placed in the command of the hospitals at Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley
marched on the morning of the 3d of August for Oropesa. A short time
after his arrival at that place, he learnt that the advanced guard of
Soult’s army was arrived at Naval Moral, and that the Spaniards, who had
retired from Bejar, had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and destroyed the
bridge; he determined, however, to move upon the French, and was in
hopes of finding them the following day. General Bassecour, with a
Spanish division, was moving along the Tietar, and was destined to act
upon the left and rear of the French. About four o’clock in the
afternoon, however, a despatch arrived from General Cuesta, announcing
to Sir Arthur Wellesley, that, from intelligence upon which he could
rely, he was persuaded that the corps of Marshal Ney had evacuated
Gallicia, and formed a junction with the corps of Marshal Mortier, from
Valladolid; that the two were united with Marshal Soult; and that the
amount of the collected force upon the rear of the allied army, could
not be less than 55,000 men; that Marshal Victor was at no great
distance from Talavera, upon the other side; that he (General Cuesta)
apprehended an attack from him; and had in consequence determined to
break up immediately from that town, and join Sir Arthur Wellesley at
Oropesa. This information was as disastrous as it was unexpected: the
letter from General Cuesta further stated, that his movement was already
begun, and that his army would form its junction with the British in the
course of the night: there remained, therefore, no hope of preventing or
delaying it, and the whole plan, upon which Sir Arthur Wellesley had
undertaken his operation, was at once destroyed.
The bridge of Almaraz was no longer in existence; the bridge of
Arzobispo was exposed, by the abandonment of Talavera, to the corps of
Victor, and the whole allied army, if it advanced, might be cut off from
any retreat across the Tagus, while its movement upon Portugal must
depend upon the success of its attack upon the combined army of Ney,
Soult, and Mortier. In this situation of affairs Sir Arthur Wellesley
did not hesitate to give up offensive operations, and retire across the
Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo.
Sir Arthur Wellesley had every reason to complain of the conduct of
General Cuesta; he had abandoned the position intrusted to him, without
any ground for so doing; for it afterwards appeared that Victor was at
some distance from Talavera, and not occupied in a movement upon the
corps of General Cuesta; but, at any rate, the Spaniards evacuated the
post intrusted to them, and abandoned the British wounded, with a
precipitancy that nothing but the actual presence of an enemy could
justify. If General Cuesta was actuated by a desire of bringing his army
to the assistance of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was about to attack a
force which he had reason to believe was superior to him, he ought to
have waited a few hours, till he had communicated with him, and in the
mean time, he should have given assistance to the removal of the British
wounded. If he thought that the return of a messenger from Oropesa (a
distance of only five leagues), would have exposed him by too much
delay, he ought at least to have left a corps to check the enemy in his
front, and to have protected the retreat of the hospitals. And, last of
all, it was his duty, to which he had also pledged himself in the most
solemn manner, to have given all the means in his power to facilitate
the removal of the British wounded. He did, however, the direct reverse:
he abandoned his position with his whole army, without communication
with Sir Arthur Wellesley; (indeed, he precluded the possibility of any,
by stating in his letter that his army was in march); and to the
wounded, instead of every assistance he could command, he gave but _four
carts_, for the whole 4,000 men. It is impossible to conceive, that the
importance of the occupation of Talavera, to the movement of Sir Arthur
Wellesley, should have escaped the observation of General Cuesta, the
ground about that town afforded the only situation in which the advance
of the French army upon the rear of the British, while moving upon
Soult, could possibly be resisted; the rest of the country was plain,
and offered no defensive position; so that in abandoning it, General
Cuesta exposed the whole allied army to an attack, in front and rear. In
short, it is very difficult to discover a sound or equitable reason for
the precipitancy with which this movement was executed; but the total
disregard which was shewn to the British wounded, the paltry number of
four carts which was afforded them, by an army that was provided with
them to excess, remains a stain upon the character of General Cuesta,
that no time will ever efface.
Sir Arthur Wellesley moved his army, upon the morning of the 4th of
August, to the bridge of Arzobispo; the nature of the campaign was
changed; Gallicia was delivered from the French; and the corps of Romana
was now in peaceable possession of it, with the opportunity of
augmenting its own numbers, and improving its discipline; the whole
province was in a situation to dispose of its military means, and to
create, in a short time, a powerful diversion, upon the rear of the
enemy assembled upon the Tagus. The north of Spain was almost entirely
in the same situation as Gallicia. The French had abandoned it, with
very few exceptions, to concentrate their force against the British
army; and Sir Arthur Wellesley conceived, that although he had been
foiled in his attempt to rescue Madrid, yet he had restored independence
to Gallicia, and in great part to the provinces adjoining it; which
might, in the end, prove most advantageous to the cause of Spain. This
opinion has since been proved to be correct; Gallicia retained its
freedom, and the other northern provinces were never afterwards but in
partial subjection to the enemy.
As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley had crossed the Tagus at Arzobispo, he
detached Major General Crawford, with the light division, to occupy,
with as much rapidity as possible, the pass at Almaraz; where it was to
be feared the enemy, whose advanced guard had seen the passage of the
allies at Arzobispo, might push a force across the Tagus, and endeavour
to intercept the British army on its march upon Deleytosa. Major General
Crawford arrived, however, in time to prevent that operation; the
movement of the army was undisturbed; General Cuesta remained at
Arzobispo; and the British moved to Deleytosa. The Spaniards were,
however, attacked a few days after by the French at Arzobispo; their
advanced guard was driven from the bridge; and their whole army retired
to Deleytosa, whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley moved to Jaraseco.
The force under General Vanegas had remained since the battle of
Talavera, in the neighbourhood of Toledo, but to the southward of the
Tagus. General Cuesta was in communication with it, and apprized Vanegas
of his retreat from Arzobispo. He directed him in consequence to fall
back to the positions about Madrilejos, from which he had originally
moved, and upon no account to risk an action with the enemy, but to keep
his corps ready to make any movement, in co-operation with the allied
army, that might afterwards be determined upon. General Vanegas prepared
to carry these orders into execution, and retired a considerable
distance through La Mancha; but, from a fatality which has never been
explained, he was induced to move forward again, over some of the ground
which he had passed, and to engage his corps in a general action with
the French under Sebastiani, at Almonacid. The Spaniards were completely
routed in this battle; their best troops were engaged in it, and many of
the corps behaved with great gallantry and good conduct; but they were
defeated with considerable loss, and were driven to the Sierra Morena.
This disaster was severely felt; the dispersion of the troops that could
be most depended upon, and who were intrusted with the defence of the
great pass into Andalusia, was an event that could not easily be
repaired; and, in addition, it destroyed all confidence in the movements
of the Spaniards; they were no longer to be depended upon, for the most
trifling operations: when they were required to act, they remained
unmoved; when intrusted with a position, as at Talavera, they deserted
it without reason; when directed to avoid an action, which, if
successful, could be of no benefit to their cause, they seemed to court
one; and when engaged, exposed themselves to the most disastrous
defeats. With this battle terminated the campaign, which had been
undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from
the central provinces of Spain. The corps under Sir Robert Wilson
retired through the mountains from Escalona to Bejar, where it was
attacked and routed by the advanced guard of Marshal Ney, who was
returning from the Tagus to the neighbourhood of Salamanca.
Sir Arthur Wellesley remained at Jaraseco, till the French, who had
collected upon the Tagus, had dispersed their corps; and till the total
failure of supplies obliged him to retire to the frontiers of Portugal,
from whence alone he could secure the provisioning of his army.
He placed his head-quarters at Badajos, his advance at Merida, and the
rest of his army in cantonments, upon the frontiers of Spain and
Portugal. The supreme government of Spain was thrown into considerable
consternation by this movement, of which it had been the sole and entire
cause. The individuals who composed it sought, notwithstanding, to throw
the blame from themselves, upon those who had the most materially
suffered by their misconduct.
The Marquis Wellesley, who was at this time the British representative
in Spain, complained most bitterly of their inattention and neglect to
an army, which had so valiantly fought in their defence; and whose blood
had been so profusely spilt, in supporting the great cause in which they
were engaged; but these complaints were only too ably urged. The
Spaniards (proud of their former glories) can but ill brook the
interference of foreign powers; their pride and haughty independence
prompt them to spurn the assistance or control of foreigners; and when
their government was justly accused of neglect, and even treason to
Spain herself, yet as that reproach was from a foreign hand, they
rallied round that government, and repelled the accusations, by the most
idle and unfounded attacks upon those who made them, and who had full
reason to complain of their unjust and unfriendly conduct. A spirit of
hostility was thus raised between the allied nations, and for some time
there was much of that unpleasant feeling which is generated by mutual
accusations. The magnanimous conduct of the British government, however,
soon set those jealousies at rest, and by degrees acquired for itself
the unbounded confidence of the Spanish nation.
The supreme government of Spain had displaced General Cuesta from the
command of his army, during the time that Sir Arthur Wellesley, (now
become Lord Wellington) remained at Jaraseco, and General Eguia was
intrusted with that important situation. This officer was soon after
directed to move the Spanish army, (leaving only the Duke of Albuquerque
with a small corps in Estremadura) and to form a junction with General
Vanegas, in the Sierra Morena, and in the neighbourhood of La Carolina.
This operation was dictated, in no small degree, by a feeling of
jealousy towards the English. The Spaniards wished to keep their army
separate from the British, because they believed it could be rendered
more subservient to their own views. While it remained in presence of so
distinguished an officer as Lord Wellington, it was curbed, and
restrained in the movements it might be directed to undertake; his
advice must necessarily be listened to, and it is not too much to say,
that some of the rulers of the country were not at that time unwilling
to see their armies directed by weaker counsels than such as would be
derived from him. There was another reason for the movement of that
army. It was believed, by many persons in the direction of affairs in
Spain, that Lord Wellington was determined to evacuate the country, and
retire into Portugal; they thought, however, that by removing the
Spanish army from Estremadura, they should shift the defence of that
province upon the shoulders of Lord Wellington; by which means they
flattered themselves, they should retain him against his will. Lord
Wellington was not so easily to be overreached: he stated to the Spanish
government, that he should remain at Badajos so long as he felt he could
be serviceable to its cause, but without neglecting the first object
which he was directed to attend to; namely, the defence of Portugal. He
pressed the government to make such arrangements as would secure the
provisioning of his army, if he was enabled again to take the field; but
above all, he recommended it to preserve the Spanish armies from being
harassed, or on any account risked with the French, excepting in such
operations as should be agreed upon, according to a general combination
of all the forces that could be brought against them. The army of the
Marquis of Romana was moved from Gallicia to Ciudad Rodrigo; where it
was placed under the orders of the Duke del Parque.
A state of tranquillity now succeeded to the active operations of the
preceding months; the French armies had been in almost constant movement
since the entrance of Buonaparte into Spain, in the month of November.
When he quitted the country to prepare for the German war, he had left
his armies in possession of all the north of Spain; Soult afterwards
added the north of Portugal. Victor was advanced to the confines of
Andalusia, near Monasterio; and Sebastiani occupied La Mancha; Suchet
was in force in Arragon, and St. Cyr was employed in the siege of the
fortresses in Catalonia. The situation of these corps was now
considerably changed. The north of Spain and Portugal was almost
entirely free from the incursions of the French; the province of
Estremadura was relieved from them; and a great portion of La Mancha was
in the occupation of the Spanish armies. The French had therefore lost
considerably during the last months; and, notwithstanding their activity
and military talents, they had been forced to retire from the provinces
which they had subdued, and to concentrate for their own defence, in a
country which they believed, after the capture of Madrid, they had
totally subjected. When Buonaparte re-crossed the Pyrenees, he directed
his imperial eagles to be placed upon the towers of Lisbon; he
proclaimed his empire in the Peninsula, and boasted that there no longer
existed any force that was capable of obstructing the accomplishment of
his imperial mandate. But the strength of patriotism in a whole people
was as yet unknown to him. The constant reduction of his forces, the
ever succeeding evacuation of apparently conquered provinces by his
troops, the never-ending conflicts in every corner of the Peninsula,
have since convinced him that a great people with one intent and one
resolution, with patriotism as their guide, are too powerful to be
subdued, though they have neither armies nor military science to oppose
to the invaders.
The British troops had been also in constant activity since the arrival
of Lord Wellington in Portugal, they therefore required rest. It became
then the interest of both French and English to preserve that state of
tranquillity which had succeeded since the passage of the Tagus.
The state of Spain about this time, was most extraordinary; the whole
people were hostile to the French, yet their exertions at the
commencement of their struggle had so far surpassed any former efforts
they had been called upon to make, that they now reposed in security,
confiding their cause to the means which they had already provided, and
sheltering themselves from any further calls, by the loud and re-echoed
declarations that they were invincible. It was in vain to combat against
this argument; if a doubt as to its validity was started, the instances
of Moncey’s retreat from Valencia and of Ney’s from Gallicia, were
thought sufficient to remove all apprehensions, and to silence for ever
the discussion of the subject; the best informed amongst the Spaniards
were carried away by feelings so congenial to their haughty spirits, and
so well adapted to the indolence of their natures. The defence of
Saragossa and of Gerona convinced them that the attempt to conquer Spain
would be unavailing, and they sunk at once into a security for which
they since have most dearly paid. If at Granada, you questioned the
public authorities as to the preparations they were making to bring new
armies into the field, they answered by an account of what had already
been produced. If in Valencia, the defeat which the French had already
sustained there was a guarantee of the destruction which would await a
second corps, that should attempt the invasion of their country; Murcia
could boast the terror with which it had inspired the enemy, since he
had never ventured to attack it; and in this manner every part of Spain
relied with confidence upon the levies which it had already produced,
and looked upon its entire deliverance from a foreign yoke, as within
little of being accomplished.
During the period of which we have been speaking, Marshal Ney commenced
an operation against the corps of the Duke del Parque: that officer had
collected his troops in a strong position at Tamanes; the French made a
desperate assault upon him, but were repulsed with considerable loss.
This action confirmed the Spaniards in the belief that they were
invincible; and a general feeling was raised, that their armies should
advance upon Madrid, and that the successes of Baylen would shrink
before the glories that awaited them in the neighbourhood of the
capital.
The disastrous termination of the German war seemed in no degree to
shake the confidence of the Spanish nation; proud of its own feats, it
disdained a feeling of dependence upon any other people for the success
of its cause.
The government partook of the same sentiment; and, most singular to
relate, during the period of this eventful repose from active
operations, made not the slightest effort to prepare for the struggle
which was to succeed.
The army of Lord Wellington which was cantoned upon the Guadiana became
extremely sickly; and numbers of the officers and men fell victims to
the disorders generated by the noxious exhalations of that river, and to
the fatigues which, amidst the greatest privations, they had previously
undergone. The Spaniards made no exertions to secure provisions for the
army; so that it was incapable of active operations.
The Spanish government seized this opportunity to attempt a scheme,
which will ever stand unrivalled in absurdity and folly. The Spanish
army which was assembled at the Carolina formed an effective force of
48,000 men; it had been placed under the orders of General Eguia, when
he marched with the greatest proportion of his army from Estremadura;
but it had afterwards been entrusted to the command of General Arisaga,
a very young and inexperienced officer; he was only a brigadier when he
was appointed to this important station, but was advanced to the rank of
a major-general upon assuming it.
It appears that this officer was befriended by a strong party of the
ministers at Seville, who had considerable influence with the supreme
government, although their views were hostile to it. He was appointed
for the purpose of carrying their objects into effect; and every officer
senior to him was removed, to enable him to assume the command. The
other Spanish corps which communicated with the central one, were
commanded by the Dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque, both of superior
rank to General Arisaga; it was, therefore, the object of his employers
to prevent their co-operation with him, lest by taking upon themselves
the direction of the forces, to which they were entitled by their rank,
they should prevent the execution of the project the ministers had in
view.
These persons conceived that it was possible to enter Madrid; and they
are supposed to have purposed, in so doing, to effect a revolution, to
displace the government of the Junta Suprema, and to seize it for
themselves.
The capital was believed to be the most advantageous place for the
execution of these projects; first, because the triumph of its
successful deliverance would secure popularity to those who had effected
it; and next, because the existing government had ever been most
unpopular in that city. With these views, therefore, General Arisaga was
ordered to break up at once from his position at La Carolina, and to
march directly upon Madrid. This order was neither communicated to Lord
Wellington, nor to any of the Spanish generals in the command of other
corps.
General Arisaga, in conformity with his instructions, moved with
considerable rapidity through the whole of La Mancha, and arrived on the
8th of November upon the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Ocaña. The
French (who were surprised at the boldness of this operation),
concentrated their troops behind the Tagus, and after a sharp rencontre
with the Spanish advanced guard, upon the 12th, they passed that river,
and attacked the Spanish army. General Arisaga had placed his whole
force in two columns of battalions, separated by a ravine, and with a
corps in advance of considerable strength, which was in possession of a
village which covered his front. The French began the engagement by the
attack of this village; but, under cover of some ground about it, they
turned the right column of the Spanish army, charged it, and in a very
short time totally dispersed it. The left column was as yet untouched,
but General Arisaga was so confounded by the destruction of his right,
that he does not appear to have made any disposition for its retreat, or
for the support of the attack that was coming upon it. The Spanish
cavalry, which was retiring with considerable precipitation, first threw
this corps into confusion by galloping through a considerable portion of
it; the French, who were fast coming up with the remainder of it,
completed its dispersion; and thus destroyed in a few hours the whole
army that had been marched against them. The Spaniards lost their guns,
their baggage, their equipments, and out of 45,000 stand of arms, not
more than 13,000 were brought back to the Carolina. The loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, was immense; a great portion of the soldiers,
who had dispersed during the action, never returned to the army; so that
the greatest number that was ever collected, of individuals who had been
present at Ocaña, did not amount to more than 25,000 men.
So decisive a defeat produced great consternation throughout the
country; the only considerable army that remained to fight for the cause
of Spain had been totally destroyed; and to enlightened and unprejudiced
minds, it was no longer doubtful that the French might at any time
march, unresisted by any military force, to the walls of Cadiz. This
opinion was far, however, from being general in Spain. All true
Spaniards were yet bound to believe that the battle of Ocaña was
unfortunate from some unforeseen accident; that such was never likely to
happen again; and that the forces which were collected at the Carolina
would yet form an impenetrable barrier to the advance of the French
armies, and protect the Andalusias, till the necessary numbers should be
collected to fall with certain destruction upon the forces of the
invader. If a doubt was started upon any part of this position, one
general answer was given, that a cat could not pass through the defile
of Despeña Perros, much less a French army. Thus you were requested to
be convinced, that no force the enemy could bring would ever succeed in
penetrating to the southward of the Sierra Morena; or in subjugating the
people of Andalusia.