MINOR MISSIONS--INDIA AND CHINA.
General Gordon arrived in London at the end of January 1880--having
lingered on his home journey in order to visit Rome--resolved as far
as he possibly could to take that period of rest which he had
thoroughly earned, and which he so much needed. But during these last
few years of his life he was to discover that the world would not
leave him undisturbed in the tranquillity he desired and sought.
Everyone wished to see him usefully and prominently employed for his
country's good, and offers, suitable and not suitable to his character
and genius, were either made to him direct, or put forward in the
public Press as suggestions for the utilization of his experience and
energy in the treatment of various burning questions. His numerous
friends also wished to do him honour, and he found himself threatened
with being drawn into the vortex of London Society, for which he had
little inclination, and, at that time, not even the strength and
health.
After this incident he left London on 29th February for Switzerland,
where he took up his residence at Lausanne, visiting _en route_ at
Brussels, Mr, afterwards Lord, Vivian, then Minister at the Belgian
Court, who had been Consul-General in Egypt during the financial
crisis episode. It is pleasant to find that that passage had, in this
case, left no ill-feeling behind it on either side, and that Gordon
promised to think over the advice Mrs Vivian gave him to get married
while he was staying at the Legation. His reply must not be taken as
of any serious import, and was meant to turn the subject. About the
same time he wrote in a private letter, "Wives! wives! what a trial
you are to your husbands! From my experience married men have more or
less a cowed look."
It was on this occasion that Gordon was first brought into contact
with the King of the Belgians, and had his attention drawn to the
prospect of suppressing the slave trade from the side of the Congo,
somewhat analogous to his own project of crushing it from Zanzibar.
The following unpublished letter gives an amusing account of the
circumstances under which he first met King Leopold:--
"HOTEL DE BELLE-VUE, BRUXELLES,
"_Tuesday, 2nd March 1880_.
"I arrived here yesterday at 6 P.M., and found my baggage had not
come on when I got to the hotel (having given orders about my
boxes which were to arrive to-day at 9 A.M.). I found I was
_detected_, and a huge card of His Majesty awaited me, inviting
to dinner at 6.30 P.M. It was then 6.20 P.M. I wrote my excuses,
telling the truth. Then I waited. It is now 9.30 A.M., and no
baggage. King has just sent to say he will receive me at 11 A.M.
I am obliged to say I cannot come if my baggage does not arrive.
"I picked up a small book here, the 'Souvenirs of Congress of
Vienna,' in 1814 and 1815. It is a sad account of the festivities
of that time. It shows how great people fought for invitations to
the various parties, and how like a bomb fell the news of
Napoleon's descent from Elba, and relates the end of some of the
great men. The English great man, Castlereagh, cut his throat
near Chislehurst; Alexander died mad, etc., etc. They are all in
their 6 feet by 2 feet 6 inches.... Horrors, it is now 10.20
A.M., and no baggage! King sent to say he will see me at 11 A.M.;
remember, too, I have to dress, shave, etc., etc. 10.30 A.M.--No
baggage!!! It is getting painful. His Majesty will be furious.
10.48 A.M.--No baggage! Indirectly Mackinnon (late Sir William)
is the sinner, for he evidently told the King I was coming.
Napoleon said, 'The smallest trifles produce the greatest
results.' 12.30 P.M.--Got enclosed note from palace, and went to
see the King--a very tall man with black beard. He was very
civil, and I stayed with him for one and a half hours. He is
quite at sea with his expedition (Congo), and I have to try and
get him out of it. I have to go there to-morrow at 11.30 A.M. My
baggage has come."
During his stay at Lausanne his health improved, and he lost the
numbed feeling in his arms which had strengthened the impression that
he suffered from _angina pectoris_. This apprehension, although
retained until a very short period before his final departure from
England in 1884, was ultimately discovered to be baseless. With
restored health returned the old feeling of restlessness. After five
weeks he found it impossible to remain any longer in Lausanne. Again
he exclaims in his letters: "Inaction is terrible to me!" and on 9th
April he left that place for London.
Yet, notwithstanding his desire to return to work, or rather his
feeling that he could not live in a state of inactivity, he refused
the first definite suggestion that was made to him of employment.
While he was still at Lausanne, the Governor of Cape Colony sent the
following telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:--"My
Ministers wish that the post of Commandant of the Colonial Forces
should be offered to Chinese Gordon." The reply to this telegram read
as follows:--"The command of the Colonial Forces would probably be
accepted by Chinese Gordon in the event of your Ministers desiring
that the offer of it should be made to him." The Cape authorities
requested that this offer might be made, and the War Office
accordingly telegraphed to him as follows: "Cape Government offer
command of Colonial Forces; supposed salary, £1500; your services
required early." Everyone seems to have taken it as a matter of course
that he would accept; but Gordon's reply was in the negative: "Thanks
for telegram just received; I do not feel inclined to accept an
appointment." His reasons for not accepting what seemed a desirable
post are not known. They were probably due to considerations of
health, although the doubt may have presented itself to his mind
whether he was qualified by character to work in harmony with the
Governor and Cabinet of any colony. He knew very well that all his
good work had been done in an independent and unfettered capacity, and
at the Cape he must have felt that, as nominal head of the forces, he
would have been fettered by red tape and local jealousies, and
rendered incapable of doing any good in an anomalous position. But
after events make it desirable to state and recollect the precise
circumstances of this first offer to him from the Cape Government.
While at Lausanne, General Gordon's attention was much given to the
study of the Eastern Question, and I am not at all sure that the real
reason of his declining the Cape offer was not the hope and
expectation that he might be employed in connection with a subject
which he thoroughly understood and had very much at heart. He drew up
a memorandum on the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, which, for
clearness of statement, perfect grasp of a vital international
question, and prophetic vision, has never been surpassed among State
papers. Although written in March 1880, and in my possession a very
short time afterwards, I was not permitted to publish it until
September 1885, when it appeared in the _Times_ of the 24th of that
month. Its remarkable character was at once appreciated by public men,
and Sir William Harcourt, speaking in the House four days later,
testified to the extraordinary foresight with which "poor Gordon"
diagnosed the case of Europe's sick man. I quote here this memorandum
in its integrity:--
"The Powers of Europe assembled at Constantinople, and
recommended certain reforms to Turkey. Turkey refused to accede
to these terms, the Powers withdrew, and deliberated. Not being
able to come to a decision, Russia undertook, on her own
responsibility, to enforce them. England acquiesced, provided
that her own interests were not interfered with. The
Russo-Turkish War occurred, during which time England, in various
ways, gave the Turks reason to believe that she would eventually
come to their assistance. This may be disputed, but I refer to
the authorities in Constantinople whether the Turks were not
under the impression during the war _that England would help
them, and also save them, from any serious loss eventually_.
England, therefore, provided this is true, did encourage Turkey
in her resistance.
"Then came the Treaty of San Stephano. It was drawn up with the
intention of finishing off the rule of Turkey in Europe--there
was no disguise about it; but I think that, looking at that
treaty from a Russian point of view, it was a very bad one for
Russia. Russia, by her own act, had trapped herself.
"By it (the Treaty of San Stephano) Russia had created a huge
kingdom, or State, south of the Danube, with a port. This new
Bulgarian State, being fully satisfied, would have nothing more
to desire from Russia, but would have sought, by alliance with
other Powers, to keep what she (Bulgaria) possessed, and would
have feared Russia more than any other Power. Having a seaport,
she would have leant on England and France. Being independent of
Turkey, she would wish to be on good terms with her.
"Therefore I maintain, that _once_ the Russo-Turkish War had been
permitted, no greater obstacle could have been presented to
Russia than the maintenance of this united Bulgarian State, and I
believe that the Russians felt this as well.
"I do not go into the question of the Asia Minor acquisitions by
Russia, for, to all intents and purposes, the two treaties are
alike. By both treaties Russia possesses the strategical points
of the country, and though by the Berlin Treaty Russia gave up
the strip south of Ararat, and thus does not hold the road to
Persia, yet she stretches along this strip, and is only distant
two days' march from the road, the value of which is merely
commercial.
"By both treaties Russia obtained Batoum and the war-like tribes
around it. Though the _only port_ on the Black Sea between Kertch
and Sinope, a distance of 1000 miles, its acquisition by Russia
was never contested. It was said to be a worthless
possession--'grapes were sour.'
"I now come to the changes made in the San Stephano Treaty (which
was undoubtedly, and was intended to be, the _coup de grâce_ to
Turkish rule in Europe) by the Treaty of Berlin.
"By the division of the two Bulgarias we prolonged, without
alleviating, the agony of Turkey in Europe; we repaired the great
mistake of Russia, from a Russian point of view, in making one
great State of Bulgaria. We stipulated that Turkish troops, with
a hostile Bulgaria to the north, and a hostile Roumelia to the
south, should occupy the Balkans. I leave military men, or any
men of sense, to consider this step. We restored Russia to her
place, as the protector of these lands, which she had by the
Treaty of San Stephano given up. We have left the wishes of
Bulgarians unsatisfied, and the countries unquiet. We have forced
them to look to Russia more than to us and France, and we have
lost their sympathies. And for what? It is not doubted that ere
long the two States will be united. If Moldavia and Wallachia
laughed at the Congress of Paris, and united while it (the
Congress) was in session at Paris, is it likely Bulgaria will
wait long, or hesitate to unite with Roumelia, because Europe
does not wish it?
"Therefore the union of the two States is certain, only it is to
be regretted that this union will give just the chance Russia
wants to interfere again; and though, when the union takes place,
I believe Russia will repent it, still it will always be to
Russia that they will look till the union is accomplished.
"I suppose the Turks are capable of appreciating what they gained
by the Treaty of Berlin. _They were fully aware that the Treaty
of San Stephano was their_ coup de grâce. But the Treaty of
Berlin was supposed to be beneficial to them. Why? By it Turkey
lost _not only Bulgaria_ and _Roumelia_ (for she has virtually
lost it), but _Bosnia_ and _Herzegovina_, while she gained the
utterly impossible advantage of occupying the Balkans, with a
hostile nation to north and south.
"I therefore maintain that the Treaty of Berlin did no good to
Turkey, but infinite harm to Europe.
"I will now go on to the Cyprus convention, and say a few words
on the bag-and-baggage policy. Turkey and Egypt are governed by a
ring of Pashas, most of them Circassians, and who are perfect
foreigners in Turkey. They are, for the greater part, men who,
when boys, have been bought at prices varying from £50 to £70,
and who, brought up in the harems, have been pushed on by their
purchasers from one grade to another. Some have been dancing boys
and drummers, like Riaz and Ismail Eyoub of Egypt. I understand
by bag-and-baggage policy the getting rid of, say, two hundred
Pashas of this sort in Turkey, and sixty Pashas in Egypt. These
men have not the least interest in the welfare of the countries;
they are aliens and adventurers, they are hated by the
respectable inhabitants of Turkey and Egypt, and they must be got
rid of.
"Armenia is lost; it is no use thinking of reforms in it. The
Russians virtually possess it; the sooner we recognise this fact
the better. Why undertake the impossible?
"What should be done? Study existing facts, and decide on a
definite line of policy, and follow it through. Russia, having a
definite line of policy, is strong; we have not one, and are weak
and vacillating. 'A double-minded man is unstable in all his
ways.'
"Supposing such a line of policy as follows was decided upon and
followed up, it would be better than the worries of the last four
years:--
"1. The complete purchase of Cyprus.
"2. The abandonment of the Asia Minor reforms.
"3. The union of Bulgaria and Roumelia, with a port.
"4. The increase of Greece.
"5. Constantinople, a State, under European guarantees.
"6. Increase of Montenegro, and Italy, on that coast.
"7. Annexation of Egypt by England, _either directly or by having
paramount and entire authority_.
"8. Annexation of Syria by France--ditto--ditto--ditto. (By this
means France would be as interested in stopping Russian progress
as England is.)
"9. Italy to be allowed to extend towards Abyssinia.
"10. Re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution, and the
establishment of a similar one in Egypt (these Constitutions, if
not interfered with, would soon rid Turkey and Egypt of their
parasite Pashas).
"I daresay this programme could be improved, but it has the
advantage of being _definite_, and a definite policy, however
imperfect, is better than an unstable or hand-to-mouth policy.
"I would not press these points at once; I would keep them in
view, and let events work themselves out.
"I believe, in time, this programme could be worked out without a
shot being fired.
"I believe it would be quite possible to come to terms with
Russia on these questions; I do not think she has sailed under
false colours when her acts and words are generally considered.
She is the avowed enemy of Turkey, she has not disguised it. Have
_we_ been the friend of Turkey? How many years have elapsed
between the Crimean war and the Russo-Turkish war? What did we do
to press Turkey to carry out reforms (as promised by the Treaty
of 1856) in those years? _Absolutely nothing._
"What has to be done to prevent the inevitable crash of the
Turkish Empire which is impending, imperilling the peace of the
world, is _the re-establishment of the Constitution of Midhat,
and its maintenance, in spite of the Sultan_. By this means, when
the Sultan and the ring of Pashas fall, there would still exist
the chambers of representatives of the provinces, who would carry
on the Government for a time, and at any rate prevent the foreign
occupation of Constantinople, or any disorders there, incident on
the exit of the Sultan and his Pashas."
Having partially explained how General Gordon declined one post for
which he appeared to be well suited, I have to describe how it was
that he accepted another for which neither by training nor by
character was he in the least degree fitted. The exact train of
trifling circumstances that led up to the proposal that Gordon should
accompany the newly-appointed Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, to India
cannot be traced, because it is impossible to assign to each its
correct importance. But it may be said generally, that the prevalent
idea was that Lord Ripon was going out to the East on a great mission
of reform, and some one suggested that the character of that mission
would be raised in the eyes of the public if so well known a
philanthropist as Gordon, whose views on all subjects were free from
official bias, could be associated with it. I do not know whether the
idea originated with Sir Bruce Seton, Lord Ripon's secretary, while at
the War Office, but in any case that gentleman first broached the
proposition to Sir Henry Gordon, the eldest brother of General Gordon.
Sir Henry not merely did not repel the suggestion, but he consented to
put it before his brother and to support it. For his responsibility in
this affair Sir Henry afterwards took the fullest and frankest blame
on himself for his "bad advice." When the matter was put before
General Gordon he did not reject it, as might have been expected, but
whether from his desire to return to active employment, or biassed by
his brother's views in favour of the project, or merely from coming to
a decision without reflection, he made up his mind at once to accept
the offer, and the official announcement of the appointment was made
on 1st May, with the additional statement that his departure would
take place without delay, as he was to sail with Lord Ripon on the
14th of that month.
It was after his acceptance of this post, and not some months before,
as has been erroneously stated, that General Gordon had an interview
with the Prince of Wales under circumstances that may be described.
The Prince gave a large dinner-party to Lord Ripon before his
departure for India, and Gordon was invited. He declined the
invitation, and also declined to give any reason for doing so. The
Prince of Wales, with his unfailing tact and the genuine kindness with
which he always makes allowance for such little breaches of what ought
to be done, at least in the cases of exceptional persons like Gordon,
sent him a message: "If you won't dine with me, will you come and see
me next Sunday afternoon?" Gordon went, and had a very interesting
conversation with the Prince, and in the middle of it the Princess
came into the room, and then the Princesses, her daughters, who said
they would "like to shake hands with Colonel Gordon."
Before even the departure Gordon realised he had made a mistake, and
if there had been any way out of the dilemma he would not have been
slow to take it. As there was not, he fell back on the hope that he
might be able to discharge his uncongenial duties for a brief period,
and then seek some convenient opportunity of retiring. But as to his
own real views of his mistake, and of his unfitness for the post,
there never was any doubt, and they found expression when, in the
midst of a family gathering, he exclaimed: "Up to this I have been an
independent comet, now I shall be a chained satellite."
The same opinion found expression in a letter he wrote to Sir Halliday
Macartney an hour before he went to Charing Cross:--
"MY DEAR MACARTNEY,--You will be surprised to hear that I have
accepted the Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, and that I am
just off to Charing Cross. I am afraid that I have decided in
haste, to repent at leisure. Good-bye.--Yours,
C. G. GORDON."
His own views on this affair were set forth in the following words:--
"Men at times, owing to the mysteries of Providence, form judgments
which they afterwards repent of. This is my case. Nothing could have
exceeded the kindness and consideration with which Lord Ripon has
treated me. I have never met anyone with whom I could have felt
greater sympathy in the arduous task he has undertaken."
And again, writing at greater length to his brother, he explains what
took place in the following letter:--
"In a moment of weakness I took the appointment of Private
Secretary to Lord Ripon, the new Governor-General of India. No
sooner had I landed at Bombay than I saw that in my irresponsible
position I could not hope to do anything really to the purpose in
the face of the vested interests out there. Seeing this, and
seeing, moreover, that my views were so diametrically opposed to
those of the official classes, I resigned. Lord Ripon's position
was certainly a great consideration with me. It was assumed by
some that my views of the state of affairs were the Viceroy's,
and thus I felt that I should do him harm by staying with him. We
parted perfect friends. The brusqueness of my leaving was
unavoidable, inasmuch as my stay would have put me into the
possession of secrets of State that--considering my decision
eventually to leave--I ought not to know. Certainly I might have
stayed a month or two, had a pain in the hand, and gone quietly;
but the whole duties were so distasteful that I felt, being
pretty callous as to what the world says, that it was better to
go at once."
If a full explanation is sought of the reasons why Gordon repented of
his decision, and determined to leave an uncongenial position without
delay, it may be found in a consideration of the two following
circumstances. His views as to what he held to be the excessive
payment of English and other European servants in Asiatic countries
were not new, and had been often expressed. They were crystallised in
the phrase, "Why pay a man more at Simla than at Hongkong?" and had
formed the basis of his projected financial reform in Egypt in 1878,
and they often found expression in his correspondence. For instance,
in a letter to the present writer, he proposed that the loss accruing
from the abolition of the opium trade might be made good by reducing
officers' pay from Indian to Colonial allowances. With Gordon's
contempt for money, and the special circumstances that led to his not
wanting any considerable sum for his own moderate requirements and few
responsibilities, it is not surprising that he held these views; but
no practical statesman could have attempted to carry them out. During
the voyage to India the perception that it would be impossible for
Lord Ripon to institute any special reorganisation on these lines led
him to decide that it would be best to give up a post he did not like,
and he wrote to his sister to this effect while at sea, with the
statement that it was arranged that he should leave in the following
September or October.
He reached Bombay on the 28th of May, and his resignation was received
and accepted on the night of the 2nd June. What had happened in that
brief interval of a few days to make him precipitate matters? There is
absolutely no doubt, quite apart from the personal explanation given
by General Gordon, both verbally and in writing, to myself, that the
determining cause was the incident relating to Yakoob Khan.
That Afghan chief had been proclaimed and accepted as Ameer after the
death of his father, the Ameer Shere Ali. In that capacity he had
signed the Treaty of Gandamak, and received Sir Louis Cavagnari as
British agent at his capital. When the outbreak occurred at Cabul, on
1st September, and Cavagnari and the whole of the mission were
murdered, it was generally believed that the most guilty person was
Yakoob Khan. On the advance of General Roberts, Yakoob Khan took the
first opportunity of making his escape from his compatriots and
joining the English camp. This voluntary act seemed to justify a doubt
as to his guilt, but a Court of Inquiry was appointed to ascertain the
facts. The bias of the leading members of that Court was
unquestionably hostile to Yakoob, or rather it would be more accurate
to say that they were bent on finding the highest possible personage
guilty. They were appointed to inquire, not to sentence. Yet they
found Yakoob guilty, and they sent a vast mass of evidence to the
Foreign Department then at Calcutta. The experts of the Foreign
Department examined that evidence. They pronounced it "rubbish," and
Lord Lytton was obliged to send Mr (afterwards Sir) Lepel Griffin, an
able member of the Indian Civil Service, specially versed in frontier
politics, to act as Political Officer with the force in Afghanistan,
so that no blunders of this kind might be re-enacted.
But nothing was done either to rehabilitate Yakoob's character or to
negotiate with him for the restoration of a central authority in
Afghanistan. Any other suitable candidate for the Ameership failing to
present himself, the present ruler, Abdurrahman, being then, and
indeed until the eve of the catastrophe at Maiwand, on 27th July 1880,
an adventurous pretender without any strong following, Lord Lytton had
been negotiating on the lines of a division of Afghanistan into three
or more provinces. That policy, of which the inner history has still
to be written, had a great deal more to be said in its favour than
would now be admitted, and only the unexpected genius and success of
Abdurrahman has made the contrary policy that was pursued appear the
acme of sound sense and high statesmanship. When Lord Ripon reached
Bombay at the end of May, the fate of Afghanistan was still in the
crucible. Even Abdurrahman, who had received kind treatment in the
persons of his imprisoned family at Candahar from the English, was not
regarded as a factor of any great importance; while Ayoob, the least
known of all the chiefs, was deemed harmless only a few weeks before
he crossed the Helmund and defeated our troops in the only battle lost
during the war. But if none of the candidates inspired our authorities
with any confidence, they were resolute in excluding Yakoob Khan.
Having been relieved from the heavier charge of murdering Cavagnari,
he was silently cast on the not less fatal one of being a madman.
Such was the position of the question when Lord Ripon and his
secretary landed at Bombay. It was known that they would alter the
Afghan policy of the Conservative Government, and that, as far as
possible, they would revert to the Lawrentian policy of ignoring the
region beyond the passes. But it was not known that they had any
designs about Yakoob Khan, and this was the bomb they fired on arrival
into the camp of Indian officialdom.
The first despatch written by the new secretary was to the Foreign
Department, to the effect that Lord Ripon intended to commence
negotiations with the captive Yakoob, and Mr (now Sir) Mortimer
Durand, then assistant secretary in that branch of the service, was at
once sent from Simla to remonstrate against a proceeding which "would
stagger every one in India." Lord Ripon was influenced by these
representations, and agreed to at least suspend his overtures to
Yakoob Khan, but his secretary was not convinced by either the
arguments or the facts of the Indian Foreign Department. He still
considered that Afghan prince the victim of political injustice, and
also that he was the best candidate for the throne of Cabul. But he
also saw very clearly from this passage of arms with the official
classes that he would never be able to work in harmony with men who
were above and before all bureaucrats, and with commendable promptness
he seized the opportunity to resign a post which he thoroughly
detested. What he thought on the subject of Yakoob Khan is fully set
forth in the following memorandum drawn up as a note to my biography
of that interesting and ill-starred prince in "Central Asian
Portraits." Whether Gordon was right or wrong in his views about
Yakoob Khan is a matter of no very great importance. The incident is
only noteworthy as marking the conclusion of his brief secretarial
experience, and as showing the hopefulness of a man who thought that
he could make the all-powerful administrative system of India decide a
political question on principles of abstract justice. The practical
comment on such sanguine theories was furnished by Mr Durand being
appointed acting private secretary on Gordon's resignation.
General Gordon's memorandum read as follows:--
"Yacoob was accused of concealing letters from the Russian
Government, and of entering into an alliance with the Rajah of
Cashmere to form a Triple Alliance. Where are these letters or
proof of this intention? They do not exist.
"Yacoob came out to Roberts of his own free will. He was
imprisoned. It was nothing remarkable that he was visited by an
Afghan leader, although it was deemed evidence of a treacherous
intention. Roberts and Cavagnari made the Treaty of Gandamak. It
is absurd to say Yacoob wanted an European Resident. It is
against all reason to say he did. He was coerced into taking
one. He was imprisoned, and a Court of Enquiry was held on him,
composed of the President Macgregor, who was chief of the staff
to the man who made the Treaty, by which Cavagnari went to Cabul,
and who had imprisoned Yacoob. This Court of Enquiry asked for
evidence concerning a man in prison, which is in eyes of Asiatics
equivalent to being already condemned. This Court accumulated
evidence, utterly worthless in any court of justice, as will be
seen if ever published. This Court of _Enquiry_ found him guilty
and sentenced him to exile. Was that their function? If the
secret papers are published, it would be seen that the despatches
from the Cabulese chiefs were couched in fair terms. They did not
want to fight the English. They wanted their Ameer. Yacoob's
defence is splendid. He says in it: 'If I had been guilty, would
I not have escaped to Herat, whereas I put myself in your hands?'
The following questions arise from this Court of Enquiry. Who
fired first shot from the Residency? Was the conduct of Cavagnari
and his people discreet in a fanatical city? Were not those who
forced Cavagnari on Yacoob against his protest equally
responsible with him? Yacoob was weak and timid in a critical
moment, and he failed, but he did not incite this revolt. It was
altogether against his interests to do so. What was the
consequence of his unjust exile? Why, all the trouble which
happened since that date. Afghanistan was quiet till we took her
ruler away. It was an united Afghanistan. This mistake has cost
£10,000,000, all from efforts to go on with an injustice. The
Romans before their wars invoked all misery on themselves before
the Goddess Nemesis if their war was unjust. We did not invoke
her, but she followed us. Between the time that the Tory
Government went out, and the new Viceroy Ripon had landed at
Bombay, Lytton forced the hand of the Liberal Government by
entering into negotiations with Abdurrahman, and appointing the
Vali at Candahar, so endeavouring to prevent justice to Yacoob.
Stokes, Arbuthnot, and another member of Supreme Council all
protested against the deposition of Yacoob, also Sir Neville
Chamberlaine."
Lest it should be thought that Gordon was alone in these opinions, I
append this statement, drawn up at the time by Sir Neville
Chamberlaine:--
"An unprejudiced review of the circumstances surrounding the
_émeute_ of September 1879 clearly indicates that the spontaneous
and unpremeditated action of a discontented, undisciplined, and
unpaid soldiery had not been planned, directed, or countenanced
by the Ameer, his ministers, or his advisers. There is no
evidence to prove or even to suspect that the mutiny of his
soldiers was in any way not deplored by the Ameer, but was
regarded by him with regret, dismay, and even terror. Fully
conscious of the very grave misapprehensions and possible
accusation of timidity and weakness on our part, I entertain,
myself, very strong convictions that we should have first
permitted and encouraged the Ameer to punish the mutinous
soldiers and rioters implicated in the outrage before we
ourselves interfered. The omission to adopt this course
inevitably led to the action forced on the Ameer, which
culminated in the forced resignation of his power and the total
annihilation of the national government. The Ameer in thus
resigning reserved to himself the right of seeking, when occasion
offered, restoration to his heritage and its reversion to his
heir. Nothing has occurred to justify the ignoring of these
undeniable rights."
Gordon's resignation was handed in to Lord Ripon on the night of the
2nd of June, the news appeared in the London papers of the 4th, and it
had one immediate consequence which no one could have foreseen. But
before referring to that matter I must make clear the heavy pecuniary
sacrifice his resignation of this post entailed upon Gordon. He repaid
every farthing of his expenses as to passage money, etc., to Lord
Ripon, which left him very much out of pocket. He wrote himself on the
subject: "All this Private Secretaryship and its consequent expenses
are all due to my not acting on my _own_ instinct. However, for the
future I will be wiser.... It was a living crucifixion.... I nearly
burst with the trammels.... A £100,000 a year would not have kept me
there. I resigned on 2 June, and never unpacked my official dress."
The immediate consequence referred to was as follows: In the drawer of
Mr J. D. Campbell, at the office at Storey's Gate of the Chinese
Imperial Customs, had been lying for some little time the
following telegram for Colonel Gordon from Sir Robert Hart, the
Inspector-General of the Department in China:--
"I am directed to invite you here (Peking). Please come and see
for yourself. The opportunity of doing really useful work on a
large scale ought not to be lost. Work, position, conditions, can
all be arranged with yourself here to your satisfaction. Do take
six months' leave and come."
As Mr Campbell was aware of Gordon's absence in India, he had thought
it useless to forward the message, and it was not until the
resignation was announced that he did so. In dealing with this
intricate matter, which was complicated by extraneous considerations,
it is necessary to clear up point by point. When Gordon received the
message he at once concluded that the invitation came from his old
colleague Li Hung Chang, and accepted it on that assumption, which in
the end proved erroneous. It is desirable to state that since Gordon's
departure from China in 1865 at least one communication had passed
between these former associates in a great enterprise. The following
characteristic letter, dated Tientsin, 22nd March 1879, reached Gordon
while he was at Khartoum:--
"DEAR SIR,--I am instructed by His Excellency the Grand
Secretary, Li, to answer your esteemed favour, dated the 27th
October 1878, from Khartoum, which was duly received. I am right
glad to hear from you. It is now over fourteen years since we
parted from each other. Although I have not written to you, but I
often speak of you, and remember you with very great interest.
The benefit you have conferred on China does not disappear with
your person, but is felt throughout the regions in which you
played so important and active a part. All those people bless you
for the blessings of peace and prosperity which they now enjoy.
"Your achievements in Egypt are well known throughout the
civilized world. I see often in the papers of your noble works on
the Upper Nile. You are a man of ample resources, with which you
suit yourself to any kind of emergency. My hope is that you may
long be spared to improve the conditions of the people amongst
whom your lot is cast. I am striving hard to advance my people to
a higher state of development, and to unite both this and all
other nations within the 'Four Seas' under one common
brotherhood. To the several questions put in your note the
following are the answers:--Kwoh Sung-Ling has retired from
official life, and is now living at home. Yang Ta Jên died a
great many years ago. Na Wang's adopted son is doing well, and is
the colonel of a regiment, with 500 men under him. The Pa to'
Chiaow Bridge, which you destroyed, was rebuilt very soon after
you left China, and it is now in very good condition.
"Kwoh Ta jên, the Chinese Minister, wrote to me that he had the
pleasure of seeing you in London. I wished I had been there also
to see you; but the responsibilities of life are so distributed
to different individuals in different parts of the world, that it
is a wise economy of Providence that we are not all in the same
spot.
"I wish you all manner of happiness and prosperity. With my
highest regards,--I remain, yours very truly
"(For LI HUNG CHANG), TSÊNG LAISUN."
Under the belief that Hart's telegram emanated from Li Hung Chang, and
inspired by loyalty to a friend in a difficulty, as well as by
affection for the Chinese people, whom in his own words he "liked best
next after his own," Gordon replied to this telegram in the following
message: "Inform Hart Gordon will leave for Shanghai first
opportunity. As for conditions, Gordon indifferent."
At that moment China seemed on the verge of war with Russia, in
consequence of the disinclination of the latter power to restore the
province of Kuldja, which she had occupied at the time of the
Mahommedan uprising in Central Asia. The Chinese official, Chung How,
who had signed an unpopular treaty at Livadia, had been sentenced to
death--the treaty itself had been repudiated--and hostilities were
even said to have commenced. The announcement that the Chinese
Government had invited Gordon to Peking, and that he had promptly
replied that he would come, was also interpreted as signifying the
resolve to carry matters with a high hand, and to show the world that
China was determined to obtain what she was entitled to. Those persons
who have a contemptuous disregard for dates went so far even as to
assert that Gordon had resigned because of the Chinese invitation.
Never was there a clearer case of _post hoc, propter hoc_; but even
the officials at the War Office were suspicious in the matter, and
their attitude towards Gordon went near to precipitate the very
catastrophe they wanted to avoid.
On the same day (8th June) as he telegraphed his reply to the Chinese
invitation, he telegraphed to Colonel Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General
for the Royal Engineers at the Horse Guards: "Obtain me leave until
end of the year; am invited to China; will not involve Government."
Considering the position between China and Russia, and the concern of
the Russian press and Government at the report about Gordon, it is not
surprising that this request was not granted a ready approval. The
official reply came back: "Must state more specifically purpose and
position for and in which you go to China." To this Gordon sent the
following characteristic answer: "Am ignorant; will write from China
before the expiration of my leave." An answer like this savoured of
insubordination, and shows how deeply Gordon was hurt by the want of
confidence reposed in him. In saying this I disclaim all intention of
criticising the authorities, for whose view there was some reasonable
justification; but the line they took, while right enough for an
ordinary Colonel of Engineers, was not quite a considerate one in the
case of an officer of such an exceptional position and well-known
idiosyncrasies as "Chinese" Gordon. On that ground alone may it be
suggested that the blunt decision thus given in the final official
telegram--"Reasons insufficient; your going to China is not approved,"
was somewhat harsh.
It was also impotent, for it rather made Gordon persist in carrying
out his resolve than deterred him from doing so. His reply was thus
worded: "Arrange retirement, commutation, or resignation of service;
ask Campbell reasons. My counsel, if asked, would be for peace, not
war. I return by America." Gordon's mind was fully made up to go, even
if he had to sacrifice his commission. Without waiting for any further
communication he left Bombay. As he had insisted on repaying Lord
Ripon his passage-money from England to India which, owing to his
resignation, the Viceroy would otherwise have had to pay out of his
own pocket, Gordon was quite without funds, and he had to borrow the
sum required to defray his passage to China. But having made up his
mind, such trifling difficulties were not likely to deter him. He
sailed from Bombay, not merely under the displeasure of his superiors
and uncertain as to his own status, but also in that penniless
condition, which was not wholly out of place in his character of
knight-errant. But with that solid good sense, which so often
retrieved his reputation in the eyes of the world, he left behind him
the following public proclamation as to his mission and intentions. It
was at once a public explanation of his proceedings, and a declaration
of a pacific policy calculated to appease both official and Russian
irritation:
"My fixed desire is to persuade the Chinese not to go to war with
Russia, both in their own interests and for the sake of those of
the world, especially those of England. In the event of war
breaking out I cannot answer how I should act for the present,
but I should ardently desire a speedy peace. It is my fixed
desire, as I have said, to persuade the Chinese not to go to war
with Russia. To me it appears that the question in dispute cannot
be of such vital importance that an arrangement could not be come
to by concessions upon both sides. Whether I succeed in being
heard or not is not in my hands. I protest, however, at being
regarded as one who wishes for war in any country, still less in
China. Inclined as I am, with only a small degree of admiration
for military exploits, I esteem it a far greater honour to
promote peace than to gain any paltry honours in a wretched war."
With that message to his official superiors, as well as to the world,
Gordon left Bombay on 13th June. His message of the day before saying,
"Consult Campbell," had induced the authorities at the Horse Guards to
make inquiries of that gentleman, who had no difficulty in satisfying
them that the course of events was exactly as has here been set forth,
and coupling that with Gordon's own declaration that he was for peace
not war, permission was granted to Gordon to do that which at all cost
he had determined to do. When he reached Ceylon he found this
telegram: "Leave granted on your engaging to take no military service
in China," and he somewhat too comprehensively, and it may even be
feared rashly if events had turned out otherwise, replied: "I will
take no military service in China: I would never embarrass the British
Government."
Having thus got clear of the difficulties which beset him on the
threshold of his mission, Gordon had to prepare himself for those that
were inherent to the task he had taken up. He knew of old how averse
the Chinese are to take advice from any one, how they waste time in
fathoming motives, and how when they say a thing shall be done it is
never performed. Yet the memory of his former disinterested and
splendid service afforded a guarantee that if they would take advice
and listen to unflattering criticism from any one, that man was
Gordon. Still, from the most favourable point of view, the mission was
fraught with difficulty, and circumstances over which he had no
control, and of which he was even ignorant, added immensely to it.
There is no doubt that Peking was at that moment the centre of
intrigues, not only between the different Chinese leaders, but also
among the representatives of the Foreign Powers. The secret history of
these transactions has still to be revealed, and as our Foreign Office
never gives up the private instructions it transmits to its
representatives, the full truth may never be recorded. But so far as
the British Government was concerned, its action was limited to giving
the Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, instructions to muzzle Gordon and
prevent his doing anything that wasn't strictly in accordance with
official etiquette and quite safe, or, in a word, to make him do
nothing. The late Sir Thomas Wade was a most excellent Chinese scholar
and estimable person in every way, but when he tried to do what the
British Government and the whole arrayed body of the Horse Guards,
from the Commander-in-Chief down to the Deputy-Adjutant General, had
failed to do, viz. to keep Gordon in leading strings, he egregiously
failed. Sir Thomas Wade went so far as to order Gordon to stay in the
British Legation, and to visit no one without his express permission.
Gordon's reply was to ignore the British Legation and to never enter
its portals during the whole of his stay in China.
That was one difficulty in the situation apart from the Russian
question, but it was not the greatest, and as it was the first
occasion on which European politics re-acted in a marked way on the
situation in China, such details as are ascertainable are well worth
recording at some length.
There is no doubt that the Russian Government was very much disturbed
at what seemed an inevitable hostile collision with China. The
uncertain result of such a contest along an enormous land-frontier,
with which, at that time, Russia had very imperfect means of
communication, was the least cause of its disquietude. A war with
China signified to Russia something much more serious than this, viz.,
a breach of the policy of friendship to its vast neighbour, which it
had consistently pursued for two centuries, and which it will pursue
until it is ready to absorb, and then in the same friendly guise, its
share of China. Under these circumstances the Russian Government
looked round for every means of averting the catastrophe. It is
necessary to guard oneself from seeming to imply that Russia was in
any sense afraid, or doubtful as to the result of a war with China;
her sole motives were those of astute and far-seeing policy. Whether
the Russian Ambassador at Berlin mooted the matter to Prince
Bismarck, or whether that statesman, without inspiration, saw his
chance of doing Russia a good turn at no cost to himself is not
certain, but instructions were sent to Herr von Brandt, the German
Minister at Peking, a man of great energy, and in favour of bold
measures, to support the Peace Party in every way. He was exactly a
man after Prince Bismarck's own heart, prepared to go to any lengths
to attain his object, and fully persuaded that the end justifies the
means. His plan was startlingly simple and bold. Li Hung Chang, the
only prominent advocate of peace, was to rebel, march on Peking with
his Black Flag army, and establish a Government of his own. There is
no doubt whatever that this scheme was formed and impressed on Li Hung
Chang as the acme of wisdom. More than that, it was supported by two
other Foreign Ministers at Peking, with greater or less warmth, and
one of them was Sir Thomas Wade. These plots were dispelled by the
sound sense and candid but firm representations of Gordon. But for
him, as will be seen, there would have been a rebellion in the
country, and Li Hung Chang would now be either Emperor of China or a
mere instance of a subject who had lost his head in trying to be
supreme.
Having thus explained the situation that awaited Gordon, it is
necessary to briefly trace his movements after leaving Ceylon. He
reached Hongkong on 2nd July, and not only stayed there for a day or
two as the guest of the Governor, Sir T. Pope Hennessey, but found
sufficient time to pay a flying visit to the Chinese city of Canton.
Thence he proceeded to Shanghai and Chefoo. At the latter place he
found news, which opened his eyes to part of the situation, in a
letter from Sir Robert Hart, begging him to come direct to him at
Peking, and not to stop _en route_ to visit Li Hung Chang at Tientsin.
As has been explained, Gordon went to China in the full belief that,
whatever names were used, it was his old colleague Li Hung Chang who
sent for him, and the very first definite information he received on
approaching the Chinese capital was that not Li, but persons whom by
inference were inimical to Li, had sent for him. The first question
that arises then was who was the real author of the invitation to
Gordon that bore the name of Hart. It cannot be answered, for Gordon
assured me that he himself did not know; but there is no doubt that it
formed part of the plot and counter-plot originated by the German
Minister, and responded to by those who were resolved, in the event of
Li's rebellion, to uphold the Dragon Throne. Sir Robert Hart was a man
of long-proved ability and address, who has rendered the Chinese
almost as signal service as did Gordon himself, and on this occasion
he was actuated by the highest possible motives, but it must be
recorded that his letter led to a temporary estrangement between
himself and Gordon, who I am happy to be able to state positively did
realise long afterwards that he and Hart were fighting in the same
camp, and had the same objects in view--only this was not apparent at
the time. Gordon went to China only because he thought Li Hung Chang
sent for him, but when he found that powerful persons were inciting
him to revolt, he became the first and most strenuous in his advice
against so imprudent and unpatriotic a measure. Sir Robert Hart knew
exactly what was being done by the German Minister. He wished to save
Gordon from being drawn into a dangerous and discreditable plot, and
also in the extreme eventuality to deprive any rebellion of the
support of Gordon's military genius.
But without this perfect information, and for the best, as in the end
it proved, Gordon, hot with disappointment that the original summons
was not from Li Hung Chang, went straight to that statesman's yamen at
Tientsin, ignored Hart, and proclaimed that he had come as the friend
of the only man who had given any sign of an inclination to regenerate
China. He resided as long as he was in Northern China with Li Hung
Chang, whom he found being goaded towards high treason by persons who
had no regard for China's interests, and who thought only of the
attainment of their own selfish designs. The German Minister, thinking
that he had obtained an ally who would render the success of his own
plan certain, proposed that Gordon should put himself at the head of
Li's army, march on Peking, and depose the Emperor. Gordon's droll
comment on this is: "I told him I was equal to a good deal of
filibustering, but that this was beyond me, and that I did not think
there was the slightest chance of such a project succeeding, as Li had
not a sufficient following to give it any chance of success." He
recorded his views of the situation in the following note: "The only
thing that keeps me in China is Li Hung Chang's safety--if he were
safe I would not care--but some people are egging him on to rebel,
some to this, and some to that, and all appears in a helpless drift.
There are parties at Peking who would drive the Chinese into war for
their own ends." Having measured the position and found it bristling
with unexpected difficulties and dangers, Gordon at once regretted the
promise he had given his own Government in the message from Ceylon. He
thought it was above all things necessary for him to have a free hand,
and he consequently sent the following telegram to the Horse Guards:
"I have seen Li Hung Chang, and he wishes me to stay with him. I
cannot desert China in her present crisis, and would be free to act
as I think fit. I therefore beg to resign my commission in Her
Majesty's Service." Having thus relieved, as he thought, his
Government of all responsibility for his acts--although they responded
to this message by accusing him of insubordination, and by instructing
Sir Thomas Wade to place him under moral arrest--Gordon threw himself
into the China difficulty with his usual ardour. Nothing more remained
to be done at Tientsin, where he had effectually checked the
pernicious counsel pressed on Li Hung Chang most strongly by the
German Minister, and in a minor degree by the representatives of
France and England. In order to influence the Central Government it
was necessary for him to proceed to Peking, and the following
unpublished letter graphically describes his views at the particular
moment:--
"I am on my way to Peking. There are three parties--Li Hung Chang
(1), the Court (2), the Literary Class (3). The two first are for
peace, but dare not say it for fear of the third party. I have
told Li that he, in alliance with the Court, must coerce the
third party, and have written this to Li and to the Court Party.
By so doing I put my head in jeopardy in going to Peking. I do
not wish Li to act alone. It is not good he should do anything
except support the Court Party morally. God will overrule for the
best. If neither the Court Party nor Li can act, if these two
remain and let things drift, then there will be a disastrous war,
of which I shall not see the end. You know I do not mourn this.
Having given up my commission, I have nothing to look for, and
indeed I long for the quiet of the future.... If the third party
hear of my recommendation before the Court Party acts, then I may
be doomed to a quick exit at Peking. Li Hung Chang is a noble
fellow, and worth giving one's life for; but he must not rebel
and lose his good name. It is a sort of general election which is
going on, but where heads are in gage."
Writing to me some months later, General Gordon entered into various
matters relating to this period, and as the letter indirectly throws
light on what may be called the Li Hung Chang episode, I quote it
here, although somewhat out of its proper place:--
"Thanks for your kind note. I send you the two papers which were
made public in China, and through the Shen-pao some of it was
sent over. Another paper of fifty-two articles I gave Li Hung
Chang, but I purposely kept no copy of it, for it went into--
"1. The contraband of salt and opium at Hongkong.
"2. The advantages of telegraphs and canals, not railways, which
have ruined Egypt and Turkey by adding to the financial
difficulties.
"3. The effeteness of the Chinese representatives abroad, etc.,
etc., etc.
"I wrote as a Chinaman for the Chinese. I recommended Chinese
merchants to do away with middle-men, and to have Government aid
and encouragement to create houses or firms in London, etc.; to
make their own cotton goods, etc. In fact, I wrote as a Chinaman.
I see now and then symptoms that they are awake to the situation,
for my object has been always to put myself into the skin of
those I may be with, and I like these people as much--well, say
nearly as much--as I like my countrymen.
"There are a lot of people in China who would egg on revolts of A
and B. All this is wrong. China must _fara da se_. I painted this
picture to the Chinese of 1900: 'Who are those people hanging
about with jinrickshas?' 'The sons of the European merchants.'
'What are those ruins?' 'The Hongs of the European merchants,'
etc., etc.
"People have asked me what I thought of the advance of China
during the sixteen years I was absent. They looked superficially
at the power military of China. I said they are unchanged. You
come, I must go; but I go on to say that the stride China has
made in commerce is immense, and commerce and wealth are the
power of nations, not the troops. Like the Chinese, I have a
great contempt for military prowess. It is ephemeral. I admire
administrators, not generals. A military Red-Button mandarin has
to bow low to a Blue-Button civil mandarin, and rightly so to my
mind.
"I wrote the other day to Li Hung Chang to protest against the
railway from Ichang to Peking along the Grand Canal. In making it
they would enter into no end of expenses, the coin would leave
the country and they would not understand it, and would be
fleeced by the financial cormorants of Great Britain. They can
understand canals. Let them repair the Grand Canal."
Having arrived at Peking, Gordon was received in several councils by
Prince Chun, the father of the young Emperor and the recognised leader
of the War Party. The leading members of the Grand Council were also
present, and Gordon explained his views to them at length. In the
first place, he said, if there were war he would only stay to help
them on condition that they destroyed the suburbs of Peking, allowed
him to place the city in a proper state of defence, and removed the
Emperor and Court to a place of safety. When they expressed their
opinion that the Taku forts were impregnable, Gordon laughed, and said
they could be taken from the rear. The whole gist of his remarks was
that "they could not go to war," and when they still argued in the
opposite sense, and the interpreter refused to translate the harsh
epithets he applied to such august personages, he took the dictionary,
looked out the Chinese equivalent for "idiocy," and with his finger on
the word, placed it under the eyes of each member of the Council. The
end of this scene may be described in Gordon's own words: "I said make
peace, and wrote out the terms. They were, in all, five articles; the
only one they boggled at was the fifth, about the indemnity. They said
this was too hard and unjust. I said that might be, but what was the
use of talking about it? If a man demanded your money or your life,
you have only three courses open. You must either fight, call for
help, or give up your money. Now, as you cannot fight, it is useless
to call for help, since neither England nor France would stir a finger
to assist you. I believe these are the articles now under discussion
at St Petersburg, and the only one on which there is any question is
the fifth." This latter statement I may add, without going into the
question of the Marquis Tsêng's negotiations in the Russian capital,
was perfectly correct.
Gordon drew up several notes or memorandums for the information of the
Chinese Government. The first of these was mainly military, and the
following extracts will suffice:--
"China's power lies in her numbers, in the quick moving of her
troops, in the little baggage they require, and in their few
wants. It is known that men armed with sword and spear can
overcome the best regular troops equipped with breech-loading
rifles, if the country is at all difficult and if the men with
spears and swords outnumber their foe ten to one. If this is the
case where men are armed with spears and swords, it will be much
truer when those men are themselves armed with breech loaders.
China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength is in
quiet movements, in cutting off trains of baggage, and in night
attacks _not pushed home_--in a continuous worrying of her
enemies. Rockets should be used instead of cannon. No artillery
should be moved with the troops; it delays and impedes them.
Infantry fire is the most fatal fire; guns make a noise far out
of proportion to their value in war. If guns are taken into the
field, troops cannot march faster than these guns. The degree of
speed at which the guns can be carried dictates the speed at
which the troops can march. As long as Peking is the centre of
the Government of China, China can never go to war with any
first-class power; it is too near the sea."
The second memorandum was of greater importance and more general
application. In it he compressed the main heads of his advice into the
smallest possible space, and so far as it was at all feasible to treat
a vast and complicated subject within the limits of a simple and
practical scheme, he therein shows with the greatest clearness how the
regeneration of China might be brought about.
"In spite of the opinion of some foreigners, it will be generally
acknowledged that the Chinese are contented and happy, that the
country is rich and prosperous, and that the people are _au fond_
united in their sentiments, and ardently desire to remain a
nation. At constant intervals, however, the whole of this human
hive is stirred by some dispute between the Pekin Government and
some foreign Power; the Chinese people, proud of their ancient
prestige, applaud the high tone taken up by the Pekin Government,
crediting the Government with the power to support their strong
words. This goes on for a time, when the Government gives in, and
corresponding vexation is felt by the people. The recurrence of
these disputes, the inevitable surrender ultimately of the Pekin
Government, has the tendency of shaking the Chinese people's
confidence in the Central Government. The Central Government
appreciates the fact that, little by little, this prestige is
being destroyed by their own actions among the Chinese people,
each crisis then becomes more accentuated or difficult to
surmount, as the Central Government know each concession is
another nail in their coffin. The Central Government fear that
the taking up of a spirited position by any pre-eminent Chinese
would carry the Chinese people with him, and therefore the
Central Government endeavour to keep up appearances, and to skirt
the precipice of war as near as they possibly can, while never
intending to enter into war.
"The Central Government residing in the extremity of the Middle
Kingdom, away from the great influences which are now working in
China, can never alter one iota from what they were years ago:
they are being steadily left behind by the people they govern.
They know this, and endeavour to stem these influences in all
ways in their power, hoping to keep the people backward and in
ignorance, and to retard their progress to the same pace they
themselves go, if it can be called a pace at all.
"It is therefore a maxim that 'no progress can be made by the
Pekin Government.' To them any progress, whether slow or quick,
is synonymous to slow or quick extinction, for they will never
move.
"The term 'Pekin Government' is used advisedly, for if the
Central Government were moved from Pekin into some province where
the pulsations and aspirations of the Chinese people could have
their legitimate effect, then the Central Government and the
Chinese people, having a unison of thought, would work together.
"From what has been said above, it is maintained that, so long as
the Central Government of China isolates itself from the Chinese
people by residing aloof at Pekin, so long will the Chinese
people have to remain passive under the humiliations which come
upon them through the non-progressive and destructive disposition
of their Government. These humiliations will be the chronic state
of the Chinese people until the Central Government moves from
Pekin and reunites itself to its subjects. No army, no purchases
of ironclad vessels will enable China to withstand a first-class
Power so long as China keeps her queen bee at the entrance of her
hive. There is, however, the probability that a proud people like
the Chinese may sicken at this continual eating of humble pie,
that the Pekin Government at some time, by skirting too closely
the precipice of war may fall into it, and then that sequence may
be anarchy and rebellion throughout the Middle Kingdom which may
last for years and cause endless misery.
"It may be asked--How can the present state of things be altered?
How can China maintain the high position that the wealth,
industry, and innate goodness of the Chinese people entitle her
to have among the nations of the world? Some may say by the
revolt of this Chinaman or of that Chinaman. To me this seems
most undesirable, for, in the first place, such action would not
have the blessing of God, and, in the second, it would result in
the country being plunged into civil war. The fair, upright, and
open course for the Chinese people to take is to work, through
the Press and by petitions, on the Central Government, and to
request them to move from Pekin, and bring themselves thus more
into unison with the Chinese people, and thus save that people
the constant humiliations they have to put up with, owing to the
seat of the Central Government being at Pekin. This
recommendation would need no secret societies, no rebellion, no
treason; if taken up and persevered in it must succeed, and not
one life need be lost.
"The Central Government at Pekin could not answer the Chinese
people except in the affirmative when the Chinese people say to
the Central Government--'By your residing aloof from us in Pekin,
where you are exposed to danger, you separate our interests from
yours, and you bring on us humiliation, which we would never have
to bear if you resided in the interior. Take our application into
consideration, and grant our wishes.'
"I have been kindly treated by the Central Pekin Government and
by the Chinese people; it is for the welfare of both parties that
I have written and signed this paper. I may have expressed myself
too strongly with respect to the non-progressive nature of the
Pekin Government, who may desire the welfare of the Middle
Kingdom as ardently as any other Chinese, but as long as the
Pekin Government allow themselves to be led and directed by those
drones of the hive, the Censors, so long must the Pekin
Government bear the blame earned by those drones in plunging
China into difficulties. In the insect world the bees get rid of
the drones in winter."
There was yet a third memorandum of a confidential nature written to
Li Hung Chang himself, of which Gordon did not keep a copy, but he
referred to it in the letter written to myself which I have already
quoted.
Having thus accomplished his double task, viz.: the prevention of war
between Russia and China, and of a rebellion on the part of Li Hung
Chang under European advice and encouragement, Gordon left China
without any delay. When he reached Shanghai on 16th August he found
another official telegram awaiting him: "Leave cancelled, resignation
not accepted." As he had already taken his passage home he did not
reply, but when he reached Aden he telegraphed as follows: "You might
have trusted me. My passage from China was taken days before the
arrival of your telegram which states 'leave cancelled.' Do you insist
on rescinding the same?" The next day he received a reply granting him
nearly six months' leave, and with that message the question of his
alleged insubordination may be treated as finally settled. There can
be no doubt that among his many remarkable achievements not the least
creditable was this mission to China, when by downright candour, and
unswerving resolution in doing the right thing, he not merely
preserved peace, but baffled the intrigues of unscrupulous
diplomatists and selfish governments.
With that incident closed Gordon's connection with China, the country
associated with his most brilliant feats of arms, but in concluding
this chapter it seems to me that I should do well to record some later
expressions of opinion on that subject. The following interesting
letter, written on the eve of the war between France and China in
1882, was published by the _New York Herald_:--
"The Chinese in their affairs with foreign nations are fully
aware of their peculiar position, and count with reason that a
war with either France or another Power will bring them perforce
allies outside of England. The only Power that could go to war
with them with impunity is Russia, who can attack them by land. I
used the following argument to them when I was there:--The
present dynasty of China is a usurping one--the Mantchou. We may
say that it exists by sufferance at Pekin, and nowhere else in
the Empire. If you look at the map of China Pekin is at the
extremity of the Empire and not a week's marching from the
Russian frontier. A war with Russia would imply the capture of
Pekin and the fall of the Mantchou dynasty, which would never
dare to leave it, for if they did the Chinamen in the south would
smite them. I said, 'If you go to war then move the Queen
Bee--_i.e._ the Emperor--into the centre of China and then fight;
if not, you must make peace.' The two Powers who can coerce China
are Russia and England. Russia could march without much
difficulty on Pekin. This much would not hurt trade, so England
would not interfere. England could march to Taku and Pekin and no
one would object, for she would occupy the Treaty Ports. But if
France tried to do so England would object. Thus it is that China
will only listen to Russia and England, and eventually she must
fear Russia the most of all Powers, for she can never get over
the danger of the land journey, but she might, by a great
increase of her fleet, get over the fear of England. I say China,
but I mean the Mantchou dynasty, for the Mantchous are despised
by the Chinese. Any war with China would be for France expensive
and dangerous, not from the Chinese forces, which would be soon
mastered, but from the certainty of complications with England.
As for the European population in China, write them down as
identical with those in Egypt in all affairs. Their sole idea is,
without any distinction of nationality, an increased power over
China for their own trade and for opening up the country as they
call it, and any war would be popular with them; so they will egg
on any Power to make it. My idea is that no colonial or foreign
community in a foreign land can properly, and for the general
benefit of the world, consider the questions of that foreign
State. The leading idea is how they will benefit themselves. The
Isle of Bourbon or Réunion is the cause of the Madagascar war. It
is egged on by the planters there, and to my idea they (the
planters) want slaves for Madagascar. I have a very mean opinion
of the views of any colonial or foreign community: though I own
that they are powerful for evil. Who would dare to oppose the
European colony in Egypt or China, and remain in those
countries?"
In a letter to myself, written about this time, very much the same
views are expressed:--
"I do not think I could enlighten _you_ about China. Her game is
and will be to wait events, and she will try and work so as to
embroil us with France if she does go to war. For this there
would be plenty of elements in the Treaty Ports. One may say,
humanly speaking, China going to war with France must entail our
following suit. It would be a bad thing in some ways for
civilization, for the Chinese are naturally so bumptious that any
success would make them more so, and if allied to us, and they
had success, it would be a bad look-out afterwards. This in
private. Li Hung Chang as Emperor, if such a thing came to pass,
would be worse than the present Emperor, for he is sharp and
clever, would unite China under a Chinese dynasty, and be much
more troublesome to deal with. Altogether, I cannot think that
the world would gain if China went to war with France. Also I
think it would be eventually bad for China. China being a queer
country, we might expect queer things, and I believe if she did
go to war she would contract with Americans for the destruction
of French fleet, and she would let loose a horde of adventurers
with dynamite. This is essentially her style of action, and Li
Hung Chang would take it up, but do not say I think so."
In a further letter from Jaffa, dated 17th November 1883, he wrote
finally on this branch of the subject:--
"I fear I can write nothing of any import, so I will not attempt
it. To you I can remark that if I were the Government I would
consider the part that should be taken when the inevitable fall
of the Mantchou dynasty takes place, what steps they would take,
and how they would act in the break-up, which, however, will only
end in a fresh cohesion of China, for we, or no other Power,
could never for long hold the country. At Penang, Singapore,
etc., the Chinese will eventually oust us in another generation."
There was one other question about China upon which Gordon felt very
strongly, viz., the opium question, and as he expressed views which I
combated, I feel bound to end this chapter by quoting what he wrote on
this much-discussed topic. On one point he agrees with myself and his
other opponents in admitting that the main object with the Chinese
authorities was increased revenue, not morality. They have since
attained their object not only by an increased import duty, but also
in the far more extensive cultivation of the native drug, to which the
Emperor, by Imperial Edict, has given his formal sanction:--
"PORT LOUIS, _3rd February 1882_.
"About the opium article, I think your article--'History of the
Opium Traffic,' _Times_, 4th January 1884--reads well. But the
question is this. The Chinese _amour propre_ as a nation is hurt
by the enforced entry of the drug. This irritation is connected
with the remembrance of the wars which led to the Treaties about
opium. Had eggs or apples been the cause of the wars, _i.e._ had
the Chinese objected to the import of eggs, and we had insisted
on their being imported, and carried out such importation in
spite of the Chinese wish by force of war, it would be to my own
mind the same thing as opium now is to Chinese. We do not give
the Chinese credit for being so sensitive as they are. As Black
Sea Treaty was to Russia so opium trade is to China.
"I take the root of the question to be as above. I do not mean to
say that all that they urge is fictitious about morality; and I
would go further than you, and say I think they would willingly
give up their revenue from opium, indeed I am sure of it, if they
could get rid of the forced importation by treaty, but their
action in so doing would be simply one of satisfying their _amour
propre_. The opium importation is a constant reminder of their
defeats, and I feel sure China will never be good friends with us
till it is abolished. It is for that reason I would give it up,
for I think the only two alliances worth having are France and
China.
"I have never, when I have written on it, said anything further
than this, _i.e. the Chinese Government will not have it_, let us
say it is a good drug or not. I also say that it is not fair to
force anything on your neighbour, and, therefore, morally, it is
wrong, even if it was eggs.
"Further, I say that through our thrusting these eggs on China,
this opium, we caused the wars with China which shook the
prestige of the Pekin Government, and the outcome of this war of
1842 was the Taeping Rebellion, with its deaths of 13,000,000.
The military prestige of the Mantchous was shaken by these
defeats, the heavy contributions for war led to thousands of
soldiers being disbanded, to a general impoverishment of the
people, and this gave the rebel chief, Hung-tsew-tsiuen, his
chance.
"A wants B to let him import eggs, B refuses, A coerces him;
therefore I say it is wrong, and that it is useless discussing
whether eggs are good or not.
"Can anyone doubt but that, if the Chinese Government had the
power, they would stop importation to-morrow? If so, why keep a
pressure like this on China whom we need as a friend, and with
whom this importation is and ever will be the sole point about
which we could be at variance? I know this is the point with Li
Hung Chang.
"People may laugh at _amour propre_ of China. It is a positive
fact, they are most-pigheaded on those points. China is the only
nation in the world which is forced to take a thing she does not
want. England is the only nation which forces another nation to
do this, in order to benefit India by this act. Put like this it
is outrageous.
"Note this, only certain classes of vessels are subject to the
Foreign Customs Office at Canton. By putting all vessels under
that Office the Chinese Government would make £2,000,000 a year
more revenue. The Chinese Government will not do this however,
because it would put power in hands of foreigners, so they lose
it. Did you ever read the letters of the Ambassador before
Marquis Tsêng? His name, I think, was Coh or Kwoh. He wrote home
to Pekin about Manchester, telling its wonders, but adding,
'These people are wonderful, but the masses are miserable far
beyond Chinese. They think only of money and not of the welfare
of the people.'
"Any foreign nation can raise the bile of Chinese by saying,
'Look at the English, they forced you to take their opium.'
"I should not be a bit surprised did I hear that Li Hung Chang
smoked opium himself. I know a lot of the princes do, so they
say. I have no doubt myself that what I have said is the true and
only reason, or rather root reason. Put our nation in the same
position of having been defeated and forced to accept some
article which theory used to consider bad for the health, like
tea used to be, we would rebel as soon as we could against it,
though our people drink tea. The opium trade is a standing,
ever-present memento of defeat and heavy payments; and the
Chinese cleverly take advantage of the fact that it is a
deleterious drug.
"The opium wars were not about opium--opium was only a _cheval de
bataille_. They were against the introduction of foreigners, a
political question, and so the question of opium import is now.
As for the loss to India by giving it up, it is quite another
affair. On one hand you have gain, an embittered feeling and an
injustice; on the other you have loss, friendly nations and
justice. Cut down pay of all officers in India to Colonial
allowances _above_ rank of captains. Do not give them Indian
allowances, and you will cover nearly the loss, I expect. Why
should officers in India have more than officers in Hongkong?"
In a subsequent letter, dated from the Cape, 20th July 1882, General
Gordon replied to some objections I had raised as follows:--
"As for the opium, to which you say the same objection applies as
to tea, etc., it is not so, for opium has for ages been a tabooed
article among Chinese respectable people. I own reluctance to
foreign intercourse applies to what I said, but the Chinese know
that the intercourse with foreigners cannot be stopped, and it,
as well as the forced introduction of opium, are signs of defeat;
yet one, that of intercourse, cannot be stopped or wiped away
while the opium question can be. I am writing in a hurry, so am
not very clear.
"What I mean is that no one country forces another country to
take a drug like opium, and therefore the Chinese feel the
forced introduction of opium as an intrusion and injustice;
thence their feelings in the matter. This, I feel sure, is the
case.
"What could our Government do _in re_ opium? Well, I should say,
let the clause of treaty lapse about it, and let the smuggling be
renewed. Hongkong is a nest of smugglers.
"Pekin would, or rather could, never succeed in cutting off
foreign intercourse. The Chinese are too much mixed up (and are
increasingly so every year) with foreigners for Pekin even to try
it. Also I do not think China would wish to stop its importation
altogether. All they ask is an increased duty on it."