seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of
view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive.
It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the
people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is
impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.
Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the
collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been
uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained
empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of
popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident
to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every
experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the
different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be
surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of
Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more
tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more
practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the national
revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and
from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this
latter description.
In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means
of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be
confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill
brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets
of the farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty
supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and
lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to
be laid hold of in any other way than by the inperceptible agency of
taxes on consumption.
If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will
best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be
best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious
doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general
Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce,
so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from
that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for
the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it
must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties
more productive, and of putting it into the power of the government to
increase the rate without prejudice to trade.
The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which
they are intersected, and of bays that wash there shores; the facility
of communication in every direction; the affinity of language and
manners; the familiar habits of intercourse; —all these are
circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between
them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions
of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate States or
confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the
temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. The
temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would not permit
those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the
avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water;
and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the
adventurous stratagems of avarice.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly
employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the
dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these
patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense
difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an
inland communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages
with which the collection of duties in this country would be
encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a situation,
with respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to
her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the
patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free country.
If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the
States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but
ONE SIDE to guard—the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from
foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to
hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would
attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would
have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well
after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination.
An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention of
any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed
vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at
a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the
government having the same interest to provide against violations
everywhere, the co-operation of its measures in each State would have a
powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should
preserve by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which
would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great
distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other
places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign
trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single
night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other
neighboring nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious
security against a direct contraband with foreign countries; but a
circuitous contraband to one State, through the medium of another,
would be both easy and safe. The difference between a direct
importation from abroad, and an indirect importation through the
channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time and
opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland communication,
must be palpable to every man of discernment.
It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at
much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison,
further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any
partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted,
that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three
per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent.,
and in Britain they exceed this proportion.[1] There seems to be
nothing to hinder their being increased in this country to at least
treble their present amount. The single article of ardent spirits,
under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable
revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the whole
quantity imported into the United States may be estimated at four
millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two
hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of
duty; and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an
effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy,
to the morals, and to the health of the society. There is, perhaps,
nothing so much a subject of national extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of
the resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist
without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign
its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province.
This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede.
Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the
principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive
weight upon land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their
true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the
people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation; nor,
indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is agriculture,
are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very
ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before
remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be subjected to
large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on consumption.
In populous cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture, to
occasion the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit
to the State; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure,
escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of
the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the
defect of other resources must throw the principal weight of public
burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants
of the government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the
sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the
community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation
consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not
even have the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the
oppression of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed in
the cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress will keep
pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in deploring the
infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.
PUBLIUS.
[1] If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XIII.
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety
consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be
usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be
drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under
one government, there will be but one national civil list to support;
if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many
different national civil lists to be provided for—and each of them, as
to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be
necessary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the
States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too
extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates. The
ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem
generally turned toward three confederacies—one consisting of the four
Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern
States. There is little probability that there would be a greater
number. According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise
an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great
Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a
confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less
comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been
proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a
certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the
same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater
extent. This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is
no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary
to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we
consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of
the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of people,
and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the
passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no
reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to
perform the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil power,
properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a
very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part
of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate
institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be
likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive
than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition,
more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as
the alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to
geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the
habits and prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to
conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league
themselves under two governments. The four Eastern States, from all the
causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection, may
with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is,
would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank
to the weight of that confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that
would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State
to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful
combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission
into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the
Northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own
navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and
dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various
circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the
encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give
unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the
purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to
confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy. As she
must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with
her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of
the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the Northern,
Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the
Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania,
if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood
of more than one confederacy to the south of that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able
to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or
any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight
in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on
the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to
take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on
mistaken ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we
take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed
to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies
against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of
the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military
establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from
the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the
States would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation
would be not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity,
commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XIV.
Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory
Answered
From the New York Packet.
Friday, November 30, 1787.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign
danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of
our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for
those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the
Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction,
which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which
alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains,
within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection
that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union
embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper,
as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are
availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the
practicable sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by
imaginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they
endeavor in vain to find.
The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has
been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that
it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a
republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from
the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was
also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the
people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they
assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A
democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic
may be extended over a large region.
To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of
some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in
forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects
either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to
heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by
placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by
citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient
Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an
easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a
democracy only; and among others, the observation that it can never be
established but among a small number of people, living within a small
compass of territory.
Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular
governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in
modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation,
no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the
same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of
discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple
agency of which the will of the largest political body may be
concentred, and its force directed to any object which the public good
requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis
of unmixed and extensive republics. It is only to be lamented that any
of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional merit of
displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive
system now under her consideration.
As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central
point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as
often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater
number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a
republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the
representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the
administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the
United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who
recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union,
that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the
States have been almost continually assembled, and that the members
from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater
intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the
neighborhood of Congress.
That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting
subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The
limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic,
on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the
Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some
instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as
the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that
latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and
forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three
common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to
seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the
distance, the amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and
three-fourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi
does not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison
of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the
practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it appears to be
demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a diet
representing the whole empire is continually assembled; or than Poland
before the late dismemberment, where another national diet was the
depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find
that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the
representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to
travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most
remote parts of the Union.
Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain
which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.
In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government
is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering
laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which
concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be
attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate
governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects
which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority
and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish
the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have
some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to
show that if they were abolished the general government would be
compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in
their proper jurisdiction.
A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the
federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive
States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other
States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods,
which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that
may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which
lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further
discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.
Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout
the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will
everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for
travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on
our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the
whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication between the
Western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each,
will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which
the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art
finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.