join that of General Cuesta, and should advance in the first instance to
the attack of Victor at Talavera. By a movement in co-operation, General
Vanegas was ordered to break up from the position in La Mancha, about
Madrilejos; to march upon Pembleque and Ocaña, and pass the Tagus at
Fuente Dueñas; where he was to arrive on the same day, the 22d of July,
that the armies under Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Cuesta, were to
arrive at Talavera, and attack the corps of Victor. General Vanegas
received this order, and agreed to its execution. Sir Arthur Wellesley
removed his army from Placencia, according to the plan which had been
arranged; passed the Tietar, and arrived at Oropesa on the 20th of July;
where he effected his junction with the army under the orders of General
Cuesta, amounting to 35,000 effective men. The next day, the Spanish
army advanced towards Talavera; and on the 22d the British corps moved
forward to the same place. While upon his march, Sir Arthur Wellesley
received several messages from General Cuesta, stating that the enemy
was disposed to attack him. Sir Arthur Wellesley pushed forward, but
upon reaching the ground, found only two squadrons of French, who had
come from Talavera to reconnoitre the position of the Spaniards.
The light troops of both armies advanced upon the rear-guard of the
French, the Spanish cavalry attempted to charge it, but without effect,
and the whole French army took up a position upon the heights, to the
eastward of the Alberche. The British and Spanish armies occupied the
ground about Talavera with their advance upon the right of the same
river. Sir Arthur Wellesley had expected to hear from General Vanegas:
according to the orders which had been sent to him, he should have been
at Fuente Dueñas upon the 22d; but from every information which could be
obtained, no movement appeared to have been made by him. The history of
the defection of his corps deserves to be recorded. When General Vanegas
received the orders from General Cuesta to move upon Madrid, he returned
for answer, that he would do so; he despatched, however, at the same
time, a courier to the supreme Junta, communicating to it the orders he
had received. That body replied, that he was not to execute the
movement, but to await its further commands in the positions which he
occupied. These directions, (which were neither announced to Sir Arthur
Wellesley nor to General Cuesta), arrived in time to stop General
Vanegas. It was difficult to explain the motive of this conduct; but it
was afterwards discovered that the supreme Junta, amongst other reasons,
was not anxious that General Cuesta should enter Madrid. He was supposed
to entertain sentiments hostile to many of those who composed it, and
not friendly to the whole body; the Junta, therefore, feared, that if he
reached Madrid, he would effect a counter-revolution, and place himself
at the head of the government; or at least overturn the Junta’s power.
This explanation of its motive gained considerable weight from the
conduct of that body, when it received General Cuesta’s despatches,
stating that he had formed his junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley at
Oropesa, and was proceeding to Madrid. The Junta then, with as much
alacrity as it had sent counter-orders before, directed General Vanegas
to move forward, and constituted him Captain-General of the province of
Madrid; so that, upon his arrival there, he would be superior to General
Cuesta, under whose orders up to that moment he had been placed.
Although by this conduct the general effect of the plan proposed by Sir
Arthur Wellesley was destroyed, yet he resolved to attack the corps of
Marshal Victor, and on the morning of the 23d moved his columns for that
purpose into a wood close to the Alberche, and stretching along the
right of the French army.
The plan of the movement which he determined upon, was to cross the
river, attack the right of Marshal Victor with the whole of the British
infantry, move the whole cavalry upon the centre of the enemy, and
engage their left with the Spanish infantry.
The corps of Marshal Victor was 22,000 men; the allied army was 50,000.
The troops of which it was composed were not all of equally good
materials; but the number of English only would almost have secured
success if the attack had taken place. General Cuesta, however, refused
to march till the following morning; and Sir Arthur Wellesley with
considerable reluctance was constrained to yield to his determination.
Some alterations were made in the course of the night in the disposition
of the troops. General Bassecour, with a Spanish division, was ordered
to the left of the British, and was to have passed the Alberche in the
rear of the enemy. Sir R. Wilson, who commanded a corps of light troops,
Spanish and Portuguese, was also ordered still further along the banks
of the Alberche to Escalona.
Marshal Victor, however, got information of the intended attack, and
retired from his position in the night. Nothing could have been more
unfortunate for the allied army; infinitely superior in numbers, it was
at the point of making a combined attack upon him, from which it would
seem almost impossible he should have escaped without considerable loss;
by his retreat unhurt, the nature of the campaign was changed, and the
bright prospects of the allies destroyed.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, since his arrival at Talavera, had complained of
the total failure on the part of the Spaniards in the supply of his army
with provisions. The necessities of the British troops made it
impossible to advance; and after the retreat of the French army, Sir
Arthur Wellesley was compelled to remain at Talavera till supplies
should arrive to him: but recommended the Spaniards, who had not the
same deficiencies, to move upon Cavalla, upon the road to Toledo, and
endeavour to communicate with General Vanegas, who was still supposed to
have made some movement in La Mancha. General Cuesta, however, without
communicating with Sir Arthur Wellesley, took the road to Sta. Olalla,
where he arrived with the whole Spanish army on the morning of the 25th.
From this place he gave notice of the defection of the corps of Vanegas.
On the morning of the 26th General Cuesta’s advance was attacked by the
advanced guard of the French army. It appeared that Joseph had called
General Sebastiani from La Mancha to Toledo; that with all the force he
could withdraw from Madrid, he had marched himself to join him; and that
he had formed a junction with these two corps and the corps of General
Victor, at or near Torrijos; that he had immediately advanced upon
General Cuesta; and was in hopes of beating him before he should be
joined by the British. General Cuesta, however, upon learning the force
of the enemy, retired to Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley had endeavoured
to find a situation in which to fight a battle in front of the Alberche;
but not having succeeded, determined to take up a position, the right
upon the town of Talavera, the left upon some heights, about a mile to
the northward of it. The Spanish army retired during the 26th and 27th,
and took up the ground marked out for it about the town of Talavera. On
the morning of the 27th Sir Arthur Wellesley sent a brigade of cavalry
and two brigades of infantry; the whole under the orders of Major
General Mackenzie, to watch the enemy upon the left of the Alberche, and
to protect the retreat of the Spaniards.
Towards two o’clock in the afternoon the French advance of cavalry began
to skirmish with the British. Major General Mackenzie soon after
retired, and about four o’clock passed the Alberche with the whole of
his corps. He took up a position in a wood upon the right bank of it,
from which he could observe the movements of the enemy.
Joseph had brought the whole of his army to the opposite side of the
river; and believing (from the small number of troops that were to be
seen upon the right bank,) that the allies were retreating, he
determined to push in their advanced guard immediately, with the hope of
falling upon their army on its march to the bridge of Almaraz; to which
place alone, after abandoning the line of the Alberche, he thought it
could be retiring. The French infantry passed the river; the brigade of
Colonel Donkin, which was posted to defend it, was to a certain degree
surprised. The river was fordable at all points, and the French advanced
guard fell upon this brigade and caused it considerable loss. Sir Arthur
Wellesley (who had just arrived upon the ground) ordered the whole of
Major General Mackenzie’s division to retire from the wood, and to fall
back upon the position in the rear, into which the army was at this time
moving. The French, elated with their first, successes, pushed forward
as rapidly as the passage of their troops would allow, and threw their
right forward, with the view of turning the town of Talavera. The Duke
of Albuquerque shewed, however, so good a front with the cavalry under
his orders (which was in a plain upon the left of the British,) that
this movement was considerably delayed. Sir Arthur Wellesley was
tempted, (while a part only of the French army had passed the Alberche),
to attack it with the whole of the allies; but upon considering the
lateness of the hour, he continued his movement to the position he had
fixed upon. The British advanced guard retired under cover of the
cavalry, and took up the ground allotted to it. The French continued to
press forward; and, at last, when it was nearly dark, brought a battery
of six guns, supported by a considerable corps of infantry, to some high
ground opposite the height upon which the left of the British was to
rest. The troops destined for this point had not at that moment reached
it. Colonel Donkin’s brigade, which was retiring near it, was ordered to
form at the foot of the hill upon the left of the Germans under General
Sherbrooke. But the French, supported by their guns, attacked these
corps, drove them from the ground they occupied, and carried the height.
Lieutenant General Hill’s and Major General R. Stewart’s brigades were
at that moment ascending it from the other side; their advance found the
French upon the top. The battalion of detachments under Colonel Bunbury
wheeled into line, charged, and retook the hill. The French, however,
returned to the attack, but were finally driven to the foot of it. The
action upon this point was severe; Major General Hill was at one moment
mixed with the French soldiers; several men of both armies were killed
or wounded with the bayonet, but the gallantry of British soldiers, and
the intrepidity of their officers, prevailed.
During this attack, the Spanish troops were alarmed by the fire of the
French, who were following the British cavalry in its retreat through
the centre of the allies; they immediately began a fire which was taken
up by the whole of the first line. Several of the officers of the Guards
who were standing in front of their men, and many of the light troops of
the Germans who were posted in advance, were killed or wounded by this
fire. The French, however, were checked by it, and remained without
making any further attack during the night. It appeared afterwards that
the French officers discovered that the whole army was in front of
Talavera, only from the firing which has just been described; they were
ignorant of any position about that town, and, therefore, till then, had
given out to their soldiers that the allied army was retiring.
At day-break on the 28th the French recommenced their attack with 14,000
men, by assaulting the hill from which they had been driven the night
before. Their troops had been collected during dark, and were formed at
the bottom of the height; they moved at a signal given, and succeeded in
ascending to a considerable distance before they were checked by the
fire of the British. From the conical shape of this hill it was
difficult to form any considerable number of men to defend it: but the
regiments which were on it charged the French troops with an impetuosity
they were unable to resist, and drove them, with considerable loss and
in total confusion, beyond the ground from which they had moved to the
attack.
The British cavalry had been ordered up to charge the French right as
they were retiring, but unfortunately it was at too great a distance to
effect this object.
After the failure of this attempt upon the hill, the French continued to
cannonade the British line for a considerable time; but the fire ceased
at length on both sides, and perfect tranquillity reigned throughout the
opposing armies. During this interval, Sir Arthur Wellesley communicated
with General Cuesta near a house in the centre of the lines, and
afterwards slept, till some fresh movements in the enemy’s camp were
reported to him.
Joseph, having been defeated in the several efforts he had made upon the
British left, determined to try his fortune upon the centre of the
allied army. The attack which followed was made under cover of a wood of
olives, and fell principally upon the brigade commanded by Major General
Alexander Campbell; this officer had taken advantage of some high banks
which intersected the ground he occupied, and through the means of which
he was enabled, with a very inferior force, to arrest the progress of
the enemy’s principal column. Being at one time, however, driven from
one of these banks, he rallied the regiment which was retiring, charged
the column which was pursuing him, drove it from the ground of which it
had taken possession, and took twelve pieces of artillery; at the same
time some squadrons of the Spanish regiment of cavalry of the King,
charged the head of a French column of infantry which was advancing
through the wood (in pursuit of some Spanish infantry that had given
way,) and cut up a considerable part of it. Thus terminated the second
attack of the memorable 28th of July; the enemy was completely repulsed,
with the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery upon different points,
and a very considerable number of his best troops. His failures seemed
decisive of the day; another pause ensued, considerable movements on the
part of the enemy were observed, and for some time were construed by the
allied army as indicative of a retreat; but the severest action was yet
to come.
The whole état major of the French was observed to have collected in
front of the left of the British; after some consultation amongst the
officers who composed it, they appeared to have decided upon a new
arrangement of their army. The aides-de-camp were despatched in
different directions, and soon after the French divisions were observed
to be moving to their new destinations. It now seemed to be the
intention of the enemy to bring the great body of his force to act upon
that part of the British line which was occupied by the Guards; and, at
the same time, to move with three columns of infantry and a regiment of
cavalry, along the valley which extended under the height which formed
the left of the British line. These columns were supported by some light
infantry, which the enemy had thrown upon the chain of hills which run
westward beyond the valley, and which were destined to turn the British
left and attack it upon the flank and rear.
To meet this movement Sir Arthur Wellesley directed the cavalry (which
was concealed in the valley) to be prepared to charge the columns of
infantry, as soon as they should have extended their formation, and
exposed their flank. He also directed the guards to be prepared for the
attack which was going to be made upon them, and upon no account to move
from the ground they occupied.
The French columns of infantry which had moved into the valley, were
more advanced than those destined for the attack upon the Guards; they
had halted near a house within gun-shot of the British left, and
appeared to be waiting for orders to advance. Major General Payne, who
commanded the British cavalry, seized this opportunity to attack them;
the enemy, observing the forward movement of the cavalry, formed himself
against the side of this house in solid column; he had a deep ravine, or
water-course, along his front, of which the British cavalry was not
aware, and he was besides supported by sixteen guns. The charge of the
cavalry was thrown into confusion by this ravine; many of the horses
fell into it; and the portion which got over it was so divided and
broken as a body, that the effect of the charge was completely done
away. The bravery of the British soldier was not, however, to be daunted
by this check. The Honourable Major Ponsonby led the men who were near
him upon the bayonets of the enemy; but their valour could not
compensate for the total confusion into which they had been thrown. The
bravery of individuals could effect nothing against a solid body of
infantry; the soldiers who were repulsed by the French columns galloped
forward upon the regiment of cavalry which supported them, and in a
short time the whole plain was covered with British dragoons dispersed
in all directions, and totally without formation. In this state they
were charged by some French regiments which were in reserve; many of
them were taken, the remainder passed through the intervals in the
French columns, and those that escaped their fire, (of whom Lord William
Russel was one), retired within the British lines.
In this attack the 23d Light Dragoons lost two-thirds of its number; its
charge was injudicious; the ground in front had not been reconnoitred,
and the French infantry was too strongly posted to promise it success.
The order for the cavalry was to charge when the French columns had
extended and exposed their flank. They had done neither when the attack
was made, but the bravery with which it was conducted, put an end to the
movements which the enemy had intended on that side; and he never
stirred afterwards from the ground upon which he was formed.
Sir Arthur Wellesley observed this hesitation, and profited by it, in
detaching the 48th Regiment, (which he had called for the defence of the
height when it was threatened with an attack), to support the movement
which the guards had at this moment made upon the enemy. These troops,
with a part of Major General Cameron’s brigade, had been attacked by the
whole reserve of the French army; but they had received it with so
tremendous a fire, that they forced it to give way; charged it with
great impetuosity; and pursued it into a wood. They had not proceeded to
any great distance, however, when the enemy brought so considerable a
number of guns to bear upon their flank, that in a very few moments all
their mounted officers were killed or wounded and near 500 of their men.
In this situation the Guards were forced to fall back in considerable
confusion: they passed through the intervals of the 48th Regiment, which
had just arrived to support them, and which checked the advance of the
enemy. The attack was most severe upon this regiment; it maintained its
ground in the most gallant manner, till the guards had re-formed, and
moved forward to its support. When the French perceived these troops
advancing, they retired; the Guards instantly huzza’d; the cry was
echoed along the whole line; the enemy continued their retreat; and thus
ended the last achievement of the battle of Talavera. The enemy was soon
perceived to be moving to the rear; he shewed a considerable force of
cavalry, and maintained a heavy cannonade to cover the retreat; and at
the close of the day he had already passed a portion of his troops
across the Alberche.
There never was a more extraordinary battle than the one which has now
been described: the French brought into the field a force of not less
than 47,000 men, and the whole of their attacks, with the most trifling
exception, were directed against the British army, not exceeding 18,000
infantry, and 1,500 cavalry. Yet the British general had nerve to
maintain the contest, and ability to baffle the efforts of the enemy.
The army displayed a courage and perseverance, which did justice to the
confidence with which its commander had relied upon it; and proved to
Spain and to the world, what the dauntless spirit of the British soldier
is capable of effecting, when under the direction of such an officer.
The enemy did justice to the talent of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and to the
unrivalled bravery of his troops; Marshal Victor admitted to an English
officer who was taken prisoner, that much as he had heard of the
gallantry of English soldiers, still he could not have believed that any
men could have been led to attacks so desperate as some that he had
witnessed in the battle of Talavera. The glory of the British arms shone
forth in brighter colours on this memorable day than it had ever done
amidst its countless triumphs of years preceding. The soldiers struggled
against privations of every description; as well as against a force
which seemed calculated to overwhelm them; their native valour spurred
them on to conquest, and stifled every feeling which could arrest or
make it doubtful.
On the morning of the 29th, the light division of 3,000 men, under Major
General Crawford, joined the army from Oropesa; it was immediately
ordered to form the advance, and take up a position in the front of the
field of battle. The allies were employed in attending their wounded,
and burying or burning the dead of both armies.
The British loss was 5,000 men in killed or wounded; the loss of the
Spaniards was much inferior. The French loss was estimated by themselves
at 14,000 men. Joseph retired in the course of the 29th with the
greatest part of his army, to Sta. Olalla; a rear guard of 6,000 men was
left at Casas Leguas, to cover his retreat, but it retired on the night
of the 30th, and joined the corps to which it belonged, near Toledo.
The army of General Vanegas, which had advanced from Madrilejos, in
obedience to the orders of the supreme Junta, had arrived upon the
Tagus, near Aranjuez and Toledo on the 28th. The advance of his corps
pushed on in the night to within a short distance of Madrid, and took
some patroles which had been sent out from the garrison; but General
Vanegas having heard that the French army was retreating towards the
capital from the field of Talavera, recalled the parties that had
crossed the Tagus, and abandoned any further offensive operations. Sir
Arthur Wellesley (who was still unable to advance, from the total want
of provisions in which the Spaniards kept him) recommended to General
Cuesta to form a junction with General Vanegas; but while this movement
was in contemplation, information was brought from Placencia, that the
corps of Soult was moving upon that town, and that the troops at Bejar,
hearing of its advance, had abandoned that position, and left the road
open to its march. Sir Arthur Wellesley could hardly believe that the
strong positions about Bejar had been so hastily given up; the corps of
Marshal Beresford was ready to have assisted the troops in occupation of
them, and a brigade of British, under the orders of Major General
Catling Crawford, was within a few days’ march, and would have assisted
in their defence. But the intelligence being soon after confirmed, Sir
Arthur Wellesley decided to carry the British army to attack General
Soult; and proposed to General Cuesta to remain in the position of
Talavera, to cover the movement of the English upon Placencia. Sir
Arthur Wellesley also proposed to leave his wounded in charge of General
Cuesta, to whose kindness and generosity he intrusted them, with a
solemn promise from him, that if any thing should oblige the Spanish
army to retire, his first care should be, to move the British to a place
of safety. General Cuesta was delighted with the plan which was proposed
to him. He felt that his own army was unequal to any contest with the
French in an open plain, and that it must be to the British only, that
he could look for the expulsion of the enemy from his rear; he also
expressed himself most particularly gratified by the confidence which
Sir Arthur Wellesley reposed in him, intrusting the wounded to his care.