FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND
HELLENISM.
The death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances recounted
in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the
prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city
half-depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he
had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonor
of Phokion’s position must have been aggravated by the distress in
Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of
its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian
settlers from Samos; which island was now taken from Athens, after
she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian
people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in
the name of Aridæus.[779] Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion
exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting
himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the
part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse
with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both
from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of
citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokrates, who was only a metic, or
resident non-freeman; but Xenokrates declined the offer, remarking,
that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had
protested as envoy.[780] This mark of courageous independence, not a
little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was
a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.
[779] Diodor. xviii. 18; Diogen. Laert. x. 1, 1. I have
endeavored to show, in the Tenth Volume of this History (Ch.
lxxix. p. 297, note), that Diodorus is correct in giving
forty-three years, as the duration of the Athenian Kleruchies
in Samos; although both Wesseling and Mr. Clinton impugn his
statement. The Athenian occupation of Samos _began_ immediately
after the conquest of the island by Timotheus, in 366-365 B.
C.; but additional batches of colonists were sent thither in
later years.
[780] Plutarch, Phokion, 29, 30.
Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities,
Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing
in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian
garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling, hostile, or
intractable, or democratical citizens.[781] Having completed the
subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf
to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It
was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and
rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and
march them up to the interior deserts of the empire.[782] His army
was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more
accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians
defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high
towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused
serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus,
who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana,
manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication,
that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme
distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians,
in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to
surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of
Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus,
as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a
view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They
concluded a pacification with the Ætolians—postponing till a future
period their design of deporting that people,—and withdrew into
Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by
giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.[783]
[781] Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. φανεροῦ δ᾽ ὄντος, ὅτι
Κάσανδρος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀνθέξεται, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν
αὐτῶν πατρικαῖς φρουραῖς φυλάττεσθαι, τὰς δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχιῶν
διοικεῖσθαι, κυριευομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων καὶ ξένων.
That citizens were not only banished, but deported, by Antipater
from various other cities besides Athens, we may see from the
edict issued by Polysperchon shortly after the death of Antipater
(Diod. xviii. 56)—καὶ τοὺς ~μεταστάντας ἢ φυγόντας~ ὑπὸ τῶν
ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν (_i. e._ Antipater and Kraterus), ἀφ᾽ ὧν
χρόνων Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη, κατάγομεν, etc.
[782] Diodor. xviii. 25. διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς
καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ ~μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἅπαντας~ εἰς τὴν
ἐρημίαν καὶ ποῤῥωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας κειμένην χώραν.
[783] Diodor. xviii. 18-25.
Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikæa, had been sent over to
Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general,
acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander’s
family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had
given birth to a posthumous son, called Alexander, and made king
jointly with Philip Aridæus), had at first sought close combination
with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views
were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at
Pella (Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, widow of the Molossian
Alexander)—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even
throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by
an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander,
but slain by Alexander’s order) with her daughter Eurydikê. It has
been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage
to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of
Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first
battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous
rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she
had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra.
Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater;
nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better
served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition.
To this step he was advised by Eumenes, his ablest friend and
coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family,
and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of
Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly
and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas
resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but to send her away after
no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him
were conveyed by Eumenes. Kynanê also (daughter of Philip and widow
of his nephew Amyntas) a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought
into Asia her daughter Eurydikê for the purpose of espousing the
king Philip Aridæus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably
instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to
death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed
was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to
permit the marriage of the king with Eurydikê.[784]
[784] Diodor. xviii. 23; Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap.
Phot. Cod. 92. Diodorus alludes to the murder of Kynanê or Kynna,
in another place (xix. 52).
Compare Polyænus, viii. 60—who mentions the murder of Kynanê
by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different explanation of her
purpose in passing into Asia.
About Kynanê, see Duris, Fragm. 24, in Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol.
ii. p. 475; Athenæ. xiii. p. 560.
All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.
C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted
by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called
Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret
intrigues of Perdikkas; who, for that and other reasons, began to
look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised
of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe
to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manœuvres of
Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning
the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more
important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.
To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far
as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed,
how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of Fortune, throughout
the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual
combatants only, but for their posterity also.[785] Until the battle
of Krannon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as
to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double
force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known
to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him.
Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least
weakened, if not paralyzed; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier,
the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and
the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As
soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy
to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him
presently doing with the Ætolians.[786] Through causes thus purely
accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during
which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected
strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The
disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect
of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenes
himself. Such issue is not to be regarded as proving that the project
was desperate or ill-conceived on the part of its promoters, who had
full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the
effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.
[785] The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii. 640) on the effects of
the battle of Pharsalia, may be cited here:—
“Majus ab hac acie, quam quod sua sæcula ferrent,
Vulnus habent populi: plus est quam vita salusque
Quod perit: in totum mundi prosternimur ævum.
Vincitur his gladiis omnis, quæ serviet, ætas.
Proxima quid soboles, aut quid meruere nepotes,
In regnum nasci?” etc.
[786] Diodor. xviii. 38. Ἀντιπάτρου δ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν
διαβεβηκότος, Αἰτωλοὶ ~κατὰ τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν συνθήκας~
ἐστράτευσαν εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν, etc.
In the spring of 321 B. C., Antipater and Kraterus, having
concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into
Asia, and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having
the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy;
leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenes as general,
to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas,
discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally,
threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenes, though embarrassed
and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own
Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against
him as a Greek—and though compelled to conceal from these soldiers
the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the
opposite side,—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained
an important victory,[787] in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus
perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenes with his own hand, after
a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and
at the cost of a severe wound to himself.[788] After the victory, he
found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply
afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man;
and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be
honorably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.
[787] Plutarch, Eumenes, 7; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 4. Eumenes
had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian cavalry to fight in
close combat with the short pike and sword of the Macedonian
Companions—relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the
alternation of charging and retiring usual to Asiatics.
Diodorus (xviii. 30, 31, 32) gives an account at some length of
this battle. He as well as Plutarch may probably have borrowed
from Hieronymus of Kardia.
[788] Arrian ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii. 8; Diodor.
xviii. 33.
This new proof of the military ability and vigor of Eumenes, together
with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and
Neoptolemus—proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving
the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to
hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his
demeanor towards the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in
his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiac branch of the
Nile—that his own army mutinied and slew him.[789] His troops joined
Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behavior gained their goodwill. Only
two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenes reached
the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had
this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of
his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly
altered. Eumenes would have occupied the most commanding position
in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom
both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news,
arriving at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only
the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the
odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He,
together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers
a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by
Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers
attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were
slain.[790]
[789] Diodor. xviii. 36.
[790] Plutarch, Eumenes, 8; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, 4; Diodor.
xviii. 36, 37.
By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers,
complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater,
Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army,
now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united.
He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the
kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by
Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to
great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydikê,
who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the
soldiers—and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents,
formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds
to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater
made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat
modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn
up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt
and Libya,—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as
each had had before.[791]
[791] Diodor. xviii. 39. Arrian, ap. Photium.
Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in
Asia, to crush Eumenes and the other chief adherents of Perdikkas;
most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian
army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the
kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed
demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The
war of Antigonus, first against Eumenes in Kappadokia, next against
Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted
for many months, but was at length successfully finished.[792]
Eumenes, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the
Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge
with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of
Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently
more than a year, against Antigonus.[793]
[792] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. lib. ix. 10. ap. Photium,
Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 39, 40, 46; Plutarch, Eumenes, 3, 4.
[793] Plutarch, Eumenes, 10, 11; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenes, c. 5;
Diodor. xviii. 41.
Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close,
Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and
presently died. One of his latest acts was, to put to death the
Athenian orator Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to
solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater
had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had
constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he
would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavored to prevail on
Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this
promise; but he steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook
the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself.
The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his
opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him
by Demades, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her
dependence “on an old and rotten warp”—meaning Antipater. This letter
gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demades is said to
have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son
Kassander; who caused Demades with his son to be seized—first killed
the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and
then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his
ingratitude.[794] All the accounts which we read depict Demades, in
general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt
politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement: at the
same time, we have no specific facts to prove it.
[794] Plutarch, Phokion, 30; Diodor. xviii. 48; Plutarch,
Demosth. 31; Arrian, De Reb. post Alex. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.
In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently
_Antigonus_ instead of _Perdikkas_.
It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the
accuser of Demades on such a matter—as Arrian and Plutarch state.
Arrian seems to put the death of Demades too early, from his
anxiety to bring it into immediate juxtaposition with the death
of Demosthenes, whose condemnation Demades had proposed in the
Athenian assembly.
Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of
Alexander’s veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full
powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his
own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch, or general of
the body-guard.[795] He thought that this disposition of power would
be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon
was older and of longer military service than any other among
Alexander’s generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of
letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses;[796] all of
whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydikê—were energetic characters; and
the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards
Antipater) furious and implacable.
[795] Diod. xviii. 48.
[796] Diod. xix. 11.
But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning,
because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate
Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of
Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched
Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus
in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But
when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real
truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the
change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts,
and might have kept out the new commander.[797] Kassander, while
securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan,
affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to
occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same
time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places
in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance
with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being
generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly,
and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia.[798] It suited
the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid
him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of
Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign
of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most
powerful military force within it.
[797] Plutarch, Phokion, 31. Diodorus (xviii. 64) says also that
Nikanor was nominated by Kassander.
[798] Diodor. xviii. 54.
Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather
than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference
shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession
of Kassander, placed all the real great powers in active hostility
against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind
to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in
Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to
invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of
her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests
of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenes, appointing him to the
supreme command[799]—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring
to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This
last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general
enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and
military governments now paramount throughout the cities.
[799] Diodor. xviii. 49-58.
The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander’s empire in Asia,
against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who
were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the
fidelity and military skill of Eumenes. At his disposal Polysperchon
placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially
the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias
also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the
only friend and savior to whom the imperial family could now look.
Eumenes replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their
cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of
Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain
from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations,
honorable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were
disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the
management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother
to the great conqueror, raised a strong favorable feeling, yet her
multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal
enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenes,
though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with
unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most
tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them.[800]
His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment
in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would
have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant
struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the
coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parætakênê—continued for two
years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus,
and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own
officers and troops[801]—do not belong to Grecian history. They
are however among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While
even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the
combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility
and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for
overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers
around him. To the last, Eumenes remained unsubdued; he was betrayed
to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the
Macedonian Argyraspides.[802]
[800] Plutarch, Eumenes, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, c. 6;
Diodor. xviii. 58-62.
Diodor. xviii, 58. ἧκε δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα,
δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης βοηθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἑαυτῇ· μόνον
γὰρ ἐκεῖνον πιστότατον ἀπολελεῖφθαι τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμενον
διορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας.
Cornelius Nepos, Eumenes, 6. “Ad hunc (Eumenem) Olympias,
quum literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, consultum, utrum
repetitum Macedoniam veniret (nam tum in Epiro habitabat) et
eas res occuparet—huic ille primum suasit ne se moveret, et
expectaret quoad Alexandri filius regnum adipisceretur. Sin
aliquâ cupiditate raperetur in Macedoniam, omnium injuriarum
oblivisceretur, et in neminem acerbiore uteretur imperio. Horum
illa nihil fecit. Nam et in Macedoniam profecta est, et ibi
crudelissime se gessit.” Compare Justin, xiv. 6; Diodor. xix. 11.
The details respecting Eumenes may be considered probably as
depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus of
Kardia had written a copious history of his own time; which,
though now lost, was accessible both to Diodorus and Plutarch.
Hieronymus was serving with Eumenes, and was taken prisoner along
with him by Antigonus; who spared him and treated him well, while
Eumenes was put to death (Diodor. xix. 44). Plutarch had also
read letters of Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 11).
[801] Diodor. xviii. 63-72; xix. 11, 17, 32, 44.
[802] Plutarch (Eumenes, 16-18), Cornelius Nepos (10-13), and
Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the touching
circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenes. On
this point Diodorus is more brief; but he recounts at much length
the preceding military operations between Eumenes and Antigonus
(xix. 17, 32, 44).
The original source of these particulars must probably be, the
history of Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, and copied,
more or less accurately, by others.
For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which
we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that
they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and
concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over
Eumenes to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of
Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability.
Indeed, we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not
trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander.[803]
In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenes, if the violent temper of
Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which,
having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks,
might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favor of free
Hellenic community.[804]
[803] Plutarch, Eumenes, 13; Diodor. xviii. 58.
[804] Plutarch, Eumenes, 3.
On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had
sent envoys to Pella.[805] To all the governments of these cities,
composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost
moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt.
Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and
that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular
sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these
Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a
proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.
[805] Diodor. xviii. 55. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας
πρεσβευτὰς προσκαλεσάμενοι, etc.
After reciting the steady goodwill of Philip and Alexander towards
Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the
untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and
ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various
cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from
the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings had now determined
to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political
constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in
the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the
month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or
deported, by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that
their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them
rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good
feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act
of recall were excluded, the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon,
and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans,
implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of
those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile
by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened
with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to
Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not
Orôpus; in all other respects, she was placed on the same footing as
in the days of Philip and Alexander. “All the Greeks (concluded this
proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear
arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and
confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all
other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures.
Obey him—as we have before written you to do; for we shall not omit
to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation.”[806]
[806] Diodor. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is
given _verbatim_. For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa,
Trikka, Herakleia, etc., we do not know the grounds.
Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—ὑμεῖς οὖν, καθάπερ
ὑμῖν καὶ πρότερον ἐγράψαμεν, ἀκούετε τούτου (Πολυσπέρχοντος).
These words must allude to written answers given to particular
cities, in reply to special applications. No general
proclamation, earlier than this, can have been issued since the
death of Antipater.
Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon
in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the
subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after
the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then
expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death
of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an
aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian
garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was
a deathblow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian
envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as
envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it
at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed
special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that
the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation
of property, and in some cases put to death;[807] the names being
probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that
such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the
rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from
without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into
Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment,
for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.
[807] Diodor. xviii. 57.
To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed
special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall
of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than
elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had
been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens,
it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion with the other
leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but
probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death.[808]
The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel
and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand
qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict,
speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship
as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to
be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who
held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the
Athenians, but for Kassander; the latter being himself also expected
with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties; each distinct
in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each
other.
[808] Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however,
that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere trick to ruin
Phokion, is only correct so far—that Polysperchon wished to put
down the Antipatrian oligarchies everywhere, and that Phokion was
the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.
The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting
Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the
recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer,
promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the
mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with
Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater.[809] He
seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in
his favor—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian
leaders and a proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but
dread the execution of Polysperchon’s edict. And he had also what
was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of
Phokion: who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had
before done with Menyllus[810]—and who had greater reason than any
one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly
held in Peiræus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to
present himself in person, in the company and under the introduction
of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the
proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the
prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison,
and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of
course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine
thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions
from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his
person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping;
even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he
pleaded, that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor’s personal
safety.[811]
[809] Diodor. xviii. 64.
[810] Plutarch, Phokion, 31.
[811] Plutarch, Phokion, 32.
Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been
secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found
that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians,
he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbor
of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and
harbor, on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding
all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he
was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in
the neighboring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in
the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree
was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for
its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion,
disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he
would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer,
making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus
by surprise, placed both the town and harbor under military
occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and
palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms.
But Phokion as general damped their ardor, and even declined to head
them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should
have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with
Konon (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew
the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation,
all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no
other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to
whom they must address their application.[812] He thus again tried to
bring Athens into communication with Kassander.
[812] Diodor. xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos,
Phokion, 2.
The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious
calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had
been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial,
containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was
in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes
of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of
arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his
operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the
loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion,
in his function as general, had been forewarned of the danger, might
have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave
dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation
except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion,
foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of
Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favoring
the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens
to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would
probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by
sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was
here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of
still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both
Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when
we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against
him.[813]
[813] Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. “Concidit autem maxime uno
crimine: quod cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi, et
Nicanorem, Cassandri præfectum, insidiari Piræo Atheniensium,
a Dercyllo moneretur: idemque postularet, ut provideret, ne
commeatibus civitas privaretur—huic, audiente populo, Phocion
negavit esse periculam, seque ejus rei obsidem fore pollicitus
est. Neque ita multo post Nicanor Piræo est potitus. Ad quem
recuperandum cum populus armatus concurrisset, ille non modo
neminem ad arma vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem præsse voluit,
sine qua Athenæ omnino esse non possunt.”
The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced
a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him
by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the
Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But
Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support
from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon’s son) with a
body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come
to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring
it to them. Their hopes, however, were again disappointed. Though
encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian
forces to co-operate with him in attacking it; but entered into
open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavored to persuade or corrupt
into surrendering the place.[814] When this negotiation failed, he
resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on
his march towards Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted
was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus; nor did he choose to
invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been
compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently
desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever;
moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was
altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it
before Polysperchon.
[814] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 33.
It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander
to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for
the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the
reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored
exiles, and without any foreign controlling force—was an assured
sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to
obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander,
he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of
Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered
Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a
military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet unfinished,—and
offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management
of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions,
accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens,
and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself.[815]
Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander’s army.
It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops, along
with the exiles, as friends and allies into the walls of Athens,
so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project
was impracticable in consequence of the mistrust created among the
Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.[816]
[815] Diodor. xviii. 65. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀντιπάτρῳ γεγονότων φίλων τινὲς
(ὑπῆρχον) καὶ ~οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων
τιμωρίας~, ὑπήντησαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καὶ διδάξαντες τὸ συμφέρον,
ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἰδίᾳ κατέχειν τὰ φρούρια, καὶ μὴ παραδιδόναι τοῖς
Ἀθηναίοις, μέχρις ἂν ὁ Κάσσανδρος καταπολεμήθῃ.
[816] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Diod. xviii. 65. 66. This seems
to me the probable sequence of facts, combining Plutarch with
Diodorus. Plutarch takes no notice of the negotiation opened
by Phokion with Alexander, and the understanding established
between them; which is stated in the clearest manner by
Diodorus, and appears to me a material circumstance. On the
other hand, Plutarch mentions (though Diodorus does not) that
Alexander was anxious to seize Athens itself, and was very near
succeeding. Plutarch seems to conceive that it was the exiles
who were disposed to let him in; but if that had been the case,
he probably would have been let in when the exiles became
preponderant. It was Phokion, I conceive, who was desirous, for
his own personal safety, of admitting the foreign troops.
The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred
and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or
evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles
found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision
of the list of state-officers, and for the re-establishment of
the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who
had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy and who still
continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion
stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Charikles, the
Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon, Nikokles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and
Philokles. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned,
some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property.
Demetrius, Charikles, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving
Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander’s camp,
throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent
understanding.[817] Alexander not only received them courteously,
but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety
and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who
were still eager to do all in their power to support him.[818] Armed
with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia
and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were
accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them
passing for friends of Polysperchon.[819]
[817] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 35.
[818] Diodor. xviii. 66. Προσδεχθέντες δὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (Alexander)
φιλοφρόνως, γράμματα ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Πολυσπέρχοντα, ὅπως
μηδὲν πάθωσιν οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα ~τἀκείνου πεφρονηκότες, καὶ νῦν
ἐπαγγελλόμενοι πάντα συμπράξειν~.
This application of Phokion to Alexander, and the letters
obtained to Polysperchon, are not mentioned by Plutarch, though
they are important circumstances in following the last days of
Phokion’s life.
[819] Plutarch, Phokion, 33.
The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the
recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander
had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy
to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with
his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus,
and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian
war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that
this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion
as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though
owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant
towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit
him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate
occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On the proposition of Agnonides
and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing
Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time
claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late
regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of
Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.[820]
[820] Diodor. xviii. 66.
The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early
as Phokion’s company, which had been detained for some days at
Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate
for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon, and presented the letter of
Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably
have obtained a more favorable reception. But as the arrival of
the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both
of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridæus in his
throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonides,—chief of the
Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenes
in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and
his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing
but confusion; until Agnonides himself exclaimed—“Pack us all into
one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgment from the
Athenians.” The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders
around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonides then set
forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and
his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having
betrayed Peiræus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal
proclamation to Athens.[821] Now, on the last of these two heads,
Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peiræus
to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter,
accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the
more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the
surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at
Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him
as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon
heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and
so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick,
and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more
harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having
been personally cognizant of his (the speaker’s) good dispositions
towards the Athenian people (he had probably been sent to Pella, as
envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy),
Polysperchon exclaimed—“Do not utter falsehoods against me before the
king.” Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start
from his throne and snatch his spear; with which he would have run
Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious
brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could
not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as
prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the
king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that
he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom
and autonomy.[822]
[821] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel. Nepos. Phokion, 3.
“Hic (Phocion), ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Piræum Nicanori
prodidisset, ex consilii sententiâ, in custodiam conjectus,
Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret judicium.”
Plutarch says that Polysperchon, before he gave this hearing
to both parties, ordered _the Corinthian Deinarchus_ to be
tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot
be Deinarchus, the logographer—of whom we have some specimens
remaining, and who was alive even as late as 292 B.
C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there
were two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann
supposes—Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement
of Plutarch must allude to an order given but not carried into
effect—which latter seems to me most probable.
[822] Plutarch, Phokion, 33, 34; Diodor. xviii. 66.
The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as
prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered
the city; being carried along the Kerameikus in carts, through
sympathizing friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached
the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly
was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have
contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been
fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners
and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was
mainly composed of Phokion’s keenest enemies, the citizens just
returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have
been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons, since the
lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about
to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so
important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This
was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles,
chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only
the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying
to exclude them.
It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than
those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must
recollect that at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy
had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenes and its principal leaders
had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer
multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens,
had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the
public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass
of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which
were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency
which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly,
when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from
the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred
against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these
authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither
originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends,
as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have
been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves
distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism
of Demophantus,[823] consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians
generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the
government was subverted.
[823] Andokides de Mysteriis, sect. 96, 97; Lycurgus adv.
Leokrat. s. 127.
When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before
them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling
of antipathy against him burst out into furious manifestations.
Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus[824] and
Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated,
when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to
the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported
fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under
a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiræus
to Nikanor[825] constituted a new crime; fastening on the people
the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by
the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded,
Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible
to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as
often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried
down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair,
and exclaimed, “For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce
against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct; but
why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?”
“Because they are your friends, Phokion”—was the exclamation of those
around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree,
to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of
hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that
if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present
cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but
this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in
respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the
Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which
the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly
was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make
the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths
in token of triumph. To many of them doubtless, the gratification
of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not
merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest
moments of life.[826]
[824] _Not_ the eminent philosopher so named.
[825] Cornel. Nepos, Phoc. 4. “Plurimi vero ita exacuerentur
propter proditionis suspicionem Piræi, maximeque quod adversus
populi commoda in senectute steterat.”
[826] Diodor. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Phokion, 34, 35; Cornelius
Nepos, Phokion, 2, 3.
After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion, Nikokles,
Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythokles, were consigned to the supreme
magistrates of Police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the
purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile
bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said
that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who
turned to the public officers and exclaimed—“Will no one check this
indecent fellow?” This was the only emotion which he manifested; in
other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely
maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the
prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his
four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his
fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he
entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion,
the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class
in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments)
celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in
honor of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off
their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the
prison.
Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion
replied—“I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the
Athenians.” The draught of hemlock was then administered to all
five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were
not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion’s friends allowed to light
a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out
of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and
there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with
her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of
earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens
in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her
own domestic hearth, with this address—“Beloved Hestia, I confide
to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family
vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses.”[827]
[827] Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are
recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity.
Nikokles entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion
before Phokion; upon which the latter replied—“Your request,
Nikokles, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused
you anything throughout my life, I grant this also.”
After the four first had drunk, all except Phokion, no more
hemlock was left; upon which the jailer said that he would
not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmæ of money were
given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place,
until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money,
sarcastically remarking, that it was hard if a man could not even
die _gratis_ at Athens.
As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato’s Phædon
(152-155), the details of the death of Sokrates,—we shall see
that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a
gradual and painless manner; the person who had swallowed the
potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs
grew heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually
chilled and became insensible, first in the extremities, next in
the vital centres. Under these circumstances, the question—which
of the persons condemned should swallow the first of the five
potions—could be of very little moment.
Then, as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the
Athenian prison—what would have been the alternative, if
Phokion’s friend had not furnished the twelve drachmæ? Would
he have remained in confinement, without being put to death?
Certainly not; for he was under capital sentence. Would he
have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive
instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian
practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose
that the Eleven had allotted to this jailer a stock of hemlock
(or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that
he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that
it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency
out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued
by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion’s sarcasm touches upon
the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own
execution.
After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did
thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a
faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity
towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense,
erected a statue in his honor, and put to death Agnonides by public
judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city
and were slain by Phokion’s son.[828]
[828] Plutarch, Phokion, 38
These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice
the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after
the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus
and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical
or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the
Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer
the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under
Antipater.
No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion
should be honored. But this is a very different thing from
spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no
reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do
I believe that it did occur. The Demos of Athens, banished and
deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and
were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he
was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit
from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he
should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did
Antipater’s work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial,
the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theatre
is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a
manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for
which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.
We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of
an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to
all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration
was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm
of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when
we survey, not merely the details of Phokion’s administration,
but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and
towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that
this judgment is fully merited. In Phokion’s patriotism—for so
doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken
of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of
the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign
kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had
neither the Panhellenic sentiment of Aristeides, Kallikratidas,
and Demosthenes—nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the
devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes.
To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate
of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among
them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now
this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man.
The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom
of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a
substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world.
Had Themistokles, Arsiteides, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece
would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia, and the
brilliant, though checkered, century and more of independent
politics which succeeded the repulse of Xerxes would never have
occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion’s
political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded
from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendency as well as
freedom, into absolute servitude. Insofar as this great public
misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more
ascribable than to Phokion. He was stratêgus during most of
the long series of years when Philip’s power was growing; it
was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen,
and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of
Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were
wanting to Demosthenes—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent
his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the
inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the
kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits,
and the future history of Greece might have been altogether
different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted
with Æschines and the Philippizers; without receiving money
from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired— by
nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and the
other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia, Phokion
received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks
of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the
fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic
as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier
part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under
the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the
latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it
is the most honorable point in his character that he always
refrained from abusing their marked favor towards himself, for
purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his
fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even
during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful
friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time
the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns
on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistokles. He
even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything,
consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian
prisoners confined at Sardis.[829]
[829] Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.
The Lamian war and its consequences, were Phokion’s ruin. He
continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his
opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his
known macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded
him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others.
On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the
thankless and dishonorable function of satrap under Antipater at
Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He
became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered
the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Demos
in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these
proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection
of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the
name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished
Demos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable
connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by
courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation
(along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less
dangerous, and less discreditable, than these manœuvres, which still
farther darkened the close of his life, without averting from him,
after all, the necessity of facing the restored Demos. The intense
and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive,
though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the
man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been
blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the
seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last
protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the
tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust,
inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once
autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.
I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in
Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards
Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with
the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance.[830] At any rate he was
tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived
at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000
soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon
hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of
Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000
Greek allies, 1000 cavalry, and sixty-five elephants; animals which
were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first
besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure
subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with
the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander
with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching
in person the various Peloponnesian towns—or addressing them by
means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian
oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the
mass of the citizens.[831] In most of the towns, this revolution
was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not
only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending
it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm
it, by movable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid
of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them,[832] and obliged
to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His
admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with
the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from
Peiræus) and Antigonus.[833]
[830] Diodor. xix. 35.
[831] Diodor. xviii. 69.
[832] Diodor. xxiii. 70, 71.
[833] Diodor. xviii. 72.
After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated
Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian
Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened
all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened.
The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians
in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could
no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which
the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced
them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus
was considered by its great constructor, Themistokles, as more
indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself.[834] The
subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from
imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and
industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected,
and the arsenals, docks, ships, etc. of the state kept up. It became
evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens
disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by
Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every
day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and
hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to
listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should
be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and
allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their
city, with the port Peiræus, their ships and revenues; that the
exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political
franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who
possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards; that Kassander should
hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against
Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name
some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of
the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean
(_i. e._ an Athenian of the Deme Phalerum), one of the colleagues
of Phokion; who had gone into voluntary exile since the death of
Antipater, but had recently returned.[835]
[834] Thucyd. i. 93.
[835] Diodor. xviii. 74.
This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian
government; yet without the severities which had marked its original
establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made
Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before
him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and
by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged
and strengthened,[836] holding a practical command over Peiræus,
though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians.
But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens:
moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ, fixed for the political
franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an
improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmæ prescribed
by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an
overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the
field against him with a rival army and an established ascendency in
many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain
from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.
[836] See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years
afterwards (Diodor. xx. 45).