Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and

having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander

marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he

undertook any farther expedition into the interior of the Persian

empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open

the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his

rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian

soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold;[330] and

Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave

them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now

prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet

in the Ægean, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the

Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160

sail.[331] During the summer of 332 B. C., while Alexander

was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the

important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made

by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos

invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted

to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the

city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonides and others, with

a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town,

and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within.

Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes

thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers,

and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of

Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the

capture—was entrapped into the harbor, and made prisoner. There

remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the

Athenian Chares, with a garrison of 2000 men; who, however, seeing no

hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate

the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus

expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands,

and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.[332]

[330] Arrian, ii. 17, 4.

[331] Curtius, iv. 5, 14.

[332] Curtius, iv. 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4-8.

These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself

directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege

Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert

track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two

miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and

encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from

the deep sands immediately around it, as well as from the mud and

quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch

Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of

every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused

to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgment was confirmed by the

Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed

the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height

of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought

of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult

the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater

would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen

to have triumphed.[333]

[333] Arrian, ii. 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο,

ἄπορον εἶναι βίᾳ ἑλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος· ἀλλ᾽

Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἱρετέον εἶναι, ὅσῳ ἀπορώτερον· ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ

τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἑλεῖν

αἰσχρὸν εἶναί οἱ, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρεῖον.

About the fidelity, and obstinate defensive courage, shown more

than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi. 40.

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall,

for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external

mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall,

when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants

and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with

his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after

escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe

wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by

a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had

predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall

into his hands.[334] During the treatment of his wound, he ordered

the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his

mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so

as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work,

the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet

high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad[335]; the loose

sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must

have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length

completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have

been considerable—though doubtless thousands of laborers would be

pressed in from the circumjacent country.[336]

[334] Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12-18; Plutarch,

Alexand. 25.

[335] Arrian, ii. 27, 5. ~χῶμα~ χωννύναι ~ἐν κύκλῳ παντόθεν~

τῆς πόλεως. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks

(Gesch. Alex. des Grossen, p. 199), that παντόθεν is not to be

interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in _many

different portions_ of the walled circuit.

Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said

χώματα in the plural, not χῶμα.

[336] Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege

as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable

truth.

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and

by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the Walls were

breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting

in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted

three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by

the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still farther breaching

the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The

entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different

points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid

Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions

manifested hardly less ardor, and the town was at length taken. Its

gallant defenders resisted, with unabated spirit, to the last; and

all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed

to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince

or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having manifested the

greatest energy and valor, was taken severely wounded, yet still

alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonatus and Philôtas into

the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and

fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order

to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable

to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and

labor, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded,—that the

palm of honor belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to

the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting

Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that

he had himself incurred great personal risk and received a severe

wound. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was moreover

still farther exasperated by the appearance of Batis—an eunuch—a

black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and

doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible

circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics,

contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch.

After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the

hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the

pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single

captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as

novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and

brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of

this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a

chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst

the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.[337] Herein Alexander,

emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor

Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the Iliad as

inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.[338]

[337] Curtius, iv. 6, 25-30; Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p.

123-125—with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnesia.

Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza in two sentences,

but gives no details of any kind.

Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he

probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There

are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence,

as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says

nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of

Curtius; while he himself recognizes how emulous Alexander was of

the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).

The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author

Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an example of bad

rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details

respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to

disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of

Hegesias as a writer does not diminish his credibility as a

witness.

[338] Arrian. vii. 14, 7.

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences

operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands

out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the

treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures

were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the

Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from

the neighborhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town

for the Macedonians.[339]

[339] Arrian, ii. 27. 11. About the circumstances and siege of

Gaza see the work of Stark, Gaza and die Philistäische Küste, p.

242, Leip. 1852.

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine

mouths,[340] were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever

encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After

such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October

332 B. C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakes,

the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected

native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching

conqueror. Seven days’ march brought Alexander and his army from

Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the

eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of

Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and

a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to

welcome him.[341] He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet

up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by

land. The satrap Mazakes surrendered himself, with all the treasure

in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here

Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the

gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian god Apis; to which he

added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most

distinguished artists.

[340] Diodor. xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq. xi. 4.

[341] Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to

Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the

shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the

lake Mareôtis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and

considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population,

as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed

by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of

withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the

Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new

city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with

Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric

impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of

Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.[342] Perceiving

soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he

included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent

mainland. The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were

obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of

the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites

of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian.[343] It

was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and

busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to

see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The

site of the place, between the sea and the Lake Mareôtis, was found

airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce.

The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good

harbors for ships coming by sea, on a coast harborless elsewhere;

while the Lake Mareôtis, communicating by various canals with the

river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the

interior.[344] As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by

transporting to them in mass the population of the neighboring town

of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides, by the intendant

Kleomenes.[345]

[342] Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, Alexand. 26.

[343] Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor. xvii. 52.

[344] Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors however speak of the

salubrity of Alexandria less favorably than Strabo: see St.

Croix, Examen des Hist. d’ Alexandre, p. 287.

[345] Pseudo-Aristotle, Œconomic. ii. 32.

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes.

It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two

centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly

in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe

to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future.

He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule

Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the

Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a

substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen

beyond mediocrity.[346]

[346] Arrian, iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (Annal. i. 11) says about

Egypt under the Romans—“provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ

fecundam, superstitione et lasciviâ discordem et mobilem, insciam

legum, ignaram magistratuum”, etc. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon.

xvii. p. 797.

The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or five

months’ stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy

desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chiefly memorable as it

marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits

of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so

transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the gods

had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralyzed or

put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality

seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career.[347]

He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors

Perseus and Herakles, to find a worthy prototype.[348] Conceiving

himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human

parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning

the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days,

through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous, was

distinguished by manifest evidences of the favor of the gods.

Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water.

When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a

sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the

march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements

made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenes, companions and

contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces

his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on

behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the

details.[349] The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being

the son of the god, and farther assured him that his career would

be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the

gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own

satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honors

to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and

presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith

that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was farther

confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that

of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Miletus.[350] Though he

did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus,

he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and

angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon.

Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander,

for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom

he was enlarging his empire.[351] But it seems rather to have been a

genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which

from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed

aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways,

but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This

is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To

Parmenio, to Philôtas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the

insolence of the king in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above

the level of humanity, appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this

subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by

fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found

re-appearing hereafter.[352]

[347] Diodor. xvii. 51. τεκμήρια δ᾽ ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ

γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων (answer of

the priest of Ammon to Alexander).

[348] Arrian, iii. 3, 2.

[349] Arrian, iii. 3, 12. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῖόν τι ξυνεπέλαβεν αὐτῷ,

~ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι~, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς ταύτῃ ἔχει· τὸ δ᾽ ἀτρεκὲς

τοῦ λόγου ἀφείλοντο οἱ ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.

Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12-15; Diodor. xvii. 49-51; Plutarch,

Alex. 27; Kallisthenes ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.

[350] Kallisthenes, Fragm. xvi. ap. Alexand. Magn. Histor.

Scriptor. ed. Geier. p. 257; Strabo, xvii. p. 814.

[351] Plutarch, Alexand. 28. Arrian, hints at the same

explanation (vii. 29, 6).

[352] Curtius, iv. 10, 3—“fastidio esse patriam, abdicari

Philippum patrem cœlum vanis cogitationibus petere.” Arrian, iii.

26, 1; Curtius, vi. 9, 18; vi. 11, 23.

The last month of Alexander’s stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis.

While nominating various officers for the permanent administration

of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral,

who brought as prisoners Aristonikus of Methymna, and other despots

of the various insular Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to

be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the

citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonides, who was sent

to Elephantinê in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the

cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when

delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.[353] Pharnabazus

also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape

from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.[354]

[353] Curtius, iv. 8, 11.

[354] Arrian, iii. 2, 8, 9.

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and

Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he

regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria, and Greece, prior to his

intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished

the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the

Macedonian prefect Andromachus.[355] In addition to all the business

transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Herakles,

and offered splendid sacrifices to other gods. Choice festivals with

tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens,

with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The

princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honor to the son of

Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorêgus, getting up at his

own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving

to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among

the ten tribes at Athens.[356]

[355] Curtius, iv. 8, 10.

[356] Plutarch, Alexand. 29; Arrian, _l. c._

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander

was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.[357] He had

already sent forward a detachment to Thapsacus, the usual ford of the

Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on

guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them

Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but

only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left

bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his

whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as

he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay,

and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed,

and Alexander crossed forthwith.[358]

[357] Arrian, iii. 6, 12.

[358] Arrian, iii. 7, 1-6; Curtius, iv. 9, 12—“undecimis castris

pervenit ad Euphraten.”

Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down

the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the

Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius.[359] But this

march (as we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand

Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert

country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazæus in

retreating had taken a north-easterly direction towards the upper

part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his

main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage

of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be

fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march,

first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next

eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains

on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it

absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded

the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and

baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from

the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the

current, and the slippery footing.[360] A resolute and vigilant enemy

might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good

fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies

left undone, than in what they actually did.[361]

[359] So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, ii. 17,

3-10)—προχωρησάντων ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρεῖον

... τόν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον ποιησόμεθα, etc. This is the

explanation of Arrian’s remark, iii. 7, 6—where he assigns the

reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphrates at Thapsakus,

did not take the straight road towards Babylon. Cyrus the younger

marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxes. Susa, Ekbatana,

and Persepolis were more distant, and less exposed to an enemy

from the west.

[360] Arrian, iii. 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 55; Curtius. iv. 9, 17-24.

“Magna munimenta regni Tigris atque Euphrates erant”, is a part

of the speech put into the mouth of Darius before the battle of

Arbela, by Curtius, (iv. 14, 10). Both these great defences were

abandoned.

[361] Curtius, iv. 9, 23; Plutarch, Alexand. 39.

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During

the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which

spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints

against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown

regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering

solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing

depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from

Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favored the Greeks,

and Selênê the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended

victory to the Macedonians—and victory too (so Aristander promised),

before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers,

Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through

the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and

the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small

advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that

Darius with his main host was not far off.[362]

[362] Arrian, iii. 7, 12; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, iv. 10, 11-18.

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What

Darius had been doing during this long interval, and especially

during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only

of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to

Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the especial view of

recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have

done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the

perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into

the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza,

the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten

months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost

him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The

Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best

of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost,[363]

and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and

perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for

the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by

others, to throw open the country to Alexander.[364] Having incurred

so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius

had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigor.

[363] Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27-30—“cum in illo statu

rerum id quemque, quod occupasset, habiturum arbitraretur”

(Amyntas).

[364] Arrian, iii. 1, 3. τήν τε ἐν Ἰσσῷ μάχην ὅπως συνέβη

πεπυσμένος (the satrap of Egypt) καὶ Δαρεῖον ὅτι αἰσχρᾷ φυγῇ

ἔφυγε, etc.

But he was paralyzed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and

several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror.

Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus,

this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition

of one who had given hostages for good behavior to his enemy. The

Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or

generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for

fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon,

as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet.[365] Bound

by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his

superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should

bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to

subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped

to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back

his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy

Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip

been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been

fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected

everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to

take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.

[365] Diodor. xvii. 23. Compare Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 4, 9;

Herodotus, vii. 10.

The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages, honorable as it

was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their

value as a subject of political negotiation.[366] It was essential

that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank,

if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of

Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his

army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and

even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved

a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out

that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris;[367] to him also,

it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to

ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a

considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching

into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to

be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have

been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater

ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to

have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious

reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such

a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe

retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

[366] The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for

refusing to visit Statira the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even

to absurdity.

In regard to women, Alexander was by temperament cold, the

opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development

was so tardy, that there was even a surmise of some physical

disability (Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. x. p. 435). As to the most

beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the

numerous tenders made to him by those who sought to gain his

favor (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of

Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female

captives, Barsinê, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon;

daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of engaging manners, and

above all, distinguished, by having received Hellenic education,

from the simply Oriental harem of Darius (Plutarch, Alex. 21).

In adopting the widow of Memnon as his mistress, Alexander may

probably have had present to his imagination the example of his

legendary ancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with

Andromache, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by

any reader of Euripides. Alexander had by Barsinê a son called

Herakles.

Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition,—so overcharged

with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always

performed himself—and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily

effort,—that he had little leisure left for indulgences; such

leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to wine-parties with the

society and conversation of his officers.

[367] Curtius, iv. 10, 19. “Itineris continui labore animique

ægritudine fatigata”, etc.

Curtius and Justin mention a third embassy sent by Darius

(immediately after having heard of the death and honorable

obsequies of Statira) to Alexander, asking for peace. The other

authors allude only to two tentatives of this kind; and the third

seems by no means probable.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with

any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all

his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a

host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated

at Issus.[368] Contingents arrived from the farthest extremities of

the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and

Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of

the Tigris, about the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between

that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for

the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius

himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from

the north, east, and south. Arbêla—a considerable town about twenty

miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of

Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and

Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or head-quarters, where the

chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near

which the troops were first assembled and exercised.[369]

[368] Arrian, iii. 7, 7.

[369] Diodorus, xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 9.

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was, the neighborhood

of Gaugamela near the river Bumôdus, about thirty miles west of

Arbêla, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a

spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating

slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for

drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of

cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian

officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of

the slopes as they thought inconvenient.[370] There seemed every

thing in the ground to favor the operation both of the vast total,

and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat

at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured

himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level

ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious

that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the

undefended passage of the Tigris.

[370] Arrian, iii. 8, 12. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνώμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς

ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ~ἐκ πολλοῦ~ οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς τε ἅρμασιν

ἐπελαύνειν εὐπετῆ πεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῇ ἵππῳ ἱππάσιμα.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla

might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of

1,000,000 of infantry[371]—40,000 cavalry—200 scythed chariots—and

fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time

in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided

for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong

swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry

wielded so admirably in close combat—together with shields for the

infantry and breastplates for the horsemen.[372] He counted much

also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a

pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point,

together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each

side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.[373]

[371] This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set

forth (ἐλέγετο), probably the best information which Ptolemy and

Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8).

Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000 foot, 200,000 horse, and 200

scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000

horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men.

Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as

that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total

as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13).

[372] Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 2.

[373] Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the

instructive note of Mützel upon this passage of Curtius, the mode

in which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points.

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the

Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbêla,

where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river

Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched

to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array

was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of

Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under

command of Barsäentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians,

horse and foot alternating—the Susians, under Oxathres,—and the

Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both

east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under

Atropates; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all

cavalry, under Phrataphernes; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ.

Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the

army near and around him—the Persian select Horse-guards, called

the king’s kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a

golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants

of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as

colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good

archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom

Darius placed his greatest confidence.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it

stood deep masses of Babylonians,—inhabitants of Sittakê down to the

Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the

east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the

scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians

and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and

Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty

chariots in front of the centre.[374]

[374] The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii. 11),

is taken from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down

in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian

officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius.

Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete,

even as to names—while it says nothing about numbers or depth or

extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to

have been present in the field, are not placed in the official

return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers

are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the

Kossæans, by Diodorus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ,

Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius

(iv. 12).

Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army,

and four days’ march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first

learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once

halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade;

and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might

repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet

leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the

ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations

which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack

them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke,

and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the

descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On

seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal

officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and

commence the attack forthwith.[375] Though most of them pronounced

for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be

rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural

or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy’s position, which

they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred.

Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still

retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp,

to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward

from the preceding day’s encampment.[376] He himself spent the

day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring

both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt

him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio,

with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in

the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies

were notoriously unmanageable by night,[377] and since their camp

had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many

disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with

an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of

many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory;

that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in

open daylight.[378] Having then addressed to his officers a few brief

encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed

them to their evening meal and repose.

[375] Arrian, iii. 9, 5-7.

[376] Arrian, iii. 9, 2-8. It is not expressly mentioned by

Arrian that the baggage, etc. was brought forward from the first

camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the

fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander’s baggage,

which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have

been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first

camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv. 13,

35. The words ἔγνω ἀπολείπειν (Arrian, iii. 9, 2), indicate the

contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished—ὡς ἅμ᾽

ἡμέρᾳ προσμῖξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (iii. 9, 3). Instead of “coming

into conflict” with the enemy at break of day—Alexander only

arrived within sight of them at break of day; he then halted the

whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally

brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in

the rear.

[377] Xenoph. Anabas. iii. 4, 35.

[378] Arrian, iii. 10, 3; Curtius, iv. 13, 4-10.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of

40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two lines.[379] The first or

main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of

Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under

the command of Philôtas, son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from

right to left) came the Agêma or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ—then

the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly

so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of

Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus,

respectively.[380] Next on the left of the phalanx, were ranged the

allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and

Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians

under Philippus—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior

to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander

himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the

left to Parmenio.

[379] Arrian, iii. 12, 1-9.

[380] Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 57; Curtius, iv. 13, 26-30.

Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve,

intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the

superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose,

Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the

Pæonians, under Aretes and Aristo—half the Agrianes, under

Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brisson—and the mercenaries

of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of

Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these

different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank

or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons

of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the

right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under

Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly,

the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and baggage.[381]

[381] Arrian, iii. 12, 2-6; Curtius, iv. 13, 30-32; Diodor. xvii.

57.

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron

spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry.[382] He

himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led

the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat

in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the

Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards,

Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the

right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract

this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the

left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost

beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his

chariots in front. To check any farther movement in this direction,

the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian

left, were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right

flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under

Menidas, and the action thus began.[383]

[382] Curtius, iv. 13, 36; Polyænus, iv. 3, 17.

[383] Arrian, iii. 13, 1-5.

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from

their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back

until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians

and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were

supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and

Scythians in the left portion of Darius’s line. The action was here

for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who

at length however, by a more compact order against enemies whose

fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of

their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.[384]

[384] Arrian, iii. 13, 9.

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his

scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them,

calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would

occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses

were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and

darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down

the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius’s

front, intended to beat down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous

pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or

disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the

protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield

struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let

through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few

only inflicted wounds or damage.[385]

[385] About the chariots. Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15,

14; Diodor. xvii. 57, 58.

Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were

launched on Darius’s left, immediately opposite to Alexander. But

it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been

let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as

implied in the words of Curtius—“Ipse (Darius) ante se falcatos

currus habebat, quos signo dato universos in hostem effudit” (iv.

14, 3).

The scythed chariots of Artaxerxes, at the battle of Kunaxa,

did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10-20). At the battle of

Magnesia, gained by the Romans (B. C. 190) over the

Syrian king Antiochus, his chariots were not only driven back,

but spread disorder among their own troops (Appian, Reb. Syriac.

33).

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main

force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave orders

to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly

silent,[386] to raise the war-shout and charge at a quick pace;

at the same time directing Aretes with the Pæonians to repel the

assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting

movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed,

at the head of all the Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening

in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians.

Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight

towards the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest

hand-combat, and thrusting with their short pikes at the faces of the

Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by

this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of

missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack.[387]

They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining

ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time,

the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long

protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For

a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate; and it

might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius’s

army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, etc., were here

posted,—had the king’s courage been equal to that of his soldiers.

But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with

Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger,

in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxes at Kunaxa, to aim

the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he

well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already

once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated

it with still more signal success at Arbêla. Darius, who had long

been in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy

on the neighboring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the

scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly

breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came

to close quarters with his troops, pressing towards and menacing

the conspicuous chariot on which he stood.[388] The sight and

hearing of this terrific _mêlée_, combined with the prestige already

attaching to Alexander’s name, completely overthrew the courage and

self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round,

and himself set the example of flight.[389]

[386] See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander

to his soldiers previous to the battle, about the necessity of

absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout

(Arrian, iii. 9, 14): compare Thucyd. ii. 89—a similar direction

from Phormio to the Athenians.

[387] Arrian, iii. 15, 4. οὔτε ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι, οὔτε ἐξελιγμοῖς τῶν

ἵππων, ἥπερ ἱππομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Persian cavalry

when driven to despair.

[388] Arrian, iii. 14, 2. ἦγε δρόμῳ τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν

Δαρεῖον—Diodor. xvii. 60. Alexander μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης καὶ

τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἱππέων ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἤλαυνε τὸν Δαρεῖον.

[389] Arrian, iii. 14, 3. Καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν

ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. Ὣς δὲ οἵ τε ἱππεῖς οἱ ἀμφ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ

αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος εὐρώστως ἐνέκειντο, ὠθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι, καὶ

τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν Περσῶν κόπτοντες, ἥ τε φάλαγξ ἡ

Μακεδονικὴ, πυκνὴ καὶ ταῖς σαρίσσαις πεφρικυῖα, ἐμβέβληκεν ἤδη

αὐτοῖς, ~καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῷ ὄντι Δαρείῳ

ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφευγεν~. At Issus, Arrian

states that “Darius fled along with the first” (ii. 11, 6); at

Arbela here, he states that “Darius was the first to turn and

flee;” an expression yet stronger and more distinct. Curtius

and Diodorus, who seem here as elsewhere to follow generally

the same authorities, give details, respecting the conduct of

Darius, which are not to be reconciled with Arrian, and which are

decidedly less credible than Arrian’s narrative. The fact that

the two kings were here (as at Issus) near, and probably visible,

to each other, has served as a basis for much embroidery. The

statement that Darius, standing on his chariot, hurled his spear

against the advancing Macedonians—and that Alexander also hurled

his spear at Darius, but missing him, killed the charioteer—is

picturesque and Homeric, but has no air of reality. Curtius and

Diodorus tell us that this fall of the charioteer was mistaken

for the fall of the king, and struck the Persian army with

consternation, causing them forthwith to take flight, and thus

ultimately forcing Darius to flee also (Diodor. xvii. 60; Curt.

iv. 15, 26-32). But this is noway probable; since the real fight

then going on was close, and with hand-weapons.

From this moment, the battle, though it had lasted so short a

time, was irreparably lost. The king’s flight, followed of course

immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread

dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command,

nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those

immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to

give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry,

and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front was obstructed

by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same

time, Aretes with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the

right flank,[390] so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed

main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised

by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing

could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track

taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises

from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound

from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full

speed.[391] It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from

being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

[390] Arrian, iii. 14, 4.

[391] Diodor. xvii. 60; Curtius, iv. 15, 32, 33. The cloud of

dust, and the noise of the whips, are specified both by Diodorus

and Curtius.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre,

the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. Mazæus, who

commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots

(which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on

the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them),

followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian

horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of

cavalry to attack them on their left flank.[392] Here the battle was

obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after

the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he

sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification

at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them

back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the

field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias

and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving

the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to

follow the advanced movement of Alexander.[393] Hence there arose a

gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions,

and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian

cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to

get into the rear and attack the baggage.[394] At first this movement

was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian

prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis,

whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused

to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or

gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander.[395] But

while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they

were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian

line, who though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to

face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus

slain, the rest got off as they could.[396]

[392] Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodorus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii.

14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who

scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazæus, though

he alludes to the effects produced by it.

[393] Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks directly here only of the

τάξις under the command of Simmias; but it is plain that what he

says must be understood of the τάξις commanded by Kraterus also.

Of the six τάξεις or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus

stood at the extreme left—that of Simmias (who commanded on this

day the τάξις of Amyntas son of Andromenes) next to it (iii.

11, 16). If therefore the τάξις of Simmias was kept back from

pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian

left (iii. 14, 6)—_à fortiori_, the τάξις of Kraterus must have

been kept back in like manner.

[394] Arrian, iii. 14, 7.

[395] Curtius. iv. 15, 9-11; Diodor. xvii. 59. Curtius and

Diodorus represent the brigade of cavalry who plundered the camp

and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazæus

from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that

they got through the break accidentally left in the phalanx, and

traversed the Macedonian lines.

[396] Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as

having been driven off by Aretes and a detachment sent expressly

by Alexander himself. Diodorus describes it as if it had not been

defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazæus after plundering

the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of

Arrian.

Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own

side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to

the paralyzing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the

spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian

army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigor

in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other

hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favor, pressed their

enemies with redoubled energy and at length drove them to flight; so

that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces,

before the succors from Alexander reached him.[397]

[397] Diodor. xvii. 60. Ὁ Παρμενίων ... μόλις ἐτρέψατο τοὺς

βαρβάρους, μάλιστα καταπλαγέντας τῇ κατὰ τὸν Δαρεῖον φυγῇ.

Curtius, iv. 16, 4-7. “Interim ad Mazæum fama superati regis

pervenerat. Itaque, quanquam validior erat, tamen fortunâ partium

territus, perculsis languidius instabat.” Arrian, iv. 14, 11; iv.

15, 8.

In conducting those succors, on his way back from the pursuit,

Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face

to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were

among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they

were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had

no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his

Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all

at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides

contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were

slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kœnus,

and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great

personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably

most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though

leaving many of their number on the field.[398]

[398] Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius also alludes to this combat;

but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16,

19-25).

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out

of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his pursuit of the

flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part.[399] The host of

Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot

mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in

the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary

and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror

and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively

small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten.

On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such

celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken,

especially at the passage of the river Lykus;[400] where he was

obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses

were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such

cavalry as could follow him, to Arbêla, in hopes of capturing the

person of Darius. In this he was disappointed, though he reached

Arbêla the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an

undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure,

and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied

without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle,

capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.[401]

[399] Arrian, iii. 15, 9.

[400] Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12-18) gives

aggravated details about the sufferings of the fugitives in

passing the river Lykus—which are probably founded on fact. But

he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had got as far

as this river in his first pursuit, from which he was called back

to assist Parmenio.

[401] Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1, 10.

To state anything like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is

impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and

many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius

at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not more

than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at

500, besides a great number of wounded.[402] The estimate of Arrian

is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other;

but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the

prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed,

at the battle of Arbêla. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever

succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments.

The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at

least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and

could never be again mustered in mass.

[402] Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27, Diodor. xvii. 61.

The defeat of Arbêla was in fact the death blow of the Persian

empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into

nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of

the defeat—here as at Issus—the most prominent and indisputable was

the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely

in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier,

and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing

short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged

into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have

appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall

this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy

formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius

had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to

believe, that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could

have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even

with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well

as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were

mere spectators, who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect.

The flank movement against Alexander’s right, instead of being made

by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to

distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and

thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself

for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of

space—the condition wanting at Issus,—the attacks of the Persians on

Alexander’s flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all,

Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by

the scythed chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there

remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the

Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of

Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity,

of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great

an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army

was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against

definite and reasonable contingences. All his successes, and this

most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable

effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But

his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults

committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon’s

command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness

alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast

real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to

become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly

held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of

the empire on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which

Alexander most desired.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the

surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon

and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to Susa, he sent

Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him

with the keys of the city; Bagophanes, collector of the revenue,

decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered

flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldæan

priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa

was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to

Alexander.[403] The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great:

sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—600 drachms

per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry,

200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign

infantry.[404] But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was

yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents[405] (= about £11,500,000

sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did

not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about

the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths

are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in

golden Darics[406]; the untouched accumulations of several preceding

kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency.

A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three

years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able

Grecian Officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance—would have

preserved both his life and his crown.

[403] Arrian, iii. 16, 5-11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1,

17-20.

[404] Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodor. xvii. 64.

[405] Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16. 12).

I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents,

the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to

three.

[406] Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the

luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the

population and the Chaldæan priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus,

as well as by directing that the temple of that god, and the other

temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxes, should be

rebuilt.[407] Treating the Persian empire now as an established

conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian

Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with them two Greeks

as assistants and guarantees—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander

of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue.

He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrines, who had surrendered at

his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of

Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menes, who took

with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new

troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus.[408] The march of

Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route

through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by

Amyntas son of Andromenes, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000

men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and

infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian

youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander’s corps

of pages.[409] The incorporation of these new-comers into the army

afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the

organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the

larger.[410]

[407] Arrian, iii. 16, 6-9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.

[408] Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor. xvii. 64.

Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the

discrepancy here is not very important.

[409] Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii,

16, 18.

[410] Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor. xvii. 65.

Respecting this reorganization, begun now at Susa and carried

farther during the next year at Ekbatana, see Rüstow and Köchly,

Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 _seq._

One among the changes now made was, that the divisions

of cavalry—which, having hitherto coincided with various

local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered

accordingly—were re-distributed and mingled together (Curtius, v.

2, 6).

After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulites,

who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two

Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force,

the other governor of the citadel—Alexander crossed the river Eulæus

or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east towards

Persis proper, the ancient hearth or primitive seat from whence

the original Persian conquerors had issued.[411] Between Susa and

Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii—rude but warlike

shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged

to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being

unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the

difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded

the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to

meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little

frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he

conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly

as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not

only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army,

but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced

to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or

expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis,

permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing

a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their

poverty allowed.[412]

[411] Arrian, iii. 17, 1. Ἄρας δὲ ἐκ Σούσων, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν

Πασιτίγρην ποταμὸν, ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίων γῆν.

The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers; the Choaspes

(now Kherkha) on the west; the Eulæus or Pasitigris, now Karun,

on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The

Eulæus appears to have been called Pasitigris in the lower part

of its course—Pliny, H. N. xxxi. 21. “Parthorum reges ex Choaspe

et Eulæo tantum bibunt.”

Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two

rivers and the site of the Persian Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book

iii. West-Asien, p. 291-320).

[412] Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius. v. 3, 5-12; Diodor. xvii.

67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by

Alexander in this march, was that described by Kinneir, through

Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the

Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of

the territory for military operation.

No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient

geography of these regions. Mr. Long’s Map of Ancient Persia

shows how little can be made out.

But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still

worse—called the Susian or Persian gates,[413] in the mountains

which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis

proper. Ariobarzanes, satrap of the province, held this pass; a

narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides,

from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could

shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of

march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates; which,

inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing morning. In

spite of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss

without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He

was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult

pass could be turned; but there was a long circuitous march of many

days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the

plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable,

was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On farther

inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep

as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a

track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of

Ariobarzanes. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders

to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give

signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light

detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount

incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter,

and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of

his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised

all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanes altogether

unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also,

the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were

for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among

the rocks and precipices; the satrap himself being one of a few that

escaped.[414]

[413] See the instructive notes of Mützel—on Quintus Curtius, v.

10, 3; and v. 12, 17, discussing the topography of this region,

in so far as it is known from modern travellers. He supposes the

Susian Gates to have been near Kala-Sefid, west of the plain

of Merdasht or Persepolis. Herein he dissents from Ritter,

apparently on good grounds, as far as an opinion can be formed.

[414] Arrian, iii. 18, 1-14; Curtius, v. 4, 10-20; Diodor. xvii.

68.

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest

of fortresses,[415] yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass

hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it

against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanes, hastening thither from

the conquered pass, still strove to organize a defence, and at least

to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already

preparing to pillage. But Tiridates, commander of the garrison,

fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched

a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly

Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost

speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole.

Ariobarzanes, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his

companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ—the two peculiar capitals of the

Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of

Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.[416]

[415] Diodor. xvii. 71.

[416] Arrian, iii. 18, 16; Curtius, v. 4, 5; Diodor. xvii. 69.

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully

moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them

mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs,

arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a

punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors, even

by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogizing

the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the public

roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of

their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority.[417]

Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old, and had lived

for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up

from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian

kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with,

we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle,

offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable

provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of

returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to

remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with

dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted

their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an

ample donation of money, clothing, and cattle.[418]

[417] Xenoph. Anabas. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always

prevailed among Orientals. “The most atrocious part of the

Mohammedan system of punishment, is, that which regards theft and

robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or the foot, is the

prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence” (Mill,

History of British India, book iii. ch. 5. p. 447).

“Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the

British camp-followers that fell into his hands” (Elphinstone,

Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380. ch. xi.).

A recent traveller notices the many mutilated persons, female as

well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde

(Burton, Scenes in Scinde, vol. ii. p. 281).

[418] Diodor. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian

does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason

to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it is

certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention

800. Diodorus calls them —Ἕλληνες ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων

ἀνάστατοι γεγονότες, ὀκτακόσιοι μὲν σχεδὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες,

ταῖς δ᾽ ἡλικίαις οἱ πλεῖστοι μὲν γεγηρακότες, ἠκρωτηριασμένοι δὲ

πάντες, etc. Some ἀνάρπαστοι πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ σοφίαν are noticed

in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 33; compare Herodot. iii. 93; iv. 204. I

have already mentioned the mutilation of the Macedonian invalids,

taken at Issus by Darius.

Probably these Greek captives were mingled with a number of

other captives, Asiatics and others, who had been treated in the

same manner. None but the Greek captives would be likely to show

themselves to Alexander and his army, because none but they would

calculate on obtaining sympathy from an army of Macedonians and

Greeks. It would have been interesting to know who these captives

were, or how they came to be thus cruelly used. The two persons

among them, named by Curtius as spokesmen in the interview with

Alexander, are—Euktemon, a Kymæan—and Theætêtus, an Athenian.

The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite

not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in

the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity,

as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as

for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of

Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxes a

century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and

seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who,

under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus

to the Ægean. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated

their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions

commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many

trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the

purposes of the Great King’s empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbatana,

were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was

still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief

magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations

from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased,

and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian

grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts

of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for

themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe

what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more

wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of

Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.[419]

[419] Diodor. xvii. 70. πλουσιωτάτης οὔσης τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον,

etc. Curtius, v. 6, 2, 3.

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as

the most hostile of all Asiatic cities,—the home of those impious

invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his

intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning

the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the

remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would

be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and

that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention

to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in

the country.[420] After appropriating the regal treasure—to the

alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver = £27,600,000

sterling[421]—Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules,

with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to

carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed

out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander

himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and

Ekbatana. Six thousand talents more, found in Pasargadæ, were added

to the spoil.[422] The persons and property of the inhabitants were

abandoned to the license of the soldiers, who obtained an immense

booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing,

furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male

inhabitants were slain,[423] the females dragged into servitude;

except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with

their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves,

much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious

articles, not without occasional bloodshed.[424] As soon as their

ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the

massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of

transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such

as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at

Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense

and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing

manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of

the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters seen by Plutarch,

Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having

been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.[425]

[420] Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodor. xvii. 70; Curtius, v. 6, 1;

Strabo, xv. p. 731.

[421] This amount is given both by Diodorus (xvii. 71) and by

Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see however from Strabo that there were

different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures

deserve no confidence upon any evidence short of an official

return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum,

considering the long series of years that had been spent in

amassing it. Alexander’s own letters (Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated

that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000

camels.

To explain the fact, of a large accumulated treasure in the

Persian capitals, it must be remarked, that what we are

accustomed to consider as expenses of government, were not

defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking

generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned

by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of

maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary

tribute. The king’s numerous servants and attendants received no

pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court

with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above

the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192; and iii. 91—and a good passage

of Heeren, setting forth the small public disbursement out of

the regal treasure, in his account of the internal constitution

of the ancient Persian Empire (Ideen über die Politik and den

Verkehr der Völker der alten Welt, part i. Abth. 1. p. 511-519).

Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (Voyage en Arménie

et en Perse, Paris, 1821, p. 272, ch. 30)—“Si les sommes que

l’on verse dans le trésor du Shah ne sont pas exorbitantes,

comparativement à l’étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles

n’en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables

qui n’en absorbent pas la moitié. Le reste est converti en

lingots, en pierreries, et en divers objets d’une grande valeur

et d’un transport facile en cas d’évènement: ce qui doit suffire

pour empêcher qu’on ne trouve exagérés les rapports que tous les

voyageurs ont faits de la magnificence de la cour de Perse. Les

Perses sont assez clairvoyans pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui

portent Futteh Ali Shah à thésauriser.”

When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mohammed, and

entered Delhi in 1739,—the imperial treasure and effects which

fell into his hands is said to have amounted to £32,000,000

sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants

(Mill, History of British India, vol. ii, B. iii, ch. 4, p.

403).—Runjeet Sing left at his death (1839) a treasure of

£8,000,000 sterling: with jewels and other effects to several

millions more. [The Punjaub, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16. London,

1845].

Mr. Mill remarks in another place, that “in Hindostan, gold,

silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to

production” (vol. i, p. 254, B. ii. ch. 5).

Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the gold and silver brought

to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state

into earthern vessels; when it cooled, the earthern vessel was

withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion

of it was cut off when occasion required for disbursements. This

practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was

habitually accumulated, and not expended.

[422] Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount which I

transcribe from Curtius, v. 6, 10.

[423] Diodor. xvii. 70. Οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐπῄεσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας

πάντας φονεύοντες, τὰς δὲ κτήσεις διαρπάζοντες, etc. Curtius, v.

6, 6.

[424] Diodor. xvii. 70, 71; Curtius, v. 6, 3-7. These two authors

concur in the main features of the massacre and plunder in

Persepolis, permitted to the soldiers of Alexander. Arrian does

not mention it; he mentions only the deliberate resolution of

Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the

Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would also

naturally dictate the general license to plunder and massacre.

Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it

as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or

love to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the license

to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any

antecedent sentiment of vengeance.

The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38)

that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first

instigated by the courtesan Thais to set fire to the palace of

Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with

his own hand—may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed

himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his

resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained

against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on

the authority of Arrian.

[425] Plutarch, Alexand. 37. Φόνον μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν τῶν

ἁλισκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε· ~γράφει γὰρ αὐτὸς, ὡς νομίζων

αὐτῷ τοῦτο λυσιτελεῖν ἐκέλευεν ἀποσφάττεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους~·

νομίσματος δὲ εὑρεῖν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην

κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκκομισθῆναί φησι μυρίοις ὀρικοῖς

ζεύγεσι, καὶ πεντακισχιλίαις καμήλοις. That ἐνταῦθα means

Persepolis, is shown by the immediately following comparison with

the treasure found at Susa.

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main

army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis. But

he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division, traversed the

interior of Persia proper; conquering or receiving into submission

the various towns and villages.[426] The greatest resistance which

he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called

the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season

and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical

difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march

of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of

Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole

army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of

3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridates, who had

surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.[427]

[426] Diod. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12-20.

[427] Curtius, v. 6, 11.

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a

simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the

defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains

into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking

himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable

pursuer.[428] He calculated that, once across these mountains,

Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march

southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes

of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of

this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

[428] Arrian, iii. 16, 1-4.