not only

should Gordon have leave to go to the Congo, without resigning his

commission, but also that he should be held entitled to draw his pay

as a British general while thus employed. But this was not the whole

truth, although I have no doubt that the arrangement would have been

carried out in any case. In their dilemma the Government saw a chance

of extrication in the person of Gordon, the one man recognised by the

public and the press as capable of coping with a difficulty which

seemed too much for them. The whole truth, therefore, was that the

Congo mission was to wait until after Gordon had been sent to, and

returned from, the Soudan. He was then to be placed by the British

Government entirely at the disposal of the King of the Belgians. As

this new arrangement turned on the assent of the King, it was vital to

keep it secret during the remainder of the 15th and the whole of the

16th of that eventful January.

When Gordon arrived at Waterloo Station, at a little before two

o'clock on 15th January, and was met there by myself, I do not think

that he knew definitely what was coming, but he was a man of

extraordinary shrewdness, and although essentially unworldly, could

see as clearly and as far through a transaction as the keenest man of

business. What he did know was that the army authorities were going to

treat him well, but his one topic of conversation the whole way to

Pall Mall was not the Congo but the Soudan. To the direct question

whether he was not really going, as I suspected, to the Nile instead

of the Congo, he declared he had no information that would warrant

such an idea, but still, if the King of the Belgians would grant the

permission, he would certainly not be disinclined to go there first. I

have no doubt that those who acted in the name of the Ministry in a

few minutes discovered the true state of his mind, and that Gordon

then and there agreed, on the express request of the Government of Mr

Gladstone, to go and see the King, and beg him to suspend the

execution of his promise until he had gone to the Soudan to arrest the

Mahdi's career, or to relieve the Egyptian garrisons, if the phrase be

preferred. It should also be stated that Gordon's arrangement with the

King of the Belgians was always coupled with this proviso, "provided

the Government of my own country does not require my services." The

generosity of that sovereign in the matter of the compensation for his

Commission did not render that condition void, and however irritating

the King may have found the circumstances, Gordon broke neither the

spirit nor the letter of his engagement with his Majesty by obeying

the orders of his own Government.

Late the same evening I was present at his brother's house to receive

an account for publication of his plans on the Congo, but surrounded

by so large a number of his relatives summoned to see their hero, many

of them for the last time, it was neither convenient nor possible to

carry out this task, which was accordingly postponed till the

following morning, when I was to see him at the Charing Cross Hotel,

and accompany him by the early boat train to Dover. On that night his

last will was signed and witnessed by his uncle, Mr George Enderby,

and myself. The next morning I was at the hotel before seven, but

instead of travelling by this early train, he postponed his departure

till ten o'clock, and the greater part of those three hours were given

to an explanation, map in hand, of his plans on the Congo. The

article, based on his information, appeared in _The Times_ of 17th

January 1884, but several times during our conversation he exclaimed,

"There may be a respite," but he refused to be more definite. Thus he

set out for Brussels, whether he was accompanied by his friend

Captain (now Colonel) F. Brocklehurst, who was undoubtedly acting as

the representative of the authorities. I believe I may say with

confidence that if he did not actually see the King of the Belgians on

the evening of the same day, some communication passed indirectly,

which showed the object of his errand, for although his own letter

communicating the event is dated 17th, from Brussels, it is a fact

within my own knowledge that late in the evening of the 16th a

telegram was received--"Gordon goes to the Soudan."

The first intimation of something having happened that his brother Sir

Henry Gordon received, was in a hurried letter, dated 17th January,

which arrived by the early post on Friday, 18th, asking him to "get

his uniform ready and some patent leather boots," but adding, "I saw

King Leopold to-day; he is furious." Even then Sir Henry, although he

guessed his destination, did not know that his departure would be so

sudden, for Gordon crossed the same night, and was kept at

Knightsbridge Barracks in a sort of honourable custody by Captain

Brocklehurst, so that the new scheme might not be prematurely

revealed. Sir Henry, a busy man, went about his own work, having seen

to his brother's commission, and it was not until his return at five

o'clock that he learnt all, and that Gordon was close at hand. He at

once hurried off to see him, and on meeting, Gordon, in a high state

of exhilaration, exclaimed, "I am off to the Soudan." Sir Henry asked

"When?" and back came the reply, "To-night!" He had got his respite.

To him at that moment it meant congenial work and the chance of

carrying out the thoughts that had been surging through his mind ever

since Egyptian affairs became troubled and the Mahdi's power rose on

the horizon of the Soudan. The reality was to prove far different. He

was to learn in his own person the weakness and falseness of his

Government, and to find himself betrayed by the very persons who had

only sought his assistance in the belief that by a miracle--and

nothing less would have sufficed--he might relieve them from

responsibilities to which they were not equal. Far better would it

have been, not only for Gordon's sake, but even for the reputation of

England, if he had carried out his original project on the Congo,

where, on a less conspicuous scene than the Nile, he might still have

fought and won the battle of humanity.

I am placed in a position to state that on the morning of the 17th, at

10 A.M., he wrote to his sister from Brussels, as follows--"Do not

mention it, but there is just a chance I may have to go to Soudan for

two months, and then go to Congo," and again in a second letter at two

o'clock, "Just got a telegram from Wolseley saying, 'Come back to

London by evening train,' so when you get this I shall be in town,

_but keep it a dead secret_, for I hope to leave it again the same

evening. I will not take Governor-Generalship again, I will only

report on situation." After this came a post-card--18th January, 6

A.M. "Left B., am now in London; I hope to go back again to-night."

That very night he left for Egypt.

That he was not detained the whole day in the Barracks is shown in the

following letter, now published for the first time, which gives the

only account of his interview with the members of the Government that

sent him out:--

"19. 1, 1884.

"MY DEAR AUGUSTA,--I arrived in town very tired, at 6 A.M.

yesterday, went with Brocklehurst to Barracks, washed, and went

to Wolseley. He said Ministers would see me at 3 P.M. I went back

to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 P.M. Wolseley came for me. I

went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and

Northbrook. They said, 'Had I seen Wolseley, and did I understand

their ideas?' I said 'Yes,' and repeated what Wolseley had said

to me as to their ideas, which was '_they would evacuate

Soudan_.' They were pleased, and said 'That was their idea; would

I go?' I said 'Yes.' They said 'When?' I said 'To-night,' and it

was over. I started at 8 P.M. H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge and

Lord Wolseley came to see me off. I saw Henry and Bob (R. F.

Gordon); no one else except Stokes--all very kind. I have taken

Stewart with me, a nice fellow. We are now in train near Mont

Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Lord

Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I

was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King of the Belgians at

once, and told him 'Wait a few months.' Kindest love to

all.--Your affectionate brother,

"C. G. GORDON."

As further evidence of the haste of his departure, I should like to

mention that he had hardly any clothes with him, and that Mrs Watson,

wife of his friend Colonel Watson, procured him all he required--in

fact, fitted him out--during the two days he stayed at Cairo. These

kindly efforts on his behalf were thrown away, for all his

baggage--clothes, uniforms, orders, etc.--was captured with the money

at Berber and never reached him. His only insignia of office at

Khartoum was the Fez, and the writer who described him as putting on

his uniform when the Mahdists broke into the town was gifted with more

imagination than love of truth.