THE CONFERENCE AND MIDHAT’S EXILE
The day fixed for the first plenary meeting of the Conference of
Constantinople was the same as that chosen for the promulgation of the
Constitution. That there was a purpose in the simultaneous occurrence
of the two events admits of no doubt; but to conclude from that fact,
as has been disingenuously argued, that the Constitution was a mere
device to defeat the ends of the Conference, is, of course, absurd, and
has been conclusively disproved.
On the 23rd December (1876), accordingly, the envoys and
plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers met in the handsome building
of the Admiralty on the Golden Horn, in the large hall that had been
prepared for their reception, to discuss with the Turkish envoys
the condition of the Christian provinces of the empire. There were
present, Count Zichy and Baron Calice representing Austro‐Hungary;
Count Chaudordy and Count Bourgoing representing France; Baron Werther
representing Germany; Lord Salisbury and Sir Henry Elliot representing
Great Britain; General Ignatieff representing Russia, and Edhem Pasha
and Safvet Pasha representing the Empire that was to be placed on the
dissecting table.
Scarcely had the preliminary formalities been concluded, when from
across the Bosphorus, at the Seraskierate, was heard the booming of the
first gun that announced the proclamation of the new Constitution.
Thereupon a somewhat dramatic scene—that, no doubt, had been arranged
beforehand—was enacted. Safvet Pasha arose in his place, and,
addressing the assembled plenipotentiaries, said: “Gentlemen, the
cannon that you hear across the Bosphorus notifies the commencement
of the promulgation by His Majesty the Sultan of a Constitution
guaranteeing equal rights and constitutional liberties to all the
subjects of the Empire alike; and in the presence of this great event,
I think our labours become superfluous.”
This little speech of the Turkish Envoy was received by the assembly in
chilling silence. The somewhat theatrical _coup_ had evidently missed
its effect. After a few moments’ dead silence, General Ignatieff moved
that the Conference should proceed with the business of the day. The
proceedings themselves were not lengthy. The envoys of the Great Powers
had been a whole month in Constantinople holding unofficial meetings
among themselves, from which the Turkish delegates were studiously
excluded; and the programme to be followed and the policy to be
enforced had all been arranged before the official meeting took place.
The object of this somewhat unusual proceeding was clear. Turkey was
to be given to understand that it had to do with a veritable Concert
of Europe, which, however much it might minimise the demands made by
one of the Powers interested, would insist unanimously on substantial
concessions from the Porte, and that the latter must in consequence
dismiss any hope or expectation of dissensions or jealousies breaking
out between the Powers.
The achievement of this unanimity was intended as the master‐stroke of
Lord Salisbury’s policy. He did not imagine then, though he probably
has realised it since, that the _rôle_ he was playing at Constantinople
had been carefully prepared for him at Vienna, and that the success
of his efforts was simply the triumph of Count Andrassy’s policy.
What remained for the Conference to do was, not to discuss measures,
but to formulate decisions. There was, at any rate, this advantage in
such a summary method: the agony would not be prolonged. The business
of the Conference began, like a Dutch auction, with a maximum opening
bid on the part of the Russian envoy. He proposed the autonomy of
the province of Bulgaria, the appointment of a Christian Vali, the
formation of a national militia, and the confinement of Turkish troops
within the limits of certain fixed fortresses. The Turkish envoys
having declared these proposals entirely inadmissible and beyond
the sphere of discussion, the proposal was modified to what General
Ignatieff designated “un minimum extrême et irreductible,” viz., that
Bulgaria should be endowed with a special privileged government, and
with an international commission to watch the administration, and that
the appointment of its Governor should be submitted to the approval
of the Great Powers. To this proposal, again, the Turkish envoys
demurred, pointing out that the examples of Servia and Roumania, to
which special privileged governments had been conceded with the other
special arrangements now proposed for Bulgaria, were not encouraging
precedents for a repetition of a similar experiment in Bulgaria: that
the Mahomedan population in the above‐named States had not been treated
with the equality and liberality promised and stipulated for, but had
found themselves under the necessity of emigrating _en masse_ from
those countries, and that even the extreme concessions made to these
States, removing all shadow of pretext for complaint, had not deterred
them from joining the enemies of the Empire, or intriguing against it
whenever the opportunity occurred.
Eventually, after a heated and rather academical passage of arms
between Edhem Pasha and Count Chaudordy, a further modification
was made in the proposals, but not without a protest from General
Ignatieff, who said: “You are plucking all my feathers out of me,” to
which Count Chaudordy replied, with pregnant truth, “You will always
have plenty left, General.” The finally irreducible minimum proposed
was to the effect that a Consular Commission should be appointed to
aid the local authorities, and that the Valis of the three provinces,
Bulgaria, Herzegovina and Bosnia, should be appointed subject to the
assent of the Great Powers, during the first five years.
The Turkish envoys, however, could not agree to this proposal either.
They pointed out that the appointment of the Consular Commission was
an infringement of the sovereign rights of the nation, _which it was
beyond their competence to acquiesce in_, and that over and above
this difficulty the proposal was open to the practical objection that
an exceptional situation created for those provinces would cause
discontent in all the other provinces of the empire, and lead to
unrest, and probably disturbance, in some of them; and they again
pointed out that the moment seemed singularly ill‐chosen for insisting
on special privileges for a portion of the Empire, when the Sultan had
just promulgated a charter containing the largest possible measure
of liberty and equal rights to all his subjects without distinction
throughout every portion of the Empire.
This declaration of _non possumus_ on the part of the Turkish delegates
was followed by a most violent speech from General Ignatieff,
immediately after which the assembly broke up without even listening
to the protest that the Ottoman delegates were prepared to make to the
speech of the Russian envoy.
The last modified proposal was embodied in an Ultimatum delivered to
the Porte by the envoys collectively, to which an answer was required
within a week. At the expiration of that time, if the answer was not
satisfactory, they declared their intention of quitting Constantinople.
On the news of what had occurred becoming known, the conduct of the
Turkish delegates was generally approved of throughout the Empire.
Christians and Mahomedans vied with each other in sending patriotic
addresses to the capital, and a battalion of Christian volunteers was
raised, at their own expense, and marched to the Servian frontier,
where they distinguished themselves greatly, let it be said in passing,
by their courage and devotion.
Midhat, in the meantime, by the Sultan’s order, had convened a Grand
Council of 237 persons, composed of all nationalities and notabilities,
to whom the final propositions of the Conference were submitted.
Midhat made a speech to the notabilities, in which he pointed out the
consequences of the rejection of the terms in question, and told them
clearly that unless they were prepared to face this _ultima ratio_,
they had no alternative but to accept the terms of the Conference.
After listening attentively to this speech, the Grand Council, by a
practically unanimous vote, amidst very considerable enthusiasm decided
on the rejection of the Ultimatum. The foreign envoys accordingly
left the capital on 20th January (1877). So ended the Conference of
Constantinople.
It is necessary here to recall the fact that Midhat during the
Conference sent the patriot Odian Effendi to London to communicate
to Lord Derby the occurrence which had recently taken place in his
country, and to add that as the Powers had not insisted on the carrying
out of the proposals formulated by Russia, which were found to be
impracticable in the present condition of Turkey, it was hoped that
the Powers would take the new Constitution under their protection, and
see to its execution in practice. The following despatch from Lord
Derby to Lord Salisbury and Sir H. Elliot shows the result of this
step:—
_The Earl of Derby to the Marquis of Salisbury and Sir H. Elliot._
“FOREIGN OFFICE,
“10_th January_ 1877.
“MY LORD AND SIR,—Odian Effendi called upon me this afternoon by
appointment, and spoke to me again of the impossibility which his
Government felt of accepting the proposals made to them in the
Conference.
“There might, he said, be concessions on both sides in regard to the
reforms, but the question of the guarantees would still remain, and
offered insuperable difficulties.
“Under these circumstances he was anxious to make a personal
suggestion, which he thought might offer a mode of arrangement, and
which he understood that Midhat Pasha was ready to adopt. It was that
the Constitution recently decreed by the Sultan should be brought
to the cognizance of the Powers in a form which should make its
execution a matter of international obligation between the Porte and
them, and that the organisation of the provincial administrations
to be drawn up by the Turkish Ministers should, after receiving the
approval of the Powers, be made a portion of the general plan, and
embodied in the same agreement.
“The whole system of reforms granted by the Sultan to his subjects
would thus be placed under the guarantee of the Powers, who would
have a right to watch over the manner in which it was carried out.
“Odian Effendi wished to know whether this proposal would be
favourably received by Her Majesty’s Government, and whether I
thought there would be any use in the Porte bringing it forward in
the Conference.
“I told Odian Effendi in reply that there was a manifest
inconvenience in discussing here the questions which at the same time
were in process of negotiation at Constantinople. I must therefore
refrain from expressing an opinion upon the plan which he had
mentioned to me.
“If it was to be proposed by the Turkish Government, this must be
done by them at Constantinople, and upon their own responsibility.[17]
“I am, etc.,
“(Signed) DERBY.”
Hardly had the foreign envoys departed from the capital, and the doors
of the great hall at the Admiralty been shut behind them, when the
Palace proposed to put the match to the mine that had been carefully
laid for the reformers.
Within a fortnight of the departure of the Plenipotentiaries, matters
were brought to a climax. Two subjects of contention between Midhat and
the Sultan had been reserved for further discussion when the Conference
should be over: the position of Galib Pasha and the question of mixed
schools. Either would serve for a _casus belli_.
Midhat had resolved on the dismissal of the complaisant Minister of
Finance, who had, _proprio motu_, doubled the amount appropriated
to the Civil list by the simple device of paying it in gold; there
were other counts, too, against the Minister which necessitated this
measure. One was the specific charge of irregularities in the accounts
of the Treasury, which, although Midhat did not attribute them to
malversation on his part, were nevertheless, in his opinion, proofs
of great negligence in the supervision of the business of his office.
The other was a general charge of incapacity as Minister of Finance,
especially revealed in his tactless method of issuing Treasury bonds,
thereby causing an excessive and alarming depreciation in the paper
of the State. The Sultan had agreed to the dismissal of Galib, but he
desired to have him forthwith appointed Senator, whereas Midhat
insisted on a preliminary examination of the accounts of his office.
It will be perceived at once that there was a great deal more in this
dispute than met the eye, and that it accounted for the bitterness of
the feelings entertained against Midhat at the Palace. The following
letter, if read between the lines, will throw some light on the
questions at issue:—
_To the First Secretary of His Majesty Saïd Pasha._
“EXCELLENCY,—By an Irade of our august Master, the nomination of
his Excellency Galib Pasha as member of the Senate has just been
adjourned. The delay on my part in making you acquainted with the
motives which have determined me to remove Galib Pasha from the
Ministry of Finance, whilst abstaining from any reflection whatever
on his personal integrity, only emphasises the responsibility of
Galib Pasha in the matter of finance. It is manifest that that
faithful servant of the State, in conformity with the orders
of our august Master, would not hesitate to admit his share of
responsibility, and in order to put an end to a discussion which has
no precedent, he should certainly claim an investigation, and submit
to its consequences, whatever sacrifices it might entail; but since
explanations are demanded of me, I hasten to give them as shortly as
I can. In order to judge whether or not Galib Pasha is competent to
administer the Finances of the State, it seems to me sufficient to
refer to the fall in the value of paper money.
“The paper of the State, fifteen years ago, amounted to twenty
millions (£T), and yet its depreciation never reached more than
50 to 60 per cent, compared to gold, although its circulation was
then limited to the radius of the town of Constantinople, and it
was not received in payment of taxes. At the present time, although
the amount issued does not amount to four millions, and there is no
limit imposed to its circulation in the Empire, and it is accepted in
payment of taxes, the depreciation amounts to 70 per cent. This state
of things is the result of the carelessness and neglect on the part
of the ministers of Finance. The depreciation, moreover, has given
rise to venality and corruption on the part of functionaries in the
Provinces, and to excitement and unrest, in consequence, in public
opinion.
“We have no accusation to make against the probity and honesty of
Galib Pasha, nor any complaint on the score of the obligation under
which we lie, of issuing bonds to realise the sum necessary, in
gold, for exportation to Europe for war purposes. But seeing that an
issue of paper money, to an amount necessary for the realisation of
£T100,000 only, is sufficient to cause a still further depreciation
of the paper and rise in gold, the Minister of Finance is in duty
bound to take such steps and employ such means as shall, as much as
possible, prevent or mitigate this consequence. For instance, he
should take a portion of the sum required from the receipts of the
Treasury, in gold, and issue the remainder of the sum in paper, with
such prudence and precaution as to avoid financial panic by all means
in his power. But Galib Pasha seems incapable of appreciating such
measures, and the finances of the State have suffered in consequence.
“Such a state of things implies a grave responsibility, and as it is
somebody’s duty to fix this responsibility, the functionary on whom
devolves these particular duties would necessarily be the person to
assume it. But it is also the duty of the person who happens to be
Grand Vizier to superintend the general march of affairs, and to take
steps to prevent all maladministration.
“In the report made by Galib Pasha, which was read before the Council
of Ministers, he declares himself incapable of finding a remedy for
this state of things. And when an official makes such a declaration,
it is impossible to keep him in the exercise of those functions
without sharing the responsibility with him. It is on these grounds
that we have based our opinion as to the necessity of replacing him.
“The day after the issue of the Imperial Irade approving this
decision, His Excellency Damad Mahmoud Djelaleddin Pasha advised us
to recommend Galib Pasha for some other post; but it so happens that
not only are the accounts in the treasury with reference to this
paper money defective, but whereas we thought that only one million
of paper money out of the proposed seven millions had actually been
issued, we now find that two millions have in point of fact been
issued.
“I thought it therefore proper, as I informed you in my letter of
the 14 Moharem, 1294, to keep Galib Pasha in the office of Finance
until all his accounts were put into proper order. In the discussion
on these matters in the Council of Ministers, on the 6th day of
Moharem, Galib Pasha informed us that he had made arrangements with
some private bankers for the purchase of £T90,000 in gold against
£T210,000 paper. This enormous depreciation, which could be accepted
only in the event of the extremest urgency, seemed to us beyond all
limits of reason.
“Whatever may be the personal honesty of an official, yet when such
irregularities take place in his Office, it would seem more proper to
request him first to put his accounts in order before appointing him
off‐hand to another position of trust, such as the Senate.
“On consideration of the whole matter, we are convinced that just as
Galib Pasha’s incompetence involves no reflection on his honesty and
probity, so the matter of the £T90,000 which I have just mentioned
is far from revealing any desire on his part to conceal the real
situation of affairs.
“Hence the only reasons why we have requested a delay in the
nomination of Galib Pasha to the Senate are founded on his own
declarations last Wednesday before the Council of Ministers.
“Although this little matter is scarcely worthy of so lengthy an
explanation, I have made it simply on the demand addressed to me to
furnish explanations on the subject, and in order to comply with the
Imperial commands.
“I will only, in conclusion, beg you very particularly to be good
enough to bring these details to the notice of His Majesty, if he
should express his desire to be made acquainted with them.
“Receive, Excellency, etc.,—
“MIDHAT.
“9 _Moharem_ 1293, _Hegira_.”
(25_th January_ 1877.)
The other question held in reserve was that of the mixed schools,
a measure to which, as we have seen on several occasions, Midhat
attached the greatest importance, as a means of welding together the
different elements of the nation. He desired to make a beginning by
applying it to the military academies of the Empire. The eve, possibly,
of a great war, in which the nation might require the service of
all her sons, seemed to him the most opportune moment conceivable
for the application of this most important reform. He accordingly
pressed it on the Sultan. He was met by the ordinary Fabian tactics
of the Palace—procrastination, promises, delay. The Sultan demurred,
temporised, first gave and then withdrew his consent, and a long
discussion ensued between them on the subject. The dispute culminated
in the following Memorandum, addressed by Midhat in the name of the
Ministry, to the Sultan, through the usual channel:—
_To the First Secretary of His Majesty Saïd Pasha._[18]
“YOUR EXCELLENCY,—All sincere friends of Turkey continue to
urge us—as did Mr Thiers quite lately—in the actual condition
of affairs, to give proofs to Europe of our sincerity and good
intentions. This very day a despatch from Musurus Pasha informs
us that Lord Derby congratulates the Imperial Government on the
dissolution of the Conference, which he considers as a success for
Turkey. At the same time Lord Derby urges us to conclude peace with
Servia as soon as possible, and to make a beginning in carrying out
those articles of the Constitution, and those propositions of the
Conference, that are susceptible of immediate application. And whilst
we, taking these friendly counsels into very serious consideration,
are working with a view of putting into operation without delay the
Firmans concerning reforms, an Imperial Irade, promulgated yesterday,
prohibits the admission of Christians into the military schools,
which a preceding Irade had authorised. Now, such a prohibition is
calculated seriously to compromise, from the very beginning, an
important reform that the whole world expects from the Constitution,
and it is natural that obstacles of this kind should discourage and
paralyse the efforts that we are constantly making to serve our
country with devotion. We therefore regret sincerely that of all
the questions which are now placed on the order of the day to be
studied by the Council, this important one alone remains in suspense,
and we regret it all the more inasmuch as the explanations that
we addressed to His Majesty on the subject yesterday morning have
remained unanswered. I therefore appeal to the Imperial goodwill,
and beseech His Majesty to bring to bear on this question all the
forethought and attention that it deserves.
“(Signed) MIDHAT.
“8 _Moharem_ 1294, _Hegira_.”
(24_th January_ 1877).
Worn out by these tactics, Midhat determined to bring the matter to
an issue, and make it what would be called a Cabinet question, and
addressed to the Sultan the following letter:—
“SIRE,—The object of promulgating the Constitution was to abolish
Absolutism, to indicate Your Majesty’s rights and duties, to define
and establish those of Ministers; in a word, to secure to the nation
complete and entire liberty, and thus by a common effort to raise the
condition and position of the country.
“Contrary to what had occurred in the case of former _Hatti Humayuns_
promulgated thirty years back, the new charter was to subsist and
receive its full application after the present political crisis
should be at an end; for our object in promulgating that Constitution
was certainly not merely to find a solution of the so‐called Eastern
Question, nor to seek thereby to make a demonstration that should
conciliate the sympathies of Europe which had been estranged from us.
“Allow me, Sire, to offer a few observations on this subject. In the
first place, Your Majesty, who is responsible before the nation for
your acts, is bound to be acquainted with your duties as well as
with your rights and prerogatives. It is, moreover, indispensable
that Ministers should have the certain conviction of being able to
accomplish their tasks, and that we should be able to free ourselves
from that habit of servile flattery which has debased our people and
ruined the country during the last four centuries.
“I am animated by a profound respect for the person of Your Majesty.
But basing my conduct on the ordinances of the Cheri (sacred law),
I am bound to withhold obedience to the commands of Your Majesty
whenever they are not in conformity with the interests of the nation;
otherwise the weight of my responsibility would be too heavy for me
to bear. The dictates of my conscience that command me to conform
my acts to the salvation and prosperity of my country impose an
imperative obligation on me; and the judgment of my country, which is
what I respect and cherish most, forbids me to act otherwise.
“I desire earnestly that no shadow of a suspicion should cross the
mind of Your Majesty, and I dread, as I have already said, to find
later on that I have sinned against my own conscience and deserved
the malediction of my countrymen. It is this very apprehension that
forces me to submit those considerations to Your Majesty. It is
indispensable, Sire, that the Ottoman nation should have the power
to reform and administer their country, according to the law. It is
unnecessary for me to point out or explain to Your Majesty all that
is contained in this phrase. I humbly pray and beseech Your Majesty
to have confidence in me and my colleagues in the accomplishment of
our difficult task, in which patriotism and love of our country are
our only motives and inspiration.
“I trust that I have not as yet committed any act compromising the
responsibility that I feel, and I desire that the nation should be
imbued with the sense of our responsibility towards it, otherwise no
satisfactory result can ever be attained.
“It is now nine days, Sire, since you have abstained from giving a
favourable answer to my petition. You thereby refuse to sanction laws
indispensable to the welfare of the country, and without which our
whole previous work will be rendered futile. Whilst Your Majesty’s
Ministers are engaged in endeavouring to restore the governmental
edifice which has with so much difficulty escaped total ruin, surely
Your Majesty would not willingly add to the work of destruction.
“If Your Majesty should in consequence of the above named opinions
consider it your duty to relieve me of my functions as Grand Vizier,
I would pray Your Majesty to confide them into such strong hands as
shall be able to reconcile the principles and ideas of Your Majesty
with the necessities of the country and the gravity of the situation
in which the Empire finds itself placed to‐day.—I am, Sire, Your
Majesty’s humble servant,
“MIDHAT.
“18_th January_ 1293, _O.S._”
(30_th January_ 1877.)
For three days he abstained from going to the Palace.
The Sultan, who was now prepared for extremities, sent Safvet Pasha
to him to inform him that all he demanded would be granted and to
request him to come to the Palace. Safvet Pasha, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and one of the Turkish delegates at the Conference, was not
what would be called a strong Minister. He was prone to conciliation
and compromise rather than energetic measures and resolutions; but he
was essentially an honest man: duplicity and treachery were absolutely
foreign to his nature. If on this occasion he was intended as an
instrument of duplicity, it was practised at his own expense, and
he was merely an unconscious tool. Midhat, however, demurred to the
invitation, and required the necessary Irades to be issued on the
matters pending with the Palace, before he resumed his functions as
Grand Vizier. Thereupon the Sultan sent his first aide‐de‐camp, Saïd
(Ingless) Pasha, to him, to assure him that the Irades were ready, if
he would, on the Sultan’s order, accompany him to the Palace. Midhat
went. He perceived on his way an unwonted display of troops in the
district of Tavshan Tashi, where his Konak was situated, but he was not
aware then, on the night of the 4th‐5th February, that the Imperial
Yacht _Izzeddine_ was moored close to the marble steps leading up to
the terrace of the Palace of Dolma‐Bagtche. If he had perceived it and
guessed its purpose, it was too late to retreat, or to escape the snare
laid for him. On his arrival at the Palace he was shown into a small
ante‐chamber and told to await the Sultan’s orders.
The first aide‐de‐camp soon returned with the Sultan’s order to deliver
up his seal of office, and to accompany him.
He then conducted him on board the _Izzeddine_, which, with steam
already up, immediately weighed anchor and steamed off in the
direction of the Sea of Marmora with Midhat on board. The Captain of
the _Izzeddine_ had sealed orders, which he was only to open in the
Sea of Marmora. These orders were, that he should wait for twenty‐four
hours in the Bay of Tchekmedje, and if he received no telegram within
that space of time, he was to conduct Midhat to any European port on
the Mediterranean that the ex‐Grand Vizier might select. No despatch
arriving, he proceeded on his course to Brindisi, where he landed
Midhat.
That the forcible banishment of the Grand Vizier was a violation of
the letter as well as the spirit of the Constitution promulgated and
sworn to by the Sultan, has never been seriously denied. The “reason
of State” urged would obviously cover any act of arbitrary power
whatever. It was for the express purpose of putting an end to such an
arbitrary _régime_ that the Constitution was framed and insisted on.
The flimsy pretext put forward, that it was in accordance with the
113th Article of the Constitution, will not bear the most superficial
examination. The power therein conceded to the Sultan was in a rider
to a clause declaring a state of siege when the safety of the State
required it, and the purport and limits of the clause must necessarily
govern the subsidiary provisions of the clause itself. Not only could
a rider of this description not bear the interpretation sought to be
placed upon it, but other substantial clauses of the Constitution
directly forbade the exercise of any such arbitrary power, and provided
for the elementary right that no man should be punished except after
due trial. But further: clauses 31, 32, and 34 contained special and
minute provisions for the arrest and trial of Ministers guilty of
treason or malversation, so that both positively and negatively, in its
substantial provisions and in its omissions, the banishment of Midhat,
with its attendant circumstances, was as clear a violation of the
Constitution as the _coup d’état_ of the 2nd December 1852 in France.
But political morality and good faith and patriotism apart, it must be
allowed that the tactics pursued by the Palace were, _qua_ tactics,
very cleverly devised. If the Sultan had struck at the Constitution as
well as the champion of it; at reform at the same time as the reformer,
he would undoubtedly have raised a storm in the country which would
have immediately endangered his throne; but by striking down the father
and pillar of the Reformers he practically killed reform, and put the
Constitution at his mercy as certainly as if he had suppressed it
then and there; and whilst pretending himself to champion both reform
and the Constitution, he managed to play the _rôle_ of Wat Tyler
successfully, and to take the sting out of the blow, and conceal the
full meaning of the act that he had just committed. There was a party
in Constantinople, to which personal ambition was not a stranger,
who imagined that Midhat was not essential to the cause of the
Constitution, and that Abdul Hamid II. was sincere in his protestations
of reforming ardour. Some were of good faith, and some were simply
moved by ambition. Both very soon discovered their mistake, and in
various distant provinces found leisure to reflect and repent of their
confiding innocence.
The Palace, although they had hazarded this great _coup_, did not feel
at all secure as to the effect it might produce on the population of
Constantinople, in spite of all the measures of precaution that had
been taken; and the order given to the captain of the _Izzeddine_ to
remain twenty‐four hours at anchor in the bay of Tchekmedje, was with a
view, in case of a serious rising in the capital, of recalling Midhat
and persuading him to resume his functions—until a more convenient
opportunity arose. The Palace was playing for safety.
Stunned by the suddenness of the blow, entirely unprepared for any
concerted action, and distracted by reports industriously spread, the
people did not rise, and the Palace breathed freely. It had gained a
complete victory.
* * * * *
Between the breaking up of the Conference and the breaking out of the
war, the sequence of diplomatic action can be very briefly narrated.
On the 19th January 1877 Prince Gortchakoff issued a Circular to the
Powers, which can be summed up in the question, “What are you going to
do about it?” One particular phrase, however, in this document must be
noted. He says that the agreement in the Berlin Memorandum not being
unanimous, and the crisis being aggravated, among other causes, by the
revolution in Constantinople, the Cabinets recommenced negotiations,
and, on the initiative of England, agreed upon a basis and guarantees
to be discussed at a Conference at Constantinople. There is very little
doubt that this revolution in Constantinople—which had the avowed
object of checking absolutism and giving the Turkish people guarantees
for good government—was in the eyes of Russia an aggravation of the
crisis, and justified, and even necessitated, in her opinion, hostile
action against Turkey. That Russia, who had undertaken the championship
of liberty and progress among the inhabitants of a neighbouring empire,
should be confronted by the establishment of institutions far more
liberal and advanced than anything her own people were allowed to dream
of; and that there should be sitting at Constantinople a Parliament,
the very name of which was a terror and nightmare at St Petersburg, was
without question an intolerable grievance.
_À propos_ of this, the famous despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo, of
November 1828, to M. de Nesselrode, may be read with profit:
“When the Imperial Cabinet examines the question as to whether the
moment had arrived to take up arms against the Porte, some doubts
as to the urgency of this measure might exist in the minds of those
who had not sufficiently meditated on the effects of the sanguinary
reforms that the Ottoman Chief had just executed with terrible
energy. But now the experience that we have just had ought to unite
everybody in favour of the line then adopted. The Emperor has put
the Turkish system to the proof, and His Majesty has found in it a
commencement of material and moral organisation which hitherto it has
never possessed. If the Sultan has been enabled to oppose to us a
more lively and sustained resistance whilst he had scarcely collected
the elements of his new plans of reform and improvement, how much
more formidable should we have found him if he had had time to give
them more consistency and solidity?...”
The whole policy of Russia towards Turkey is contained in the above
despatch. The Cabinets of the Powers did not immediately answer Prince
Gortchakoff’s Circular of the 19th January. General Ignatieff took a
circular journey round Europe and felt the pulses of its Governments.
On the 13th March, Count Schouvaloff handed to Lord Derby the draft
Protocol which it was proposed to submit to the signature of the
Great Powers, so as “to terminate the incident.” In this interview,
the Russian Ambassador urged in favour of this course the unfortunate
result that would ensue if shades of difference of opinion were to
manifest themselves in the replies of the various Cabinets to the
Russian Circular, which might be a determining cause to induce Russia
to seek for a solution _either by means of a direct understanding with
the Porte_, or by force of arms.
Lord Derby does not seem to have requested the Russian Ambassador
to explain the above oracular utterance. There was more in it than
he perhaps imagined. Another remarkable expression fell from Count
Schouvaloff at this interview, and one which shows that he did not
give himself the trouble, in his interview with the English Minister,
to maintain even the appearance of consistency. “_As a period of some
months would not be sufficient to accomplish these reforms_, it would
be preferable,” etc. But this was Mr Disraeli’s and Lord Derby’s
contention, though not sustained, for postponing diplomatic action, and
the Turkish Ministers were never tired of urging it as a good and valid
reason for deferring the Conference altogether.
The Protocol that was signed at London on the 31st March 1877 was
certainly, as compared with the Protocol of the Conference, a very
colourless document. After recapitulating certain recent diplomatic
acts and taking cognisance of certain others, in view of certain
indications, “the Powers propose _to watch carefully_ by means of
their Representatives at Constantinople, and their local agents, the
manner in which the promises of the Ottoman Government are carried into
effect.” It concluded by saying: “If their hopes should once more be
disappointed, and if the conditions of the Christian subjects of the
Sultan should not be improved in a manner to prevent the return of
the complications which periodically disturb the peace of the East,
they think it right to declare that such a state of things would be
incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general. In
such case, they reserve to themselves the right to consider, in common,
the means which they may deem best fitted to secure the well‐being of
the Christian population and the interests of the general peace.”
This Protocol was accompanied by two remarkable declarations, annexed
to the Minutes of the Meeting at the Foreign Office at which the
Protocol was signed—the one on the part of the Russian Ambassador, the
other on that of the English Minister.
The latter was to the effect that, in the event of the object for
which the Protocol had been signed, viz., reciprocal disarmament and
peace, not being attained, the Protocol in question should be regarded
as null and void.
The declaration by the Russian Ambassador was in the following terms:—
“If peace with Montenegro is concluded, and the Porte accepts the
advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a
peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in
the Protocol, let it send to St Petersburg a special envoy to treat
of disarmament, to which his Majesty the Emperor would also, on his
part, consent. If massacres similar to those which have occurred
in Bulgaria take place, this would necessarily put a stop to the
measures of demobilization.”
The Porte thought fit, perhaps unnecessarily, inasmuch as its adhesion
to the Protocol was not required, to make on the 9th April 1877 a
most elaborate and spirited answer to the position taken up by the
signatories of that document.
It pointed out that the efforts of the Powers were exclusively directed
to what they considered the well‐being of one portion only of the
Sultan’s subjects, whereas the reforms which the new Constitution
aimed at introducing did not bear a special or exclusive character in
regard to province, race, creed or language. That the small account
which the Powers seemed to have taken both of the great principles of
equality and justice which the Turkish Government sought to introduce
into the internal administration, and of its rights of independence and
sovereignty, was deeply to be regretted. That Turkey as an independent
State could not submit “to be placed under any surveillance, whether
collective or not.” That the Treaty of Paris explicitly declared the
principle of non‐intervention. That Treaty which binds the other high
contracting parties as well as Turkey, cannot be abolished by a
Protocol in which Turkey has taken no part. And as for the last clause,
the Government of the Sultan saw in it “a proceeding of intimidation
calculated to deprive their action of all merit of spontaneity, and a
source of grave complication for the present as well as for the future.”
With reference to the declaration of the Russian Ambassador annexed to
the Protocol, the Porte very pointedly remarked that “as regards the
disorders which might break out in Turkey and arrest the demobilization
of the Russian army, the Sultan’s Government, while resenting the
offensive terms in which this idea has been expressed, believes that
Europe is convinced that the disorders which have disturbed the
tranquillity of the provinces were due to external agitation; that
the Imperial Government cannot be held responsible for them, and that
consequently the Russian Government will not be justified _in making
the demobilization of its armies depend on such contingencies_.”
This last paragraph pointed out a serious practical difficulty that
confronted the Ottoman Government with reference to the proposal
for demobilization. Russia was supposed to be able to mobilise her
armies in eight days: at any rate, it was a question of days with her.
Turkey, on account of her geographical position, and the nature of
her organisation, required several months to effect this object. If,
therefore, after making the greatest sacrifices in order to collect her
forces, she were now to dismiss them to their distant homes, and Russia
were allowed, on a pretext indicated by herself, to remobilise her own
army, Turkey would be caught at the greatest possible disadvantage, and
would then be completely at the mercy of her unscrupulous opponent. And
nothing would be easier than for Russia, employing the means at which
she had shown herself an adept, to excite troubles which would give her
the very justification which she sought for a systematic attack on the
now defenceless Ottoman Empire. The Porte had had experience of this
very same line of action and of argument in respect to Servia. On the
2nd November 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby that “General
Ignatieff told me this morning that he has been directed by his
Government to inform the Porte that they would consider any excesses
committed by the Turkish troops as a violation of the armistice;
and one of the secretaries of the Russian Embassy was desired this
afternoon to tell me, further, that the General had orders at once to
leave Constantinople upon any violation of it occurring,” and he adds,
“a ready pretext for a rupture appears thus to be prepared.”[19]
On the 19th April 1877, Prince Gortchakoff issued another Circular
announcing a declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, and
concluding with the following most remarkable sentence: “In assuming
this task, our august Master fulfils a duty imposed upon him by the
interests of Russia, whose _peaceful development is hindered by the
permanent disturbances of the East_.”
Commentary would spoil this choice bit. The lamb was troubling the
stream.
On the 1st May, Lord Derby made a most caustic and merciless reply to
the Russian Circular.
After pointing out that the Porte had never wavered “in affirming its
intention of carrying out the reforms already promised,” which was the
avowed object of the Powers, and that by patience and moderation on
both sides these objects might still have been attained, and that it
was the presence of large Russian forces on the frontiers of Turkey,
“menacing its safety, rendering disarmament impossible, and exciting a
feeling of apprehension and fanaticism among the Mussulman population,”
that constituted a material obstacle to internal pacification and
reform. It went on to say, that the course on which the Russian
Government had entered involved graver and more serious considerations.
It was in contravention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris
of 30th March, 1856, by which Russia and the other signatory Powers
engaged, each on its own part, to respect the independence and the
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and further, that they
had, as late as 1871, signed a declaration at the Conference of London,
affirming it to be “an essential principle of the law of nations
that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty,
nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the
Contracting Parties by means of an amicable arrangement.” It concluded
by saying, in reference to the pretension that Russia was acting in the
interest of Great Britain and of the other Powers, that it felt bound
to state in a manner equally formal and public that the decision of the
Russian Government was not one that could have their concurrence or
approval.
Nothing could be more logical or reasonable, but it was not logic or
reason that could keep the Russian armies on their side of the Pruth.