SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS —
SIEGE OF TYRE.
It was about February or March 333 B. C., when Alexander
reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time,
giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose
doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable
exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There
was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure,
said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and
his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as
such by the gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of
fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of
this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form
a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to
untie. An oracle had pronounced, that to the person who should untie
it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see
this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well
as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the
Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the
knot, and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting
the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until
at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the
cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the
problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia; a belief
which the gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during
the ensuing night.[237]
[237] Arrian, ii. 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18;
Justin, xi. 7.
At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating
the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who
were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this
prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were
held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity
occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians,
he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.[238]
[238] Arrian, i. 29, 8.
Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded
from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of
Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Ægean (during
the first half of 333 B. C.), with the purpose of carrying war into
Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a
large Phenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries,
together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradates.
Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the
co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos,
where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference,
declared in his favor; while Mitylênê, the greatest of the five,
already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him.
Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade
of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double
palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died
of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned
the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be
known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to
a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by
Alexander should be dismissed; that the column, recording alliance
with him, should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become
allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the
name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be
recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus,
as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only
extorted contributions, but introduced a garrison under Lykomêdes,
and established a returned exile named Diogenes as despot.[239] Such
breach of faith was ill calculated to assist the farther extension of
Persian influence in Greece.
[239] Arrian, ii. 1, 4-9.
Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander’s
army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions
of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly
important as promising future progress. Several of the Cyclades
islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet
was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count upon aid for
an anti-Macedonian movement.[240] But all these hopes were destroyed
by the unexpected decease of Memnon.
[240] Diodor. xvii. 29.
It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his
established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered
his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had
with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not
unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had
gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command
among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius
to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of
operations, and upheld against court-calumnies. Though Alexander had
now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means,
if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of
seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last
chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value
of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom
he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of
Memnon lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full
leisure to reorganize the Macedonian fleet,[241] and to employ the
undivided land-force for farther inland conquest.[242]
[241] Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. “Nondum
enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis
gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur.”
[242] Diodor. xvi. 31.
If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the
death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change
of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian
king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to
take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops,
already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially
arrived, and were still coming in.[243] Their numbers became greater
and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host,
the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men; by others, as
400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy
and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language,
filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were
among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian
courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated
the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his
persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana,
Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive;
but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had
come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians,
Katdakes, etc.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia,
are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxes in the
plain of Doriskus, by paling off a space capable of containing
exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in
succession.[244] Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him,
had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian
imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the
real conditions of military preponderance,—accustomed only to the
gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength,—the
king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a
god on earth, certain to trample down all before him—just as most
Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxes,[245] and by stronger reason
Xerxes respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all
this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling,
given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless
rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of
untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgment.
[243] Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. Diodorus represents the Persian king
as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops,
_after_ he heard the death of Memnon; which cannot be true. The
letters must have been sent out before.
[244] Curtius, iii. 2.
[245] Herodot. vii. 56—and the colloquy between Xerxes and
Demaratus, vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into
the mouth of Xerxes is natural and instructive. On the other
hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses
supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an Asiatic
multitude—Xenophon, Anabas. i. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language
of the Arcadian Antiochus—Xen. Hellen. vii. i. 38; and Cyropæd.
viii. 8, 20.
But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response
in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near
Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidemus, who having incurred the
implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens
after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together
with Ephialtes to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent
omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of
devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion
of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative
reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with
the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions,
however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility
that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as
Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxes), that the vast multitude
now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number
of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics,
but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased
army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services
either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike
surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked
intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle
of their present muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult
with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with
Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended
by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidemus as a traitor who
wished to acquire the king’s confidence in order to betray him to
Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still farther
exasperated by the clamors of his courtiers, seized with his own
hands the girdle of Charidemus, and consigned him to the guards for
execution. “You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian), the
truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you.”[246]
[246] Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.
Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory,
Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and
march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army
became the really important and aggressive force, with which he
himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the
plans of Memnon—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned
them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most
safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the
Granikus, when Memnon’s counsel was originally given, the defensive
part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very
strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.
C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly
desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere.
In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring
the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will
presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had
succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet
remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the
Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that,
the passes over Mount Amanus itself— all indispensable for Alexander
to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions,
against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity, for
executing the defensive part of Memnon’s scheme, could not present
itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such
advantages would not be thrown away.
The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was
manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving
intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of
Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he
at the same time despatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of
Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who
served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army.[247]
Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations
was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.
[247] Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.
It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the
part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian
drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight,
and set before us little except the secondary points in the case.
Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming
to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of
waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now,
unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this
step augmented the chances in favor of the Macedonians. But it was a
step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army
under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open
plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the
neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at
all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians,
to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred,
it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in
originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong
lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.
The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not
only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put
in relief the really important and determining points.
While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married
Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back
with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry,
together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians.[248] As soon
as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably
about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia.
At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who
submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he
would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these
terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of
Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of
Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving
therein Sabiktas as satrap.[249]
[248] Arrian, i. 29. 6.
[249] Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18.
Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward
towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus,
at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylæ,
or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication, between
Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great
chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow,
winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and
it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly
obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present,
the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through
this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received
many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier.
Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents
it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army.[250]
Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger
Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother
Artaxerxes; and Xenophon,[251] who then went through it, pronounces
it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying
force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact,
that he had prepared a fleet, in case he found the pass occupied,
to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and
great indeed was his astonishment, to discover that the habitual
recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The
narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men
abreast, was shut in by precipitous rock on each side.[252] Here, if
anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might
have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the
resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.
[250] Respecting this pass, see Vol. IX. Ch. lxix. p. 20 of the
present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from
Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one, the easternmost
descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon
Tarsus. In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha,
the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass undefended,
so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without
opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but
defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the
Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadalvène et
Barrault, p. 243).
Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.
[251] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2. 21; Diodor. xiv. 20.
[252] Curtius, iii. 4, 11.
Yet Arsames, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia,
having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse
than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising
enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander,
the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking
a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable
than mountain-robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost
insuperable barrier, without the loss of a man.[253] On the ensuing
day, he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving
in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by
Arsames.[254]
[253] Curtius, iii. 4, 11. “Contemplatus locorum situm
(Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem
suam”, etc.
See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathokles (son of Lysimachus)
holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkêtes.
[254] Arrian, ii. 4, 3-8; Curtius, iii. 4. Curtius ascribes to
Arsames the intention of executing what had been recommended by
Memnon before the battle of Granikus—to desolate the country in
order to check Alexander’s advance. But this can hardly be the
right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian’s account seems
more reasonable.
At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended.
Either from excessive fatigue—or from bathing while hot in the
chilly water of the river Kydnus—he was seized with a violent fever,
which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was
despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune
filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer
remedies, for fear of being held responsible for what threatened
to be a fatal result.[255] One alone among them, an Akarnanian
named Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to
cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to
prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received
a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of
Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading
the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with
the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark,
at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching
the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of
the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus,
indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence
in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first
it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and
even to bring him to death’s door; but after a certain interval, its
healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander
was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army.[256]
A reasonable time sufficed, to restore him to his former health and
vigor.
[255] When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years
afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him
to be crucified (Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Arrian, vii. 14).
[256] This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less
of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii.
4; Diodor. xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexand. 19; Curtius, iii. 5;
Justin, xi. 8.
It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of
Alexander, by superhuman successes continued for four years—to
contrast the generous confidence which he displayed towards
Philippus, with his cruel prejudgment and torture of Philôtas
four years afterwards.
It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio,
at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army,
for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the
pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.[257] This narrow road,
bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on
the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for
passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The
Gates, about six days’ march beyond Tarsus,[258] were found guarded,
but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time Alexander
himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly
direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and
regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian
mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward
march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of
cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next
to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philôtus, being sent by
a more direct route across the Alëian plain. Mallus, sacred to the
prophet Amphilocus as a patron-hero, was said to be a colony from
Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with
peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilocus, exempted
Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the
citizens.[259]
[257] Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.
[258] Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to
Issus, and one day more from Issus to the gates of Kilikia and
Syria.—Xenoph. Anab. i. 4, 1; Vol. IX. Chap. lxix. p. 27 of this
history.
[259] Arrian, ii, 5, 11.
It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication
respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be
encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus,
about two days’ march from the mountain pass now called Beylan.
That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of
the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first
over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above
specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount
Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander
communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a
spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially
of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favorable to the
enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon
Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly Alexander,
well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the
following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick
and wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia
and Syria. At the second day’s march from those Gates, he reached the
seaport of Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.[260]
[260] Arrian, ii. 6.
Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm,
he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The
Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in
Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of
Issus.
Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous
host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his
children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied
him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the
apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for
the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of
gold and silver alone, we are told, that there was enough to furnish
load for 600 mules and 300 camels.[261] A temporary bridge being
thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the
whole army to cross.[262] Much of the treasure and baggage, however,
was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus,
but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.
[261] Curtius, iii. 3, 24.
[262] Curtius, iii. 7, 1.
At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring
on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply
to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated
on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we
have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted
Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in
like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of
Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass,
now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished
that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be
trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.
But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of
Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended.
We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his
life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among
the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians,
with abundant exaggerations: and when Alexander, immediately after
recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away
from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was
construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even
asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in
Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so.[263] At any
rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion,
and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that
the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier
satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty
and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to
resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an
advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymôdes indeed, and other
intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile
Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in
his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would
come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too, speedily.
They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of
Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be
useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius,
but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous.[264] Even
some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their
letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order
was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria
and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia.[265] To cross, by any
pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous
army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the
suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no
inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were,
both of them, narrow and easily defensible.[266] Darius followed the
northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of his enemy.
[263] Curtius, iii. 7, 8.
[264] From Æschines (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that
Demosthenes, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens,
received letters at this moment written in high spirits,
intimating that Alexander was “caught and pinned up” in Kilikia.
Demosthenes (if we may believe Æschines) went about showing
these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at
hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident
anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sanballat at
Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.
[265] Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor. xvii. 32.
[266] Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xv. 4. See the instructive
commentary of Mützel ad Curtium, iii. 8, p. 103, 104. I have
given in an Appendix to this Volume, some explanatory comments on
the ground near Issus.
Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward
to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in
the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass
to drive them before him back into Macedonia.[267] Reaching Issus,
seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of
their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his
grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or
amputation of hands and arms.[268] He then marched forward—along the
same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by
Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.
[267] Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly;
but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one
another in the night, etc.
[268] Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned,
a few pages back, that about a fortnight before, Alexander
had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of
Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli
and Anchilaus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this
time by a distance, not less than eight days of ordinary march.
If during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would
have been just between them, and would have cut them off one
from the other. It was Alexander’s good luck that so grave an
embarrassment did not occur.
The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they
overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he, that he refused to
believe the news, until it had been confirmed by some officers whom
he sent northward along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley,
and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly
visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to
them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favorable
auspices under which a battle would now take place.[269] His address
was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be
led against the enemy.[270]
[269] Arrian, ii. 7, 8.
[270] Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodor. xvii. 33.
His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen
miles.[271] By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight
the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates
of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before.
Again master of that important position, he rested there the last
portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward
towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so
confined, as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry
following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander
to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of
the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed
across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. on the extreme
right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next
(reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the
phalanx, under Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of
these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command;
himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire
left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on
the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more
than fourteen stadia, or about one English mile and a half.[272] From
fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians,
he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His
Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians,
were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianes, and the
principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied
cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on
the left flank to Parmenio.[273]
[271] Kallisthenes called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb.
xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.
Polybius criticises severely the description given by
Kallisthenes of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the
words of Kallisthenes himself, we are hardly in a condition to
appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is
certainly overstrained.
[272] Kallisthenes ap. Polybium, xii. 17.
[273] Arrian, ii. 8, 4-13.
Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight
where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw
across the river a force of 30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry,
to ensure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the
river.[274] He composed his phalanx or main line of battle, of 90,000
hoplites; 30,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics
armed as hoplites (called Kardakes), on each side of these Greeks.
These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one
body or multitude[275]—filled the breadth between the mountains and
the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000
men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander.
But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no
room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his
Greek and Asiatic hoplites, yet not formed into any body of reserve,
or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was
thoroughly formed, he recalled to the left bank of the Pinarus the
30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a
protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme
left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them
to act, so that they were forced to cross the right wing, where
accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled.
Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind
the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or
rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep,
he obstructed in some places by embankments.[276]
[274] Compare Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17.; and Arrian, ii.
8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies
as these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little
facility in moving. Kallisthenes did not notice them, as far as
we can collect from Polybius.
[275] Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσούτους γὰρ ~ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἁπλῆς~
ἐδέχετο τὸ χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο.
The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the
exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of
sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would
stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore
80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of
Rüstow and Köchly, p. 280, about the Macedonian line). Assuming
a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the stadium, and
therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that
given by Kallisthenes. But there must have been intervals left,
greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments,
which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have
found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.
Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the
sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles.
The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenes are equivalent to nearly one
English mile and three-quarters.
Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever
been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or
array—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498;
Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124.
[276] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenes appears to have reckoned
the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the
cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the
Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that
there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian
enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii.
18).
As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering
detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius,
he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian
cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and
bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarissophori, as well as the
light infantry, Pæonians, and archers, to the front of his right. The
Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers,
were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against
the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these
20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed
the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the
hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily,
that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them.
He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against
them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and
the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front
equal to that of his enemies.[277]
[277] Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The
slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with
which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to
the battle—are noticed by Curtius, iii. 9, 11.
Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain
halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious
to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy
might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he
continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front,
until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of
his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right,
accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell
upon the Kardakes or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared
for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakes
scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to
close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right.
Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this
untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized
with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with
all speed among the foremost fugitives.[278] He kept to his chariot
as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some
rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in
such terror, that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal
mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have
made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight
of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so
that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one
another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground
out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the
centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the
army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was
no one left to give any general order.
[278] Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος, ξὺν
τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, etc.
This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the
highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius
(iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot
of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot,
in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to
be on the point of overturning it. Chares even went so far
as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict
with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh
(Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by
Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a
slight wound in the thigh.
In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and
Curtius have copied the same authority.
Kallisthenes (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had
laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of
Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22),
and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of
the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the
safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How
did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may
reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be
conspicuous: moreover the Persian kings were habitually in the
centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed
the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother
Artaxerxes.
After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes assumed to himself the
honor of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death
those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it
(Plutarch, Artax. 16).
This great battle—we ought rather to say, that which ought to have
been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the
Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of
Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre
and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes,
behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward
with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his
left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not
receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded
and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus.
Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in
the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and
the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division,
Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front rank men or choice
phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed
the rout on the enemies’ left, brought back his victorious troops
from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave
decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries
were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself
had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet
seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part
of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian
line, and made their escape southward.[279]
[279] This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears
to me probable though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in
consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of
Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth’s Essay on the
Cilician and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geograph. Society,
1838, p. 194]. These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in
their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way
over very difficult ground.
Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed
Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to
cross the Pinarus[280] and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with
whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that
Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed.
They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage
from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakes on the _right_
flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing,
nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these
Kardakes came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of
the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the
general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have
left the field.[281]
[280] Arrian, ii. 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenes
stated the same thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had
crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery.
Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something
false and absurd (xii. 18). This shows that the criticisms of
Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if
the Macedonian phalanx _could_ not cross the Pinarus—converting a
difficulty into an impossibility (xii. 22).
[281] Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.
The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a
vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives
was prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground,
narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses,
their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many
perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; insomuch
that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian
of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a
ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass
over it.[282] The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a
November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour.
The camp of Darius was taken together with his mother, his wife, his
sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield,
and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum
of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure
had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said
to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain
moreover were several eminent Persian grandees,—Arsames, Rheomithres,
and Atizyes, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakes, satrap of
Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse
were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a
sword.[283]
[282] Arrian, i. 11, 11; Kallisthenes ap. Polyb. xii 20.
[283] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. Curtius (ii. 11, 27) says
that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and
fifty horse, killed; with 504 men wounded;—Justin states, 130
foot, and 150 horse (xi. 9).
The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were
treated by Alexander’s order with the utmost consideration and
respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found
the regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment
of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that
the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that
the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose
to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed.
Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was
still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed
to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being
undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest
for the empire of Asia.[284] Besides this anecdote, which depends on
good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted
about his kind behavior to these princesses; and Alexander himself,
shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it,
which he thought himself obliged to contradict in a letter. It is
certain, (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he
never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife
of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he
even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.[285]
[284] Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare
Diodor. xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.
[285] Plutarch, Alex. 22. ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἑωρακὼς ἂν
εὑρεθείην τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.
How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of
Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass
over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make
out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number,
made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads
and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage,
would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius
managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened
to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of
force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of
8000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymôdes. These
men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south,
by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia,
where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves
been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means
of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they
immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.[286]
With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears
with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or reform,
nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The
booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and
silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of
the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving,
with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at
the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or
complimented all who had distinguished themselves.[287]
[286] Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 48. Curtius says
that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains
(Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19).
[287] Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12, 27; Diodor. xvii. 40.
The “Aræ Alexandri, in radicibus Amani”, are mentioned by Cicero
(ad Famil. xv. 4) When commanding in Kilikia he encamped there
with his army four days.
No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or
more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not
only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts
of Darius for recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family.
Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, re-appearing
in different places for operations of detail; but we shall find no
farther resistance to Alexander and his main force, except from the
brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming
sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the
force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it
might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a
Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a
contempt, not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to
vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general
and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood
conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault
in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of
fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley,
whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this
(as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and
by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same,
had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount
Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground unless
there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be
distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive
action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each
other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat
of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether
blind and childish;[288] nay, that faith, though overweening
beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run
away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks
of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing
his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.[289] But it
was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as
to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been
ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and
thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their
effect.[290] Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous
for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again
exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence
for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought
in a spacious plain chosen by himself.
[288] See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxes—Herodot.
vii. 48; compare the speech of Achæmenes, vii. 236.
[289] Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς
ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression
borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare Arrian, ii. 6, 7.
[290] Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger
was asked by some of the Grecian Officers, whether he thought
that his brother Artaxerxes (who had as yet made no resistance)
would fight—“To be sure he will (was the reply) if he is the son
of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the
crown without fighting!” Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia
at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i.
7, 9)
Happy was it for Memnon, that he did not live to see the renunciation
of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the
Ægean, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though
weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled
to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian
Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Karia,[291] was
nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian
manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of
Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian
king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a
force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the
Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the
terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt
in the island of Chios as the result of this news, Pharnabazus
immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining
nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten
triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and
to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be
conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among
the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates
to Halikarnassus.[292] It appears, however, that he afterwards went
to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable
success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the
Persians.[293] On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed
all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to
Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian
synod, assembled at Corinth during the Isthmian festival, manifested
their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath
of gold.[294]
[291] Arrian, ii. 5, 8.
[292] Arrian, ii. 13, 4-8.
[293] Diodor. xvii. 48.
[294] Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to
mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed
at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.
With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through
Kœle-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way
to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent
most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian
women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a
considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the
treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to
convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the
hands of the enemy.[295] There was captured a large treasure—with a
prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury,
belonging to the court and the grandees.[296] Moreover the prisoners
made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had
to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were
among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor
of Darius—the daughter of Darius’s brother Oxathres—the wives of
Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and
Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by
Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also
several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian,
who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to
Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army
at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by
Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but
not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble
name and parentage—Iphikrates, son of the great Athenian officer of
that name.[297] The captive Iphikrates not only received his liberty,
but was induced by courteous and honorable treatment to remain with
Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards from sickness, and his
ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his
family at Athens.
[295] Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian
(ii. 15, 1)—ὀπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Δαμασκὸν—confirm the statement of
Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the
town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away
from the town.
[296] A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is
preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty
(Athenæus, xiii. p. 607).
[297] Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13-16. There is some
discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to
the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.
I have already stated in a former volume[298] that the elder
Iphikrates had been adopted by Alexander’s grandfather into the regal
family of Macedonia, as the savior of their throne: probably this was
the circumstance which determined the superior favor shown to the
son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the
military genius of the father. The difference of position, between
Iphikrates the father and Iphikrates the son, is one among the
painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism; the father, a
distinguished officer moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining
by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and
even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family;
the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city
by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or
rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an
Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his
own security and the freedom of Greece.
[298] See above, in the History, Vol. X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 108; Vol.
X. Ch. lxxix. p. 251; and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 263. c. 13.
Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada princess of
Karia as her son (Arrian, i. 23, 12).
Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to
Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus,
on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with
that islet and some other neighboring towns, the domain of the
Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with
his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean; but his
son Strata, acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his
homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with
the neighboring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato
was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician
city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the
queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent
envoys to meet him and invite his approach.[299] Their sentiments
were unfavorable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody
and perfidious proceedings which (about eighteen years before) had
marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.[300]
Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as
well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean
with the Persian admiral Autophradates, and formed a large proportion
of his entire fleet.[301]
[299] Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.
[300] Diodor. xvi. 45.
[301] Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6-16.
While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his
onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius,
asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and
tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another.
Darius farther attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had
begun the wrong against Persia,—that Alexander had continued it—and
that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply,
Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against
Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to
avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxes. He then alleged
various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having
instigated the assassination of Philip, as well as the hostilities
of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. “Now (continued he), by the
grace of the gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps,
next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and
made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to
the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me,
and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else
which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not
as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you;
otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to
contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run
away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be.”[302]
[302] Arrian, ii. 14; Curtius, iv. i. 10; Diodor. xvii. 39. I
give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Both
Curtius and Diodorus represent Darius as offering great sums
of money and large cessions of territory, in exchange for the
restitution of the captives. Arrian says nothing of the kind.
This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of
importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom
fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of
life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with
himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of
submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to
be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was
mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander
himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis[303])
which of the two should be master of Asia.
[303] Arrian, ii. 12, 9.
The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the
morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt
by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of
the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly
upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the
Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly
from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the
Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that
their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be
recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining
arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him,
one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them
in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority
of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon
islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied,
that even Alexander’s energy and ability might hardly have proved
sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before
him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and
efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when
the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him
that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still
greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had
no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate
attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities
they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was
even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause
above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander’s
march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbors,
if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold
out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the
irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of
Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports,
except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a
blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian,
was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family,
yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.[304]
[304] Curtius, iv. 1, 20-25; Justin, xi. 10. Diodorus (xvii. 47)
tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon;
which is highly improbable.
With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the
most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less
ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation
from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed
by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent
commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men
brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together
with a golden wreath of honor; announcing formally that the Tyrians
were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.[305] In reply,
he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents,
and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished
to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Herakles. The Phenician god
Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Herakles, and was
thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of
the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice
there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.[306]
The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an
answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit
within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all
other points, they would obey Alexander’s orders.[307] They added
that his wish to sacrifice to Herakles might be accomplished without
entering their city, since there was in Palætyrus (on the mainland
over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow
strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than
their own.[308] Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took
note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with
angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.[309]
[305] Arrian. iii 15, 9. ὡς ἐγνωκότων Τυρίων πράσσειν, ὅ,τι ἂν
ἐπαγγέλλῃ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.
[306] Curtius (_ut suprà_) adds these motives: Arrian asserts
nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius
represents what is likely to have been the real fact and real
feeling of Alexander.
It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with
rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true
that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out _his_
narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.
[307] Arrian, ii. 16, 11.
[308] Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent
and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians, is not noticed by
Arrian.
[309] Arrian, ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀπίσω
ἀπέπεμψεν, etc. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. “Non tenuit iram, cujus
alioqui potens non erat”, etc.
Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the
Tyrians as foolish wilfulness,[310] have not fully considered how
much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to
Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force
armed and in battle army.[311] We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at
Tyre to Herakles—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was
force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as
in fact it was, after the town had been taken.[312] The Tyrians were
thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military
force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was
completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as
permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not
endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure
it from a new master. It was in fact hazarding their all; submitting
at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a
successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians
promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we
see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained
from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without the
necessity of besieging the town. The great value of Phenician cities
consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and
gave to them the command of the sea.[313] Had Alexander required
that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in
his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it
readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia,
nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between
the two belligerents, as if the contest were still undecided.[314]
Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian
soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of
Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands,
prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to
make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without
a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy and intelligent
communities of the ancient world.
[310] Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι, βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως
τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ θῦσαι, προπετέστερον διεκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς
τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.
[311] Arrian, i. 18, 4.
[312] Arrian, ii. 24, 10.
[313] This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his
address to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre
(Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).
[314] Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), “Tyros
facilius _societatem_ Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam
_imperium_.” This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians
as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the
_imperium_ of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one
extreme demand.
Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of
Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabbath, under pretence of
offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).
Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the
mainland;[315] the channel between the two being shallow towards the
land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining
the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls,
the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland,
reached a height not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity
and base.[316] Besides these external fortifications, there was a
brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms,
machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.
[315] Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day
presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of
Alexander’s time.
[316] Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.
It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven
to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against
the formidable arm of Alexander; and against Alexander as he then
stood, they might have held out successfully; for he had as yet no
fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The
question turned upon the Phenician and Cyprian ships, which were for
the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian
admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all
the Phenician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging
to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away
their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate,
to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This
could hardly have failed to happen if he had treated the Tyrians with
decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had
made them his enemies.
What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradates in the Ægean,
when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other
Phenician cities; next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we
know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his
ships for the defence of his own city;[317] the Sidonian and Aradian
ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their
own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before
they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradates without
Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did),
had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander,
as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not
improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly,
the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if
ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as
his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies,
though ultimately they all turned out in favor of Alexander, were
in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid
resolution of the Tyrians; who were farther encouraged by promises
of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that
city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious
solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.[318]
[317] Azemilchus was with Autophradates when Alexander declared
hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when
it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).
[318] Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvli. 40,
41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the
Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only
refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary
to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending
of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he
found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify
the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to
Alexander’s temperament, after what had passed between him and
the Tyrians.
Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian
and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to
construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the
half mile channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into
his service laboring hands by thousands from the neighborhood; he
had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in
Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardor and perseverance,
under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome,
even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede
it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as
to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds
and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed
the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the
protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in
front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from
engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts,
the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel
to the city wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians
sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove
against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At
the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little
boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole.
So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were
burnt,—the outer wood-work which kept the mole together was torn up
in many places,—and a large part of the structure came to pieces.[319]
[319] Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor. xvii. 42; Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.
Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to
begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth
and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in
front, and for better defence against lateral attacks. But it had
now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the
sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town.
Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus to reconstruct the mole and build new
engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling
as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various
quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from
Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in
requisition the ships of the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and
Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left
the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders;
while not long afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also,
tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.[320] He
was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part
and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation
of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested
from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near
the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been
fulfilled; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered
and brought into his power a superior Persian fleet.[321]
[320] Arrian. ii. 20, 1-4; Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how
strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander’s point of
view, when we find him telling us, that that monarch _forgave_
the Phenicians and Cyprians for their adherence and past service
in the Persian fleet, considering that they had acted under
compulsion.
[321] Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries
earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon and other
Phenician towns had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander
apud Joseph. Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).
Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and
training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put
himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of
eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he
dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and
hazard.[322] On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with
a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for
prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbor
of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping
that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within,
struck with surprise and consternation; having not before known that
their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander,
having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight,
immediately caused their two harbors to be blocked up and watched;
that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south,
towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.[323]
[322] Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.
[323] Arrian, ii. 20, 9-16; Curtius, iv. 3, 11.
From this time forward, the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians
could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed
across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted
upon it to batter the walls: movable towers were rolled up to take
them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though
reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed
obstinate bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in
repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall
fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon,
that none of Alexander’s engines could make any breach in it; but
on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large
breach having been made in this south-wall, he assaulted it with two
ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he
himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time
he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable
point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders.
Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach
in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck,
upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective
storming-parties. Admêtus got upon the wall, but was there slain;
Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got
such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the
same time, his ships also forced their way into the two harbors, so
that Tyre came on all sides into his power.[324]
[324] Arrian, ii. 23, 24; Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodor. xvii. 46.
Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate,
the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded
the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a
defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the
battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the
Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege,
as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the
Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter
in the temple of Hêraklês were spared by Alexander from respect to
the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few
leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both
sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred,
and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the
capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.[325]
But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in
their hands; while 2000 of them who survived, either from disabling
wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the
sea-shore by order of Alexander.[326] The females, the children, and
the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said
to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume
slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously
sent away to Carthage.[327]
[325] Curtius, iv. 4, 15.
[326] This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by
Diodorus (xvii. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps
may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see
no ground for disbelieving it.
[327] Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodorus, xvii. 46.
Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated
his much-desired sacrifice to Herakles. His whole force, land and
naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more
costly hecatomb had never been offered to that god, when we consider
that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege,
and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his
former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we
cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400,
which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill
of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period
of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to
accomplish it sooner.[328]
[328] The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by
the fact, that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again
rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).
Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and
rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents,
with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as
ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should
become his son-in-law as well as his ally. “If I were Alexander (said
Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into
farther peril.”—“So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio;
but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer.” His
answer to Darius was to this effect—“I want neither your money nor
your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and
you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose
to marry your daughter, I _shall_ marry her—whether you give her
to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any
act of friendship.”[329] Alexander might spare the submissive and
the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and
his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course
this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not
before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.
[329] Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more
insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp
of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens
it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54)—and
represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after
Alexander’s return from Egypt.