enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may
be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of
sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means,
first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the
people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics
are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public
weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious
considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the
republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain
number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that,
however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in
order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number
of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of
the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small
republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not
less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be
more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the
vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the
suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre
in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and
established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a
mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By
enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
representatives too little acquainted with all their local
circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you
render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend
and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a
happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State
legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and
extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of
republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance
principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in
the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer
probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the
fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be
remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable
purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to
the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has
over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by
a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of
representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render
them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not
be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to
possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater
security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of
any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal
degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the
Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater
obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret
wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of
the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a
political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of
sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national
councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money,
for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for
any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the
whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same
proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county
or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican
government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel
in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and
supporting the character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XI.
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those
points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of
opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of
men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to
our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous
spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has
already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of
Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in
that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the
foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies
in America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming,
with painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten
their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have
all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the
creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally
indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving
us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This
would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in
their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of
clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did
not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by
facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.
If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our
prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending,
at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign
countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets.
This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to
appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of
people—increasing in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively
addicted to agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain
so—to any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would
be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct
communication in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its
products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another
country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America, capable
of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of
commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of
this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with
the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most
valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When
these questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have
received a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has
been said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the
system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us
through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers
and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of
our markets. But would not her navigation be materially injured by the
loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade?
Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the
Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the mere
circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so
circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations,
by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by
transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch
of the British commerce?
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will
justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a
state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of
the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities
of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present
system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the
markets of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive
the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British
government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in
exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a
correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be
inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations
toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a
federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union
under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period
not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with
those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable
weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties.
This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the
West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the
reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the
fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most
commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the
usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of
military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived
that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great
advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon
our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the
Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America,
and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this
part of the world as our interest may dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that
the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and
would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly
placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would
be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each
other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple
or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often
as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be
respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation,
despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being
neutral.
Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and
resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle
all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This
situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by
inducing an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an
extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the
offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little
arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and
unchangeable course of nature.
But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might
operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,
availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the
conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common
interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our
becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our
navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine
us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content
ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the
profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and
persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the
genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself
an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost,
and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom,
might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.
There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are
rights of the Union—I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the
Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the
Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the
future existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful
partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The
disposition of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment.
France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view
them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course,
would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which
experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable branch of
traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their
own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to
exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?
This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit.
All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously
participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of
mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of
seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the
principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a
universal resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be
indispensable.
To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various
ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the
quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and
support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources
of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or
partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single
part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated
America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential
establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance
certain kinds of naval stores—tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood
for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting
texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy
might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of
signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national
economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater
plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn
from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external
or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more
than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of
a navy.
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance
the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions,
not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for
exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part
will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from
a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial
enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the
productions of different States. When the staple of one fails from a
bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of
another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for
exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be
conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a
given value than with a small number of materials of the same value;
arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctations of
markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods,
and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can
scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter
predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would
be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. The
speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these
observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the
commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable
than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.
It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united
or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them
which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,
interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the
course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial,
as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of
government.
There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed,
of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into
the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a
newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation
invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the
system of American affairs. The world may politically, as well as
geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set
of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by
her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees,
extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have
successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long
maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the
World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit.
Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed
to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have gravely asserted
that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in
America—that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in
our atmosphere.[1] Facts have too long supported these arrogant
pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor
of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.
Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another victim to
his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European
greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and
indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system,
superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and
able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new
world!
PUBLIUS.
[1] “Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains.”
THE FEDERALIST.
No. XII.
The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, November 27, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
The effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have
been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of
revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all
enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a
primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of
gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the
precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,
it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and to
make them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous
merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the
industrious manufacturer,—all orders of men, look forward with eager
expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their
toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture and commerce
has, from indubitable experience, received a decision which has
silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has
proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are
intimately blended and interwoven. It has been found in various
countries that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has
risen in value. And how could it have happened otherwise? Could that
which procures a freer vent for the products of the earth, which
furnishes new incitements to the cultivation of land, which is the most
powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a
state—could that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and
industry, in every shape, fail to augment that article, which is the
prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which they
are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have
had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a
spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and
refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason
and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a
great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the
celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these
objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and
facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary
dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile,
cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which is
situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this
territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And
yet, from the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch
can boast but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to
owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the
preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the
strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.