INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION TO VOLUME III.[63]
When war seemed likely, the following scheme for the strategical
distribution of the troops in the Far East in the event of hostilities
was agreed to by the Viceroy, Alexeieff:
1. The major portion of the troops, consisting of 60 infantry
battalions, 65 squadrons, 2 sapper battalions, and 160 guns (total,
65,000 rifles and sabres), were to be sent into Southern Manchuria. The
main body was to be concentrated in the area Hai-cheng–Liao-yang, and
the advance guard[64] moved forward to the Ya-lu.
2. The garrison of Port Arthur was to consist of the 7th East Siberian
Rifle Division (12 battalions), 2 battalions of fortress artillery, and
1 company of sappers. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, consisting
of 4 battalions with 6 guns, was also detailed for the defence of
the Kuan-tung district, to augment the strength of the garrison if
necessary.
3. The garrison of Vladivostok was to consist of the 8th East Siberian
Rifle Division (8 battalions of infantry), with 2 battalions of
fortress artillery, 2 sapper companies, and 1 mining company.
4. That of Nikolaievsk was to be 1 fortress infantry battalion, 1
fortress artillery company, and 1 mining company.
This scheme, by which the force detailed for the defence of Port Arthur
and the whole Kuan-tung Peninsula was limited to sixteen battalions,
was due to our exaggerated idea of the strength and invincibility of
our Pacific Ocean Fleet. According to the Viceroy, it was founded
on the following opinion, expressed by Admiral Witgeft, Chief of
Alexeieff’s temporary naval staff:
“According to the present relative strengths of the two fleets,
the possibility of ours being defeated is a contingency that
need not be considered, and until it has been destroyed it is
inconceivable that the Japanese can land at Newchuang or any
other spot on the Gulf of Korea.”
[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA.]
But such an attenuation of our force in this quarter was contrary
to the opinion of a committee—attended by me in my capacity of War
Minister—which sat in Port Arthur in June, 1903. The Viceroy and senior
commanders of the garrison were present at the meeting when it was
resolved and recorded as “essential” that the 3rd Siberian Corps should
be formed for the defence of Kuan-tung, in addition to the 7th East
Siberian Rifle Division, its permanent garrison, and that this corps
should be composed of the 3rd and 4th East Siberian Rifle Divisions,
each of twelve battalions. In fact, it was considered necessary to have
thirty-six battalions of infantry, exclusive of reserve battalions,
for the defence of Port Arthur and the Peninsula. This formation of a
special army corps for Kuan-tung was thought to be necessitated by the
existence so close to Port Arthur of Dalny, a magnificently equipped
port, connected by railway to the fortress, and a most convenient base
for operations against it.
Feeling that the force allotted to the defence of the Peninsula was
inadequate, on February 11 I telegraphed as War Minister to Alexeieff
that I considered it imperative that the 9th East Siberian Rifle
Division—then under formation—should be sent there in place of the 3rd
East Siberian Rifle Division, ordered to the Ya-lu. The Viceroy did not
concur in this view, but he temporarily retained the 13th and 14th East
Siberian Rifle Regiments.
On February 20, 1904, I was appointed to the command of the Manchurian
Army. In my first communication to the Viceroy (No. 1 of February 24)
I again expressed the opinion that, in view of the possibility of it
being besieged by four or five Japanese divisions, our first efforts
should be directed to strengthening Port Arthur. And I further stated:
“If Port Arthur is weakly garrisoned, and should be besieged,
I might be tempted by that fact to assume the offensive before
there has been sufficient time to concentrate our forces. It is
for this reason that I have already advised the concentration
of the 9th Division in Kuan-tung to replace the 3rd.”
However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch
of March 1:
“Separate operations against the fortress would only be really
worth undertaking if the enemy could make certain of seizing it
by a _coup de main_, and the moment for this has passed. The
land front is becoming more formidable every day, and, though
not complete, the works are now well advanced; 200 additional
guns have been mounted in Port Arthur itself, and more than
forty at Chin-chou; the strength of the garrison is being
brought up by the reservists arriving from Trans-Baikalia,
and the stocks of supplies are being increased. All the bays
nearest the fortress, as well as the port of Dalny, have been
mined, and for the rest—the oft-proved stubbornness of the
Russian soldier in defence can be relied on.”
He had already reported to the Tsar that—
“Although separate operations against Port Arthur would
threaten the fortress itself with all the hardships of a siege
or blockade, they would be rather advantageous to our arms
as a whole, for they would entail a division of the enemy’s
forces.”
As regards my own recommendations upon the plan of operations to be
followed against Japan, I drew up two memoranda, which I submitted to
the Tsar on February 15 and March 4. In the former I stated:
“In the first phase of the campaign our main object should
be to prevent the destruction of our forces in detail. The
apparent importance of any single locality or position
(fortresses excepted) should not lead us into the great error
of holding it in insufficient force, which would bring about
the very result we are so anxious to prevent. While gradually
growing in numbers and preparing to take the offensive, we
should only move forward when sufficiently strong, and when
supplied with everything necessary for an uninterrupted advance
lasting over a fairly long period.”
Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the
words “Quite so.”
I left St. Petersburg on March 12, and arrived at Liao-yang on the
28th. On this date there were collected in the concentration area in
Southern Manchuria 59 battalions,[65] 39 squadrons and _sotnias_, and
140 guns. The distribution was as follows:
The _Southern Force_ (under General Sakharoff) of the 1st and 9th East
Siberian Rifle Divisions—20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 54 guns—was in
the area Hai-cheng—Ta-shih-chiao—Newchuang—Kai-ping.
The _Eastern (Advance) Force_ (under General Kashtalinski) of the 3rd
East Siberian Rifle Division—8 battalions, 24 guns, 8 mountain and 8
machine-guns—was moved to the Ya-lu.
The _Mounted Force_ (under General Mischenko) of 18 squadrons and 6
guns was operating in Northern Korea.
The _Main Body_ was divided into two groups:
At An-shan-chan: 5th East Siberian Rifle Division
of 8 battalions and 24 guns.
At Liao-yang: 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry
Divisions, 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments—21
battalions, 10 squadrons, and 24 guns.
In addition to these, the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—3
battalions and 4 guns—was allotted to the protection of the Viceroy’s
Headquarters.
In _Port Arthur_ were the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division—12
battalions, 2 reserve battalions, 3-1/2 battalions of fortress
artillery, and a sapper and mining company.
In _Kuan-tung_ were the 5th, 13th, 14th, and 15th East Siberian Rifle
Regiments, 1 battalion of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2
battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 1 reserve
battalion—12 battalions, 20 guns, and 1 _sotnia_ of Cossacks.
On my arrival I approved the following scheme of engineering works:
The fortification of the positions on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and
at Liao-yang, Mukden, and Tieh-ling; the construction of roads across
the passes to the Ya-lu, and of three parallel roads from Kai-ping to
Mukden; the construction of crossings over the Liao River, and the
hutting of three army corps. I at once took steps also to strengthen
our advance guard on the Ya-lu, which was some 133 miles distant. Two
regiments of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division were sent there, in
addition to the third battalions for the regiments of the 3rd East
Siberian Rifle Division. By the time, therefore, that the enemy began
crossing the Ya-lu, the Eastern (Advance) Force had been increased
to eighteen battalions, besides which the 21st East Siberian Rifle
Regiment had been moved towards Ta-shih-chiao. The advance guard was
under General Zasulitch. Meanwhile the units of the 1st Siberian
Division were detained by Alexeieff in Harbin, so that, from the middle
of March to the middle of April, the Manchurian Army did not receive a
single battalion from the rear.
Notwithstanding the orders Zasulitch had received to avoid a decisive
engagement with the enemy, who had the superiority in numbers, on
May 1 part of his force became hotly engaged in what developed into a
serious fight at the Ya-lu, and after a disastrous finish his eastern
force was withdrawn to the passes of the greater Fen-shui-ling range,
which they reached on May 7. In this action only nine of our eighteen
battalions took any active part, those of the 11th and 12th East
Siberian Rifle Regiments showing great gallantry and determination.
When asked why he had disobeyed the orders repeatedly given to him
not to become entangled in a serious engagement, but to fall back on
Feng-huang-cheng, Zasulitch gave as his reason that he had hoped to
defeat the enemy. On May 5 the Japanese began debarking at Pi-tzu-wo,
and a small force of all arms under General Zikoff was detached
from the southern force in order to reconnoitre and ascertain the
importance of this landing. The advance of this column incidentally
enabled us to repair temporarily the portion of the line which the
enemy had destroyed, and so to run a train-load of mélinite shells,
machine-guns, and ammunition through to Port Arthur. The Emperor was
fully alive to the danger of the situation caused by the dispersion
of the Manchurian Army, and on May 11 telegraphed his orders for an
immediate concentration. This was completed by the 14th, and the force
was grouped on two points—Hai-cheng and Liao-yang. The former group
consisted of twenty-seven battalions, twelve squadrons and _sotnias_,
and eighty guns; the latter of twenty-eight battalions, six _sotnias_,
and eighty-eight guns. The passes over the Fen-shui-ling range were
guarded by small columns of infantry with guns, and advance and flank
guards were thrown out. The independent cavalry, operating on our
flanks east of the passes, was divided in two bodies, under Mischenko
and Rennenkampf. West of Liao-yang was a small force under General
Kossagovski, while five and a half battalions of the 1st Siberian
Division lay at Mukden. At this time also, when the Viceroy returned to
Port Arthur (after Admiral Makharoff’s death of April 13), the weakness
of the place began to be shown up, and Alexeieff’s apprehensions as to
its safety became acute. In a despatch of May 16 he questioned whether
the place “would be able to hold out for more than two or three months,
in spite of all the steps taken to strengthen its defences.” On April
25 the Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff telegraphed to me that, owing to
the inadequacy of the garrison, Alexeieff considered it essential that
if the fortress were attacked, the field army should support it as
energetically and rapidly as possible. Alexeieff was not singular in
his pessimistic views, for Stössel also gave up hope of a successful
defence of Port Arthur directly after he had so unnecessarily
abandoned the Chin-chou position on May 27. On the 28th I received a
telegram from him urging me to support him speedily and in strength.
This opinion was again endorsed by Alexeieff, who telegraphed on June
5 that “Port Arthur cannot strictly be called a storm-proof fortress,
and it is a question whether it can even stand a siege of the length
indicated in my telegram of May 16.”
The result of this _volte-face_ on the part of Alexeieff as to the
powers of resistance of the place was that he pressed me to send part
of the army at once to assist it, though we were by no means ready for
such an enterprise. On May 21 he wrote that he considered the moment
in every way favourable for the army to assume the offensive in one of
two directions—either towards the Ya-lu, with the object of defeating
and throwing Kuroki back across the river, detaching a force to contain
him there, and then moving on to relieve Port Arthur, or else direct on
that place.
It should be borne in mind that these instructions were given at a time
when the position of only two of the hostile armies had been fixed. Of
these, one—of three divisions and three reserve brigades—had forced
the crossing of the Ya-lu, and the other—of three divisions—had landed
near Pi-tzu-wo. Moreover, a landing, of the extent of which we had no
information, was then being carried out at Ta-ku-shan. Consequently
we did not know the destination of one-half of the enemy’s army, and
were thus not in possession of two important pieces of knowledge which
were necessary before any operations of a decisive character could be
undertaken—namely, the position of the enemy’s main forces and their
probable plan of operations. It was incumbent on us, therefore, to
exercise great caution, and to keep our forces as far as possible
concentrated, so as to be ready to meet the attack of two or even three
armies. Concerning the two directions in which the Viceroy advocated
an advance, the following few points suggest themselves. For any
operations towards the Ya-lu—bearing in mind the necessity for guarding
our flank and rear against one hostile force landing at Pi-tzu-wo,
and possibly others landing near Kai-ping or Newchuang—not more than
sixty to seventy battalions were available of the ninety-four which
in the middle of May constituted the army; the whole of the food for
these troops had to be brought up by rail, owing to the exhaustion of
the local resources—never very plentiful—in the hilly country between
Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng: we had not got the transport to do
this, for our ten transport trains could only have carried a three or
four days’ supply for a force of this size; the usual May and June
rains would have made the movement of our guns and baggage at first
difficult, and then impossible, and we had at that time no mountain
artillery or pack transport; we were by no means well placed in the
matter of artillery parks: the horses for those of the 5th, 6th, and
9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Divisions were still _en route_ to
Harbin, while the 1st and 2nd Siberian Divisions had arrived without
any. Finally, if Kuroki should fall back behind the Ya-lu without
accepting battle, we should have been obliged to retire and leave at
least an army corps to contain him. When the rainy season came on, this
corps itself would have been obliged to withdraw, as with interrupted
communications it would have been seriously threatened by Kuroki’s
far larger force, well provided with both mountain artillery and
pack transport. For these reasons an offensive towards the Ya-lu was
impracticable.
Under the conditions laid down by the Viceroy as to keeping screens on
the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and leaving a reserve at Hai-cheng[66]
until such time as fresh reinforcements had been received, a direct
advance on Port Arthur could only be made with one corps of twenty-four
battalions. In view of the possibility of Kuroki taking the offensive
in superior force (after reinforcement by the troops already beginning
to land at Ta-ku-shan) against our cordon, which extended along the
Fen-shui-ling range for more than sixty-six miles, and in view of the
possibility of the Japanese cutting off any detachment moving on Port
Arthur by landing somewhere in its rear, the despatch of this corps
130 miles to the south could not but be considered a most risky and
difficult operation.
As our numerical weakness absolutely precluded a general assumption
of the offensive on our part, I pointed out that by such a movement
for the relief of Port Arthur we risked disorganizing the whole army.
I also drew attention to the fact that, according to the report of
Captain Gurko, who had just arrived from the fortress, its combatant
strength amounted to at least 45,000 men (including sailors), and that
the enemy could not therefore have any very overwhelming superiority.
My views upon the inexpediency of any movement towards Port Arthur were
communicated to the War Minister in my telegrams (Nos. 692 and 701)
of May 28 and 30. But in a telegram of the 31st the Viceroy urgently
requested me to advance to the relief of the fortress, and expressed
the wish that four divisions should be detailed for the operation;
while on June 6 he quoted to me a message from St. Petersburg in which
it was stated that the time was “ripe for the Manchurian Army to assume
the offensive.”
At the end of May the first reinforcements—the 3rd Siberian
Division—began to arrive in the concentration area. This enabled me to
increase the force detailed for the advance into Kuan-tung up to 32
battalions,[67] 22 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 100 guns. As a reserve
to this force, the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division was placed in the
area Kai-ping—Hsiung-yao-cheng, and to a brigade of the 3rd Siberians
was allotted the duty of watching the coast from Newchuang to the
latter place. To hold Kuroki and the troops under Nodzu that had landed
at Ta-ku-shan in check, 40 battalions, 52 _sotnias_, and 94 guns were
left on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), distributed over a length of more
than sixty-six miles. The general reserve consisted of the 5th East
Siberian Rifle Division at Liao-yang, and a brigade of the 3rd Siberian
Division at Hai-cheng. Early in June the force detailed under General
Shtakelberg for the operations towards Port Arthur began to concentrate
at Te-li-ssu, with its advance guard at Wa-fang-tien. On the 13th the
Japanese themselves began to advance from Pu-lan-tien, and by the
evening of that day we had been able to rail two regiments of the 9th
East Siberian Rifle Division into Te-li-ssu. On the 14th the enemy’s
attack of our position there was repulsed, and on the following day
Shtakelberg proposed to make a counter attack, having been reinforced
at noon by the Tobolsk Regiment. However, the battle ended in our
defeat, and we were forced to fall back. General Gerngross, who was
in command of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, was wounded, but
remained in action. Shtakelberg’s orders gave him freedom of action,
but he was instructed not to accept decisive battle if the enemy were
in superior numbers. Simultaneously with the enemy’s advance from the
south, Kuroki moved forward on the 14th to the Ta Ling[68] (Pass)
from Hsiu-yen, where three (according to some reports four) Japanese
divisions were concentrated. Their 12th Division and three reserve
brigades were left to watch our eastern force, and a further movement
on Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, or Hai-cheng was quite likely.
In order to be in a position to check the combined advance of the
two Japanese groups, I thought it advisable to strengthen our
southern force, and therefore so rearranged our dispositions that
87 out of 110 battalions were massed on the southern front, in the
area Kai-ping—Hai-cheng, against Oku and Nogi. Fortunately for us,
the critical position of our eastern front during the operations at
Te-li-ssu was not appreciated by Kuroki, which fact favoured Count
Keller’s demonstration towards Feng-huang-cheng in the middle of June.
Otherwise Kuroki might have seized Liao-yang. On the 25th the enemy’s
advance against our eastern force was commenced. On the 27th Keller
withdrew some of his troops from the Fen-shui Ling (Passes) without
opposition, and by July 1 the main body was concentrated seven miles
east of Lang-tzu-shan and twenty-seven from Liao-yang. On June 27,
without any serious engagement, but under pressure from the enemy, we
abandoned the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), which they at once occupied.
A few days previously—on June 23—about a division of the enemy had
been located by Rennenkampf to the east of Sai-ma-chi. Believing that
Hai-cheng constituted our greatest danger, as the enemy might, if they
gained a success there, cut off Shtakelberg’s force close by, on the
29th I concentrated forty-one battalions and eighteen _sotnias_ under
Zasulitch at Hsi-mu-cheng, intending with them to hurl back the enemy
on to their Hai-cheng line of advance. However, on the same day we
discovered that those of the enemy who had moved at first from the Ta
Ling (Pass) along the Hsi-mu-cheng road had again retired to it.
This danger being temporarily averted, I ordered the 31st Infantry
Division back to Hai-cheng. As the defence of Liao-yang from the east
was the next most urgent matter, a brigade of the 9th Division, which
had just arrived from Russia, was moved to Lang-tzu-shan to act as
a reserve to the eastern force, which had been previously augmented
by the return to it of two regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle
Division. The other brigade was sent, under General Hershelman, who
commanded the division, to Hsi-kei-an village [at the junction of the
Liao-yang and Mukden roads], so as to cover the left flank of the
eastern force and guard the road to Mukden. Taking into consideration
the considerable increase of the eastern force, I ordered Count Keller
to take the offensive, so as again to get possession of the passes.
He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command,
he advanced with only twenty-four. Though our troops were successful
in the early hours of July 17, thanks to the gallant conduct of the
24th East Siberian Rifles under Colonel Lechitski, the result of the
day’s action was not favourable. Keller stopped the advance before
even bringing into action his strong reserves, with the result that at
nightfall the eastern force was once more on its former positions on
the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass). On the 19th the brigade of the 9th Division
was driven from its position at Chiao-tou, and fell back towards
Hu-chia-tzu.[69]
By the middle of July the disposition of the enemy’s forces was
approximately as follows: Kuroki, with three field divisions and
reserves, had captured the three Fen-shui Ling and Mo-Tien Ling
(Passes), and, with his outposts thrown out on the roads to Liao-yang,
had reached the valley of the Tang Ho, a tributary of the Tai-tzu Ho.
Nodzu, with an army of approximately the same strength, had captured
the passes on the Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and Hai-cheng roads, and
had two divisions and a brigade in reserve on the Hai-cheng line of
advance and one on the Ta-shih-chiao line. Oku, having moved up from
Kuan-tung with his army of some four divisions, had driven back our
outposts and occupied Kai-ping. Two brigades were left in reserve on
the line Feng-huang-cheng—Kuan-tien-chang. Thus, according to our
information, two armies of about 90 to 100 battalions had advanced
against us from the east, and one of about 50 to 60 battalions from
the south, whilst Nogi’s army of 3 divisions and 2 reserve brigades
had been left to operate against Port Arthur. Our dispositions were
briefly: 44 battalions against Kuroki’s army; 28 battalions on the
line Fen-shui-ling—Hai-cheng against 2 divisions and 1 reserve brigade
of Nodzu’s army; 48 battalions against Oku’s army, and 1 division of
Nodzu’s; 16 battalions were in the general reserve at Hai-cheng, and
four in garrison at Liao-yang. It must, however, be borne in mind that
the effective strength of our battalions was very far short of the
prescribed establishment.[70] From the beginning of the war up to July
only 3,600 men were received in the way of drafts.
With the above dispositions of the opposing forces, we should,
according to the theory of the art of war, have been able to operate
on “interior lines.” But for us this was extremely difficult, as,
in the first place, we had not enough men to attain the necessary
superiority over any one of the hostile groups without laying ourselves
open to defeat by the other two; and, in the second, the rains had so
seriously damaged the roads as to prevent the rapid movement (as we
had heavy guns and baggage) necessary for successful action even on
interior lines. Finally, as their bases (Korea, Ta-ku-shan, Pi-tzu-wo)
were enveloping it was possible for each of their groups to refuse an
unequal battle, and fall back without exposing its communications.
Still, notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, it was proposed
to attack Kuroki, who menaced our communications most, at the earliest
favourable moment. The troops which could be employed to strike him
were distributed in two directions: twenty-four battalions of the
eastern force on the main road from Liao-yang to Lang-tzu-shan, with
its outposts on the Yang-tzu-ling heights; and twenty-four battalions
of the 10th Army Corps on the line Liao-yang—Sai-ma-chi, with its
outposts five miles short of Chiao-tou. Twenty-four battalions of the
17th Corps were told off to remain as a reserve to these two groups at
Liao-yang, while to prevent our left flank being turned, and to cover
the Mukden road, the 11th Pskoff and 2nd Dagestan Regiments, which
had just arrived from Russia, were ordered to Pen-hsi-hu. But on July
23, when I inspected the 10th Corps, I found that it was absolutely
incapable of operating in the hills, as it had no pack-animals. In
fact, those companies on outpost duty on steep or high ground had
actually to remain all day without food or water. As the units of the
17th Corps were in a similar condition, it was impossible even to think
of at once assuming the offensive.
Meanwhile, on the 23rd and 24th, the enemy themselves took the
initiative by attacking the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps south of
Ta-shih-chiao. In spite of the fact that the position held by these
corps was very extended (eleven miles), and was divided in the centre
by a rocky ridge, and that its left flank could have been easily
turned, all the enemy’s efforts were repulsed. The regiments of the 4th
Siberians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, behaved splendidly,
but “in view of the great superiority of the enemy and the development
of an attack from the direction of Ta-ling,” Zarubaeff, who was given
general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early
on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force towards Hai-cheng.
On learning of this, I ordered General Sluchevski to make immediate
preparations for offensive operations, and, if Kuroki should cross the
Tai-tzu Ho and move towards Mukden, at once to advance, whether his
troops were prepared for operating in the hills or not, and endeavour
to strike Kuroki’s communications. However painful the abandonment
of the port of Newchuang was for us after our tactical success at
Ta-shih-chiao—for the enemy could now make use of it as a new base—the
strategical position of our army was improved. With the departure of
the southern force towards Hai-cheng, our greatly extended front was
diminished by twenty miles.
On July 31 the enemy advanced all along the line. As far as our
southern group was concerned, their blow was directed against
Zasulitch, who was holding a position west of Hsi-mu-cheng, especially
against his right flank, which was driven back in spite of the devoted
efforts of the Voronej and Kozloff Regiments. As any further success
on their part threatened to cut off the 2nd Siberians from the main
body of the southern group, I withdrew Zasulitch’s force to Hai-cheng.
On the same day, the enemy’s operations on the eastern front were
directed against both our groups. In the action on the Yang-tzu Ling
(Pass) General Count Keller was killed, and the unexpected death of
this gallant commander, together with the abandonment without orders
by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment[71] of the position which
protected his left flank, greatly influenced Kashtalinski (Keller’s
successor) in coming to his too hasty decision to withdraw the force
to Lang-tzu-shan. At the same time the 10th Corps was taken partly by
surprise,[72] and driven from its advanced posts towards Hu-chia-tzu.
Sluchevski, learning of the retirement of the eastern force towards
Lang-tzu-shan, and fearing for his right flank, then withdrew his corps
to An-ping. In these operations the corps commander displayed a lack of
energy, and several regiments showed great unsteadiness, especially the
reservists, many of whom actually left the ranks during the progress of
the fight.
The complicated nature of the situation now necessitated extreme
caution on our part, lest anything should prevent our concentration in
strength at Liao-yang, and there fighting a decisive battle against all
three Japanese armies with some hope of success. From Liao-yang to our
position on the eastern front, An-ping–Lang-tzu-shan, was twenty miles,
and to Hai-cheng forty miles. In order to insure the movement of the
troops on the southern front to their positions at Liao-yang in good
time, it was necessary to move them from Hai-cheng to the position at
An-shan-chan—fifteen miles from Liao-yang—which was fortified at the
beginning of the war. The retirement began early on August 2, and on
the following day the troops were concentrated on the position. In my
report to the Tsar of August 4, I gave the following general reasons
for withdrawing to the line An-shan-chan–Lang-tzu-shan–An-ping after
the July fighting:
1. The Japanese superiority in numbers.
2. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger,
carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack
transport.
3. Their energetic and intelligent leadership.
4. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and
5. The lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance
of what we were fighting for).
Every moment gained at the beginning of August was of great importance
to us, as the units of the 5th Siberians, which the Viceroy agreed
to send to the front—instead of into the Pri-Amur district, as was
proposed earlier—should have been beginning to arrive in Liao-yang.
Orders were therefore issued to fortify an advanced position half a
march from Liao-yang in addition to the main position at that place,
and for this time was required. Still, in spite of the obvious and
immense importance of every day we gained by delaying the enemy’s
advance, General Bilderling, who had taken over the command of our
eastern front from July 31, wrote that it was necessary to withdraw
his troops immediately without fighting to Liao-yang itself, while
Sluchevski urged that the army should be concentrated still further
north—in the area Liao-yang–Mukden. These officers reiterated the same
opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of
moving their troops towards Liao-yang became greatly increased by the
heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port
Arthur by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations
on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stössel’s highly
alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist
the fortress and make an advance of some sort—though it were only a
demonstration—towards Hai-cheng.
On August 25 the enemy again advanced, and on the 26th attacked us
on the eastern front, but their onslaught on the 3rd Siberians at
Lang-tzu-shan and the attempt made to turn our right flank failed.
Ivanoff (who was in command of the corps) handled his artillery most
skilfully, and all units of this corps behaved well. The reserves
sent up by Bilderling arrived in good time, but the enemy obtained a
position on the left of the 10th Corps which enabled them to menace the
retirement of this corps along the Tang Ho. In the hot fight on the
26th again several units of the 10th Corps did splendidly. At this time
a strong turning movement was discovered being developed against the
left flank of our An-shan-chan position; but by delaying and inflicting
heavy loss on the enemy on the Lang-tzu-shan and An-ping positions,
all the corps were able to fall back on the advanced positions at
Liao-yang, where the army was concentrated on August 29. At the
beginning of the action there the army was short of its prescribed
strength by 350 officers and 14,800 men. Excluding the men detailed for
extra duty (on the communications, etc.), the average strength of our
companies was only 140 to 150 rifles, and those companies that lost
most heavily in the previous fights could muster less than 100.
The detailed account of the battle of Liao-yang has long ago been
submitted to Headquarters. The following is a general description of
it: On August 30 and 31 the enemy attacked our advanced positions with
great determination, especially that of the 1st and 3rd Siberians, but
were repulsed everywhere with heavy loss. In this fight the regiments
of the 1st, 9th, 3rd, 6th, and 5th East Siberian Rifle Divisions
rivalled each other in steadiness and gallantry, while the dispositions
made by Shtakelberg and Ivanoff were good. Our success, however, was
by no means lightly gained. Our artillery expended as much as 100,000
rounds of ammunition, leaving us with only 10,000 rounds in the army
reserve. Moreover, excluding eight battalions furnishing guards and
holding the works of the main Liao-yang position, on September 1 only
sixteen battalions were left in the general reserve. During the 31st
we observed that large bodies of Kuroki’s army were crossing on to
the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. And, as the position held by the
10th Corps (against which Kuroki should have been operating in full
strength) had not for two days been subjected to any such determined
attacks as that held by the 1st and 3rd Siberians, there was every
reason to suppose that Kuroki’s main body was moving round to operate
against our communications. Accordingly a decision had to be made of
one of two alternatives: either—
1. To contain Kuroki with a small force and advance to the south
against Oku and Nodzu; or—
2. To fall back on the main Liao-yang position, leave as few troops
as possible to defend it, and then attack in force that portion of
Kuroki’s army which was moving round our left, and endeavour to crush
it by driving it back on the Tai-tzu Ho, which at that time of the year
was unfordable except at a few points.
As regards the first, even if we were successful against Oku and Nodzu,
they could always fall back on their communications if in difficulties,
and so draw us away from Liao-yang, while any success by Kuroki which
might lead to an attack by him on our communications would threaten
us with catastrophe.[73] In order to collect sufficient force to
move against the two armies, it would have been necessary to have
contained Kuroki with only such troops as were on the right bank of the
river—namely, the 17th Corps and two regiments of the 54th Division
(total, forty battalions) under Bilderling. But as these troops were
not yet seasoned, it was impossible to rely on their performing such an
extremely difficult task as that of holding in check Kuroki’s superior
numbers on the necessarily extended position they would have to occupy
[this fear was justified by subsequent events]. These considerations
led to the adoption of the second alternative.
On the 31st, under cover of darkness and without being pressed, we
began the evacuation of the advanced positions, which had already been
of value to us, inasmuch as the enemy had been weakened by the losses
incurred in attacking them. By the following morning as many as 100
battalions, with artillery and cavalry, had crossed on to the right
bank of the river. The Japanese did not occupy our abandoned positions
till the evening of that date, when they began to shell Liao-yang.
The general disposition of the army was as follows: 56 battalions, 10
_sotnias_, and 144 guns (under Zarubaeff) were still on the left bank;
30 battalions, 5 _sotnias_, and 84 guns were on the right for the
defence of Liao-yang itself. In addition to the small columns detailed
to guard our flanks and rear, the remainder of the army, totalling
93 battalions, 73 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 352 guns, were told
off to attack Kuroki. But in making this calculation as to the number
of battalions available, it is essential to explain a very important
factor. During the whole period of the war from its commencement
till August only 6,000 men had been received at the front as drafts
to repair wastage, and, as I have said, we began the fighting round
Liao-yang with a shortage of 15,000 men. The result of this, taken
in connection with the great number of men that had to be detached
for various non-combatant duties, and also our losses in the fighting
that had already taken place in the neighbourhood, was that the actual
strength of the ninety-three battalions was, on September 1, only from
50,000 to 55,000 rifles. For instance, the twenty-one battalions
comprising the 10th Corps (which took part in the affair of September
2) only numbered 12,000 rifles, and the total of the twenty-four
battalions of the 1st Siberians only amounted to 10,000. Kuroki’s army,
on the other hand, was calculated to number approximately from 65,000
to 70,000 men. The plan of operations for the troops crossing on to the
right bank was as follows: The force was to deploy between the position
held by the 17th Corps near the village of Hsi-kuan-tun and the heights
near the Yen-tai mines, which were to have been held by Orloff’s force
of thirteen battalions. Using the Hsi-kuan-tun position as a pivot,
the army was to throw its left forward so as to strike the Japanese in
flank. The position for the 17th Corps near this village was chosen by
Bilderling in preference to that which had been prepared for defence
beforehand on the right bank on the line San-chia-tzu–Ta-tzu-pu, and
sufficient attention was not paid to its fortification. All that was
done was to dig a few trenches, and no field of fire had even been
cleared in the _kao-liang_ crops. The consequence was that, in the
early morning of September 2, the enemy drove the 137th Niejinsk
Regiment from the peak north-east of this place, which constituted the
left flank position of the 17th Corps, and to regain this hill became
the first thing we had to do. For this Bilderling was given forty-four
battalions, with the 3rd Siberians in reserve, while the 1st Siberians
and Orloff’s column were to assist by threatening the Japanese right.
Both Bilderling and Shtakelberg had been instructed as to what was
expected of them, but they were given an absolutely free hand as to
their dispositions. Notwithstanding the large force under Bilderling’s
command, the operations failed in their object. Although the peak was
recaptured on the evening of the 2nd, we were again driven off during
the night, and had to fall back some two miles, only halting on the
Erh-ta-ho heights.
Orloff, on the other hand, moved from his position on the heights south
of the Yen-tai mines before he ought to have done, without waiting for
the arrival of the 1st Siberians. His troops became at once immersed
in a perfect sea of _kao-liang_, and were fired on from front and
flank; parts of the column were seized with panic, and the whole force
retreated in disorder towards Yen-tai station. A large portion even
went as far as the station itself. This sudden and unexpected departure
from the field of 12,000 men had a disastrous result on this flank. We
lost an excellent position, which should have served as the support for
our advance from the left, and the enemy, spreading away to the north,
had by 5 p.m., in spite of the gallant efforts of Samsonoff and his
Siberian Cossacks, occupied the whole range of heights and the Yen-tai
mines. With the occupation of these heights the whole of our left was
endangered. At midnight Shtakelberg reported that, owing to his heavy
losses in the preceding battles, he would not be able to take the
offensive, or even to accept battle on the following day.
Meanwhile the armies of Oku and Nodzu had advanced in force against
Liao-yang, but had been driven back by Zarubaeff. Here the main burden
of the fighting fell on the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which
behaved extremely well, as did the regiments of the 4th Siberians. On
the night of the 3rd, however, Zarubaeff reported that, though the
enemy had been repulsed, he had only three battalions left in reserve,
and needed reinforcements and gun ammunition. At the same time a
message came in from Lubavin, who was covering the Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden
line, informing me of his retirement to the Tung-chia-fen Ling (Pass),
sixteen miles from Mukden. From this it is evident that if, choosing
the first alternative, we had marched against Oku and Nodzu, Kuroki
could most certainly have driven back the 17th Corps and 54th Division,
and have seized the railway in rear of our troops moving southwards.
As we knew, however, that Kuroki was not operating against us with his
main body during the battle of the 2nd, we realized it might have been
sent to turn our left. Such being the situation, we had to decide
whether to maintain our hold on the river, or to abandon Liao-yang
and retire to the position on the left bank of the Hun Ho in front of
Mukden, which had been already fortified.
As regards the first alternative, it seemed possible that we might,
by an immense effort and skilful manœuvring, be able to hold on to
Liao-yang and throw Kuroki behind the Tai-tzu Ho. But for this it was
essential to draw in the force that had crossed to the right bank, and
to deploy it on a fresh line farther to the north, so that we might be
able to attack the enemy’s position on the heights near the Yen-tai
mines from the north as well as from the west. Such a movement would
have exposed our right, and would have isolated the position still
held by the 17th Corps on the right bank of the river. The Japanese
might drive it in and issue in rear of the troops at Liao-yang, for
that place was only eleven miles distant from the position to which
the 17th Corps would have had to retire if it were driven back. The
defenders of Liao-yang, being then attacked by Oku and Nodzu combined,
would be in a critical situation. As regards the second alternative,
a retirement on Mukden presented great disadvantages and dangers. It
increased the distance to Port Arthur; it would have to be carried out
under pressure from the enemy in front and on the left, and the roads
had been so much damaged by rain that it was doubtful whether we
should succeed in getting our transport or even artillery to Mukden.
The abandonment of Liao-yang could not fail both to depress the troops
who had so gallantly defended it and encourage the enemy. But, on
the other hand, we should be extricated by such a retirement from a
situation in which we were threatened in front and flank. A successful
withdrawal would also give time for the 1st Army Corps to come up, and,
what was not less important, for us to replenish artillery ammunition,
of which we were very short. Besides this, the banks of the Tai-tzu Ho
were specially unsuited for our troops, as they were almost entirely
covered with _kao-liang_. Our men were unused to this, lost their heads
whenever they got into it, and were very liable to panic.
On the whole, our past experiences of the offensive did not inspire any
confidence that we should be able to cope with the difficult situation
implied by a retention of Liao-yang. I decided, therefore, on the
retirement towards Mukden, which was carried out by September 7. The
most difficult work, especially on the early morning of the 5th, fell
to the lot of the 1st Siberians, who had to beat off Kuroki’s force
attacking from the east; this they did with success, and without losing
a single trophy, in spite of the difficulties in which we were placed.
A general account of the operations round Liao-yang, and a statement
of all the considerations which led to our retirement, were telegraphed
to the Emperor on September 11. On the 14th the army was made happy by
the following gracious message, which I received from His Majesty:
“From your reports of the fighting at Liao-yang, I appreciate
that it was impossible for you to have held that position
longer without risk of being completely cut off from your
communications. Under such conditions, and in face of the
existing difficulties, the retirement of the whole force across
country without the loss of guns or baggage was a brilliant
feat of arms. I thank you and the gallant troops under your
command for their heroic conduct and enduring self-sacrifice.
May God help you all!”
Upon retirement, our troops were grouped in two principal bodies—
1. The defence of the main position on the left bank of the Hun Ho was
entrusted to the 10th and 17th Corps under Bilderling, to whom was
subordinated Dembovski’s force of 10 battalions of the 5th Siberians,
which was guarding the near right flank of the main position.
Altogether, the troops under Bilderling’s command amounted to 75
battalions, 53 squadrons and _sotnias_, 190 guns, 24 mortars, and 3
sapper battalions.
2. The protection of the left flank from Fu-shun to the west was
entrusted to Ivanoff’s force, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of
the 4th and some units of the 5th Siberians (total, 62 battalions, 26
_sotnias_, 128 guns, and 2 sapper battalions).
3. To keep touch between these two main groups were the 1st Siberians
under Shtakelberg (total, 24 battalions, 10 squadrons and _sotnias_, 56
guns, and 1 sapper battalion). To his force was entrusted the defence
of the portion of the Hun Ho from Chiu-tien to Pu-ling.
4. The general reserve was disposed in two groups—
(_a_) 4th Siberians (24 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 12 mortars,
and 1 sapper battalion) on the line Erh-tai-tzu–Khou-kha.[74]
(_b_) 1st Army Corps, which concentrated in Mukden early in
September[75] (32 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 1 sapper
battalion), along the Mandarin road on the line Pu-ho–Ta-wa.
5. The protection of the extreme right was entrusted to Kossagovski
(6-1/2 battalions, 9 squadrons, 14 guns), the main body of which was at
Kao-li-tun on the Liao.
6. A brigade of the 6th Siberians (8 battalions and 1-1/2 _sotnias_)
was concentrated at Tieh-ling to protect our communications.
7. The Trans-Baikal and Ural Cossack Brigades which did not belong to
any corps were joined together under the command of Mischenko (21
_sotnias_ and 8 guns).
Besides putting the finishing touches to the main position at Mukden,
which had already been fortified, the defensive work consisted of
strengthening the Fu-liang and Fu-shun positions, and throwing up some
works on the right bank of the Hun Ho between Mukden and Fu-liang. The
object of these was to check the enemy crossing until our reserves
could come up. In addition to this, much was done to improve the
communications towards Tieh-ling. On September 20 I learned by telegram
from the Viceroy of the formation of the 2nd Manchurian Army. This was
to comprise the 6th Siberians and 8th Army Corps, five Rifle brigades
from Russia, a Cossack infantry brigade, the 4th Don and 2nd Caucasian
Cossack Divisions, and three dragoon regiments of the 10th Cavalry
Division. General Grippenberg was appointed to the command of this
force on September 24.
Our position at Mukden had some very grave defects.
1. Its left flank (Fu-liang–Fu-shun) was, owing to the bend in the Hun
Ho to the north-east of Mukden, thrown much too far back. If the enemy
were successful on this flank, and came out on to our communications,
we should be compelled to abandon the main position prematurely.
2. Almost immediately in rear of the position was the River Hun, which
was at the time unfordable, and could only be crossed by bridges.
Behind the river was the town itself.
3. The Fu-shun coal-mines, which were most necessary to us (for railway
fuel), were right in front of the position.
These drawbacks, as well as our great desire to prevent any of the
enemy’s forces being detached for the reinforcement of Nogi’s besieging
army, drove us to try and take the offensive as soon as possible.
Meanwhile the drafts whereby to replace our losses were still arriving
at the front very slowly; during July and August only 4,200 men were
received. On September 29 the eight corps composing the Manchurian Army
could only muster 151,000 rifles, the deficit in officers being 670.
Besides these corps, the Viceroy put the 6th Siberian Corps[76] under
my command, with the proviso that it should not be included in the
army, and should not be split up.[77] It was concentrated at Mukden on
October 8. My requests that the units of the 1st Siberian Division—some
ten battalions—which were not included in the army, might be made over
to me were not acceded to. But although we were really too weak, an
advance seemed more advantageous than waiting for the enemy to attack,
for there seemed little chance of our being able to hold our ground on
the Mukden positions.
According to our information, the Japanese main forces had crossed
on to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, between Liao-yang and
Pen-hsi-hu, and were disposed approximately as follows: In the
centre, behind the line Yen-tai station–Yen-tai mines, six divisions
with brigades in reserve; on the right, écheloned along the line
Pan-chia-pu-tzu–Pen-hsi-hu, two divisions with brigades in reserve;
on the left, more or less along the line San-de-pu–Sha-tai-tzu, two
divisions with their reserves. The enemy had fortified their positions
on the Yen-tai heights and at Pan-chia-pu-tzu. It was decided,
therefore, that the first object of our advance was to hurl the
Japanese back on to the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. To do this we
were to deliver a frontal attack, and at the same time endeavour to
turn their right, so that, if successful, we should dislodge them from
the hills. Orders were issued for the forward movement to commence on
October 5. The following was the plan of advance decided upon by me:
1. _Western Force._—This force, under Bilderling, consisting of the
10th and 17th Corps (total, 64 battalions, 40 squadrons and _sotnias_,
196 guns, and 2 sapper battalions), was to make a demonstration in
front against the enemy’s main force.
2. _Eastern Force._—This force, under Shtakelberg, consisting of
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberians (total, 73 battalions, 29 squadrons
and _sotnias_, 142 guns, 6 mortars, 32 machine-guns, and 3 sapper
battalions), was to attack the right flank of the enemy, moving round
it from the east. The first objective of this force was the enemy’s
positions at Pan-chia-pu-tzu.[78]
3. _The General Reserve._—This, consisting of the 1st Army Corps and
4th Siberians, with Mischenko’s brigade (total, 56 battalions, 20
_sotnias_, 208 guns, 30 mortars, and 2 sapper battalions), was to move
up in rear of the interval between the western and eastern forces.
4. _The 6th Siberians_ (32 battalions, 6 _sotnias_, 96 guns, and 1
sapper battalion) was to remain temporarily in Mukden (with a brigade
at Tieh-ling), so that it might either be moved to a flank or added to
the reserve, according as the operations developed.
5. _Flank Guards._—A force of 30-1/2 battalions, 39 _sotnias_, 82 guns,
and 1 sapper battalion was told off to protect the flanks. Of this,
19-1/2 battalions, 25 _sotnias_, 64 guns, and the sapper battalion were
to take part in the attack of the enemy’s position while keeping touch
with Dembovski’s and Rennenkampf’s columns of the eastern and western
forces respectively.
6. Should the enemy concentrate towards their right, an endeavour
was to be made to break through their centre in the direction of the
Yen-tai mines by the 6th Siberians, with Bilderling’s force and the
general reserve.
The advance began on October 5, and meeting with no determined
opposition, we on the 9th occupied the following positions:
_Western Force._—The line Shih-li-ho–Ta-pu.
_Eastern Force._—The line San-chia-tzu–Shang-shan-tzu–Ununin.
_In the Centre._—By the range of hills south of Khaamatan (with the
assistance of a portion of the general reserve).
The 4th Siberians, especially the Tomsk, Barnaul, and Irkutsk
Regiments, did excellent work, as did Mischenko’s mounted force,
reinforced by the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. Rennenkampf’s
column moved out into the Tai-tzu Ho Valley, and worked along both
banks of the river towards Pen-hsi-hu. Though the independent
regiments of the 1st and 3rd Siberians suffered heavily, overcame
the difficulties of the locality, and made altogether a gallant bid
for success, they failed in their object, mainly owing to the lack
of co-ordination in the plan of operations, and of cohesion in its
execution. On the evening of the 10th the Japanese themselves took the
offensive, having concentrated their main forces opposite our right and
centre. Bilderling’s western force, after fighting desperately against
heavy odds and losing forty-six guns, fell back on the 12th on to the
main position on the Sha Ho. Our centre, augmented by the 1st Corps,
found itself, in consequence, too far forward, and was obliged on the
evening of the 13th to commence a retirement on to the high ground near
the position of the western force, and occupied the heights south of
Erh-ta-ho. From the 10th to the 12th Shtakelberg’s eastern force made a
gallant but vain endeavour to get possession of the almost inaccessible
ridges to the north of the road from Pen-hsi-hu to the Yen-tai mines.
His dangerous position, thirteen miles in advance, and the necessity
for collecting enough troops in our centre to repulse the further
attacks of the enemy’s main body, compelled me on the 12th to order him
to withdraw to the high ground of the position occupied by the rest of
the army, and to move a portion of his force in support of our centre.
The enemy’s further attempts to drive us from the ground we were
holding were unsuccessful, though we were hard pressed on the Sha Ho,
and the general desire to retire on our Mukden positions became very
great. In a night attack on the 15th the enemy succeeded in dislodging
two regiments of the 22nd Division from the “One Tree Peak,” which they
were holding on the left bank of the Sha Ho between the villages of
Sha-ho-pu and Sha-ho-tung. The loss of this height, which commanded us
on the right bank of the river, and constituted, so to speak, the key
of our position, by no means improved the situation. On the evening of
the 16th, therefore, I concentrated a force of twenty-five battalions
under Putiloff, whom I ordered to attack the enemy in front and flank.
After desperate hand-to-hand fighting, he succeeded on the morning of
the 17th in driving them off the heights, and captured eleven guns, one
machine-gun, many limbers and waggons. This episode put the finishing
touch to the major operations of both sides, and we now proceeded to
pass the winter in our respective positions in close touch with one
another.
The reasons of the indecisive issue to the battle were:
1. Shtakelberg’s unskilful disposition of the large force put under his
command, which was (as we discovered later) almost three times the size
of that opposed to him.
2. The absence of proper control and generalship among senior
commanders of the western force.
3. The abortive operations of, and lack of energy displayed by the
officer commanding the 10th Corps. (Among other things, he not only
retired quite unnecessarily on October 12 from his position on the left
bank of the Sha Ho, but also neglected to warn his neighbour in command
of the 1st Corps, who was in consequence placed in a critical position.)
4. The useless manœuvres of the officer commanding the 31st Division,
who several times ordered one of his brigades to retire without due
cause.
5. The unsteadiness of many units.[79]
6. The lack of cohesion in the operations of the 6th Siberians (on the
right of the western force).
During this battle of the Sha Ho the senior commanders—Generals
Bilderling and Shtakelberg—were given instructions as to what was
required of them generally, but were left to make their dispositions
independently.
As will be seen from the above brief sketch of events, the September
fighting had no decisive results. The two sides suffered equally, and
lost about 50,000 men each. Still, our assumption of the offensive,
even with inadequate numbers, greatly improved our strategical
position by moving our general front thirteen miles forward in front of
Mukden, and afforded us a matter of four and a half months of time. As
soon as we occupied the positions on the Sha Ho from Shou-lin-tzu on
the right flank to Kao-tu-ling on the left, we set to work fortifying
them. Besides ten battalions of the 1st Corps, the whole of the 1st
Siberians and twenty-four battalions of the 6th Corps were moved into
the general reserve in rear of the centre, and we were confident that
we would be able to hold our ground. We still had, however, a very
small number of men—indeed, in some units the shortage was alarming.
The total strength of the 252 battalions comprising our army on October
25 was only 140,000 rifles, which works out at an average strength of
550 per battalion, while many battalions could not even muster 400
men. Not less disquieting was the lack of officers, which now amounted
in the infantry alone to over 2,700, or an average deficiency per
battalion of eleven. Meanwhile the drafts to repair wastage were still
coming up in driblets. In October and November we only received some
13,000 men. It was not till December 8 that they began to reach us in
any quantity; during that month and the first half of January 72,000
arrived. I reported upon this vital question in my letters to the Tsar
of October 26 and November 5.
In his despatches of October 23 and 26 His Majesty was pleased to
inform me that I had been appointed to the supreme command of all the
forces in the Far East, that General Linievitch was appointed to the
command of the 1st, and General Baron Kaulbars to the command of the
3rd Army.[80] My first act was to augment the army by adding to it the
whole of the 1st Siberian and 61st Divisions, the latter of which was
intended by Alexeieff for the Pri-Amur district. This at once added
20,000 rifles to the field army; the leading units also of the 8th
Corps began to arrive at the beginning of November, and at the end of
the month were concentrated at Mukden. But the main thing which still
remained to be done was the improvement of our railway communication
with Russia, which became more than ever necessary on account of the
increased army to be supplied.
On November 28 the effective strength of all three armies, including
the 8th Corps, amounted to 210,000 men. Our information as to the enemy
put their strength at this date at about 200,000. Although we were
rather superior in numbers, our superiority was too slight to insure
a successful offensive under the particularly difficult conditions
offered by the intense cold weather, and the fact that the enemy’s
positions were strongly fortified. The low temperature rendered the
lightest trench work practically impossible, and made the provision of
a large amount of warm clothing an absolute necessity. Our preparations
for the offensive, as regards making Mukden an intermediate base and
our engineering work, began in November. In addition to the branch
railway to the Fu-shun mines, which was completed that month, a branch
was laid to the right flank of our dispositions,[81] and a field line
to Rennenkampf’s force on the left.[82] But still, when December came
we were not ready to advance, mainly owing to the delay in railway
construction, largely caused by the weather. Although I was informed
by the War Minister, in a communication dated November 8, that the
running capacity of the Siberian and Trans-Baikal lines would from
October 28 be brought up to twelve pairs of military trains, we never
received as many right up to the end of the war. The result of this was
that the expected drafts, as well as the three Rifle brigades, arrived
about ten days later than we had calculated on receiving them, and
there was great delay in the distribution of warm clothing to the men,
particularly felt boots. Very great difficulty also was experienced in
collecting the food-supplies necessary for the forward movement, and
in organizing new transport units.
When, in the middle of December, I summoned a meeting of the three
army commanders and consulted them as to the possible date of an
advance, in view of the critical state of affairs at Port Arthur, they
unanimously stated that it was essential to await the arrival of the
whole of the 16th Corps. On receiving the news of the surrender of
the fortress, I again asked their opinions as to whether—in view of
Oyama’s armies being probably augmented by that of Nogi—they did not
consider it desirable to commence an advance at an earlier date. But
they still adhered to their former opinion, modifying it only to the
extent that we should begin our advance while this corps was arriving,
and not wait until its concentration was completed. As regards the
actual plan of the offensive operations, the opinions of the three
army commanders were the same—namely, that we should deliver the
main blow with as large a force as possible at the enemy’s left, and
envelop it. The only difference of opinion was as to the depth of this
envelopment. The boldest and most original plan was that proposed by
Grippenberg—namely, that he should undertake, with the 2nd Army, a
wide turning movement—almost an envelopment—of the enemy’s left in the
direction of Yen-tai station, and cut himself free from the 3rd Army.
He considered it necessary to have seven corps under his command for
this operation. This, however, was impracticable, as, even without
leaving any troops as a general reserve, besides the 16th Corps then
arriving, only four corps could be given him—namely, the 8th, 10th,
1st Siberian, and the Composite Rifle Corps. General Linievitch, who
was apprehensive that the enemy might attack the 1st Army, thought
it dangerous to give Grippenberg the 1st Siberians. Kaulbars, in his
turn, thought it impossible, without grave risk of the 3rd Army being
driven from its positions, to detach any portion of it to the 2nd Army.
Finally, Grippenberg’s plan, though it promised great advantages in the
event of success, seemed very risky, for it extended our already long
front still more, and made it so attenuated that it would be liable to
be broken by a determined attack at any point. Moreover, no general
reserve would be left at my disposal with which to deal with any
unforeseen emergency.
After proposing the above bold plan, Grippenberg suddenly went to the
other extreme, and became pessimistic. For instance, on January 13,
he informed me that the campaign was as good as lost, that we ought
to retire to Harbin, hold on to that point and Vladivostok, and from
thence move with two armies “in other directions.” On my asking him
which were the directions in which we should move, he gave no clear
explanation. The same idea was expressed also in a report received on
the same day (dated January 12) from General Ruzski, the Chief of the
Staff of the 2nd Army. In it was contained Grippenberg’s opinion that
it was impossible for us to dream of being successful after Nogi’s
arrival, and that—
“The officer commanding the Army accordingly inclines to the
conclusion that, under the circumstances, the best solution of
the question would be to fall back to Mukden, or further if
necessary, and there to await a favourable opportunity to take
the offensive.”
However, it was finally decided, in accordance with the opinions of
Linievitch and Kaulbars, and with the consent of Grippenberg, to take
the offensive in January, on the condition that complete and direct
touch was maintained between all three armies.
According to our information, the strength of the Japanese armies was
approximately as follows:
Kuroki’s Army 68 battalions, 21 squadrons,
and 204 guns
Nodzu’s Army 50 battalions, 11 squadrons,
and 168 guns
Oku’s Army 60 battalions, 29 squadrons,
and 234 guns
or a total in all three armies under Oyama of 178 battalions, 61
squadrons, and 606 guns. It was calculated that they could put 200,000
rifles in the field against us on January 14, 1905. As a matter of
fact, we underestimated the number. From the prisoners we took we knew
accurately what was going on in their 1st Army, but we were unable to
ascertain with sufficient accuracy and in good time what was happening
in the rear, or what reinforcements were being received. Their
fortified positions were as follows: The left flank up to the village
of Hsiao-tung-kou was held by Oku. In the centre was Nodzu’s army. On
the right was Kuroki. Opposite Rennenkampf, on our extreme left, was a
force under Kavamura amounting to about 15,000 to 20,000 men. Nogi’s
army was estimated at 72 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 156 guns; but
which units had reached Oyama, and how they were grouped, we did not
know.
In order to induce the enemy to detach as many men as possible for
their line of communications, and so weaken their front, to handicap
their supply arrangements, and to stop the rail transport of Nogi’s
units to the front, a raid by a mounted force[83] was organized against
their line of communications. The objects of this raid, which was under
Mischenko, were:
1. To seize Newchuang station, and destroy the large stocks of
food-supplies collected there; and—
2. To blow up the railway-bridges and destroy the track on the portion
of the line from Ta-shih-chiao to Kai-ping.
Neither object was fully attained, chiefly owing to the slowness with
which the force moved. Individual episodes that occurred are, however,
very instructive, and show that our cavalry is quite fitted to perform
the most self-sacrificing duties.
The plan agreed upon for the main advance was explained in my orders of
January 19. Just as it had been in September, our primary object was to
drive the enemy behind the Tai-tzu Ho, and to inflict on him as much
damage as possible. The force selected for our first attentions was
Oku’s left-flank army, the left wing of which was to be enveloped. The
advance of the 1st and 3rd Armies against the positions held by Nodzu
and Kuroki were to be started and developed in accordance with, and
depending upon, the measure of success attending the efforts of the 2nd
and 3rd Armies to capture the enemy’s left-flank positions on the Sha
Ho. The armies were given the following tasks:
1. The 2nd Army was to gain possession of the line of Japanese
works San-de-pu–Lita-jen-tun–Ta-tai–San-chia-tzu, and then the line
Tsun-lun-ian-tun–Ta-ta-san-pu along the Sha Ho. And, conformably to
the enemy’s action and the success attained by the 3rd Army, it was,
while throwing a strong containing force to the south, to develop its
operations towards the line San-tia-tzu–Shih-li-ho, and on the heights
south of the last village.
2. The 3rd Army was to capture the line of works Chang-ling-pu–Ling-
shen-pu, and then the line along the Sha Ho from the latter point to
Hun-ling-pu inclusive. And, conformably to the enemy’s action and the
successes attained by the 2nd Army, it was to develop its operations
towards the line Hei-te-kai Peak–Hung-pao Shan Peak.
3. The 1st Army was to co-operate in the capture of Hou-te-kai
Peak, and seize the heights near the villages of Cheng-san-lin-tzu
and Shih-shan-tzu. And according to the action of the enemy and
the successes attained by the 2nd and 3rd Armies, it was, with the
assistance of the 3rd Army, to develop its operations towards the
positions near the villages Ta-pu, San-chia-tzu, Shan-lu-ho-tzu, which
we had occupied on the 10th to 12th October.
In my orders of January 21 it was clearly defined that the above scheme
would require modification dependent on the line of action adopted by
the Japanese.
If, contrary to our calculations, the enemy preferred to contain our
2nd and 3rd Armies, and to fall with the rest of their forces on the
1st, or on the interval between the 1st and 3rd Armies, the position
would call for a very energetic advance against their flank by the 2nd
and 3rd Armies.
If they should at once fall back on their second line of positions
without holding on to their first line, we should endeavour to turn
their retirement into a disordered retreat.
January 25 was the day fixed for the commencement of our advance,
but, owing to the action of Grippenberg, who should have started the
movement, the arrangements had to be altered. Almost a fortnight before
our operations began our chances of success had been unfortunately
reduced by certain dispositions made by him. The corps to be attached
to his army were disposed as follows:
8th Corps South of the River Hun on
both sides of the railway.
10th Corps At Bai-ta-pu village on the
Mandarin road.
1st Siberians Behind the right flank of the
1st Army.
The right of the 2nd Army between the 5th Siberians and the River
Hun was only protected by cavalry, while a separate column of five
battalions and two cavalry regiments under Kossagovski was on the right
bank of the river. Notwithstanding the instructions issued that these
dispositions were to hold good as long as possible, in order that we
might conceal our intentions from the enemy, and also that the 10th
Corps—intended to act as a reserve in the event of their striking at
our centre—was not to be moved from its place without my knowledge, on
January 14 Grippenberg transferred the 14th Division over on to the
left bank of the Hun, and on the 16th, without letting me know, moved
the 10th Corps closer to the right of the 3rd Army. These movements,
of course, at once disclosed our intentions, and information soon came
in that the enemy had, in their turn, commenced moving their troops
westwards and fortifying opposite our new dispositions.
The strength of the army was:
+--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+
| | Bat- |Squadrons |Field|Mortars|Siege|Machine| Sapper|
| |talions| and |-Guns| |-Guns| -Guns | Bat- |
| | | Sotnias | | | | |talions|
+--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+
|2nd Army| 120 | 92 | 412| 24 | 4 | 20 | 3 |
|3rd Army| 72 | 18 | 294| 54 | 56 | 12 | 3 |
|1st Army| 127 | 43 | 360| 12 | -- | 8 | 5 |
|General | | | | | | | |
| Reserve| 42 | -- | 120| -- | -- | 4 | -- |
| +-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+
| Total| 361 | 153 |1,186| 90[84]| 60 | 44 | 11 |
+--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+
By the middle of January our numbers were, as regards rank and file,
almost up to the authorized war strength, except in the Composite
Rifle, 8th and 16th Corps, which had arrived short, so that the total
of our forces was about 300,000 rifles. Although the establishment in
officers was not fully complete, we now had some 5,600 in the infantry,
which gave us on the average 15 per battalion.
The advance began on January 25, as ordered, the 1st Siberians first
seizing the village of Huan-lo-to-tzu, and later, after a hot fight
lasting all day, the village of Hei-kou-tai;[85] Kossagovski’s
column gained possession of Chi-tai-tzu and Ma-ma-kai without much
difficulty. San-de-pu was not attacked that day. Of the 14th Division,
which was intended for this attack, three regiments were sent on
the 22nd to join Mischenko’s force, in order to strike a separate
blow at a small Japanese force of all arms, which, according to
spies, was in occupation of A-shih-niu. Mischenko moved against this
place with his infantry, but found no enemy there, and so the 14th
Division was marched forty miles on a fool’s errand, and only arrived
at Chang-tan on the morning of the 26th, thoroughly exhausted. The
action of the 25th for the village of Hei-kou-tai, which we only
seized with great difficulty and after heavy loss, in spite of our
overwhelming superiority, indicated that such strongly fortified
points as San-de-pu and Lita-jen-tun could not be attacked without
proper previous preparation, for we could not afford to waste men. I
particularly underlined the necessity for this in my directions—“For
the operations of the 2nd Army in capturing the enemy’s fortified
line San-de-pu–Lita-jen-tun–Ta-tai,” dated January 15, and also in
my instructions with regard to the 2nd Army’s operations against the
Lita-jen-tun portion, dated January 16. Notwithstanding this, in the
orders for the dispositions of the 2nd Army on January 26, it was to
operate on the line from Hou-leng-tai to the Hun—over a distance of
ten miles against a fortified position—and to capture the two strongly
defended points, San-de-pu and Lita-jen-tun. Grippenberg, moreover,
came to no understanding with Kaulbars as to co-operation, and it was
only upon a request made by the commander of the 10th Corps that the
commander of the 3rd Army arranged to co-operate with his artillery,
and so prepare the assault of the 5th Siberians. Being by chance in
Hsui-tun just at the time when the 10th Corps was making ready to carry
out its allotted task, I was able to avert a dispersed attack (over a
stretch of thirteen miles), and to prevent the employment of troops in
an unprepared assault on strongly fortified positions. The attack to
be made by the left flank of the 2nd Army on the morning of January 26
was countermanded by Grippenberg himself, but the order was delayed
in transmission, and if I had not been in Hsui-tun it would have taken
place.
The attack of the village of San-de-pu by the 14th Division alone
failed, and it could hardly have done otherwise in the absence of
any artillery preparation. Neither the ground round it nor the
fortifications of the place itself had been studied, and no sketch-plan
of it had been made or issued to the troops. The result was that our
guns shelled a village called Pei-tai-tzu, north-east of San-de-pu,
all day instead of the place itself, which they did not touch, while
the 14th Division attacked and captured Pao-tai-tzu (to the west of
San-de-pu), and reported to me they had taken San-de-pu. The outer
enclosure of San-de-pu village was mistaken by this division for that
of a _reduit_ inside the village, and acting upon the assumption that
they were not strong enough to seize this _reduit_, they were ordered
back to their former positions, and abandoned Pao-tai-tzu. Meanwhile,
having received the report that San-de-pu had been taken, Grippenberg
gave orders for the heavy guns and mortars with the 8th Corps to be
sent at once to the 10th Corps, in order to prepare the assault of
Lita-jen-tun next day. At the same time, as his men, who had had no
sleep for three nights, were utterly exhausted, he asked permission
to rest his army on the 27th. Accordingly, the 1st Siberians were
ordered to halt in the area south-east of Hei-kou-tai; but as we
had not yet taken this area, the order led to this corps having to
fight a separate action on the 27th for the possession of Su-ma-pu
and Piao-tsao. When it became known on the morning of the 27th that
San-de-pu had not been taken, Grippenberg was obliged to give up all
idea of repeating the attack on the 27th, as he had sent his heavy
guns to the 10th Corps. The decision was also necessitated by the fact
that the Japanese had sent up strong reinforcements. When Shtakelberg
was informed that San-de-pu had not been taken, he did not consider
it possible to carry out Grippenberg’s twice repeated order to cease
his attack, and late in the evening, after a hot fight, he seized the
greater part of Su-ma-pu by a disconnected attack with four regiments.
But being counter-attacked at dawn on the 28th by superior numbers both
in front and on the left, he was forced to fall back with great loss
(6,000 men). By that evening the 1st Siberians were holding a position
on the line Tou-pao–Chu-san-ho-tzu, which the Japanese continued to
assault with great fury till the early morning. The despatch of troops
towards Su-ma-pu in no way met the circumstances: it led to a needless
digression from the main objective of the whole operations—_i.e._,
San-de-pu—and generally to a still greater extension of the already
too long front occupied by the 2nd Army. In order to divert the enemy’s
attention from our right flank by a demonstration, the villages of
Hsia-tai-tzu and La-pa-tai were attacked and seized on January 27 by
part of the 10th Corps under Tserpitski; but as we were not ready to
storm San-de-pu, these places were abandoned.
The cavalry of the 2nd Army, under Mischenko, made a bold dash at the
enemy’s rear, and succeeded in killing and capturing a good many;
but their success would have been far greater had the Don regiments
under Teleshoff not been late in arriving. Mischenko, who was at the
head of the advanced _sotnias_, was severely wounded, and Teleshoff,
who succeeded in the command, failed to carry out the task entrusted
to him. He neither sent word that the Japanese were receiving
reinforcements, nor helped the Siberians when they were fighting for
Su-ma-pu.
By evening on the 28th the situation in the 2nd Army was roughly as
follows: The positions north of San-de-pu, along a front of eight
miles—from the positions occupied by the 3rd Army up to the River
Hun—were held by the 10th Corps and 15th Division; sixteen battalions
of the former had been brought closer to the river, and behind them
was the reserve of the 3rd Army, a brigade of the 17th Corps. The
Composite Rifle Corps and 1st Siberians were distributed along a front
west of San-de-pu, on the line Chan-chua-tzu–Tou-pao. Kossagovski’s
force was at San-chia-tzu. The reserve of the 2nd Army consisted of
only one regiment of the 14th Division,[86] and Grippenberg had (26th
to 28th) three times asked for reinforcements to be sent him from the
general reserve. The front of the 2nd Army was spread over twenty
miles. Thus, by the evening of the 28th the greater part of that army
was separated from the 3rd Army by San-de-pu village, which was still
in the enemy’s hands, and was dispersed over a long line fronting
south-east. Whilst so distributed, not only was it difficult to assist
it with troops from the 3rd Army in the event of its being attacked,
but there was the danger, if the enemy reinforced heavily, of their
being in a position to employ San-de-pu as a pivot, force back the
Rifle Corps, and break through on to the communications of the 1st
Siberians. Meanwhile reports came in which showed that only a portion
of the enemy’s available forces were operating against Grippenberg,
while the movement of Kuroki’s and Nodzu’s troops to the west showed
that the enemy could still throw another six divisions into the fight.
They might be moved against the weakened and extended front of the 3rd
Army, thrust into the interval between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, or
used as reinforcements to the troops operating against our positions
west of San-de-pu.
About 7 p.m. Kaulbars reported to me that the enemy had at 4 p.m. begun
a movement in great strength towards their advanced positions. At the
same time this movement became disclosed, and we opened artillery and
rifle fire. As the reserve of the 3rd Army had already been given
to the 2nd, I was obliged, as a temporary measure, to give Kaulbars
the 72nd Division from my reserve. This left me with only thirty
battalions of the 16th Corps, which had just arrived. Although the
positions held by the Composite Rifle Corps and 1st Siberians had
behind them an ice-covered river with steep frozen banks that hindered
the crossing of all three arms, and were therefore inconvenient, yet
the situation of the 2nd Army—enveloping San-de-pu, as it did—offered
us certain advantages if we could only drive back the troops attacking
the 1st Siberians and succeed in storming that place on the 29th.
When, therefore, the above report came in from Kaulbars, the Chief of
Staff of the 2nd Army was asked on the telephone when it was proposed
to start the assault on San-de-pu. To this Ruzski replied that it
certainly could not take place next day, as it had not been properly
prepared by artillery, and that it was impossible then to fix a time
for it. On account of the vagueness of this reply, he was instructed
to report to Grippenberg the information sent in by Kaulbars, and also
the orders in which the 2nd Army was instructed to take up a more
concentrated position in the early hours of the 29th, assuming as their
first task the defence of the line Ssu-fang-tai—Chang-tan—Ta-man-ta-pu.
Grippenberg, who was in a neighbouring apartment with a telephone,
did not say a single word to this message,[87] and these orders
were carried out. All the enemy’s attacks on the positions
Tou-pao–Chu-san-ho-tzu were repulsed by the 1st Siberians before
retiring.
Thus ended our first attempt at the offensive, and it cost us 10,000
men. The chief cause of our failure was, of course, our neglect to
prepare properly the assault on San-de-pu, which again was a sign that
we did not yet sufficiently respect our foe. Though a contempt of the
enemy was all through the war evinced by the senior officers when
they first arrived at the front, yet after our first actions it was
generally, and perhaps unfortunately, replaced by an exaggerated idea
of their merits. The absence of proper touch between Grippenberg and
the corps under him was also responsible for much, as, owing to it, the
transmission of orders and of information was greatly delayed. The
whole of the 8th and Composite Rifle Corps, again, did not shine in
action. For instance, on the 28th, certain units of the 15th Division,
though not at all pressed, began to retire without permission. By
doing so they exposed the siege battery they were covering, which was
preparing to destroy its guns and blow up its ammunition preparatory to
retiring itself.
On January 30 Grippenberg reported himself sick by letter, and by the
Tsar’s permission left on February 3 for St. Petersburg. This action
of his set a fatal example both to those under him and to the rest of
the army, and was most harmful to all discipline. The opinions, also,
that he had expressed, to the effect that the campaign was virtually
over, and that we should retire to Mukden and Harbin, had a dangerously
disturbing effect on our weaker members. It was in the long-run more
harmful than any single defeat of a portion of our force would have
been.
When the right flank of the 2nd Army fell back, the army held a
line from Fu-cha-chuang-tzu to Ssu-fang-tai. The enemy made several
unsuccessful attempts to drive us from those of their advanced
positions that we had captured, their main efforts being directed
towards the recapture of Pei-tai-tzu and Chang-tan-ho-nan. We, on our
side, made energetic preparation to continue the advance we had begun
so unluckily. Fresh siege batteries were brought up, the approaches to
the enemy’s defended posts were carefully reconnoitred, and detailed
plans were made. On February 16 we received some drafts, which were
used to make good the casualties in the 1st Siberians and the Composite
Rifle Corps, both of which had suffered so heavily at Hei-kou-tai.
On February 10 General Kaulbars assumed command of the 2nd Army,
and Bilderling temporarily took over command of the 3rd. Meanwhile,
early in this month, information kept coming in that large bodies of
Japanese cavalry with guns, together with bands of Hun-huses, were
collecting in Mongolia, especially near the portion of the railway
between Kung-chu-ling and Kuang-cheng-tzu, and early on the morning
of the 12th the enemy raided the line north of the station of the
former name and blew up a railway-bridge. The same day a reconnoitring
party of the Frontier Guards suddenly came on a Japanese force of two
cavalry regiments, a battalion, and some 2,000 Hun-huses near the
Mongolian frontier. In the ensuing action we lost a number of men and
one gun. General Chichagoff continued to report with great insistence
that large bodies of the enemy—over 10,000 strong—were collecting in
Mongolia for the purpose of cutting our communications. Believing these
reports, I detailed a brigade of the 41st Division and the whole of
the Don Cossack Division to reinforce our protective troops on the
railway itself, upon which, of course, we were dependent for supplies,
drafts, and reinforcements. In addition to this, I also put some 15,000
reservists[88] under the command of General Nadaroff, to strengthen the
Frontier Guards and the line-of-communication troops generally.
The rumours that we heard at this same time also of the landing of a
large Japanese force in Northern Korea (assumed to be in connection
with the liberation of Nogi’s army by the surrender of Port Arthur),
part of which might be detailed for operations against Vladivostok,
compelled me to take in hand the strengthening of our forces in the
Primorsk district, and of the Vladivostok garrison in particular. With
this end in view, a mixed brigade of six battalions, formed from men
of the 1st Army, was sent to the fortress. In order to enable this
brigade to be expanded into a division, and each of the Rifle regiments
in the Primorsk district into regiments of four battalions, it was
necessary, first of all, to divide the drafts which had come up for the
army between the field army and the troops in the Primorsk district.
Although forced to reduce the strength of the field army to the above
extent, I made a mistake in not insisting upon a sufficiently strong
general reserve being formed. To do this I should have taken the whole
of the 17th Corps into my reserve, though such a course would have been
against the opinion of General Bilderling (who considered it dangerous
to weaken the 3rd Army, as he had no reliance in the steadiness of the
reserve troops of that army, the 5th and 6th Siberians). Instead of the
thirty-two battalions, which would have been thus obtained, only one
division, the 6th Siberians,[89] was added to the general reserve.
In my orders issued after our disastrous action at Hei-kou-tai, it was
laid down that as many units as possible should be taken out of the
firing-line, so that strong army reserves might be formed. In order
to render this possible, it was pointed out that defensive positions
should not be held in equal strength along the whole front; that it
was sufficient to prepare and hold the most important portions of a
line as strongly as possible; and that, by holding on to these at all
costs, time would be gained in which reserves could be pushed up to any
threatened section. Unfortunately, I left too much to the experience
and discretion of the army commanders, and did not sufficiently insist
on exact compliance with my instructions.
Adhering to the original plan of offensive operations decided upon in
accordance with the opinions of all the army commanders, I requested
Kaulbars to fix the first day for the advance. He first chose February
23, but owing to the troops of the 2nd Army being worn out with the
very heavy work they had done in connection with the fortification of
the positions, the advance was, at his own request, postponed till
the 25th. On the 24th, however, Kaulbars heard that the date for
the assault of San-de-pu was known to the enemy. He therefore lost
hope of success, and asked that the assault might be indefinitely
postponed. Meanwhile, on the 23rd, the enemy advanced in force against
the Ching-ho-cheng column, and this body fell back from its fortified
position next day after fighting an unsuccessful engagement.
At the commencement of the Japanese advance our armies were distributed
as follows:
_Right Flank._—2nd Army, consisting of the 1st Siberians, Composite
Rifle, 8th and 10th Corps, a brigade of the 3rd and a mixed brigade
of the 5th Siberians (total, 126 battalions), occupying the line
Ssu-fang-tai–Chang-tan–Hou-lien-tai, a length of sixteen miles.
_Centre._—3rd Army, consisting of the 5th Siberians (less
two regiments), 17th Corps, and one division of the 6th
Siberians (total, 72 battalions), occupying the line Hou-lien-tai–Ling-
shen-pu–Sha-ho-pu–Shan-lan-tzu, a length of eleven miles.
_Left Flank._—Here were the 1st Army (less one regiment), 4th, 2nd,
and 3rd Siberians (the latter less one brigade), 71st Division,
Independent Siberian Reserve Brigade, and two Trans-Baikal
infantry battalions (total, 128 battalions), occupying the line
Shan-lan-tzu–Lu-chiang-tun–Erh-ta-kou–Lia-cheng-wu-tun, and further
along the right bank of the Sha Ho, having its left flank three miles
east of the Kao-tai Ling (Pass), a length of thirty miles. The 1st Army
also had independent columns at Ching-ho-cheng and Hsin-tsin-tin.
_The General Reserve_ consisted of forty-four battalions—namely, the
16th Corps (less one brigade) on the railway six miles south of Mukden
station, 72nd Division, and 146th Tsaritsin Regiment, behind the right
flank of the 1st Army at Huang-shan.
On February 23 the shortage in the infantry (rank and file) of all
three armies was 49,000.
A “Short Account of the Operations round Mukden in February, 1905,” was
submitted to His Majesty the Tsar with a letter from me dated May 13,
1905. A detailed description of these operations has been completed,
and has now also been submitted to His Majesty. The whole of the
Mukden operations can be divided into three phases:
1. From February 23 to 28, till the turning movement against our right
flank developed.
2. From February 28 to March 9—the period of our concentration on the
right bank of the Hun Ho, and our attempts to drive back the enemy who
were enveloping us.
3. From March 9 to 16—our final attempt to hold on to Mukden, and our
forced abandonment of it.
FIRST PHASE.
During this the enemy directed their attention exclusively to the left
flank of the 1st Army—to Rennenkampf’s force, the 3rd, and (partly) the
2nd Siberians. Amongst the troops operating against Rennenkampf was the
11th Japanese Division from Port Arthur, and from this it was surmised
that other portions of Nogi’s army were also acting on that flank. The
widely extended position of the 1st Army, bearing in mind the absence
of an adequate army reserve; the concentration of large bodies of
the enemy against the 2nd and 3rd Siberians, disclosed on February
24; the retirement of the Ching-ho-cheng force; the possibility of a
turning movement against it; and, finally, the decision of the officer
commanding the 2nd Army to postpone the attack indefinitely—all these
made me decide to reinforce the 1st Army quickly from my general
reserve, not only in order to check the enemy, but also in order
to operate actively ourselves. The first reinforcements despatched
were: a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division on February
24 to protect the left flank of the Ching-ho-cheng force, and the
146th Regiment and 2nd Brigade of the 72nd Division on February 25
to reinforce the left flank of the 1st Army. Finally, when it was
discovered that the enemy were operating in great strength against the
left flank of the Kao-tai Ling position, the 1st Siberians and 1st
Brigade of the 72nd Division were sent on February 27 to assist the
1st Army in its projected advance. On this day, also, the 85th Viborg
Regiment was sent to reinforce Daniloff’s force. When the 1st Army
received these additions, amounting in all to fifty-four battalions,
the advance of Kuroki’s army and of the right flank force of Kavamura
was checked; but still our intended advance did not take place (owing
to the exaggerated reports as to the enemy’s strength), and the 1st
Siberians were sent back to the right flank to rejoin the general
reserve.
SECOND PHASE.
The first report of large bodies of Japanese infantry appearing near
Ka-liao-ma, on the left bank of the Liao, was received on February 28.
News came in also of the enemy moving along the right bank, and of the
appearance of their columns at Hsin-min-tun. It was essential to take
immediate steps to meet them on the way to Mukden in their turning
movement. I thought it was possible, by using the positions of the 3rd
Army as a pivot of manœuvre, and withdrawing its right flank on to
the line Ling-shen-pu–Shua-lin-tzu–Lan-shan-pu, to leave[90] for the
defence of the section between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, and of that
on the right bank, a total of forty-eight battalions, and to transfer
on to the right bank the remainder of the 2nd Army (forty-eight
battalions), and, after reinforcing them with twenty-four battalions
of the 16th Corps and thirty-two battalions collected from the 3rd and
1st Armies, to detail them for operations against Nogi. The command
of the troops collected on the right bank of the Hun was entrusted
to Kaulbars, and I pointed out to him several times the particular
importance of rapid and energetic action against the turning movement
which threatened Mukden and our communications.
The first units sent from the main reserve at Mukden to the west were:
1. Towards Kao-li-tun, on the river, to operate against the wide
turning movement along the River Liao, a brigade of the 41st Division
under Birger.
2. To Sha-ling-pu, the 25th Division, under General Topornin,
commanding the 16th Corps.
3. Simultaneously the 2nd Brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions were
concentrated under the command of Topornin, south of the 25th Division,
on March 2.
The successive arrangements made by Kaulbars, in view of the enemy’s
advance—already commenced on the right of the 2nd Army; the abandonment
of Ssu-fang-tai; the withdrawal of troops from the right bank; the
relief of corps that had been engaged, and the retention of troops
which had already started towards Mukden, not only disclosed to the
Japanese the possibility of free movement along the right bank of the
river, but delayed the arrival on the western front of reinforcements
from the 2nd Army. General Topornin therefore received no support
either on March 2 or 3; still, he successfully continued on March 3
the attack commenced the day before on the village of Sha-ling-pu.
However, in view of the turning movement that had now become quite
clear against our right flank, Kaulbars ordered a retirement—though the
enemy were in no way pressing us—to the western Mukden fortifications.
The troops took up a line fronting on Ma-tuan-tzu–Wu-kuan-tun, and,
in spite of the orders given, did not occupy either the old railway
embankment or the fortified position west of Lin-min-shan-tzu.
This direct withdrawal towards Mukden placed our troops in a very
disadvantageous position, and enabled the enemy both to continue their
turning movement, and make it wider and more dangerous. Immediately
after our retirement from Sha-ling-pu, they moved forward quickly
and enveloped our western front, and, moving on March 3 across on to
the main Hsin-min-tun road, began to threaten Mukden from the north.
Birger’s brigade, which had now returned from Kao-li-tun, fell back on
Hu-shih-tai station.
The protection of Mukden on the west and north was placed under
Kaulbars, and was undertaken by units joining the general reserve.
1. The composite divisions of three regiments of the 17th Corps under
De Witte took up the fortified position at Khou-kha[91] on the morning
of March 3.
2. A force of seven battalions under Colonel Zapolski was sent to
Hu-shih-tai station.
3. The 10th Rifle Regiment was concentrated at siding No. 97.
4. Eighteen battalions of the 1st Siberians came up as a reserve to
these on March 3.
The concentration which I had ordered of the units of the 2nd Army on
the right bank of the Hun was taking place extremely slowly. Indeed,
some regiments which had already assembled had been sent back to the
left bank. When I reached Mukden on the 3rd, I impressed on Kaulbars
the necessity of not losing any time, and told him to attack the
following day, but gave him a free hand as to the direction of attack.
He did not carry out the order, owing to the concentration of his
army on the right bank not having been completed. Meanwhile, in the
early hours of March 4, the important hamlet of Ssu-hu-chia-pu was
evacuated by the 2nd Army, and at the same time Ivanoff withdrew the
15th Division from the position behind the Hun and the right flank
of the 3rd Army, which he had been told to defend, without fighting.
The latter thus became exposed. A brigade of the 5th Siberians and
nine _sotnias_ of cavalry, which had remained on the right bank near
Tung-chen-tzu, were moved across to the left.
During March 4, which was thus lost to us for offensive operations,
Nogi continued his turning movement, which was now becoming enveloping
and dangerous. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with Kaulbars,
I ordered him on the 5th to concentrate sufficient troops for the
purpose, and to attack the enemy’s left, and I again emphasized the
fact that our main chance of success lay in the rapidity and energy
with which he struck. In an order of the 2nd Army of March 5, a force
of forty-nine battalions was organized to make the attack under the
command of Gerngross. Here again the concentration was too slow, and
the right column only moved out from the line Sha-ho-tzu–Khou-kha about
2 p.m. Its right flank might have been strengthened by a brigade of the
41st Division with Zapolski’s column, and the left flank by sixteen
battalions of the 25th Division. We therefore might have contained the
enemy on the Yang-hsin-tun–Hsiao-sha-ho-tzu line with a force under
Tserpitski, and have attacked with a mass of seventy-seven battalions.
Kaulbars, alarmed at Tserpitski’s exaggerated reports as to the nature
of the attacks made on his left by some three divisions, moved a
brigade from Gerngross’s force behind the left flank, sent another
on to the left bank of the river, and stopped Gerngross’s attack
till such time as the result of Tserpitski’s action should be known.
The net result of these proceedings, of the late commencement of the
operations, and of their half-hearted nature, was that, although we
met with no opposition, on the 5th we moved our right only on to the
line Pao-ta-tun–Fang-hsin-tun–San-chia-fen; and so another day was
lost. In accordance with my orders for energetic action, the advance
of the right was continued on the 6th, but it was carried out with
less men than on the previous day (thirty-three battalions), without
energy or cohesion, and met with determined opposition at the village
of Liu-chia-kan. Then, before the whole of Gerngross’s force had
become engaged, Kaulbars stopped the advance, and gave orders to take
up the defensive. That day we got possession only of Tsuang-fang-chih.
In short, notwithstanding the great strength of the 2nd Army, with its
reinforcements of more than fifty battalions, on March 4, 5, and 6—the
three most important days—we moved our right only a few miles forward,
and took to defensive measures even on the western front.
Owing to the ill success of the operations of the 2nd Army on March
5, I issued orders to all the armies to send back their divisional
baggage along their respective lines of communication towards the
north of Mukden. On the 5th the Japanese began a series of attacks
on our northern and western fronts. On the left flank of our west
front they were everywhere repulsed by Tserpitski and Hershelman,
whose forces amounted to forty-nine battalions. In the centre of
the western front they won a partial success, on March 7 compelling
units of the 25th Division to retire temporarily from Wu-kuan-tun.
But on the northern front, which was the most dangerous for us,
they won great successes, on the 7th and 8th getting possession of
several villages. From there they repeatedly attacked our northern
force of twenty-five battalions under Launits, which was holding the
line Ta-heng-tun–San-tai-tzu–Kung-chia-tun. At the same time their
columns moved still farther to the north, and threatened Hu-shih-tai
station. To protect this, I despatched a force of six battalions of
the 4th Siberians to Tsu-erh-tun under Colonel Borisoff. To secure our
retirement to Tieh-ling, in case we should not succeed in beating off
Nogi’s army, on the evening of March 7 I gave orders to the 1st and 3rd
Armies, who were too far forward, to retire early on the 8th to our
fortified positions south of Mukden—at Fu-liang and Fu-shun. With their
retirement and the concentration of the whole of the 2nd Army on the
right bank it became possible to allot forty-eight battalions from the
1st and 3rd Armies to operate against Nogi, and to collect seventeen
battalions into the reserve of the 2nd Army. Of these reinforcements,
General Artamonoff’s force of ten battalions alone arrived under my
command on the 8th.
THIRD PHASE.
Having failed in our attempts to stop Nogi’s army, which was moving
round our right flank, first on the line from Sha-ling-pu to the
old railway embankment, and then on the line of the Hsin-min-tun
main road, I decided to try once more to block it on the line
Ku-san-tun–Tsu-erh-tun, and, if a favourable opportunity occurred, to
assume the offensive from this line. On the 9th we had the following
troops available for the purpose:
1. Borisoff’s column of 6 battalions holding the villages of
Tung-chan-tzu, Ku-san-tun, and Hsia-hsin-tun.
2. Artamonoff’s column of 9 battalions[92] at Tsu-erh-tun.
3. Hershelman’s column of 14 battalions, sent from the reserve of the
2nd Army to that place. Total, 29 battalions.
On March 9 I ordered Lieutenant-General Muiloff, to whom was given
the command of these troops, to co-operate with Launits’ force in an
attack on the village of Hei-ni-tun. The operation was carried out in
a disjointed manner, without careful reconnaissance, and without any
arrangement for co-operation having been made with Launits; a bad storm
and clouds of sand also impeded us, and the attack failed. The Japanese
continued their advance to the north-west. Thus, by the 9th, the enemy
was still not driven back on the side where they were most dangerous;
part of the village of San-tai-tzu, taken from us in the early hours
of that day, remained in their hands. The situation, indeed, appeared
critical, for we received news on the same evening of the Japanese
advance to the Hun Ho against the section Fu-liang–Hsiao-fang-shen,
which was held by weak units of the 1st Army, 4th and 2nd Siberians.
Indeed, if we delayed the withdrawal on Tieh-ling longer there was
great danger that some of our most advanced forces in the south and
south-west might be cut off. Therefore orders were given that same
evening for a retirement to Tieh-ling early on the 10th, and for this
operation roads were allotted as follows: The 2nd Army was to proceed
along both sides of the railway and west of the Mandarin road; the 3rd
Army along the Mandarin road and others to the east of it, as far as
the Fu-liang–Hsi-chui-chen–Hui-san–Shu-lin-tzu road; the 1st Army along
the latter, and the roads to the east of it.
Meanwhile the enemy had on the 9th broken through the 1st Army near
Chiu-tien, driving back part of the 4th Siberians from this point
to Leng-hua-chi. The officer commanding the 2nd Siberians (next
to them) did nothing but merely hold his position on the River
Hun at Hsiao-fang-chen, and the enemy spread out along the valley
Hsiao-hsi-chua–Hu-shan-pu. The attempt made to drive them back at night
by the Tsaritsin Regiment failed.
During the early morning of the 10th our position became yet worse;
on the right flank the Japanese drove back Borisoff’s force to
Hsiao-kou-tzu and opposite San-tai-tzu, and penetrated as far as the
grove of the Imperial tombs. On the east large bodies of them appeared
in sight of the Mandarin road. One was opposite Levestam’s force, while
another began shelling the Mandarin road near Ta-wa from the heights
near Hsin-chia-kou. The orders given on March 5 for the baggage to
be sent back in good time had not been carried out, and part of the
impedimenta of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which was stretching along the
road near Mukden early on the 10th, blocked the passage of the 5th and
6th Siberians and 17th Corps. On this morning also the Japanese, who
had broken through near Chiu-tien on the 9th, began to press our left
flank under Meyendorff. The troops sent as reinforcements did not act
together, and were driven back north-west. By 10 a.m. Meyendorff was in
full retreat—not north-east, but north-west towards the Mandarin road,
which he crossed between Ta-wa and Pu-ho. The 6th Siberians now began
to retire prematurely, and by so doing exposed the right of the 1st
Corps and the left of the 17th. This unnecessarily sudden retirement
of more than forty battalions under Meyendorff and Soboleff placed the
17th Corps and the 5th Siberians in a difficult position. Instead of
fronting south, they had to front south-east. After a hot fight this
force, consisting of thirty battalions, was also obliged to move to
the rear prematurely. They did not go to Ta-wa, but west and south of
the Mandarin road. This opened out a way for the enemy to that road,
and also to the railway north—further on the portion between Mukden
and Wen-ken-tun. By seizing this section about 2 p.m., before the
rearguards or even the tail of the main body had passed Wa-tzu, they
took our troops in flank. We had evacuated the village of San-tai-tzu
prematurely, and it was quickly occupied by the Japanese. Between
Wa-tzu and this village there is a defile, less than three miles long,
through which a large part of the 2nd Army had to force its way under
attack from both sides. Portions of the rearguards under Hanenfeld and
Sollogub, which tried to get round to the east of it, were captured or
destroyed.
I instructed General Dembovski to organize the defence of the Mandarin
road at Ta-wa, and for that purpose to utilize the troops retiring
along it. By 10 a.m. the distance between the portions of the enemy on
the west and east of the railway was only seven miles. It was vital
to stop any further contraction of the area of retirement of the 2nd
Army. This might be done by blocking the Japanese advance to the
railway from the west and north-west. As I was more anxious about the
latter direction than any other, I moved out the eighteen battalions
under Zarubaeff, which had joined my reserve from the 1st Army, on
to the line Ma-kou-chia-tzu–Yang-tzu-tun, and ten battalions of the
72nd Division on the front Tung-shan-tzu–Hsiao-hsin-tun. The first
force covered the railway between Hu-shih-tai and San-tai-tzu, and the
second barred the enemy’s advance and supported the right flank of
Artamonoff’s column. As a reserve to these troops, in case of pressure
from the east, a brigade of the 1st Siberian Division was left near
Hu-shih-tai station. By 4 p.m. the state of affairs on the Mandarin
road became worse, as, immediately after General Levestam’s force had
retired behind Pu-ho, Dembovski also abandoned his positions near
Ta-wa, and moved off to the west. The fighting ceased as darkness came
on. The last of the 2nd Army to fall back were portions of the 1st,
2nd, and 3rd Rifle Regiments under Lieutenant-Colonel Korniloff; they
broke through near Wa-tzu in the pitch dark, though hemmed in by the
enemy on three sides.
We continued to retire during the night, covered by the rearguard under
Muiloff and that of Zarubaeff’s column. On the 11th several units of
the 1st and 3rd Armies collected at the village of Yi-lu; but the
greater part of the 3rd Army fell back direct on Tieh-ling. Bilderling
was unable to carry out his proposal of remaining on the River Yi-lu
till the 12th, and, having taken command of Shileiko’s force, after
slight opposition retired northwards from Yi-lu village. By doing
this he placed the rearguards of the 2nd Army that were still south
of this point in a very precarious position. The main bodies of all
the armies began on the 11th to occupy a position eight miles south
of Tieh-ling on the Fan Ho. The 2nd Army took up a line to the west
and the first one to the east of the Mandarin road, the 3rd remaining
in reserve. Everything possible was done to restore order amongst the
troops, transport, and parks. On the 13th the enemy’s advanced troops
reached our positions, and on the 14th they attacked, directing their
main effort on the line between the sections held by the 2nd Siberians
and 72nd Division. All their attacks were repulsed with great loss, and
many hundreds of dead were left in front of our position. Our losses
were 900.
The two-weeks battle had badly disorganized several units, especially
those of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. The men who had got separated from
their own units and attached to others had to be sorted out and
restored, baggage, transport, and parks had to be separated, and
ammunition replenished. To carry this out made it essential that we
should not be in direct touch with the enemy—that there should be
some space between us. For this reason, and on account of the turning
movement against our right flank along the River Liao, discovered by
the cavalry, I decided not to accept battle at Tieh-ling, but to order
a general retirement of all the armies on the 14th to the Hsi-ping-kai
position, which was the best one between Tieh-ling and the River
Sungari. The 1st and 2nd Armies began to move out of Tieh-ling on March
16, and by the 22nd were on the heights of Hsi-ping-kai.
CONCLUSIONS UPON THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN[93]
Both the nearness of the events related above and our ignorance
about the enemy make it impossible for any detailed and absolutely
impartial judgment to be formed upon the reasons for our defeat in
this great battle. The records that have been collected so far,
however, are sufficient to throw light upon a few facts—upon certain
of our dispositions that did not correspond to the requirements of the
case. Those made by the commander of the 2nd Army, to which force was
entrusted the duty of stopping Nogi’s turning movement towards our
rear, are of particular interest, and certain of them which had a very
important bearing on the issue of the operations are now described.
General Kaulbars made neither a sufficient nor a clever use of his
cavalry. This fact, coupled with the unfortunate selection of its
leaders, was the reason why the mounted branch did such bad work,[94]
and behaved in a manner that can hardly be called “devoted” during the
Mukden operations. In the instructions given on March 1 to Grekoff’s
cavalry to operate against Nogi, the object to be attained was plainly
set forth, but how it was to be attained was not clearly defined. The
execution of its most important task was also made the more difficult
by the fact that Grekoff’s force was, on the same day as the orders
were issued, split up into two almost equal groups, of which the
eastern was found to be fighting Oku instead of Nogi. To rectify this,
the cavalry under Pavloff was ordered on the same day by Kaulbars
to undertake a special task against the turning columns, but on the
2nd the order was changed, and eight of Pavloff’s _sotnias_ were put
under the command of Launits, who was operating against Oku. No touch
was maintained between their different groups, and the greater part
of the mounted forces clung to the infantry, and did practically no
fighting (the losses suffered by this Arm during the twenty-three days’
operations in February and March were quite insignificant). Yet most of
our regiments were quite capable of performing the most difficult tasks
of war. The action of the infantry of the 2nd Army on the positions
which they had taken up was completely passive. They did not try to get
into touch with the enemy to ascertain their strength and dispositions
(by taking prisoners), or to occupy advanced posts where these would
be advantageous. The reconnoitring patrols of this army also did but
little work. The consequence of such unsatisfactory performance of
their duties by the cavalry and advanced infantry units of the 2nd Army
was that information of the enemy was so meagre that the appearance of
a great mass of Nogi’s army on and to the east of the Hsin-min-tun road
came as a complete surprise to Kaulbars.
Owing to the appearance of large hostile bodies near Ka-liao-ma, I
had on February 28 already ordered him[95] to take immediate steps
to ascertain their exact strength, the direction in which they were
moving, and their intentions. I repeated this order[96] on March 2,
instructing him to find out their strength and dispositions more
accurately if possible, and to frame some plan of action. I pointed
out the necessity for energetic steps to ascertain the whereabouts of
Nogi’s main body—whether it was opposite Sha-ling-pu, or whether it was
executing a wider turning movement. On the morning of March 5 I for
the third time[97] asked Kaulbars to find out where Nogi’s left flank
was. Not one of these orders was carried out, with the result that I
had inadequate and incorrect information upon which to form a decision
as to the strength and whereabouts of the enemy operating on the right
bank of the Hun. Tserpitski’s alarmist reports to the effect that more
than three divisions were opposed to him made the fog worse. Kaulbars,
who had been ordered to stop Nogi’s flanking movement, on the strength
of incorrect information, all the time turned his chief attention
towards the western front to Oku, whom he took for Nogi. The latter,
owing to the 2nd Army’s inaction on March 3, 4, 5 and 6, was made a
present of four days in which to complete his sweeping movement to the
north-east,[98] and Kaulbars continued to see danger only on the west,
paying insufficient attention to what was happening on the Hsin-min-tun
road, north-west of Mukden. On March 1 he conceived a most complicated
“castling” manœuvre, which he endeavoured to carry out when in direct
touch with the enemy. The Composite Rifle Corps was ordered to cross
from the right bank of the Hun on to the left, and the 8th Corps from
the left to the right. The Rifle regiments crossed over the river,
and by so doing evacuated the most important section near Chang-tan,
but the 8th Corps was unable to get across. The enemy at once took
advantage of this, and, rapidly throwing their 8th Division forward
along the right bank of the river, drove back the relatively weak force
of ours still on that side. Kaulbars, moreover, stopped the movement on
Sha-ling-pu (of the Composite Division under Golembatovski), which had
already been started, and by so doing deprived us of the possibility
of checking the heads of the enemy’s columns on March 2. Finally, the
5th Rifle Brigade under Churin—which was moving by my orders to operate
against Nogi—was stopped on March 3 by Kaulbars in the valley on the
right bank of the Hun, and found itself among the troops opposing Oku.
After weakening Topornin by sixteen battalions, Kaulbars, on reaching
his force, countermanded the advance on Sha-ling-pu, which had been
begun on the morning of the 3rd, and suddenly withdrew thirty-two
battalions to Mukden without fighting. This made our position
distinctly worse. He took no steps to establish and maintain touch
with Birger’s brigade on the Hsin-min-tun road, and never informed
the latter of the order to retire he had given to Topornin on the
3rd. In telling Launits on the morning of March 3 of his decision (to
withdraw Topornin’s force to Mukden), he stated that “Grekoff’s column
and Birger’s brigade are probably cut off from Mukden,” but he made
no attempt to help Birger. And yet up to 2 p.m. on the 3rd Birger’s
brigade was not even engaged. Our attempt to retake Ssu-hu-chia-pu on
March 4 was stopped by Launits, owing to the receipt of orders from
Kaulbars not to attack if it was likely to be a costly operation.
Kaulbars did nothing that day, although he had under his command
119 battalions[99] on the right bank of the Hun, and although I
had ordered him to assume the offensive. Moreover, he did not even
know the whereabouts of the troops under him. Although he had 113
battalions under his command on the right bank on March 5, he again
did nothing. He did not carry out my orders to attack the enemy’s left
energetically, and permitted these troops, which were at Khou-kha—next
to Gerngross’s force—to deploy very slowly, and stopped their advance
before they had got in touch with the enemy. Moreover, yielding to
the preconceived idea of the main danger lying in the west, he moved
sixteen splendid battalions of the 10th Corps from Gerngross’s force,
operating towards Hsin-min-tun, on to the left flank of the army. Yet
again on the 6th, although he had 116 battalions on the right bank,
he effected scarcely anything, for our active operations towards
Hsin-min-tun were conducted with an insufficient force, and therefore
failed.
The result of his dispositions from March 2 to 5 was that on the 6th
we did not have a single battalion of the 2nd Army operating against
Nogi, whereas we should have had forty.[100] All ninety-six battalions
of the 2nd Army were on that day distributed on the defensive against
Oku. This distribution of troops, which in no way met either the
general requirements or the definite task given to Kaulbars—to stop
Nogi’s army—constituted one of the main reasons of the failure of our
operations at Mukden.
On the 2nd and 3rd the following troops were given to Kaulbars from my
reserve for his operations against Nogi:
Battalions.
16th Corps 24
1st Siberians 18
De Witte’s column (3rd Army) 15
Zapolski’s column 4
――
Total 61
Moreover, sixteen battalions of the 10th Corps (2nd Army) were by my
orders concentrated opposite Sha-ling-pu on the 2nd, and on the 7th
the 10th Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 4th Siberians were
sent from my reserve to join Kaulbars’ army—_i.e._, he was given in all
eighty-one battalions, of which sixty-five had not previously belonged
to the 2nd Army. Of these, as transpired later, as many as thirty-five
battalions did not take part, or only took very little part, in any
fighting up to the 10th—_i.e._:
Battalions.
1st Siberians 13
De Witte’s column 13
2nd Brigade, 9th Division 8
10th Rifle Brigade 2
――
Total 35
These units either occupied defensive positions, and merely watched
the Japanese making a flank march past them,[101] or were moved for no
reason from one place to another (2nd Brigade of the 9th Division).
Their losses from the 3rd to 9th were trifling.
On the 4th, when I ordered Kaulbars to “move every available man on to
the right flank near the Hsin-min-tun road,” the reverse was done. Two
regiments (Tambov and Zamost) were moved from the right bank of the
river on to the left; the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Division was ordered
to move away from the Hsin-min-tun road, and crossed from Huang-ku-tun
to Liu-kou-tun, and the Primorsk Dragoons from an important position
on this road were sent to the rear to Hu-shih-tai.[102] On March 5 we
were able to collect more than 100 battalions for operations against
Nogi, 70 being concentrated by my instructions. But although Kaulbars
had received orders to send an army corps on to the right bank of the
Hun to engage Nogi, he not only did not carry out the order, but lost
five days (March 2 to 6), and thus allowed the turning movement to
develop so far that part of the force I had collected (25th Division)
was on the 7th operating, not against Nogi, but against Oku’s left
flank. Moreover, as he had on the 5th also weakened the force collected
by me to act against Nogi by sending 16 battalions to the left flank of
the 2nd Army, the result of these dispositions and our inaction during
these five days was that on the 7th only 37 battalions operated against
Nogi instead of 100. The loss of time, and the weakness of the force
that actually opposed Nogi, were largely contributory to our failure.
Having so far employed only a very small part of the troops entrusted
to him for offensive operations, on the 7th Kaulbars definitely and
finally assumed the defensive. He did not even seize the opportunity
of the repulses suffered by the enemy at Wu-kuan-tun and against
Tserpitski’s force to attack. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, with 140
battalions at his disposal, he assumed a passive rôle everywhere.
While allowing a great confusion of units, he did not take proper
steps, which he was quite able to do, to re-establish the corps,
divisional and brigade organization, and on the 8th he did not take
advantage of the possibility of forming a reserve from the entire 10th
Corps, which would have enabled him to re-establish the organization
of the other corps. On the 4th he removed Generals Muiloff, Topornin,
and Kutnevich from the command of their corps for no reason, and as
he did not replace them by other officers, the staffs of these corps
were headless. The employment of the reserves in the 2nd Army was
neither carried out by arrangement, nor in accordance with the actual
necessities of the situation, so that there were instances of reserves
being sent up when not required (Gerngross on March 8). In spite of
my order, which he received on the 5th, to send back the baggage and
transport to the north, Kaulbars only obeyed this instruction in regard
to Tserpitski’s and Gerngross’s columns on the 9th, and thus made
our retirement, especially that of our rearguards, most difficult.
He failed to observe the appearance or concentration of the enemy
on the northern front, and took no steps to avert this danger. The
concentration of our forces on this side was carried out under my own
orders. Had it not been for this, the enemy would have seized the
village of San-tai-tzu and the grove of the Imperial tombs on the 7th.
One occasion when Kaulbars did issue orders that met the case was
when he ordered Launits to attack the enemy on March 10 at Hei-ni-tun
so as to assist the retirement, and he got together a strong force
for this purpose. But then, when these troops were on the point of
commencing the attack, he went to Launits and countermanded it, without
even informing me of this most important change in his previous
dispositions. Yet, had this attack been only partially successful, it
would have greatly relieved the situation. Right up to March 13 not one
of the arrangements made by him was fully carried out, and it is clear
that he did not even then in the least appreciate the conditions. In
addition to wasting time, extending his front, and acting only on the
defensive, he did not realize the danger of Nogi’s appearance at such
a moment north of Mukden, nor of his movement round our flank. In a
letter to me of August 11, he wrote that on March 8 and 9, “although we
had been retiring for a week, circumstances were going very well for
us, as, the further the enemy moved northwards, the nearer they were
getting to their Poltava.”
From the above it can be seen that Kaulbars’ dispositions, his
inaction, and his misunderstanding of the whole situation, could not
lead the 2nd Army to Poltava. On the contrary, on March 8 and 9, 1905,
it was nearly a case of Tsushima.
It only remains for me to conclude with a few pages out of the short
report on the war which I submitted to His Majesty the Emperor.
“Of the many causes contributing to the disastrous issue to the
Battle of Mukden, I will only mention the following:
“1. The fall of Port Arthur liberated Nogi’s army, the whole
of which took part in the battle. The formation of the new
divisions in Japan was completed at the same time, and, judging
by the prisoners we captured, two of these also took part in
the battle. The immediate making good of wastage in their ranks
presented no particular difficulty to the enemy, owing to the
relative proximity of Japan to the theatre of war, and the
resultant ease with which she was able to transport her troops
by sea. Judging by the muster rolls found on the dead and
wounded, the effective strength of their companies was between
200 and 250 rifles, and all casualties were at once replaced.
“The liberation of Nogi’s army and the landing of troops in
Northern Korea compelled us to increase the force detailed
for the defence of the Primorsk district and Vladivostok,
and the appearance of bodies of Japanese cavalry, together
with artillery and numerous bands of Hun-huses in Mongolia,
coupled with the raids on the railway, which were becoming
more frequent, necessitated steps being taken to increase the
railway guard along its 1,350 miles’ length in Manchuria.
“These two measures took fourteen battalions and twenty-four
_sotnias_ from the field army, and also a large number of the
80,000 reservists then being sent to the front as drafts.
“All these things combined enabled the Japanese at the battle
of Mukden to be as strong as, if not stronger than, we were in
the number of rifles.
“2. The tardy discovery by our cavalry of the enemy’s movement
round our right flank, when ‘strong columns of Japanese
infantry’ had already appeared at Ka-liao-ma.
“3. The complete lack of energy displayed by the officer in
command of the 2nd Army in repulsing Nogi’s force which was
moving round us, with the result that we lost seven most
important days (March 1 to 8).
“4. His complete ignorance of the strength and whereabouts of
the enemy moving round his right. The lack of information and
the inaccuracy of what was received rendered some of my own
dispositions not only unnecessary, but wrong. As a particular
instance, I may mention that I only knew for certain when
it was too late that the enemy were not making (as had been
reported) a wider turning movement on both banks of the Liao
towards Tieh-ling.
“5. The lack of energy displayed by senior officers of the
3rd Army on March 10 in overcoming the difficulties of the
retirement. Their passive attitude with regard to the enemy’s
movements towards the Mandarin road—illustrated by the
diversion of the various columns (on encountering the enemy)
towards the west on to the line of retirement of the 2nd Army,
instead of forcing back the enemy away from the Mandarin road.
“The inaction of the 55th Division of the 6th Siberians was
remarkable. The commander of this unit, who only had this one
division under his command, decided to place it directly under
the officer in command of the 1st Corps. Having done so, he
rode away from his division to Ta-wa village. When he reached
the railway on the morning of the 11th, he was unable to inform
me where his division[103] was!
“6. The failure of the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armies
to carry out the orders I had given some days before the
retirement began to send back the baggage and transport
northwards. It was the disorder and panic which occurred
amongst these auxiliary services on the retirement that caused
the loss of so many guns and limbers, and ammunition and
baggage waggons.
“7. The inertia displayed by the officers commanding the 2nd
Siberian Division and the 2nd Siberians, when an attempt was
made to prevent the enemy breaking through near Chiu-tien, and
when later they spread north of the Mandarin road. Besides the
twenty-four battalions of the 1st Corps and the 4th Siberians,
which did remain on the right flank of the 1st Army, the 55th
Division might have been used in this operation. But the
officer commanding the 2nd Siberians received the enemy’s
advance passively, merely throwing back his right flank, and
thus presenting the enemy with an opening for their advance on
to the Mandarin road.
“8. Nevertheless, I consider that I myself am the person
principally responsible for our defeat, for the following
reasons:
“(_a_) I did not sufficiently insist on the concentration of
as large a general reserve as possible before the operations
commenced.
“(_b_) I weakened myself just before an important battle by a
brigade of infantry and a Cossack division (believing General
Chichagoff’s reports). If I had not sent one brigade of the
16th Corps for duty on the communications, and had insisted
on the 1st Siberians being sent back from the 1st Army at
full strength, I should have had two full corps available for
operations against Nogi’s turning movement.
“(_c_) I did not take adequate measures to prevent the
confusion of units. Indeed, during the battle I was myself
compelled to contribute to the disintegration of corps.
“(_d_) I should have made a better appreciation of the
respective spirit of both sides, as well as of the
characteristics and qualifications of the commanders, and I
should have exercised more caution in my decisions. Although
the operations of the 2nd Army from March 2 to 7 failed in
their object, my firm belief in ultimate victory resulted in my
ordering a general retirement later than I ought to have done.
I should have abandoned all hope of the 2nd Army defeating the
enemy a day sooner than I did; the retirement would then have
been effected in complete order.
“(_e_) When convinced of Kaulbars’ inertia and passive tactics,
I should have taken command of the troops on the right bank of
the Hun personally. On March 9 I should similarly have taken
command of Muiloff’s force, and acted as a corps commander.”
In my letters of March 31 and May 13, 1905, to His Majesty the Emperor,
I reviewed generally the factors which made the war extraordinarily
difficult for us.[104]
Has the army survived its Tsushima? No; it went through nothing
nearly so bad as that. We fought hard everywhere, and we inflicted
greater losses on the enemy than they on us. We were weaker in numbers
than they were, and we retired. Even the Mukden reverse owes its
reputation as a decisive Japanese victory to the impressions of our
own correspondents, who were with the baggage and in rear. Can one say
that the Russian land forces were defeated, when in the first important
battles (at Liao-yang and on the Sha Ho) we only put into action a
fourteenth part of our armed forces, and at Mukden, at a time when the
Japanese had already put forth their greatest efforts, we had less than
a sixth of our force? Nor must it be forgotten that we fought against a
nation of 50,000,000 martial and ardent souls, who, hand in hand with
their Emperor, were able to grasp victory by fearing no sacrifice. To
defeat such a foe in such a distant theatre of war, great and continued
efforts were required of the whole of our country as well as of the
army. In the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we
waged great wars with such leaders as Charles XII. and Napoleon. In
these we also experienced defeat, but in the end we issued absolute
victors. In the eighteenth century, between defeat at Narva and victory
at Poltava nine years elapsed; in the nineteenth, between defeat at
Austerlitz and our entry into Paris there was also nine years’ interval.
The events which happened in the Far East in 1904–05 can, owing to
their historical importance and their significance for Russia and the
whole world, be placed alongside those through which Russia passed
in the early years of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In
the struggle with Charles XII. and Napoleon the Russian people was
at one with the Tsar, and bravely bore all trials and sacrifices,
strengthening and improving the army, treating it with kindness,
believing in it, wishing it well, and profoundly respecting it for its
gallant deeds. The people realized the necessity for success, hesitated
at no sacrifice, and were not troubled by the time required to gain it,
and the harmonious efforts of Tsar and people gave us complete victory.
The way to victory is in the present day by the same road which our
ancestors followed in the early years of the last two centuries.
If mighty Russia, headed by the Tsar, had been permeated by a brave
and single-minded desire to defeat the Japanese, and had not stinted
the sacrifices and time necessary to preserve Russia’s integrity and
dignity, our glorious army, supported by the trust of its ruler and a
united people, would have fought until the enemy had been vanquished.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
THE ROYAL TIMBER COMPANY[105]
Among the first questions suggested by General Kuropatkin’s narrative
and the editorials, reports, and official proceedings that he quotes,
are: Who was State Councillor Bezobrazoff? How did he acquire the
extraordinary power that he evidently exercised in the Far East? Why
was “everybody”—including the Minister of War—“afraid of him”? Why
did even the Viceroy respond to his calls for troops? and why was his
Korean timber company allowed to drag Russia into a war with Japan,
apparently against the opposition and resistance of the Tsar, the
Viceroy, the Minister of War, the Minister of Finance, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, the Port Arthur Council, and the diplomatic
representatives of Russia in Peking, Tokio, and Seoul?
No replies to these questions can be found in General Kuropatkin’s
record of the events that preceded the rupture with Japan, but
convincing answers are furnished by certain confidential documents
found in the archives of Port Arthur, and published at Stuttgart,[106]
just after the close of the war, in the Liberal Russian review
_Osvobojdenie_. Whether General Kuropatkin was aware of the existence
of these documents or not I am unable to say; but as they throw a
strong sidelight on his narrative, I shall append them thereto, and
tell briefly, in connection with them, the story of the Ya-lu timber
enterprise as it is related in St. Petersburg.
In the year 1898, a Vladivostok merchant named Briner obtained from
the Korean Government, upon extremely favourable terms, a concession
for a timber company that should have authority to exploit the great
forest wealth of the upper Ya-lu River.[107] As Briner was a promoter
and speculator who had little means and less influence, he was unable
to organize a company, and in 1902 he sold his concession to Alexander
Mikhailovich Bezobrazoff, another Russian promoter and speculator, who
had held the rank of State Councillor in the Tsar’s Civil Service,
and who was high in the favour of some of the Grand Dukes in St.
Petersburg.
Bezobrazoff, who seems to have been a most fluent and persuasive
talker, as well as a man of fine presence, soon interested his Grand
Ducal friends in the fabulous wealth of the Far East generally, and in
the extraordinary value of the Korean timber concession especially.
They all took shares in his enterprise, and one of them, with a view
to getting the strongest possible support for it, presented him to
the Tsar. Bezobrazoff made an extraordinarily favourable impression
upon Nicholas II., and in the course of a few months acquired an
influence over him that nothing afterward seemed able to shake. That
the Tsar became financially interested in Bezobrazoff’s timber company
is certain; and it is currently reported in St. Petersburg that the
Emperor and the Empress Dowager together put into the enterprise
several million roubles. This report may, or may not, be trustworthy;
but the appended telegram (No. 5), sent by Rear-Admiral Abaza, of
the Tsar’s suite, to Bezobrazoff in November, 1903, indicates that
the Emperor was interested in the Ya-lu enterprise to the extent, at
least, of the two million roubles mentioned. Bezobrazoff’s “Company,”
in fact, seems to have consisted of the Tsar, the Grand Dukes, certain
favoured noblemen of the Court, Viceroy Alexeieff probably, and the
Empress Dowager possibly. Bezobrazoff had made them all see golden
visions of wealth to be amassed, power to be attained, and glory to be
won, in the Far East, for themselves and the Fatherland. It was this
known influence of Bezobrazoff with the Tsar that made “everybody” in
the Far East “afraid of him”; that enabled him to enlist in the service
of the timber company even officers of the Russian General Staff;
that caused Alexeieff to respond to his call for troops to garrison
Feng-huang-cheng and Sha-ho-tzu; and that finally changed Russia’s
policy in the Far East, and stopped the withdrawal of troops from
Southern Manchuria.
General Kuropatkin says that the Russian evacuation of the province of
Mukden “was suddenly stopped by an order of Admiral Alexeieff, whose
reasons for taking such action have not to this day been sufficiently
cleared up.” The following telegram from Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff,
of the Russian General Staff, to Rear-Admiral Abaza, the Tsar’s
personal representative in St. Petersburg, may throw some light on the
subject:
(No. 1.)
TO ADMIRAL ABAZA,
HOUSE NO. 50, FIFTH LINE,
VASSILI OSTROFF, ST. PETERSBURG.
Our enterprises in East constantly meet with opposition from
Dzan-Dzun of Mukden and Taotai of Feng-huang-cheng. Russian
officer merchants have been sent East to make reconnaissances
and examine places on Ya-lu. They are accompanied by Hun-huses,
whom I have hired. The Dzan-Dzun, feeling that he is soon to
be freed from guardianship of Russians, has become awfully
impudent, and has even gone so far as to order Yuan to begin
hostile operations against Russian merchants and Chinese
accompanying them, and to put latter under arrest. Thanks to
timely measures taken by Admiral, this order has not been
carried out; but very fact shows that Chinese rulers of
Manchuria are giving themselves free rein, and, of course,
after we evacuate Manchuria their impudence and their
opposition to Russian interests will have no limit. _Admiral
(Alexeieff) took it upon himself to order that Mukden and
Yinkow (Newchuang) be not evacuated._[108] To-day it has been
decided to hold Yinkow, but, unfortunately, to move the troops
out of Mukden. _After evacuation of Mukden, state of affairs,
so far as our enterprises are concerned, will be very, very
much worse,[108] which, of course, is not desirable._ To-morrow
I go to the Ya-lu myself.
(Signed) MADRIDOFF.
Shortly before Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff sent this telegram to
Admiral Abaza, Bezobrazoff, who had been several months in the Far
East, started for St. Petersburg with the evident intention of seeing
the Tsar and persuading him to order, definitely, a suspension of
the evacuation of the province of Mukden, for the reason that “it
would inevitably result in the liquidation of the affairs of the
timber company.” From a point on the road he sent back to Madridoff
the following telegram, which bears date of April 8, 1903, the very
day when the evacuation of the province of Mukden should have been
completed, in accordance with the Russo-Chinese agreement of April 8,
1902:
(No. 2.)
TO MADRIDOFF,
PORT ARTHUR.
There will be an understanding attitude toward the affair after
I make my first report. I am only afraid of being too late, as
I shall not get there until April 16, and the Chief leaves for
Moscow on April 17. I will do all that is possible, and shall
insist on manifestation of energy in one form or another. Keep
me advised, and don’t get discouraged. There will soon be an
end of the misunderstanding.
(Signed) BEZOBRAZOFF.
On April 24, 1903, Bezobrazoff sent Madridoff from St. Petersburg a
telegram written, evidently, after he had made his first “report” to
“the Chief.” It was as follows:
(No. 3.)
TO MADRIDOFF,
PORT ARTHUR.
Everything is all right with me. I hope to get my views adopted
in full as conditions imposed by existing situation and force
of circumstances. I hope that if they ask the opinion of the
Admiral (Alexeieff), he, I am convinced (_sic_), will give me
his support. That will enable me to put many things into his
hands.
(Signed) BEZOBRAZOFF.
General Kuropatkin says that Admiral Alexeieff gave him “repeated
assurances that he was wholly opposed to Bezobrazoff’s schemes, and
that he was holding them back with all his strength”; but the Admiral
was evidently playing a double part. While pretending to be in full
sympathy with Kuropatkin’s hostility to the Ya-lu enterprise, he
was supporting Bezobrazoff’s efforts to promote that enterprise.
Bezobrazoff rewarded him, and fulfilled his promise to “put many things
into his hands” by getting him appointed Viceroy. Kuropatkin says that
this appointment was a “complete surprise to him”; and it naturally
would be, because the Tsar acted on the advice of Bezobrazoff, Von
Plehve, Alexeieff, and Abaza, and not on the advice of Kuropatkin,
Witte, and Lamsdorff. It will be noticed that Von Plehve—the
powerful Minister of the Interior—is never once mentioned by name in
Kuropatkin’s narrative. Everything seems to indicate that Von Plehve
formed an alliance with Bezobrazoff, and that together they brought
about the dismissal of Witte, who ceased to be Minister of Finance on
August 29, 1903. Anticipating this result of his efforts, and filled
with triumph at the prospect opening before him, Bezobrazoff wrote to
Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff on August 25, 1903, as follows:
(No. 4.)