the bear-spirit with the evil spirit, bear, serpent, panther, etc. The
candidate impersonates the good bear-spirit, and some mide sometimes
take upon themselves the impersonation of the evil spirits.[7] In the
ritual of the fourth degree, representing the complete initiation, the
dramatization and its symbolistic interpretation are best shown. He who
succeeds becomes correspondingly powerful in his profession. Hunters,
warriors, and lovers have occasion to call upon him, and charms to
counteract the evil effects of an enemy’s work are sometimes sought.[8]
The Ojibwa interpretation of the Midewiwin is seen in all its details
in the birch-bark records.[9] A mide of the second degree can look into
futurity; can hear what is transpiring at a distance; can touch, for
good or for evil, friends and enemies at a distance, however remote;
and has the ability to traverse all space in the accomplishment of
his desires or duties.[10] A bad mide of this degree has the power of
assuming the form of any animal. In this guise he may destroy the life
of his victim immediately, and then resume his human form and appear
innocent of the crime. A “fourth-degree mide” is presumed to be in
a position to accomplish the greatest feats in necromancy and magic.
He is not only endowed with the power of reading the thoughts and
intentions of others, but also of calling forth the shadow (soul) and
of retaining it within his grasp at pleasure.
From the above it will be seen that the Midewiwin covered practically
all the religious and the shamanistic ideas of the Ojibwa.
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE MENOMINEE MIDEWIWIN
Among the Menominee, initiation generally takes place as a substitution
of one individual for one who has died, although any person who gives
proof of eligibility is accepted. The former is by far the more common
method. Generally a person makes the promise of procuring a substitute
for some deceased member, and a favorite relative or dear friend of the
deceased may be elected. There are four mide-priests who determine upon
the candidacy and appoint an instructor. The instruction the candidate
receives is confined to the knowledge of the remedies known to the
instructor.[11] Each remedy must be paid for separately. The four
mide-priests select two sets of assistants and two ushers, who all play
a prominent part in the ceremonies proper.[12]
When a candidate is taking the place of a deceased member, the
ceremonies begin at the grave of the latter,[13] and, after a service
which lasts from dusk of one day to dawn of the next, all proceed to
the Midewiwin lodge. But only the four highest officiating medicine-men
enter. After a ritual which consists of chants and speeches of welcome,
and the passing of the drum from the first to the other three mide,
the other members who are to take an active part enter. A short ritual
then takes place, after which the second set of mide enter and another
ritual follows. Then the ordinary and visiting mide enter, the former
taking seats according to the phratries to which they belong; and the
candidate, his nearest relations, and he who had promised to give the
feast, enter with them and take seats near the mide of the first group.
Finally the third set of mide enter. The seating in the lodge is,
candidate, friends, etc., near the eastern end; first four mide, next
to them; second set, on northern side near western entrance; and third
set of mide, at the middle of the southern side.
The ceremonies begin by calling the candidate forward to stand before
the mide of the first group. His family and friends stand around him
in a semicircle, dancing in time to the chanting and drumming. One
of the mide begins a chant, at the end of which a pause occurs, and
the candidate and friends resume their seats. The drum is passed in
rotation to the second, third, and fourth mide. As they chant, the
candidate, etc., stands before them. The last of the four then chants
the origin myth of the Midewiwin. The drum is now passed to the mide
who had chanted first. He continues the narration of the ritualistic
myths. Drum and gourds are then passed from one mide to the other, and
from the first set of mide to the third, until the circuit has been
made.
These ceremonies are continued through the night, although only the
three sets of mide remain in the lodge all that time. Shortly after
sunrise, almost all leave the lodge. When they return, preparations
are made for the initiation. The shooting of the candidate is
performed by the second set of mide. The candidate, after recovering,
makes the circuit of the lodge, shooting whomsoever he desires. The
characteristics of this shooting ceremony are practically identical
with those of the Winnebago.
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RITUAL
I. THE COMMON ELEMENTS.—The common elements in the foregoing
ritualistic complexes are both general and specific in nature. We have,
as general, an initiation ritual; and as specific, a shooting ritual.
There are in addition, in the Central Algonkin and Winnebago group,
other resemblances, such as similarities in the ethical teaching, in
the details of the shooting ritual itself, and in the presence of the
secret brush ritual. To the above must be added the fact that the songs
of the Winnebago ceremonies are to a large extent in some Central
Algonkin dialect.
The meaning of these general similarities will be touched upon later.
What I wish to insist upon here is, that if the ritualistic complexes
are at all to be regarded as identical, this is so by reason of the
presence in each of a shooting ritual. This identity is strengthened
in each case by the association of this specific shooting ritual with
the more general feature of initiation. The most dramatic phase in the
main ceremony is this initiation and shooting complex; and it seems,
therefore, quite intelligible why the number of similar details thus
associated together should have been interpreted as the historically
primary and basic elements.
To postulate an historical identity, however, on the basis of a number
of common elements, in the face of numerous and important differences,
implies a specific attitude toward the nature and significance of the
common elements in these ceremonies. We know, indeed, that almost
all theoreticians place greater insistence upon the similarities
than upon the differences in cultural phenomena. There is perhaps a
natural tendency to do so. But quite apart from this tendency, there
must likewise be certain definite reasons for such an interpretation.
It is essential, consequently, to understand at the very outset the
theoretical justification of this position.
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMON ELEMENTS—SCHURTZ’S THEORY.—This
question has been taken up _in extenso_ by Schurtz,[14] in his work
on “Age Classes and Men’s Societies.” Here, as well as in previous
theoretical discussions, the presence of a number of similarities has
been considered sufficient for establishing the identity of a group
of ceremonies that admittedly possess a large number of specific
peculiarities. But Schurtz gives us a detailed psychological exposition
(and in this lies perhaps his superiority over others who have
discussed the same subject) of the reasons which have prompted him to
take a certain attitude toward these “similarities.” If Schurtz’s work
is therefore selected in preference to that of others, it is because of
the fact that, in addition to practically taking the same position as
most of the other theoreticians, he has most clearly defined some of
the assumptions underlying their position.
Schurtz’s line of argument seems to have been the following. An
investigation of civilized as well as of primitive organizations has
disclosed a number of similarities. Their historical development is
unknown; but the enormous distance separating them geographically,
precludes the possibility that these similarities have been due either
to borrowing or to dissemination from some one original centre. They
must consequently be explained by assuming that they have developed
independently, as external manifestations of the unity of the human
mind. We are thus led to the assumption accepted by most ethnologists
to-day, that the human mind tends to express itself in similar
modes of thought and action the world over. The variation in these
modes is to be ascribed either to the differences in the nature of
the geographical and social surroundings or to the emotional and
intellectual individuality of different groups of people, or to both.
We are, however, concerned here not so much with the variations as
with the common modes of thought and action. It is consequently of
prime importance to determine first the nature of these modes, their
sequence, and the extent to which this sequence has been conditioned by
the modes themselves.
We start at the very outset with an implied assumption; for by
“sequence,” Schurtz distinctly understood an ordered sequence. His
work is primarily an attempt to determine what this ordered sequence
has been, and how it has been determined. The norm of organization in
which the human race expressed itself primarily, is, according to him,
the age-group. Owing to the historical development of various cultural
areas, it is no longer possible to detect this “primary element;” and
he consequently finds it necessary to demonstrate its existence from
another point of view, which is essentially psychological.
The development of the age-group has followed a very definite
sequence—definite, because it has been determined by certain inherent
tendencies of the human mind. These tendencies are “the instinct for
association”[15] (_Geselligkeitstrieb_) and “the sexual instinct”
(_Geschlechtstrieb_). Granting the existence of these two tendencies,
we have then to inquire how they have conditioned the essential
similarities in the evolution of our social life, and the forms in
which that social life has expressed itself.
There are two possible assumptions. We may assume that at a certain
stage of cultural development groups of people possessed no social
individuality sufficiently strong to determine their own development,
and that the _Geselligkeitstrieb_ and _Geschlechtstrieb_ alone, or
reinforced by other factors, were sufficiently strong to condition
development along certain lines; or we may, on the other hand, assume
that the primary modes in which people have expressed themselves are
necessarily of so simple and generalized a type, that they always were
the same. Schurtz has practically assumed a stage in human development
when the individuality of the component units of a social group was at
a minimum; when there was, so to say, a “group mind,” whose initial
development is most easily explained by the influence of inherent
tendencies. It must be said, in fairness to Schurtz, that the other
alternative mentioned above was probably also in his mind. However,
he seems to have elaborated his theory with the first alternative
constantly before his eyes.
This unexpressed assumption is of the greatest possible moment in
Schurtz’s interpretation, because it immediately establishes a certain
fixity for his primary norm; and excluding as it does the possibility
of variation, because the two tendencies, as constants, are acting upon
social groups whose component members have a minimum of individuality,
brings it about that the same primary norm must be simple and
generalized in its nature.
Schurtz has thus given us a psychological _milieu_, and we must now
proceed to investigate what are the specific norms of development, the
method by which these norms have been determined, the nature of their
sequence, and how this sequence has been absolutely conditioned. The
first two of these points become clearer if we attack the question of
sequence first.
It is apparent from Schurtz’s work that to him the necessity for an
ordered sequence was self-evident. This acceptance of an ordered
sequence as axiomatic was conditioned primarily by the fact that he
implied at the very outset that the ordered sequence present in the
evolution of biological phenomena was to be found in an essentially
comparable manner in the development of civilization. In the same way
Schurtz’s use of the terms “highest” and “lowest” and of “intermediate
stages” is only inadequately explained when regarded as derived from
the study of history. Neither can we assume that these terms were
merely a reflection of the conclusion he had drawn from a comparison of
the palpable differences between Europeans and “primitive” people. His
whole treatment of “intermediate stages,” and of the factors he calls
to his aid in explaining them,—such as divergences due to variations
from a type, vestiges, functional changes,—these are all strictly
biological not merely in their terminology, but likewise in their
general connotation.
The justification for equating the processes which have played a large
part in historical and biological evolution seemed, indeed, apparent.
In the cultural history of any people, we find elements splitting up
and giving rise to innumerable variations. In this divergence we meet
again and again with two phenomena,—first, that of the general decay of
cultural elements, of their total disappearance in some cases and of
their persistence as vestigial remains in others; and, secondly, that
of the incessant change, of the re-adjustment and re-interpretation
of cultural phenomena, so that elements often take upon themselves
functions which they originally did not possess, while these original
functions are either partially or totally obscured. Numerous other
points, more specific in nature, could be adduced to demonstrate more
fully the essential similarity of cultural and biological phenomena.
The comparability of the data of civilization and biology brought in
its train, however, the natural corollary that the general course
of their development was the same. Such an assumption fitted in
admirably with the psychological presuppositions of Schurtz, and with
the inferences he felt justified in drawing from the historical data.
Neither Schurtz, nor, for that matter, any theoretician of his time,
ever made any attempt to prove that the method of biological evolution
was the same as that of the historical. It was commonly assumed to
have been the same; but, quite apart from this acceptance of a fact
that seemed to need no proof, the similarity in the evolution of
biological and historical phenomena was by implication conditioned by
his psychological assumptions. The number of norms are necessarily
reduced to a minimum when inherent tendencies are acting on a “group
mind,” for it would be tacitly admitting a large range for personal
individuality, to assume the existence of many norms; but if there
are only a few norms, or, as Schurtz concludes, one norm,—that of the
age-group,—variations can only have arisen as differentiations of this
norm, due to influences either from within or from without.
We are consequently reduced to a condition exactly parallel to that
which we find, according to the theory of evolution, in biology.
Variations are the result of a differentiation of some unit. It is the
object, in the classification of biological data, to demonstrate, by
means of a series of ascending forms, the evolution of the most highly
differentiated from the least differentiated. In thus arranging the
data, it followed that the least-differentiated forms contained the
simple general manifestations of life, and that at the same time the
most highly-differentiated forms likewise contained all these simple
general manifestations, although they were here, as a rule, so changed
as to be entirely obscured, if not unrecognizable.
In a manner almost exactly parallel to the above, Schurtz sought
to classify the phenomena of social organization. The highest must
contain within itself the simple and general phenomena of the lowest
form. Having thus demonstrated to his satisfaction the existence
and the necessity of an ordered sequence, he turned his attention
to demonstrating that this sequence was psychologically as well as
historically conditioned. His line of argument here can best be shown
by analyzing the first few chapters of his book.
At the basis of all social organizations lie two elementary forces,—the
“instinct for association” and the “sexual instinct.” The sexual
instinct is primary, because it is obviously an essential condition
of life. The instinct for association is secondary in so far as its
expression in outward form is concerned. It is as old as the sexual
instinct; but, since at the initial stage of human development the
sexual instinct is so strong a force, the instinct of association had
no observable influence on the actions of men.
The forms of social organization which the sexual instinct conditions
are those based upon certain kinds of blood relationship. These forms
are primary. To establish the priority of the forms thus imposed by
blood relationship, we have but to remember that, as the relationship
of individuals to one another preceded everything else, so the social
forms based upon blood relationship must have preceded all other social
forms. We are therefore to regard as the earliest stage of social
organization that of groups bound together by blood relationship. But
what has been the force differentiating these groups? Obviously not the
same sexual instinct that has caused the formation of these primary
groups. To explain the factors that have caused this differentiation we
must call to our aid two phenomena,—first, that of sexual solidarity;
and, secondly, that of the instinct for association.
Sexual solidarity has its roots in the nature of man and woman, and is
possessed by them in equal intensity. The instinct for association is,
however, a specifically masculine trait. It is found among women only
in a minimal degree. An important corollary follows from this fact: If
women societies are found anywhere, they are to be considered merely
as imitations of men’s societies. If women are found as members in a
society, this is to be regarded as secondary and purely adventitious.
These, and some more specific points to be enumerated later, must be
borne in mind continually, as Schurtz makes a far-reaching use of them.
The instinct for association, he goes on to say, expresses itself,
however, between those of like interests; that is, between those who
would most likely be of the same age. It is not likely, for instance,
to occur between married and unmarried men. We have here two apparently
organically determined classes. In the earliest stages of social
development, however, when the norms of social expression conditioned
by the sexual instinct were still of paramount importance, insistence
was most naturally placed upon the most important stage of man’s
physiological development,—the age of puberty. The strong line of
demarcation between the period preceding and following sexual maturity
was so ever-present a fact to the mind of primitive man, that it found
expression in the multitude of initiatory rites. In these initiatory
rites we have another of the specific “symptoms” with which we shall
have to deal afterward.
When the instinct for association developed more strongly, the
differences due to age, plus the physiological factor, conditioned the
natural formation of two classes,—one of men before puberty, and one of
men after puberty. This natural twofold division was also strengthened
by another factor; for until the age of puberty, boys were under the
influence of women, and were therefore to be reckoned as one with them.
The three groups—men before puberty, unmarried men after puberty,
and married men—are thus built upon the basis of age distinction and
common interest. They are the norms of primitive social organization,
and, as we have seen, their origin is due to inherited instincts.
By implication Schurtz has here also assumed the existence of a
definite sequence; for the division into pre- and post-puberty
groups is a consequence of the sexual instinct, and is therefore
primary. Differentiation into the groups of married and unmarried
men thereupon followed; but the initiation, which is synchronous
with the age of sexual maturity, has introduced another factor, that
of promiscuous sexual intercourse; and the regulation that this has
demanded is found outwardly expressed in the “men’s house.” The
common interests that drew men together into groups have thus far
been those conditioned largely by age. In the development of society,
however, interests became more and more diversified, and resulted,
first, in the disappearance of the age factor as the essential element
for associations, and, secondly, in the necessity for more closely
organized units with specific characteristics. To obtain this close
organization, one of the essential elements was secrecy, and thus
developed out of the “men’s house” those innumerable clubs and secret
societies which we find so common to-day.
In such manner we have constructed an ascending evolutionary series.
It must not be forgotten that in such a series the highest stage is
but a differentiated lower stage. It must likewise be remembered that
there is a tendency for intermediate stages to leave vestigial remains
wherever they developed into higher stages. We may consequently expect
to find traces of “age groups” and “men’s houses” all over the world.
In addition, we must remember that a number of “symptoms”—such as “the
exclusion of women” from a society, the presence of “an initiation,” of
“degrees,” and of “secrecy”—have always been associated with certain
stages of growth. They may serve us for criteria of this growth and of
the stages thereof, and they constitute proofs of historical identity.
They will often appear unassociated with the definite stage assigned
to them; but that is immaterial, for their almost universal presence
is a sufficient guaranty of their significance. It is not necessary to
inquire into their individual significance among definite societies,
because a negative answer would prove nothing, as differences from the
general scheme outlined can be interpreted most easily in terms of some
functional change.
It must of course be remembered that the various points of view from
which Schurtz approached his problem were so inextricably interwoven,
that it is unwarranted to assume that every position he took was as
distinctly analyzed as I have attempted to show.
From two points of view, a psychological and a biological one, Schurtz
obtained similar conclusions. It is now only necessary, after we have
seen how he established his psychological _milieu_ and his sequence
of norms, to investigate the manner in which he approached the
ethnological data themselves.
Schurtz claims to have reached his interpretation from an inductive
study of the available data. We have seen that there is good reason to
suppose that he approached the data with certain preconceptions, the
most important of which was the necessity of “ascending stages” in the
evolution of society. He had to determine, before everything else, the
initial stage of social evolution, and to look for it or for as close
an approximation to it as might still be found to-day. However, as soon
as we accept what Schurtz thought were the necessary consequences of
the two tendencies,—of the instinct for association and of the sexual
instinct,—obviously, then, that organization which conforms closest to
the conditions there imposed would be the most primitive.
He thereupon found himself confronted with the relatively easy task of
finding such an organization. He found it in Australia, and selected
it as the starting-point of his series. In justice to Schurtz and
other theoreticians, it should, however, be said that the Australian
cultures impressed many then, and continue to impress many now, as
cultures that either had been stunted in their growth, or had developed
only as far as the most primitive stages. From that point on, the
construction of a series was a simple task.
Such, in brief, is the position of Schurtz.