MIDHAT’S EARLY YEARS
MIDHAT was born at Constantinople in 1822. His father, Hadji Ali
Effendi, was a native of Rustchuk, and gave his son the usual education
provided by the local schools, until he was of an age to follow him in
his different displacements, first to Widdin and Lofdja, and afterwards
to Constantinople in 1836. A few years after this he obtained a
position in the Secretariat of the Grand Vizier’s office, whence he was
promoted to superior employment in the provinces. He remained two years
at Damascus, and then, after a short interval spent in Constantinople,
he proceeded, in 1844, to Konia, as secretary to Sami Bekir Pasha’s
Council. In 1849 he was nominated to the Presidency of the
_Medjlissi‐Vala_ (Grand Council of State) and promoted to the rank of
Sanie, which is the first rank in the Ottoman hierarchy, and in 1851
to that of Mutemaiz, with the functions of First Secretary to the
Grand Council.
Soon after this, difficulties in the provinces of Damascus and
Aleppo, connected with the Custom House, and with the conduct of
the Commander‐in‐Chief of the Army of Arabia, Kibrissli Mehemet
Pasha, necessitated the despatch of a public functionary with full
power to inquire into the irregularities, civil and military, which
were notorious in those provinces. Midhat was chosen for this
important and confidential mission. In the space of six months he
settled the question of the Customs in favour of the Government,
by which the sum in dispute, £T150,000, was restored to the Ottoman
Treasury, and a further surplus of £70,000 was secured. He further
fixed the responsibility for the insurrection of the Druses on the
Commander‐in‐Chief, Kibrissli Mehemet Pasha, and recommended his recall.
The courage and capacity of which Midhat gave proof in this mission
attracted to him the attention of the Grand Vizier of the day, the
famous Reshid Pasha, who appointed him to a confidential post in the
Superior Council of the State, which he occupied during the successive
Grand Vizierates of Reshid, Aali, and Great Rifat Pashas. This may be
considered the initiation of Midhat into political, as distinguished
from administrative, life. It was in this post that he assisted, in
1852, at the historical interview between Rifat Pasha, Turkish Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Mentchikoff, the special envoy of the
Emperor Nicholas, in the negotiations that preceded the Crimean War.
In 1854, Kibrissli Mehemet Pasha, who in consequence of Midhat’s
report had been dismissed from the command of the Syrian Army Corps,
became Grand Vizier. He now charged Midhat with the difficult and
delicate mission of pacifying the disturbed provinces of Adrianople
and the Balkans, and clearing them of the brigandage that infested
them. The organising genius of Midhat proved equal to the task. He
suppressed brigandage with a strong hand, and by restoring tranquillity
in this district he deprived the neighbouring States of all pretexts
for chronic complaints. To prevent the return of trouble he further
elaborated a whole plan of re‐organisation, which he submitted to the
approval of the Government at Constantinople, where Reshid Pasha had
again become Grand Vizier. The draft of this plan arrived at the
very time that Reshid and Aali Pashas were engaged in drawing up
regulations for the government of the _Eyalets_ (provinces), with a
view to their decentralisation. Midhat’s plan was accepted, and it
was decided that he should be nominated to the governorship of the
important province of the Danube (Bulgaria), when suddenly another
change of Ministry at Constantinople delayed the execution of the whole
plan of reform. In the meantime an appalling earthquake at Broussa had
caused terrible damage in that important city and much misery among
its inhabitants. Midhat was now despatched thither with a mission to
succour sufferers and to help to restore confidence among the terrified
inhabitants.
On his return from Broussa he was despatched as special commissioner
to inspect the provinces of Widdin and Silistria, which were in open
rebellion against the central authorities. Here Midhat, as he had
previously done in Syria, made a detailed report, pointing out the
faulty administration of the provinces, and fearlessly inculpating the
two Valis (governors).
This discharge of a public duty was met by the usual manœuvres of
inculpated Pashas. Their friends at the Palace bestirred themselves in
their favour, and induced the Sultan to reject the proposals of Midhat,
and to send a well‐known Ulema at Constantinople, Haireddin Effendi, to
the two vilayets in question, to make a further report in verification
or contradiction of that of Midhat. To the confusion and disappointment
of the friends of the incriminated Valis, Haireddin Effendi made a
report in every way confirming the views and recommendations, and
emphasizing the accusations of Midhat.
At this time (1858) Reshid Pasha died, and Aali Pasha, his successor,
obtained six months’ leave of absence for Midhat, to be spent in
travelling in Europe, with a view to the study of certain points
of European administration with which he desired to make himself
acquainted. Paris, London, Vienna, and Brussels were successively
visited in this short period of time, and much valuable information
obtained, both as to the spirit and working of European governments.
Midhat had by this time already acquired a certain reputation as a
successful provincial governor and whenever trouble in the empire
declared itself, his name recurred as a fit and proper person to be
despatched as special envoy or governor to pacify the province in
question. Kibrissli Mehemet Pasha had now again become Grand Vizier,
and as trouble of a serious kind had for some time been brewing in
the vilayet of Nish (Servia), where, in spite of the presence of an
imposing force of regular and irregular troops, insecurity of life and
property was rampant, and an alarming emigration of the inhabitants was
taking place, he nominated Midhat to the Governorship of this important
province (1861).
Midhat resolved to make an attempt to pacify the province without the
use of armed force, and to gain the confidence of the Bulgarians by
the redress of their just grievances. His first step was to invite the
notabilities of the different districts to conferences, to state their
complaints, and attentively examine with him the remedies that should
be applied. These grievances practically resolved themselves into two:
(1) the entire absence of roads and other means of intercommunication,
which made it impossible for the inhabitants—exclusively cultivators
of the soil—to find markets for their produce; (2) the rampant
brigandage that everywhere existed, rendering life and property
insecure. These two causes, it was, that induced the emigration into
Servia, which was assuming large proportions, where the Bulgarians
found among their fellow‐Slavs both greater security and more
favourable conditions of labour.
Midhat readily acknowledged the justice and reasonableness of these
complaints, and proceeded to strike a bargain with the notables. They
were to undertake to use their influence to pacify the country and
discourage emigration for two years, and Midhat engaged within this
time to carry out the reforms and improvements that were mutually
agreed upon between them. Midhat strictly carried out the terms of this
agreement. He ordered the troops back to their barracks, commenced
the great high road between Nish and Sofia with the byroads connected
with it, and by means of military patrols sent out in every direction,
brigandage very soon entirely disappeared from the country. Roads were
now being laid out in every direction, and bridges constructed over
the Morava and other rivers, so as to meet the requirements of an
agricultural population, and facilitate the outlet for their produce.
An elaborate system of block‐houses all along the Servian frontier put
an end to the incursions of armed bands of Servians, which had long
fostered and sustained disturbance in the province, and many Bulgarian
families who had emigrated into Servia now began to return to their
former habitations. Concurrently with these material ameliorations,
Midhat occupied himself with the solution of other economical and
moral problems that concerned the well‐being of the community. The
relations between proprietors and tenants of the soil had long been in
an unsatisfactory condition. Midhat convoked representatives of both
these classes to a conference, and with much pains, and after long
discussions, he succeeded in finding a means of reconciliation between
their opposing pretensions, to the satisfaction of both parties.
At Prisrend, in that part of the provinces inhabited by the Arnauts,
he was confronted with problems of a peculiar nature. Here a vendetta
(similar to the Corsican vendetta) existed among the unruly
mountaineers of Albanian descent. Midhat, faithful to his system of
working hand in hand with the inhabitants themselves, convoked an
assembly of notables of the district, and with their co‐operation, and
by their own initiative, instituted a permanent commission to settle
money compositions for bloodshed, and by this means he succeeded in
suppressing a vendetta that had existed for centuries among this brave
but unruly people. He further induced them to give up the practice
of carrying arms, and, for the first time in the history of the
provinces, to submit to Imperial conscription; he further organised
a _gendarmerie_, secured the peaceful collection of taxes, and put
an end to all religious persecution; schools, too, were established,
and hospitals for members of all religious denominations without
distinction. Thus the vilayets of Nish and Prisrend gradually recovered
the full enjoyment of tranquillity and peace, and Christians and
Mussulmans alike began to enjoy the prospect of returning prosperity.
In the provinces of Widdin and Silistria the problem of pacification
was complicated by a factor which rendered the solution far more
difficult. Here the continued and systematic interference of Russia by
means of her consuls and agents, supported by the Russian ambassador
at Constantinople, working hand in hand with the agents of the Slav
Committees, who were overrunning the country and preaching the gospel
of rebellion, created quite a new set of problems to be dealt with.
It was no longer local grievances to be redressed, but a political
propagandism to be faced.
Aali and Fuad Pashas, the successors of Reshid Pasha, appreciating the
administrative and reforming talents of Midhat, summoned him in 1864
to Constantinople, to consider with them a general organic law for
the government of the provinces of the empire (_loi des vilayets_),
and it was there resolved that the vilayets of Silistria, Widdin,
and Nish should be combined into a single government under the name
of the “Vilayet of the Danube,” and entrusted to Midhat. The Imperial
sanction to this appointment and to the organic reforms proposed was
obtained (in 1865) in spite of the opposition of the reactionary party
in Constantinople, headed by the Sheik‐ul‐Islam of the day, Saadeddine
Effendi, strenuously backed by Sourrouri Effendi Naib, an avowed
enemy of the new Vali, whom we shall meet with later on figuring, as
a reward for his zeal, and in acknowledgment of his impartiality, as
the President of the tribunal that tried and condemned Midhat. But the
influence of Fuad Pasha was sufficient to overcome all such opposition,
and Midhat forthwith entered upon his new and important functions.
It will be sufficient to give a summary account of the radical reforms
introduced by the new Vali in the government of this important province.
The whole vilayet was divided into seven distinct _sandjaks_
(districts), the sandjak into _cazas_ (cantons), and the cazas into
_nahies_ (communes), and in each of these centres councils were created
for the levying of taxes and local administration of the district.
Forced labour (_corvée_) was abolished; bridges to the number of
1400 were constructed; and 3000 kilometres (circ. 2000 miles) of
roads constructed; brigandage was effectually stamped out and a local
_gendarmerie_ raised, and agricultural banks, with a view of relieving
the small farmer from the exactions of the usurer, established. The
capital for these purposes was procured by an ingenious system, founded
on the cultivation of the public and waste lands, by which not only was
relief given to distressed and needy agriculturists, but a local fund
was created for important local improvements. Agriculture, the staple
industry of the inhabitants, soon began to flourish in consequence of
these wise and energetic measures, and with agriculture the affiliated
industries and commerce of the country. The navigation of the Danube,
the great artery of the province, next engaged the attention of the
Pasha, and soon two, and then four, vessels, flying the Ottoman flag
for the first time, made their appearance on this river. A postal
service was likewise started, and through the initiative of the
governor a manufactory of carriages established at Rustchuk, which
at the end of the very first year paid a dividend of 10 per cent.
Charitable institutions too were not neglected, and orphan asylums for
Christian and Mahomedan children alike were constructed at Rustchuk and
Sofia, and the pupils initiated in trades and industries.
The key of all these reforms, and the cardinal principle of this
administration, was to work hand in hand with the local authorities.
By their aid the valuation of all property held in the respective
districts was carried out equitably and fairly, and taxes founded
on this assessment were levied without complaint; and although the
salaries of responsible officials, such as the police and judges, were
considerably increased, and many vexatious taxes abolished, the new
revenue of the province showed a considerable and increasing surplus.
The prosperity of this large province under its new administrator could
not fail to attract the attention of the authorities at Constantinople,
and Midhat now received the congratulations both of the Sultan and
of the Sublime Porte. An Imperial Irade, moreover, enjoined all the
governors of the other provinces of the empire to apply in their
respective vilayets the same reforms that Midhat had introduced in
that of the Danube, a detailed plan and description of which had been
forwarded to Constantinople by Rifat Effendi, the secretary of the
vilayet (subsequently Grand Vizier).
So far everything seemed to go well, and a new era of prosperity seemed
about to dawn for the provinces of the empire generally. It is worth
while for those who really desire to obtain an inside view of the
working of Turkish absolutism, and to discern the secret springs that
move the Government of Turkey, and make themselves acquainted with the
hidden causes that have time after time wrecked the hopes of Turkish
reformers, to follow attentively what we are now about to relate, on
the authority, be it noted, of one in a position, if any one was, to
know the truth and put his fingers on the plague‐spot.
Midhat felt that his work would not be complete, nor would the return
of material prosperity suffice to attach his province permanently
to the Government of the Sultan, unless he applied himself as well
to the moral side of the problem and succeeded in counteracting the
manœuvres of the enemies of the empire to sow disaffection in the
minds of the youth of the province. One of the most effective devices
contrived by them with this view was the plan, pursued for many
years, of sending large numbers of Bulgarian youths to carry on their
studies at the Russian universities of Odessa, Kharkoff, and Kieff,
and these, on their return, became the chiefs of the staffs of the
active propagandists of Panslavic ideas among the youths of Bulgaria.
These missionaries of disaffection constituted one of the most serious
dangers to Ottoman sovereignty, and one of the most difficult problems
to deal with. Midhat determined to grapple with it, and with this view
he determined to establish in the principal centres of the province
schools and universities where the Bulgarian youths, Christians and
Mussulmans alike, should enjoy all the advantages of a first‐class
modern education without having to seek it abroad. The incidental
advantage of a fusion of Christian and Mussulman elements in the
country, under the inspiring influence of a common education, at an
age when friendships are most easily formed and generous sentiments
evoked, did not escape the sagacity of Midhat. The whole project
was explained by him in a detailed report to the Sublime Porte, the
expenses being provided half by the surplus revenues of the province,
and the rest by voluntary subscriptions.
When this project was made known at Constantinople, the person who most
readily seized the full import of it was General Ignatieff, the Russian
ambassador. It went directly counter to all the most cherished plans
and projects of the Panslavic party, of which he was the moving spirit.
There was nothing that he did not do to wreck the plan and upset the
Pasha. Unfortunately the nature of an absolute government and the
character of an Eastern autocrat afforded him ample means of action.
The interference of a foreign ambassador in the internal economy of a
province of the empire had nothing in it which appeared abnormal or
impertinent; such interference was consecrated by long usage and had
become chronic and accepted. Ignatieff began by representing to the
sovereign that the spirit of the reforms effected by Midhat in his
vilayet, especially the institution of local councils (which was of
the very essence of the reforms introduced), were in direct opposition
to the spirit of absolutism, and that the result would infallibly be
that little by little the province itself would become detached from
the body of the empire, and would claim its entire independence, as had
already happened in the case of Egypt. It is not certain, however, that
the ambassador would have gained his point, even with a sovereign so
tenacious of his prerogatives as was Abdul Aziz, had not an unfortunate
error of typography, eagerly seized on and exploited by Ignatieff,
played into the hands of the ambassador. In a passage of the official
journal of the province, the term “deputies” was inadvertently applied
to the members of the chief council of the vilayet. This apparently
trivial circumstance, the slip of a typographist, was sufficient to
turn the scale in the Sultan’s mind and to wreck the project. Abdul
Aziz refused his consent to the proposal, on the obviously insincere
pretext of the expense connected with it. Thus this crowning act of
Midhat’s work, the reform which above all others was calculated to
attach the Bulgarians to the central government and to destroy a
nest of disaffectation in the province, was defeated by a foreign
ambassador playing on the ignorant susceptibilities and autocratic
instincts of the sovereign of the country. If this were a single and
exceptional example of the working of autocracy, it might be passed
over in comparative silence, however regrettable it was in this
particular instance; but the whole modern history of Turkey shows
that such intervention was nothing less than a system of statecraft
whereby autocracy was cunningly worked for the ruin of the country in
as certain and deadly a way as was the _Liberum Veto_ of the Polish
constitution. The spontaneous caprices and whims of an autocrat are the
least part of the baneful effects of autocracy; it is in the shadows
that flit behind the throne, stronger than the throne itself, working
systematically on the ignorance and fears of the autocrat, with settled
purpose and in pursuit of settled plans, that lies, in the East at any
rate, the real curse of absolutism.
Simultaneously with this diplomatic action at Constantinople, order
was given to the Panslavic Committees established at Bucharest and
Kichenew to prepare for action in the field. Midhat’s agents had kept
him informed of the revival of agitation entertained by the agents of
these committees among the Bulgarian peasants, and he lost no time in
transmitting this information to the Porte.
[Illustration: 6 7 4 2 1 3 5
MIDHAT PASHA AND HIS SUITE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
DANUBE.
1. Midhat Pasha.
2. “Inspecteur de la Cour Judiciare.”
3. “Juge du Cheri.”
4. Adib Effendi, Minister of Customs (1889).
5. Rifat Pasha, Grand Vizier (1897).
6. Raïf Pasha, Minister (1890).
7. Chakir Pasha, “Maréchal” (1878).]
On the 2nd May, 1867, Midhat received the following telegram from
Sistovo:—“Last night numerous armed bands crossed the frontier close
to Sistovo, and were immediately joined by other bands who were waiting
for them on this side of the frontier, and early this morning they
commenced operations by the horrible mutilation of five Mussulman
children, aged from eight to twelve, who were tending sheep on the
plains.”
The object and purpose of these barbarities was obvious: it was to
excite reprisals on the part of the Mussulman population, which would
afford a pretext to the enemies of the empire to fill Europe with an
outcry against Turkish barbarity and fanaticism. The same policy,
heralded by the same acts, ruthlessly pursued later on, did produce the
desired effect, and Bulgarian atrocities became a proverb and byword in
the world; but on this occasion the energy of Midhat, and the patience
and forbearance of the Mussulman population, defeated the purpose of
the conspirators. Midhat, immediately on receiving the above telegram,
embarked two companies of regulars on board a steamer and despatched
them to Sistovo, whither he accompanied them himself. He found the
whole population, Christian and Mussulman, in a state of the greatest
excitement, and his first care was to calm the effervescence and to
inspire confidence in the energy and resolution of the authorities.
The plan of the insurgents was to push on as rapidly as they could to
the Balkans, increasing their forces as they went along by the native
levies which had been organised by the committees for this purpose,
until they reached the monastery of Kapanbova, where a large _dépôt_ of
arms had been collected, and which was intended to be the headquarters
of the insurrection.
The presence of four battalions of regulars at Capriova prevented
the execution of this plan, and after suffering several defeats in
the field, the bands dispersed in various directions, closely pursued
by the troops and the local levies that had joined them. Midhat now
instituted a special tribunal, composed of six Mussulmans and six
Christian judges, to try the rebel prisoners, and the evidence given by
the prisoners themselves, clearly demonstrated that the invading bands
had been equipped and sent out by the Slav Committees of Bucharest
and Kichenew, and were acting in unison with corresponding committees
established throughout the province. By the unanimous vote of this
tribunal, sentences of death were passed on the leaders, and penal
servitude and minor punishment, according to their status and degree of
culpability, on all the rebels taken in arms. By these energetic means
the insurrection was effectually stamped out and tranquillity restored
to the province.
An outcry, however, was quickly raised in the European Press against
the “methods of barbarism” adopted to repress the insurrection, and the
Pasha was accused of ultra severity against Christian insurgents and
reprehensible leniency towards Mussulman offenders.
So far from this latter accusation having any real foundation, the
very composition of the special tribunal appointed to deal with
these troubles was a guarantee of its impartiality. Moreover, the
following fact will afford an example of the impunity enjoyed by the
Mahomedan criminals. In the course of these troubles two dead bodies of
Christians were found in a field near Biscara; a judicial investigation
was immediately ordered on the spot, and the result was that the
evidence pointed to a sergeant of _gendarmerie_, a Mussulman of the
name of Mehemet Tchavouch, as having committed the murder. Pressed
by questions Mehemet made a full confession, and he was thereupon
condemned to death and forthwith executed.
Midhat now turned his attention to the best means of anticipating
and guarding against similar raids and insurrections in the future.
He knew well that the central revolutionary committees at Bucharest
and Kichenew would not disarm, but would simply watch for a more
favourable opportunity to put their plans into execution. To garrison
the whole frontier with regular troops would expose the province
to large expenditure, and the troops, when called upon to act, to
calumny and misrepresentation. He accordingly conceived the plan of
organising a local militia of 40,000 men, recruited from all classes
of the population, Christian and Mussulman alike, to whom the defence
of their own localities should be entrusted, and they were to be
indemnified if called upon to act beyond the boundaries of their
district. By this means a cheap and effective force was provided
against all contingencies, and at the same time the confidence reposed
in the loyalty of the population generally received a conspicuous
demonstration. The defence of the line of the Danube was secured
in a similar manner. A succession of guard‐houses was established
throughout the length of the river, and their defence confided to a
river‐guard recruited equally from the Christian and Mussulman riverine
population.
So ingenious was the plan of organisation, that the term of service
for each guardsman did not exceed one month in ten years. The arms and
equipments were provided by voluntary subscription raised from all the
inhabitants of the province.
During all this time the greater the energy shown by Midhat in the
organisation, development and defence of this frontier province of the
empire, the greater became the determination of the Slav Committees to
undo and defeat his work.
After the late exploits of these committees in Bulgaria, Midhat had
organised a system of surveillance at the headquarters of these
committees, and information having reached him that emissaries had been
despatched from Galatz to Belgrade in order to organise a new raid
into Bulgaria, he ordered these emissaries to be closely watched and
followed in all their movements. On their embarkation at Rustchuk, on
board the Austrian vessel _Germania_, he sent photographs of them to
the Austrian Consul, with a request that the Ottoman authorities should
be allowed to examine the passports of the passengers. Accompanied
by an Austrian Consular Agent the Turkish authorities accordingly
proceeded on board, where they were immediately received by shots
from revolvers on the part of the two suspected agents, who had
barricaded themselves in the saloon of the vessel, and had determined
to resist arrest. After an indescribable scene of confusion among the
panic‐stricken passengers aboard, the Turkish _gendarmerie_, acting
with the consent of the Consul, succeeded in effecting the capture of
the agents, who were both mortally wounded in the encounter.
The capture of these revolutionary agents made a great noise in Europe.
General Ignatieff at Constantinople, seized on the circumstance as a
pretext to demand the recall of Midhat, accompanying the Servian Agent
to the Palace in the audience accorded to the latter, whose complaints
were founded on the fact that one of the captured agents was a Servian.
Midhat’s influence, however, was still in the ascendant, and these
intrigues remained for a time without effect.
Other means failing, a desperate and criminal attempt was now made
to get rid of this too energetic Pasha. Two attempts to assassinate
him followed in quick succession, the first at Rustchuk, where the
overseer of the training school fired a shot, fortunately without
effect, on the Pasha as he was walking in the school enclosure; and
the other by a Servian, who attempted to enter his service with the
view to assassinating him, and who made a full confession seriously
compromising two important personages in Servia. He was sent to
Constantinople, tried, and condemned to penal servitude for life, in
spite of the strenuous efforts of General Ignatieff in his favour.
Not very long after these stirring events (1868) Midhat was summoned
to Constantinople, where he was placed at the head of the Council of
State, and he was succeeded in the governorship of the province, for
which he had done so much, by Sabri Pasha, the deputy‐governor of Nish.
As President of the Council, Midhat marked his short tenure of that
office by the institution of a school of Arts and Sciences at Sultan
Ahmed, in Stamboul, and by the establishment of a bank for loans, with
the special purpose of relieving small employers from the tyranny of
usurers. This bank (Emniet Sandighie) still exists. It soon, however,
became obvious to Midhat that his system of usefulness in his new
ministerial position was strictly limited; his authority in matters
pertaining to his own office was constantly overruled on important
matters, especially those concerning finance, by the Grand Vizier,
acting on the authority of the Sultan, and this incompatibility of
views culminated on the question of Turkish railways, whereupon Midhat
insisted on resigning. Just at this time Nakieddine Pasha was dismissed
from the governorship of the province of Bagdad, and Midhat was
appointed Vali of Bagdad (1869).
Hardly had the new Vali reached his post, when he found himself
confronted with some difficult problems of quite a different order
from those he had dealt with on the Danube, but of a not less serious
description. The question of recruiting was the most urgent, and called
for immediate solution. The Arab tribes, turbulent and independent by
nature, had always shown themselves refractory to enlistment, and were
now in open revolt against its enforcement. One of the difficulties
of the situation consisted in the fact that the military authority
in the province was separated from the civil, and was in the hands
of the commander of the 6th Army Corps, Samih Pasha, whereas the
situation required all authority, military as well as civil, to be
concentrated in the hands of a single strong central authority. Midhat
did not hesitate at such a crisis to assume the full responsibility
of this concentration, and took immediate military steps to suppress
the insurrection by force. He ordered the city of Bagdad to be
surrounded by cavalry, and sent infantry and artillery to protect
the foreign Mission Houses and the non‐Mussulman quarters from the
fanaticism of the Arabs. He at the same time ordered the bridge over
the Tigris to be cut, so as to prevent intercommunication among the
rebels; and when these energetic measures had fairly intimidated the
Arabs, he offered them a general amnesty on condition of immediate
surrender. These conditions were now accepted, and the insurrection
suddenly collapsed, and no further resistance was offered to the
recruiting. The promptitude with which this dangerous rebellion was
suppressed was appreciated by the Porte, and a telegram was received
from Constantinople approving the measures he had taken, and placing
officially the supreme command of the 6th Army Corps in his hands.
The next serious difficulty was connected with the levying of taxes.
This had always been a difficult operation among the nomad tribes, of
which the population in a great measure consisted, and was the cause of
continual disputes and insurrections. Matters had, however, now reached
a crisis, for a colonel at the head of a battalion of regulars sent to
Divanie and Dogara to collect the tithes was surrounded by tribesmen
to the number of ten thousand men, and himself killed and his troops
killed or dispersed. The new Vali seized at once the seriousness of
the situation, for the encouragement which this success afforded the
tribesmen threatened to give rise to a general insurrection of all the
surrounding nomads.
It was necessary to avenge the defeat at once and to make a signal
example of the tribesmen concerned. Midhat accordingly ordered a large
force, consisting of seven battalions of infantry, four thousand
cavalry, with a complement of artillery, to proceed directly to Dogara,
under the command of Samih Pasha, whilst with three thousand chosen
troops he hastened himself to the disaffected district. A pitched
battle now took place between the Arabs and the troops, which resulted
in the complete defeat of the former and the capture of their chief.
A not unusual incident accompanied the close of the battle. A Shiite
Sheik, Abdul Kerim, was marching at the head of a considerable force
of tribesmen from the Shiite districts of Urfa and Aleppo to join the
rebels, when he received the news of their defeat. Pretending that he
was on the road to offer his services to the Government, he joined his
forces to those of the Vali, and accompanied the victorious troops on
their entry into Bagdad. A military tribunal was at once instituted to
try the rebels; the rebel chiefs were condemned and executed, but the
tribesmen, on the promise of future good behaviour, were released.
Midhat Pasha clearly discerned that if an end was to be put to these
chronic troubles, and these nomad tribes were to be reduced to anything
like permanent order, it was not sufficient to defeat them in battle,
and that a radical change had to be brought about in their general
status, and especially the conditions of land tenure in the country.
The Arab cultivator, for the most part, held his lands from the State
on the condition of giving three‐fourths of the produce to the State,
retaining one‐fourth for himself. Such a system naturally discouraged
agriculture and rendered all improvements in cultivation impossible.
The consequence was that, for the most part, the Arab shunned the
soil, preferring predatory to industrial modes of gaining his living.
Midhat determined to attach him to the soil by giving him rights of
proprietorship, and divided large tracts of land into plots, which were
offered for sale on easy and advantageous terms, special provision
being made against accumulation of plots into single hands. The success
of this policy was remarkable, and whereas the revenues of the State
increased, the turbulence of the tribesmen, and the risings which had
become chronic, greatly diminished.
The agricultural prosperity that resulted from these measures
stimulated other branches of industry and rendered it necessary to
provide outlets for the newly created surplus of the country. The
first step in this direction was to render navigable the Tigris and
Euphrates, the great arteries of the country, and to improve or create
the means of communication between their two banks, and between the
different towns situated along their course. The only service of the
kind that existed consisted of the boats of an English company plying
between Bagdad and Bussora. Midhat determined to start a service of
Turkish boats to supply adequately the needs now felt, in the same
way that he had formerly done on the Danube when he was Governor of
Bulgaria. He ordered the existing vessels to be repaired, new vessels
of a larger tonnage to be constructed, and coal _dépôts_ to be formed
at Mascat, Aden, Bender and Bushire; and now, for the first time in
history, steamers under the Ottoman flag were to be seen periodically
in the Suez Canal, on their way to Constantinople. The _Babel_, one of
these vessels, which had originally cost £T88,000 for construction,
was bought for the sum of £T33,000 from a bankrupt company, and
on its very first voyage between Constantinople and Bussora, which
coincided with the time of the pilgrimages, it cleared £T35,000—more
than sufficient to cover its purchase price. A net surplus of £T1000
a month resulted from this improved river navigation, and Midhat now
determined on extensive dredging works, with a view to extending the
navigation northwards and adapting it to vessels of a larger tonnage.
Chakir Bey (afterwards Marshal and Ambassador to St Petersburg, and one
of Midhat’s faithful partisans) was despatched north with a company
of engineers, and reported favourably on the enterprise. Thereupon
dredging and other engineering works were immediately ordered to be
undertaken.
The periodical overflow of the waters of the Euphrates had converted
large tracts of country into marshes, and marsh fevers in consequence
becoming endemic, rendered them uninhabitable. Drainage works on a
large scale, with a view of reclaiming these lands and of curing the
insalubrity, were also undertaken. Irrigation works were likewise
started, and much attention was devoted to this subject by the Pasha,
with a view to gradually restoring the system introduced by the first
Arab conquerors, which had converted this country into the Garden of
the East, and rendered the Caliphate of Bagdad proverbial for its
wealth and prosperity. A tramway, too, between Bagdad and Kiazimie was
constructed, and its entire length, 7 miles, completed within a year. A
textile manufactory, too, was started, and an engine of 70-h.p. ordered
in France, the despatch of which was only delayed by the breaking out
of the Franco‐German War (1870).
Whilst energetically pursuing these material improvements, Midhat
Pasha was far from neglecting the moral side of the problem of Reform.
Schools were opened in every district; hospitals, refuges for old age,
and loan banks everywhere arose, and a printing‐press established
where the newspaper _Zora_ was published, and municipal institutions
for lighting and watering and other local purposes were instituted in
all the principal centres. A petroleum spring discovered in the vilayet
was immediately utilised for public purposes. It was not too much to
hope that a decade of such enlightened government would have repaired
the neglect of centuries and restored their ancient prosperity to the
rich valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates.
In 1870 the Shah of Persia, accompanied by a numerous suite, came
to visit the holy places of Nejef and Kerbela, and although the
province had to support the whole expense of this costly visit,
amounting to over £T30,000, Midhat Pasha determined to give the royal
visitor a reception worthy of his exalted rank, and to profit by the
occasion by settling some vexed questions long pending between the
two neighbouring Mahomedan countries. The circulation of depreciated
Persian money in the province had long disturbed the value of exchanges
and created confusion in commercial transactions. The exchange value
of this currency, and the amount of it to be issued in the future,
were now agreed upon. The incursions and depredations of nomad
Kurds, the Hamavends, Sendjabi, etc., shifting their camping‐ground
from Persian to Turkish territory, and _vice versa_, so as to evade
taxation and elude the authorities of either nation, whilst plundering
indiscriminately the peaceful inhabitants of both, had long been a
scandal, creating a state of affairs on the frontier difficult to cope
with. A better understanding and a combined policy of surveillance
between the Persian and Turkish authorities on the frontier were now
established, and block‐houses on the model of those successfully
introduced on the Servian frontier were constructed, to the infinite
relief of the agricultural population of both nations, situated on the
entire length of this extensive line. Midhat Pasha failed, however, to
obtain the sanction of the Persian authorities to a scheme which he had
long cherished, and which he trusted to this occasion to be able to put
into execution.
At Nejef, one of the sacred places to which periodical pilgrimages
were made, there were rich treasures, the proceeds of the offerings
of Indian and Persian devotees of the Shiite sect during centuries
past, which, on the invasion of the Wahabites, had been hidden in a
cave. Midhat Pasha had ordered the cave to be opened and an official
inventory to be made of the treasures that it contained. This inventory
revealed treasures of diamonds, rubies, pearls, and other precious
stones, to the value of no less than £T300,000, and Midhat proposed a
public sale of the treasure and the appropriation of its proceeds to
works of public utility, such as a railway between Persia and Bagdad,
or, if such an appropriation of a sacred treasure appeared too secular,
at least to the creation of such much‐needed institutions as hospitals
and refuges and caravanserai for the pilgrims on the route of their
pilgrimages to the holy places. Even this reasonable proposal, however,
was vetoed by the Persian Ulemas, and the whole scheme falling through,
Midhat ordered the treasure to be carefully deposited again in the
cave from which it had been taken, and its entrance secured with the
official seals of the Turkish and Persian authorities.
Certain events now took place having a bearing beyond the boundaries
of the province and of a quasi‐international character. The town of
Bussora, important on account of its geographical position as the
terminus station of the Euphrates on the Persian Gulf, suffered from
the inconvenience of an extremely unhealthy climate, resulting from
the stagnant waters of the Achar, a branch of the river Shat‐el‐Arab,
on which it was built. Midhat determined to remove the site of the
township on to the main river, and with that view built a Governor’s
house and Government buildings on the new site as a nucleus for a new
city. Outside this enclosure, the township of Nassrieh was laid out
on plans furnished by the Pasha, to become the capital of the sandjak
of Muntefik, and to replace the old town of Suk esh‐sheyuh which
was falling into ruins, and was deficient in all the necessaries of
civilisation.
Sixty miles from Bussora, and on the coast of Nedjed, is situated
the little town of Koweit of six thousand houses, the inhabitants of
which are all Mussulmans. Midhat Pasha’s predecessor, Namik Pasha,
had endeavoured to bring this population within the influence of his
jurisdiction, but they successfully resisted all attempts at imposing
taxation upon them, and had maintained their quasi‐independence under
their own chiefs, the descendants of one Sabah who had come with
this tribe of “Moutayer” from Nedjed five hundred years before, and
had maintained ever since with practical independence a republican
form of government, choosing by election their own judges (_cadis_)
and the professors of their religious schools (_medresses_). Owing
to the restricted extent of their territory, the inhabitants, like
those of Venice, took chiefly to maritime pursuits, and upwards of two
hundred small vessels of various tonnage traversed in every direction
the Indian Ocean, as far as the coasts of Zanzibar, and practically
monopolised the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf. Although they had
adopted a special flag of their own, they occasionally hoisted a Dutch
or English flag, to secure certain privileges accorded to these flags
by the capitulations. It seemed highly desirable to Midhat Pasha to
put an end to this equivocal status of the inhabitants of Koweit, and
to regularise their position. He accordingly entered into negotiations
with them, and offered the full enjoyment of their autonomy and
privileges under the government of their own Sheik Sabah, provided they
recognised themselves as forming part and parcel of the Ottoman empire,
and adopted the Ottoman flag as their national ensign. These conditions
were accepted by the people of Koweit, and their territory became a
sandjak of the vilayet of Bagdad. A formal treaty to that effect was
drawn up and signed and confirmed by _berats_ (writs of investiture)
from Constantinople, and new schools and mosques arose in Koweit.
After the settlement of Koweit, Midhat’s attention was turned to the
conquest of the Nedjed, the most important event that marked his
governorship of Bagdad.
The Nedjed is the geographical denomination of an extent of country
including about a quarter of the Arabian peninsula. Soliman, the
conqueror, after defeating the Portuguese squadron in the Persian Gulf,
had annexed it to his empire, and had despatched a special governor
from Constantinople to administer the province of Hassa. A century
after this, the inhabitants rose in revolt and formed themselves into a
separate State, which included the island of Bahrein in its limits. On
the first breaking out of these troubles, the Egyptian troops sent out
to repress the revolt had been successful, and had defeated the rebels
at Riad and Derayeh, forcing the Wahabites to recognise the authority
of the Sultan, but the Ottoman Government, whose attention was now
turned elsewhere, neglected to follow up this success, and the Nedjed
gradually regained its independence under the dynasty of Wahab.
In the time of Midhat Pasha, the reigning Sheik, Abdul Fazil, whilst
in the enjoyment of quasi‐independence himself, had never dreamt
of encroaching on the neighbouring territories under the authority
of the Sultan, nor of exciting revolt among their inhabitants by
preaching among them the particular tenets of Wahabism; but his brother
Saood, under the instigation of certain counsellors, with a view to
supplanting him in the government of the country, declared war on him,
and succeeded in dethroning him.
Abdul Fazil now had recourse to the intervention of Midhat Pasha, whom
he warned of the probable consequences that would follow the victory of
his brother with respect to the propagandism of Wahabite ideas among
the surrounding tribes. Midhat determined to act, but before entering
on a campaign that might prove an arduous undertaking, he took measures
to ascertain the exact forces that Saood had at his disposal, as well
as the topography of the country where military operations would have
to be carried out. With this view, spies and agents disguised as
merchants were sent in various directions, and soundings were taken of
different parts of the coast. A full report as to the situation of the
Nedjed in all these respects was in due course furnished to Midhat, who
in the meantime had requested and obtained the necessary authorisation
from the Grand Vizier, Aali Pasha, for the projected campaign.
Midhat was aware that certain delicate international questions might
arise in the course of the expedition. The policy of England, as
represented by its Indian Government, had always been to favour rather
than to discourage the desire of independence on the part of the Arab
chiefs in this part of the world. A serious and systematic attempt,
therefore, to suppress their independence and to attach these distant
members permanently to the body of the Ottoman Empire might seem to
run counter to the policy of the Indian Government on the shores of
the neighbouring Persian Gulf. Midhat had always been a stout and
consistent supporter of the English Alliance, but he was by no means
inclined for that reason to sacrifice to that alliance the essential
interest of the Ottoman Empire; and while resolved to proceed with
tact and due considerateness for the interests and susceptibilities of
a friendly Power, he did not hesitate, in spite of a certain amount
of sympathy manifested by England towards Saood, to proceed with the
expedition he had resolved upon.
The most populous province of Nedjed was Hassa, with its port Elkatif.
Thirty‐two hours distant from this port are situated the townships
of Elhofuf and Elmuberez, surrounded by fortified walls. Six hours
distant from Elkatif is the port of Ras Tannurah, offering favourable
conditions for a disembarkation of troops. Securing his communications
between Bussora and Elkatif, a distance of 360 miles by sea, by means
of the proffered co‐operation of Abdullah Elsabah, Sheik of Koweit,
who put his flotilla at the disposal of the Pasha for that purpose,
Midhat embarked five battalions of regular troops with a complement of
artillery under the command of Nafiz Pasha, General of division, for
the port of Ras Tannurah, whence they immediately marched to Elkatif,
which after a faint resistance capitulated to the Ottoman troops. The
surrender of Elmuberez and other strategical points in the Wahabs’
country followed in quick succession, and in a very short space of time
the partisans of Saood were dispersed and the whole country brought
under Imperial rule.
Midhat was now about to start himself for the Nedjed, with a view to
organise the country as a province of the Ottoman Empire, when his
attention was called by the Governor of Diarbekir, Kurd Ismail Pasha,
to the suspicious movements in the neighbourhood of Urfa of Sheik
Abdul Kerim, of the tribe of Chamar, the same, it will be remembered,
who, on the occasion of the revolt of the Dogara tribesmen, arriving
too late to assist the defeated rebels, turned round and offered his
services to the victorious Pasha.
Thinking the present occasion more favourable for carrying out his
cherished policy, he was marching straight on Bagdad, killing and
pillaging on his route. Warned by Kurd Ismail, Midhat took immediate
steps to crush him. Abdul Kerim had divided his forces into three
parts, the first advancing on Zor, the second on Mosul, and the
third, under his own command, marching on Bagdad. On this information
reaching him, Midhat ordered two battalions of regulars to reinforce
Kurd Ismail, whilst General Echeref Pasha was directed to fortify
Zor and other strategical points on the Tigris and Euphrates. These
troops coming into collision with the first division of Abdul Kerim’s
army in the neighbourhood of Zor, easily dispersed them, whilst Kurd
Ismail himself, attacking the second division of the rebels in the
neighbourhood of Mosul, completely routed it. On learning of the
successive defeats of the two wings of this invading army, Abdul
Kerim quickly abandoned all idea of advancing, and took measures to
secure his own safety. His retreat by the desert being cut off by
the droughts prevailing at this season, he made for his own native
country, the Chamar, but Midhat threatening Sheik Ibn Reshid, chief
of the tribe Djebel, if he ventured to offer refuge to the rebel,
diverted Abdul Kerim’s retreat to the direction of Muntefik by Hilah
and Kerbela, where he fell in with Nassir Pasha, and in the fight that
ensued was wounded and taken prisoner. After a regular trial for armed
rebellion and treachery, he was condemned to death, and the sentence
being approved of by the authorities at Constantinople, he was in due
course hanged at Mosul. His brother, Ferhan Pasha, now received the
chieftainship of the tribe Chamar, with an increase of territory and
a regular monthly subsidy, whilst the turbulent tribesmen acknowledged
the authority of the Imperial Government and consented to pay the
taxes. This settlement was followed by a resumption of agricultural
pursuits on the part of the inhabitants, and the general pacification
of the country.
But troubles in these parts did not end with the conquest of the
Nedjed and the defeat of Abdul Kerim. Abdullah Fazil—who had by means
of Ottoman arms been restored to the government of Elkatif, with the
Turkish title of Mutessarif, in the new vilayet of Nedjed—once freed
from all apprehension respecting the ambition of his brother Saood,
began to manifest restlessness under Turkish regular administration.
Discontent, too, with Turkish fiscal arrangements was felt by the
tribesmen, and affairs began again to assume a threatening aspect.
Midhat determined to inquire into the causes of this discontent, and
finding that exemption from all taxation, save that sanctioned by the
Mussulman law, viz. the tithe, had been consecrated by secular usage
among them, and that the neighbouring tribes who had come under English
protection, Oman, Mascat, etc., fully enjoyed the privilege of this
exemption, determined to satisfy the population of Elkatif in this
respect, and forthwith consented to limit their liability to taxation
to the regular payment of the tithe.
There remained the island of Bahrein, the conquest of which, on account
of the importance of its position on the Persian Gulf, Midhat now
determined to effect. In order to superintend operations himself, and
in case of any international friction demanding his presence, Midhat
started for the Nedjed. Abdullah Fazil hearing of this, and fearing
that his own equivocal conduct was the cause of the journey, fled from
Elkatif to Riad, and in spite of the Pasha’s assurances, refused to
return. His dismissal from the Government was thereupon pronounced, and
the district converted into the sandjak of Hassa, and together with
the command of the troops, was entrusted to Nafiz Pasha. A friendly
interchange of views now took place between Midhat Pasha and the
Government of India, the result of which was that the island of Bahrein
was officially annexed to the Mutessarifat of Hassa. Two Turkish
corvettes, the _Libnan_ and the _Iskenderoun_, under the command of
Arif Bey, sailed for the island, followed by two English gunboats
under Commander Pelly, and the Turkish and English vessels exchanged
salutes and other friendly courtesies in the port. When the Turkish
sailors disembarked on the island they were received with the most
indescribable enthusiasm by the islanders, who had not seen the Turkish
ensign flying on a man‐of‐war for two centuries past. The Sheik of the
island offered an appropriate piece of land to be used as a _dépôt_
for coals for Turkish vessels, and offered to place the resources of
the island at the disposition of the Turkish authorities if necessity
should arise. On weighing anchor from Bahrein the two corvettes were
joined by the vessel that had Midhat Pasha on board, and the little
flotilla sailed together to Koweit. Here the same scenes were enacted
that had distinguished the visit to Bahrein, and nothing occurred
to mar the cordiality that existed between the Ottoman and British
forces that met in these Eastern ports. The convention which had been
previously agreed upon between Midhat and the British authorities
prevented any friction between them.
The re‐establishment of Imperial authority in these regions justified,
and indeed necessitated, a considerable increase in the Turkish
flotilla in these waters. Before the opening of the Suez Canal, Turkey
only possessed the two corvettes the _Boursa_, and the _Ismir_, neither
of which was in a sea‐going condition. Midhat sent the _Boursa_ to
Bombay to undergo repairs, and added the _Libnan_, _Iskenderoun_,
_Deniz_, _Babel_, _Ninova_, _Nedjed_, and _Assour_, besides ten
vessels of light draught for river police, and to reinforce the
Bagdad squadron. The port of Bussora, no longer adequate to the naval
requirements of the province, was enlarged and improved, and works for
an inner harbour capable of anchoring vessels of 10-feet draught were
commenced at Kut‐el‐Frenghi on the river Shat‐el‐arab.
All these various improvements and reforms, and the general advance in
the political and administrative status of this important province,
were highly appreciated by the Government of the Porte, which was
now under the enlightened guidance of Aali Pasha, who addressed the
following letter to Midhat Pasha:—
“EXCELLENCY,—The very weak state of health from which I have
been for some time suffering has been the cause of the delay that
has occurred in answering your letters concerning the voyage of
His Majesty the Shah. Pray accept my most sincere excuses. I beg
to congratulate you in a very especial manner, on your brilliant
successes in the Nedjed. Everything seems to indicate that, thanks
to the tact with which you have brought about the pacification of
the Provinces of Assir, the political importance of which is so
considerable, the whole Arabic peninsula will soon return to its
ancient status. By your services you have merited the glorious title,
‘Haremein Muhteremein.’
“The effect of the Shah’s visit on the Shiite population in the
province was the subject of considerable preoccupation with us,
but the good intentions and loyalty manifested on both sides, have
smoothed over many difficulties and brought about highly desirable
results.... It is quite certain that Nevab Ikbal Eldevle, being
a just and upright man, will blame and discourage any flagrant
departure from justice and equity on the part of his co‐religionists.
“Be good enough to thank him in my name, when the occasion offers,
for the seal in agate, the engraving and inscription on which are
very fine.
“Prince Abbas Mirza has arrived here, and he has twice been received
in Audience by his Majesty.... He seems a polished and intelligent
person, but I have not yet had any opportunity to form an estimate of
his character.
“I am,
“(seal) MEHMED EMIN AALI.
“23 _Djemaziel Evel, 1288_ (1871), _Hegira_.”
By the same courtier the Sultan Abdul Aziz sent Midhat Pasha a sword of
honour set with diamonds, with the inscription “Nedjed” engraved on it.
This was the closing scene of Midhat’s governorship of Bagdad, and with
it closed the first half of his career, viz., as Provincial Governor.
Circumstances were occurring at Constantinople destined to bring him
on the scene there, to play his part in the important political events
about to occur in the metropolis.
But a change of a portentous nature had taken place at Constantinople.
Fuad Pasha and Aali Pasha, whose prestige and popularity had gained an
ascendancy over the Sultan, and had, since his accession, practically
monopolised power, and who had strenuously supported Midhat in all
his reforming measures both on the Danube and the Euphrates, died
within a few months of each other. The disappearance of these two able
and powerful Ministers synchronized with the return of Abdul Aziz
from a tour in Europe, when symptoms of an ominous character began
to reveal themselves in the sovereign. He showed himself impatient
of contradiction or advice of any kind, expressing openly his
relief at being freed from the incubus of his former Grand Viziers;
he completely changed the etiquette of the Court, imposing on the
occasion of audiences an antiquated ceremonial, accompanied by unwonted
prostrations to be observed on entering the Imperial presence, and he
directed that henceforth he should be addressed in inflated language,
strange even to the forms of Oriental adulation. But what was more
serious than these triflings of Imperial vanity, was the fact that he
now launched out, careless of the resources of the budget, on the most
lavish expenditure of every kind both of a public and private nature.
Fleets of costly ironclads were ordered and equipped without regard to
their cost; marble palaces rose, as by enchantment, on the banks of the
Bosphorus, and every whim and caprice on his own part or that of the
Palace had to be gratified without stint or delay. He found in Mahmoud
Nedim a compliant Grand Vizier, who, in return for the retention of
power, undertook to find the ways and means for the gratification of
all his master’s wishes.
The reflex action of this state of things at headquarters was felt
in the most distant provinces. When the exactions of the Palace had
expropriated the balance of the sums destined to the various services
of the State, recourse was had to the provinces to make good the
deficiencies by extraordinary “benevolences” and remittances. Works
of public utility or necessity were accordingly suspended, and the
funds necessary for their completion diverted to the metropolis.
Incompetent favourites arrived from Constantinople with orders to the
Vali to provide them with lucrative posts, and by these means the whole
fabric of the new administration, painfully and patiently built up,
was dislocated and deranged. Midhat, recognising the impossibility of
governing in such conditions, resigned his Governorship and set out for
Constantinople.
THE FIRST GRAND VIZIERATE OF MIDHAT PASHA.
On his arrival in Constantinople, Midhat found that an order had been
issued for his banishment from the capital, under cloak of nominating
him to the government of Adrianople. Insisting, however, on the
exercise of his right of audience with the sovereign before setting out
for his new post, he made such strong representations to the Sultan
with respect to the general situation of the empire, that Abdul Aziz
thereupon abruptly dismissed Mahmoud Nedim, and appointed Midhat Grand
Vizier in his place (1873).
As soon as he had filled the principal offices of State with the best
material he could find—Chirvani Rushdi Pasha, Djémil Pasha, and Sadik
Pasha—the first and most pressing necessity that confronted him was
to endeavour to put the Finances in order. This was no easy task. The
public accounts presented were entirely fictitious. His first discovery
was to the effect that whereas the budget showed a surplus of half a
million (£T), there was in point of fact a deficit of three millions.
The actual appropriation of the sums debited in the accounts presented
another difficulty. A sum of £T100,000 disbursed by the Treasury was
not accounted for at all. Midhat insisted on a full inquiry, and,
discovering that this sum had been appropriated by the late Grand
Vizier, directed an investigation into the matter before the members
of the Council of State, who ordered its immediate restitution by
Mahmoud Nedim, and recommended his banishment. He, however, alleging
in private that this sum in question although nominally attributed to
him was really allotted to the Palace, found in the Valide Sultan and
her _entourage_ most powerful allies in his duel with Midhat. Banished
by the insistence of the Grand Vizier, first to Adrianople and then to
Trebizond, he soon obtained permission to return to Constantinople.
Two distinct parties began now to stand out in clear relief. On the
one side was Midhat, warmly supported by public opinion in the capital
and in the provinces, and by all that was most enlightened among the
Softas and Ulemas, headed by Chakir Effendi, and on the other side
the whole army of corruption, headed by Mahmoud Nedim and protected by
the Valide Sultan and the Palace Camarilla. Another powerful ally of
the late Grand Vizier was General Ignatieff, who by the most ingenious
and persistent methods—condescending even to the resources of the
stage—worked on the mind of the Sultan in order to restore Mahmoud
Nedim to power.
An incident soon occurred which brought matters to a crisis. The
Khedive of Egypt, desirous of changing the order of succession in
his family and of obtaining various privileges and prerogatives
from his suzerain, was in the habit of making periodical visits
to Constantinople, carrying away with him each time, by judicious
payments, some shred of the sovereign rights of the Porte. These visits
became a regular source of income and emolument to the Palace and all
its myrmidons. Arriving at Constantinople on the occasion of one of
these visits he found Midhat Pasha installed as Grand Vizier, and to
his surprise and disappointment, and to the discomfiture of the Palace
clique, he was obliged this time to return to Alexandria with his
presents, _re infectâ_.
It soon became apparent that one of two things must happen: the Sultan
would either have to change the whole _régime_ and scale of expenditure
of the Palace, or change his Grand Vizier; and as he never really
contemplated the former course, he adopted the latter. The determining
cause was Midhat’s action with reference to certain scandals—incidents
connected with Baron Hirsch’s railway schemes.
It is only in a despotic country, where State contracts are signed in
the dark, and _cahiers de charge_ are examined by carefully chosen
experts and passed by complaisant accountants, that such a scandal as
the Hirsch railways is possible or conceivable. If the cynicism of the
whole transaction had not become notorious, and thus excited as much
laughter as its nefariousness caused indignation, it would be worth
while to set out in detail all the circumstances of this stupendous
business.
To obtain a contract giving unlimited control over the richest forests
in the world, on the pretext of cutting sleepers, is in itself a
pretty smart stroke of business. To stipulate for payment of railways
according to the mileage executed, irrespective of topographical
considerations or local requirements, is a triumph of contracting
skill; but to claim payment for work done in the plains only, on
the basis of an average calculated for working through plains and
mountain‐chains alike, is the very glory of financial genius. The
secret, too, of the art was as simple as the result was lucrative.
Backsheesh in adequate amounts, distributed at appropriate moments in
the right quarters, was the alpha and omega of the business.
Midhat, in his determination to strike at the root of the whole system
of corruption, irrespective of persons or of consequences, having
discovered that the highest person in the land was himself a recipient
of the largesses of the Austrian baron, insisted on the restitution of
the sums received. The Sultan listened to the advice tendered, returned
the money, and dismissed his Grand Vizier.