THE LAST NILE MISSION.
When Gordon left Egypt, at the end of the year 1879, he was able to
truthfully declare in the words of his favourite book: "No man could
lift his hand or his foot in the land of the Soudan without me." Yet
he was fully alive to the dangers of the future, although then they
were no more than a little cloud on the horizon, for he wrote in 1878:
"Our English Government lives on a hand-to-mouth policy. They are very
ignorant of these lands, yet some day or other, they or some other
Government, will have to know them, for things at Cairo cannot stay as
they are. The Khedive will be curbed in, and will no longer be
absolute Sovereign. Then will come the question of these countries....
There is no doubt that if the Governments of France and England do not
pay more attention to the Soudan--if they do not establish at Khartoum
a branch of the mixed tribunals, and see that justice is done--the
disruption of the Soudan from Cairo is only a question of time. This
disruption, moreover, will not end the troubles, for the Soudanese
through their allies in Lower Egypt--the black soldiers I mean--will
carry on their efforts in Cairo itself. Now these black soldiers are
the only troops in the Egyptian service that are worth anything." The
gift of prophecy could scarcely have been demonstrated in a more
remarkable degree, yet the Egyptian Government and everybody else went
on acting as if there was no danger in the Soudan, and treated it like
a thoroughly conquered province inhabited by a satisfied, or at least
a thoroughly subjected population. From this dream there was to be a
rude and startling awakening.
It is impossible to say whether there was any connection direct or
indirect between the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the military leaders at
Cairo and the rebellion in the Soudan, which began under the auspices
of the so-called Mahdi. At the very least it may be asserted that the
spectacle of successful insubordination in the Delta--for it was
completely successful, and would have continued so but for the
intervention of British arms--was calculated to encourage those who
entertained a desire to upset the Khedive's authority in the upper
regions of the Nile. That Gordon held that the authors of the Arabi
rising and of the Mahdist movement were the same in sympathy, if not
in person, cannot be doubted, and in February 1882, when the Mahdi had
scarcely begun his career, he wrote: "If they send the Black regiment
to the Soudan to quell the revolt, they will inoculate all the troops
up there, and the Soudan will revolt against Cairo, whom they all
hate." It will be noted that that letter was written more than twenty
months before the destruction of the Hicks Expedition made the Mahdi
master of the Soudan.
It was in the year 1880 that the movements of a Mahommedan dervish,
named Mahomed Ahmed, first began to attract the attention of the
Egyptian officials. He had quarrelled with and repudiated the
authority of the head of his religious order, because he tolerated
such frivolous practices as dancing and singing. His boldness in this
matter, and his originality in others, showed that he was pursuing a
course of his own, and to provide for his personal security, as well
as for convenience in keeping up his communications with Khartoum and
other places, he fixed his residence on an islet in the White Nile
near Kawa. Mahomed Ahmed was a native of the lower province of
Dongola, and as such was looked upon with a certain amount of contempt
by the other races of the Soudan. When he quarrelled with his
religious leader he was given the opprobrious name of "a wretched
Dongolawi," but the courage with which he defied and exposed an
arch-priest for not rigidly abiding by the tenets of the Koran,
redounded so much to his credit that the people began to talk of this
wonderful dervish quite as much as of the Khedive's Governor-General.
Many earnest and energetic Mahommedans flocked to him, and among these
was the present Khalifa Abdullah, whose life had been spared by
Zebehr, and who in return had wished to proclaim that leader of the
slave-hunters Mahdi. To his instigation was probably due not merely
the assumption of that title by Mahomed Ahmed, but the addition of a
worldly policy to what was to have been a strictly religious
propaganda.
Little as he deemed there was to fear from this ascetic, the Egyptian
Governor-General Raouf, Gordon's successor, and stigmatised by him as
the Tyrant of Harrar, became curious about him, and sent someone to
interview and report upon this new religious teacher. The report
brought back was that he was "a madman," and it was at once considered
safe to treat him with indifference. Such was the position in the year
1880, and the official view was only modified a year later by the
receipt of information that the gathering on the island of Abba had
considerably increased, and that Mahomed Ahmed was attended by an
armed escort, who stood in his presence with drawn swords. It was at
this time too that he began to declare that he had a divine mission,
and took unto himself the style of Mahdi--the long-expected messenger
who was to raise up Islam--at first secretly among his chosen friends,
but not so secretly that news of his bold step did not reach the ears
of Raouf. The assumption of such a title, which placed its holder
above and beyond the reach of such ordinary commands as are conveyed
in the edicts of a Khedive or a Sultan, convinced Raouf that the time
had come to put an end to these pretensions. That conviction was not
diminished when Mahomed Ahmed made a tour through Kordofan, spreading
a knowledge of his name and intentions, and undoubtedly winning over
many adherents to his cause. On his return to Abba he found a summons
from the Governor-General to come to Khartoum. That summons was
followed by the arrival of a steamer, the captain of which had orders
to capture the False Mahdi alive or dead.
Mahomed Ahmed received warning from his friends and sympathisers that
if he went to Khartoum he might consider himself a dead man. He
probably never had the least intention of going there, and what he had
seen of the state of feeling in the Soudan, where the authority of the
Khedive was neither popular nor firmly established, rendered him more
inclined to defy the Egyptians. When the delegate of Raouf Pasha
therefore appeared before him, Mahomed Ahmed was surrounded by such an
armed force as precluded the possibility of a violent seizure of his
person, and when he resorted to argument to induce him to come to
Khartoum, Mahomed Ahmed, throwing off the mask, and standing forth in
the self-imposed character of Mahdi, exclaimed: "By the grace of God
and His Prophet I am the master of this country, and never shall I go
to Khartoum to justify myself."
After this picturesque defiance it only remained for him and the
Egyptians to prove which was the stronger.
It must be admitted that Raouf at once recognised the gravity of the
affair, and without delay he sent a small force on Gordon's old
steamer, the _Ismailia_, to bring Mahomed Ahmed to reason. This was in
August 1881. By its numbers and the superior armament of the troops
this expedition should have proved a complete success, and a competent
commander would have strangled the Mahdist phenomenon at its birth.
Unfortunately the Egyptian officers were grossly incompetent, and
divided among themselves. They attempted a night attack, and as they
were quite ignorant of the locality, it is not surprising that they
fell into the very trap they thought to set for their opponents.
In the confusion the divided Egyptian forces fired upon each other,
and the Mahdists with their swords and short stabbing spears completed
the rest. Of two whole companies of troops only a handful escaped by
swimming to the steamer, which returned to Khartoum with the news of
this defeat. Even this reverse was very far from ensuring the triumph
of Mahomed Ahmed, or the downfall of the Egyptian power; and, indeed,
the possession of steamers and the consequent command of the Nile
navigation rendered it extremely doubtful whether he could long hold
his own on the island of Abba. He thought so himself, and, gathering
his forces together, marched to the western districts of Kordofan,
where, at Jebel Gedir, he established his headquarters. A special
reason made him select that place, for it is believed by Mahommedans
that the Mahdi will first appear at Jebel Masa in North Africa, and
Mahomed Ahmed had no scruple in declaring that the two places were the
same. To complete the resemblance he changed with autocratic pleasure
the name Jebel Gedir into Jebel Masa.
During this march several attempts were made to capture him by the
local garrisons, but they were all undertaken in such a half-hearted
manner, and so badly carried out, that the Mahdi was never in any
danger, and his reputation was raised by the failure of the
Government.
Once established at Jebel Gedir the Mahdi began to organise his forces
on a larger scale, and to formulate a policy that would be likely to
bring all the tribes of the Soudan to his side. While thus employed
Rashed Bey, Governor of Fashoda, resolved to attack him. Rashed is
entitled to the credit of seeing that the time demanded a signal, and
if possible, a decisive blow, but he is to be censured for the
carelessness and over-confidence he displayed in carrying out his
scheme. Although he had a strong force he should have known that the
Mahdi's followers were now numbered by the thousand, and that he was
an active and enterprising foe. But he neglected the most simple
precautions, and showed that he had no military skill. The Mahdi fell
upon him during his march, killed him, his chief officers, and 1400
men, and the small body that escaped bore testimony to the formidable
character of the victor's fighting power. This battle was fought on
9th December 1881, and the end of that year therefore beheld the firm
establishment of the Mahdi's power in a considerable part of the
Soudan; but even then the superiority of the Egyptian resources was so
marked and incontestable that, properly handled, they should have
sufficed to speedily overwhelm him.
At this juncture Raouf was succeeded as Governor-General by
Abd-el-Kader Pasha, who had held the same post before Gordon, and who
had gained something of a reputation from the conquest of Darfour, in
conjunction with Zebehr. At least he ought to have known the Soudan,
but the dangers which had been clear to the eye of Gordon were
concealed from him and his colleagues. Still, the first task
he set himself--and indeed it was the justification of his
re-appointment--was to retrieve the disaster to Rashed, and to destroy
the Mahdi's power. He therefore collected a force of not less than
4000 men, chiefly trained infantry, and he entrusted the command to
Yusuf Pasha, a brave officer, who had distinguished himself under
Gessi in the war with Suleiman. This force left Khartoum in March
1882, but it did not begin its inland march from the Nile until the
end of May, when it had been increased by at least 2000 irregular
levies raised in Kordofan. Unfortunately, Yusuf was just as
over-confident as Rashed had been. He neglected all precautions, and
derided the counsel of those who warned him that the Mahdi's followers
might prove a match for his well-armed and well-drilled troops. After
a ten days' march he reached the neighbourhood of the Mahdi's
position, and he was already counting on a great victory, when, at
dawn of day on 7th June, he was himself surprised by his opponent in a
camp that he had ostentatiously refused to fortify in the smallest
degree. The Egyptian force was annihilated. Some of the local
irregulars escaped, but of the regular troops and their commanders not
one. This decisive victory not merely confirmed the reputation of the
Mahdi, and made most people in the Soudan believe that he was really a
heaven-sent champion, but it also exposed the inferiority of the
Government troops and the Khedive's commanders.
The defeat of Yusuf may be said to have been decisive so far as the
active forces of the Khedive in the field were concerned, but the
towns held out, and El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in particular
defied all the Mahdi's efforts to take it. The possession of this and
other strong places furnished the supporters of the Government with a
reasonable hope that on the arrival of fresh troops the ground lost
might be recovered, and an end put to what threatened to become a
formidable rebellion. A lull consequently ensued in the struggle.
Unfortunately, it was one that the Mahdi turned to the best advantage
by drilling and arming his troops, and summoning levies from the more
distant parts of the provinces, while the Khedive's Government,
engrossed in troubles nearer home--the Arabi revolt and the
intervention of England in the internal administration--seemed
paralysed in its efforts to restore its authority over the Soudan,
which at that moment would have been comparatively easy. The only
direct result of Yusuf's defeat in June 1882 was that two of the Black
regiments were sent up to Khartoum, and as their allegiance to the
Government was already shaken, their presence, as Gordon apprehended,
was calculated to aggravate rather than to improve the situation.
Matters remained very much in this state until the Mahdi's capture of
the important town of El Obeid. Notwithstanding the presence within
the walls of an element favourable to the Mahdi, the Commandant, Said
Pasha, made a valiant and protracted defence. He successfully repelled
all the Mahdi's attempts to take the place by storm, but he had to
succumb to famine after all the privations of a five months' siege. If
there had been other men like Said Pasha, especially at Khartoum, the
power of the Mahdi would never have risen to the height it attained.
The capture of an important place like El Obeid did more for the
spread of the Mahdi's reputation and power than the several victories
he had gained in the field. This important event took place in January
1883. Abd-el-Kader was then removed from the Governor-Generalship, and
a successor found in Alla-ed-din, a man of supposed energy and
resource. More than that, an English officer--Colonel Hicks--was given
the military command, and it was decided to despatch an expedition of
sufficient strength, as it was thought, to crush the Mahdi at one
blow.
The preparations for this fresh advance against the Mahdi were made
with care, and on an extensive scale. Several regiments were sent from
Egypt, and in the spring of the year a permanent camp was established
for their accommodation at Omdurman, on the western bank of the Nile,
opposite Khartoum. Here, by the end of June 1883, was assembled a
force officially computed to number 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers,
300 irregular cavalry, and not fewer than 30 pieces of artillery,
including rockets and mortars. Colonel Hicks was given the nominal
command, several English and other European officers were appointed
to serve under him, and the Khedive specially ordered the
Governor-General to accompany the expedition that was to put an end to
the Mahdi's triumph. Such was the interest, and, it may be added,
confidence, felt in the expedition, that two special correspondents,
one of whom was Edmond O'Donovan, who had made himself famous a few
years earlier by reaching the Turcoman stronghold of Merv, were
ordered to accompany it, and report its achievements.
The Mahdi learnt in good time of the extensive preparations being made
for this expedition, but he was not dismayed, because all the fighting
tribes of Kordofan, Bahr Gazelle, and Darfour were now at his back,
and he knew that he could count on the devotion of 100,000 fanatical
warriors. Still, he and his henchman Abdullah, who supplied the
military brains to the cause, were not disposed to throw away a
chance, and the threatening appearance of the Egyptian military
preparations led them to conceive the really brilliant idea of
stirring up trouble in the rear of Khartoum. For this purpose a man
of extraordinary energy and influence was ready to their hand in Osman
Digma, a slave-dealer of Souakim, who might truly be called the Zebehr
of the Eastern Soudan. This man hastened to Souakim as the delegate of
the Mahdi, from whom he brought special proclamations, calling on the
tribes to rise for a Holy War. Although this move subsequently
aggravated the Egyptian position and extended the military triumphs of
the Mahdi, it did not attain the immediate object for which it was
conceived, as the Hicks Expedition set out on its ill-omened march
before Osman had struck a blow.
The power of the Mahdi was at this moment so firmly established, and
his reputation based on the double claim of a divine mission and
military success so high that it may be doubted whether the 10,000
men, of which the Hicks force consisted when the irregulars raised by
the Governor-General had joined it at Duem, would have sufficed to
overcome him even if they had been ably led, and escaped all the
untoward circumstances that first retarded their progress and then
sealed their fate. The plan of campaign was based on a misconception
of the Mahdi's power, and was carried out with utter disregard of
prudence and of the local difficulties to be encountered between the
Nile and El Obeid. But the radical fault of the whole enterprise was a
strategical one. The situation made it prudent and even necessary for
the Government to stand on the defensive, and to abstain from military
expeditions, while the course pursued was to undertake offensive
measures in the manner most calculated to favour the chances of the
Mahdi, and to attack him at the very point where his superiority could
be most certainly shown.
But quite apart from any original error as to the inception of the
campaign, which may fairly be deemed a matter of opinion, there can be
no difference between any two persons who have studied the facts that
the execution of it was completely mismanaged. In the first place the
start of the expedition was delayed, so that the Mahdi got ample
warning of the coming attack. The troops were all in the camp at
Omdurman in June, but they did not reach Duem till September, and a
further delay of two months occurred there before they began their
march towards El Obeid. That interval was chiefly taken up with
disputes between Hicks and his Egyptian colleagues, and it is even
believed that there was much friction between Hicks and his European
lieutenants.
The first radical error committed was the decision to advance on El
Obeid from Duem, because there were no wells on that route, whereas
had the northern route _via_ Gebra and Bara been taken, a certain
supply of water could have been counted on, and still more important,
the co-operation of the powerful Kabbabish tribe, the only one still
hostile to the Mahdi, might have been secured. The second important
error was not less fatal. When the force marched it was accompanied by
6000 camels and a large number of women. Encumbered in its movements
by these useless impedimenta, the force never had any prospect of
success with its active enemy. As it slowly advanced from the Nile it
became with each day's march more hopelessly involved in its own
difficulties, and the astute Mahdi expressly forbade any premature
attack to be made upon an army which he clearly saw was marching to
its doom.
On the 1st November 1883, when the Egyptians were already disheartened
by the want of water, the non-arrival of reinforcements from the
garrisons near the Equator, which the Governor-General had rashly
promised to bring up, and the exhausting nature of their march through
a difficult country, the Mahdi's forces began their attack. Concealed
in the high grass, they were able to pour in a heavy fire on the
conspicuous body of the Egyptians at short range without exposing
themselves. But notwithstanding his heavy losses, Hicks pressed on,
because he knew that his only chance of safety lay in getting out of
the dense cover in which he was at such a hopeless disadvantage. But
this the Mahdi would never permit, and on 4th November, when Hicks had
reached a place called Shekan, he gave the order to his impatient
followers to go in and finish the work they had so well begun. The
Egyptian soldiers seem to have been butchered without resistance. The
Europeans and the Turkish cavalry fought well for a short time, but in
a few minutes they were overpowered by superior numbers. Of the whole
force of 10,000 men, only a few individuals escaped by some special
stroke of fortune, for nearly the whole of the 300 prisoners taken
were subsequently executed. Such was the complete and appalling
character of the destruction of Hicks's army, which seemed to shatter
at a single blow the whole fabric of the Khedive's power in the
Soudan, and rivetted the attention of Europe on that particular
quarter of the Dark Continent.
The consequences of that decisive success, which became known in
London three weeks after it happened, were immediate throughout the
region wherein it occurred. Many Egyptian garrisons, which had been
holding out in the hope of succour through the force that Hicks Pasha
was bringing from Khartoum, abandoned hope after its destruction at
Shekan, and thought only of coming to terms with the conqueror. Among
these was the force at Dara in Darfour under the command of Slatin
Pasha. That able officer had held the place for months under the
greatest difficulty, and had even obtained some slight successes in
the field, but the fate of the Hicks expedition convinced him that the
situation was hopeless, and that his duty to the brave troops under
him required the acceptance of the honourable terms which his tact and
reputation enabled him to secure at the hands of the conqueror. Slatin
surrendered on 23rd December 1883; Lupton Bey, commander in the Bahr
Gazelle, about the same time, and these successes were enhanced and
extended by those achieved by Osman Digma in the Eastern Soudan,
where, early in February 1884, while Gordon was on his way to
Khartoum, that leader inflicted on Baker Pasha at Tokar a defeat
scarcely less crushing than that of Shekan.
By New Year's Day, 1884, therefore, the power of the Mahdi was
triumphantly established over the whole extent of the Soudan, from the
Equator to Souakim, with the exception of Khartoum and the middle
course of the Nile from that place to Dongola. There were also some
outlying garrisons, such as that at Kassala, but the principal
Egyptian force remaining was the body of 4000 so-called troops, the
less efficient part, we may be sure, of those available, left behind
at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set
out on his unfortunate expedition. If the power of the Mahdi at this
moment were merely to be measured by comparison with the collapse of
authority, courage, and confidence of the titular upholders of the
Khedive's Government, it might be pronounced formidable. It had
sufficed to defeat every hostile effort made against it, and to
practically annihilate all the armies that Egypt could bring into the
field. Its extraordinary success was no doubt due to the incompetency,
over-confidence, and deficient military spirit and knowledge of the
Khedive's commanders and troops. But, while making the fullest
admission on these points, it cannot be disputed that some of the
elements in the Mahdi's power would have made it formidable, even if
the cause of the Government had been more worthily and efficiently
sustained. There is no doubt that, in the first place, he appealed to
races which thought they were overtaxed, and to classes whose only
tangible property had been assailed and diminished by the Anti-Slavery
policy of the Government. Even if it would be going too far to say
that Mahomed Ahmed, the long-looked-for Mahdi, was only a tool in the
hands of secret conspirators pledged to avenge Suleiman, to restore
Zebehr, and to bring back the good old times, when a fortune lay in
the easy acquisition of human ivory, there is no doubt that the
backbone of his power was provided by those followers of Suleiman,
whom Gordon had broken up at Shaka and driven from Dara. But the
Mahdi had supplied them in religious fanaticism with a more powerful
incentive than pecuniary gain, and when he showed them how easily they
might triumph over their opponents, he inspired them with a confidence
which has not yet lost its efficacy.
In 1884 all these inducements for the tribes of the Soudan to believe
in their religious leader were in their pristine strength. He had
succeeded in every thing he undertook, he had armed his countless
warriors with the weapons taken from the armies he had destroyed, and
he had placed at the disposal of his supporters an immense and
easily-acquired spoil. The later experiences of the Mahdists were to
be neither so pleasant nor so profitable, but at the end of 1883 they
were at the height of their confidence and power. It was at such a
moment and against such a powerful adversary that the British
Government thought it right to take advantage of the devotion and
gallantry of a single man, to send him alone to grapple with a
difficulty which several armies had, by their own failure and
destruction, rendered more grave, at the same time that they
established the formidable nature of the rebellion in the Soudan as an
unimpeachable fact instead of a disputable opinion. I do not think his
own countrymen have yet quite appreciated the extraordinary heroism
and devotion to his country which Gordon showed when he rushed off
single-handed to oppose the ever-victorious Mahdi at the very zenith
of his power.
In unrolling the scroll of events connected with an intricate history,
it next becomes necessary to explain why Gordon voluntarily, and it
may even be admitted, enthusiastically, undertook a mission that, to
any man in his senses, must have seemed at the moment at which it was
undertaken little short of insanity. Whatever else may be said against
the Government and the military authorities who suggested his going,
and availed themselves of his readiness to go, to Khartoum, I do not
think there is the shadow of a justification for the allegation that
they forced him to proceed on that romantic errand, although of course
it is equally clear that he insisted as the condition of his going at
all that he should be ordered by his Government to proceed on this
mission. Beyond this vital principle, which he held to all his life in
never volunteering, he was far too eager to go himself to require any
real stirring-up or compulsion. It was even a secret and unexpressed
grievance that he should not be called upon to hasten to the spot,
which had always been in his thoughts since the time he had left it.
He could think of nothing else; in the midst of other work he would
turn aside to discuss the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan as paramount
to every other consideration; and when a great mission, like that to
the Congo, which he could have made a turning-point in African
history, was placed in his hands, he could only ask for "a respite,"
and, with the charm of the Sphinx strong upon him, rushed on his fate
in a chivalrous determination to essay the impossible. But was it
right or justifiable that wise politicians and experienced generals
should take advantage of such enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, and let
one man go unaided to achieve what thousands had failed to do?
It is necessary to establish clearly in the first place, and beyond
dispute, the frame of mind which induced Gordon to take up his last
Nile mission in precisely the confiding manner that he did. Gordon
left Egypt at the end of 1879. Although events there in 1880 were of
interest and importance, Gordon was too much occupied in India and
China to say anything, but in October 1881 he drew up an important
memorandum on affairs in Egypt since the deposition of Ismail. Gordon
gave it to me specially for publication, and it duly appeared in _The
Times_, but its historical interest is that it shows how Gordon's
thoughts were still running on the affairs of the country in which he
had served so long. The following is the full text:--
"On the 16th of August 1879, the Firman installing Tewfik as
Khedive was published in Cairo. From the 26th of June 1879, when
Ismail was deposed, to this date, Cherif Pasha remained Prime
Minister; he had been appointed on the dismissal of the
Rivers-Wilson and de Blignières Ministry in May. Between June and
August Cherif had been working with the view of securing to the
country a representative form of government, and had only a short
time before August 16 laid his proposition before Tewfik.
Cherif's idea was that, the representation being in the hands of
the people, there would be more chance of Egypt maintaining her
independence than if the Government was a personal one. It will
be remembered that, though many states have repudiated their
debts, no other ruler of those states was considered responsible
except in the case of Ismail of Egypt. Europe considered Ismail
responsible personally. She did not consider the rulers of
Turkey, Greece, Spain, etc., responsible, so that Cherif was
quite justified in his proposition. Cherif has been unjustly
considered opposed to any reform. This is not so. Certainly he
had shown his independence in refusing to acknowledge
Rivers-Wilson as his superior, preferring to give up his position
to doing so, but he knew well that reform was necessary, and had
always advised it. Cherif is perhaps the only Egyptian Minister
whose character for strict integrity is unimpeachable.
"A thoroughly independent man, caring but little for office or
its emoluments, of a good family, with antecedents which would
bear any investigation, he was not inclined to be questioned by
men whose social position was inferior to his own, and whose
_parti pris_ was against him. In the Council Chamber he was in a
minority because he spoke his mind; but this was not so with
other Ministers, whose antecedents were dubious. Had his advice
been taken, Ismail would have now been Khedive of Egypt. Any one
who knows Cherif will agree to this account of him, and will rate
him as infinitely superior to his other colleagues. He is
essentially not an intriguer.
"To return, immediately after the promulgation of the Firman on
August 16, Tewfik dismisses suddenly Cherif, and the European
Press considers he has done a bold thing, and, misjudging Cherif,
praise him for having broken with the advisers who caused the
ruin of Ismail. My opinion is that Tewfik feared Cherif's
proposition as being likely to curtail his power as absolute
ruler, and that he judged that he would by this dismissal gain
_kudos_ in Europe, and protect his absolute power.
"After a time Riaz is appointed in Cherif's place, and then
Tewfik begins his career. He concedes this and that to European
desires, but in so doing claims for his youth and inexperience
exemption from any reform which would take from his absolute
power. Knowing that it was the bondholders who upset his father
he conciliates them; they in their turn leave him to act as he
wished with regard to the internal government of the country.
Riaz was so placed as to be between two influences--one, the
bondholders seeking their advantages; the other, Tewfik, seeking
to retain all power. Riaz of course wavers. Knowing better than
Tewfik the feeling of Europe, he inclines more to the bondholders
than to Tewfik, to whom, however, he is bound to give some sops,
such as the Universal Military Service Bill, which the
bondholders let pass without a word, and which is the root of the
present troubles. After a time Tewfik finds that Riaz will give
no more sops, for the simple reason he dares not. Then Tewfik
finds him _de trop_, and by working up the military element
endeavours to counterbalance him. The European Powers manage to
keep the peace for a time, but eventually the military become too
strong for even Tewfik, who had conjured them up, and taking
things into their own hands upset Riaz, which Tewfik is glad of,
and demand a Constitution, which Tewfik is not glad of. Cherif
then returns, and it is to be hoped will get for the people what
he demanded before his dismissal.
"It is against all reason to expect any straightforward dealings
in any Sultan, Khedive, or Ameer; the only hope is in the people
they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object.
"There is no real loyalty towards the descendants of the Sandjak
of Salonica in Egypt; the people are Arabs, they are Greeks. The
people care for themselves. It is reiterated over and over again
that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it has
altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit
of the bondholders. The army may be paid regularly, but the lot
of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the Soudan is the same
oppressed lot as before. The prisons are as full of unfortunates
as ever they were, the local tribunals are as corrupt, and Tewfik
will always oppose their being affiliated to the mixed tribunals
of Alexandria, and thus afford protection to the judges of the
local tribunals, should they adjudicate justly. Tewfik is
essentially one of the Ameer class. I believe he would be willing
to act uprightly, if by so doing he could maintain his absolute
power. He has played a difficult game, making stock of his fear
of his father and of Halim, the legitimate heir according to the
Moslem, to induce the European Governments to be gentle with him,
at the same time resisting all measures which would benefit his
people should these measures touch his absolute power. He is
liberal only in measures which do not interfere with his
prerogative.
"It was inevitable that the present sort of trouble should arise.
The Controllers had got the finances in good order, and were
bound to look to the welfare of the people, which could only be
done by the curtailment of Tewfik's power. The present
arrangement of Controllers and Consul-Generals is defective. The
Consul-Generals are charged with the duty of seeing that the
country is quiet and the people well treated. They are
responsible to their Foreign Offices. The Controllers are charged
with the finances and the welfare of the country, but to whom
are they responsible? Not to Tewfik; though he pays them, he
cannot remove them; yet they must get on well with him. Not to
the Foreign Office, for it is repeatedly said that they are
Egyptian officials, yet they have to keep on good terms with
these Foreign Offices. Not to the bondholders, though they are
bound, considering their power, to be on good terms with them.
Not to the inhabitants of Egypt, though these latter are taught
to believe that every unpopular act is done by the Controllers'
advice.
"The only remedy is by the formation of a Council of Notables,
having direct access to Tewfik, and independent of his or of the
Ministers' goodwill, and the subjection of the Controllers to the
Consul-Generals responsible to the Foreign Office--in fact,
Residents at the Court. This would be no innovation, for the
supervision exists now, except under the Controllers and
Consul-Generals. It is simply proposed to amalgamate Controllers
with Consul-Generals, and to give these latter the position of
Residents. By this means the continual change of French
Consul-Generals would be avoided, and the consequent ill-feeling
between France and England would disappear. Should the Residents
fall out, the matter would be easily settled by the Governments.
As it is at present, a quadruple combat goes on; sometimes it is
one Consul-General against the other Consul-General, aided by the
two Controllers, or a Consul-General and one Controller against
the other Consul-General and the other Controller, in all of
which combats Tewfik gains and the people lose.
"One thing should certainly be done--the giving of concessions
ought not to be in the power of Controllers, nor if
Consul-Generals are amalgamated with Controllers as Residents
should these Residents have this power. It ought to be exercised
by the Council of Notables, who would look to the welfare of the
people."
The progress of events in Lower Egypt during 1881 and 1882 was watched
with great care, whether he was vegetating in the Mauritius or
absorbed in the anxieties and labours of his South African mission.
Commenting on the downfall of Arabi, he explained how the despatch of
troops to the Soudan, composed of regiments tainted with a spirit of
insubordination, would inevitably aggravate the situation there. Later
on, in 1883, when he heard of Hicks being sent to take the command and
repair the defeat of Yusuf, he wrote:--"Unless Hicks is given supreme
command he is lost; it can never work putting him in a subordinate
position. Hicks must be made Governor-General, otherwise he will never
end things satisfactorily." At the same time, he came to the
conclusion that there was only one man who could save Egypt, and that
was Nubar Pasha. He wrote:--"If they do not make Nubar Pasha Prime
Minister or Regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is the only
man who can rule that country." This testimony to Nubar's capacity is
the more remarkable and creditable, as in earlier days Gordon had not
appreciated the merit of a statesman who has done more for Egypt than
any other of his generation. But at a very early stage of the Soudan
troubles Gordon convinced himself that the radical cause of these
difficulties and misfortunes was not the shortcomings and errors of
any particular subordinate, but the complete want of a definite policy
on the part, not of the Khedive and his advisers, but of the British
Government itself. He wrote on this point to a friend (2nd September
1883), almost the day that Hicks was to march from Khartoum:--
"Her Majesty's Government, right or wrong, will not take a
decided step _in re_ Egypt and the Soudan; they drift, but at the
same time cannot avoid the _onus_ of being the real power in
Egypt, with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is
undoubtedly the fact that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in
power against the will of the people; this alone is insufferable
from disgusting the people, to whom also Her Majesty's Government
have given no inducement to make themselves popular. Their
present action is a dangerous one, for without any advantage over
the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore open with
France, and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to act
in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further
than that, Her Majesty's Government must eventually gain the
odium which will fall upon them when the interest of the debt
fails to be paid, which will soon be the case. Also, Her
Majesty's Government cannot possibly avoid the responsibility for
the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a wretched war drags on
in a ruined country at a cost of half a million per annum at
least. I say therefore to avoid all this, _if Her Majesty's
Government will not act firmly and strongly and take the country_
(which, if I were they, I would not do), let them attempt to get
the Palestine Canal made, and quit Egypt to work out its own
salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will take place. This
anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is the
travail in birth. Her Majesty's Government do not prevent anarchy
now; therefore better leave the country, and thus avoid a
responsibility which gives no advantage, and is mean and
dangerous."
In a letter to myself, dated 3rd January 1884, from Brussels, he
enters into some detail on matters that had been forgotten or were
insufficiently appreciated, to which the reported appointment of
Zebehr to proceed to the Soudan and stem the Mahdi's advance lent
special interest:--
"I send you a small note which you can make use of, but I beg you
will not let my name appear under any circumstances. When in
London I had printed a pamphlet in Arabic, with all the papers
(official) concerning Zebehr Pasha and his action in pushing his
son to rebel. It is in Arabic. My brother has it. It is not long,
and would repay translating and publishing. It has all the
history and the authentic letters found in the divan of Zebehr's
son when Gessi took his stockade. It is in a cover, blue and
gold. It was my address to people of Soudan--Apologia. Isaiah
XIX. 19, 20, 21 has a wonderful prophecy about Egypt and the
saviour who will come from the frontier."
The note enclosed was published in _The Times_ of 5th January, and
read as follows:--
"A correspondent writes that it may seem inexplicable why the
Mahdi's troops attacked Gezireh, which, as its name signifies, is
an isle near Berber, but there is an old tradition that the
future ruler of the Soudan will be from that isle. Zebehr Rahama
knew this, but he fell on leaving his boat at this isle, and so,
though the Soudan people looked on him as a likely saviour, this
omen shook their confidence in him. He was then on his way to
Cairo after swearing his people to rebel (if he was retained
there), under a tree at Shaka. Zebehr will most probably be taken
prisoner by the Mahdi, and will then take the command of the
Mahdi's forces. The peoples of the Soudan are very superstitious,
and the fall of the flag by a gust of wind, on the proclamation
of Tewfik at Khartoum, was looked on as an omen of the end of
Mehemet Ali's dynasty. There is an old tree opposite Cook's
office at Jerusalem in Toppet, belonging to an old family, and
protected by Sultan's Firman, which the Arabs consider will fall
when the Sultan's rule ends. It lost a large limb during the
Turco-Russian war, and is now in a decayed state. There can be no
doubt but that the movement will spread into Palestine, Syria,
and Hedjaz. At Damascus already proclamations have been posted
up, denouncing Turks and Circassians, and this was before Hicks
was defeated. It is the beginning of the end of Turkey. Austria
backed by Germany will go to Salonica, quieting Russia by letting
her go into Armenia--England and France neutralising one another.
"If not too late, the return of the ex-Khedive Ismail to Egypt,
and the union of England and France to support and control the
Arab movement, appears the only chance. Ismail would soon come to
terms with the Soudan, the rebellion of which countries was
entirely due to the oppression of the Turks and Circassians."
These expressions of opinion about Egypt and the Soudan may be said to
have culminated in the remarkable pronouncement Gordon made to Mr W.
T. Stead, the brilliant editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, on 8th
January 1884, which appeared in his paper on the following day. The
substance of that statement is as follows:--
"So you would abandon the Soudan? But the Eastern Soudan is
indispensable to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your
hold upon Egypt proper if you abandon your hold of the Eastern
Soudan to the Mahdi or to the Turk than what it would to retain
your hold upon Eastern Soudan by the aid of such material as
exists in the provinces. Darfour and Kordofan must be abandoned.
That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White
Nile should be retained, and north of Sennaar. The danger to be
feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady
Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever
go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature.
It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering
Mahommedan Power established close to your frontiers will
exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities
in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may
do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they
may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this
danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous
fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Placards have been posted in
Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive out the
Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the
Mahdi, the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take
fire. In self-defence the Turks are bound to do something to cope
with so formidable a danger, for it is quite possible that if
nothing is done the whole of the Eastern Question may be reopened
by the triumph of the Mahdi. I see it is proposed to fortify Wady
Halfa, and prepare there to resist the Mahdi's attack. You might
as well fortify against a fever. Contagion of that kind cannot be
kept out by fortifications and garrisons. But that it is real,
and that it does exist, will be denied by no one cognisant with
Egypt and the East. In self-defence the policy of evacuation
cannot possibly be justified.
"There is another aspect of the question. You have 6000 men in
Khartoum. What are you going to do with them? You have garrisons
in Darfour, in Bahr el Gazelle, and Gondokoro. Are they to be
sacrificed? Their only offence is their loyalty to their
Sovereign. For their fidelity you are going to abandon them to
their fate. You say they are to retire upon Wady Halfa. But
Gondokoro is 1500 miles from Khartoum, and Khartoum is only 350
from Wady Halfa. How will you move your 6000 men from
Khartoum--to say nothing of other places--and all the Europeans
in that city through the desert to Wady Halfa? Where are you
going to get the camels to take them away? Will the Mahdi supply
them? If they are to escape with their lives, the garrison will
not be allowed to leave with a coat on their backs. They will be
plundered to the skin, and even then their lives may not be
spared. Whatever you may decide about evacuation, you cannot
evacuate, because your army cannot be moved. You must either
surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all
hazards. The latter is the only course which ought to be
entertained. There is no serious difficulty about it. The Mahdi's
forces will fall to pieces of themselves; but if in a moment of
panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the
Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against the security of
Egypt and the peace of the East, which may have fatal
consequences.
"The great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo. It is the
weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Soudan. It is
because Hicks was not adequately supported at the first, but was
thrust forward upon an impossible enterprise by the men who had
refused him supplies when a decisive blow might have been struck,
that the Western Soudan has been sacrificed. The Eastern Soudan
may, however, be saved if there is a firm hand placed at the helm
in Egypt. Everything depends on that.
"What then, you ask, should be done? I reply, Place Nubar in
power! Nubar is the one supremely able man among Egyptian
Ministers. He is proof against foreign intrigue, and he
thoroughly understands the situation. Place him in power; support
him through thick and thin; give him a free hand; and let it be
distinctly understood that no intrigues, either on the part of
Tewfik or any of Nubar's rivals, will be allowed for a moment to
interfere with the execution of his plans. You are sure to find
that the energetic support of Nubar will, sooner or later, bring
you into collision with the Khedive; but if that Sovereign really
desires, as he says, the welfare of his country, it will be
necessary for you to protect Nubar's Administration from any
direct or indirect interference on his part. Nubar can be
depended upon: that I can guarantee. He will not take office
without knowing that he is to have his own way; but if he takes
office, it is the best security that you can have for the
restoration of order to the country. Especially is this the case
with the Soudan. Nubar should be left untrammelled by any
stipulations concerning the evacuation of Khartoum. There is no
hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at present. Let them
continue to hold on until disunion and tribal jealousies have
worked their natural results in the camp of the Mahdi. Nubar
should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he
will deal with the Soudan, of course, I cannot profess to say;
but I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at
Khartoum, with full powers, and furnish him with two millions
sterling--a large sum, no doubt, but a sum which had much better
be spent now than wasted in a vain attempt to avert the
consequences of an ill-timed surrender. Sir Samuel Baker, who
possesses the essential energy and single tongue requisite for
the office, might be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan,
and he might take his brother as Commander-in-Chief.
"It should be proclaimed in the hearing of all the Soudanese, and
engraved on tablets of brass, that a permanent Constitution was
granted to the Soudanese, by which no Turk or Circassian would
ever be allowed to enter the province to plunder its inhabitants
in order to fill his own pockets, and that no immediate
emancipation of slaves would be attempted. Immediate emancipation
was denounced in 1833 as confiscation in England, and it is no
less confiscation in the Soudan to-day. Whatever is done in that
direction should be done gradually, and by a process of
registration. Mixed tribunals might be established, if Nubar
thought fit, in which European judges would co-operate with the
natives in the administration of justice. Police inspectors also
might be appointed, and adequate measures taken to root out the
abuses which prevail in the prisons.
"With regard to Darfour, I should think that Nubar would probably
send back the family and the heir of the Sultan of Darfour. If
subsidized by the Government, and sent back with Sir Samuel
Baker, he would not have much difficulty in regaining possession
of the kingdom of Darfour, which was formerly one of the best
governed of African countries. As regards Abyssinia, the old
warning should not be lost sight of--"Put not your trust in
princes"; and place no reliance upon the King of Abyssinia, at
least outside his own country. Zeylah and Bogos might be ceded to
him with advantage, and the free right of entry by the port of
Massowah might be added; but it would be a mistake to give him
possession of Massowah which he would ruin. A Commission might
also be sent down with advantage to examine the state of things
in Harrar, opposite Aden, and see what iniquities are going on
there, as also at Berbera and Zeylah. By these means, and by the
adoption of a steady, consistent policy at headquarters, it would
be possible--not to say easy--to re-establish the authority of
the Khedive between the Red Sea and Sennaar.
"As to the cost of the Soudan, it is a mistake to suppose that it
will necessarily be a charge on the Egyptian Exchequer. It will
cost two millions to relieve the garrisons and to quell the
revolt; but that expenditure must be incurred any way; and in all
probability, if the garrisons are handed over to be massacred and
the country evacuated, the ultimate expenditure would exceed that
sum. At first, until the country is pacified, the Soudan will
need a subsidy of £200,000 a year from Egypt. That, however,
would be temporary. During the last years of my administration
the Soudan involved no charge upon the Egyptian Exchequer. The
bad provinces were balanced against the good, and an equilibrium
was established. The Soudan will never be a source of revenue to
Egypt, but it need not be a source of expense. That deficits have
arisen, and that the present disaster has occurred, is entirely
attributable to a single cause, and that is, the grossest
misgovernment.
"The cause of the rising in the Soudan is the cause of all
popular risings against Turkish rule, wherever they have
occurred. No one who has been in a Turkish province, and has
witnessed the results of the Bashi-Bazouk system, which excited
so much indignation some time ago in Bulgaria, will need to be
told why the people of the Soudan have risen in revolt against
the Khedive. The Turks, the Circassians, and the Bashi-Bazouks
have plundered and oppressed the people in the Soudan, as they
plundered and oppressed them in the Balkan peninsula. Oppression
begat discontent; discontent necessitated an increase of the
armed force at the disposal of the authorities; this increase of
the army force involved an increase of expenditure, which again
was attempted to be met by increasing taxation, and that still
further increased the discontent. And so things went on in a
dismal circle, until they culminated, after repeated deficits, in
a disastrous rebellion. That the people were justified in
rebelling, nobody who knows the treatment to which they were
subjected will attempt to deny. Their cries were absolutely
unheeded at Cairo. In despair, they had recourse to the only
method by which they could make their wrongs known; and, on the
same principle that Absalom fired the corn of Joab, so they
rallied round the Mahdi, who exhorted them to revolt against the
Turkish yoke. I am convinced that it is an entire mistake to
regard the Mahdi as in any sense a religious leader: he
personifies popular discontent. All the Soudanese are potential
Mahdis, just as all the Egyptians are potential Arabis. The
movement is not religious, but an outbreak of despair. Three
times over I warned the late Khedive that it would be impossible
to govern the Soudan on the old system, after my appointment to
the Governor-Generalship. During the three years that I wielded
full powers in the Soudan, I taught the natives that they had a
right to exist. I waged war against the Turks and Circassians,
who had harried the population. I had taught them something of
the meaning of liberty and justice, and accustomed them to a
higher ideal of government than that with which they had
previously been acquainted. As soon as I had gone, the Turks and
Circassians returned in full force; the old Bashi-Bazouk system
was re-established; my old _employés_ were persecuted; and a
population which had begun to appreciate something like decent
government was flung back to suffer the worst excesses of Turkish
rule. The inevitable result followed; and thus it may be said
that the egg of the present rebellion was laid in the three years
during which I was allowed to govern the Soudan on other than
Turkish principles.
"The Soudanese are a very nice people. They deserve the sincere
compassion and sympathy of all civilised men. I got on very well
with them, and I am sincerely sorry at the prospect of seeing
them handed over to be ground down once more by their Turkish and
Circassian oppressors. Yet, unless an attempt is made to hold on
to the present garrisons, it is inevitable that the Turks, for
the sake of self-preservation, must attempt to crush them. They
deserve a better fate. It ought not to be impossible to come to
terms with them, to grant them a free amnesty for the past, to
offer them security for decent government in the future. If this
were done, and the government entrusted to a man whose word was
truth, all might yet be re-established. So far from believing it
impossible to make an arrangement with the Mahdi, I strongly
suspect that he is a mere puppet, put forward by Elias, Zebehr's
father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he
had assumed a religious title to give colour to his defence of
the popular rights.
"There is one subject on which I cannot imagine any one can
differ about. That is the impolicy of announcing our intention to
evacuate Khartoum. Even if we were bound to do so we should have
said nothing about it. The moment it is known that we have given
up the game, every man will go over to the Mahdi. All men worship
the rising sun. The difficulties of evacuation will be enormously
increased, if, indeed, the withdrawal of our garrison is not
rendered impossible.
"The late Khedive, who is one of the ablest and worst-used men in
Europe, would not have made such a mistake, and under him the
condition of Egypt proper was much better than it is to-day. Now,
with regard to Egypt, the same principle should be observed that
must be acted upon in the Soudan. Let your foundations be broad
and firm, and based upon the contentment and welfare of the
people. Hitherto, both in the Soudan and in Egypt, instead of
constructing the social edifice like a pyramid, upon its base, we
have been rearing an obelisk which a single push may overturn.
Our safety in Egypt is to do something for the people. That is to
say, you must reduce their rent, rescue them from the usurers,
and retrench expenditure. Nine-tenths of the European _employés_
might probably be weeded out with advantage. The remaining
tenth--thoroughly efficient--should be retained; but, whatever
you do, do not break up Sir Evelyn Wood's army, which is destined
to do good work. Stiffen it as much as you please, but with
Englishmen, not with Circassians. Circassians are as much
foreigners in Egypt as Englishmen are, and certainly not more
popular. As for the European population, let them have charters
for the formation of municipal councils, for raising volunteer
corps, and for organising in their own defence. Anything more
shameful than the flight from Egypt in 1882 I never read. Let
them take an example from Shanghai, where the European settlement
provides for its own defence and its own government. I should
like to see a competent special Commissioner of the highest
standing--such a man, for instance, as the Right Honourable W. E.
Forster, who is free at once from traditions of the elders and of
the Foreign Office and of the bondholders, sent out to put Nubar
in the saddle, sift out unnecessary _employés_, and warn
evil-doers in the highest places that they will not be allowed to
play any tricks. If that were done, it would give confidence
everywhere, and I see no reason why the last British soldier
should not be withdrawn from Egypt in six months' time."
A perusal of these passages will suffice to show the reader what
thoughts were uppermost in Gordon's mind at the very moment when he
was negotiating about his new task for the King of the Belgians on the
Congo, and those thoughts, inspired by the enthusiasm derived from his
noble spirit, and the perfect self-sacrifice with which he would have
thrown himself into what he conceived to be a good and necessary work,
made him the ready victim of a Government which absolutely did not
know what course to pursue, and which was delighted to find that the
very man, whom the public designated as the right man for the
situation, was ready--nay, eager--to take all the burden on his
shoulders whenever his own Government called on him to do so, and to
proceed straight to the scene of danger without so much as asking for
precise instructions, or insisting on guarantees for his own proper
treatment. There is no doubt that from his own individual point of
view, and as affecting any selfish or personal consideration he had at
heart, this mode of action was very unwise and reprehensible, and a
worldly censure would be the more severe on Gordon, because he acted
with his eyes open, and knew that the gravity of the trouble really
arose from the drifting policy and want of purpose of the very
Ministers for whom he was about to dare a danger that Gordon himself,
in a cooler moment, would very likely have deemed it unnecessary to
face.
Into the motives that filled him with a belief that he might inspire a
Government, which had no policy, with one created by his own courage,
confidence, and success, it would be impossible to enter, but it can
be confidently asserted that, although they were drawn after him _sed
pede claudo_ to expend millions of treasure and thousands of lives,
they were never inspired by his exhortations and example to form a
definite policy as to the main point in the situation, viz., the
defence of the Egyptian possessions. In the flush of the moment,
carried along by an irresistible inclination to do the things which he
saw could be done, he overlooked all the other points of the case, and
especially that he was dealing with politicians tied by their party
principles, and thinking more of the passage through the House of some
domestic measure of fifth-rate importance than of the maintenance of
an Imperial interest and the arrest of an outbreak of Mahommedan
fanaticism which, if not checked, might call for a crusade. Gordon
overlooked all these considerations. He never thought but that he was
dealing with other Englishmen equally mindful with himself of their
country's fame.
If Gordon, long before he took up the task, had been engrossed in the
development of the Soudan difficulty and the Mahdi's power, those who
had studied the question and knew his special qualifications for the
task, had, at a very early stage of the trouble, called upon the
Government to avail themselves of his services, and there is no doubt
that if that advice had been promptly taken instead of slowly,
reluctantly, and only when matters were desperate, there is no doubt,
I repeat, remembering what he did later on, that Gordon would have
been able, without a single English regiment, to have strangled the
Mahdi's power in its infancy, and to have won back the Soudan for the
Khedive.
But it may be said, where was it ever prominently suggested that
General Gordon should be despatched to the Soudan at a time before the
Mahdi had become supreme in that region, as he undoubtedly did by the
overthrow of Hicks and his force?
I reply by the following quotations from prominent articles written by
myself in _The Times_ of January and February 1883. Until the capture
of El Obeid at that period the movement of the Mahdi was a local
affair of the importance of which no one, at a distance, could attempt
to judge, but that signal success made it the immediate concern of
those responsible in Egypt. On 9th January 1883, in an article in _The
Times_ on "The Soudan," occurs this passage:--
"It is a misfortune, in the interests of Egypt, of civilisation,
and of the mass of the Soudanese, that we cannot send General
Gordon back to the region of the Upper Nile to complete there the
good work he began eight years ago. With full powers, and with
the assurance that the good fruits of his labours shall not be
lost by the subsequent acts of corrupt Pashas, there need be
little doubt of his attaining rapid success, while the memory of
his achievements, when working for a half-hearted Government,
and with incapable colleagues, yet lives in the hearts of the
black people of the Soudan, and fills one of the most creditable
pages in the history of recent administration of alien races by
Englishmen."
Again, on 17th February, in another article on the same subject:--
"The authority of the Mahdi could scarcely be preserved save by
constant activity and a policy of aggression, which would
constitute a standing danger to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt.
On the other hand, the preservation of the Khedive's sovereign
rights through our instrumentality will carry with it the
responsibility of providing the unhappy peoples of Darfour,
Dongola, Kordofan, and the adjacent provinces with an equitable
administration and immunity from heavy taxation. The obligation
cannot be avoided under these, or perhaps under any
circumstances, but the acceptance of it is not a matter to be
entertained with an easy mind. The one thing that would reconcile
us to the idea would be the assurance that General Gordon would
be sent back with plenary powers to the old scene of his labours,
and that he would accept the charge."
As Gordon was not resorted to when the fall of El Obeid in the early
part of the year 1883 showed that the situation demanded some decisive
step, it is not surprising that he was left in inglorious inaction in
Palestine, while, as I and others knew well, his uppermost thought was
to be grappling with the Mahdi during the long lull of preparing
Hicks's expedition, and of its marching to its fate. The catastrophe
to that force on 4th November was known in London on 22nd November.
I urged in every possible way the prompt employment of General Gordon,
who could have reached Egypt in a very short time from his place of
exile at Jaffa. But on this occasion I was snubbed, being told by one
of the ablest editors I have known, now dead, that "Gordon was
generally considered to be mad." However, at this moment the
Government seem to have come to the conclusion that General Gordon had
some qualifications to undertake the task in the Soudan, for at the
end of November 1883, Sir Charles Dilke, then a member of the Cabinet
as President of the Local Government Board, but whose special
knowledge and experience of foreign affairs often led to his assisting
Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, offered the Egyptian Government
Gordon's services. They were declined, and when, on 1st December 1883,
Lord Granville proposed the same measure in a more formal manner, and
asked in an interrogatory form whether General Charles Gordon would be
of any use, and if so in what capacity, Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord
Cromer, threw cold water on the project, and stated on 2nd December
that "the Egyptian Government were very much averse to employing him."
Subsequent events make it desirable to call special attention to the
fact that when, however tardily, the British Government did propose
the employment of General Gordon, the suggestion was rejected, not on
public grounds, but on private. Major Baring did not need to be
informed as to the work Gordon had done in the Soudan, and as to the
incomparable manner in which it had been performed. No one knew better
than he that, with the single exception of Sir Samuel Baker, who was
far too prudent to take up a thankless task, and to remove the
mountain of blunders others had committed, there was no man living who
had the smallest pretension to say that he could cope with the Soudan
difficulty, save Charles Gordon. Yet, when his name is suggested, he
treats the matter as one that cannot be entertained. There is not a
word as to the obvious propriety of suggesting Gordon's name, but the
objection of a puppet-prince like Tewfik is reported as fatal to the
course. Yet six weeks, with the mighty lever of an aroused public
opinion, sufficed to make him withdraw the opposition he advanced to
the appointment, not on public grounds, which was simply impossible,
but, I fear, from private feelings, for he had not forgotten the scene
in Cairo in 1878, when he attempted to control the action of Gordon on
the financial question. There would be no necessity to refer to this
matter, but for its consequences. Had Sir Evelyn Baring done his duty,
and given the only honest answer on 2nd December 1883, that if any one
man could save the situation, that man was Charles Gordon, Gordon
could have reached Khartoum early in January instead of late in
February, and that difference of six weeks might well have sufficed to
completely alter the course of subsequent events, and certainly to
save Gordon's life, seeing that, after all, the Nile Expedition was
only a few days too late. The delay was also attended with fatal
results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there
early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent
down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children,
making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of
open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of
February had been spent.
The conviction that Gordon's appointment and departure were retarded
by personal _animus_ and an old difference is certainly strengthened
by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government
would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust
the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the
slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly informed our
representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient,
and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: "Zebehr
will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt."
But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British
Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the
situation required that something should be done as soon as possible,
for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings
might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small
and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population.
The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for
dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding
territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still
loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they
chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with
10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not
available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock
the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville
replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the
employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In
the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and
"concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan." In fact the
British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to
get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the
matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the
despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been
adopted, but as he had not, the only way to get rid of the
responsibility was to thrust it on Gordon, who was soon discovered to
be ready to accept it without delay or conditions.
On 22nd December 1883 Sir Evelyn Baring wrote: "It would be necessary
to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full
powers to withdraw the garrisons, and to make the best arrangements
possible for the future government of the country." News from Khartoum
showed that everything there was in a state verging on panic, that the
people thought they were abandoned by the Government, and that the
enemy had only to advance for the place to fall without a blow. Lastly
Colonel de Coetlogon, the governor after Hicks's death, recommended on
9th January the immediate withdrawal of the garrison from Khartoum,
which he thought could be accomplished if carried out with the
greatest promptitude, but which involved the desertion of the other
garrisons. Abd-el-Kader, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan and
Minister of War, offered to proceed to Khartoum, but when he
discovered that the abandonment of the Soudan was to be proclaimed, he
absolutely refused on any consideration to carry out what he termed a
hopeless errand.
All these circumstances gave special point to Sir Evelyn Baring's
recommendation on 22nd December that "an English officer of high
authority should be sent to Khartoum," and the urgency of a decision
was again impressed on the Government in his telegram of 1st January,
because Egypt is on the point of losing the Soudan, and moreover
possesses no force with which to defend the valley of the Nile
downwards. But in the many messages that were sent on this subject
during the last fortnight of the year 1883, the name of the one
"English officer of high authority" specially suited for the task
finds no mention. As this omission cannot be attributed to ignorance,
some different motive must be discovered. At last, on 10th January,
Lord Granville renews his suggestion to send General Gordon, and asks
whether he would not be of some assistance under the altered
circumstances. The "altered circumstances" must have been inserted for
the purpose of letting down Sir Evelyn Baring as lightly as possible,
for the only alteration in the circumstances was that six weeks had
been wasted in coming to any decision at all. On 11th January Sir
Evelyn Baring replied that he and Nubar Pasha did not think Gordon's
services could be utilised, and yet three weeks before he had
recommended that "an English officer of high authority" should be
sent, and he had even complained because prompter measures were not
taken to give effect to his recommendation. The only possible
conclusion is that, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, General Gordon was
not "an English officer of high authority." As if to make his views
more emphatic, Sir Evelyn Baring on 15th January again telegraphed for
an English officer with the intentional and conspicuous omission of
Gordon's name, which had been three times urged upon him by his own
Government. But determined as Sir Evelyn Baring was that by no act or
word of his should General Gordon be appointed to the Soudan, there
were more powerful influences at work than even his strong will.
The publication of General Gordon's views in the _Pall Mall Gazette_
of 9th January 1884 had roused public opinion to the importance and
urgency of the matter. It had also revealed that there was at least
one man who was not in terror of the Mahdi's power, and who thought
that the situation might still be saved. There is no doubt that that
publication was the direct and immediate cause of Lord Granville's
telegram of 10th January; but Sir Evelyn Baring, unmoved by what
people thought or said at home, coldly replied on 11th January that
Gordon is not the man he wants. If there had been no other
considerations in the matter, I have no doubt that Sir Evelyn Baring
would have beaten public opinion, and carried matters in the high,
dictatorial spirit he had shown since the first mention of Gordon's
name. But he had not made allowance for an embarrassed and purposeless
Government, asking only to be relieved of the whole trouble, and
willing to adopt any suggestion--even to resign its place to "the
unspeakable Turk"--so long as it was no longer worried in the matter.
At that moment Gordon appears on the scene, ready and anxious to
undertake single-handed a task for which others prescribe armies and
millions of money. Public opinion greets him as the man for the
occasion, and certainly he is the man to suit "that" Government. The
only obstruction is Sir Evelyn Baring. Against any other array of
forces his views would have prevailed, but even for him these are too
strong.
On 15th January Gordon saw Lord Wolseley, as described in the last
chapter, and then and there it is discovered and arranged that he will
go to the Soudan, but only at the Government's request, provided the
King of the Belgians will consent to his postponing the fulfilment of
his promise, as Gordon knows he cannot help but do, for it was given
on the express stipulation that the claim of his own country should
always come first. King Leopold, who has behaved throughout with
generosity, and the most kind consideration towards Gordon, is
naturally displeased and upset, but he feels that he cannot restrain
Gordon or insist on the letter of his bond. The Congo Mission is
therefore broken off or suspended, as described in the last chapter.
In the evening of the 15th Lord Granville despatched a telegram to Sir
Evelyn Baring, no longer asking his opinion or advice, but stating
that the Government have determined to send General Gordon to the
Soudan, and that he will start without delay. To that telegram the
British representative could make no demur short of resigning his
post, but at last the grudging admission was wrung from him that
"Gordon would be the best man." This conclusion, to which anyone
conversant with the facts, as Sir Evelyn Baring was, would have come
at once, was therefore only arrived at seven weeks after Sir Charles
Dilke first brought forward Gordon's name as the right person to deal
with the Soudan difficulty. That loss of time was irreparable, and in
the end proved fatal to Gordon himself.
In describing the last mission, betrayal, and death of Gordon, the
heavy responsibility of assigning the just blame to those individuals
who were in a special degree the cause of that hero's fate cannot be
shirked by any writer pretending to record history. Lord Cromer has
filled a difficult post in Egypt for many years with advantage to his
country, but in the matter of General Gordon's last Nile mission he
allowed his personal feelings to obscure his judgment. He knew that
Gordon was a difficult, let it be granted an impossible, colleague;
that he would do things in his own way in defiance of diplomatic
timidity and official rigidity; and that, instead of there being in
the Egyptian firmament the one planet Baring, there would be only the
single sun of Gordon. All these considerations were human, but they
none the less show that he allowed his private feelings, his
resentment at Gordon's treatment of him in 1878, to bias his judgment
in a matter of public moment. It was his opposition alone that
retarded Gordon's departure by seven weeks, and indeed the delay was
longer, as Gordon was then at Jaffa, and that delay, I repeat it
solemnly, cost Gordon his life. Whoever else was to blame afterwards,
the first against whom a verdict of Guilty must be entered, without
any hope of reprieve at the bar of history, was Sir Evelyn Baring, now
Lord Cromer.
Mr Gladstone and his Government are certainly clear of any reflection
in this stage of the matter. They did their best to put forward
General Gordon immediately on the news coming of the Hicks disaster,
and although they might have shown greater determination in compelling
the adoption of their plan, which they were eventually obliged to do,
this was a very venial fault, and not in any serious way blameworthy.
Nor did they ever seek to repudiate their responsibility for sending
Gordon to the Soudan, although a somewhat craven statement by Lord
Granville, in a speech at Shrewsbury in September 1885, to the effect
that "Gordon went to Khartoum at his own request," might seem to infer
that they did. This remark may have been a slip, or an incorrect mode
of saying that Gordon willingly accepted the task given him by the
Government, but Mr Gladstone placed the matter in its true light when
he wrote that "General Gordon went to the Soudan at the request of
H.M.'s Government."
Gordon, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Stewart, an officer
who had visited the Soudan in 1883, and written an able report on it,
left London by the Indian mail of 18th January 1884. The decision to
send Colonel Stewart with him was arrived at only at the very last
moment, and on the platform at Charing Cross Station the acquaintance
of the two men bound together in such a desperate partnership
practically began. It is worth recalling that in that hurried and
stirring scene, when the War Office, with the Duke of Cambridge, had
assembled to see him off, Gordon found time to say to one of Stewart's
nearest relations, "Be sure that he will not go into any danger which
I do not share, and I am sure that when I am in danger he will not be
far behind."
Gordon's journey to Egypt was uneventful, but after the exciting
events that preceded his departure he found the leisure of his
sea-trip from Brindisi beneficial and advantageous, for the purpose of
considering his position and taking stock of the situation he had to
face. By habit and temperament Gordon was a bad emissary to carry out
cut-and-dried instructions, more especially when they related to a
subject upon which he felt very strongly and held pronounced views.
The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I
quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordon's
hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally
I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied
them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to
rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province
after providing for its administration. The letter given in the
previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement
between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression
of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what
conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the
start the Government's view of the matter and his presented no glaring
difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the
garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his
establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on
which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in
the affair. Gordon's marvellous qualities were to extricate them from
the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian
Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite
thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied.
The following instructions should be read by the light of these
reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the
same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and
had widely different goals in view:--
"FOREIGN OFFICE, _January 18th, 1884_.
"Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at
once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the
Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for
the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in
that country, and for the safety of the European population in
Khartoum.
"You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode
of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and
upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration
by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best
be secured.
"In connection with this subject, you should pay especial
consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be
taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly
be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary
movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the
interior.
"You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent and
Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her
Majesty's Government should be sent, under flying seal.
"You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform
such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to
entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E.
Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will
assist you in the duties thus confided to you.
"On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir
E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you
whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go
yourself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum _viâ_ the Nile."
General Gordon had not got very far on his journey before he began to
see that there were points on which it would be better for him to know
the Government's mind and to state his own. Neither at this time nor
throughout the whole term of his stay at Khartoum did Gordon attempt
to override the main decision of the Government policy, viz. to
evacuate the Soudan, although he left plenty of documentary evidence
to show that this was not his policy or opinion. Moreover, his own
policy had been well set forth in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, and might
be summed up in the necessity to keep the Eastern Soudan, and the
impossibility of fortifying Lower Egypt against the advance of the
Mahdi. But he had none the less consented to give his services to a
Government which had decided on evacuation, and he remained loyal to
that purpose, although in a little time it was made clear that there
was a wide and impassable gulf between the views of the British
Government and its too brilliant agent.
The first doubt that flashed through his mind, strangely enough, was
about Zebehr. He knew, of course, that it had been proposed to employ
him, and that Mr Gladstone had not altogether unnaturally decided
against it. But Gordon knew the man's ability, his influence, and the
close connection he still maintained with the Soudan, where his
father-in-law Elias was the Mahdi's chief supporter, and the paymaster
of his forces. I believe that Gordon was in his heart of the opinion
that the Mahdi was only a lay figure, and that the real author of the
whole movement in the Soudan was Zebehr, but that the Mahdi, carried
away by his exceptional success, had somewhat altered the scope of the
project, and given it an exclusively religious or fanatical character.
It is somewhat difficult to follow all the workings of Gordon's mind
on this point, nor is it necessary to do so, but the fact that should
not be overlooked is Gordon's conviction in the great power for good
or evil of Zebehr. Thinking this matter over in the train, he
telegraphed from Brindisi to Lord Granville on 30th January, begging
that Zebehr might be removed from Cairo to Cyprus. There is no doubt
as to the wisdom of this suggestion, and had it been adopted the lives
of Colonel Stewart and his companions would probably have been spared,
for, as will be seen, there is good ground to think that they were
murdered by men of his tribe. In Cyprus Zebehr would have been
incapable of mischief, but no regard was paid to Gordon's wish, and
thus commenced what proved to be a long course of indifference.
During the voyage from Brindisi to Port-Said Gordon drew up a
memorandum on his instructions, correcting some of the errors that had
crept into them, and explaining what, more or less, would be the best
course to follow. One part of his instructions had to go by the
board--that enjoining him to restore to the ancient families of the
Soudan their long-lost possessions, for there were no such families in
existence. One paragraph in that memorandum was almost pathetic, when
he begged the Government to take the most favourable view of his
shortcomings if he found himself compelled by necessity to deviate
from his instructions. Colonel Stewart supported that view in a very
sensible letter, when he advised the Government, "as the wisest
course, to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge
of the country."
General Gordon's original plan was to proceed straight to Souakim, and
to travel thence by Berber to Khartoum, leaving the Foreign Office to
arrange at Cairo what his status should be, but this mode of
proceeding would have been both irregular and inconvenient, and it was
rightly felt that he ought to hold some definite position assigned by
the Khedive, as the ruler of Egypt. On arriving at Port-Said he was
met by Sir Evelyn Wood, who was the bearer of a private letter from
his old Academy and Crimean chum, Sir Gerald Graham, begging him to
"throw over all personal feelings" and come to Cairo. The appeal could
not have come from a quarter that would carry more weight with Gordon,
who had a feeling of affection as well as respect for General Graham;
and, moreover, the course suggested was so unmistakably the right one,
that he could not, and did not, feel any hesitation in taking it,
although he was well aware of Sir Evelyn Baring's opposition, which
showed that the sore of six years before still rankled. Gordon
accordingly accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood to Cairo, where he arrived on
the evening of 24th January. On the following day he was received by
Tewfik, who conferred on him for the second time the high office of
Governor-General of the Soudan. It is unnecessary to lay stress on any
minor point in the recital of the human drama which began with the
interview with Lord Wolseley on 15th January, and thence went on
without a pause to the tragedy of 26th January in the following year;
but it does seem strange, if the British Government were resolved to
stand firm to its evacuation policy, that it should have allowed its
emissary to accept the title of Governor-General of a province which
it had decided should cease to exist.
This was not the only nor even the most important consequence of his
turning aside to go to Cairo. When there, those who were interested
for various reasons in the proposal to send Zebehr to the Soudan, made
a last effort to carry their project by arranging an interview between
that person and Gordon, in the hope that all matters in dispute
between them might be discussed, and, if possible, settled. Gordon,
whose enmity to his worst foe was never deep, and whose temperament
would have made him delight in a discussion with the arch-fiend, said
at once that he had no objection to meeting Zebehr, and would discuss
any matter with him or any one else. The penalty of this magnanimity
was that he was led to depart from the uncompromising but safe
attitude of opposition and hostility he had up to this observed
towards Zebehr, and to record opinions that were inconsistent with
those he had expressed on the same subject only a few weeks and even
days before. But even in what follows I believe it is safe to discern
his extraordinary perspicuity; for when he saw that the Government
would not send Zebehr to Cyprus, he promptly concluded that it would
be far safer to take or have him with him in the Soudan, where he
could personally watch and control his movements, than to allow him to
remain at Cairo, guiding hostile plots with his money and influence in
the very region whither Gordon was proceeding.
This view is supported by the following Memorandum, drawn up by
General Gordon on 25th January 1884, the day before the interview, and
entitled by him "Zebehr Pasha _v._ General Gordon":--
"Zebehr Pasha's first connection with me began in 1877, when I
was named Governor-General of Soudan. Zebehr was then at Cairo,
being in litigation with Ismail Pasha Eyoub, my predecessor in
Soudan. Zebehr had left his son Suleiman in charge of his forces
in the Bahr Gazelle. Darfour was in complete rebellion, and I
called on Suleiman to aid the Egyptian army in May 1877. He never
moved. In June 1877 I went to Darfour, and was engaged with the
rebels when Suleiman moved up his men, some 6000, to Dara. It was
in August 1877. He and his men assumed an hostile attitude to the
Government of Dara. I came down to Dara and went out to
Suleiman's camp, and asked them to come and see me at Dara.
Suleiman and his chiefs did so, and I told them I felt sure that
they meditated rebellion, but if they rebelled they would perish.
I offered them certain conditions, appointing certain chiefs to
be governors of certain districts, but refusing to let Suleiman
be Governor of Bahr Gazelle. After some days' parleying, some of
Suleiman's chiefs came over to my side, and these chiefs warned
me that, if I did not take care, Suleiman would attack me. I
therefore ordered Suleiman to go to Shaka, and ordered those
chiefs who were inclined to accept my terms in another
direction, so as to separate them. On this Suleiman accepted my
terms, and he and others were made Beys. He left for Shaka with
some 4000 men. He looted the country from Dara to Shaka, and did
not show any respect to my orders. The rebellion in Darfour being
settled, I went down to Shaka with 200 men. Suleiman was there
with 4000. Then he came to me and begged me to let him have the
sole command in Bahr Gazelle. I refused, and I put him, Suleiman,
under another chief, and sent up to Bahr Gazelle 200 regular
troops. Things remained quiet in Bahr Gazelle till I was ordered
to Cairo in April 1878, about the finances. I then saw Zebehr
Pasha, who wished to go up to Soudan, and I refused. I left for
Aden in May, and in June 1878 Suleiman broke out in revolt, and
killed the 200 regular troops at Bahr Gazelle. I sent Gessi
against him in August 1878, and Gessi crushed him in the course
of 1879. Gessi captured a lot of letters in the divan of
Suleiman, one of which was from Zebehr Pasha inciting him to
revolt. The original of this letter was given by me to H.H. the
Khedive, and I also had printed a brochure containing it and a
sort of _exposé_ to the people of Soudan why the revolt had been
put down--viz. that it was not a question of slave-hunting, but
one of revolt against the Khedive's authority. Copies of this
must exist. On the production of this letter of Zebehr to
Suleiman, I ordered the confiscation of Zebehr's property in
Soudan, and a court martial to sit on Zebehr's case. This court
martial was held under Hassan Pasha Halmi; the court condemned
Zebehr to death; its proceedings were printed in the brochure I
alluded to. Gessi afterwards caught Suleiman and shot him. With
details of that event I am not acquainted, and I never saw the
papers, for I went to Abyssinia. Gessi's orders were to try him,
and if guilty to shoot him. This is all I have to say about
Zebehr and myself.
"Zebehr, without doubt, was the greatest slave-hunter who ever
existed. Zebehr is the most able man in the Soudan; he is a
capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zebehr has a
capacity of government far beyond any statesman in the Soudan.
All the followers of the Mahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi
on Zebehr's approach, for they are ex-chiefs of Zebehr.
Personally, I have a great admiration for Zebehr, for he is a
man, and is infinitely superior to those poor fellows who have
been governors of Soudan; but I question in my mind, 'Will Zebehr
ever forgive me the death of his son?' and that question has
regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears
me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it if one is a
father.
"I would even now risk taking Zebehr, and would willingly bear
the responsibility of doing so, convinced, as I am, that Zebehr's
approach ends the Mahdi, which is a question which has its pulse
in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine.
"It cannot be the wish of H.M.'s Government, or of the Egyptian
Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its
evacuation, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which
could prevent it is the restoration of Zebehr, who would be
accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of
months. My duty is to obey orders of H.M.'s Government, _i.e._ to
evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible, _vis-à-vis_ the
safety of the Egyptian employés.
"To do this I count on Zebehr; but if the addenda is made that I
leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zebehr becomes a
_sine quâ non_.
"Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Does H.M.'s
Government or Egyptian Government desire a settled state of
affairs in Soudan after the evacuation? Do these Governments want
to be free of this religious fanatic? If they do, then Zebehr
should be sent; and if the two Governments are indifferent, then
do not send him, and I have confidence one will (_D.V._) get out
the Egyptian employés in three or four months, and will leave a
cockpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be
done. I will only say, first, I was justified in my action
against Zebehr; second, that if Zebehr has no malice personally
against me, I should take him at once as a humanly certain
settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. I have written this
Minute, and Zebehr's story may be heard. I only wish that after
he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as
his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish this
inquiry to be official, and in such a way that, whatever may be
the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence.
"With respect to the slave-trade, I think nothing of it, for
there will always be slave-trade as long as Turkey and Egypt buy
the slaves, and it may be Zebehr will or might in his interest
stop it in some manner. I will therefore sum up my opinion, viz.
that I would willingly take the responsibility of taking Zebehr
up with me if, after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar
Pasha, they tell 'the mystic feeling' I could trust him, and
which 'mystic feeling' I felt I had for him to-night when I met
him at Cherif Pasha's house. Zebehr would have nothing to gain in
hunting me, and I would have no fear. In this affair my desire, I
own, would be to take Zebehr. I cannot exactly say why I feel
towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going would settle the
Soudan affair to the benefit of H.M.'s Government, and I would
bear the responsibility of recommending it.
"C. G. GORDON, Major-General."
An interview between Gordon and Zebehr was therefore arranged for 26th
January, the day after this memorandum was written. On 25th it should
also be remembered that the Khedive had again made Gordon
Governor-General of the Soudan. Besides the two principals, there were
present at this interview Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Gerald Graham,
Colonel Watson, and Nubar Pasha. Zebehr protested his innocence of the
charges made against him; and when Gordon reminded him of his letter,
signed with his hand and bearing his seal, found in the divan of his
son Suleiman, he called upon Gordon to produce this letter, which, of
course, he could not do, because it was sent with the other
incriminating documents to the Khedive in 1879. The passage in that
letter establishing the guilt of Zebehr may, however, be cited, it
being first explained that Idris Ebter was Gordon's governor of the
Bahr Gazelle province, and that Suleiman did carry out his father's
instructions to attack him.
"Now since this same Idris Ebter has not appreciated our kindness
towards him, nor shown regard for his duty towards God, therefore
do you accomplish his ejection by compulsory force, threats, and
menaces, without personal hurt, but with absolute expulsion and
deprivation from the Bahr-el-Gazelle, leaving no remnant of him
in that region, no son, and no relation. For he is a
mischief-maker, and God loveth not them who make mischief."
It is highly probable, from the air of confidence with which Zebehr
called for the production of the letter, that, either during the Arabi
rising or in some other way, he had recovered possession of the
original; but Gordon had had all the documents copied in 1879, and
bound in the little volume mentioned in the preceding Memorandum, as
well as in several of his letters, and the evidence as to Zebehr's
complicity and guilt seems quite conclusive.
In his Memorandum Gordon makes two conditions: first, "if Zebehr bears
no malice personally against me, I will take him to the Soudan at
once," and this condition is given further force later on in reference
to "the mystic feeling." The second condition was that Zebehr was only
to be sent if the Government desired a settled state of affairs after
the evacuation. From the beginning of the interview it was clear to
those present that no good would come of it, as Zebehr could scarcely
control his feelings, and showed what they deemed a personal
resentment towards Gordon that at any moment might have found
expression in acts. After a brief discussion it was decided to adjourn
the meeting, on the pretence of having search made for the
incriminating document, but really to avert a worse scene. General
Graham, in the after-discussion on Gordon's renewed desire to take
Zebehr with him, declared that it would be dangerous to acquiesce; and
Colonel Watson plainly stated that it would mean the death of one or
both of them. Gordon, indifferent to all considerations of personal
danger, did not take the same view of Zebehr's attitude towards him
personally, and would still have taken him with him, if only on the
ground that he would be less dangerous in the Soudan than at Cairo;
but the authorities would not acquiesce in a proposition that they
considered would inevitably entail the murder of Gordon at an early
stage of the journey. They cannot, from any point of view, be greatly
blamed in this matter; and when Gordon complains later on, as he
frequently did complain, about the matter, the decision must be with
his friends at Cairo, for they strictly conformed with the first
condition specified in his own Memorandum. At the same time, he was
perfectly correct in his views as to Zebehr's power and capacity for
mischief, and it was certainly very unfortunate and wrong that his
earlier suggestion of removing him to Cyprus or some other place of
safety was not adopted.
The following new correspondence will at least suggest a doubt whether
Gordon was not more correct in his view of Zebehr's attitude towards
himself than his friends. What they deemed strong resentment and a
bitter personal feeling towards Gordon on the part of Zebehr, he
considered merely the passing excitement from discussing a matter of
great moment and interest. He would still have taken Zebehr with him,
and for many weeks after his arrival at Khartoum he expected that, in
reply to his frequently reiterated messages, "Send me Zebehr," the
ex-Dictator of the Soudan would be sent up from Cairo. In one of the
last letters to his sister, dated Khartoum, 5th March 1884, he wrote:
"I hope _much_ from Zebehr's coming up, for he is so well known to all
up here." I come now to the correspondence referred to.
Some time after communications were broken off with Khartoum, Miss
Gordon wrote to Zebehr, begging him to use his influence with the
Mahdi to get letters for his family to and from General Gordon. To
that Zebehr replied as follows:--
"TO HER EXCELLENCY MISS GORDON,--I am very grateful to you for
having had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th, and
am very sorry to say that I am not able to write to the Mahdi,
because he is new, and has appeared lately in the Soudan. I do
not know him. He is not of my tribe nor of my relations, nor of
the tribes with which I was on friendly terms; and for these
reasons I do not see the way in which I could carry out your
wish. I am ready to serve you in all that is possible all my life
through, but please accept my excuse in this matter.
"Please accept my best respects.
ZEBEHR RAHAMAH, Pasha.
"CAIRO, _22nd January 1885_."
Some time after the fall of Khartoum, Miss Gordon made a further
communication to Zebehr, but, owing to his having been exiled to
Gibraltar, it was not until October 1887 that she received the
following reply, which is certainly curious; and I believe that this
letter and personal conversations with Zebehr induced one of the
officers present at the interview on 26th January 1884 to change his
original opinion, and to conclude that it would have been safe for
General Gordon to have taken Zebehr with him:--
"CAIRO [_received by Miss Gordon
about 12th October 1887_].
"HONOURABLE LADY,--I most respectfully beg to acknowledge the
receipt of your letter, enclosed to that addressed to me by His
Excellency Watson Pasha.
"This letter has caused me a great satisfaction, as it speaks of
the friendly relations that existed between me and the late
Gordon Pasha, your brother, whom you have replaced in my heart,
and this has been ascertained to me by your inquiring about me
and your congratulating me for my return to Cairo" [that is,
after his banishment to Gibraltar].
"I consider that your poor brother is still alive in you, and for
the whole run of my life I put myself at your disposal, and beg
that you will count upon me as a true and faithful friend to you.
"You will also kindly pay my respects to the whole family of
Gordon Pasha, and may you not deprive me of your good news at any
time.
"My children and all my family join themselves to me, and pay you
their best respects.
"Further, I beg to inform you that the messenger who had been
previously sent through me, carrying Government correspondence to
your brother, Gordon Pasha, has reached him, and remitted the
letter he had in his own hands, and without the interference of
any other person. The details of his history are mentioned in the
enclosed report, which I hope you will kindly read.--Believe me,
honourable Lady, to remain yours most faithfully,
ZEBEHR RAHAMAH."
REPORT ENCLOSED.
"When I came to Cairo and resided in it as I was before, I kept
myself aside of all political questions connected with the Soudan
or others, according to the orders given me by the Government to
that effect. But as a great rumour was spread over by the high
Government officials who arrived from the Soudan, and were with
H.E. General Gordon Pasha at Khartoum before and after it fell,
that all my properties in that country had been looted, and my
relations ill-treated, I have been bound, by a hearty feeling of
compassion, to ask the above said officials what they knew about
it, and whether the messenger sent by me with the despatches
addressed by the Government to General Gordon Pasha had reached
Khartoum and remitted what he had.
"These officials informed me verbally that on the 25th Ramadan
1301 (March 1884), at the time they were sitting at Khartoum with
General Gordon, my messenger, named Fadhalla Kabileblos, arrived
there, and remitted to the General in his proper hands, and
without the interference of anyone, all the despatches he had on
him. After that the General expressed his greatest content for
the receipt of the correspondence, and immediately gave orders to
the artillery to fire twenty-five guns, in sign of rejoicing, and
in order to show to the enemy his satisfaction for the news of
the arrival of British troops. General Gordon then treated my
messenger cordially, and requested the Government to pay him a
sum of £500 on his return to Cairo, as a gratuity for all the
dangers he had run in accomplishing his faithful mission. Besides
that, the General gave him, when he embarked with Colonel
Stewart, £13 to meet his expenses on the journey. A few days
after the arrival of my messenger at Khartoum, H.E. General
Gordon thought it proper to appoint Colonel Stewart for coming to
Cairo on board a man-of-war with a secret mission, and several
letters, written by the General in English and Arabic, were put
in two envelopes, one addressed to the British and the other to
the Egyptian Government, and were handed over to my messenger,
with the order to return to Cairo with Colonel Stewart on board a
special steamer.
"But when Khartoum fell, and the rebels got into it, making all
the inhabitants prisoners, the Government officials above
referred to were informed that my messenger had been arrested,
and all the correspondence that he had on him, addressed by
General Gordon to the Government, was seized; for when the
steamer on board of which they were arrived at Abou Kamar she
went on rocks, and having been broken, the rebels made a massacre
of all those who were on board; and as, on seeing the letters
carried by my messenger, they found amongst them a private letter
addressed to me by H.E. Gordon Pasha, expressing his thanks for
my faithfulness to him, the rebels declared me an infidel, and
decided to seize all my goods and properties, comprising them in
their _Beit-el-Mal_ (that is, Treasury) as it happened in fact.
"Moreover, the members of my family who were in the Soudan were
treated most despotically, and their existence was rendered most
difficult.
"Such a state of things being incompatible with the suspicion
thrown upon me as regards my faithfulness to the Government, I
have requested the high Government officials referred to above to
give me an official certificate to that effect, which they all
gave; and the enclosed copies will make known to those who take
the trouble to read them that I have been honest and faithful in
all what has been entrusted to me. This is the summary of the
information I have obtained from persons I have reason to
believe."
Some further evidence of Zebehr's feelings is given in the following
letter from him to Sir Henry Gordon, dated in October 1884:--
"Your favour of 3rd September has been duly received, for which I
thank you. I herewith enclose my photograph, and hope that you
will kindly send me yours.
"The letter that you wished me to send H.E. General Gordon was
sent on the 18th August last, registered. I hope that you will
excuse me in delaying to reply, for when your letter arrived I
was absent, and when I returned I was very sorry that they had
not forwarded the letter to me; otherwise I should have replied
at once.
"I had closed this letter with the photograph when I received
fresh news, to the effect that the messengers we sent to H.E.
Gordon Pasha were on their way back. I therefore kept back the
letter and photograph till they arrived, and I should see what
tidings they brought.... You have told me that Lord Northbrook
knows what has passed between us. I endeavoured and devised to
see His Excellency, but I did not succeed, as he was very busy. I
presented a petition to him that he should help to recover the
property of which I was robbed unjustly, and which H.E. your
brother ordered to be restored, and at the same time to right me
for the oppression I had suffered. I have had no answer up to
this present moment.
"Hoping that H.E. Gordon Pasha will return in safety, accept my
best regards, dear Sir, and present my compliments to your
sister.
"ZEBEHR.
"_28th Oct. 1884._"
To sum up on this important matter. There never was any doubt that the
authorities in the Delta took on themselves a grave responsibility
when they remained deaf to all Gordon's requests for the co-operation
of Zebehr. They would justify themselves by saying that they had a
tender regard for Gordon's own safety. At least this was the only
point on which they showed it, and they would not like to be deprived
of the small credit attached to it; but the evidence I have now
adduced renders even this plea of doubtful force. As to the value of
Zebehr's co-operation, if Gordon could have obtained it there cannot
be two opinions. Gordon did not exaggerate in the least degree when he
said that on the approach of Zebehr the star of the Mahdi would at
once begin to wane, or, in other words, that he looked to Zebehr's
ability and influence as the sure way to make his own mission a
success.
On the very night of his interview with Zebehr, and within forty-eight
hours of his arrival in Cairo, General Gordon and his English
companion, with four Egyptian officers, left by train for Assiout, _en
route_ to Khartoum.