be transferred to Dalny, and this in co-partnership with the
Ministry of Finance. The Manchurian Steamship Line will have
all our ocean freight, amounting to 25,000,000 feet of timber,
and the business will become international. From this you will
understand how I selected my base and my lines of operation.”
In view of the complete defeat of such clear-sighted statesmen and sane
counsellors as Kuropatkin, Witte, and Lamsdorff, there can be no doubt
that Bezobrazoff’s “base and lines of operation” were well “selected.”
The document that most clearly shows the interest of the Tsar in the
Ya-lu timber enterprise is a telegram sent to Bezobrazoff at Port
Arthur in November, 1903, by Rear-Admiral Abaza, who was then Director
of the Special Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, over which the Tsar
presided, and who acted as the latter’s personal representative in
all dealings with Bezobrazoff and the timber company. In the original
of this telegram significant words, such as “Witte,” “Emperor,”
“millions,” “garrison,” “reinforcement,” etc., were in cipher; but when
Bezobrazoff read it he (or possibly his private secretary) interlined
the equivalents of the cipher words, and also, in one place, a query
as to the significance of _artels_—did it mean mounted riflemen or
artillery? The following copy was made from the interlined original:
(No. 5.)
FROM PETERSBURG,
_November 14–27, 1903_.
TO BEZOBRAZOFF,
PORT ARTHUR.
Witte has told the Emperor that you have already spent the
whole of the two millions. Your telegram with regard to
expenditure has made it possible for me to report on this
disgusting slander, and at the same time contradict it.
Remember that the Chief counts on your not touching a rouble
more than the three hundred without permission in every
case. Yesterday I reported again your ideas with regard to
the reinforcement of the garrison, and also with regard to
the _artels_ (mounted Rifles or artillery?) in the basin.
The Emperor directed me to reply that he takes all that you
say into consideration, and that in principle he approves.
In connection with this the Emperor again confirmed his
order that the Admiral telegraph directly to him. He expects
a telegram soon, and immediately upon the receipt of the
Admiral’s statement arrangements will be made with regard to
the reinforcement of the garrison, and at the same time with
regard to the mounted Rifles in the basin. In the course of the
conversation the Emperor expressed the fullest confidence in
you.
(Signed) ABAZA.
General Kuropatkin refers again and again to the Tsar’s “clearly
expressed desire that war should be avoided,” and he regrets that His
Imperial Majesty’s subordinates “were unable to execute his will.”
It is more than likely that Nicholas II. did wish to avoid war—if he
could do so without impairing the value of the family investment in
the Korean timber company—but from the above telegram it appears that
as late as November 27, 1903, only seventy days before the rupture
with Japan, he was still disregarding the sane and judicious advice
of Kuropatkin, was still expressing “the fullest confidence” in
Bezobrazoff, and was still ordering troops to the valley of the Ya-lu.
APPENDIX II
BREAKDOWN OF THE UNIT ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION[109]
Amongst the causes which added to our difficulties must be mentioned
the frequent breakdown in action of the normal organization of the
troops. It began when war was declared, and though efforts were made
to rectify things as far as possible, it was not till after the battle
of the Sha Ho that we were really able to re-establish our formations.
But both the corps and divisional organization again disappeared during
the battle of Mukden, and the resulting confusion to a certain extent
contributed to our defeat.
When war began the corps organization of the troops stationed in the
Far East was not complete, and one corps was formed of the independent
Rifle brigades. When the Rifle regiments were brought up to a strength
of twelve battalions, the normal composition of the 1st and 3rd
Siberian Divisions was twenty-four battalions. The 2nd Siberian Corps
was supposed to consist of one Rifle division and one reserve division
formed in the Trans-Baikal district. Before hostilities commenced,
a division of the 3rd Siberian Corps (the 3rd East Siberian Rifle
Division) was moved by the Viceroy to the Ya-lu; the 4th East Siberian
Rifle Division, with the corps staff, remained in Kuan-tung. The 1st
Reserve Division, which constituted part of the 2nd Siberian Corps,
I kept at Harbin, and this corps remained with only one division
till I was appointed Commander-in-Chief. When the operations began, I
endeavoured to reform the dislocated corps organization. I therefore
collected on the line Liao-yang–Feng-huang-cheng the 3rd and 6th
Siberian Rifle Divisions, and formed with them a corps which I called
the 3rd Siberians. At first I did not succeed in sending to this corps
the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—it being stationed in Mukden as
a guard on the Viceroy’s Headquarters—and my subsequent request that
it might be sent to the Ya-lu to join the corps there was refused;
it was only sent forward after the battle of the Ya-lu. The line
Liao-yang–Ta-shih-chiao–Port Arthur was guarded by the 1st Siberian
Corps, at full strength. The 2nd Siberian Corps, in which was included
the 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions, which had arrived in
the Far East in 1903, composed my reserve, and was divided between
Liao-yang and Hai-cheng.
At first, owing to our paucity of numbers, the 3rd Siberians had to
defend a large tract of country. Six regiments of this corps were
on the line River Ya-lu–Feng-huang-cheng–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang;
one regiment was on the line Ta-ku-shan (sea and mouth of
Ya-lu)–Hsui-yen–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng. One regiment was on the line
Kuan-tien-cheng–Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang. When the 4th Siberians
arrived, the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng was occupied by one
of its brigades, because a considerable number of Japanese had made
their appearance in this direction. The remaining three brigades
were concentrated near the station of Ta-shih-chiao,[110] as a
reserve either for the 1st Siberians to the south or the brigade
of the 4th Siberians on the Ta Ling (Pass). All the units of the
10th Army Corps which arrived from Russia were collected on the line
Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang, where Kuroki’s army was in force. As
soon as the units of the 4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps occupied
the above-mentioned lines, the regiments[111] belonging to the 3rd
Siberians were moved off to join their own corps. On arriving from
European Russia, the units of the 17th Army Corps were concentrated
near Liao-yang, and formed my main reserve.
The two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, which arrived in the
Far East in 1903, were organized as independent brigades, and, till the
troops concentrated at Liao-yang, operated with the advanced forces.
The brigade of the 35th Division fought with the 1st Siberians, to
which it was sent up as a reinforcement in the battle of Te-li-ssu. The
brigade of the 31st Division sent to reinforce the troops operating
on the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta-Ling–Hai-cheng, together with the 5th East
Siberian Rifle Division, became part of the 2nd Siberians. When the
Japanese advanced with all their three armies on July 31, the general
disposition of our troops was as follows:
1. To the south, opposite Oku’s army, were the 1st and 4th Siberian
Corps, total forty-eight battalions (the 1st Siberians at full
strength, the 4th Siberians consisting of three brigades), under the
command of General Zarubaeff.
2. On the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng, opposite Nodzu’s army,
were the 2nd Siberians and a brigade of the 4th Siberians, total
twenty-eight battalions, under the command of Lieutenant-General
Zasulitch.
3. On the line Ya-lu–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang, opposite Kuroki’s army,
were the 3rd Siberians, and the 10th and 17th Army Corps, total eighty
battalions, under the command of General Bilderling. At this time the
5th Siberians were, by the Viceroy’s orders, detrained at Mukden,
and told off to protect the rear and the line Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden, and
to act at the same time as a reserve for the advanced corps. When we
moved towards Hai-cheng the brigade of the 4th Siberians operating on
the line Hai-cheng–Ta Ling–Ta-ku-shan, returned to its own corps. In
retiring towards Liao-yang, the two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army
Corps, which had been sent out to the Far East in 1903, joined these
corps.
During the first days of the battle of Liao-yang the 1st, 3rd, and
4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps took part at their full strength of
units. The 2nd Siberians had only one division, and the 17th Army Corps
concentrated on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and was not at first
engaged. When we crossed on to the right bank of the river, in order
to operate against Kuroki, the corps organization became in several
instances quite dissolved. In addition to the 2nd and 4th Siberians,
we had to leave a brigade from both the 3rd Siberians and the 10th
Army Corps for the defence of the immense fortified camp at Liao-yang
itself. At the time of our advance at the beginning of October, I did
everything possible to keep the corps organization intact. The 1st
and 3rd Siberians and the 1st, 10th, and 17th Army Corps operated at
full strength, while the 4th and 6th Siberians had three brigades
each, one brigade of the 4th Siberians being sent to strengthen the
3rd, which had a particularly difficult task allotted to it, and
one brigade of the 6th Siberians (which was under me) being left by
the Viceroy’s orders to protect our rear. The 2nd Siberians, which
consisted of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, was strengthened by
five reserve battalions. The 5th Siberians was alone (for good reasons)
split up into two groups, one operating under the command of the corps
commander on the extreme right flank, the other on the extreme left
under General Rennenkampf. The account of the September operations
of the Eastern and Western Forces, given in Chapter IX., shows
to what an extent the units became mixed by the mere course of the
fighting. As soon as I was appointed Commander-in-Chief, I did my best
to prevent this in the future. The 61st Reserve Division, which did
not belong to an army corps, and had been detailed by the Viceroy to
strengthen the Vladivostok District, was sent by me to the field army
and incorporated in the 5th Siberians, in place of the 71st Division,
which was concentrated on the extreme left flank under the command of
General Rennenkampf. All the regiments of the 1st Siberian Division
were sent to join the 2nd Siberian Corps, and the 1st Siberian and
10th Army Corps were moved at full strength from the first line to my
main reserve. The 3rd, 4th, and 6th Siberian and the 1st and 17th Army
Corps were at full strength—distributed along the first lines and in
reserve. The 2nd and 5th Siberian Corps had each only three brigades,
one brigade of the latter having been left on the right bank of the
Hun Ho to protect our extreme right. A brigade of the 5th Division
holding Putiloff Hill was left, at the special request of the officer
commanding the 1st Manchurian Army, on the positions which had been
captured by the splendid regiments of this brigade (19th and 20th East
Siberian Rifle Regiments). As soon as the 8th and 16th Army Corps
arrived they were posted to my main reserve; the three Rifle Brigades
were formed into a Composite Rifle Corps.
Early in January, 1905, I concentrated all three corps of the 2nd
Army—_i.e._, the 8th, 10th, and Mixed Rifle Corps in reserve, and I
had in my main reserve the 1st Siberians with a division of the 16th
Army Corps (the other was still on the railway). We had altogether
128 battalions in reserve, and our position was most favourable. It
might, however, have been still better if I had insisted on strong army
reserves being formed in the 1st and 3rd Armies. My proposal to move
the 17th Army Corps back from the advanced lines met with a strongly
worded request that the distribution of the 3rd Army might be left as
it was. In the 1st Army I might have insisted on the whole of the 4th
Siberian Corps being sent to join the reserve after the transfer of
the Rifle Brigade from Putiloff Hill to the strong Erh-ta-ho position.
I made a mistake also in forming three Rifle Brigades together into
one corps. If I had kept them as independent brigades, it would have
been unnecessary to take brigades from army corps whenever independent
brigades were required. Although the Japanese had fewer battalions
than we had, these were much stronger than ours; they also had more
independent units than we had. Their divisions were not organized in
corps, their small armies being made up of divisions and independent
brigades, and our corps organization was not sufficiently flexible
to meet the thirteen to fifteen Japanese divisions, and a similar
number of independent brigades. The enemy were able to take divisions
and brigades from the advanced positions and transfer them, without
upsetting their existing organization, and with far greater ease than
we could move our corps. When an independent brigade operated against
us—as, for instance, on the line Sai-ma-chi–An-ping—we were obliged to
break up our corps organization in order to meet it with one of our
brigades; this happened in the 10th Army Corps.
Again, owing to the general course of events and other reasons over
which I had no control, our corps organization had to be broken up
before the operations at Hei-kou-tai, but was restored as soon as
possible. It also occurred during the February fighting round Mukden,
where the circumstances, indeed, did not in every case warrant it.
After General Grippenberg’s disastrous operations at Hei-kou-tai our
strategical position was altered much for the worse. Four army corps,
which had until then been standing in reserve, were sent up into the
fighting-line, and three of them became hopelessly mixed up in the
process. At the time I thought it only possible to keep one corps (the
1st Siberians) in reserve, but the 16th Army corps, the 72nd Division,
a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, and the Tsaritsin
Regiment were available, as it turned out. This made a total reserve of
eighty-two battalions. With such a strong main reserve I hoped to be
able to meet the enemy successfully, if, on being reinforced by Nogi’s
army from Port Arthur, they took the offensive.
According to our estimates, the fall of Port Arthur might reinforce
the Japanese field army by some fifty battalions altogether, but we
thought that the greater portion of Nogi’s army would be sent to
operate against Vladivostok, or via Possiet towards Kirin, so as
to take us in the rear. The possibility of this made us extremely
sensitive, both as to our rear and as regards Vladivostok. The first
thing we did, therefore, on Nogi’s army being set free, was to
strengthen the garrison of the latter place, which was very weakly held
for the extent of the defences. I sent there from all three armies
cadres of a strength of six battalions, which were to expand into four
regiments so as to form the 10th East Siberian Rifle Division. It was
thought that, upon a general assumption of the offensive, the Japanese
would simultaneously try to bring about a rising of the local native
population, and to destroy the railway bridges behind us. To give
colour to our fears, a whole series of reports, each more alarming than
the last, were received from General Chichagoff. In these he described
the large numbers of the enemy that had appeared behind us with the
intention of seizing Harbin as well as of destroying the railway. I
mentioned (Vol. III.) how this officer calculated the strength of the
enemy in our rear at tens of thousands, and how persistent he was in
his demands that the troops guarding the line might be strengthened.
As a proof of the urgency of the circumstances, he reported the
defeat, with a loss of guns, of some Frontier Guards sent out by him
to reconnoitre east of the Kuan-cheng-tzu station. Later information
corroborated these reports in so far that parties of the enemy,
accompanied by bands of Hun-huses, had penetrated far in rear, broken
through our line of posts between Kuan-cheng-tzu and Bei-tu-ne, and
were threatening the latter point, which, being our central corn-supply
depôt, was of immense importance to us. Large bodies of Japanese and
Hun-huses were also reported as moving in the direction of Tsit-si-har
with the intention of blowing up the important railway-bridge across
the River Nonni, and thus cutting our railway communication. One of the
large bridges near the station of Kung-chu-ling was, after a skirmish
with our guards, destroyed. In the face of such “circumstantial
evidence” as the loss of guns and the destruction of bridges, it was
impossible not to credit General Chichagoff’s reports (the extent of
their exaggeration we did not find out till later), and to refuse him
assistance. The security of our communications was literally vital,
for even their temporary disorganization meant catastrophe. Not only
the flow of reinforcements to the front, but the collection and
distribution of local supplies would have ceased. As we were over 5,300
miles away from our base (Russia), we had been forced to form a local
supply base, and the loss of this would have threatened the army with
starvation. As, therefore, the actual numbers guarding the railway were
small, I increased them by one brigade of the 16th Army Corps and four
Cossack regiments. My staff inclined to the opinion, indeed, that six
Cossack regiments should have been sent.
In February the Japanese moved forward in strength, carrying out a
frontal attack combined with simultaneous turning movements against
both our flanks. To carry out such an operation successfully implies
great numerical superiority on the side of the attackers, or else
great attenuation along their front; and relying, apparently, on the
strength of their positions, the Japanese did weaken their front to a
very great extent. Our best plan would accordingly have been to have
attacked them in the centre in the hope of breaking through there, and
then operating afterwards against the outflanking movements. But this
might have been disastrous, for if they succeeded in holding their
frontal positions with comparatively small numbers stiffened by extra
artillery and machine guns and well reinforced by reserves [which
were in their case splendidly organized], we might still have been
outflanked by the turning movements.
The special difficulty of frontal attacks was amply confirmed during
the Mukden battles, for, although our troops there held very extended
positions, they repulsed the Japanese whenever the latter made only a
frontal attack. When, therefore, the Japanese assumed the offensive,
and Kavamura’s movement round our left flank developed, I determined to
check it by attacking Kuroki in front and flank. The situation on our
left had become very alarming, for by losing the strong Ching-ho-cheng
position and retiring towards Ma-chun-tan we had exposed the left
flank of the 3rd Siberian Corps on the Kao-tai Ling (Pass). A still
wider turning movement threatened to throw the 71st Division back on
Fu-shun, but the reinforcements rapidly sent to the 1st Army from the
main reserve were able to arrest Kavamura’s movement, largely owing
to the behaviour of General Rennenkampf’s and Daniloff’s 71st and 6th
East Siberian Rifle Divisions, which fought with great gallantry and
stubbornness. If the 1st Army, which had a strength of 175 battalions,
had made a successful advance, it ought to have influenced the
operation then under way against our right. Being anxious to take the
offensive, I gave Linievitch, commanding the 1st Army, the chance
of selecting the main point of attack, and he decided to strike the
point where Kuroki’s and Kavamura’s armies joined. The orders had been
issued, and the movement had actually begun, when certain unconfirmed
reports as to the movement of some Japanese divisions round the left
flank of the 3rd Siberians unfortunately led him to stop the attack
and send back such units of the 1st Siberian Corps as had been lent to
the 1st Army for the operation. We had lost several days in collecting
troops for this offensive movement, and large bodies of the enemy had
meanwhile been moving round our right. I have described in detail (Vol.
III.) the steps taken to avert this danger, and the results achieved.
Here I will only mention them briefly. Against the 2nd Army, which
consisted of ninety-six battalions, and which was mostly located on the
left bank of the Hun Ho, Oku was operating with the greater part of
his army. His right flank was, according to our information, operating
against the 5th Siberians, and part, probably, against the 17th Army
Corps of the 3rd Army. Thus, opposed to the troops under General
Kaulbars’ command at the time when Nogi’s advance developed, there
were, according to our calculations, not more than thirty-six to forty
Japanese battalions. As the 2nd Army was reinforced by twenty-four
battalions of the 16th Army Corps from the main reserve, theoretically
we should have driven Oku’s army south by an energetic offensive, and,
having thus cut it off from Nogi’s force, should have fallen on the
latter. To do this we should have had to seize the fortified positions
with strong defensive points near the village of San-de-pu by frontal
attack. Practically, in the much more favourable conditions of a month
previous, 120 battalions of the 2nd Army had been unable to drive the
enemy southwards and get possession of this village after six days’
continuous fighting. There was every reason to fear, therefore, that
even if we gained possession of these points, and succeeded in forcing
back Oku’s army, so many men would have been expended in the effort
that we should have been in no condition to oppose Nogi, who could then
have captured Mukden, and cut off the 2nd and 3rd Armies from their
communications.
Whatever course was decided upon, our weakness in power of manœuvre,
the strength of the Japanese divisions, and their great powers of
defence, had to be borne in mind. On the whole, a consideration of
these points rather led to the conclusion that it was probably a
distinct advantage to them to engage as many of us as possible in a
frontal attack on their positions, so that they might be the more
certain of success in their turning movement. After looking at the
question from all sides, I decided to stand on the defensive in the
front of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and to move as quickly as possible
sufficient troops to the right bank of the Hun Ho to check and then
drive back Nogi’s army, which was executing the turning movement. The
first troops to be used for this were those of the 2nd Army, whose duty
it was to protect the right flank of our whole force. For this purpose
I first took one corps from this army, calculating that the sixty-four
remaining battalions could without difficulty withstand any onset by
Oku (of from thirty to forty battalions). General Baron Kaulbars was
ordered to move this corps as quickly as possible towards the village
of Sha-ling-pu, where I proposed to concentrate the units to oppose
Nogi. To operate against him I then moved up twenty-four battalions
of the 16th Corps together, putting them also under the command of
General Kaulbars, while as a reserve to these advanced troops I took
twelve battalions from the 3rd and the 1st Siberian Corps, which I
ordered to move towards Mukden and rejoin my reserve as soon as news
was received of the attack being stopped, and of the departure of
the 1st Army to Chi-hui-cheng. Thus, arrangements were made for the
concentration of ninety-two battalions, which by March 3 should easily
have been able to cover our right flank, check Nogi’s army, and drive
it back. Unfortunately, our hopes of what was going to be effected on
this flank were not fulfilled. In order to move this army corps against
Nogi, Kaulbars essayed a most complicated manœuvre—namely, to move the
Composite Rifle Corps from the right bank of the Hun Ho on to the left,
and to replace it on to the right bank by the 8th Army Corps, which was
to move on Sha-ling-pu. The first part of this plan was carried out—the
Rifle Corps crossed on to the left bank, but, owing to the Japanese
pressure, the 8th Army Corps remained on that side. Thus the units
of the two Corps became mixed up. Of the 2nd Army, only two brigades
(of the 10th Army Corps), which had been sent there under my orders,
together with the 25th Infantry Division, arrived at Sha-ling-pu.
Meanwhile the whole of the 10th Army Corps, or at least twenty-four
battalions of it, might have been moved there, for it was opposed by
very few of the enemy. The transfer from the right—the threatened—flank
of the Rifles had, as is now known, very serious consequences, for by
it the right flank of the 2nd Army was uncovered too soon, and the
units there, being attacked in front and flank, began to retreat, which
caused the adjacent troops to do the same.
From the information I received as to the enemy’s movements, I decided
to move the 16th Army Corps in two directions—one portion direct on
Hsin-min-tun, and the 25th Division on Sha-ling-pu. When it became
apparent that the enemy were not advancing behind the Liao Ho, but
between it and the Hun Ho, Kaulbars very properly gave orders for a
brigade of the 41st Division to be sent up towards the 25th Division
at Sha-ling-pu. We should have thus had the 16th Corps, consisting
of twenty-four battalions, all together; and to this it was General
Kaulbars’ intention to add the 8th Army Corps at full strength. As
this force would have been reinforced by me by another Siberian corps,
we should have had three army corps against Nogi. Unfortunately,
however, Kaulbars countermanded the orders already issued to General
Birger (to join the 25th Division), and this brigade continued to
act independently, and added to the existing confusion of troops,
especially when it split up and retired in two directions—towards
Mukden and Hu-shih-tai station. Instead of the 8th Army Corps arriving
to reinforce the 25th Division, two brigades of the 10th Army Corps
turned up. Finally, Linievitch did not consider it possible to carry
out his orders (to send the 1st Siberian Corps to Mukden at full
strength), and asked permission to detain two regiments of it, and so
the divisions of the 1st Siberian Corps arrived in Mukden with only
three regiments each. Fully recognizing the danger of our position on
the right flank, the commander of the 3rd Army sent his army reserve
of three regiments of the 17th Army Corps to Mukden, and on his own
initiative added to them the Samara Regiment (three battalions), which
had been sent to him the day before with a view to strengthening his
left. Meanwhile the different orders given during the fighting between
February 23 and March 4 by the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Armies
resulted in an inextricable confusion of lesser units, which added
to that caused by the breakdown of the corps organization. As there
were insufficient army reserves, Linievitch reinforced the troops that
were being attacked from the corps reserves of those corps which had
not been attacked. For instance, when the enemy’s advance against the
left flank of the 1st Army began, certain units of the 3rd Siberian
Corps, by moving eastwards along the front, were able to strengthen
Rennenkampf’s force. When the Kao-tai Ling position—defended by the 3rd
Siberians—was attacked, this corps was supported by portions of the 2nd
and 4th Siberian Corps to the west of them; when the 2nd Siberians were
attacked they were reinforced by units of the 4th.
Thus the reinforcements sent up by me only served to heighten the
general confusion of units caused by the orders of the officer
commanding the 1st Army and of the corps commanders. Against Kavamura
on March 1 and 2 there were in the 1st Army the 71st Division,
consisting of three regiments, the whole of the 6th East Siberian Rifle
Division, one regiment of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, and
one regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total twenty-nine battalions.[112]
Against Kuroki were the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, consisting
of three regiments, one regiment of the 71st Division, two of the 4th
Siberians, and one of the 2nd Siberians—total twenty-five battalions.
On the assumption that we should attack, I sent to these troops the
72nd Division and the 1st Siberians at full strength, as well as one
regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total forty-four battalions. Thus
sixty-nine battalions were concentrated on and behind the positions
of the 3rd Siberian Corps. Farther west, on the positions of the 2nd
Siberian Corps, there remained of this corps fourteen battalions,
which, reinforced by a regiment of the 4th Siberians, successfully
repulsed all attacks, including an assault made by the Japanese Guards.
Still farther west, on the positions of the 4th Siberians, which were
not attacked, there were twenty to twenty-four battalions of this same
corps. Finally, against Nodzu’s right twenty-four battalions of the
1st Army Corps not only completely repulsed all attacks, but pressed
forward very successfully. Generally speaking, although the units of
the 1st Army were considerably mixed up, the corps organization of the
1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberians and the 1st Army Corps was not very much
disturbed.
In the 2nd Army matters were worse. The unsuccessful attempt to
“castle” two corps (the Composite Rifle and 8th Army Corps) was the
start of the break-up of the army corps organization, and in beating
off the enemy these two corps, together with the 10th, became still
more involved. Throughout the fighting of the night of March 4 no
touch was kept between the different units of the 8th Army Corps. The
14th Division (three regiments) and one regiment of the 15th Division
crossed on to the right bank of the Hun Ho and moved westwards, while
the 15th Division (three regiments) arrived behind the left flank of
the 3rd Army after a night march to the north-east. On the morning of
the 4th mingled portions of all these corps took up fresh positions on
both banks of the Hun Ho.
Sufficient efforts were not made to readjust matters either in the
divisions or corps. The commander of the 10th Army Corps maintained
under his command only two brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions
(consisting of sixteen battalions), which had been moved by my order
towards Sha-ling-pu; the commander of the 16th Army Corps was with the
25th Infantry Division, which had sixteen battalions; while neither
the commanders of the 8th or Composite Rifle Corps had got so many
troops directly under them. By General Kaulbars’ orders, Tserpitski was
appointed to command the left wing of the troops moved on to the right
bank of the Hun Ho; among these was only one regiment of the 10th Army
Corps, the remainder belonging to the 8th Army, Composite Rifle, and
5th Siberian Corps. At the same time as Kaulbars appointed Tserpitski,
he removed the commanders of the 8th, Composite Rifle, and 16th Corps
from the direct command of troops. This gave the _coup de grâce_ to
the corps organization of this army. It was now completely destroyed.
As I have mentioned (Vol. III.), there was an opportunity on March 6 of
withdrawing the whole of the 10th Army Corps from the first line, and
so reorganizing the 8th Corps and the Composite Rifles properly, but
the commander of the 2nd Army did not seize it.
The inaction of the 2nd Army on March 4, its passive and disastrous
operations on the 5th and 6th, placed our right flank in a very
difficult position. Nogi was moving not only along the flank, but to
the rear of the 2nd Army. The commander of this army, continuing to
see danger where there was none, paid particular attention to Oku’s
operations, and left Nogi to move round to our rear without hindrance.
Indeed, had I not interfered on March 7, Nogi’s force would have seized
Shan-tai-tzu, the Imperial Tombs, and Mukden, and moved in rear of the
2nd Army. By my orders the defence of the positions near Shan-tai-tzu,
Ta-heng-tun, and Wen-ken-tun was organized so as to face to the north
and west. The movement of the 3rd Army towards the Hun Ho contracted
our position, and enabled me to withdraw to my main reserve portions of
the 9th, 15th, and 54th Divisions, and by means of this concentration
the danger of Nogi’s movement to our rear was temporarily averted,
but in the section held by the 2nd Army we were fighting on three
fronts—west, south, and north. Under such conditions I naturally sent
into action those units which were nearest. Still, the defence of the
northern front was entrusted to a brigade of the 41st Division, the
Volinsk Regiment, and to the 9th Rifle Regiment. Near Tsu-erh-tun were
concentrated three regiments of the 9th and three of the 54th Divisions.
On the 6th and 7th I made a final attempt to wrest victory from the
Japanese. Hoping that Kuroki had suffered heavily on the preceding
days, and relying on the splendid material in the 1st Army, I made
up my mind, after considerable discussion of the matter with its
commander on the telephone, to weaken that army considerably, so as to
make certain of having sufficient men at Tsu-erh-tun. I augmented my
main reserve by the whole of the 72nd Division, a brigade of the 2nd
Siberian, and eighteen battalions from the 1st Army and 4th Siberian
Corps. The commander of the 1st Army was of opinion that if we did not
soon have a success on the right this weakening of the 1st Army might
be a danger, but though fully realizing the force of his contention, I
considered it necessary to take the risk for the following reasons:
1. One hundred and five splendid battalions were still left under the
command of General Linievitch.
2. The enemy in front of the 1st Army must, according to the reports
sent in by its commander, have lost very heavily.
3. The Japanese had transferred almost the whole of Oku’s army to
the right bank of the Hun Ho, immediately after Nogi’s, and we had
either to break through this disposition or strengthen those of our
forces on the right bank of the Hun Ho by a lateral movement. As I
have described already (Vol. III.), our hopes were not realized. The
movement of the reserves to Tsu-erh-tun was effected very much more
slowly than we had counted upon, and, taking advantage of our reduction
in strength on the front held by the 1st Army, the enemy broke through
there. At the point of our position (Chiu-tien) where the enemy broke
through, _there should have been, according to the arrangements of the
officer commanding the 1st Army, four regiments of the troops under
his command, but as a matter of fact there were only ten companies
of the Barnaul Regiment_.[113] Taking all the circumstances into
consideration, our retirement was, in my opinion, a day too late, and
instead of throwing all the reinforcements which arrived at Tsu-erh-tun
into the fight, some of them (General Zarubaeff’s force) had to be kept
as a last reserve in case the enemy attempted to close us in with a
ring of fire.
In the last fights at Mukden, the 4th Siberian Corps was scattered
along the whole front, but the enemy being at that spot in
inconsiderable strength, did not attack its strong position at
Erh-ta-ho. Thirty-two splendid battalions of this corps might have
been used by the commander of the 1st Army for a local counter-attack,
or, together with the troops of the 1st Army Corps or those of the 2nd
Siberians, for a greater effort at the counter-offensive, for which a
very favourable opportunity presented itself when the enemy attacked
the 2nd Siberians. By advancing we could have taken the attacking
forces in flank and rear, and the Japanese Imperial Guards would have
been threatened with disaster. But the opportunity was not seized.
Hence the 4th Siberian Corps, having no force opposed to it, only
formed, so to speak, a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Armies.
On the whole, the confusion was at its greatest between March 8 and 10
on the northern front of the 2nd Army, but the energetic and gallant
General Launits was in command, and he not only beat back all attacks,
but rescued the inert units of the 2nd Army, whose rear Nogi was
threatening. On March 10 General Muiloff, in command of the rearguard
(composed only of the Lublin Regiment), gallantly and successfully
carried out the difficult duty of covering the retirement of the 2nd
and 3rd Armies.
It must be remembered that, though the corps organization mostly
broke down, the regimental organization was preserved, and this
gave a cohesion in action which, when taken advantage of, served us
right well. The preservation of the regimental organization was also
important on account of the rationing of the troops. The first line
transport (with field kitchens and two-wheeled ammunition carts) were
kept with regiments, and so ammunition and food were in many cases
most opportunely forthcoming in spite of the mixing up of units. The
nearness of our supplies also at Mukden enabled us easily to refill
regimental reserves. Against the 1st Siberian Corps at the bloody
action at Su-no-pu (near San-de-pu) on January 27—a fight that was more
or less unpremeditated on both sides—units of five different Japanese
divisions were engaged, though the enemy had a comparatively small
force in the field. The enemy, therefore, must also have suffered from
confusion.
I have endeavoured to give some explanation of how it was that
units got mixed up; but I consider that it was in many cases quite
unnecessary. Consequently, when I reported to the Tsar that I was
mainly responsible for our disaster at Mukden, I pointed out that one
of my mistakes was that I did not sufficiently legislate to prevent
this confusion, and that, as a matter of fact, I was forced by
circumstances to add to it.
INDEX
ABAZA, Admiral, his connection with the Royal Timber Company,
ii. 309–313
Abdur Rahman, and Afghanistan, i. 84, 85
Adabash, Colonel, his information on Japanese reserve forces, i. 206
Afghanistan:
her frontier, i. 62;
Britain’s advance, i. 63, 84;
and Russia, i. 64–66, 87;
a buffer State, i. 85;
Boundary Commission, i. 86
Alexander I., Emperor of Russia:
more freedom for the army, i. 14;
his example, i. 20
Alexander II., Emperor of Russia:
the clamour for peace, i. 22;
the emancipation of the serfs, i. 23;
military economy, i. 87;
the Siberian Railway, i. 149
Alexander III., Emperor of Russia, military economy, i. 87
Alexeieff, Admiral:
stops work at Port Arthur, i. 126, 128;
the Boxer rebellion, i. 154;
stops the evacuation of Mukden, i. 169;
his connection with Bezobrazoff and the Royal Timber Company,
i. 173–185, ii. 306–313;
becomes Viceroy of the Far East, i. 187;
his negotiations with Japan, i. 188–198;
disperses his troops and fleet, i. 225;
his opinion of the fleet, i. 237, 238;
report on the Eastern Chinese Railway, i. 246;
presses for relief, i. 257;
strategical distribution of troops, ii. 205–211;
the weakness of Port Arthur, ii. 213, 229
Alien population, dangers of an, i. 102
Alma, battle of the, i. 17
America, Russia hands over her possessions in, i. 35
Ammunition:
defects in gun, i. 137;
average expenditure of rifle, ii. 149, 150
Amur district, Russia’s annexation of, i. 35
Armament (see Army):
inferior, i. 15;
moral effect of, i. 107, 108;
artillery, i. 121, 135;
for Port Arthur, i. 129;
test of a new field-gun, i. 136;
defects in gun ammunition, i. 137
Army, Russian:
the Great Northern War, i. 5, 6;
reductions in, i. 8;
distribution of, i. 9;
struggle with France, i. 10;
annexation of Finland, i. 12;
in the Crimean War, i. 13–21;
in the Turkish wars, i. 24–34;
casualties in the two main struggles, i. 36;
peace and war establishments, i. 38;
relative speed of mobilization, i. 88–90, 272–284;
losses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, i. 99;
incapacity of generals, i. 101;
improvement of, i. 113, 119–124;
value of the Siberian Corps, i. 125;
want of railway transport, i. 131–134, 156, 242–268;
re-armament of the artillery, i. 135, 136;
defects in gun ammunition, i. 137;
numbers in the Pri-Amur district, i. 144;
its distribution, i. 225, ii. 209, 210;
its favourable state when peace declared, i. 230–234;
defeats at Yalu, Chin-chou, and Te-li-ssu, i. 257, 258;
loss at Sha Ho, i. 259;
the reservists, i. 278–290;
shortage and capabilities of officers, i. 290–294, 300–305;
discipline, i. 295, 296;
corporal punishment, i. 297–299;
want of sappers, i. 305;
machine-guns, i. 306–309;
criticism of staff work, ii. 2, 3;
cavalry at manœuvres, ii. 4;
attack and defence, ii. 5;
column formation, ii. 6;
work of the artillery, ii. 7;
work of the sappers, ii. 7, 8;
criticism by commanders, ii. 9;
tactical instruction, ii. 10–25;
relative positions of, ii. 33, 34, 37–40;
absence of military spirit and patriotism, ii. 35, 183;
adverse conditions, ii. 37, 39;
effect of the rainy season and dysentery, ii. 41;
difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60;
defects in the command, ii. 60–72;
in the rank and file, ii. 72–80;
Kuropatkin’s final address to, ii. 88–97;
suggestions for the improvement of:
(1) the senior rank, ii. 98–114;
(2) the regulars and reservists, ii. 114–127;
(3) reserve organization, ii. 128–131;
(4) augmenting the combatant infantry, ii. 131–136;
(5) machine-guns, ii. 136;
(6) depôt troops, ii. 137–139;
(7) communication troops, ii. 139, 140;
(8) engineer troops, ii. 141–146;
(9) artillery, ii. 146–151;
(10) cavalry, ii. 151–155;
(11) infantry, ii. 155–161;
(12) organization, ii. 161–176;
summary of the war, ii. 177–204;
gradual improvement in spirit, ii. 183, 188, 189;
strategical distribution of, ii. 205, 271;
Kuropatkin’s narrative of the war, ii. 205–305;
strength of, ii. 258;
breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335
Artamonoff, General, ii. 281, 282
Artillery:
rearmament of the, i. 121, 135;
machine, i. 306–309, ii. 136, 137;
suggested improvements, ii. 146–155, 162
Asia:
Russia’s war with Turkey, i. 26;
Russia’s position in, i. 34;
Russia’s frontiers, i. 40–46;
opposition to Russia’s expansion in, i. 147
_Asia for the Asiatics_, ii. 195, 196
Austerlitz, Russia’s heavy loss at, i. 98
Austria:
war with Napoleon, i. 10;
Crimean War, i. 16;
her frontier with Russia, i. 51–54;
her strategic railways, i. 55;
her speed of mobilization, i. 90;
her perfected organization, i. 103
Austro-Hungary:
Russian frontiers, i. 44, 50–52;
trade with Russia, i. 52;
possibility of war with Russia, i. 53, 54
Azov, surrender of, i. 6
Baikal, Lake, great obstacle to the Siberian Railway, i. 149, 248, 254
Balasheff, Acting State Councillor:
his warlike despatch, i. 178;
investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 181
Baltic Sea: Russian aims, i. 5, 9;
defence of, i. 114
Batianoff, General, Commander of the 3rd Manchurian Army, ii. 186
Batoum, i. 32
Bayazet, the defence of, i. 26
Berlin:
Congress, i. 32;
Treaty of, i. 82
Bessarabia, Russian annexation of, i. 13, 24
Bezobrazoff, State Councillor:
his connection with the Royal Timber Company, i. 169, ii. 306–313;
his propositions, i 172–174;
Kuropatkin’s report on, i. 177–179;
investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 180, 184
Bilderling, General, Commander of the 2nd Manchurian Army:
his report, ii. 186;
criticism on, ii. 228, 234, 247;
his force, ii. 242;
withdraws to position on the Sha Ho, ii. 245, 286
Black Sea, the:
Russian progress towards, i. 6, 12, 13;
Russia deprived of a war fleet in, i. 19, 24, 33;
coast defence on, i. 114
Blume, M., theorist in strategy, ii. 69
Borisoff, Colonel, at Mukden, ii. 281, 283
Borodino, Russian loss at, i. 98
Boskey, General, surprises the Russians at the battle of the Alma,
i. 17
Bothnia, Gulf of, Russian aims, i. 9, 41, 42
Boxer Rebellion, i. 136, 154, 155
Bulgaria:
Turko-Servian War, i. 24, 25;
Russian behaviour in, i. 29, 30
Burun, M., on the Russian fleet, i. 236, 237, 240, 241
Caucasus, the:
her Russian frontier, i. 5, 8, 33, 34, 57, 58;
her troops, i. 26, 114
Cavalry:
not sufficiently used, ii. 151, 152;
failure of the officers, ii. 153–155, 288;
details of units, ii. 162
Censorship, necessity for press, ii. 176
Charles XII., King of Sweden, war with Russia, i. 5
Cherniaeff, General, Geok Tepe, i. 32
Chichagoff, General, his alarmist reports, ii. 302, 321, 322
China:
peaceful attitude of, i. 5;
Peking Treaty, i. 35;
Russian frontier and trade, i. 67, 68;
war with Japan, i. 69, 151, 201–204;
Russian policy, i. 72, 157;
the awakening of, i. 91;
Boxer Rebellion and treaty with Russia, i. 154–162;
her alarm at Russia’s policy, i. 170;
Russian treatment of the Chinese, ii. 190, 191
Chin-chou, battle of, i. 257
Civil disorder, repression of, ii. 125
Constantinople, Russian advance to walls of, i. 30, 82
Cossacks. See Cavalry
Crimean War:
strength of Russian army, i. 13;
Russia’s unpreparedness, i. 16, 101, 109;
Inkerman, i. 18;
siege of Sevastopol, i. 19;
a premature peace, i. 20–22
Dalny:
Russian annexation of, i. 69;
Japanese use of, i. 127;
its fortifications, i. 172, ii. 207;
commerce, i. 190;
coal storage at, i. 246
Danube, the, Russian acquisition and loss of the mouths of,
i. 13, 16, 19, 24, 32
Defence schemes, ii. 26–30
Dembovski, General, at Mukden, ii. 285, 286
Demchinski, M., _Were we Ready for War?_ i. 111
Djam, Russian force at, i. 84
Dragomiroff, General, and quick-firing artillery, i. 136;
his theories, ii. 8, 10, 11
Dubniak Hill, capture of, i. 25
Dukhovski, General, Governor-General and Commander
in the Pri-Amur district, and the Siberian Railway, i. 151, 171
Dushkevitch, Colonel, i. 302
Eastern Chinese Railway:
the bad condition of, i. 131, 132, 182–242;
a parallel in Persia, i. 193;
suggested sale to China, i. 221;
capacity of, i. 243–256
Emmanuel, Major, his appreciation of the Japanese army, i. 222
Engineers, ii. 141–146;
details of units, ii. 162
Essen, Admiral, his daring sally from Vladivostok, i. 239
Esthonia, Russian annexation of, i. 5
Eupatoria, the Allies’ disembarkation at, i. 17
Feng-huang-cheng, Russian occupation of, i. 170–174, 184
Finance Minister, dual capacity of, i. 139
Finland, Russian annexation of, i. 5, 12, 41;
Russian frontier, i. 8 _n._, 9;
her aims for autonomy, i. 42
Fortresses, work on the, i. 126–130
France:
her struggles with Russia, i. 10;
strength of her army, i. 15;
cause of Franco-Russian _entente_, i. 46;
lessons from the Franco-German War, i. 78–81
Friederichsham, Treaty of, i. 40, 41
Frontiers (see Russia), Russian, i. 8 _n._, 35, 40–77
Galicia, strategic value of, i. 54, 55
Geok Tepe, Russian attack on, i. 31, 85, 148
Georgia, Russian annexation of, i. 8
Germany:
war with Napoleon, i. 10;
her Russian frontier, i. 44, 45;
her Russian trade, i. 45, 59;
her strategic preparations, i. 46–49;
possibilities of war, i. 49, 50;
trade in Persia, i. 59, 60;
lessons from the Franco-German War, i. 79, 80;
her relative speed of mobilization, i. 90;
her perfect organization, i. 103, 113;
her military expenditure, i. 112, 113
Gerngros, General:
the Boxer Rebellion, i. 155;
wounded at Te-li-ssu, i. 219;
the battle near Mukden, ii. 278, 279, 293, 297
Giers, M., Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
on the cession of Kuldja, i. 93
Glinski, M., _The Resurrected Dead_, i. 292
Godunoff, Boris, and the Caspian Sea, i. 4
Goltz, Von der, a distinguished German writer,
his dictum on war, i. 88
Gorbatoff, M., _Thoughts Suggested by Recent Military Operations_,
ii. 75, 76
Great Britain:
strength of her army, i. 15;
the Crimean War, i. 16–20;
her trade with Persia, i. 59, 60;
Russia and Afghanistan, i. 62–67, 84, 85;
Afghan Boundary Commission, i. 86;
treaty with Japan, i. 269
Grieg, Admiral, Russian Minister of Finance,
on the cession of Kuldja, i. 93
Grippenberg, General, Commander of the 2nd Army:
his peculiar theories and behaviour, i. 299,
ii. 11, 23–25, 55–60, 251–253, 257, 260, 261, 264–267, 320;
_The Truth about the Battle of Hei-kou-tai_, ii. 83
Grodekovi, General, i. 154, 155
Guber, General, ii. 52
Gulistan, Treaty of, i. 60
Guns. See Artillery
Gurieff, M., _The Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War_, i. 146
Gurko, General, siege of Plevna, i. 26; criticisms by, ii. 9
Hamilton, General Sir Ian, an appreciation of the Japanese army,
i. 223
Harbin:
concentration at, i. 155, 160;
railway difficulties, i. 245, 254, 261, 268;
drunkenness at, ii. 188
Hei-kou-tai, operations at, ii. 82, 83, 271, 320
Hei-ni-tun, Russian attack on, ii. 282
Herat, proposed railway, i. 67;
and Russia, i. 86
Hershelman, General, i. 279
Hsi-mu-cheng, concentration at, ii. 42
Hsi-ping-kai positions:
Russian occupation of, i. 229, ii. 32, 182, 287;
handed over to Japan, i. 232;
preparations near, ii. 184, 185, 194
Hun-huses, raids by, i. 158, 159
Imeretinski, General, at Plevna, i. 28
India and Russia’s policy, i. 64–67
Infantry (see Army):
the chief arm, ii. 155;
improvement in, ii. 156;
officers’ casualties, ii. 157, 158;
promotion in the field, ii. 159;
_field_ v. _office_ training, ii. 160;
organization and details of units, ii. 161–170;
penalties on active service, ii. 171–175
Istomin, Admiral, his heroic death, i. 18, 21
Ivanovitch, Tsar Theodore, i. 4
Japan:
peaceful attitude of, i. 5;
Russia and Saghalien, i. 35;
Peking Treaty, i. 35;
war with China, i. 69, 151, 202–204;
events leading up to the war with Russia, i. 123–130, 151, 157–166,
170, 177–179;
the Royal Timber Company, i. 172;
Kuropatkin’s visit to, and impressions of, i. 174, 175, 217–223;
progress of negotiations, i. 188, 193;
Russia’s bluff, i. 193–198;
her early history, i. 199;
birth of her army, i. 200–202;
expedition to China, i. 203;
her estimated strength, i. 203, 208, ii. 192;
expansion for war, i. 204–206;
her loss in the war with Russia, i. 207, ii. 192;
her sea-transport, i. 209;
Russian criticisms on the army of, i. 210;
her officers in Russian employ, i. 212;
her reserve troops, i. 213;
the _samurai_ spirit, i. 214;
her resentment with Russia, i. 215;
her system of education, i. 217–219;
Korea a vital question, i. 219;
German and English appreciations of, i. 222, 223;
her disembarkations on Liao-tung Peninsula and Kuan-tung unhindered,
i. 225;
her advantages, i. 226;
their moral tone, i. 227;
the nation with the army, i. 228;
partial exhaustion, i. 230, 235, ii. 194, 195;
strength of the fleets in the Far East, i. 236, 237;
the naval battles near Port Arthur and Vladivostok, i. 238–241;
her victories at the Yalu, Chin-chou and Te-li-ssu, i. 257, 258,
ii. 38, 83;
her treaty with Great Britain, i. 269;
relative positions after fifteen months’ war, ii. 31–35, 39–44;
her losses, ii. 192, 193;
Kuropatkin’s summary of the war, ii. 217–287, 314–335
Jassy, Treaty of, i. 6
Jilinski, General, Headquarter Staff, i. 206, 256
Ka-liao-ma, ii. 274, 290
Kamchatka, Russian annexation of, i. 35
Kao-li-tun, ii. 275
Kars, the capture of the fortress of, i. 26, 30, 32, ii. 14
Kashgaria, i. 70;
Chinese take possession of, i. 92
Kaufmann, General, i. 32;
and Afghanistan, i. 85;
the cession of Kuldja, i. 92, 93;
the Bokhara Khanate, i. 147
Kaulbars, General, ii. 58;
in command of the 3rd Army, ii. 249, 265;
in command of the 2nd Army, ii. 268;
the assault of San-de-pu, ii. 271;
battles near Mukden, ii. 272–287;
criticisms on, ii. 288–305, 324–335
Keller, General Count, ii. 42, 221;
his death, ii. 71, 226
Khanates, the, i. 147, 148
Khilkoff, Prince, Minister of Ways and Communications,
and the Siberian Railway, i. 246, 248, 250, 254
Khiva, Russian failure to gain possession of, i. 5
Kipke, Surgeon-General, list of Japanese casualties, i. 207, 208
Kirghiz tribes and Russia, i. 4 _n._, 5, 8 _n._
Kirin, capture of, i. 155
Kondratenko, General, the hero of Port Arthur, i, 300, ii. 71
Korea:
independence of, i. 69;
necessity for quiet in, i. 72, 73;
Russian activity in, i. 153, 178;
timber concession, i. 170;
council at Port Arthur on, i. 180, 181;
the Treaty of Peking, i. 199;
a vital question, i. 219
Korniloff, Admiral, siege of Sevastopol, i. 18;
heroic death, i. 21
Korniloff, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii. 286
Kronstadt, fortifications of, i. 126
Kruimoff, Captain, i. 303
Kuan-tung Peninsula: Russian annexation of, i. 35, 69;
Japanese land and fortify, i. 127, 257;
Russian defence force, ii. 206, 207
Kuang-cheng-tzu, seizure by rebels, i. 155
Kuldja, province of, i. 70;
the cession to China of, i. 92–95, 148, 149
Kuprin, M., _The Duel_, ii. 69
Kuroki, General:
in command of the 1st Japanese Army, i. 257, 258;
his opinion of the Russian shells, i. 306;
his victory at Te-li-ssu, ii. 38;
his positions, ii. 39, 40, 216, 222;
his turning movement, ii. 230–232, 264;
strength of his army, ii. 253;
battle of Liao-yang, ii. 317;
at Mukden, ii. 323,329, 332
Kuropatkin, General, Minister of War, afterwards Commander-in-Chief:
his report on the possibilities of the twentieth century, i. 39;
his report on the Russian frontiers and their suitability, i. 40–77;
deductions from the work of the army as a guide to future wars,
i. 96–110;
the work before the War Department, i. 111–144;
his opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions, i. 145–198;
difference of opinion with Admiral Alexeieff, i. 167–169;
the Royal Timber Company, i. 172–184, ii. 306;
his impressions on visiting Japan, i. 174, 175, 217–223;
his reports on the Manchurian position, i. 176–179, 189–193;
his responsibility for the rupture with Japan, i. 177–179;
his pyramid of Russian interests, i. 185, 186;
resignation on the establishment of the Viceroyalty, i. 187;
his proposal to give way, i. 189;
his report on strength of Japanese army, i. 242;
on necessity for Russian railway improvements, i. 252–254, 263–268;
on mobilization, i. 271–289;
on reserve of officers, i. 293, 294;
his recommendations as to officers, i. 301–305;
on machine-guns and ammunition, i. 306–309;
his criticisms of staff work, ii. 2, 3;
of cavalry, ii. 4;
of attack and the defence, ii. 5, 6;
of column formation in attack, ii. 6;
on the work of the artillery and sappers, ii. 7, 8;
on criticism by commanders, ii. 9;
on tactical instruction of our troops, ii. 10;
his supplementary and monthly instructions, ii. 12, 13, 15–22;
reasons for the reverses at Plevna, ii. 13, 14;
his diagram of, and opinion on, the relative positions in Manchuria,
ii. 33–44;
on difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60;
on defects in _personnel_, ii. 60–72;
on the rank and file and Social Revolutionists, ii. 72–81;
on the countermanding of orders, ii. 81–84;
takes the blame for the defeat at Mukden, ii. 85, 86, 335;
his farewell address, ii. 87–97;
his suggested improvements in the senior ranks and all arms,
ii. 98–176;
his summary of the war, and conclusions, ii. 177–305;
breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335
Kushk, proposed railway to, i. 67;
defeat of Afghans at, i. 86
Kutnevitch, General, ii. 297
Lamsdorff, M., Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and the Royal Timber Company, i. 173, 174, ii. 306, 311, 312
Launits, General, his gallantry, ii. 334
Lessar, Acting State Councillor, Russian Minister in China,
council at Port Arthur on the Yalu enterprise, i. 175, 180
Levestam, General:
withdrawal to Hsi-mu-cheng, ii. 40;
the battle near Mukden, ii. 283, 286
Liao-tung Peninsula, Japanese land at, i. 225, 257
Liao-yang:
seizure by rebels, i. 155;
Russian concentration at, i. 225, 242, 258;
battle at, ii. 18, 83, 229, 230, 317;
Russian retirement, ii. 86;
Japanese losses at, ii. 193;
Kuropatkin’s arrival at, ii. 209
Linievitch, General:
capture of Peking, i. 155;
in command of the 1st Army, i. 230, ii. 249, 324;
Commander-in-Chief, i. 301, ii. 198;
and Kuropatkin, ii. 56, 58
Livonia, Russia’s annexation of, i. 5
Lomakin, General, his disastrous expedition against the Turcomans,
i. 31
Losses, Russian, in the two main struggles, i. 36;
in past wars, i. 98;
in the future, i. 99
Madridoff, Lieutenant-Colonel, and the timber concession,
i. 175, 181, 184, ii. 309
Makharoff, Admiral, i. 225, 238
Maksheef, Professor, on military expenditure, i. 111–113
Malakhoff Hill, capture of, i. 19
Malingering, i. 174
Maloshevitch, N. S., _Memoirs of a Sevastopol Man_, i. 16
Manchuria (see also Railways):
Russian movements in, i. 35;
the question of annexation, i. 71, 105, 157–179;
expansion of Russian garrison, i. 122;
the rising in, i. 126;
the War Minister’s opinion on, i. 145;
investigation of the timber concession, i. 180–184;
pyramid of Russian interests, i. 185, 186;
negotiations, i. 187–198;
Japanese invade Southern, ii. 32–44;
summary of the war, and conclusions, ii. 177–305
Martinoff, M. E., _Spirit and Temper of the Two Armies_, ii. 77, 78
Menshikoff, M., Russian writer, ii. 69
Menshikoff, Prince, Commander-in-Chief, Crimean War, i. 17;
battle of Inkerman, i. 18;
superseded, i. 19
Meyendorff, General Baron, Commander of 1st Army Corps, i. 302;
retreat of, ii. 284
Milutin, General:
the emancipation of the serfs, i. 24;
Plevna, i. 25;
cession of Kuldja, i. 93;
the improvement of the army, i. 113
Mischenko, General:
retirement of the local railway guards, i. 155;
his cavalry successes, ii. 150
Mobilization, relative speed of, i. 90;
inconveniences of, i. 272–286
Moscow, a poor spirit in, i. 198, 199
Muiloff, Lieutenant-General, ii. 282;
removal of, ii. 297;
his gallantry, ii. 334
Mukden:
seized by the rebels, i. 154;
recaptured, i. 155;
battles round, i. 229 _n._, 260, ii. 43, 246, 272–305, 314–335;
Japanese losses at, ii. 193, 194;
Russia’s unfavourable position at, ii. 196, 197, 240, 241
Nakhimoff, Admiral, i. 18;
his heroic death, i. 21
Namangan, occupation of, i. 148
Narbut, General, member of the military council, i. 293
Narva, reasons for Russian defeat at, i. 5
_Nasha Jizu_, newspaper, _The Viceroy Alexeieff’s Firm Policy_, i. 109
_Navarin_, Russian battleship, terrible loss on, i. 240
Navy, Russian:
state of, i. 15;
disadvantages of, i. 107;
its uselessness at Port Arthur, i. 131;
the Pacific Squadron, i. 224;
minor part played by, i. 236;
strength of Japanese and, i. 236, 237;
battles at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, i. 238–241
Newchuang:
Russian intentions, i. 157;
evacuation of, ii. 43
Nicholas II., Tsar of Russia, on improvements in the army, i. 120–122;
his efforts against war, i. 145, 187;
railway transport, i. 245, 252, 263–268;
mobilization, i. 272;
orders concentration, ii. 212;
on Kuropatkin’s retirement at Liao-yang, ii. 238;
his connection with the Royal Timber Company and Bezobrazoff,
ii. 306–313
Nicolaeff, Grand-Duke Michael, operations in Asia, i. 26
Nicolai-Pavlovitch, the late Emperor, his warning, i. 16
Nishtabtski, Treaty of, i. 5
Nodzu, General, lands on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236;
his advance, ii. 222;
summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335
Nogi, General, lands on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236;
on the fall of Port Arthur, i. 260;
at Mukden, ii. 84, 152, 281;
summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335
Norway, her frontiers, i. 40
Obrucheff, General, Chief of Headquarter Staff:
cession of Kuldja, i. 93;
the improvement of the army, i. 113
Offensive, advantages of strategic, ii. 169
Officers, Russian:
incapacity of, i. 101, ii. 1–11;
the shortage of, i. 290–295;
General Grippenberg’s resignation, i. 299, ii. 57;
quality of, i. 300–303;
_The Resurrected Dead_, i. 305;
the susceptibilities of, ii. 57, 58;
defects in, ii. 61–72, 95–97;
suggested improvements, ii. 98–113;
casualties among, ii. 157;
line officers have no fair chance, ii. 158;
promotion in the field, ii. 159;
_field_ v. _office_ training, ii. 160, 161;
suggested changes in rank of, ii. 164–168;
removal of incompetent, ii. 172
Oku, General:
his landing on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236, 256;
joins General Nodzu’s army, ii. 43;
battle of Liao-yang, ii. 84;
summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335
Organization, Russian:
defects in, i. 26, 27, 88, 89, 119;
difficulties in, ii. 44–60;
Kuropatkin’s proposals on, ii. 161–176;
breakdown of, ii. 314–320
Orenburg-Tashkent Railway, i. 86 _n._
Orloff, General, at Liao-yang, i. 279;
retreat to Yen-tai, ii. 234
Osaka, great exhibition at, i. 219
Ostolopoff, Colonel, i. 302
_Osvobojdenie_, the Royal Timber Company, ii. 307
Pacific Ocean, opposition to Russian access to, i. 146, 147
Patriotism in Japan and Russia, ii. 78–80, 121–123, 227
Paul II., Emperor of Russia, and the army, i. 8
Pavloff, Chamberlain, Russian Minister in Korea, Yalu enterprise,
i. 175, 180
Pavlovski, M., engineer of Siberian Railway, i. 253
Peking, Treaty of, i. 35, 199;
capture of, i. 155
Penalties on active service, ii. 171, 173
Persia:
war with Russia, i. 33;
frontier and trade with Russia, i. 58, 59;
the cockpit of the Middle East, i. 59;
Great Britain and Germany in, i. 60;
Russian aims in, i. 61
_Personnel_, defects in, ii. 60–72
Peter the Great:
war with Sweden, i. 5;
war with Turkey, i. 6;
founder of the Russian fleet, i. 7;
his struggles with Charles XII. and Napoleon, i. 10, 11;
his counsel, i, 20;
his influence, i. 41
Petroff, General, i. 245
Petrovitch, Paul, Emperor, his reforms, i. 38
Plancon, M., diplomat, investigation of the Timber Company, i. 180
Plehve, Von, Minister of the Interior, and the Timber Company, ii. 311
Plevna, battle at, i. 25–30;
the cause of the Russian reverses at, ii. 13
Poland, Russia’s neighbour, i. 3;
her struggles with Russia, i. 7;
the problem of, i. 10, 11;
rebellion, i. 23
Poltava, Russian victory at, i. 5, 11, 41
Port Arthur:
Russian aims, i. 69;
work at, i. 126, 127;
armament for, i. 128, 129;
the council on the timber concession, i. 180–184;
Kuropatkin’s advice as to, i. 189, 190;
Chino-Japanese War, i. 202;
naval battles at, i. 238–241;
fall of, i. 260;
garrison at, ii. 205, 208;
weakness of, ii. 211, 213, 214;
result of fall of, ii. 299
Pri-Amur district and Russia, i. 77;
increase of troops in, i. 121, 122, 144, 151
Punishment, corporal, ii. 173
Putiloff Hill:
Japanese losses at, ii. 193;
movement of troops from, ii. 319
Railways, the Siberian, i. 123, 149, 156;
as a factor in the Japanese War, i. 131–134, 198;
the problem of, i. 242–254, ii. 31;
necessity for guarding, ii. 37
_Razsvet_, newspaper, on Kuropatkin’s responsibility, i. 177
_Razviedchik_ (_The Resurrected Dead_), i. 292
Rediger, Lieutenant-General, War Minister, his report, i. 138, 139
Rennenkampf, General:
capture of Tsitsihar and Kirin, i. 155;
in the Tai-tzu Ho Valley, ii. 244, 254, 273;
Liao-yang, ii. 318, 328;
the gallantry of his troops, ii. 323
Reservists, Russian, i. 275–286, ii. 73, 163
Revenue, Russian, i. 142
Revolutionists, Social, ii. 75–80
Roop, General, criticisms by commanders, ii. 9.
Roslavleff, M., on Kuropatkin’s responsibility, i. 176, 177;
the council at Port Arthur, i. 184
Roumania:
Russian frontier, i. 44, 56;
her aspirations, i. 57.
Rozhdestvenski, Admiral, result of his defeat at Tsushima, i. 241, 242
Rusin, Captain, Russian naval attaché, his report on the Japanese
navy, i. 206, 207
_Ruski Viestnik_, article on the fleets in the Far East, i. 236, 237
Russia:
extent of, in the eighteenth century, i. 2, 3;
her neighbours, i. 3;
her aims, i. 4;
the Great Northern War and its result, i. 5–7;
extension of, in the nineteenth century, i. 8, 35;
reductions in the army, i. 8;
closer touch with Europe, i. 9;
struggles with France, i. 10;
Polish problem, i. 11;
annexation of Finland, i. 12;
further wars with Turkey, i. 13, 24;
deterioration of the army, i. 14;
her navy, i. 15;
her unpreparedness, i. 16;
Crimean War commences, i. 16;
Allies’ disembarkation permitted, i. 17;
battle of the Alma, i. 17, 18;
Inkerman, i. 18;
siege of Sevastopol, i. 18, 19;
a premature peace, i. 20–22, 81, 82;
emancipation of the serfs, i. 23;
Plevna, i. 25;
failure of assaults, i. 26;
her slow concentration and shortcomings, i. 27–29;
her ultimate success, i. 30;
Geok Tepe, i. 31;
Kushk, i. 32;
her position, i. 33–35;
losses in the two centuries, i. 36, 37, 98, 99;
peace and war establishments, i. 38;
her future, i. 39;
her Swedish frontier, i. 40–44;
her German frontier and trade, i. 44–50;
her Austro-Hungarian frontier, i. 50–55;
Austria’s strategic railways, i. 55;
her Roumanian frontier, i. 56;
her Turkish frontier and trade, i. 57;
her Persian frontier and trade, i. 58, 59;
her aims in Persia, i. 61;
her frontier with Afghanistan, i. 62;
her policy versus Great Britain, i. 63–66;
no wish for India, i. 67;
her Chinese frontier, trade, and policy, i. 67–73;
her position, i. 73–77;
lessons from Franco-German War, i. 79, 80;
_National_ wars, i. 80, 81;
her isolation in 1878, i. 83;
her lever against Great Britain, i. 84;
Afghan Boundary Commission, i. 85, 86;
military economy, i. 187;
her disabilities, i. 188, 189;
relative speed of mobilization, i. 90;
the awakening of China, i. 91;
cession of Kuldja, i. 92–94;
her complications, i. 95;
deductions from the past, i. 96;
strain of armed peace, i. 97;
probable losses in the future, i. 99;
dangers of alien population, i. 102;
the chief duty of the twentieth century, i. 103;
her handicap on the west, i. 104, 114;
her forward movement in Manchuria, i. 105;
the disadvantages of a navy, i. 106, 107;
military expenditure, i. 112, 118;
expansion of forces in the Pri-Amur district, i. 121–123;
commencement and causes of the war with Japan,
i. 123, 151, 156, 157;
work at Port Arthur, i. 127, 130;
railway factor, i. 131–149;
line of communications 5,400 miles long, i. 135;
dual capacity of Finance Minister, i. 139, 140;
her finance and revenue, i. 141–144;
War Minister’s opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions,
i. 145;
inception of the Siberian Railway, i. 149–155;
Boxer Rebellion, i. 154, 155;
her intentions as to Manchuria, and the result, i. 157–170;
treaty with China, i. 158, 160;
influence of M. de Witte, i. 171;
the Royal Timber Company, i. 172–184, 306–313;
pyramid of her interests, i. 185, 186;
establishment of a Viceroyalty in the Far East, i. 187;
Kuropatkin’s special reports, i. 188–193;
her bluff, i. 194–198;
reasons for her reverses in the war with Japan, i. 229–309,
ii. 1–97;
suggested improvements in the army, ii, 98–176;
summary of the war, ii. 177–287;
conclusions upon the battle of Mukden, i. 288–305;
breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335
_Russki Invalid_, article on military expenditure, i. 111, 112;
on duty and love of country, ii. 78–80
Russo-Chinese Bank, De Witte’s influence over the, i. 172
Saghalien, Russian garrison at, i. 148, 200;
part concession of, to Japan, i. 232
St. George, the Cross of, ii. 16
St. Petersburg Convention, i. 40 _n._
Sakharoff, General, Chief of the Headquarter Staff, i. 115, 207;
War Minister, i. 252;
the Siberian Railway, i. 261;
mobilization, i. 272, 273, 276, 277;
unfitness of generals, i. 300;
his description of the Japanese plans, ii. 30;
commands the Southern Force, ii. 209
Samoiloff, Lieutenant-Colonel, military attaché in Japan,
his views on Japanese strength, i. 208
Samsonoff, General, and his Siberian Cossacks, ii. 234
Sappers. See Engineers
Serfs, emancipation of the, i. 23, 24
Servia, war with Turkey, i. 24
Sevastopol, siege of, i. 18, 19, 83;
Russian loss at, i. 98
Sha Ho, Russian strength at battle of, i. 242, ii. 182;
Japanese loss at, ii. 193
Shipka Pass, defence of the, i. 26, 30
Shtakelberg, General:
on the Yalu, ii. 38;
concentration at Te-li-ssu, ii. 218, 219;
battle near the Yen-tai Mines, ii. 234;
strength of his force, ii. 243 _n._;
faulty disposition of his troops, ii. 246, 247;
his attack on Su-ma-pu, ii. 262
Siberian Railway. See Railways
Siberian Rifle Regiments, East, expansion and value of, i. 124–126,
ii. 183, 207
Sinope, Russian victory at, i. 15, 16, 107
Skobeleff, General, at Plevna, i. 26, 28;
seizes Geok Tepe, i. 31, 85, 148
Solovieff, M., historian, the Crimean War, i. 21, 22
Sosnovski, Lieutenant-Colonel, and the Chinese, i. 92
Spade, revival in the army of the use of the, i. 142
Stössel, General:
defence of Port Arthur, ii. 213;
his alarmist reports, ii. 229
Subotin, General, capture of Mukden, i. 155
Sungari River, Russian withdrawal to, i. 232
Surrender, the question of, ii. 175
_Suvoroff_, Russian battleship, gallantry on the, i. 240
Suvoroff, General, his campaigns, i. 8, 10
Sviatosloff, Grand-Duke, i. 4
Sweden as Russia’s neighbour, i. 3;
war with Russia, i. 12, 36;
her Russian frontier, i. 40–44
Tartars as Russia’s neighbours, i. 3
Ta-shih-chiao, battle of, ii. 182
Tashkent, Russian occupation of, i. 87, 147
Tchernaya, battle of the, i. 18
Telegraph and telephones, need for, ii. 143, 144, 162
Te-li-ssu, Russian disaster at, i. 257, 258
Territorial system, the, ii. 126
Tieh-ling, retirement from, ii. 86
Timber Company, the Royal:
its importance, i. 169;
Bezobrazoff’s propositions, i. 172;
investigation of, i. 173–184;
history of, ii. 306–313
Todleben, General:
Crimean War, i. 21;
assault on Plevna, i. 26
Togo, Admiral:
naval battle at Port Arthur, i. 238, 240
Topornin, General, ii. 276, 292, 297
Trans-Baikal Railway to Vladivostok, i. 69;
capacity of, i. 247–256
Trans-Baikal Cossack, success of, ii. 153
Triple Alliance, the, i. 46, 51, 87, 113
_Trous de loup_, i. 215, 216
Trubetski, Prince, President of the Moscow nobility,
correspondence with Kuropatkin, ii. 198–200
Tserpitski, General, ii. 279, 280, 290, 296, 297, 330
Tsitsihar, capture of, i. 155, ii. 322
Tsushima, defeat of Russian fleet at, i. 238–241
Turkey, and Russia, i. 3;
wars with Russia, i. 6, 81–83;
her army, i. 15;
her peace strength, i. 15;
Crimean War, i. 16;
war with Servia and Russia, i. 24;
Plevna, i. 25;
Russian loss, i. 36;
possibility of trouble with Russia, i. 58
Turkomans, Russian expedition against the, i. 30–32, 85, 86
Ujin, Colonel, his pack telephone system, ii. 143 _n._
Uniform, value of, ii. 100–103
Units, proposed details of, ii. 161–163;
breakdown of, ii. 314–335
_Ushakoff_, Russian ironclad, total loss of, at Tsushima, i. 240
Ussuri districts, Russian annexation of, i. 35, 69, 200
Vannovski, General, War Minister:
the improvement of the army, i. 113;
succeeded by General Kuropatkin, i. 115;
on the allotment of funds, i. 117
Velichko, Major-General, armament for Port Arthur, i. 128
Viceroyalty, establishment of the, i. 187
Vladivostok:
Trans-Baikal Railway, i. 69;
fortification of, i. 126, 148, 151, 200;
Russian fleet at, i. 237;
daring sally from, i. 239;
garrison at, ii. 206
Vogak, Major-General, council at Port Arthur, i. 180
War Department (see also Army), problems for the Russian, i. 1–39;
expansion of the army, and growing complications of defence
problems, i. 78–96;
the chief duty of the twentieth century, i. 102–104;
taken by surprise, i. 105;
estimate procedure and inadequacy of funds allotted,
i. 116–122, 138, 139;
ready by September, 1905, i. 134;
lines of communication 5,400 miles long, i. 135;
dual capacity of Finance Minister, i. 139;
Manchurian and Korean questions, i. 145–198;
reasons for the Russian reverses, i. 229–309, ii. 1–97;
measures for the improvement of the army, ii. 98–176;
the causes of Russian failure summarized, ii. 177–204
Wei-hai-wei, Japanese occupation of, ii. 30
Witgeft, Admiral, his death while attacking the Japanese fleet, i. 238
Witte, Sergius de, Minister of Finance, and Dalny, i. 127, 172;
his dual capacity, i. 139;
his influence, i. 171;
and the Russo-Chinese Bank, i. 172;
and the evacuation of Manchuria, i. 173;
and the Royal Timber Company, i. 173–184, ii. 306–313
Yakub Beg, death of, i. 92
Yalu, battles on the, i. 125, 257, ii. 38;
the timber concession, i. 169–184, ii. 306–313;
naval engagement at the mouth of the, i. 202
_Yellow Peril_, the, a reality, ii. 200
Yen-tai mines, battle at the, ii. 234–236
Zarubaeff, General, i. 303;
withdraws his troops towards Hai-cheng, ii. 225;
the retreat from Mukden, ii. 232, 285, 286, 333
Zasulitch, General, his defeat, ii. 38, 211, 212, 225
Zikoff, ii. 212
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THE LIFE OF HENRY PELHAM, FIFTH DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, 1852–54 AND 1859–64,
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FOOTNOTES
[1] [To economize ammunition at manœuvres, batteries sometimes signal
that they are firing instead of actually doing so.—ED.]
[2] [What in the British Army are colloquially known as “Pow-wows.”—ED.]
[3] [1903.—ED.]
[4] Independent fire is difficult to control, and almost impossible to
stop in action.
[5] [The Cross of St. George corresponds to our Victoria Cross, but is
more easily won.—ED.]
[6] [Russian regiments in Europe, as a rule, consist of four
battalions. East Siberian Rifle regiments in the late war had
three.—ED.]
[7] [Liao-yang.—ED.]
[8] [The Sha Ho.—ED.]
[9] [Hsi-ping-kai, Kung-chu-ling, and Kuang-cheng-tzu.—ED.]
[10] [1903.—ED.]
[11] [See next page.—ED.]
[12] It was followed by the 2nd Infantry Division; 10th and 17th Army
Corps; 5th Siberian Corps; 1st Army Corps, and 6th Siberian Corps.
[13] The leading units of the 10th Army Corps arrived on June 30.
[14] Sixty miles by a road which the rains had made very difficult.
[15] [A European Russian regiment contains four battalions.—ED.]
[16] My report of June 20.
[17] The officer commanding the 2nd Manchurian Army stated that the
whole war strength of his force (total of rifles, sabres, guns, with
twenty-five men to a gun, and ten to a machine-gun) constituted, on an
average, only half the actual numbers.
[18] This amounted in some units to as much as 20 per cent. in men, and
30 per cent. in officers.
[19] [Behind and between armies.—ED.]
[20] [One man on one full day’s work.—ED.]
[21] [General Kuropatkin’s views on this point appear to have changed,
see p. 270.—ED.]
[22] [Who had succeeded Grippenberg in the command of the 2nd Army.—ED.]
[23] Or sergeant-majors.
[24] [On account of student disorders that had led to the closing of
the Universities.—ED.]
[25] Medical students.
[26] [General Kuropatkin himself.—ED.]
[27] Our communications were threatened, and the Yen-tai Mines on the
flank were in the enemy’s hands.
[28] The retirement from Liao-yang was orderly, while that from Mukden
more nearly approached a rout; but it is not certain that the Russians
were really beaten at the former place when the decision to retire was
made.—ED.
[29] [_Sic._ This seems almost incredible.—ED.]
[30] [The portion of this chapter which immediately follows deals in
great detail with the breakdown of the unit organization. It has been
separated from the text, and is given in Appendix II.—ED.]
[31] When the appointments of Inspector-Generals were created, some
confusion resulted between the powers of these and that of the district
commanders.
[32] Two in the two brigades, and two on the divisional staff.
[33] [Service with the colours in Russia has been reduced generally
from five to three years.—ED.]
[34] The transport was not fully horsed.
[35] [By this expression is meant a land not belonging to Russia.—ED.]
[36] [The term used by common folk in Russia when addressing men of
higher birth.—ED.]
[37] Owing to famine in the Kholm district in the years just before
the war, the reservists in it were called up later than those in the
neighbouring districts, and the majority of them were consequently
stationed on the line of communications.
[38] [Summary courts-martial under martial law.—ED.]
[39] With two-wheeled baggage-carts, the number has to be increased by
an additional fifty-four men.
[40] Cooks and mess caterers, eighteen of each—_i.e._, sixteen per
company, and two with scout sections, one mounted, one dismounted.
[41] Three per company.
[42] [This is taking a regiment at 4,000—_i.e._, the men actually in
the firing-line and not employed specially—for scout sections, etc.—ED.]
[43] I several times reported to the War Minister that the despatch of
drafts to fill up wastage in the units already at the front was much
more necessary than the despatch to us of fresh units.
[44] [Battle of Hei-kou-tai.—Ed.]
[45] Colonel Ujin’s pack-telephone system, which I tried in Manchuria,
is a very good one.
[46] [Presumably squares on a map.—ED.]
[47] Artillery regiments to be subordinate in all respects as regards
command to the divisional commander. The commander of an artillery
brigade must technically superintend and inspect all batteries with an
army corps.
[48] One cavalry regiment per division.
[49] One sapper battalion and one company of sappers per division; one
mining and two telegraph companies as corps troops.
[50] [_Sic._ This word is rather misleading. Some formation less than a
regiment is meant.—ED.]
[51]
Voiskovoi Starshina = Lieutenant-Colonel }
Esaoul = Captain } Of
Sotnik = Lieutenant } Cossacks.
Khorunji = Cornet }
[52] In the wars with Turkey and Persia, in the Caucasus and Central
Asia.
[53] [The first portion of this chapter, which is a recapitulation
of what has already been written in Chapters I. to VII., has been
omitted from this translation. What is now given touches more upon the
war itself.—ED.]
[54] [About 1–1/3 miles to the inch.—ED.]
[55] [_Sic._ Killed and wounded (see p. 207, Vol I.).—ED.]
[56] [At the Sha Ho.—ED.]
[57] [At Mukden.—ED.]
[58] [Possibly the author refers to China, Japan, and India being young
in a national sense.—ED.]
[59] [? Telegram.—ED.]
[60] [General Linievitch.—ED.]
[61] [? 1904 and 1905 also.—ED.]
[62] [The name of General Kuropatkin’s country estate in the province
of Pskoff.—ED.]
[63] [This chapter is composed of the introduction and conclusion to
Volume III. of the original, which have been translated, as they add
some light on points not touched upon in Volume IV.—ED.]
[64] Eighteen infantry battalions, 25 squadrons, 86 guns total, 19,000
rifles and sabres.
[65] Two of them sapper battalions. The third battalions formed in
Russia for all the East Siberian Rifle Regiments were only then
beginning to arrive.
[66] The Viceroy’s letter (No. 2,960) of June 6 called attention to the
necessity of “bearing in mind measures to guard against the event of an
advance by Kuroki.”
[67] 1st and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, and 2nd Brigade of the
35th Division.
[68] [There are several passes of this name.—ED.]
[69] [This action is apparently what is elsewhere known as that of
Chiao-tou.—ED.]
[70] [The reasons for this are given in great detail in Volume
IV.—_i.e._, Chapters I. to XII. of this book.—ED.]
[71] This regiment did splendidly in later fights.
[72] The 122nd Tamboff Regiment was attacked when bivouacking.
[73] The positions held on August 31 by the portion of Kuroki’s army
that crossed the river were only eleven miles from the railway.
[74] [? Houton.—ED.]
[75] The corps also arrived at the front with a shortage of about 400
men per regiment—_i.e._, 1,600 per division.
[76] Less one brigade garrisoning Tieh-ling.
[77] [Presumably because it was destined for the 2nd Army.—ED.]
[78] Including Rennenkampf’s column, Shtakelberg had under him 85
battalions, 43 _sotnias_, 174 guns, and 3 sapper battalions.
[79] A very large number of men, particularly of the 1st Corps, left
the ranks without reason. At Mukden, however, this corps fought with
great gallantry and steadiness.
[80] [Grippenberg had already been appointed to the command of the 2nd
Army.—ED.]
[81] From Ssu-chia-tun station to Ta-wang-chiang-pu.
[82] From Fu-shun to Ma-chia-tun.
[83] Of 72 squadrons and _sotnias_, 4 mounted scout parties, and 22
guns.
[84] Including thirty siege-guns.
[85] Its garrison was not more than two battalions.
[86] Two regiments of the four in this division had been sent to
reinforce the Composite Rifle Corps, and one regiment to reinforce the
1st Siberians.
[87] General Grippenberg could not use the telephone himself, as he was
somewhat deaf.
[88] Out of the 80,000 men of the drafts which had arrived.
[89] According to the programme of the arrival of the troops, I
calculated on increasing my reserve by three and four Rifle brigades,
but they arrived more than ten days late.
[90] For operations against Oku.
[91] [? Houton.—ED.]
[92] One was ordered to support General Launits.
[93] [The body of Vol III. in the original deals in great detail with
the battle of Mukden, and is omitted in this translation.—ED.]
[94] Except from February 27 to March 1.
[95] 12.20 p.m., February 28.
[96] 3.25 p.m., March 2.
[97] 6.45 a.m., March 5.
[98] [Query north-west.—ED.]
[99] In addition to five and a half battalions of the 41st Division.
[100] Sixteen battalions of the 19th Corps, concentrated at Sha-ling-pu
under my orders on March 2; sixteen battalions of Golembatovski’s; and
eight battalions of Churin’s division, detained by Kaulbars on the way
to join the troops operating against Nogi.
[101] Major-General Krauze’s report.
[102] And fifty battalions collected towards Hsin-min-tun were thus
left with two squadrons of the Niejinsk Dragoons.
[103] In the afternoon of the 11th this division began to move on
Tieh-ling; it had only suffered small loss during the battle.
[104] [Only the concluding portion of what follows in the original is
given here; the remainder is an exact repetition of what has been more
than once recapitulated.—ED.]
[105] [This extract is, by the kind permission of the editor, reprinted
from _McClure’s Magazine_, where it appeared as an editorial note upon
the article on these memoirs, published in September, 1908.—ED.]
[106] _Osvobojdenie_, No. 75, Stuttgart, August 10, 1905. No question
has ever been raised, I think, with regard to the authenticity of these
letters and telegrams; but if there were any doubt of it, such doubt
would be removed by a comparison of them with General Kuropatkin’s
memoirs.—G. K.
[107] Asakawa, who seems to have investigated this matter carefully,
says that the original contract for this concession dated as far back
as August 26, 1896, when the Korean King was living in the Russian
Legation at Seoul as a refugee.—“The Russo-Japanese Conflict,” by K.
Asakawa, London, 1905, p. 289.
[108] The italics are mine.—G. K.
[109] [Extracted from Chapter X.—ED.]
[110] At the junction of roads near Newchuang.
[111] The 21st and 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments.
[112] Of these a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division and
one regiment of the 1st Army Corps were sent by my orders.
[113] The Omsk Regiment lost its way, and for a long time could not be
found, and the Krasnoyarsk and Tsaritsin Regiments were kept with the
2nd Siberian Corps.