SUMMARY OF THE WAR
I have already reviewed[53] (in Chapters VIII., IX., X., and XI.)
the causes of our failure. They can be summarized in three groups:
1. Those causes independent of the War Ministry.
2. Those dependent on the War Ministry, for which officers in the field
had no responsibility.
3. Those for which officers in the field were alone responsible.
The first group comprises—
(_a_) The absence of any diplomatic arrangement which would have
enabled us to despatch and distribute our whole army freely as
circumstances dictated (similar to that which in 1870–71 made it
possible for the Prussians to move the whole of their armed forces
against France).
(_b_) The subordinate part played by the fleet during the war.
(_c_) The inferiority of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways.
(_d_) The internal disorders in Russia, which affected the spirit of
the army.
The second group comprises—
(_a_) The delay in mobilizing the reinforcements for the Far East.
(_b_) The transfer into the reserve during the war of well-trained
soldiers—men who were still liable for colour service—from the military
districts in European Russia, while untrained elderly reservists were
being sent to the front.
(_c_) The belated despatch of drafts to the front. (The reason of this
was also the inefficiency of the railways.)
(_d_) The delay in promoting those who particularly distinguished
themselves in the field. (Many recommendations were ignored.)
(_e_) The deficiencies in our technical equipment.
(_f_) The faults of organization (absence of troops for protecting
communications, dearth of transport, unwieldiness of the army and corps
organizations).
(_g_) Deficiencies in the _personnel_ both of officers and men.
The third group comprises—
(_a_) The absence of a true military feeling among the troops.
(_b_) The poor spirit in action shown by some of them.
(_c_) The lack of determination on the part of commanders of all
degrees to carry out the tasks entrusted to them.
(_d_) The breakdown of the organization under the stress of war.
The weak points of our forces, which were so noticeable in the wars
waged in the second half of the last century, had not been entirely
eliminated during the fifty years which intervened since the Crimea,
and were again evident in the recent struggle—namely:
1. We were inferior to our enemy in technical troops and equipment.
2. The “command” was unsatisfactory.
3. The army was insufficiently trained tactically.
4. We did not insure victory by having considerable superiority in
numbers.
We did not have before us any clear idea of our object, and
consequently did not show sufficient determination in its prosecution.
So many different reasons have been advanced for our failure that the
question naturally arises as to what foundation there really is for my
opinion—shared by the greater part of the army in the field—that if we
had not concluded peace so hastily victory would have crowned our arms.
My belief that we could, and ought to, have issued victorious from the
struggle is based upon—
I. The steady growth of our material forces.
II. The growth of our moral forces.
III. The gradual deterioration of the enemy
in both respects.
I.
We have already seen how fatal the inefficiency of our railways was for
us. Yet, though six months before the outbreak of war only two pairs
of short trains were available for military purposes, when peace was
concluded we had ten and even twelve pairs of full trains running in
the twenty-four hours. Thus, during hostilities the carrying capacity
of the railway grew sixfold, and was capable of still further increase.
Notwithstanding all our reverses, the army continued to grow in
numbers, and was 1,000,000 strong when peace was concluded, and more
than two-thirds of this number (including the newly arrived drafts,
the new corps, and the Pri-Amur troops) had not been under fire.
Moreover, owing to improved rail transport and the proper exploitation
of all local resources, the whole number was assured of everything
necessary, both for fighting and subsistence, to an extent that had
never previously been the case. We had received a proper proportion
of artillery of every nature, reserves of light railway material,
telegraph and wireless telegraph stores, and entrenching and technical
tools and equipment of all sorts. We had constructed three strong
lines of defence at Hsi-ping-kai, Kung-chu-ling, and Kwang-cheng-tzu;
our communications in rear were safe; almost every army corps was in
possession of its own line of rails; and the Sungari and other rivers
were crossed by many bridges. The war strength of all units had been
considerably augmented. Russia’s resources for continuing the struggle
were greater than those of Japan, for not only had our Guards and
Grenadiers not been drawn upon, but the greater part of the army was
still at home.
II.
Though an improvement of _moral_ is by no means as easy to bring about
in an army as that of its material condition, the officers who were
most in touch with our men were convinced that it was done in our
case. It may possibly be a peculiarity of the Russian soldier that
he possesses latent moral strength of the kind which is developed
slowly, and not destroyed by any trials to which the individual is
subjected; but to those who made a study of the war it appeared
perfectly clear that our men showed an increasing spirit of stubborn
determination as the campaign progressed. In the early fights before
the battle of Liao-yang—at Te-li-ssu and Ta-shih-chiao—we withdrew
after comparatively small losses. At the latter fight two army corps,
and at Yang-tzu-ling one corps, retired, though they together did not
collectively lose as many men as the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment
alone lost in the battle of Mukden. At Liao-yang our men fought better
than in the previous fights; on the Sha Ho they showed a better spirit
than at Liao-yang; while at Mukden many units showed a still further
improvement. We were all convinced, therefore, that in a defence of,
or an offensive advance from, the Hsi-ping-kai position, the men would
fight even better than at Mukden, for the improvement in spirit shown
by our troops had been progressive and steady. They had learned much,
particularly during their long stay in direct touch with the enemy
on the Sha Ho. Even the reserve units, which failed in the early
fights, fought with great bravery and steadiness at Mukden. To prove
this, it is only necessary to recall the exploits of the 71st and
54th Divisions, the later arrived reserve units of the 55th and 61st
Divisions at Mukden, and of many regiments of the 10th, 17th, and 1st
Army Corps. The regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps and the East
Siberian Rifles, indeed, were an example throughout the war.
The Tsar, in his Order to the army and fleet of January 14,
1905, predicted this improvement in the _moral_ of the troops,
notwithstanding their reverses, with great foresight. His belief in the
spirit of the army was expressed in the following memorable words:
“Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and
losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By
them Russia’s strength is renewed, and her power increased.”
As operations continued we made corresponding progress in our tactics.
We learned how to attack and make use of the ground, and how to
employ artillery, and learned by heart the lesson of keeping strong
reserves in hand [at the Hsi-ping-kai position the reserve of the 1st
Manchurian Army alone consisted of eighty battalions]. We also learned
how to obtain intelligence of hostile forces. At the close of the war
our knowledge of the Japanese dispositions was more complete than
it had ever been; indeed, we had accurate information of the exact
whereabouts, not only of their main bodies, but also of many individual
units. (This was chiefly obtained from prisoners.)
We received as reinforcements 300,000 regular soldiers then with
the colours, most of whom had volunteered for the front, and the
1905 recruits. These young soldiers were ready to face any danger;
they arrived in the highest spirits, and their cheerfulness and
evident keenness to see some fighting did one’s heart good. The
older reservists were mostly employed on duties in the rear. As a
result, volunteers were always forthcoming for the numerous raids and
reconnaissances made by the 1st Manchurian Army from the Hsi-ping-kai
position, or for any other adventurous work. The mainspring of the
improvement in our spirit, however, was the more careful selection made
of the officers appointed to command units. Many of these now began to
display military qualifications of a high order. The fighting round
Mukden had produced generals of a calibre upon which we could have
fully relied in any subsequent battles. As regards the general question
of the readiness of the 1st Manchurian Army for renewed fighting after
the Mukden battle, I concluded my report on this force as follows:
“With the occupation of the Hsi-ping-kai position the army
found itself confronted with a great work.
“No map of the neighbouring country existed, and the little
information we had of the enemy was chiefly remarkable for
its absolute vagueness. There were no roads to the rear, no
local depôts for the supply of the army, and no fords over
the Sungari River, which was a standing menace, as the usual
Spring floods were still ahead of us.
“The co-ordinated and willing efforts of all ranks, however,
soon changed all this. The fortified line of works from
Hsi-ping-kai Station to the village of Kung-chu-ling became
practically invincible, and the order was given to use it as a
_place d’armes_ and accumulate strong reserves there. In May
there were eighty battalions in reserve behind the left flank;
practically one-half of the five army corps was located here.
“A two-verst[54] map was made, showing not only the country
in our rear, but the strip of ground right up to the enemy’s
positions.
“By means of reconnaissances and the employment of spies,
we gradually sifted our inaccurate intelligence till our
information was correct. We were able first to locate the
disposition of the enemy’s armies, then of his divisions, and,
finally, of small units.
“The services to the rear were carried out with similar energy;
roads were laid out, the Sungari was bridged, and storehouses
were built.
“At the beginning of July the army was almost ready to advance;
the only thing lacking was the equipment for light railways for
horse traction. Without this it was impossible to advance in
any great strength.
“During the last few months a horse railway was laid to
Ya-mu-tzu, and the carriage of supplies for a forward movement
was thus assured.
“A connected series of reconnaissances were carried out in
order to gain knowledge of the ground in front.
“The army was brought almost up to full strength by the drafts
and new units which had joined.
“In August it was quite ready for battle, and its now
recuperated and reinforced veteran corps waited the order for a
forward movement in complete confidence.”
General Bilderling, who commanded the 2nd Manchurian Army (which
suffered the most heavily at Mukden), finishes his report on this army
as follows:
“The army occupied the Hsi-ping-kai position, shattered and
disorganized by the battle of Mukden; but it has recovered with
extraordinary rapidity. With the arrival of the young soldiers
and reservists, all the units have been brought up to full war
strength, and it is only in the officers that there is still
a great deficiency. The mounted units have been reinforced by
fresh squadrons and by horses from the artillery reserve; the
guns and waggons which were lost or had become unserviceable
have been replaced. Every division has been strengthened by
mounted and dismounted machine-gun sections, and howitzer
batteries have been formed; a light railway for horse-draught
has been laid along the whole length of the position and in
rear of it; and, profiting by recent experience, the troops are
now thoroughly proficient in all exercises and manœuvres. Thus
the army, by reason of its numbers, material composition, and
training, has become really better prepared for hostilities at
the close of the war than it was at the beginning, and again
constitutes a menace to the enemy.”
The 3rd Manchurian Army, which, under the command of General Batianoff,
formed a reserve for the 1st and 2nd Armies, and contained corps which
had arrived latest and had not been in action, was also a large and
reliable body of men.
Of course, there is a skeleton in every cupboard, and naturally in such
a large force as the three armies constituted there were weak spots.
Thus, there were to be found amongst the men, and even the officers,
a certain number of poor-spirited creatures who disbelieved in the
possibility of victory. But even such characters would have plucked up
their spirits and done good service at the first success.
From the moment I joined the army in Manchuria, I invariably told every
unit that I met or reviewed that the war could only end after we had
been victorious; that till then none of us would be allowed to return
home; and that victory was certain when sufficient reinforcements
reached us. And belief in these facts sank into the hearts of officers
and private soldiers. Both before and after Mukden, I more than once
heard the men themselves—particularly those in hospital—say that they
could not return home till the enemy had been defeated. “The women
will laugh at us,” were their words. Another important factor, and
one which the Russian especially values, is constant and affectionate
care for his bodily needs and his health. For anyone who has not been
on active service it is difficult to appreciate how troops who have
been disorganized and badly shaken by hard fighting can regain heart
if they suddenly find hot food ready for them. A night’s rest, a full
stomach, ammunition replenished, a quiet calling of the roll, and the
calm demeanour of their officers—all assisted to make our splendid
soldiers once more ready for the fray. As regards the army’s _moral_
generally, I should mention that the nearer our men were to the enemy,
the better were their spirits and the fewer the carping comments and
criticisms which always do so much harm; there was no time to read the
papers. When I visited the advanced units of the 1st Army (those of
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberians, and of the 1st Army Corps commanded
by Colonels Prince Trubetski, Tikhomiroff, Redkin, and General
Kashtalinski), I found universal keenness to advance. The men were well
looked after, discipline was strict, and the attitude of both men and
officers was one of quiet and steady determination. But in proportion
as the distance from the advanced lines increased, and direct touch
with the enemy was lost, there was time for talk and gossip. It was on
the lines of communication (particularly at Harbin) that drunkenness
and gambling took place, besides other forms of dissipation that
disgraced the army. It was here that the white-livered brigade
collected, leaving the front under any excuse even when fighting was in
progress, and, indeed, what else could be expected of them? It is much
to be regretted that some of our pressmen judged the army by what they
saw at Harbin, and that we were judged by this standard even in Russia.
Many officers and others in authority who had failed to pass the
“ordeal by fire” lived on in Russia, and from them a correct opinion
as to the self-sacrifice and devotion of the army and its readiness to
continue the war could hardly have been expected. Unfortunately for
us, also there happened to be on the Committee of Imperial Defence two
general officers who had been at the front. One had left it; the other
had been deprived of his command of an army corps. Clearly, such men
as these could not have much assisted this new and important body to
insist on the necessity of continuing the struggle.
A step taken by me to raise and to maintain the spirit of the army
was the rapid promotion of those officers who had most distinguished
themselves in the field. We obtained a number of our best senior
regimental officers by promoting captains, and, what is more important,
we appointed many distinguished officers to the command of regiments
without regard to their lack of seniority, or to the fact that some
of them were only lieutenant-colonels. In a very short time these
commanding officers improved their regiments almost beyond recognition,
and fully proved how important a careful selection is in war. By
promoting to Major-General those colonels who had most distinguished
themselves on service, we began to get at the head of brigades leaders
who were worthy of every confidence, and offered a splendid selection
from which to choose divisional and corps commanders.
A further step which I took to woo victory was to enforce the humane
treatment of the Chinese population of Manchuria. I, and those
immediately under me, insisted on their being protected (as far as war
conditions permitted) from unnecessary hardships, and on their property
being guarded, and I made a point of their being promptly paid in
cash for everything they brought in. This assisted us considerably in
getting supplies, and, notwithstanding the great hardships we ourselves
occasionally suffered, I invariably insisted on these relations being
maintained. Consequently, not once was I forced to have recourse to
requisitioning supplies or transport, nor had I to use force to get
local labour. The results surpassed all my expectations, for, in spite
of the great efforts made by the enemy to raise the Chinese population
against us, and in spite of the unfriendly feeling towards us of
many of the Chinese authorities themselves, the mass of the people
appreciated our attitude, remained quiet, and, by freely bringing in
their products, saved us from hunger. Although they might have easily
kept us in a perpetual state of alarm by killing isolated officials,
attacking small detachments, destroying the telegraphs and the roads,
they—with very few exceptions—lived on peacefully in the theatre of
war, in some instances even joining with us in fighting the Hun-huses.
Thus, besides the plan of campaign for carrying on the war—in which the
possibility of retiring even behind Harbin was foreseen—the principal
means taken by me to secure victory were:
1. To instil in all ranks a firm belief that the war could only be
brought to a close with victory, and that till victory had crowned our
efforts not one of us would return home.
2. To foster a constant fatherly endeavour on the part of all in
authority to attend, as far as the exigencies of the Service permitted,
to the comfort and preserve the health of the troops.
3. To assist in all ways the readiness and preparation of the troops,
particularly by accelerating, irrespective of mere seniority, the
promotion of the most distinguished of the officers.
4. To maintain a uniformly humane attitude towards the Chinese
population of Manchuria.
III.
The enemy’s army began to weaken in the moral as well as the material
sense.
To drive back our army northwards to Hsi-ping-kai called for immense
efforts and many sacrifices on the part of the Japanese. I have
stated (in Chapter VII.) that our Headquarter Staff estimated the
total peace establishment of their army at 110,000 men [of which
13,000 were always absent on furlough and leave], and the reserve and
territorial forces at only 315,000, so that the total number available
for service was, as we thought, not more than 425,000. But, according
to the figures of the Japanese army medical authorities, more than
1,000,000 men were called up to the colours, which must have demanded
a great effort on the part of the nation. It was found necessary also,
during the war, to alter the existing laws so as to catch those men
who had already completed their time in the reserve for a further
period of service in the regular army, and to draft into the ranks
in 1904 and 1905 the recruit contingent of 1906 as well as that of
1905. (Towards the end we began to find old men and boys amongst our
prisoners.) Their casualties were very high; in the Cemetery of Honour
in Tokio alone 60,600 men killed in battle were buried, and to these
must be added more than 50,000 who died of wounds. Thus it appears
from these two sources alone that they lost 110,000—a figure equal to
the whole peace establishment of the army. Taking into account our
standing peace army of 1,000,000 men, our losses were comparatively far
lighter than those of the Japanese. In all some 554,000 men passed
through their hospitals during the war, of whom 220,000[55] were wound
cases. Altogether they lost 135,000 men killed and died of wounds and
sickness. Their losses in officers were particularly heavy, and the
men fought with such stubborn bravery that whole regiments, and even
brigades, were on certain occasions almost wiped out of existence. This
happened, for instance, in the fight for Putiloff Hill,[56] on October
15; also during the February fighting for the position held by the 3rd
Siberians on the Kiao-tu Ling [Pass]; in the battle of March 7, at
Tu-hung-tun[57] and other points. At Liao-yang and Mukden the majority
of the enemy’s troops suffered very heavily in their frontal attack of
our positions, and failed to take them. The fate of these battles was
decided by turning movements. In the fighting on the Sha Ho they tried
hard to force us back towards Mukden, and many of their units were
again and again driven off our positions, and only occupied them after
we had abandoned them of our own accord. The spirit of these Japanese
troops who had thus seen no success attend their individual efforts
could not but be shaken. Again, the ever-increasing determination
displayed by our men must have affected their spirit. Their regulars
had been placed _hors de combat_ in considerable numbers, and however
quickly the recruits might be called up and trained, it was not to be
expected that they would be able to develop the same stubbornness in
defence, and the same dash in attack, that their comrades had possessed
in the first campaign. This was noticeable in the fighting in front of
Mukden, but especially near Hsi-ping-kai. While our scouting parties,
and the troops of the advanced posts, were pressing the enemy more and
more boldly, we began to notice a comparative lack of enterprise on
their part, coupled with a want of their former daring, and even their
watchfulness. Perhaps the strain of war was beginning to tell on the
Southern temperament. Indeed, for six whole months they gave us time
to strengthen ourselves and fortify, without once attempting to attack
and press us back on the Sungari, and so inflict a crushing defeat.
While we remained at Hsi-ping-kai the number of prisoners taken by us
began to increase, and they ceased to display the fanaticism shown by
those captured in 1904. Many openly acknowledged that they were weary
of the war, and from the nature of numerous letters from Japan found
on the killed and prisoners, it was evident that this weariness was
general. These letters also told of the heavy increase in taxation
during the war, of the increased cost of the necessities of life,
and of the dearth of employment. Once an entire company surrendered
in front of the positions held by the 1st Siberians, a thing that had
never happened before. Nor were the enemy well situated as regards
material. Money became more and more scarce, while the requirements of
the growing army increased. Particular difficulty was found in quickly
replenishing artillery ammunition. This was very noticeable on the Sha
Ho.
But what must have been the most serious source of anxiety to Japan
was the indifference which Europe and America were beginning to show
to her successes. At first it had seemed profitable to Great Britain
and Germany that Russia and Japan should be drawn into war, for when
they were exhausted the hands of both would be tied—ours in Europe, and
Japan’s in Asia. Nevertheless, it was not to the interest of Europe
generally to allow the triumph of the Japanese in the battlefields of
Manchuria to become absolute. A victorious Japan might join with China,
and raise the standard of “Asia for the Asiatics.” The extinction
of all European and American enterprises in Asia would be the first
object of this new great Power, and the expulsion of Europeans from
Asia would be the end. There is already little enough room on the
Continent of Europe. Without the markets of the wide world she could
not exist, and the cries of “America for the Americans,” “Asia for the
Asiatics,” “Africa for the Africans,” are of serious import for her.
But the danger is approaching, and is so imminent that the Powers of
Europe will be forced to sink their differences and unite in order to
withstand the attempt of the young nations[58] to drive old Europe home
into the narrow shell which she has long since outgrown. We might have
taken advantage of this change in international feeling, and have tried
to close the money markets of the world to Japan. Only one decisive
victory on our part was wanted to bring about a very serious reaction
both in Japan and in the army in the field. If we had exhausted her
financial resources, and had continued the war, we might soon have
compelled her to seek an honourable peace, which would have been
advantageous to us.
At Mukden we fought with a shortage in establishment of 300,000 men;
we began the war with inconsiderable forces; we conducted it under the
most unfavourable conditions, and without the support of the country;
we were, moreover, weakened by disturbances in the interior, and were
connected with Russia only by a single-track weak line. In these
impossible conditions we put 300,000 of the enemy _hors de combat_,
and had 600,000 rifles ready at Hsi-ping-kai at a time when they were
beginning to flag. If we attained such results, can it be said that
our army accomplished but little? Is it fair to continue applying
the epithet “Disgraceful” to the war? It cannot be denied that both
the troops and their leaders did less in the time at their disposal
than they might have done if properly supported by the country; but
by the summer of 1905 conditions had begun to change in our favour.
The conquered are always judged severely, and the leaders should
naturally be the first to bear the responsibility for disaster to the
troops under them. We can only be judged as acquitted because of our
readiness to continue the struggle—a readiness which was created, and
grew stronger in the army in spite of disaster. We believed in the
possibility and certainty of victory, and if it had not been for the
serious internal disturbances in Russia, we should have undoubtedly
been able to prove the truth of our belief in battle.
Even the inhabitants of Moscow, where, in all the difficult times the
nation has passed through, a manly and determined voice has always
been raised in support of the honour and dignity of Russia, showed
that their spirits had on this occasion fallen. It was with amazement
and sorrow that we read of a certain action of the Moscow Town Council
on June 7, 1905. The news had immense effect on the army, and on
hearing of it I sent the following letter[59] to Prince Trubetski, the
President of the Moscow nobility:
“An overwhelming impression has been produced throughout
the army by the news which has reached us from home that
many poor-spirited people are trying to bring about an early
peace. It is forgotten that a peace made before victory has
been won cannot be honourable, and will not therefore be
permanent. Never has our army been so strong and so ready for
serious battle as now. Victory is nearer than seems likely
to those at a distance. The troops have great belief in the
new Commander-in-Chief;[60] they are assured of everything
necessary to their wants, and their health is excellent. We
would welcome news of the enemy’s advance, and are ready to
move against them, when ordered to, with full faith in our
strength. The troops have become war-seasoned. Even those units
which were for various reasons not as steady as they should
have been in the early fights are now thoroughly reliable.
Numbers of wounded officers and men are hastening to rejoin,
though not completely convalescent. Though we have lost the
fleet, the army remains to us, and, I repeat, it is more
powerful than it ever was before. Our position is altogether
stronger and, tactically, better placed than those we held at
Liao-yang or Mukden, for the Japanese do not envelop us in
the same way. Though their forces have also been growing in
numbers, there are many indications that their strength is on
the wane: their ranks are being filled with men who formerly
would not have been accepted, and the whole spirit of the army
has undergone a change. More men allow themselves to be taken
prisoners than before; their artillery and cavalry are weaker
than ours, and they are short of gun ammunition. Letters from
Japan, which we have found on the men, show that a general
feeling of dissatisfaction with the war is growing among the
people, for prices have gone up, and they are enduring great
privations. These are the conditions under which I to-day
read in letters from Moscow that on June 7 the Town Council
discussed the advisability of inviting the representatives of
the people to consider the question of putting an end to the
war. Last February, on my departure for the front, you, in the
name of all the representatives of Moscow, bade me farewell
with words full of courage and of faith in the might of Russia.
I therefore consider it my duty to send this letter to you.
If the Muscovites do not feel as able as before to send their
worthiest sons to us to help us overcome the foe, let them at
least not prevent us from doing our duty in Manchuria.
“Although there is nothing of a secret nature in this letter,
its publication in the Press over my signature is very
undesirable.”
In reply, Prince Trubetski wrote to me on June 14 as follows:
“I have handed over your telegram, which greatly touched me,
to the Mayor and Zemstvo; I will communicate its contents to
as many as I can, and I will do everything that is possible to
get action taken on it. If it may be considered necessary by
the Tsar to end the war, I do not think it should be discussed
beforehand in committees. May God help you! My whole heart is
with you.”
But the efforts of individuals were powerless to check the march
of events. The serious state of Russia’s internal affairs and the
hostile—to put the best construction on it—indifference of the people
resulted in peace being prematurely concluded. The consequences
of making such a peace, by which Japan was recognized as Russia’s
conqueror in Asia, will have serious results not only for us, but for
all the Powers who have possessions or interests on that continent.
The “Yellow peril,” the appearance of which has only recently been
foreseen, is now a reality. Notwithstanding her victorious issue from
the war, Japan is hurriedly increasing her forces, while China is
forming a large army under the guidance of Japanese officers and on the
Japanese model. In a very short space of time she and Japan will be
able to pour an army of more than 1,500,000 into Manchuria, which, if
directed against us, could proceed to take a great deal of Siberia from
Russia, and reduce her to a second-rate Power.
We have seen above how the absence of any previous diplomatic
arrangements forced us to keep the greater part of our armed forces
in European Russia during the war, which fact constituted one of the
reasons of our reverses (the Guards and Grenadiers Corps remained
in Russia, while the reserve troops fought in Manchuria). We have
one consolation in that we now know that our Western neighbours are
not pursuing any policy of aggression against us, for they had an
excellent opportunity in the years 1905 and 1906[61] to alter the
existing frontier had they wished to do so. We may hope, therefore,
to be able to come to some understanding with the Powers of Europe by
which, should we be again attacked in the Far East, we shall be able
to throw the whole of our armed forces into a struggle with either
Japan or Japan and China combined. Another reason for our failure is
the fact that we were unable rapidly to make full use of such forces
as were available, because of the weakness of railway communication
between Russia and Manchuria. It is clear that, as matters now stand in
the Far East, the laying of a second track over the Siberian line and
the construction of a railway along the bank of the Amur are so vital
for us that no time should be lost in doing these things. The mere
construction of a line along the Amur can help us but little, while
a double-track line, even with forty-eight trains in the twenty-four
hours, cannot, of course, satisfy all the requirements of the great
army we should have to put in the field in the event of a fresh war.
In future we shall only be able to rely to a small extent upon the
vast supplies of food in Manchuria, and shall be obliged to convey
the greater portion not only of our munitions of war, but of our
food-supplies, from European Russia and Siberia. It will therefore be
necessary to make use of our water communications, for the failure of
the attempt to transport supplies in 1905 by the Arctic Ocean and the
River Yenissei cannot be considered final. Particular assistance also
could be afforded to the army by increasing the population of Siberia,
and so at the same time augmenting the local resources necessary for an
army. The rich reserves of metals, coals, and timber in that part will
assist us in bringing nearer to the Far East not only our food-supply
base, but also our war base (for ordnance, ammunition, explosives,
etc.).
Among the main reasons for our disasters must be mentioned the
indifferent, even hostile attitude of the people to the late war; but
the menace to our nation from the Far East is now so clear that all
grades of society ought to prepare—in case of a fresh attack on Russia
by Japan or China—to rise like one man to defend the integrity and the
greatness of our Fatherland.
Thus, to attain success in any such future war, which is by no means an
improbable contingency, we should strive—
1. To be in a position to make use of all our troops;
2. To have thorough railway communication between the Pri-Amur and
Russia;
3. To prepare the waterways of Siberia for the carriage of heavy goods
in bulk from west to east;
4. To move the army’s base as far as possible from Russia into Siberia;
and, what is most important—
5. To make ready to carry on a new war not only with the army, but with
the whole of a patriotic nation.
History had apparently destined Russia to undergo a bitter trial from
1904 to 1906, both on the field of battle and at home. Our great nation
has issued renewed and strengthened from still heavier trials, and let
us not doubt now but that Russia, summoned by the Tsar to a new life,
will quickly recover from the temporary blows which she has sustained,
and will not fall from her high place among the other nations of the
world. As regards the army, its bitter experiences should not on this
occasion fail to bear fruit, and the most detailed, thorough, and
fearless study of all its defects can only bring about a renewal and
increase of strength. We must remember one point—and it is the main
point: our officers and many of the men conducted themselves most
unselfishly in most difficult circumstances. Given this, all our other
faults can be comparatively quickly mended; but before all else, we
must not be afraid of openly acknowledging them.
Strength lies—in the truth.
In this important work of rejuvenation which is now beginning in Russia
for the good of the people and the army, we must remember the great
words of the Tsar to the Army and Fleet almost two years ago:
“Russia is mighty. During the thousand years of her existence
there have been years of still greater suffering—years when
greater danger menaced. Yet she has every time issued from the
struggle with fresh glory, with added might.
“Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and
losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By
them Russia’s strength is renewed and her power increased.
“A. N. KUROPATKIN, GENERAL.
“SHESHURINO,[62]
“_November 30, 1906_.”
END OF VOLUME IV. OF THE ORIGINAL