every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus
find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices
for the sake of the general protection; so the States which lie at the
greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course,
may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be
at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will
consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its
strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the
States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send their
representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more
so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support
alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by
the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less
benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less
distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other
respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained
throughout.
I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions
will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never
suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however
fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into
the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion
would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you
that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords
of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same
family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual
happiness; can no longer be fellowcitizens of one great, respectable,
and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells
you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a
novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in
the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it
is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against
this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it
conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American
citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their
sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of
their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be
shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild
of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us
in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our
happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be
rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the
glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent
regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not
suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of
their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this
manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the
world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the
American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had
no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which
a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which
an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States
might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims
of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight
of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of
mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human
race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a
revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They
reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of
the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is
incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works
betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred
most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to
be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of
your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate
and to decide.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XV.
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York.
In the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my
fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light,
the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have
unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be
exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of
America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by
jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through
which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated
will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto
unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in
some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that
you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which
can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which
you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of
the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which
sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles
from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done,
without sacrificing utility to despatch.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of
the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the
“insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the
Union.” It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or
proof to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or
doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men
assent, and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as
by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be
acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects, they in
general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are
material imperfections in our national system, and that something is
necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts
that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They
have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and
have at length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the
principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived,
a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of
our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted
by the intelligent friends of the Union.
We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last
stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can
wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which
we do not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which
we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects
of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and
to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the
preservation of our political existence? These remain without any
proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable
territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power
which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been
surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our
interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent
or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor
government.[1] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?
The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty,
ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a
free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes
us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of
public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and
irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at
the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of
foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The
imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us. Our
ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a
violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of
national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the
country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of
waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of
private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among
all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of
every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That
most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced
within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of
insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration
of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it
may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national
disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could befall a community so
peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not
form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?
This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those
very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the
proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us
to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss
that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive
that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand
for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us
at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the
paths of felicity and prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be
resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract
proposition that there exist material defects in our national system;
but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old
adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition
to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of
success. While they admit that the government of the United States is
destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those
powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to
aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of
federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at
sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members.
They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political
monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the
principal defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that
the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial
imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the
building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in
the first principles and main pillars of the fabric.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as
contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though
this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the
rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States
has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money;
but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to
the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that
though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws,
constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice
they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at
their option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that
after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head,
there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for
deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old,
and which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of
GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at
all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to
the mild influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or
alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes
precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place,
circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and
depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts
of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual
vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the
interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early
part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for
this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times
fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to
establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the
world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and
quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before
they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to
mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have
no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose
general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any
immediate interest or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a
similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious,
and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated
under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least,
consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate
government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and
defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends
and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships,
nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we
still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is
the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a
common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those
ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic
difference between a league and a government; we must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, —the only proper
objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the
idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words,
a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty
annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to
be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or
recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted
in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or
by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the
COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the
last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or
communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a
court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be
enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of
their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by
the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to
the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach
of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must
become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things
can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent
man choose to commit his happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the
regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a
sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the
respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present
day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the
same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further
lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times
betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is
actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of
civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,
without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more
rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary
of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of
mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to
reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action
is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon
one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the
deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of
whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they
would blush in a private capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an
impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the
exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to
restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in
every political association which is formed upon the principle of
uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there
will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or
inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual
effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not
difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power.
Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of
that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that
the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the
particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with
perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to
execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The
reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature.
If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed
without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will
be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the
respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it
or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures
themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or
required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary
conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this
will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny,
without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state,
which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong
predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to
mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member
of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans,
framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the
discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part.
Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular
assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is, where there is no
exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious
resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how impossible
it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a
distance from each other, at different times, and under different
impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits.
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is
requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every
important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was
to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been
executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured
themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels
of the national government, and brought them to an awful stand.
Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the
forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a
more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal
government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once.
The causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal and
disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the
Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of
example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the
least delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those
who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we
consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These
were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which
even speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could
not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive
voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn
its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall
upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.
PUBLIUS.
[1] “I mean for the Union.”
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XVI.
The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, December 4, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
The tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or
communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified
by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events
which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of
which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in
those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a
distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely
observing here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which
history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far
as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from
the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those
which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the
applauding suffrages of political writers.