1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had
been condemned by the Dykastery, because his trial had come
on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were
acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the
evidence against all was the same also—viz. nothing more than
the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who
hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe,
on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were
acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.
This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenes—unquestionably the
greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian
antiquity,—is the most painful result of the debates respecting
the exile Harpalus. Demosthenes himself denied the charge; but
unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged
in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive
conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the
circumstances as far as we know them—there are several which go to
show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we
are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we
must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenes
take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his
cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to
reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenes was from
the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures
for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that
Demosthenes began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he
was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian
treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on
the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents,
which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause
of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator
appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected
to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this
simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given,
expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by
indignant murmuring.[720] So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But
we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may indeed have been
disabled by sore throat from speaking at some particular assembly;
so far the story may be accurate; but that he desisted from opposing
Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly
not true; for we know from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperides,
that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus
and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander.
In fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes, as having from
subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his
prospects.[721] Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive
proof that Demosthenes was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus.
The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing
to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape
from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred;
and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of
favoring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to
hand over to a Macedonian executioner. Insofar as it was a crime not
to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed
as much by Phokion as by Demosthenes; and indeed more, seeing that
Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important
administrative duties—while Demosthenes was only an orator and mover
in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the
persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same
motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of
his money, and thus removed it from his own control.[722]
[720] Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X.
Oratt. p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth. Cod. 265, p. 494.
[721] See the fragment of Hyperides in Mr. Babington’s edition,
pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note),
insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenes had done
by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.
[722] In the Life of Demosthenes apud Photium (Cod. 265), the
service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for
which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as
I have stated it in the text—Demosthenes first spoke publicly
against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους
(~ὥς φασι~) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο
(then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of
sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described
as follows)—καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ προδοῦναι τὸν
ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, τά τε Ἁρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν
ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.
That Demosthenes should first oppose the reception of
Harpalus—and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus
to Antipater’s requisition—is here represented as a change of
politics requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it.
But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are
perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.
The charge therefore made against Demosthenes by his two
accusers,—that he received money _from_ Harpalus,—is one which all
the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole
case. Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling the money, after it
had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we
may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to
judge. Demosthenes had moved, and the people had voted, that these
treasures should be lodged in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis;
a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in
the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these
new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the
Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of
Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion
himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put
it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate
process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there
is no proof,—and in my judgment no probability,—that Demosthenes was
at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of
above £80,000—not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided
in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely
to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty
requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to
the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury
must have gone through this labor, providing the slaves or mules
requisite for carrying so heavy a burthen up to the acropolis.
Now we have ample evidence from the remaining Inscriptions, that
the details of transfering and verifying the public property, at
Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least
of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the
large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree
implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly
questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the
acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally
brought and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenes might surely
repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood
thereby to bind himself down as guarantee for its accuracy. An
adverse pleader, like Hyperides, might indeed turn a point in his
speech[723]—“_You_ told the assembly that there were 700 talents,
and now _you_ produce no more than half”—but the imputation wrapped
up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes, is utterly
groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make
report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury.
Demosthenes could only learn it from them; and it might certainly
be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform
himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give
publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we
neither know by whom, nor how soon.[724]
[723] Fragm. Hyperides, p. 7, ed. Babington—ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια
~φήσας~ εἶναι τάλαντα, ~νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις~;
In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperides reproaching
Demosthenes for not having kept effective custody over the
person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing
a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or
prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary jailers.
This is to make Demosthenes responsible for the performance of
_all_ the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct
of the treasurers and the jailers.
We must recollect that Hyperides had been the loudest advocate
of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians
to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the
charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenes, is,
that Demosthenes prevented this from being accomplished. Yet
here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that
Demosthenes did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the
sword of the Macedonian executioner!
The line of accusation taken by Hyperides is full of shameful
inconsistencies.
[724] In the Life of Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p.
846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest
chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to
the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακομισθέντων
μεμηνυκὼς μήτε τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμελείαν, etc. The biography apud
Photium seems to state it as if Demosthenes did not communicate
the amount, _at the time_ when he proposed the decree of
sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict,
from the testimony of Hyperides.
Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending
to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This conclusion will
certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed
by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and
evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenes for
the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides also was of
the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even
the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no
justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the
sums for which each of them is chargeable.[725] It appears to have
been made _ex-parte_, as far as we can judge—that is, made without
hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to
be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by
Hyperides and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which
the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenes demanded, as every
defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be
proved by some positive evidence, Hyperides sets aside the demand as
nothing better than cavil and special pleading.[726]
[725] Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις
πάσας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ
πεποίηται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ ~οὐδεμιᾷ προσγέγραφε,
δι᾽ ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει~· ἀλλ᾽ ~ἐπικεφάλαιον~ γράψασα, ὁπόσον
ἕκαστος εἴληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ὀφειλέτω....
[726] Hyperid. Frag. p. 20, ed. Babingt. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες
τὸ χρυσίον, ~ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν
βουλὴν σοῦ καταγνῶναι~ (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46, and
the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).
Hyperid. p. 16, ed Babingt. Καὶ ~συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλὴν~,
προκλήσεις προτιθεὶς, καὶ ~ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν
ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοὶ ὁ δοὺς, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ᾽
ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον
παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν~.
This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favor
of the defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the
accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.
The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperides and four other
orators procured (κατεσκεύασαν) the condemnation of Demosthenes
by the Areopagus.
One farther consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months
after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenes, Alexander
died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater
in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenes was then recalled;
received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as
had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of
Alkibiades; took a leading part in the management of the war; and
perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser
Hyperides.
Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenes, countenances the
conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances
of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but
political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.
There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active
support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed
various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his
views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing
them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to
judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperides himself,
as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest
recipients.[727] Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass,
though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the
flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian
case. When the tide of sentiment turned—when fear of Macedonian force
became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures
were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers
of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves
probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in
demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover,
the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no
more than 350 were forthcoming.[728] It was indispensable that some
definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly
in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through
the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander
about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the
guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of
persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private
accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenes himself
was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the
Areopagites.
[727] The biographer of Hyperides (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt.
p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself
unbribed; the comic writer Timokles names Hyperides along with
Demosthenes and others as recipients (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).
[728] See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.
Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now
it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent
in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when
published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead
of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is,
that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in
investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming
to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did
agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling
out Demosthenes as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and
embodying Demades also, by way of compromise, in the same list of
delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious.
I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular
with both the reigning parties: with the philo-Macedonians, from long
date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians,
because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers
count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of
course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base
creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both
parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that
to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of
finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.
Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It
leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion;
but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable;
while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure
of dangers from without, worked upon by party-intrigues within.[729]
[729] We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian
admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves
of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom
his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenes was _not_ among
them. As far as this statement goes, it serves to exculpate
Demosthenes. Yet I cannot assign so much importance to it as
Bishop Thirlwall seems to do. His narrative of the Harpalian
transactions is able and discriminating (Hist. vol. vii. ch. 56.
p. 170 _seqq._).
During the half-year and more which elapsed between the arrival of
Harpalus at Athens, and the trial of Demosthenes, one event at least
of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nicanor
to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal
letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its
citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint
of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival
by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was
heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered
there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus:
“King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities—We have not
been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your
restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about
this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not
recall you of their own accord.”[730]
[730] Diodor. xix. 8.
It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints
and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing
auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript
had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders farther,
to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian
cities;[731] and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but
restitution of their properties.[732]
[731] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington.
[732] Curtius, x. 2, 6.
That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of
sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each
city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on
his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting
aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of
Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to
attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling
in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It
proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the hellenic world.
Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander, were sure to
look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities,
and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of
the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant
obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have
refused to execute the order.[733] It is one evidence of the disgust
raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenes is severely
reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or
sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly
consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.[734]
[733] Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that
the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except
the Athenians and Ætolians—cannot be credited. It was popular,
doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate
friends.
[734] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81; compare Hyperid. Fragm. p.
36, ed. Babington.
In the winter or early spring of 323 B. C. several Grecian
cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against
the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them; but
we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.[735]
There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during
this winter and spring (323 B. C.). The disbanded soldiers
out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenes,
an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the
command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from
Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with
the Ætolians.[736] Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by
Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus
to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance
of the troops who had accompanied him over.
[735] Diodor. xvii. 113.
[736] Diodor. xvii. 111: compare xviii. 21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5;
viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenes brought over 50,000 of these
mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnesus, during the lifetime of
Alexander, and against Alexander’s will. The number here given
seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some
to come across.—Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance
was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander
himself during the latter months of his life, in reference to the
mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the
magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.
Such was the general position of affairs, when Alexander died at
Babylon in June 323 B. C. This astounding news, for which no
one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout
Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favorable
prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian
dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic
Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus:[737] Alexander
had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast
empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands.
Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various
subject neighbors.[738]
[737] A striking comparison made by the orator Demades (Plutarch,
Apophthegm. p. 181).
[738] See Frontinus, Stratagem, ii. 11, 4.
No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the
anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people
to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to
organize a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenes
was then in exile; but Leosthenes, Hyperides and other orators of the
same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a
strenuous feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition
on the part of Phokion and his partisans.[739] The rich men for the
most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were
fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the
hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly
proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200
quadriremes, and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians
under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that
envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly
invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation.[740]
Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects,
still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his
functions as one of the generals.[741] But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and
others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously
assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.
[739] Plutarch, Phokion, 23. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there
appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by
that author in his history of these transactions; one which he
ascribes to Hyperides instigating the war, the other to Phokion,
against it (Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 668).
[740] Diodor. xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent
the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenes. He seems to
fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents
which he had carried away from Asia; but it is certain, that no
more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the
Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming.
Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with himself, when he says
afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in
Krete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries,
and carried them over to Kyrênê in Africa.
[741] It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if
true) must be referred—The Athenians were eager to invade Bœotia
unseasonably; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept
them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and
upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head
(Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 818).
Leosthenes, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself
at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed
across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and
Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for
expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards
Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favor and encouragement almost
everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the
Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Athamantes, and Dolopes; by
most of the Malians, Œtæans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis;
by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises
were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian
tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians,
Trœzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the
league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.[742] These adhesions were
partly procured by Hyperides and other Athenian envoys, who visited
the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round
in like matter to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides
were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public
assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the
side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully
seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile
in Peloponnesus.
[742] Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.
To Demosthenes the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of
organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance
of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly
embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian
envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the
various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he
thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed
a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him
to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The
archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to
the harbor to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full
of impassioned emotion, Demosthenes poured forth his gratitude for
having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater
even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiades on returning
from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted
by force. His fine could not be remitted, consistently with Athenian
custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents
as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his
execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the
fine.[743]
[743] Plutarch, Demosth. 27.
What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we
are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on,
under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against
Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that
which had resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. Nevertheless, the
name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy
drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for
emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in
the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven
years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of
Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa,
Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received
from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well
aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued
pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also
that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and
in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had
been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander’s
orders in the preceding summer;[744] for we find no mention made
of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a
considerable land-force to join Leosthenes at Thermopylæ; a citizen
force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries
besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered
them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenes
himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his
army, attacked the Bœotian troops, gained a complete victory, and
opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster,
including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater,
who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force
immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry—and with
a fleet of 110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.[745]
[744] See the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ
περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων ... we do
not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it
seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time
when Alexander’s decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated.
[745] Diodor. xviii. 13.
Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing
assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the
energetic movements of Leosthenes. Still less was he prepared for
the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed
an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength
to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian
commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, etc., soliciting
reinforcements; but in the mean time, though inferior in numbers,
he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenes. In
the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and
even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia;
so that no resource was left to him except the fortified town of
Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of
Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came
from Asia. Leosthenes immediately commenced the siege of Lamia,
and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to
storm the town; but its fortifications were strong, with a garrison
ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss.
Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as
had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip
and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege
into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting
the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding,
and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked
bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other
cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.[746] Phokion, on
hearing the confident language of those around him remarked—“The
stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly, but I fear
we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course.”[747]
At this critical moment, Leosthenes, in inspecting the blockading
trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from
one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.[748]
A funeral oration in his honor, as well as in that of the other
combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperides,
on whom the people devolved that duty in preference to Demosthenes.
[746] Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.
[747] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23; Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p.
803.
[748] Diodor. xviii. 12, 13.
The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a
hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the
last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and
one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels.
But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenes had
displayed military genius and ardor along with Panhellenic purposes.
His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity.
The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous
army of Greeks, who after the battle, easily persuaded themselves
that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under
promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenes, the
Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained
leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended.[749]
When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there
had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred
to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate,
Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name
Phokion had been made and rejected.[750] But during this interval
there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to
keep the army together; so that the precious moments for rendering
the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled
to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his
aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from
the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers
to surrender at discretion[751]—with which condition he refused to
comply.
[749] Diodor. xviii. 13-15.
[750] Plutarch, Phokion, 24.
[751] Diodor. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.
Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But
before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had
crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of
Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that
Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and
to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade,
and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from
Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigor and success.
Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under
Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over
Leonnatus, who was himself slain;[752] and the Macedonian phalanx
having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to
more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with
the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up with the
troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not
however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army
from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground,
out of the reach of cavalry.[753]
[752] Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii. 14, 15: compare
Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.
[753] Diodor. xviii. 15.
During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly,
it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of
a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the
eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian
fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the
Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades,
at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The
Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were
made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up
the losses sustained.[754] Our information is not sufficient to
reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems
probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through
Œniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the
Ætolians;[755] and perhaps this may have been the reason why the
Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.
[754] Diodor. xviii. 15.
[755] Diodor. xviii. 8.
In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic
liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital
opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia,
still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means
of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian
contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution
of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was
quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising
reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not
like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much
prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties,
hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army
of Antiphilus in Thessaly became much thinned,[756] though still
remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of
Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel
him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow
under Kraterus.
[756] Diodor. xviii. 17.
In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian
commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go
back to June 323 B. C., the period of Alexander’s death, and
to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had
fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the
last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.
On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its
large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except
a child named Herakles, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of
his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of
the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth
of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused
Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married to be entrapped
and assassinated along with her sister.[757] There was, however,
at Babylon, a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip
by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in
intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia,
there were Olympias, Alexander’s mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow
of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynanê,[758] another sister, widow of
Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him);
all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the
deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.
[757] Plutarch, Alexand. 77.
[758] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.
After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at
Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip
Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister;
among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions
of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to
Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia,
and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to
Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and
Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenes; Media, to Pithon. The eastern
satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.
In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to
Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with
Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to
Antipater and Kraterus.[759] We thus find the Grecian cities handed
over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left
by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of
deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.
[759] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. _ut supra_; Diodor. xviii.
3, 4; Curtius, x. 10; Dexippus, Fragmenta ap. Photium, Cod. 82,
ap. Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 667, ed. Didot (De Rebus post
Alexandrum).
All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants,
administering portions of an empire one and indivisible, under
Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority,
bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the
horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of
vizir,[760] and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at
this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that
Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to
leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for
himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the
other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity
of the empire, contending against severality and local independence.
In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most
effective auxiliary was Eumenes of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for
several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings
of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathes (who
had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to
transfer it to Eumenes, to whom it had been allotted in the general
scheme of division.[761]
[760] Arrian and Dexippus—De Reb. post Alex. _ut supra_: compare
Diodor. xviii. 48.
[761] Diodor. xviii. 16.
At the moment of Alexander’s death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at
the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had been
directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain
there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to
Asia with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of
written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most
gigantic scale; for western conquest—transportation of inhabitants
by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection
of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and
Macedonia, etc. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers
and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for
any one but Alexander to think of.[762] Kraterus and Antipater had
each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors
of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not
venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of
these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of
the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering
upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra
at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of
Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him
(through Hekatæus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after
the defeat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation
against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist
Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the
government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.[763] This scheme
remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus
was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death
was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more
than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous
rival.
[762] Diodor. xviii. 4.
[763] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.
It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to
conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater to
whom he ceded the command, found himself at the head of a powerful
army—40,000 heavy infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 3000 archers and
slingers. He again marched into Thessaly against the Greeks under
Antiphilus; and the two armies came in sight on the Thessalian plains
near Krannon. The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry, and 3500
cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, of admirable efficiency.
The soldiers in general were brave, but insubordinate; while the
contingents of many cities had gone home without returning, in spite
of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined
by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer
fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with
his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry,
the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of
Antipater’s infantry, and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They
were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the
Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult
neighboring ground, where they were soon joined by their victorious
cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men; that of
the Macedonians, 120.[764]
[764] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.
The defeat of Krannon (August 322 B. C.) was no way
decisive or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit
of Leosthenes, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of
the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make
head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding counsel, declined to
await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the
necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater;
who however returned for answer, that he would not recognize or
treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no
propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian
commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke
reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation
of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such
reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and
successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately,
the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after
city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted
lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætolians. In
a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with
the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward
as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on
the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days’ march of
Athens.[765]
[765] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.
Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the
Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian
orators, especially Demosthenes and Hyperides, retired from the city
at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina.
Phokion and Demades, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater,
were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and
petitioners for lenient terms. Demades is said to have been at this
time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been
indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the
Graphê Paranomon; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief,
to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion
nor Demades, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in
anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same
terms as Leosthenes had required from Antipater himself at Lamia.
Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate
terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty
that Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which
he returned to Athens with the answer. The people had no choice
except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater;[766] and
Phokion and Demades came back to Thebes to learn his determination.
This time they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokrates—the
successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school
of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokrates had long
resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and
intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath
of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before
this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have
been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact,
Xenokrates did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to
silence by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to
a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added to his
honor, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than
either of the other envoys.[767]
[766] Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, who had held a bold
language and taken active part against Antipater throughout
the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue
recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such
was the story connected with his statue, erected a few years
afterwards at Athens, representing him in the costume of an
orator, but with a sword in hand—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 847:
compare Polybius, xii. 13.
[767] Plutarch, Phokion, 27; Diodor. xviii. 18.
According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians
were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war;
to surrender Demosthenes, Hyperides, and seemingly at least two
other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in
Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution and disfranchise
all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be
transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign
shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dipossessed and the
island retransferred to the Samian exiles and natives.
It is said that Phokion and Demades heard these terms with
satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokrates entered against
them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted, when he
said[768]—“If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are
moderate; if as freemen, they are severe.” To Phokion’s entreaty,
that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with,
Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would
be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians;
while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the
proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was
prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.
[768] Plutarch, Phokion, 27. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἠγάπησαν
ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ Ξενοκράτους, etc.
Pausanias even states (vii. 10, 1) that Antipater was disposed
to grant more lenient terms, but was dissuaded from doing so by
Demades.
If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he
expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander
had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison
can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens,
all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ
were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number
below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty,
was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as
turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9000 richest citizens, the “party
of order”, were left in exclusive possession, not only of the
citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out
of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast,
some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude
banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked
anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonides,
the friend of Demosthenes, and one of his earnest advocates when
accused respecting the Harpalian treasures.[769] At the request
of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less
sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some
exiles, Agnonides among the rest, to remain within the limits of
Peloponnesus.[770] We shall see him presently contemplating a still
more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.
[769] See Fragments of Hyperides adv. Demosth. p. 61-65, ed.
Babington.
[770] Diodor. xviii. 18. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν μυρίων
(instead of δισμυρίων, which seems a mistake) καὶ δισχιλίων
μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος· οἱ δὲ τὴν ὡρισμένην τίμησιν ἔχοντες
περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, ἀπεδείχθησαν κύριοι τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς
χώρας, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἐπολιτεύοντο. Plutarch states
the disfranchised as above 12,000.
Plutarch, Phokion, 28, 29. Ὅμως δ᾽ οὖν ὁ Φωκίων καὶ φυγῆς
ἀπήλλαξε πολλοὺς δεηθεὶς τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου· καὶ φεύγουσι διεπράξατο,
μὴ καθάπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν μεθισταμένων ὑπὲρ τὰ Κεραύνια ὄρη καὶ
τὸν Ταίναρον ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κατοικεῖν,
ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἁγνωνίδης ὁ συκοφάντης.
Diodorus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that Antipater assigned
residences in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond
the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian
coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus—or to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those
who went beyond Tænarus would probably be sent to Libya: see
Thucydides, vii. 19, 10; vii. 50, 2.
It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not
only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen
population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual
hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three
sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from
contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the
Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of
that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were
prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found
established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have
brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in
foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having
preceded his Seisachtheia, or measure for the relief of debtors.[771]
What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their
new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have
been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison,
which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the
twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than
a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented
a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual
ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Demeter, the multitudinous
festal procession of citizens escorted the god Iacchus from Athens to
Eleusis.[772]
[771] Plutarch, Phokion, 28. ἐκπεπολιορκημένοις ἐῴκεσαν: compare
Solon, Fragment 28, ed. Gaisford.
[772] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.
One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was, to condemn to
death, at the motion of Demades, the distinguished anti-Macedonian
orators who had already fled—Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aristonikus, and
Himeræus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius
the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and
Demosthenes in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an
Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword.
At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the
anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in
the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of
the time the Exile-Hunters,[773] were everywhere on the look-out to
seize these proscribed men; many of the orators, from other cities as
well as from Athens, were slain; and there was no refuge except the
mountains of Ætolia for any of them.[774] One of these officers, a
Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over
with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the
three Athenian orators—Hyperides, Aristonikus, and Himeræus—dragging
them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of Æakus. They
were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched
forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ in Peloponnesus. All were
there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable
authority, that the tongue of Hyperides was cut out before he was
slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being
put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets
impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several
different stories.[775]
[773] Plutarch, Demosth. 28. Ἀρχίας ὁ κληθεὶς Φυγαδοθήρας.
Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846.
[774] Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated, as matter of
traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century
afterwards. In the speech of his Akarnanian opponent, there is
nothing to contradict it—while the fact is in itself highly
probable.
See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit in Griechenland, ch.
71, note 4.
[775] Plutarch, Demosth. 28; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849;
Photius, p. 496.
Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias proceeded
with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenes. The temple
of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary,
was held in such high veneration, that Archias, hesitating to drag
him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily,
under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenes, well
aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple,
and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the
sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary.
The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different
ways.[776] Eratosthenes (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that
Demosthenes carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said
that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to
a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was
seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater.
Amidst these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain,
that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from
the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out.
The most remarkable assertion was that of Demochares, nephew of
Demosthenes, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards.
Demochares asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had
been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the
gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty
of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration
of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that Archias the
Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonor and
wretchedness.[777]
[776] Plutarch, Demosth. 30. τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων, ὅσοι γεγράφασί τι
περὶ αὐτοῦ, ~παμπολλοὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ~, τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
ἐπεξελθεῖν, etc.
The taunts on Archias’s profession, as an actor, and as an
indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of
Demosthenes (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the
man or of the occasion; nor are they sufficiently avouched to
induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit
Demosthenes might choose to manifest, at such a moment, would
surely be vented on the chief enemy, Antipater; not upon the mere
instrument.
[777] Plutarch, Demosth. 30; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846;
Photius, p. 494; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. vi. ap. Photium,
Cod. 92.
The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement
and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public
Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and
of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters—are events belonging
to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction
of the autonomous hellenic world. Of Hyperides as a citizen we know
only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and
with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenes, a strenuous
opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his prosecution
of Demosthenes respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as
it comes before us) discreditable. Of Demosthenes we know more—enough
to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time
of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before
us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352-351 B.
C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took
a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened
Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He
impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the
older and more influential politicians either could not or would not
see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service
and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices
of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only
entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenes
first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before
the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable,
might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia
and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenes
possessed in 351 B. C. as much public influence as he had
acquired ten years afterwards, in 341 B. C.
Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down
to the battle of Chæroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest
patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years’
war which ended with the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians in the
main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate
military results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be
responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and successful,
its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its
diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the
purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that
they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic
also. It was not Athens only that he sought to defend against Philip,
but the whole hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest
of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Perikles,
Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian,
Spartan, Theban, rather than hellenic. He carries us back to the time
of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation immediately succeeding
it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia
were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective
Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his
numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism;
trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous
hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and
desirable existence[778]—but inculcating at the same time that these
blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion
of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.
[778] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 324. οὗτοι—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ
μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὑτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετραφότες, etc.
From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B. C.,
to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was
nor could be conducted by Demosthenes. But, condemned as he was to
comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens,
in the Harpalian affair of 324 B. C. If, instead of opposing
the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly
as Hyperides—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably
have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander.
In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I
have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian
war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original
suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw
himself into it with unreserved ardor, and was greatly instrumental
in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from
so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was,
like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of
Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair
chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating
on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility
among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only
to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no
reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately
proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble
an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another
year, its termination would probably have been very different. We
shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After
a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and
dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenes himself
could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his
existence as a fugitive beyond sea.
Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally
also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous
stimulating and admonitory harangues on the public affairs of the
moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few
remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us,
not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but
as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate
the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.