GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF
THE LAMIAN WAR.
Even in 334 B. C., when Alexander first entered upon his
Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had
been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages
of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by
Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon
such armed force for support. There existed among them no common
idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except
such as it suited Alexander’s purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian
sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the
recollection of which Demosthenes was wont to appeal, in animating
the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and
supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander
to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for
ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a
province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle
in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are “in the hands of the
king.”[656] A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at
Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that
we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander
on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political
import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details
of each city—“the streets and fountains which we are repairing
and the battlements which we are whitening”, to use a phrase of
Demosthenes[657]—the good management of the Athenian finances by the
orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private
disputes or politics of the past.
[656] Aristot. Physic. iv. 3. p. 210 a. 21. ἔτι ~ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ
τῶν Ἑλλήνων~, καὶ ὅλως ~ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ~.
[657] Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36.
But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the
first years of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment
have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if
he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered
their own affairs with skill and vigor. I have already stated, that
during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought
rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a
decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which
might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied
his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice
of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the
defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore
depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was
well aware.
During the winter of 334-333 B. C., Memnon with the Persian fleet
appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean,[658]
and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in
Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected
death, and still more by Darius’s abandonment of the Memnonian plans,
they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the
immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of
Issus, Demosthenes[659] and others (as has already been mentioned)
were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success
for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at
Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B. C. to March
or April 331 B. C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed
extinct, and Darius was so paralyzed by the captivity of his family,
that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in
their gallant efforts of defence, without the least effort to save
them. At length, in the spring of 331 B. C., the prospects again
appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first,
was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the
interior, many weeks’ march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to
attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements
with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking
auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B. C.) came the
catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander
could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.
[658] Arrian, ii. 1.
[659] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 552.
Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia
presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and
a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of
Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens
and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as
a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now
a Macedonian garrison.[660] Moreover, besides that garrison, the
Bœotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, etc., were themselves strongholds
of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having
received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands.[661]
In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy
of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested
allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.
[660] Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scriptt. Biograph. p.
301. φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος Ἀλέξανδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ
κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους, etc.
[661] Pausanias, i. 25, 4.
At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few
were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful
an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the
enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtes and Charidemus, the military
citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been
demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there
to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and
action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander
at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent
to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtes perished
at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the
utmost gallantry; Charidemus suffered a more unworthy death from the
shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained
at Athens, such as Demosthenes and Lykurgus, were not generals or
men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that
submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched
not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him,
such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on
behalf of Grecian freedom.
But it was not Demosthenes nor Lykurgus who now guided the general
policy of Athens.[662] For the twelve years between the destruction
of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demades were
her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite
characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the
favor of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained.
Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian
fleet, during Alexander’s first campaign in Asia; these, together
with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him
farther as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians
generally.[663] There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of
Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same
cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his
advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip’s power
was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It
suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by
frequent presents to Demades, a man of luxurious and extravagant
habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end,
declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by
Antipater, but even by Alexander.[664]
[662] “Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes
Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 331), Æschines and men of his stamp
are in full ascendency and affluence—I am impotent: there is
no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only
for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling
potentate.”
[663] Arrian, i. 29, 8.
[664] Plutarch, Phokion, 30.
It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonizing policy
was now decidedly in the ascendent—accepted, even by dissentients,
as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed
the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like
Lykurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment,
still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course
restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus
continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three
successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an
uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely
the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the
public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a
financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since
Perikles. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied
the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples—enlarged, or
constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable
stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and
maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the
protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he
was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require
the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian
people.[665] The main cause of his firm hold upon the public mind,
was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the
parallel of Phokion.
[665] See the remarkable decree in honor of Lykurgus, passed by
the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death,
in the archonship of Anaxikrates, B. C. 307 (Plutarch,
Vit. X. Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree,
constituting four-fifths of the whole, goes over the public
conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.
It seems that the twelve years of financial administration
exercised by Lykurgus, are to be taken probably, either from
342-330 B. C.—or four years later, from 338-326 B.
C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two.
Droysen and Meier prefer the earlier period—O. Müller the later.
(Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, also the second
edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p.
114-118).
The total of public money, recorded by the Inscription as having
passed through the hands of Lykurgus in the twelve years, was
18,900 talents = £4,340,000, or thereabouts. He is said to have
held, besides, in deposit, a great deal of money entrusted to him
by private individuals. His official duties as treasurer were
discharged, for the first four years, in his own name: during the
last eight years, in the names of two different friends.
As to Demosthenes, he did not hold any such commanding public
appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy
from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel
during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very
significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon’s motion for
crowning Demosthenes, was instituted by Æschines, and official entry
made of it, before the death of Philip—which event occurred in
August 336 B. C. Yet Æschines did not venture to bring it
on for trial until August 330 B. C., after Antipater had
subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even
at that advantageous moment, when the macedonizers seemed in full
triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion
and Demades were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing
a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant
sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In
fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it
requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or
deporting two-thirds of the citizens.[666] It seems however that the
anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to
Alexander, between 334 and 330 B. C. Ktesiphon accepted a
mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death
of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenes stands accused of
having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in
Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B. C. This assertion of
Æschines, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general
prudence of Demosthenes as to his known and formidable enemy.[667]
[666] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.
[667] Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of
Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration, p. 550)
charges Demosthenes with having sent letters to Alexander,
soliciting pardon and favor. He states that a young man named
Aristion, a friend of Demosthenes, was much about the person of
Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent. He cites
as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called
_Paralus_, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in
Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B. C. (compare
Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperides also seems to have advanced the
like allegation against Demosthenes—see Harpokration, v. Ἀριστίων.
The fragments of the oration of Hyperides in defence of
Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington),
delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, give
general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion
to the existing Macedonian ascendancy. Euxenippus had been
accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperides strenuously denies
it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever
conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at
school (says Hyperides) know the names of the corrupt orators, or
servile flatterers, who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among
them (p 11, 12).
It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian
movements now took rise.
In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes
at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned.
Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens
in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip
and the Thebans,—had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central
Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a
battle against the Messapians.[668] He was succeeded by his son
Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though
abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to
take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince
was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same
denial on Alexander’s nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens
three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be
dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the
inscription, that they were dedicated “by Alexander and the Greeks,
_excepting the Lacedæmonians_.”[669] Agis took the lead in trying to
procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards
the close of summer 333 B. C., a little before the battle
of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men
and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.[670] At that moment,
they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as
most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in
Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known,
they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes;
which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself
master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected
at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went
to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the
Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete,
he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in
Peloponnesus, he organized some demonstrations, which Alexander sent
Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331
B. C.[671] At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval
mastery of the Ægean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so
that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably
Amphoterus recovered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis
in Peloponnesus.
[668] Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.
[669] Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.
[670] Arrian, ii. 13, 4.
[671] Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It
is to this war in Krete, between Agis and the Macedonian party
and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words
contained, Politica, ii. 7, 8), as having exposed the weakness of
the Kretan institutions—see Schneider’s note on the passage. At
least we do not know of any other event, suitable to the words.
In October 331 B. C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a
fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the
bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the
coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander’s force,
it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring
of 330 B. C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet
it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale
of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable
body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and
the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed
war with Macedonia,[672] and therefore incurred little additional
risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters
to cast back upon Greece small hands of soldiers who had hitherto
found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to
Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis
found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable
to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian
war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy
in Macedonia.[673] An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the
revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was
thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable
distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being
in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a
Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.[674]
Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of
Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could
muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against
Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half
of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet
be anticipated.[675]
[672] Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian
treasures at Susa (about December 331 B. C.), sent a
large remittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for
carrying on the war against the Lacedæmonians (Arrian, iii. 16.
17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnesus had begun in
the spring of 331 B. C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his
aggressive movements in Peloponnesus did not assume formidable
proportions until the spring of 330 B. C. At the date
of the speech of Æschines against Ktesiphon (August 330 B.
C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the
forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedæmonian
prisoners were only _about to be sent_ to Alexander to learn
their fate (Æsch. adv. Kt. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is
certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated
before the battle of Arbela. Moreover, there were Lacedæmonian
envoys, present with Darius until a few days before his death
(July 330 B. C.), who afterwards fell into the hands
of Alexander (Arrian iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have
known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the
victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B.
C.—and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got
together about three months before (March 330 B. C.).
Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4. p. 234) discusses the chronology
of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory.
He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no
necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander
(Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time
between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.
[673] Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after
the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs
and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilaus,
15.
[674] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς
ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθειστήκει, etc.
[675] Diodor. xvii. 62; Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 35.
Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush
of success appeared in attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans
(except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some
other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled
to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating
the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to
lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the
stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably
occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself
at Athens in favor of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet
to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion
and Demades, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially
upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people
would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution.[676] Even
Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging,
could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against
Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of
general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of
the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad
policy.[677] Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms
that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached
Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in
danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to
terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially,
fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated.
Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who,
though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell
resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost
3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great
many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained
either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof that Agis and his
companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage
worthy of the best days of Sparta.
[676] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.
[677] This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenes,
from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.
It is however difficult to believe, what Æschines insinuates,
that Demosthenes boasted of having himself got up the
Lacedæmonian movement—and yet that he made no proposition or
suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenes can hardly have
lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his
anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things
took a favorable turn.
Deinarchus (_ut suprà_) also accuses Demosthenes of having
remained inactive at this critical moment.
The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted
to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at
Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to
Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those
among their leading men who had advised the war.[678] But he would
not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians,
without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty
hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys
or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.[679] We are told
that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at
Baktra;[680] what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.
[678] Curtius, vi. 1, 15-20; Diodor. xvii. 63-73. After the
defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing
from ἀτιμία those who had escaped from the battle—as had been
done after Leuktra (Diodor. xix. 70).
[679] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 524.
[680] Curtius, vii. 4, 32.
The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander’s
accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate
themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the
second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility
of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended
miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever.
Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal.
The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as
against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have
been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in
hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian
force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability
(so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism
worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown
stands higher, only because the cause in which he fell ultimately
triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part
with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great
military powers of Greece which will appear presently, when we come
to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better
combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.
Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet
during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful
sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle
was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the
Athenians might probably have declared in his favor; and although no
independent position could have been permanently maintained against
so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was
thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might
have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable.
In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the macedonizing
statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents,
and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually
manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power
became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies
of Demosthenes to offer a favorable opportunity for ruining and
dishonoring him.
To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial
contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable
accusation of Æschines against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown
to Demosthenes—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenes,
on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn
or winter of 337-336 B. C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote
of public honor in favor of Demosthenes, and had obtained the
probouleuma or preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the
same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Æschines attacked the
proposition under the Graphê Paranomôn, as illegal, unconstitutional,
mischievous, and founded on false allegations.[681] More than six
years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation;
yet Æschines had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which
indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the
numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before
his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the
same honor upon Demosthenes,[682] and had been indicted under the
Graphê Paranomôn; but with such signal ill-success, that their
accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the
Dikasts, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of
the Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited
Æschines; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon’s
motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under
the Graphê Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special
circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able
to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within
this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range
of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of
Demosthenes; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand
publicly dishonored both as citizen and as politician. Unless this
latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschines gained nothing
by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the
indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the
probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being
actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenes might have
forced Æschines to the alternative of either dropping his indictment
or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge,
which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold
enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B. C.
when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes
with several other citizens.
[681] Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in
the oration of Demosthenes De Coronâ, there appears one (p. 266)
purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another
(p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschines. I
have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all
the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name
of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of
them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding
Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxix. p. 424; Ch. xc. p. 456-486.
We know from the statement of Æschines himself that the motion
of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenes to
be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and
that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon
Chærondas (June 337 B. C.—see Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p.
421-426). We also know that the accusation of Æschines against
Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip,
which took place in August 336 B. C. (Æschin. ib. p.
612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with
the probouleuma which followed upon it) must have occurred some
time during the autumn or winter of 337-336 B. C.—that
the accusation of Æschines must have been handed in shortly
after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in
at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month
Elaphebolion of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to
the appointment of Demosthenes. Moreover, whoever compares the
so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted Demosth. De
Coronâ, p. 266, with the words in which Æschines himself (Adv.
Ktesiph. p. 631. ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποιήσω, see also
p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it
cannot be genuine.
[682] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 253, 302, 303, 310. He says (p.
267-313) that he had been crowned _often_ (πολλάκις) by the
Athenians and other Greek cities. The crown which he received on
the motion of Aristonikus (after the successes against Philip at
Byzantium and the Chersonesus, etc. in 340 B. C.) was
the _second_ crown (p. 253)—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 848.
In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenes enjoying the
inchoate honor of a complimentary vote from the senate, Æschines
intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both
the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six
years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to
trial, under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive
anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of
Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of
anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities
also.[683] Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry
his resentment still farther, Æschines could now urge that Athens
was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of
Demosthenes,[684] and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the
only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who
had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and
bitter harangue, Æschines first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon
was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held
by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at
large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him
unworthy of such an honor, even if there had been no formal grounds
of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenes into four
periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B. C., between
Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out
of the next ensuing war in 341-340 B. C.—the third, ending
with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time
following.[685] Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the
conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly,
and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly
charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander,
at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and
intrepid opposition to them.[686]
[683] Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 294.
[684] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 645. διαβέβληται δ᾽ ἡμῶν ἡ
πόλις ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων ~περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιρούς~·
δόξετε δ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ~ὁμογνώμονες εἶναι τοῖς
παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην~· ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου
πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this, the
last sentence of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, where he
puts up a prayer to the gods—ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην
ἀπαλλαγὴν ~τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων~ δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.
The mention by Æschines (immediately before) of the Pythian
games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of
this judicial trial—August, 330 B. C.
[685] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.
[686] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.
That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been
driven from her independent and even presidential position into the
degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time
when Demosthenes first began political life—was a fact but too
indisputable. Æschines even makes this a part of his case; arraigning
the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenes as the cause of so
melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public
compliment or no better plea than a series of public calamities.[687]
Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenes prior to the
battle of Chæroneia, Æschines proceeds to the more recent past, and
contends that Demosthenes cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity
to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all
highly favorable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the
Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the first was, when Alexander
first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle
of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis
in Peloponnesus.[688] On neither of these occasions did Demosthenes
call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to
Æschines) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.
[687] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526, 538, 541.
[688] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551-553.
I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity
between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported
allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the
last-mentioned charges advanced by Æschines, there is enough of known
fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before
us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenes. The victorious
career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves
amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschines,
presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian
patriot, to involve his country in warfare against so formidable
an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against
Demosthenes, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian
operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenes does not
notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground,
that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about
Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the
death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired,
by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched
visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and
the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with
others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who
helped to aggrandize Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor
indeed so well.[689]
[689] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 311-316.
I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in
a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums
which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient
and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian
oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history;
a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to
uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world,
against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were
directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in
my last preceding volume. Demosthenes here passes them in review,
replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the
interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B. C., (or
the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is
remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his
whole public life,[690] he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed
that portion of it which is perhaps the most honorable to him—the
early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a
politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the
first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip’s
aggrandizement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic
precautions against it; in spite of apathy and murmurs from older
politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the
peace of 346 B. C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in
the antecedents of that event against the charges of Æschines, whom
he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which
I have already tried to elucidate, in my last volume. Passing next
to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile
diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with
the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenes is not satisfied with simple
vindication. He re-asserts this policy as matter of pride and honor,
in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having
manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and
takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim
and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been
adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake;
Demosthenes swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Platæa and
Salamis.[691] To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is
an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without
strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity
aggravated by dishonor.
[690] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 227. μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου
~παντός~, ὡς ἔοικε, λόγον διδόναι τήμερον καὶ τῶν κοινῇ
πεπολιτευμένων, etc.
[691] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ
ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων
ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι
προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς
παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, etc., the oath
so often cited and admired.
Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenes to his
rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct
Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been
appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over
the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it
probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action,
of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen, was now
cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force; there still
remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed
during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it
successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood
forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most
memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of
Philip at Chæroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by
Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic
conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands
of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded
either to repudiate Demosthenes, or to disclaim sympathy with his
political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce
them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschines is
enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken
of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is
usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would
have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions
wherein the fame of Demosthenes was involved, the Dikasts had given
a verdict unfavorable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and
even honorably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness
of mind in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic,
and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in
his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the
minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many general allegations of
corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was
no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the
Dikastery.
The indictment now preferred by Æschines against Ktesiphon only
procured for Demosthenes a new triumph. When the suffrages of the
Dikasts were counted, Æschines did not obtain so much as one fifth.
He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It
appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine,
and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to
have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the
interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander’s life (at the
time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory
restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for
returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander’s
death.[692]
[692] See the various lives of Æschines—in Westermann, Scriptores
Biographici, pp. 268, 269.
We cannot suppose that Æschines was unable to pay the fine of 1000
drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not
therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and
humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens.
We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by
himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together
auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian
cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenes in his
own defence,—delivered with all his perfection of voice and
action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its
public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise,
and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been
inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of
Æschines became themselves angry with him for having brought the
indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been
that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward
and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenes must have
received a public coronation.[693] In no other way, under the
existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenes have obtained so
emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such
a mortification was insupportable to Æschines. He became disgusted
with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical
school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils,
the successful oration of his rival, De Coronâ. Of course it excited
a burst of admiration. “What, if you had heard the beast himself
speak it!”—exclaimed Æschines.
[693] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 315. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν
ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μήδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν
ἀνωμολόγημαι—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει,
κινδυνεύεις δὲ εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ᾽ ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι
μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, etc.
Yet Æschines had become opulent, according to Demosthenes, p. 329.
From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant,
we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against
him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled
here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B. C.,
to January 324 B. C.), during which we have no information
about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander’s march into
Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the
conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death
or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay
the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory
order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of
unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian
islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in
Laconia.
It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B. C.),
that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed
at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious
prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable
treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers.[694] While satrap, he had
invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses,
Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached, and
whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of
the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments
to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens
and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in
Kilikia,—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before
her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along
with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and
Syria.[695] To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a
retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse
gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had
received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.[696]
Moreover he had consigned to Charikles, son-in-law of Phokion, the
task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honor of Pythionikê;
with a large remittance of money for the purpose.[697] The profit or
embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the good
will of Charikles—a man very different from his father-in-law, the
honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated
by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to
quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B. C., he had already
acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her
leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight
to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and
protection in that city.[698]
[694] Diodor. xvii. 108. He states the treasure brought out of
Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.
[695] See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus
addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and
before his flight to Athens—Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot,
ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 586-595. Theopompus speaks in the present
tense—~καὶ ὁρᾷ~ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ λάου προσκυνουμένην (Glykera),
etc. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus
(Athenæ. ibid.).
[696] Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satirical
drama called Agên, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the
Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B. C.
[697] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi
Fragment. 72. ed. Didot.
Plutarch’s narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply
that Harpalus gave this money to Charikles _after_ his arrival at
Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had
been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch
treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on
it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and
magnificent.
[698] Curtius, x. 2, 1.
The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that
the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off
the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic
freedom. Such is the color of the case, as presented in the satiric
drama called Agên, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac
festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B. C. Such news,
connecting itself in Alexander’s mind with the recent defeat of
Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries,
incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be
equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.[699]
But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying
that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of
Harpalus.[700]
[699] Curtius, x. 2, 1. “Igitur triginta navibus Sunium
transmittunt” (Harpalus and his company), “unde portum urbis
petere decreverunt. His cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque
juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus
petiturus.” Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7—who mentions this hostile
intention in Alexander’s mind, but gives a different account of
the cause of it.
The extract from the drama _Agên_ (given in Athenæus, xiii.
p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of
Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery,
with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to
enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present
privations and future ruin:—
A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον,
ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουν· ~νῦν δὲ~, τὸν χέδροπα μόνον
καὶ τὸν μάραθον ~ἔσθουσι~, πυροὺς δ᾽ οὐ μάλα.
B. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἅρπαλον
αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας
σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι.
A. Γλυκέρας ὁ σῖτος οὗτος ἦν· ἔσται δ᾽ ἴσως
αὐτοῖσιν ~ὀλέθρου~ κοὐκ ἑταίρας ἀῤῥαβών.
I conceive this drama Agên to have been represented on the banks
of the _Choaspes_ (not the _Hydaspes_—see my note in the Chapter
immediately preceding, p. 240), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia
of 324 B. C. It is interesting as a record of the
feelings of the time.
[700] Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending
to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several
months longer, during the autumn of 324 B. C. when
he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the
flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the
rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ
Ἀλέξανδρον Ἄμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῖ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, ~καὶ ὅταν
Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ~, μυρίαις πανοπλίαις καὶ ταῖς ἴσαις καταπέλταις
καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (Ephippus
ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 538. Fragment. 3. ed. Didot).
The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite
indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect
evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without
symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the
rumors first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus
with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were
coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philokles was
instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbor.[701]
But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus,
solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single
ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater
moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we
are told to upwards of 700 talents, or more than £160,000. We must
recollect that he was already favorably known to the people by large
presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship.
He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking
protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating
from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he
did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own
disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt
against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful
allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would
raise the standard of liberation.[702] To many Athenian patriots,
more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy
and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every
influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men
like Charikles, who were already in his interest. His cause was
espoused by Hyperides,[703] an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and
an orator second only to Demosthenes. There seems good reason for
believing that at first, a strong feeling was excited in favor of
taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the
idea of war with Alexander.[704]
[701] Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς
τὸν Πειραῖα καταπλεῦσαι, στατηγὸς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν
Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, etc. Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton,
s. 4. ὃς παρ᾽ Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθ᾽ ἥκειν
καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν, etc.
[702] See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty,
fragments of the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes,
published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a
recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From
Fragm. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington’s edition) we may see that
the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by
Harpalus—indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive
evidence. Hyperides addresses Demosthenes—ταύτας ὑπ...ις τῷ
ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας
πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν
ἀποστροφήν· ~τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους~, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἧκον φέροντες εἰς
ταὐτὸ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους
ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, ~τούτους σύμπαντας~ οὐ μόνον ~κεκώλυκας
ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου~ τῇ συλλήψει τοῦ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ....
From the language thus used by Hyperides in his accusation, we
are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus,
upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the
people when the case was first under discussion.
The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not
requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other
fragments, the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though
highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the
whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.
[703] Pollux, x. 159.
[704] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων
ὡρμημένων Ἁρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον,
ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πραγμάτων
Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός· ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σιωπῶντος
διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσθένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον
ἰδόντες, οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν;
Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavored to corrupt, resisted of
course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenes
also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset.[705]
Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not
be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed
those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels
quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism.
His prudence, on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his
political position; for while it incensed Hyperides and the more
sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself
anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonizing opponents.
[705] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.
The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenes
and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of
Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favor.
Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys
from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should
be surrendered.[706] The like requisition was also addressed by the
Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron
from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no
less than of Demosthenes. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian
vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the
people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the
necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest
Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the
acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander;
to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves
of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit
a lenient sentence at his hands.[707] Now it was Demosthenes who
moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of
the money;[708] whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from
Hyperides and the other Harpalian partisans, who denounced him
as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus
was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the
satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenes, and every one else; for even
those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the
odium and dishonor of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a
certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one
of his own companions.[709]
[706] Diodor. xvii. 108.
[707] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ
(Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ
τούτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, etc.
[708] See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration
of Hyperides against Demosthenes. That it was _Demosthenes_ who
moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis,
we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who
delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen.
sect. 68, 71, 89)—~ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης~, ὡς
δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς
τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα.
Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97-106) accuses Demosthenes of base
flattery to Alexander. Hyperides also makes the same charge—see
the Fragments in Mr. Babington’s edition, sect. 2. Fr. 11. p. 12;
sect. 3. Fr. 5. p. 34.
[709] Pausan. ii. 33, 4; Diodor. xvii. 108.
At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were
passed, Demosthenes requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus
publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which
the people had just resolved to impound.[710] Harpalus answered,
720 talents; and Demosthenes proclaimed this sum to the people, on
the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its
magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it
was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents.
Now it is said that Demosthenes did not at once communicate to the
people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with
the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by
himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not
know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the
acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise
and outcry were excited.[711] It was assumed that the missing half
of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and
suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenes and
Hyperides both included.
[710] This material fact, of the question publicly put to
Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of
Demosthenes, appears in the Fragments of Hyperides, p. 5, 7,
9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκέλευσε ...
τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ
ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· ~ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο~ ὅτι ἑπτακόσια,
etc.
The term κατατομὴ (see Mr. Babington’s note) “designates a
broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically
arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with
them.”
[711] Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenes
given by Photius (Cod. 265, p. 494) it is stated that only 308
talents were found.
In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the Senate of
Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the
presumed delinquents[712] fit to be indicted before the Dikastery;
he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real
delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally
punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though
Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience.
Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting
only one who was recently married.[713] At length the report
appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with
the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been
taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenes himself, charged
with 20 talents—Demades charged with 6000 golden staters—and other
citizens, with different sums attached to their names.[714] Upon
this report, ten[715] public accusers were appointed to prosecute
the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery.
Among the accusers was Hyperides, whose name had not been comprised
in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenes was brought to trial, first
of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500
citizens,[716] who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found
him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state.
Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison;
but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trœzen
in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and
sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.[717] What was done
with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not
know. It appears that Demades[718]—who was among those comprised, and
who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenes, by both Hyperides
and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore
must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily
returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died.
Philokles and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being
included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their
trial ended, does not appear.[719]
[712] That this motion was made by Demosthenes himself, is a
point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s.
5. 62, 84, etc.: compare also the Fragm. of Hyperides, p. 59, ed.
Babington.
Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as
if Demosthenes had proposed to recognize the sentence of the
Areopagus as final and peremptory, and stood therefore condemned
upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted
sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted
afterwards; besides that, it is repugnant to the judicial
practice of Athens.
[713] Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv.
Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not
delivered until after an interval of six months. About their
delay and the impatience of Demosthenes see Fragm. Hyperides, pp.
12-33, ed. Babington.
[714] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperides
in Mr. Babington, p. 18.
[715] Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton, s. 6. Stratokles was one of
the accusers.
[716] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108, 109.
[717] Plutarch, Demosth. 26.
[718] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.
[719] See the two orations composed by Deinarchus, against
Philokles and Aristogeiton.