DEPOSITION AND DEATH OF ABDUL AZIZ
After an honourable exile as Governor of Salonica, Midhat obtained
leave to return to Constantinople, and after a brief tenure of the
office of Minister of Justice and of the Presidency of the Council
of State, he handed in his resignation in the following terms, and
retired to his Konak in the neighbourhood of the capital and awaited
developments:
_To Midhat Pasha, President of the Council of State._
“I beg that your Highness will be good enough to instruct me as to
the reply I am to make to His Majesty, in case he should question me
as to the motives for your resignation.
“HAFIZ MEHEMED
“_Head Chamberlain_ (_of Sultan Aziz_).”
_Reply._
“EXCELLENCY,—My request is not based upon any personal motives. I
have nothing but praise for all my colleagues, both high and low;
but the motives which have forced me to this decision are, as I have
already set out in my petition, the difficulties of the position in
which we are placed, that is to say, our finances are in a hopeless
condition, the civil administration is utterly disorganised, and the
state of the army is beyond description; all this compromised the
security and credit of the country, and the non‐Mussulman element
loudly proclaims the intention that it long ago formed of placing
itself under foreign protection. While the faults and mistakes
made twenty years ago have prepared the way for the disasters
which are now showing themselves in rapid succession, and which are
sufficient to employ all our time, our foreign policy has also been
misdirected, the feelings of the Powers have changed towards us,
and they entertain hostile intentions towards our country to such a
degree that the most friendly Power has lost all confidence in us.
It is impossible for us not to deplore the unfortunate results which
this line of conduct cannot fail to produce for Turkey, and for the
faithful servants of His Majesty—that of being unable to see the
future clearly before them. In view of the attitude adopted by His
Highness the Grand Vizier, which gives reason to hope that this state
of affairs may be remedied, I feel compelled to devote my feeble
efforts and support to those duties which are specially incumbent on
me in the existing crisis through which the Ministry is passing. But
as I have explained in the petition which I have already sent in, I
have passed the greater portion of my life in provincial service, and
have never taken part in such delicate and complicated affairs, and
am therefore compelled to ask you to have the goodness to intercede
with His Majesty to accept my resignation.
“I am, etc.,
“MIDHAT.
“29 _Cheval_, 1291 (1874).”
In the meantime things went from bad to worse in the affairs of the
State. Grand Viziers one after the other were appointed and dismissed.
Mehemet Rushdi Pasha, Essad Pasha, Chervani Rushdi Pasha, held office
for a few months only, and with the best of intentions were utterly
unable to grapple with the situation, and the “villain of the piece,”
Mahmoud Nedim, was at last recalled to office. The finances of the
country were fast getting beyond all remedy. Although it was only
twenty years since the fatal secret of a national debt had been learnt
in Turkey, bankruptcy was already staring the country in the face. So
palpable was this to the best friends of Turkey, that Mr Yorke in the
British Parliament, in the interests of a long‐standing ally of Great
Britain, and of the alliance itself, called attention to the state of
Turkish finances, and summoned the British Government to intervene
through its ambassador at Constantinople to endeavour to ward off
impending catastrophes. Three months after this warning the Turkish
Treasury suspended payment on half the amount of the coupons of the
public debt.
The outcry caused by this measure throughout Europe, not only in
strictly commercial and financial circles, but in every class of the
community, was indescribable. Tempted by the high rate of interest,
and confiding in the assurances of financiers interested in floating
successive loans that “Turkey always has paid and therefore always
would pay” the coupons of its debts, the _petite bourgeoisie_ and the
small investor had largely placed their savings in Turkish bonds, and
the “tightness” and misery caused by the suspension was undoubtedly
very great (1875). Meetings of indignant bond‐holders were held in
every capital and large city in Europe, and the Turkish Government and
the Turkish nation, the Pasha and the people, were confounded in a
common anathema. The ground was admirably prepared for an explosion of
political passion directed against Turkey. The occasion for this was
not long in presenting itself.
During the second Vizierate of Essad Pasha, certain movements of a
suspicious nature took place on the Montenegrin frontier which would
have arrested the attention of a more vigilant Government. A party of
sixty Slav peasants from the village of Nevesinje in the Commune of
Mostar, on some trivial quarrel with the local authorities, emigrated
in a body across the frontier into Montenegro. In a short time, through
the good offices of the Russian Ambassador, they obtained leave to
return to their homes; but very soon, in concert with their Montenegrin
friends, they organised a _razzia_ on the lands of the neighbouring
Mussulmans. Instead of nipping this incipient rebellion in the bud and
enquiring into its cause, the local authorities temporised with its
leaders and awaited instructions from Constantinople as to how they
were to proceed. Encouraged by this impunity, and with the assurance
of external support, the insurgent bands rapidly increased in numbers,
and when at last the Government determined to act, it found itself in
presence of a serious rebellion. Essad Pasha, well‐intentioned but
weak, and preoccupied with the serious outlook of affairs generally,
accepted the insidious offer of the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors to
intervene between the leaders of the bands and the Supreme Government.
No policy could have been more fatal. It afforded the greatest possible
encouragement to the rebels, who considered the step an acknowledgment
by the Government of its own inability to deal with the movement;
it practically conceded belligerent rights to the rebels, and it
encouraged the habit and consecrated the principle of interference by
foreign governments in the internal affairs of the empire.
The hollowness of the offer was apparent the moment the terms of
surrender came to be discussed, and the net result of this diplomatic
comedy was, as was no doubt intended, that what was at first an
insignificant rising of a handful of peasants was raised to the dignity
of a recognised rebellion that could negotiate on equal terms with
the Imperial Government through the medium of foreign consuls and
ambassadors.
Mahmoud Nedim had now succeeded Essad Pasha as Grand Vizier (1875),
and as no effective measures were taken to suppress the rising, it
went on spreading from village to village and district to district
till the contagion was caught in Bulgaria. There, in the beginning
of 1874, a commencement of unrest showed itself in the districts
of Drenova, Kazanlik, and Zagra; but the local authorities (warned
by what had taken place in the Herzegovina through the neglect of
initial precautions) had all the leaders of the movement arrested.
Thereupon General Ignatieff made such energetic representations to the
Porte, that orders arrived not only for the release of the imprisoned
malcontents, but for the dismissal of all the functionaries concerned
in their arrest.[6]
The effect of this novel and original mode of dealing with an
insurrection was soon apparent in the effervescence and excitement it
caused among the Mussulman population throughout the province. They
saw rebel bands, the leaders of which were patronised and supported by
foreign consuls and diplomatists, being organised without disguise and
approaching their own hearths, whereas all defensive measures on the
part of their own natural leaders were discountenanced and punished.
They thereupon resolved to take the matter into their own hands, and
formed vigilance committees and organised local bands under the command
of retired _zaptiés_ throughout the province.
In such psychological conditions an explosion of popular passions
was certain sooner or later to take place. The occasion for this was
furnished by an incident that occurred at Salonica on the 5th May 1875.
This incident was, with the Bulgarian insurrection and the Berlin Note,
one of the external difficulties that confronted the Government, and
placed it in a very critical position. A young Bulgarian girl had
come by rail to Salonica from a neighbouring village on the evening
of the 5th May, accompanied by a _hoadja_, with a view to making a
declaration of conversion to Mahomedanism before the Grand Council of
Salonica—a formality required by the law, as a preliminary to her
being married to a young Mahomedan of her village. On her arrival
at the station she was met by a mob of Greeks and Bulgarians who
pulled off her _yashmak_ and _feradje_ (mantle and veil), and forcing
her into a carriage, in spite of the efforts of four _zaptiés_ who
came up in the middle of the disturbance, drove her at a gallop to
the American Consulate, where the brother of the Vice‐Consul (a
Bulgarian), who had arranged the abduction, concealed her during the
night. The next day he had her removed to the house of a friend, so
that all trace of the girl should be lost. But early next morning a
Mussulman mob, comprising (as in such occurrences is certain to be
the case) the worst and most violent sections of the population, had
assembled at the Konak and loudly demanded the restoration of the
girl and her appearance before the Grand Council. As their demands
were not complied with, they retired to the Saatli Mosque, adjacent
to the Governor’s Konak, where they reiterated their demands for the
restoration of the girl. Unfortunately, by some fatality which was
never satisfactorily explained, the German and French Consuls found
their way into the mosque in the very midst of excited Mussulmans.
Whether they went there of their own accord to remonstrate and argue
with the people, or approaching the scene of the demonstration were
hustled into the mosque, was never cleared up. But once they appeared
there, the frenzy of the mob burst all bounds, and the most violent
amongst them, pursuing the Consuls into one of the apartments of the
_Muderris_ (Academy) in connection with the mosque, fell on them
with iron bars hastily snatched from the windows of the mosque, and
murdered them on the spot. The English Consul, Mr Blunt, accompanied
by his _cavass_, seems to have been the only one who kept his head on
this occasion and acted with presence of mind and sagacity; for, at
the risk of his own life, he forced his way to the Konak, and when he
found that the Governor could not effect the restoration of the girl,
which was the only way to calm the mob and rescue the Consuls, he sent
to the American Vice‐Consulate to apprize Mr Lazaro, who was the cause
of the whole disturbance, of the perilous situation of his colleagues,
the French and German Consuls, and to implore him to restore the girl.
Unfortunately, Mr Lazaro at first procrastinated and pretended that
he did not know where the girl was, and so precious time was lost;
and when subsequently, on a further appeal from Mr Consul Blunt, he
delivered up the girl, it was too late, for the crime against the
foreign Consuls who had intervened had been accomplished.
Although the Ottoman Government took immediate steps to punish the
authors of this crime—the six principal leaders of which were
immediately executed, and the remainder punished with severe terms
of penal servitude—the effect of the outrage on the public opinion
of Europe, in the existing state of feeling in regard to Turkey,
can easily be conceived. It excited indignation everywhere; but the
anti‐Turkish Press, now pretty numerous, seized on it with avidity and
pointed to it as irrefragable evidence of the incorrigible fanaticism
of the whole Mussulman population of the empire, and called for various
coercive measures, amounting in some cases to a combined crusade, to
protect the Christians in the country, now threatened with wholesale
massacre.[7]
It was in vain that Europeans who had lived all their lives in the
country, and were acquainted from personal experience with the feelings
and opinions of the inhabitants, protested against these exaggerations
and deprecated their vain terrors. Colonel James Baker, an English
resident for twenty years in the neighbourhood of Salonica, where he
had been farming on a large scale, and whose occupation had brought
him in contact with all sorts and conditions of men, Christian and
Mahomedan alike, wrote a book ridiculing these apprehensions, and
communicating his experiences of the harmony and good fellowship
existing among the adherents of both religions, with whom he had for
twenty years been brought into contact.
But the experience of people living on the spot could not stem the
torrent of hostile prejudice fortified by such dramatic examples
as the murder of the Consuls at Salonica. General Ignatieff, whose
plans were being admirably served by events, was not slow in lending
the weight of his authority to the propagation of these imaginary
terrors. He embodied 300 Montenegrin workmen at Constantinople to
serve as a body‐guard of his Embassy, to the amusement of his more
sensible colleagues, who were quite aware of the baselessness of the
fears that were the pretext of these ostentatious precautions. But the
_mise en scène_ contrived by the ingenious ambassador was not the less
effective, and these picturesque mountaineers as they lounged about
the streets of Pera, in their handsome national costume, bristling
with multifarious arms in their embroidered sashes, were striking
advertisements of the terrible dangers that threatened all Christians
in the fanatical land of the Osmanli.
Servia, too, was preparing to enter the lists. Although without
the shred of a grievance against the suzerain Power, nor indeed
alleging any, Prince Milan, moved by the sole ambition to convert his
principality into a kingdom, had easily allowed himself to be drawn
into the conspiracy of a concerted attack on the Ottoman Empire. All
the reserves of his army were called out and armed with newly imported
rifles; and trains full of Russian officers of all grades and ranks,
from Generals of divisions to corporals and sergeants, arrived daily at
the capital to organise this militia into a fighting machine, and to
drill the raw peasants into soldiers. The whole country, in fact, from
Belgrade to Alexinatz, was an armed camp.
Everything portended important developments for the ensuing spring
(1875). Early in the year, information reached the Porte that a serious
outbreak would take place in Bulgaria in the month of April, and that
the districts of Philippopolis, Eski‐Zagra, and Tirnova would be the
scene of the explosion. The information which was very detailed and
supported by evidence as to its accuracy, was accompanied by an earnest
request by the authorities of the threatened districts that a body of
regular troops should be despatched to the spot to inspire confidence
in the inhabitants and to protect the lives and property of peaceful
citizens. General Ignatieff again interfered, and in the capacity
of _amicus curiæ_, insisted that the presence of regular troops
would only inflame the passions of the population and precipitate a
crisis. Mahmoud Nedim allowed himself to be persuaded by the Russian
Ambassador, and persisted in turning a deaf ear to the reiterated
requests of the local authorities for the despatch of a regular force.
Three weeks before the appointed day (16th April 1875) the anticipated
rising took place. It was accompanied by exactly the same incidents
that had characterised every previous rising that obeyed a _mot
d’ordre_ from outside. The armed bands fell on the first Mussulmans
they met with, and massacred them all, regardless of age or sex, with
the obvious aim of provoking reprisals that should play into the hands
of the enemies of Turkey.[8] These reprisals did, in fact, take place,
and were, no doubt, of a sanguinary and wholesale character. It is not
intended here to defend or condemn the atrocities that took place on
this occasion; but human nature being what it is, and the provocation
endured by the Mussulman population being taken into account, and due
allowance being made for the contagion of passion and panic, it is
no great wonder if scenes were enacted in Bulgaria that have marked
revolution and _jacqueries_ in all ages in every part of the world;
and perhaps still less if a confessedly and bitterly hostile Press in
Europe denounced “methods of barbarism” with little sifting of evidence
and with much dramatic exaggeration. Party spirit has occasionally not
scrupled to apply exactly the same terms without much reason to the
methods of warfare of its own regular troops. One fact was clearly and
conclusively established by the various commissions subsequently sent
to prosecute enquiries on the spot, viz., that not a single instance
occurred of an unarmed Christian being injured, or of a Christian
village being destroyed whose inhabitants had not actually risen in
armed rebellion. Fanaticism, in the strict acceptation of the term, is
not so discriminating.
Matters had now come to such a pass that a general cataclysm was
to be apprehended. Bulgaria, Montenegro and Herzegovina in flames,
Servia arming to the teeth under the supervision of competent foreign
officers, Roumania preparing to move in the same direction, a bankrupt
treasury at home, a Grand Vizier whose sole resource seemed to be in
the promises and counsels of a perfidious ambassador, the arch‐enemy of
his country, and a sovereign wholly unconscious, or careless, of the
condition of the empire, provided his own extravagant caprices were
gratified—such was the aspect of affairs in Turkey in the spring of
1876. But that was not all.
Under the spur of public opinion, and moved by secret springs in the
same direction, European diplomacy was meddling with the matter. Rulers
of State and masters of many legions were holding meetings to discuss
the situation in the East, and “Notes” and “Memorandums” were flying
about the Chancellories of Europe. The diplomatic outlook was quite as
menacing as the situation at home was critical.
It was in such a condition of affairs that counsel was being taken
in Midhat’s Konak, among a few patriots who did not yet despair of
their country, as to the best mode of saving the empire. But before
the events that led up to the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Aziz are
detailed, it will be useful to cast a glance at what was passing in the
diplomatic world in Europe.
The first and most important event in this respect, inasmuch as it was
the key of all that subsequently occurred, was the meeting of the Czar
and the Emperor of Austria at Reichstadt, 8th July 1876.[9]
The outcome of that interview, with respect to Turkey, is no secret
to‐day, but twenty‐five years ago it was certainly ignored in London,
otherwise the negotiations that took place between the English
and Austrian Governments relative to the contingency of an armed
intervention in the Turko‐Russian War—carried on through the Austrian
Embassy in London in the significant absence of the Ambassador, which
went so far as to discuss the terms of a guaranteed war loan—would
certainly not have occurred. The acumen of the English Government
on this occasion would seem to have been somewhat at fault, and the
information that came to it from Vienna strangely unreliable; for it
acted, throughout negotiations extending over two years, in undisturbed
reliance on the _bonâ fides_ of the Austrian Chancellor’s assurances,
and apparently in a secure trust in the force of his Magyar prejudices
with respect to Russia. The fact is patent to‐day—and was well known
at Berlin, and was not ignored in Paris—that Austria was, if not the
actual instigator of the Herzegovinian rising—which is by no means
certain—the Power that was determined to profit by it, and that her
whole policy and diplomatic action with respect to the events that
were taking place in the South‐East of Europe was governed by this
determination.
The turning‐point of Austrian policy with respect to Turkey has already
been indicated: the abandonment by England of Austria’s interests on
the Danube left her free, or even compelled her to have regard to what
she considered her own exclusive interests; and the meeting of the two
Emperors, at the breaking out of the Herzegovinian disturbances, was
the confirmation of this change of policy.
Two assurances seem to have been given by the Czar at this now historic
interview. First, that whatever might be the outcome of events in
Turkey, he would not seek for Russia any territorial aggrandisement in
Europe; and secondly, with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, that in
the contingency of the continuance of disturbances there he would not
oppose the occupation of those provinces by Austria if sanctioned by
the rest of Europe.
If this agreement had not been a secret one, and the terms of it had
been known or suspected in London, does any one imagine that events
would have followed the course they did, or that the “Notes” and
“Memorandums” coming from Vienna and Berlin would have been taken
seriously by the English Cabinet? The pact between the two Emperors,
sealed at Reichstadt, was quite as much at the expense of England in
Asia as of Turkey in Europe. It was a practical corollary of Prince
Bismarck’s avowed Eastern policy.
There is only an academical interest now in pointing out the _rôle_
that the personality of Count Andrassy and his reputed Magyar
sentiments played in all these transactions, and it is not necessary to
interrupt the course of this narrative by dwelling on them.
After the Andrassy Memorandum had prepared the Cabinets of Europe for
some sort of diplomatic interference in the affairs of Turkey, and
familiarised them with the idea, the natural course of events in the
Turkish Empire did the rest. The ball set going at Vienna was taken up
at Berlin. The comparatively colourless diplomatic Memorandum concocted
in the first‐named capital was followed by a far more coercive Note
emanating from the latter. The former contained recommendations,
the latter added external sanctions to them. The policy intended to
be pursued with reference to Turkey was contained in germ in this
remarkable “Note,” and the diplomatic strategy to be employed was
herein clearly revealed. The “Conference,” which was to impose the
conditions and insist on the sanction, was already on the _tapis_,
and formed the subject of an interchange of views between the various
European governments; and it was, as it were, under the shadow of
this menace to the integrity and independence of the country that the
friends of Midhat now hastened their deliberations.
As early as the winter of 1875, Midhat, with a view of profiting by
the lights, and seeking the advice of the eminent diplomatist who
represented the Court of St James at Constantinople, paid a visit to
Sir Henry Elliot, the purpose of which can best be described in the
words of the Ambassador himself.[10]
“In the beginning of December 1875, I was informed by one of Midhat’s
partisans, a Pasha who had filled some of the highest offices of the
State, that the object of his party was to obtain a ‘Constitution.’
This was more than a year before its promulgation, when it was
declared to have been invented only to defeat the Conference then
sitting at Constantinople.... A few days later Midhat himself called
upon me and explained his views more fully than he had ever done
before, though I was acquainted with their general tenor. The Empire,
he said, was being rapidly brought to destruction; corruption had
reached a pitch that it had never before attained; the service of the
State was starved, while untold millions were poured into the Palace,
and the provinces were being ruined by the uncontrolled exertions of
governors who purchased their appointments at the Palace, and nothing
could save the country but a complete change of system. The only
remedy that he could perceive, lay, first, in securing a control over
the sovereign by making the Ministers—and especially as regarded the
finances—responsible to a national popular Assembly; and secondly
in making this Assembly truly national, by doing away with all
distinctions of classes and religions, and by placing the Christians
on a footing of entire equality with the Mussulmans; thirdly, by
decentralisation and by the establishment of provincial control over
the governors. It must surely be admitted that these were enlightened
and statesmanlike views, deserving of every encouragement.... He
dwelt repeatedly on the value that the sympathy of the British nation
would be to the reformers, and on the manner in which his countrymen
were now looking to England as the example they hoped to follow. I
told him in reply that I could not doubt that measures framed upon
the lines he had laid down must command the approval and ensure the
good wishes of every Englishman who, like myself, had faith in the
advantages of constitutional checks upon arbitrary power. I gave
him this assurance confidently and in good faith; for certainly
the very last thing that I anticipated was that those who in this
country make the greatest parade of their devotion to constitutional
principles would be the first to heap contumely upon men who were
trying to introduce it into theirs, and to hold up their proposals to
ridicule....”
The first of the many incidents that soon after this conversation began
to follow each other closely, took place on the 10th May 1876, when
an assemblage of several thousand Softas stopped Prince Izzeddine, the
Sultan’s eldest son, on his way to the Seraskierat (Ministry of War),
desiring him to return to the Palace, and to inform the Sultan that
they demanded the dismissal of Mahmoud Nedim, the Grand Vizier and of
Hassan Fehmi Effendi, the Sheik‐ul‐Islam. The Sultan did not venture to
reject the demand. Mahmoud and Hassan Fehmi were dismissed, the latter
being replaced by Hassan Hairullah Effendi, who enjoyed a high and
exceptional reputation for learning and enlightenment. Mehemet Rushdi
Pasha, an old man universally respected, was named Grand Vizier; and as
he insisted on Midhat joining his Cabinet (although holding no specific
office), it was believed that he would be the guiding spirit, and
general satisfaction was felt. Sir Henry Elliot proceeds to say:
“This general satisfaction did not last long. The Sultan quickly
showed his determination to resist all reforms by appointing to high
posts several of the worst of the old school of Pashas, and it then
became so evident to me that an attempt to depose him would certainly
very shortly be made, that on the 25th May I put my conviction on
record in a despatch in which I wrote that the word ‘Constitution’
was in every mouth; that the Softas, representing the intelligent
public opinion of the Capital, knowing themselves to be supported by
the bulk of the Nation—Christian as well as Mahomedan—would not, I
believed, relax their efforts till they obtained it, and that should
the Sultan refuse to grant it, an attempt to depose him appeared
almost inevitable; that texts from the Koran were circulated proving
to the faithful that the form of Government sanctioned by it was
properly democratic, and that the absolute authority now wielded by
the Sovereign was an usurpation of the rights of the people and not
sanctioned by the Sacred Law; and both texts and precedents were
appealed to to show that allegiance was not due to a Sovereign who
neglected the interests of the State. The disaffection, I said, now
ran through every class, and from the Pashas down to the porters
in the streets and the boatmen on the Bosphorus, no one thought any
longer of concealing his opinions.... Within a week after my reports
were written, the deposition had been effected....”
The two moving spirits in the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz were
undoubtedly Midhat Pasha and Hussein Avni Pasha, the Minister of War
(_seraskier_). The latter, a thorough soldier and a sterling patriot,
distinguished for the great energy and decision of his character
as well as the impetuosity of his temper, had occupied the highest
military posts in the country, and had been repeatedly exiled from
Constantinople by the Sultan. He was particularly feared and disliked
by Mahmoud Nedim, who had procured his banishment each time that
he had been made Grand Vizier. Although not sharing all Midhat’s
constitutional views and professing more confidence in the efficacy
of the sword than in the saving grace of popular institutions, he had
lent a willing and energetic support to his colleague’s views as to the
indisputable necessity of deposing the Sultan as a preliminary to any
attempted amelioration in the condition of the State.
As soon as the final resolution of Ministers was arrived at, and
before any commencement of execution could be given to it, it was
indispensable to obtain a _Fetva_ (authoritative decree) of the
Sheik‐ul‐Islam, Hassan Hairullah, the highest authority and mouthpiece
of the Sacred Law, in order to give legal validity to the act of
deposition. Accordingly the following _Fetva_ was issued for the
deposition:—
“If the Chief of the Faithful gives proof of mental derangement; if
he displays ignorance of State matters; if he employs the public
revenues for his personal expenditure, beyond what the Nation and
the State can support; if he introduces confusion into political
and spiritual concerns, and if his continuance in power becomes
injurious to the nation, may he be deposed?”
Answer: “The Cheri pronounces ‘Yes.’
“Signed by the humble
“HASSAN HAIRULLAH,
“To whom God grant His indulgence.
“_Djemaziel Evel_, 1293, _Hegira_.”
(30_th May_ 1876.)
Armed with this _Fetva_, Ministers decided on the immediate execution
of their plans, the details of which, it was agreed, should be left to
the Grand Vizier, to Midhat, and to the Minister of War.
There was a slight divergence of views between Midhat and the
Seraskier with reference to the form of procedure which should
accompany the deposition. Hussein Avni inclined to a simple military
_pronunciamento_, whereas Midhat wished to give the consecration of
popular sanction to the act. For this purpose he proposed that the
Softas and the population of Stamboul should be convoked _en masse_ to
the Noure‐Osmanieh Mosque, where they should set forth the griefs of
the nation and demand a change of _régime_; and that on this demand
being refused or ignored, they should proceed at once to the execution
of the decree of deposition. The majority of Ministers inclined to
this latter method of proceeding; but a circumstance occurred which
necessitated a change of plans and determined the abandonment of the
proposal for a popular demonstration.
The 31st May was chosen for the execution of the plan agreed upon. On
the eve of that day information reached Midhat from a woman of the
Palace that the Sultan had had wind of the affair, and that the whole
plot was about to be discovered. This was corroborated by the fact that
twice that same day Hussein Avni had been peremptorily summoned to the
Palace, although on the first summons he had pleaded illness as a
reason for disregarding it.
It was decided thereupon by the Ministers to anticipate the hour fixed
upon, and to proceed at once with the execution of their design.
At midnight accordingly, of the 30th of May, Mehemet Rushdi and Midhat,
accompanied each by a single attendant carrying a lamp, proceeded to
Sirkedji to embark on a _caïque_[11] for Pachalimani on the Bosphorus,
the residence of Hussein Avni. It was a pitch‐dark night with rain
falling in torrents, and it was with some difficulty that they reached
the place of rendezvous. Here they found Hussein Avni anxiously waiting
for them, and after a hurried interview in which the final dispositions
were made, they separated to their respective posts. Hussein Avni
started for the palace of Dolma‐Bagtche, whilst Rushdi and Midhat
proceeded to the Seraskierat.
It had been decided that the Ministers and high civil and military
dignitaries should assemble at the War Office and await the arrival
of Prince Murad, whom Hussein Avni had undertaken to conduct there in
person; and that as soon as he should arrive, the proclamation and
investiture of the Prince as the new Sultan should take place. It
was further arranged that immediately on the arrival of the Prince a
bonfire should be lit on the tower of the Seraskierat, as a signal to
the fleet of what was taking place, and thereupon a Royal salute should
be fired by Kaisserli Ahmed’s ironclads, to announce to the whole city
the commencement of a new reign.
Hussein Avni, proceeding in the direction of the Palace, was, according
to preconcerted arrangement, met by Suleiman Pasha, to whom the
delicate task of executing the measures necessary to be taken at the
Palace had been entrusted.
Suleiman Pasha, marshal in the army and director‐in‐chief of the school
of military cadets at Pancaldi, the trusted lieutenant and right‐hand
man of Hussein Avni, himself a strong partisan of Midhat Pasha and
the young hope of the Reform Party, was the very man to carry out an
operation requiring careful preparation and unflinching resolution for
its successful execution.
The troops in the barracks of Tash‐Kishla and Kumuch‐Suyou had already
received their orders from Redif Pasha, the commander of the _corps
d’armée_ of Constantinople, and had been so posted as to blockade all
approaches by land. The fleet of ironclads under the personal command
of Kaiseli Ahmed, the captain Pasha, had taken the same precautions by
sea, so that nothing remained but to disarm the sentinels and _corps de
garde_ along the immediate approaches to the Palace. Suleiman, taking
with him a selected body of military students from Pancaldi, under the
command of Ahmed Bey (colonel) and Bedry and Rifat Beys (captains),
after successfully performing, without disturbance but not without some
opposition, the delicate operation of disarmament, hastened to the
apartments of Prince Murad. Although the Prince had been made aware of
the intentions of the Ministers, and had acquiesced in their general
arrangements, it had been found impossible to acquaint him with the
change of date resolved upon. He, therefore, fearing some surprise or
treachery, hesitated for some time before he could be induced to comply
with Suleiman’s urgent request that he should immediately join Hussein
Avni, who was waiting for him in a carriage at the gates of the Palace
to drive him to the Seraskierat, where his proclamation and investiture
as the new sovereign were to take place. At one moment it looked as if
the solemn drama about to be enacted would have to be played out with
the part of the “Prince of Denmark” omitted.
Having surmounted this unexpected difficulty and despatched Murad on
his way to the Seraskierat, Suleiman proceeded to discharge the second
and more distasteful part of the mandate confided to him. Making his
way to the Imperial apartments, and overcoming the hesitation of
the attendants by presenting an order signed by all the Ministers,
he peremptorily demanded to be immediately led into the presence of
the Sultan. The demand being at last complied with, he proceeded to
communicate to Abdul Aziz the justification of his intrusion, and read
to him the _fetva_ of the deposition. Whilst the Sultan and Suleiman
were engaged in parleying, the big guns of Ahmed’s ironclads were heard
booming in the distance. Abdul Aziz at once took in the import of the
firing, and from that moment yielded to the inevitable. He prepared
to comply with the order communicated to him to quit the Palace of
Dolma‐Bagtche for that of Top‐Kapou, which had been assigned as a
residence for him.
The new Sultan confirmed all his Ministers in their posts, addressing
the following letter to the Porte:—
_To my Grand Vizier and very patriotic Mehemet Rushdi Pasha_—
“By the favour of the Almighty and the will of my subjects, we
have ascended the throne of our ancestors, and by reason of your
patriotism and ability in the discharge of your duties as Grand
Vizier, we confirm you and all your colleagues in your former posts.
The numerous difficulties experienced for some time past both in our
domestic affairs and foreign relations, have produced uneasiness in
the public mind, and caused detriment to the material and territorial
interests of the country. The necessity of amending this state of
things and of adopting remedial measures such as shall insure the
happiness and secure the confidence of our subjects, imposes itself
imperatively upon us; and to effect these purposes, it is absolutely
necessary to organise the administration of the State on a basis
of stability and justice. Our exclusive attention will be directed
to this end, and for this purpose we desire that our Ministers,
after due deliberation, shall submit to us for our approbation their
views on the means by which, whilst respecting the laws of the Cheri
and of Justice, the organisation of our Empire in accordance with
the wants and requirements of our people can be effected, with the
view of procuring to all our subjects alike, without distinction
or restriction, the completest liberty compatible with order; and,
moreover, that our Ministers shall communicate to us their views
on the application of such just laws and regulations as shall be
calculated to consolidate and unify the national and patriotic
sentiments of all our subjects. It is clear, moreover, that in order
to obtain these objects, it is indispensable to reorganise the
Council of State, the Ministers of Justice, as well as of public
Institutions and of the Finances, as well as other departments
of State; and it is, moreover, evident that one of the principal
reforms of all will consist in establishing on a sound foundation
the financial situation of the Empire, and in taking steps that no
expenditure shall be tolerated that shall not have been provided for
by the Budget of the State, by which measures it may be hoped that
public credit and confidence will be restored. In order to help to
obtain this result, we hereby diminish our Civil list by the sum of
£T300,000, and surrender to the State the coal‐mines of Heraclia and
the other mines and manufactories appertaining to the Civil list; and
we recommend that like economies shall be effected in all the various
branches of the administration, so as to establish an equilibrium in
our finances. Our liveliest desire is for a continuance of intimate
relations with all the friendly Powers, by the strictest observance
of treaty obligations, and all our efforts will be directed to this
end, and we pray the Almighty to crown them with success.
“9 _Djemaziel Evel_, 1293, _Hegira_.”
(2_nd June_ 1876.)
Besides the retention of their portfolios by all the Ministers, Kemal
Bey (the best known and most distinguished poet and litterateur
of Turkey) and Zia Bey (equally celebrated as a poet and patriot)
were appointed as his private secretaries, and Sadullah Bey (well
known for his liberal sympathies and opinions) made chief of the
Sultan’s secretariat—important guarantees for the smooth working of
the machinery of State, and security against the revival of the old
pernicious intrigues of the Palace against the Ministers of the Porte.
Murad had, moreover, undertaken to promulgate the Constitution prepared
by Midhat and his colleagues at the earliest date compatible with the
despatch of urgent public business.
So far everything seemed to favour the Reformers. A revolution of the
most fundamental character, involving the destruction of autocratic
power in Turkey, and carrying the promise of a Constitution which would
lay the foundations at any rate of stable government in the country,
effected not only without bloodshed or disturbance of any kind, but
with the assent and approval of all classes and creeds in the land, and
with a new sovereign on the throne known sincerely to share the views
of his Ministers and the aspirations of his people, all this seemed to
ensure the prospect of healing the wounds of the much afflicted land of
the Osmanli, and of opening up a new era of progress and prosperity in
the East.
But suddenly a cloud, not bigger than a man’s hand, lowered over the
destinies of the country, and from this time the stars in their courses
fought against Turkey, and violently set back the date of the promised
era of prosperity.
On the eventful night of the 30th‐31st May, during the drive with
Murad to the Seraskierat, Hussein Avni had perceived that the Prince
was suffering from violent nervous excitement, and these symptoms
were still further accentuated in the return journey to the Palace of
Dolma‐Bagtche after the ceremony of investiture was over—so much so
that Midhat Pasha, who accompanied him, thought it prudent to remain in
the Palace, without quitting it, for three days. The physicians called
in consultation did not at first take a grave view of the case, and
sanguine hopes were entertained that, in a short time, by pursuing
the regimen of repose and hygiene recommended by these authorities,
Sultan Murad would rapidly recover his health and be able to discharge
the duties incumbent on him. Dr Lamsdorf of Vienna, the celebrated
specialist, made a very favourable diagnosis of the case. A happy issue
of this most unfortunate and inopportune malady was now generally
hoped for and expected, when two startling events occurred in rapid
succession, each seriously aggravating and affecting the Sultan Murad’s
nervous condition of health, and together fatally compromising the hope
of rapid recovery.
The first of these tragedies referred to was enacted in the Palace of
Tcheragan, five days after the dethronement of the late Sultan. Abdul
Aziz, whose imperious temper could ill brook the change of destiny
that had overtaken him, had already made one or two unsuccessful
attempts, which were with difficulty thwarted, to throw himself out of
the windows of the Palace. On the morning of the 5th June, he asked
for a pair of scissors with which to trim his beard. On the attendants
demurring to comply with this request, the Valide Sultan ordered the
scissors to be given to her son. Shortly after this, the ladies of her
suite, looking out of a window of a corridor that commanded a view on
the room occupied by the late Sultan, saw him sitting quietly in an
armchair with his back turned to the window; but shortly afterwards,
perceiving that his head had dropped on his lap, they ran to the door
and tried to open it. Finding it locked, and fearing a catastrophe,
they ran screaming to the Valide Sultan and informed her of what they
suspected. Orders being given to break into the room, they found Abdul
Aziz sitting in the posture already described, and in a pool of blood
flowing from two wounds in his arms, evidently caused by the scissors,
which had fallen beside him on the floor. The physicians, who were
hastily summoned, could only confirm the apprehension that life was
extinct, and the Ministers, immediately apprised of the fact of the
tragedy, ordered an immediate examination of the body to be made by
all the available medical men in Constantinople, hastily summoned to
draw up an official report on the subject. Seventeen medical men of
all nationalities, comprising all the most distinguished in the city
and in the Embassies of the great Powers, signed a unanimous report to
the effect that death was undoubtedly due to suicide, and handed the
following certificate:—
“The year 1876 A.D., on the 23rd of May, O.S., the 4th of June, N.S.,
or the year of the Hegira, the 11th of the month of Djemazi‐el‐ewel
1293, Sunday, at 11 o’clock A.M., we, the undersigned doctors of
medicine, namely, Marco Pasha, Nouri Pasha, Julius Millingen,
Caratheodori, Sotto, Dickson, Marroin, Nouridjian, Spadare, Vitalis,
S. Spagnolo, Marc Markel, Jatropoulo, Miltiadi Bey, Abdinour Effendi,
Mustafa Effendi, Servet Bey, Mehmed Bey and Jacques de Castro,
being summoned by the ministry by order of His Imperial Majesty
to ascertain the cause of the death of the ex‐Sultan Abdul Aziz,
proceeded to the guard‐house situated near the Imperial Palace
of Tcheragan. There we were ushered into a chamber on the ground
floor and found a body lying on a mattress on the floor. The body
was covered with a new white linen cloth. On removing this cloth
we recognised the ex‐Sultan Abdul Aziz. All the parts of the body
were cold and bloodless, pale, or covered with coagulated blood.
The corpse was not rigid, the eyelids were partially unclosed, the
corneæ were slightly opaque, the mouth partly open. Linen cloths,
soaked in blood covered the arms and legs. On lifting the linen
coverings on the arms we discovered a gash near the joint of the left
arm five centimetres long and three centimetres deep. The edges of
the wound were hacked and irregular. The direction of the wound was
from above to below, and from inside to outside. The veins of this
region were cut, and the cubital artery at its emerging point was
three‐fourths severed. At the joint of the right arm we discovered a
wound, slightly oblique, also hacked, two centimetres long and one
centimetre deep. On this side the wounds were only in the smaller
veins; the arteries were intact.
“We were shown a pair of scissors ten centimetres long, very sharp,
one point of which bore a small lateral projection near its summit.
The scissors were stained with blood, and we were told that the
ex‐Sultan Abdul Aziz had with these scissors inflicted upon himself
the wounds above described.
“We then proceeded to the residence of the late Sultan, where we were
ushered into a large chamber looking on to the sea. There we found in
the corner of a sofa, placed near a window, a pool of blood spread
over that article of furniture, and on the matting of the floor a
great quantity of coagulated blood in one mass, and further several
stains spread over the room.
“From what precedes we are unanimously of opinion:—
“1. That the death of the ex‐Sultan Abdul Aziz was caused by the loss
of blood produced by the wounds of the blood‐vessels at the joints of
the arms.
“2. That the instrument shown to us could certainly produce such
wounds.
“3. That the direction and nature of the wounds, together with the
instrument which is said to have produced them, lead us to conclude
that suicide had been committed.
“In witness whereof we have accordingly drawn up and signed the
present minute of proceedings at the guard‐house of Tcheragan on the
day, month and year aforesaid.
“_Signed_:
“Dr Marco, Nouri, A. Sotto, Physician attached to the Imperial
and Royal Embassy of Austria‐Hungary; Dr Spagnolo, Marc Markel,
Jatropoulo, Abdinour, Servet, J. de Castro, A. Marroin, Julius
Millingen, C. Caratheodori; E. D. Dickson, Physician of the British
Embassy; Dr O. Vitalis, Physician of the Sanitary Board; Dr E.
Spadare, J. Nouridjian, Miltiadi Bey, Mustafa, Mehmed.”
The body was transferred to Top‐Kapou and buried in the mausoleum of
Sultan Mahmoud.
Ten days after the tragedy at the Palace of Tcheragan the news of
which had deeply affected Sultan Murad, another quickly followed, in
some respects of a still more startling character, and calculated to
prostrate still further a mind already unhinged.
A Circassian captain, formerly aide‐de‐camp of the Sultan Abdul Aziz,
one Hassan by name, on whom certain suspicion of violent intentions
rested, had been ordered to Bagdad, and on his showing signs of
recalcitrancy, he was imprisoned for insubordination by orders of
Hussein Avni, the Minister of War. Feigning submission, he was released
after two days’ detention. On the 15th June, during a Cabinet Council
which was being held at the house of Midhat Pasha, and at which all the
Ministers were present, Tcherkess Hassan, armed with no less than six
revolvers, forcing the consigne without much difficulty, managed to
penetrate into the room where the Council was sitting, and advancing
straight up to Hussein Avni, discharged a barrel of a revolver at
him, and turning sharply on Reshid Pasha, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, shot him dead on the spot. The Minister of Marine, Kaisserli
Ahmed, threw himself on the assassin and tried to disarm him, but he
was immediately stabbed with a poniard that Hassan carried in his
left hand. Hussein Avni, although severely wounded, managed to make
his way to the staircase, but Hassan, following him, struck at him
furiously in the neck with his dagger and despatched him. Returning to
the Council room he discharged his revolvers promiscuously all around
him, smashing the chandelier suspended in the middle of the room, and
consequently plunging the room into darkness. It was this that probably
saved the lives of the remaining Ministers, for Kaisserli Ahmed, though
wounded, and Mehemet Rushdi, and Halid succeeded in escaping into
an adjoining boudoir, where they barricaded the door against their
furious assailant, who, having despatched the War Minister, seemed
chiefly bent on wreaking vengeance on the Minister of Marine. Midhat
escaped by a miracle, and by slipping off his coat, the sleeve of which
he left in the hand of Hassan who had seized it in the darkness. One
of Midhat’s servants, Ahmed Aga, on hearing the firing, had rushed
into the room and tried to seize the assassin from behind, but Hassan
turned sharply on him and shot him dead. The same fate attended Chukri
Bey, the aide‐de‐camp of the Minister of Marine, who also rushed in to
the rescue. At last a guard of _gendarmerie_ appeared on the scene,
and a regular fusillade ensued between the Circassian at bay and the
_gendarmes_ reinforced by a picket of soldiers; it was only then, after
a regular pitched battle, that this determined criminal was at length
overpowered and seized.
He was very soon afterwards tried, and hanged in due course, stoutly
denying to the last that he had any accomplices.
The effect of these compound tragedies on the mind of the Sultan Murad
was disastrous. His recovery, sanguine hopes of which had been held
out by Dr Lamsdorf, the famous specialist summoned from Vienna to give
his opinion on the state of the Sultan’s health, seemed destined to
be indefinitely postponed. Two parties, holding distinct views on the
situation and the manner it should be dealt with, now showed themselves
among the Ministers and the high Court officials. Mehemet Rushdi
especially, the old experienced vizier and the majority of Ministers
well aware of the favourable disposition of Sultan Murad towards the
cause of reform, and very averse to taking a plunge in the dark, leant
to the opinion that patience should be exercised and reasonable time
given for the recovery of the Sultan’s health.
But another and very active party had in the meantime been formed, of
which Damad Mahmoud Djelaleddin Pasha (the Sultan’s brother‐in‐law)
was the moving spirit, and which included, together with some high
Palace officials, one or two of the influential marshals, such as Redif
Pasha, the commander of the Constantinople _corps d’armée_ and under
the influence of Damad Mahmoud Djelaleddin. This party—as far as it
could be said to have been based on any particular political opinions,
and not on the simple ground of ambition and the desire to exercise a
preponderating influence in the future _régime_—consisted of the men
who had acquiesced, and even participated, in the dethronement of the
late Sultan, but did not share, and some of them were even bitterly
opposed to, the constitutional views advocated by Midhat and the
reforming party. Borne along by the current of events which they would
have been impotent to resist, they would have constituted a helpless
minority in the State without power or influence, if they had had to
do with a reforming Sultan on the throne, a palace where men like Zia
Bey, and Kemal Bey were the guiding spirits, and the party of reform in
strong possession of the Porte. The prospect, however, of being able
to change the occupant of the throne and place their own candidate
upon it afforded them the precious opportunity of upsetting the whole
edifice of reform, of themselves seizing the chief power of the State,
and turning the revolution that had been accomplished to their own
exclusive advantage. It was less a victory of reaction than a triumph
of ambition.
Damad Mahmoud Djelaleddin was a very ignorant and uncultivated man,
and though careless and without a conviction in respect to political
opinions, he enjoyed the reputation of being neither careless nor
indifferent with respect to matters of personal or pecuniary concern to
himself. On the other hand, he was endowed with great, almost brutal,
determination of character, and was utterly reckless as to the means
of carrying out his ends. His position of Damad (brother‐in‐law to the
Sultan) gave him great influence in the Palace, and at the same time
secured him weight in the Councils of the State. He was the very soul
of the anti‐reform conspiracy.
Having described Damad Mahmoud Djelaleddin, the character of his
lieutenant, Redif Pasha, can be described in a sentence: he was Damad
Mahmoud _in petto_. Whatever qualities distinguished the master were
conspicuous in the lieutenant, and only in a less degree, inasmuch
as he was physically of a somewhat less robust nature. He had, like
Mahmoud, lent himself with all the weight of his military position to
the dethronement of Abdul Aziz, but he viewed with an evil eye the
advance of reform, and still more the triumph of the reformers.
These two men practically constituted the central power of the
conspiracy, for those who co‐operated with them were scarcely admitted
into the inner councils or secret plans of the Duumvirate, although
themselves the willing participators in the conspiracy.
Among them was Djevdet Pasha, Minister of Justice, who, during all the
stirring events of the Vizierate of Mehemet Rushdi, had been lying low
in the Cabinet waiting for the opportune moment to show his colours and
take part in the overthrow of the ministry.
Whilst enumerating the instruments of Mahmoud’s ambition, it would be
impossible to omit the names of two other men who, although they had
not yet emerged into the notoriety which they were soon to enjoy, were
indispensable tools of Mahmoud’s ambition, and powerfully contributed
to the success of his plans. These were the two Saïds. The one was
brother‐in‐law of Mahmoud, and destined for the important post of
first aide‐de‐camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. He was generally known
as “Ingless Saïd Pasha,” for his having been educated at Woolwich,
and though entirely wanting in initiative or political convictions,
was naturally of a frank and loyal disposition, not deficient in
energy, and an invaluable coadjutor in carrying out the views of his
brother‐in‐law. With Redif Pasha he formed the third member of the
Triumvirate, which Mahmoud intended should, during the succeeding
reign, govern the country. The other Saïd, of whom a great deal more
will have to be said hereafter, was known, on account of his small
stature, as “Saïd Kutchouk” (small), and when he reaches the dignity of
Pasha, it will be necessary to distinguish him from the other Saïd by
this appellation. He was supposed to be the _âme damnée_ of Mahmoud,
especially by Mahmoud himself, who destined him for the important
confidential post of First Secretary to the Sultan.
Without any doubt, Damad’s plans were well conceived, and his net was
well spread. The post of Vice‐Sultan he reserved for himself.
Behind these were marshalled the whole phalanx of Reaction, and the
Konak of Mahmoud become the Cave of Adullam of all the malcontents.
The means of action were not wanting to the conspirators in this
respect; indeed, the material to their hand was only too abundant.
A sovereign of unsound mind is not recognised by the Ottoman
Constitution. The girding of the Padishah with the sword of Osman, as
an essential part of the ceremony of investiture, was to the Ottoman
sovereigns what the sacred oil of Rheims was to the kings of France,
and this ceremony had not taken place.
No Sultan, moreover, had ever before absented himself from attendance
at the mosque on Friday, and the Selamlik that follows. The public
anxiety and excitement on the subject were genuine and universal.
Public affairs, too, were suffering: the Constitution was, in a double
sense, suspended; the new Constitution could not be promulgated,
and the old Constitution, such as it was, could not be worked; the
mainspring of the machinery of State was deranged. Foreign diplomacy,
too, was beginning to take an active part in the matter. The
ambassadors and envoys from foreign States were asking to whom, and
when, they could present their credentials. The Russian Embassy—that
seemed to have better information relative to Prince Hamid’s character
than Ministers themselves—was particularly persistent and active in
this respect. It was evident that the crisis could not be indefinitely
prolonged.
In these circumstances, it was resolved by Ministers that Midhat should
go to Muslou‐Oglou, where Prince Hamid, heir presumptive to the throne,
resided, in order to ascertain by a personal interview with him whether
Ministers could rely on his co‐operation to carry out the important
reforms that they had in hand, should it become absolutely necessary to
remove Murad from the throne, and in that event, to agree to certain
clear and definite stipulations with the Prince as conditions of their
support.
These stipulations were the following:—
1. To promulgate without delay the new Constitution.
2. To act in matters of State only with the advice of his responsible
advisers.
3. To appoint Zia Bey and Kemal Bey his private secretaries, and to
make Sadullah Bey the head of the Palace Secretariat.
The importance attached by Midhat and Rushdi to this last condition
was very great. It afforded a guarantee against those intrigues of
the Palace which had ship‐wrecked so many schemes of reform, and
prevented, so far as was possible, a renewal of that mute opposition
between the Palace and the Porte which had existed for centuries, and
had paralysed the efforts of so many Ministers.
At this historical interview at Muslou‐Oglou Prince Hamid evidently
“played a deep game” with Midhat Pasha. He promised all and more than
all that was asked of him. He pretended to opinions more advanced
than the most advanced of his Ministers, and in favour of even a more
democratic Constitution than the one elaborated. The other condition he
accepted without demur.
On receiving these clear and emphatic declarations, Midhat returned
to Stamboul and reported the result of his interview to the assembled
Ministers, who thereupon resolved to take the decisive step and put
Prince Hamid on the throne in the place of his brother Murad.
As on the occasion of the dethronement of the Sultan Abdul Aziz, it was
necessary to obtain a _Fetva_ from the Sheik‐ul‐Islam to the effect
that the contemplated step was in accordance with the Sacred Law.
Mehemet Rushdi thereupon demanded an official report from six principal
physicians in Constantinople—of whom four belonged to the Embassies of
the Great Powers—who, after examination of Murad, handed to him the
following certificates:—
“On the 31st of the month August, 1876, Chaban 11: 1293 Hegira, we
have made a report on the health of His Majesty Sultan Murad, and
come to certain conclusions which we hereby confirm, and add thereto
the following opinion, viz. that even should the Sultan Murad after a
long lapse of time, contrary to expectation, recover his intellectual
faculties, these can never recover their normal condition.”
“(Signed) CASTRO.
AKIF.
DICKSON, _Physician to English Embassy_.
MARROIN, _Physician to French Embassy_.
MUHLIG, _Physician to German Embassy_.
SOTTO, _Physician to Austro‐Hungarian Embassy_.”
Thereupon Mehemet Rushdi made a speech to the people gathered together
to hear the report of these physicians at the Palace of Top‐Kapou.
“Our sovereign, the Emperor Murad,” he said, “has been enabled
to reign for only twelve days, but during that time he has been
afflicted with an illness which, in spite of all the efforts of human
science, has shown no amendment. His intellectual faculties are
in a state of great feebleness, and the physicians pronounce them
incurable. Nevertheless we have waited for the expiration of the
legal delay, and this delay has now expired. This is the sum total
of the truth of the matter. Let us be informed of what, under such
circumstances, the law of the Cheri dictates.”
The assembled crowd expressed its sense of the justice of these words,
and the Sheik‐ul‐Islam, Hassan Hairullah, gave the following _Fetva_:—
“If the Commander of the Faithful is suffering from mental
alienation and if the exercise of his function is thereby rendered
impracticable, can he be deposed?
“Answer: The Cheri says ‘Yes.’
“(Signed) HASSAN HAIRULLAH,
“To whom God grant His indulgence.
“12 _Chaban_ 1293, _Hegira_.”
(1_st September_ 1876.)