dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood
of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B. C., he
died, poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne
Arses, one of the king’s sons, killing all the rest. After two
years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to
death also, together with all his children; thus leaving no direct
descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne
one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the
brothers of Artaxerxes Memnon), who had acquired glory, in a recent
war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable
champion of the enemy’s army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to
poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him
to drink the deadly draught himself.[172] In spite of such murders
and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards
reproached to Darius[173]—the authority of Darius seems to have been
recognized, without any material opposition, throughout all the
Persian empire.
[172] Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.
[173] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.
Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B. C. 336,
when Philip was organizing the projected invasion of Persia, and when
the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already
making war in Asia—Darius prepared measures of defence at home,
and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[174]
On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king
publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated
the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful
Alexander.[175] Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he
imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during
the first months of Alexander’s reign, when the latter might have
been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective
employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of
Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia, satisfied Darius that
the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for
defence. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped: the satraps
in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting
in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was
furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under
his separate command.[176]
[174] Diodor. xvii. 7.
[175] Arrian, ii. 14, 11.
[176] Diodor. xvii. 7.
We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events,
during the nineteen months between Alexander’s accession and his
landing in Asia (August 336 B. C., to March or April 334 B. C.) We
learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the
north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own
territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of
Adramyttium[177]) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly
upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though
only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to
content himself with a rich booty from the district around.[178]
The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia
with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but
was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas,
in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to
Rhœteium.[179]
[177] Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν
τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν—which doubtless means this region, conquered
by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.
[178] Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.
[179] Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near
Magnesia between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).
We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of
Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both
active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the
region north-east of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal
imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over
without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334
B. C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont,
had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it
did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to
any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet
actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander’s
designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have
been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in
Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps
unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field,
disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and
even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious
imputations.
At the time of Alexander’s landing, a powerful Persian force was
already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under
command of Arsites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several
other leading Persians—Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia),
Pharnakes, Atizyes, Mithridates, Rhomithres, Niphates, Petines,
etc. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of
Darius), and distinguished for personal valor. The greater number
of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians,
Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, etc.[180] In cavalry they
greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior
in number,[181] composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian
mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry,
and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and
100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian
are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is
certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.
[180] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.
[181] Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.
Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division,
earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle.
Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in
infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he
enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy
the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in
order to render any considerable advance of the invading force
impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he
recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia;
that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put
aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable
points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility
against him from the Greeks and other neighbors.[182]
[182] Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in
Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority
of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly
both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon’s policy;
which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less
effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the
offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and
destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly
have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander,
and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian
generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon’s
ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of
the irresistible Persian fleet.
I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus,
because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too
exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all
allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either
certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian;
he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric,
which contrasts favorably both with Diodorus and with Curtius;
but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.
Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money,
we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have
found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that
Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own
dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back
his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for
the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma
by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian
leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander’s military superiority,
and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they
repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonorable, insinuating
that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own
importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity
was farther strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military
leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been
impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsites, in whose
territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take
effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house
in it to be burnt.[183] Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had
possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to
the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—“of
not being able to procure a dinner in his own country”.[184] The
proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the
arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.
[183] Arrian, i. 12, 18.
[184] Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.
This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalized
by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise
from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,[185] and flows
northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat
east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth: near the
point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in
many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus
offering obstruction to an enemy’s attack. The Persians, marching
forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of
the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into
the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city situated between Priapus and
Parium.[186]
[185] Strabo, xiii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and
Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This
comes from Demetrius, a native of Skepsis.
[186] Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπώρειαν
κατειλημμένοι, etc. “prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit.”
Justin, xi. 6: compare Strabo, xiii. p. 587, 588.
Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbê
(where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the
second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus; receiving
on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware
that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of
scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry
and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermôtus
(the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched direct towards the Granikus,
in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry
on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river,
he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio
advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on
the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against
the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping
during the night.
In Alexander’s array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the
central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of which it consisted,
were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus,
Amyntas son of Andromenes, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus.[187]
Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the hypaspistæ,
or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light
horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniate squadron of
Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokrates, all under
Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry,
the bowmen, and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of
Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.[188] The left
flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct
divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians,
under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus,
son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas,
whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the
command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right
and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including
three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its
flank—for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On
the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank.
The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithres—the
Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsites and
Spithridates—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenes, with their
divisions.[189] The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were
kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute
the passage of the river.
[187] Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name
of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed.
The words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως seem to prove
that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager,
and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three
others (Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while
the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου appear wrongly
inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished
officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his
τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the
τάξεις,—once again in counting from the left.
[188] Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with
thirteen squadrons (ἴλαι) of cavalry. Whether this total includes
all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry—we
cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).
[189] Diodor. xvii. 19.
In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each
other in anxious silence.[190] There being no firing or smoke, as
with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible
to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander
himself on the Macedonian right from the splendor of his armor and
military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanor of those
around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their
own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their
cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed
a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for
advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of
Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the
squadron of Apollonia, of which Sokrates was captain—commanded on
this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippus) supported by the light horse
or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of
regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ.[191] He then himself
entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry
and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the
usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a
straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted
their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front
extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in
line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian
cavalry.[192] Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left
under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under
the like precautions.
[190] Arrian, i. 14, 8. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφότερα τὰ στρατεύματα,
ἐπ᾽ ἀκροῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφεστῶτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν
ἦγον· καὶ σιγὴ ἦν πολλὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων.
[191] Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same
cavalry as those who are called (in 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας,
under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.
[192] Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον
κέρας ... ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν,
ᾗ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ
κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστὸν, τῇ φάλαγγι
προσμίξῃ αὐτοῖς.
Apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ᾗ
παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which
follows describing the purpose to be accomplished.
I cannot think that the words imply a movement _in échelon_,
as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen
Kriegswesens, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river against the
stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of
others.
The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the
opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it
was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best
of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit
of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others
down at the water’s-edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The
Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push
their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain.
Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no
impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the
main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching
the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with
increased fervor on both sides. He was himself among the foremost,
and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both
sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical
force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great
advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting
pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length
the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander with those around him,
gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the
high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not
equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing
at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line,
overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the
level ground with comparative facility.[193] Indeed no cavalry could
possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with
its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in
any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other
points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with
Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.
[193] Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself)
ξυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ᾽ ἄλλαις τῶν
τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη.
These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete
Arrian’s description of the battle had before been. Dwelling
almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements
of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of
the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under
Parmenio. We discover from these words that _all_ the τάξεις of
the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander’s half, but also the
three in Parmenio’s half) passed the river nearly at the same
time, and for the most part, with little or no resistance.
Here again, as at the water’s edge, Alexander was foremost in
personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a
soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided
him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having
broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting
him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus,
one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon
instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against
Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column
of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance
of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and
laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the
Persian leaders, Rhœsakes, who struck him a blow on the head with
his scymetar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not
penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakes
through the body with his pike.[194] Meanwhile a third Persian
leader, Spithridates, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand
and scymetar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment,
Kleitus son of Dropides—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high
in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted
arm of Spithridates and severed it from the body, thus preserving
Alexander’s life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridates,
rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his
armor, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions
near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his
adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry
was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian
cavalry also fought with vigor and success;[195] and the light-armed
foot, intermingled with Alexander’s cavalry generally, did great
damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun,
speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the
Macedonians.
[194] Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16.
These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.
[195] Diodor. xvii. 21.
But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardor of pursuit,
calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian
infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement
or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously
terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention.[196]
He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front,
while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and
rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed
under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that
against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater
part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to
pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made
prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the
dead bodies.[197]
[196] Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on
seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with
Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.
[197] Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on
the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with
2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.
In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry
was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain.
But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves
with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander,
was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridates, Rhœsakes,
and Spithridates, whose names have been already mentioned,—but
also Pharnakes, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanes satrap of
Kappadokia, Atizyes, Niphates, Petines, and others; all Persians
of rank and consequence. Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia, whose
rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon’s advice, escaped
from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from
anguish and humiliation.[198] The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry,
though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in
Arrian’s account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was
either left in the field, or could be afterwards reassembled in Asia
Minor.
[198] Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.
The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small.
Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under
Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt
to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain;
of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on
the side of Alexander.[199] It is only the number of killed; that
of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the
number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.[200] If
this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near
that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into
conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But
when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of
the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear
still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated
at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only
2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian)
were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely
to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly
affirms that they resisted with desperate valor, and that most of the
Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not
easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be
brought within the statement of Arrian.[201]
[199] Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.
[200] Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the
proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above
what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p.
273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of
wounded to killed is from 8:1 to 10:1.
[201] Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus
(apud Plutarch. _l. c._) said that there were slain, among the
companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four
persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian’s
statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.
After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for
his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the
twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus,
to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing
in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain
he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service.
The dead bodies were honorably buried, those of the enemy as well as
of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service
who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported
to Macedonia, there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander
condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf
of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general
vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent
to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be
dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis with this inscription—“Alexander
son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians (_present
these offerings_), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting
Asia.”[202] Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented
no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which
could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing
his own self-aggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed
Pan-hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful, as
strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons
competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian
empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine
Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and
especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True
Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.
[202] Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.
The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsites and the other
satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully
fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most
formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service,
was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was
fought only by the Persian cavalry;[203] the infantry was left to be
surrounded and destroyed afterwards.
[203] Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an
ἱππομαχία (i. 17, 10 and elsewhere).
The battle was fought in the Attic month Thargelion: probably the
beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).
No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of
Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The
impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two
accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees
who perished, realizing almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxes, and
the Chorus, in the Persæ of Æschylus,[204] after the battle of
Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander
himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed
foremost into the _mélée_, but killed two of these grandees with his
own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now,
must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon
the imagination of contemporaries.
[204] Æschylus, Pers. 950 _seqq._
Several of the neighboring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous
subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and
were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they
had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighboring Grecian city
of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered
and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that
they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio
to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the
satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison
and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein.
The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander’s power,
and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf,
levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before.[205] He
himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction
towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the
Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty
and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple
wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at
any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long
blockade,[206] which would have allowed time for the arrival of the
fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now
accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within
eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief
citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrines.
The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure Were delivered up to him
without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there were not in Asia
any Persian governors of courage and fidelity such as had been
displayed by Maskames and Boges after the repulse of Xerxes from
Greece.[207] Alexander treated Mithrines with courtesy and honor,
granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally,
with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by
Mithrines was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to
the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious
strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and
giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the
spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated.
He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of
Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and
Nikias, collector of tribute.[208] The freedom granted to the
Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them
from paying the usual tribute.
[205] Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.
[206] About the almost impregnable fortifications and position
of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15-18; Herod. i. 84. It held out
for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (B. C. 216),
and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the
defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.
[207] Herodot. vii. 106, 107.
[208] Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodor. xvii. 21.
From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine
Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place
of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus
and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite
Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he
reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two
principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was
in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck
unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison
(Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to
surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus,
with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the
harbor, and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political
revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who
had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing
their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple
of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated
therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator
in the agora.[209] Some of the party, though abandoned by their
garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however
was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance,
restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and
directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now
be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge
in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned
to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not
the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an
honorable and prudent moderation.[210]
[209] Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus,
which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no
information: nor are we told who Heropythus was or under what
circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been
interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of
the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander’s invasion.
[210] Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.
Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with
his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions
of surrender from the two neighboring inland cities, Magnesia and
Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000
foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry;
while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a
northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and
Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of
them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison
as an instrument of Persian supremacy—to place the government in
the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute.
He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession
to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle
array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor
proceeding thither by sea.[211] He expected probably to enter
Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were
disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town,
though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus
he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and
determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,[212] four
hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained
seamen, was approaching.
[211] Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.
[212] Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.
This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented
Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of
arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been
taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do
not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus;[213]
and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate
circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope
of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the
battle. Whether the towns in Memnon’s principality of Atarneus had
attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His
interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia,
that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce
Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders
to this effect were presently sent down by that prince;[214] but at
the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the
command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.
[213] Diodor. xvii. 22.
[214] Diodor. xvii. 23.
It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before
its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one
hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which
commanded the harbor of that city. Alexander found the outer portion
of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making
preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported
4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian
fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and
obliged to take moorings under the neighboring promontory of Mykalê.
Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea,
Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to
share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition,
affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in
numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for
nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for
insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons,
Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of
the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships,
Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that
the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this
interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to
him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories
would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would
overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land-operations.[215] This
part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability,
is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does,
not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the
pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well
to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious
and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or
mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the
ancient world.
[215] Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.
Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating
with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named
Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as
to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbor, blocked
up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening
demonstrations from the water’s edge; while he himself brought up
his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them
in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with
the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were
overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of
them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping
into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield.
Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the
Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on
to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbor, and there prepared
to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were
thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack
the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to
effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved
on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of
capitulation, and received them into his own service.[216] To the
surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city,
while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.
[216] Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.
The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighboring promontory of
Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the
capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus.
At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his
own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was
nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated
that by concentrating all his efforts on land-operations, especially
against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet
from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to
himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a
moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.[217]
[217] Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time,
the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24),
that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to
Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be
captured by the Persian fleet. We shall see that Alexander
reorganized his entire fleet during the ensuing year.
Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of
Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of
Memnon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or
had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his
march southward from Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards
Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering
Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family,
who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions,
adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many
years earlier, under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes
of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It
was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning
family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia
were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers
and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of
Idrieus, his widow Ada, was expelled from Halikarnassus and other
parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still
preserved some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the
conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his
daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobates, warmly
espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of
resistance against the invader.[218]
[218] Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo, xiv. p.
657.
But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian
fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memnon, now invested by
Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was
there in person. There was not only Orontobates with many other
Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by
Ephialtes, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature
and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and
twenty-two feet deep,[219] had been still farther strengthened under
the prolonged superintendence of Memnon;[220] lastly, there were two
citadels, a fortified harbor, with its entrance fronting the south,
abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines.
The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which
Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea
at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the
land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the
Persian ships with their numerous crews.
[219] Arrian, i. 20, 13.
[220] Arrian, i. 20, 5. ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ
πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, etc.
His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or
north-east of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted
by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls.
After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a
large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards
the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which
Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter farther westward) were situated.
While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at
the same time attempted a night-attack on Myndus, but was obliged
to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined
himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from
missiles by movable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled
up the wide and deep ditch round the town, so as to open a level road
for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the
walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition
was successfully prosecuted; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from
the garrison, repulsed; though not without loss and difficulty,
by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines
had overthrown two towers of the city-wall, together with two
intermediate breadths of wall; and a third tower was beginning to
totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of
brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great
height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles.[221] It
appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third
tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but
an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers
from the division of Perdikkas.[222] These men, elate with wine,
rushed up single-handed to attack the Mylasean gate, and slew
the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until
at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a
general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the
end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back
into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then
have been assaulted and taken, had measures been prepared for it
beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless,
before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed
their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day,
Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position,
however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the
Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their
front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them.
Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity,
that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even
the main wood-work of one of them, was burnt. It was not without
difficulty that Philôtas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard,
preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in,
until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.[223] Though his
troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not
carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting
a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of
defeat: nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which was granted
by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtes.[224]
[221] Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 25, 26.
[222] Both Arrian, (i. 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 25) mention
this proceeding of the two soldiers of Perdikkas, though Diodorus
says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.
[223] Arrian, i. 21, 7-12.
[224] Diodor. xvii. 25.
After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the
engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his
own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction
gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtes
especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the
only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging
engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head
of a last desperate sally.[225] He took immediately near him 2000
chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to
burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and
simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each
against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by
multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtes with his division,
marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main
point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers
tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for
personal strength than for valor, he occupied the front rank, and
was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers
charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of
the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the
Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled.
They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still
more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip’s
campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped
more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the
most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades,[226]
cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both
withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtes,
foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back
to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage.
During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at
the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally,
over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians
were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the
king’s body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers,
perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party
were at length repulsed and driven into the city.[227] The loss of
the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls,
under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.
[225] The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is what stands
described in i. 22 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus;
though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does
not name Ephialtes at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian
authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on
Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the
Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other
hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great
part, Grecian authors; in whose view eminent Athenian exiles,
like Ephialtes and Charidemus, counted for much more.
The fact here mentioned by Diodorus, that Ephialtes drove back
the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only
by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard—is one of much
interest, which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian
says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to
it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias: the part of his
work in which it ought to have been narrated, is lost. On this,
as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverses,
obstructions, and losses, of Alexander’s career. His authorities
probably did so before him.
[226] Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. 1. viii. 2. ... οἱ γὰρ
πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι
τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ ... τοῖς μὲν
φυγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ
συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη
νενικηκέναι....
[227] Arrian, i. 22, 5.
By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of
Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobates, satisfied that
no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage
of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and
towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near
the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores,
and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to
the neighboring islet called Arkonnesus—partly to the island of
Kos.[228] Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept
good garrisons well-provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it.
The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It
was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered
the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands.
He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the houses should be
spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned
the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under
condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy
were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it
necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but
surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3000
men to guard it.[229]
[228] Arrian, i. 23, 3, 4; Diodor. xvii. 27.
[229] Arrian, i. 23, 11; Diodor. xvii. 7; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.
Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his
artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the
cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage waggons, to Sardis.
The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia,
Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is
mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea,
so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite
of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander’s
arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus,
Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow.[230] One
alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation.[231]
On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of
Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city,
Phasêlis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort
erected and garrisoned against them by the neighboring Pisidian
mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their
deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektes.[232]
[230] Arrian, i. 24, 6-9.
[231] Diodor. xvii. 28.
[232] Arrian, i. 24, 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 17.
After this brief halt at Phasêlis, Alexander directed his course to
Pergê in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent
most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by
Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king
himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still,
under the mountains by the brink of the sea, called Klimax. When the
wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of
water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the
spot, the wind had blown strong from the south—but as he came near,
the special providence of the gods (so he and his friends conceived
it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and
left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to
their waists.[233] From Pergê he marched on to Sidê, receiving on his
way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but
deprecated the entrance of a garrison; which they were allowed to
buy off promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses
which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having
left a garrison at Sidê, he advanced onward to a strong place called
Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to
aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault;
which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the
Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put
their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained
them to submission, and then marched back to Pergê; from whence he
directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,[234] through the
difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.
[233] Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ
ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, etc. Strabo, xiv. p. 666; Curtius, v. 3, 22.
Plutarch’s words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that
Alexander did not boast so much of this special favor from the
gods, as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.
[234] Arrian, i. 27, 1-8
After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce
several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward
into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the
steep and impregnable fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000
Karians, and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of
relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress,
unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day.[235]
Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ,
and left there Antigonus (afterwards the most powerful among his
successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched
northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio
was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was
concluded.[236]
[235] Curtius. iii. 1, 8.
[236] Arrian, i. 29, 1-5.
APPENDIX.
ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE.
The statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried
by the phalangite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on
all points both clear and consistent with itself. “The sarissa (he
says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory; and
fourteen cubits as adapted to actual practice”—τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισσῶν
μέγεθός ἐστι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἑκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ
δὲ τὴν ἁρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δεκατεσσάρων. Τούτων δὲ τοὺς
τέσσαρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ ταῖν χεροῖν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατόπιν
σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).
The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in
theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean,
that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater
length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers
were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they
employed against an enemy.
Of the later tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine
Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as
given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2)
state its length at sixteen cubits—Ælian (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen
cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other
authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though
none state the case so clearly as he does.
Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238),
authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military
matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They
maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must
have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen _feet_ in length—not
sixteen _cubits_. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think
that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.
First, they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual
service was _sixteen_ cubits long. Computing the weight of such a
weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that
it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as
only _fourteen_ cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the
hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us
read _cubits_ where we ought to have read _feet_,—it will follow that
the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be _fourteen
feet_, not _sixteen feet_. Now this length is not sufficient to
justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.
Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the
Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied
by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight, he had two
Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes opposed to him (xviii. 13). But
there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says
that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn
up in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and
an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and
on each side of him (χάλασμα καὶ διάστασιν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει
τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατ᾽ ἐπιστάτην καὶ παραστάτην) in
order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore
perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to
attack the phalanx, occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and
had ten pikes to deal with.
Farther, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of
_cubits_, really meant _feet_; because (cap. 12) he speaks of _three
feet_ as the interval between each rank in the file, and these _three
feet_ are clearly made equal to _two cubits_. His computation will
not come right, if in place of _cubits_ you substitute _feet_.
We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it: that
the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in
length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such
a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war
of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he
himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of
Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid
great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on
the subject.
It might indeed be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though
true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and
Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which
moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.
Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable,
except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions.
But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite
is always spoken of. So Livy, xxxi. 39, “Erant pleraque silvestria
circa, incommoda phalangi maximè Macedonum: quæ, nisi ubi _prælongis
hastis_ velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo
opus est) nullius admodum usus est.” Compare also Livy, xliv. 40, 41,
where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we
find, “Si carptim aggrediendo, circumagere _immobilem longitudine et
gravitate hastam_ cogas, confusâ strue implicatur:” also xxxiii. 8, 9.
Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had
to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried
a pike _fifteen cubits_ long, together with a short sword; he does
not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv.
7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to
the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynœki defended their
citadel “with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry
them” (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing
hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is
described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the
assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three
feet in length (ξυστὸν ναύμαχον ἐν παλάμῃσιν—δυωκαιεικοσίπηχυ, Iliad,
xv. 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in
length—intended to be hurled (Iliad vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading
is not settled whether ἔγχος ἔχ᾽ ἑνδεκάπηχυ, or ἔγχος ἔχεν δεκάπηχυ.
The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth
century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian
phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or
four first ranks, composed of the strongest and bravest men in the
regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay.
The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to
resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at arms: they were
irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in
among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their
great confidence was in the length of the pike—Macciavelli says of
them (Ritratti dell’ Alamagna, Opere t. iv. p. 159; and Dell’ Arte
della Guerra, p. 232-236), “Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non é
possibile entrare tra loro, né accostarseli, quanto é la picca lunga.
Sono ottime genti in campagna, à far giornata: ma per espugnare terra
non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo: ed universalmente, dove non
possano tenere l’ ordine loro della milizia, non vagliono.”