armies, a short time before the battle of Ocaña, seized the opportunity,
which was offered by the destruction of the central army of Spain, to
detach a considerable corps against the Duke del Parque, who had lately
succeeded in occupying Salamanca. The French were fortunate enough to
bring his army to action at Alba de Tormes, and, in spite of the good
conduct of some of his troops, entirely to disperse it. The defeat of
this corps laid the north of Portugal open to the incursions of the
French; the whole of Castile fell into their possession; Salamanca
became a depôt, from whence they could prepare the means of a powerful
attack; and there no longer remained a force that could oppose or delay
their operations.
Lord Wellington saw the absolute necessity of removing his army to the
north of the Tagus, to oppose the invasion which was thus preparing. He
had no longer any Spanish armies that he could co-operate with; the only
two, of any considerable force, with which he was in communication, had
brought destruction upon themselves, without either listening to his
counsels, or communicating to him their movements; they were now no
longer in a state to be of any assistance to him, nor could he protect
them against the powerful reinforcements which were arriving from
Germany to the French, and which bid fair to over-run the whole of the
Peninsula. The system of war was now to be completely changed. When Lord
Wellington entered Spain, the Spaniards had an army of considerable
strength, with which he had hoped to co-operate with effect against a
comparatively small and extended force of French. The tables were now
reversed; the Spanish armies could scarcely be said to have any military
existence; they had proved that, while in strength, they were not to be
depended upon, much less were they to be looked to for any assistance in
their present state. The French were marching an army of more than
100,000 men into the country; so that a defensive war was the only one
which could be carried on against them. Lord Wellington was convinced
that the hostility of the Spaniards to the French was not to be
overcome: although their armies were beaten from the field, yet the
determined opposition of the people repelled the yoke which was
attempted to be forced upon them. The nature of the country was
favourable to a protracted, desultory warfare; and its extent and
poverty seemed to bid defiance to a subjection, which, to be made
complete, would require a more considerable force than France seemed
able to afford, or Spain could produce the means of supporting. As far
as experience could lead to any conclusion as to the future, in the new
warfare which the Spanish nation was waging against its invaders, there
appeared no advantage to the enemy from the occupation of any part of
the country, for any period of time. The moment a province was
evacuated, it rose in more determined hostility, than it had shewn
before its invasion. No advantage accrued to the French from either
violent or conciliating measures; they were always looked upon as
enemies; and, after months of peaceable occupation, if they exposed
themselves unprotected by numbers in the provinces which they had
considered as subdued, they were sure of meeting with the same hostility
they had from the first experienced.
With this state of things to direct Lord Wellington in the system of
warfare upon which he was called upon to decide, he felt no hesitation
in prescribing to himself, and to the allies, a conduct which should
protract the war; should lead the enemy to extend his forces; should
encourage the whole people of the Peninsula to intercept his
communications; and should give the governments of the countries engaged
in the contest, the opportunity of increasing and improving the more
regular means of resistance or attack.
Lord Wellington moved his army in the beginning of December, from the
neighbourhood of Badajos to the North of the Tagus. It arrived, in the
first weeks of January, in the new cantonments which had been prepared
for it; they extended from Coimbra to Pinhel, while a corps, under
Lieutenant General Hill, was left at Abrantes. In this position the army
went into winter-quarters: it was abundantly supplied, and was employed
only in recruiting itself from the dreadful effects of the preceding
campaign, and the sickness which had followed it. Head-quarters were
placed at Viseu.
While Lord Wellington was employed in this movement, Marshal Soult
concentrated the French armies in La Mancha; for the purpose of making
an irruption into the southern provinces of Spain.
The British officers who had been at the Carolina were satisfied, that,
notwithstanding the boasted impossibility of forcing the Spanish army at
the pass of Des Peña Perros, there was in reality nothing easier. The
pass itself was strong, but no fortifications, which deserved that name,
had been thrown up to defend it. The old road from Madrid, by the Puerto
del Rey, was almost unobserved; and the force which was employed to
defend the position of the Sierra Morena, which was fifty leagues in
extent, did not exceed 25,000 men, most of them the unfortunate
fugitives from the battle of Ocaña. With such an army, it would have
been impossible for the most able commander to have defended the entry
into Andalusia; but even that chance was denied the Spaniards, for they
still had General Arisaga at their head. The Junta Suprema was urged to
make some exertion to recruit the Spanish forces, and to prepare for the
struggle which was fast approaching; but that body could only prove its
patriotism by echoing the national cry, that Spaniards were invincible.
Several nuns, who believed themselves inspired prophetesses, were
produced to the loyal inhabitants of Seville, to assure them, that if
ever the French should see the walls of that town, the fire of heaven
would fall upon them, before they should reach its gates. In many other
towns the same prophetic inspiration descended upon the nuns; they
foretold in every instance the destruction which awaited the invaders;
but the misfortunes they were themselves to suffer, appear not to have
been so correctly foreseen by them. The preparations of the French in La
Mancha seemed, however, at last to have roused the Junta from its state
of apathy; Seville and the world were called as witnesses of its new
vigour, by a decree for the fabrication of 100,000 _knives_, to be
distributed amongst the voluntary defenders of the country. This piece
of absurdity will hardly be credited by those who were not at Seville at
the moment; yet it is a fact which stands recorded amongst the vigorous
measures of the Junta, and will hereafter be a standard to judge of the
hands to which the defence of Spain was at that time intrusted. The
credit of the Junta, which had been fast declining, was completely
destroyed by the promulgation of this decree; to raise itself again in
the estimation of the public, it published an order for the assembling
of the Cortes; but its race was nearly run, all confidence in it was
gone, and a few days more completed the term of its existence.
Marshal Soult had terminated his preparations for the invasion of
Andalusia, towards the end of December; he had collected a force of
50,000 men, and commenced his movements in two columns; the more
considerable one, with the whole of his artillery, he destined to the
attack of the principal pass by the Carolina; the other was directed to
move by the mountain-road upon Cordova; neither of these corps
experienced any resistance: the much-talked-of pass of Des Peña Perros
was abandoned without a shot, and the Spanish army which was to defend
it, retired toward Jaen. The corps which moved upon Cordova was equally
successful. Marshal Soult directed a part of his army to pursue the
Spaniards upon Jaen, which had been fortified at very great expense, but
which surrendered a few hours after it was summoned. With the remainder
of his army he moved with great rapidity upon Seville.
When the Junta Suprema was made acquainted with the successful irruption
of the French, its first object was to escape to a place of safety, and
it made choice of Cadiz for this object; but its members had
considerable apprehensions, lest the populace, who were enraged against
them, should impede their flight. They fell, however, upon a most
extraordinary expedient to save themselves:—A bulletin was published by
authority, and distributed throughout Seville, stating, that a courier
to the British Minister had arrived, bringing dispatches from Lord
Wellington, who was moving with the British army upon Salamanca, and was
left with his advance within a few leagues of that place; that the
courier, had passed through the armies of the Dukes del Parque and
Albuquerque, who were within a short distance of each other, and were
about to fall upon the flank of Marshal Soult. Under cover of this
communication (the whole of which was false, for no courier whatsoever
had arrived at the British Minister’s, nor were any of the movements
making by any of the corps which were mentioned), the individuals who
composed the Junta, began to escape to Cadiz; the populace of Seville
were not long, however, in discovering the imposition which had been
practised upon them; and a pursuit of the Junta immediately commenced;
many of its members were seized upon the road to Cadiz, and imprisoned
in the convent of the Cartjuo, near _Xeres_; they were afterwards
carried to the Isla de Leon, where they were required to abdicate their
authority, and appoint a Regency. They concurred in these directions,
and named General Castanos (who was but just released from the
confinement in which they had placed him) the president of a board of
Regents, who were to govern the country in the name of Ferdinand the
Seventh.
While these changes were effecting, the people of Seville reinstated the
former Junta of their province, and added the Marquis of Romana, the
Duke of Albuquerque, and some English to its number; but this body had
not time to act; Marshal Soult was already within a few days’ march of
the town: it constituted, however, the Marquis of Romana Captain-General
of Estremadura; and directed the Duke of Albuquerque, who had brought
his corps with him from Estremadura, to take up a position at Carmona,
to defend the approach to Seville. The army which the duke commanded
was, however, too weak to resist the French; he therefore fell back upon
their approach; and, in spite of their efforts to prevent it, retired to
the Isla de Leon. To this place Marshal Soult pursued him, and thus, in
one movement, without a single action, reduced the whole of the southern
provinces of Spain to the subjection of France. He extended his army to
the walls of Gibraltar; he occupied Malaga, Granada, Jaen, Cordova, and
Seville, and he prepared for the siege of Cadiz, which was the only bar
to the complete reduction of Andalusia.
This operation was as rapid and as successful, as it was possible to
execute. The great resources of the Spanish monarchy were reduced at one
blow; the riches of Andalusia were abandoned to the enemy without a
struggle; and the great nursery of the Spanish armies, the provinces
from which innumerable bands of patriots might have been drawn, were at
once delivered into the hands of the invader. Some persons thought,
that, in the tame relinquishment of these treasures, they perceived a
readiness in the Spaniards to abandon the cause for which they had, till
that moment, so gloriously been struggling; but the fallacy of that
opinion has since been proved. The revolution in Spain had found that
country merged in all the vices of its former weak and imbecile
governments. Spain had not for many years been called into any extensive
warfare; it was without any military organization; it was unused to
great exertions; yet the people were proud of their former exploits;
and, without adverting to the changes which had taken place, believed
themselves and their armies as invincible, as they had been during the
most brilliant periods of their history. The nation had been long sunk
in ignorance and oppression; it had no military science, no commanders
to whom it could look for assistance, no army that could defend it; yet
it had universally risked a contest with the greatest military power the
world had ever seen; and which had armies, more powerful than any the
nation could oppose to them, within its territory. Elated by the first
successes at Baylen and Saragossa, the Spaniards afterwards sunk into
their former habits of indolence. Pride dictated to them a feeling of
security, which reason would have made them doubt; but their succeeding
reverses never changed their first opinions; although the total want of
confidence, in their generals or their governments, made them little
anxious to place themselves under their directions. The Supreme Junta,
which had been established to rule the country in circumstances of the
greatest difficulty, was totally unable to call forth the energies of
the nation. The same intrigues, which had existed under the long reign
of the Prince of the Peace, continued under its auspices. The want of
money was soon felt throughout the country, the Junta was unacquainted
with the means of obtaining it, and was not very scrupulous in the
application of the sums it received. The army was unpaid, and was
consequently without discipline. The generals were unsupported by the
government, which was too weak to uphold them in the execution of their
duty. The Juntas of the different provinces yielded but a limited
obedience to the central one; they were composed of persons who looked
most to their own advantage in the high situations to which they had
been called, and who were unwilling to make exertions, the burthen of
which would fall upon themselves. In this state of things, the
declaration that Spain was invincible, was the readiest mode of
abstaining from those efforts which were necessary to make her so, but
which accorded too little with the character of the people who were to
make them. Andalusia was in consequence totally unprepared for the blow
which was struck at her, her population however was not the less hostile
to the invaders; there was no point round which it could rally in the
hour of danger, the people sunk under the power of their enemies, but
they still were Spaniards; they moaned the cruel fate which had attended
them, but they remained steadfast through all their misery to the great
cause of their nation and their independence.
While Marshal Soult was employed in overrunning the southern provinces
of Spain, General Suchet (who in the month of June had defeated the army
of General Blake on the heights of Santa Maria), marched with a
considerable corps to reduce the kingdom of Valencia. He reached, with
little opposition, the walls of that capital; but the resistance of the
people was there so determined, and the means he brought with him so
inadequate to the task imposed upon him, that he retired from the
country without having effected any object for which he had commenced
his operation; he resumed his position in Arragon, and afterwards
employed himself in the siege of the fortresses of Catalonia.
The first act of the new regency of Spain was to request Lord Wellington
to afford some assistance from his army, for the garrison and defence of
Cadiz. Lord Wellington, in compliance, detached to that place a force of
3,000 men, which arrived there after a short passage from Lisbon, and
which contributed materially to its defence. The siege was begun under
the directions of Marshal Soult, in the end of January, 1810; and it
lasted almost without interruption till August 1812.
The great body of reinforcements that about this time arrived to the
French armies in Spain took the direction of Salamanca: it became
therefore evident that an attack on Portugal was determined upon.
Marshal Ney placed the advance of his corps upon the Agueda, and
threatened to invest Ciudad Rodrigo; but the difficulty of obtaining
provisions in the winter season prevented him from undertaking that
operation till later in the year. A detachment from the French army
attacked a part of the British rifle corps, under Colonel Beckwith, at
Barba del Puerco, but was repulsed with considerable loss. This was the
first affair which took place between the army, which was entitled that
of Portugal, and the British corps destined to defend that kingdom; it
was a sample of what its whole body was afterwards to meet with. Marshal
Ney, commanded in chief at Salamanca; General Junot was second to him.
These officers were anxious to engage Lord Wellington to break up from
his winter-quarters, and, if possible, to draw him into the open country
of Castile. With this view General Junot was detached to Astorga, to
undertake the siege of that town. Lord Wellington was not induced to
depart from the system which he had prescribed to himself, by the
movements of the enemy; he felt, that however important the possession
of Astorga might be to the cause he was employed in defending, yet it
was more essential to maintain his army in the positions it occupied,
and to preserve it unbroken for the great contest which, he foresaw, it
would soon be called upon to maintain. He remained, therefore, in
perfect quiet, recruiting his army, and giving the Portuguese the
opportunity of forming and improving their troops. Astorga was taken
after a defence of five weeks, and Junot returned with his corps to the
neighbourhood of Salamanca. Marshal Soult detached General Regnier with
his corps to operate in Estremadura against the Spanish troops, of which
the Marquis of Romana had the command. Lieutenant General Hill, who had
been left at Abrantes with a corps of 13,000 men, British and
Portuguese, advanced to Portalegre, to co-operate with them, and to
prevent the investment of Elvas or Badajos. He was directed, however,
not to engage in offensive operations. General Regnier effected little.
He had several engagements with parts of the Marquis of Romana’s corps,
but none of them were productive of any decisive results.
In the beginning of May, Lord Wellington was apprized of some movements
in the French army, which indicated an advance in strength upon Ciudad
Rodrigo; he lost not a moment in putting his army in motion, and placing
it on the frontiers of Portugal. He established his head-quarters at
Celorico, and his divisions at Pinhel, Alverca, Guarda, Trancoso, and
along the valley of the Mondego, as far as Cea, and upon the opposite
bank of that river at Fornos, Mangualde, and Viseu. He determined in
this position to await the movements of the enemy; he could decide from
it, in security, either to co-operate in the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo,
or to attack the French army if an opportunity was given him. Marshal
Ney moved, however, but a small corps to the neighbourhood of Ciudad
Rodrigo; the roads from Salamanca were still extremely bad, and
impracticable for a train of artillery; he gave up therefore any further
object. Marshal Massena was at this time sent by Buonaparte to take the
command of the army of Portugal, and he arrived at Salamanca in the end
of May. The corps of General Regnier was added to his army, which was
now composed of the 6th corps under Ney, the 8th corps under Junot, and
the second corps under Regnier. Massena brought this latter corps from
the south of the Tagus to the neighbourhood of Coria, from which place
it was in communication with him; and Lieutenant General Hill, who had
been directed to observe it, made a corresponding movement, crossed the
Tagus at Villa Velha, and established his head-quarters at Sarzedas.
Marshal Mortier was detached by Soult to supply the place of Regnier in
Estremadura; and the Marquis of Romana remained in observation of the
corps which that officer had brought with him. A reinforcement of some
regiments which had returned from the Walcheren expedition, was sent
about this time, under Major General Leith, from England. As the men
were extremely sickly, Lord Wellington did not choose to bring them to
the army; they were embodied with some regiments of Portuguese; and
placed upon the Zezere, where General Leith commanded the whole corps.
The force of the allied army destined for the defence of Portugal, may
be computed at the following amount:—
Men.
The Corps with Lord Wellington 30,000
The Corps with Lieutenant General Hill 14,000
The Corps with Major General Leith 10,000
——————
54,000
In co-operation with this force was a corps of Portuguese
Militia 10,000
The corps under the Marquis Romana 12,000
——————
Making a total of 76,000
The French force under Massena was
Men.
The Infantry of the 2d, 6th and 8th corps 62,000
The Cavalry 6,000
The Artillery, &c. 4,000
——————
Total 72,000
To this were afterwards joined two Divisions of
The 9th corps under Count Erlon 10,000
The remaining division of this corps under General Claparede 8,000
The corps of Marshal Mortier which cooperated to the south of
the Tagus, 13,000
———
Making a total of 103,000
These numbers are the very lowest at which the French army can be
calculated. Buonaparte always called the force under Massena alone
100,000 men; and the French officers, before the invasion of Portugal,
gave the same account of the numbers with which they were to overwhelm
us.
In comparing the amount of the two armies, the description of force of
which they were composed should be taken into consideration. The
Portuguese had as yet been perfectly untried; and their militia was so
defective in organization as to be evidently unfit for the operations of
a campaign. Yet Lord Wellington was not alarmed at the disparity of
numbers, or the superior organization of the troops of the enemy; he
relied upon his own genius to baffle their efforts, and combined his
plans with reference to the troops he had to command.
In the latter part of the year 1809, while Lord Wellington was still at
Badajos, he had contemplated the possibility of his being attacked in
Portugal by a superior force; he had considered the nature of the
country he should have to defend, as well as the system of warfare which
would most tend to support the contest in the Peninsula: he looked upon
the preservation of his own army as the guarantee of the future triumph
of the cause he was to maintain: the extension of the enemy, in the
occupation of distant provinces, must be a source of weakness to him;
the lengthening his communications must add considerably to his
embarrassments. Lord Wellington, therefore, fixed upon the heights of
Sobral and Torres Vedras, as the best positions in which he could
collect his army, and offer battle to the superior forces of his enemy.