Suggested measures for the improvement of the senior
ranks; for the improvement of the regulars and
reservists; for the reorganization of the reserve troops;
for increasing the number of combatants in infantry
regiments—Machine-guns—Reserve troops—Troops on the
communications—Engineers—Artillery—Cavalry—Infantry—Organization
generally.
Our recent experiences have furnished ample material by which we may
be guided in our efforts to improve the war training and increase
the efficiency of our forces. The War Ministry, assisted by officers
who served in Manchuria, and by articles which have appeared in the
military Press, has already embarked upon numerous reforms. I shall
here merely express my own opinion upon the points I consider most
important, and which should be settled first of all. Amongst these are
measures for—
1. The improvement of the senior ranks.
2. The improvement of the regular soldiers and reservists.
3. Reforms in the organization of the reserve troops.
4. Increasing the number of actual combatants in our infantry regiments.
5. Enlarging the war establishment of regiments, brigades, divisions,
and corps, and, by means of decentralization, making them more
independent.
As regards the first: Our three wars of the last fifty years have
disclosed many shortcomings in our officers. Most of these have
undoubtedly been due to the undeveloped state of the nation, and to
the general conditions of life and labour, which have affected the
army as an integral part of the whole population. Any serious attempt
to improve our officers as a body, therefore, is only likely to be
successful if and when a general improvement sets in in our social
conditions. It has pleased the Tsar to inaugurate many fundamental
reforms for the betterment of the civil status of all classes of our
population in every walk of life, and reforms in the officer class
should be instituted at the same time.
Why is it that, with so many capable, keen, and intelligent men as
we possess among our junior officers and those in comparatively
subordinate positions, we have so few original-minded, keen, and
competent seniors? As I have said, the standard of all ranks of the
army entirely depends on that of the nation. With the growth of the
moral and mental faculties of the people at large there will be a
corresponding growth in that of the military class; but so long as
the nation suffers from a paucity of well-informed, independent, and
zealous men, the army cannot well be expected to be an exception. If
the uniform attracted the pick of the population, out of a nation of
many millions, however backward, there would be at least hundreds of
the very best men—in every sense—quite capable of commanding troops in
war. It would therefore seem necessary—
1. To adopt a military uniform such as will attract the flower of our
youth.
2. To insist that the best of those privileged to wear the uniform
should serve in the army, and there acquire the military knowledge and
strength of character necessary for war.
[Illustration: GENERAL GRIPPENBERG.]
In the first of these two particulars we have succeeded, for in
Russia the military uniform has been particularly honoured for years;
but we have by no means approached near the second desideratum. The
majority of the best men wearing military uniform have not only never
served in the army, but are absolutely unconnected with it. In the
eighteenth century a custom crept in of dressing the sons of grandees
in military clothes, and they could get promotion at an age when they
were riding toy horses round drawing-rooms. Then, little by little,
military uniform, military rank, even that of General, ceased to become
the absolute prerogative of the army, or, indeed, to denote any
connection with war. The members of the Church were the only people
not arrayed in it. Members of the Imperial Council, Ambassadors,
Senators, Ministers of the different departments and their assistants,
Governor-Generals, Governors, Mayors, Superintendents of Police,
officials in the various Government departments and in the military
institutions, all wore military uniform, and were graded in different
ranks. With few exceptions, all that they had to do with the army was
to be a source of weakness to it. Amongst the many names in the long
list of generals, only a few belong to officers on the active list,
and, what is worse, those who are serving in the army get superseded
in rank by, and receive less emoluments than, those who are not.
Consequently, the best elements in the service are naturally anxious
to leave. The posts of Minister of the Interior, of Finance, of Ways
and Communications, of Education, and of State Control, used to be held
by generals and admirals, as well as the appointments of Ambassador
at Constantinople, Paris, London, and Berlin. Service uniforms were
therefore conspicuous at all diplomatic and ministerial gatherings.
Military clothes also had a great attraction for other departments, and
several of them tried to assimilate their uniforms as much as possible
to those of army officers. The worst offender in this respect was the
Ministry of the Interior, which adopted a uniform for police-officers
and even for constables which could hardly be distinguished from that
worn by military officers. The private soldiers were naturally unable
to make anything of this multitude of uniforms, and never knew whom to
salute or obey; indeed, the police-officers’ great-coats and caps with
cockades were enough to puzzle the most discriminating. This all seems
incomprehensible; but the ambition to wear military uniform is easily
explained. It is largely due to the ignorance of the people. Not long
ago, anyone wearing even a hat with a cockade was taken in the country
for a person in authority; caps were doffed to him, and in winter
heavily laden sledges would be turned into snow-drifts to give him the
road, while his vulgar abuse would be patiently accepted.
Thirty years ago, when a young officer, I spent about a year on
service with the French in Algiers, and travelled a great deal. I was
astonished to find that it was found convenient, even under republican
rule, to keep to a system of semi-military government for the native
population—Arabs and Kabyles. It was, in this case, entrusted mainly to
army officers, and those civilians who were also appointed had to adopt
a uniform similar to that worn by the military. These officials told
me in all seriousness that their spurs and the gold braid round their
caps assisted them in their dealings with the Arabs, in collecting
taxes, settling land questions, and other matters. It was so in our
case. Undoubtedly the wearing of military clothes did facilitate the
difficult work which our police-officers have to do; but a great
change has recently come over the country, and a uniform alone is not
now enough to command obedience. It is sometimes a drawback, if not a
danger. It is, of course, to be hoped that such an unnatural state of
affairs will not last; but it is very desirable to take advantage of
the present indifference displayed by the civil population to uniform
to take it from all who are not actually serving in the army. The
time has come when the prestige appertaining to our uniform should be
restored, and the status of those serving in the army should be raised.
With the same object in view, we must continue to try and improve the
material position and prospects of the corps of officers. An important
matter, and one to which I have given much attention—so far without
entire success—is that service on the staff, in offices and in branches
of the War Department, should not pay better than service with the
troops. Many of the officers now so employed in semi-civil duties can
well be replaced by civilian officials. It is, moreover, essential that
service in the Frontier Guards, in the Customs, police, gendarmerie,
on the railway, and as tax-collectors, should cease to be financially
preferable to service in the army.
As senior officers get on in the service, they must not be allowed to
forget what they have previously learnt, a thing which is now only
too common. It is essential that they should be practised in peace
in commanding troops, and not be mere administrators, inspectors,
spectators, and umpires. They should therefore be in a position to
spend most of their time with troops in the field and in cantonments.
With our military system the command of troops is at present almost
entirely in the hands of the regimental, brigade, divisional, corps and
district commanders.[31] Thus our infantry and cavalry regiments used
to be under five masters. But, in the words of the proverb, too many
cooks spoil the broth, and in war all was not for the best in all our
regiments. Often while the ingredients and the fire left nothing to be
desired, the cooks did not know what to do. How can such a state of
things be explained? It will be said that the selection of commanders
was not always happy. That is true; but it must be remembered that
selections had to be made from those men who were qualified according
to the regulations and the reports drawn up by various commanding
officers. In some cases seniority was considered to be by itself
a qualification for promotion. Efforts of a sort were undoubtedly
made to get the best men we had, but they were insufficient. All
the commanders in the five degrees of our military hierarchy are so
occupied with their daily work of routine and correspondence, while
many are so overburdened with the administrative details of their
appointments, that they have little time to attend to the business of
actual war. Yet, as they get on in the service, more knowledge of war
is required of them. The short periods of concentration in summer,
with only a few days of instructional work on both sides, give little
practice in command, and at other times the number of responsible
duties connected with administration places that art on a far higher
plane than mere soldiering. And what is most important is that the
whole of our service—of our lives almost—is spent doing things which
do not go to form character. Of the five posts above mentioned, only
two—the divisional and corps commanders—are in any way independent,
and their occupants are immersed in office work. The relative amount
of time spent on the different sorts of duties tends to turn the
regimental commander into an administrator rather than a fighter,
while a brigade commander has absolutely no independence; in fact, his
absence or presence is scarcely noticed. Finally, the same tendency
to produce office men and bureaucrats is noticeable even in the work
of those on the highest rungs of the ladder—the general officers in
command of military districts. Instances might be multiplied of men
who, though long in charge of military districts, never once commanded
troops on manœuvres, and for several years never even got astride a
horse. How can this impossible state of affairs be remedied, and a body
of leaders, constantly practised in the execution of those duties in
command of troops that would be required of them in war, be formed?
I.
On active service the rôle of the regimental commander is both wide
and important. To issue successfully from the test of modern war, he
must have character, experience, and facility in manœuvring his unit
in the field, must know his men well, and therefore have found the
time both for intercourse with his officers and for perfecting himself
in his profession. In battle it is men he has to deal with, and not
files of papers and storehouses. But, situated as he is at present, he
is so overburdened with important administrative details that most of
his time is passed dealing with requisitions and inventories instead
of with flesh and blood. The penalties he incurs by neglect of his
administrative duties are far heavier and more tangible than those
incurred by neglecting the tactical training of his regiment. The
greater part of these duties—those such as are connected with clothing,
transport, and rationing—should be removed from his shoulders. He
should be made the controller of these sections of duty, and not the
person actually responsible. Nor is his position easy in respect
to the _personnel_. The great shortage of officers, especially in
those units quartered in inferior barracks, is the cause of many
difficulties. When mobilization is ordered, some of the already too
small number of officers are told off for the innumerable miscellaneous
duties and detachments; commanders of battalions and of companies are
interchanged; many of the men are transferred to other units, a mass
of reservists join, and, if there is not time for the new arrivals to
settle down with the few old hands, the commander has to lead into
action a regiment which he does not know, and which does not know
itself. Our mobilization schemes, therefore, require revision in this
respect, and every regiment should have in peace-time a permanent
establishment of officers and men who would accompany the regiment on
service. The company commanders in particular should not be removed
from their companies. But to make such an arrangement possible, it is
essential that one of the senior captains (who might be appointed to
the staff) should run the regimental school. It is also important to
keep the regimental commander as a man apart as far as possible; he
should be made to realize upon all occasions the peculiar importance of
the duties entrusted to him, and the respect due to himself personally
by reason of these duties.
II.
In Manchuria, just as in the wars of the second half of last century,
the great value of the infantry brigade as an independent fighting
unit came out strongly in all the large battles; as also did the great
influence of its commander on the result of the fight.
The advance and rear guards of army corps generally consisted of
brigades. A brigade commander usually began the attack; a brigade
commander usually finished it (by commanding the rearguard). And yet
the post of Brigadier is not considered one of importance; his powers
are insignificant, and his position does not allow him sufficient
independence to enable him to train either himself or his unit.
Divisional commanders and their chief staff-officers in peace-time
often ignore the brigadiers as if they were not wanted, and were fifth
wheels to the coach; and their absence for whole years, building
barracks and roads, etc., is not considered to have any adverse effect
on the successful training of the regiments under them. In such
circumstances even the zealous ones, and those anxious to do their
duty, become dulled, slack, and lose capacity for work. There can
be only one way out of this unnatural state of things, which, from
a military point of view, is most harmful: _brigade commanders must
in peace-time be given independent command of those units which they
will have to command independently in war_. This applies to cavalry as
well as to infantry. Every brigade should have a small staff such as
exists in independent brigades—namely, two adjutants, one an officer
of the General Staff for operations, and one for administration. Each
brigade commander should have powers in both these branches of their
duty equal to that now delegated to divisional commanders, while their
disciplinary powers should remain as at present.
III.
Our divisional commanders are independent and in direct touch with
troops; but they also are overburdened with routine correspondence,
and as they are frequently appointed to command the summer camps, it
happens that they are more often present at the exercises of the troops
as spectators than actually in command. In field operations where
there are two sides, the divisional general rarely finds it possible
to take command of one, partly owing to an exaggerated idea of his
own abilities, and partly to the scarcity of officers of sufficient
seniority to be umpires. Consequently, he only gets practice in
commanding troops in the field during concentrations of large bodies
of men. This is not enough. Commanders of infantry divisions, in
particular, do not know nearly enough about the other arms, owing to
the little practice they get in commanding mixed forces. So, while
giving greater powers to brigade commanders, it will be also advisable
to delegate to divisional generals the powers now exercised by corps
commanders (with the exception of disciplinary powers). Divisional
commanders should always remember that the 16,000 rifles which they
command are a number that can decide the fate of any action. With the
inclusion, in divisions, of artillery, sapper, and cavalry units,
exceedingly instructive exercises can be arranged within these units
both in summer and winter, and the troops and their commanders thereby
trained for war under modern war conditions. The four[32] officers of
the General Staff who would be with each division should be relieved of
all routine, except that relating to operations, and they should devote
the whole of their time and energies to preparing work for the brigade
and divisional commanders in the training of the troops for battle.
IV.
Army corps commanders are quite independent, but, like the divisional
commanders, are overburdened with routine correspondence, etc., and do
not get sufficient practice in commanding troops in the field. Some,
during a tour of duty of several years, have never commanded troops
on manœuvres; and it is impossible for all of them to have sufficient
acquaintance with cavalry, as some corps do not include this arm.
They and their staff, especially the General Staff officers, have no
practice at all, or else very little, in the use of technical equipment
and the modern aids to warfare (telegraphs, telephones, mines, motors,
balloons, etc.). The experience of the late war showed up the necessity
of increasing the establishment of the army corps, and the actions
of their commanders will have such an important, and in many cases
deciding, influence, that extremely careful selection is necessary for
these posts; the men appointed must be capable of teaching others as
well as of learning themselves. As with the divisional generals, so
should the powers of corps commanders be extended at the expense of
those now exercised by officers in command of military districts.
V.
The commanders of military districts are the senior officers actually
in charge of troops, and have at the same time important duties as
administrative heads of districts. Here again administrative work,
together with correspondence connected with the troops, occupies the
greater part of their time, and only in exceptionally favourable
circumstances (the large manœuvres with concentrations of troops from
different districts) can they get any practice in commanding in the
field. But as they also have to perform the duties of Governor-General,
they are not able to devote sufficient time to the troops, even in
inspecting them, or to improving themselves. I am absolutely convinced
that, however much such a combination of two appointments—each of which
requires a man of exceptional ability and character—may be desirable
from the political point of view, it has the gravest disadvantages for
the army. There is a limit to human power. As our governor-generals
devote the greater part of their time and energies to civil matters,
they entrust a large part of their military duties to the chief
staff-officers of the districts. It can easily be understood that such
an arrangement is not in the interests of the army. For instance, the
most important military district—that of Warsaw—was, as far as the army
was concerned, neglected in the time of several governor-generals.
Indeed, at one time, much to the subversion of the authority of
officers in command of districts and corps, the troops in this area
were controlled by the chief of the district staff! Therefore, if
we wish that the commanders of military districts—our most natural
selections for the command of armies in war—should have time to prepare
themselves for this important duty, _we should free them from civil
duties_; otherwise we shall get no improvement. They must also be
relieved of the numerous and responsible cares with respect to all
those questions which in war mainly fall to the officer in command of
the communications.
The inspection of hospitals, of supply depôts, engineer and artillery
units, of parks, of offices—everything that takes too much time
from the exercises for the actual training of the troops and of
themselves—should be eliminated from their duties. These have become
so heavy with the complications of modern war, and are fraught with
such importance to army and country, that the men who will have to
perform them must unceasingly prepare themselves in peace; but, for
the reasons I have already given, few officers have time to follow up
the developments in their profession. That is why in the recent war
we were left behind in knowledge of the employment of artillery, of
the utility of the various technical means of intercommunication, in
appreciating relative value of different attack formations, etc. _Our
senior officers must be given_ _sufficient leisure, while improving
the troops under them, at the same time to improve themselves._
IMPROVEMENT OF THE REGULARS.
I have more than once pointed out how excellent the regulars were
as regards military qualifications, and how much more reliable in
the first fights than the reservists, especially the older ones. But
we must look to the nation itself for the cause of the shortcomings
of both. The lack of education in the peasant is reflected in the
private soldier, and the non-existence of a martial spirit amongst the
masses, coupled to the dislike for the war, resulted in the absence
of a military spirit in our troops in Manchuria. Their ignorance
made the conduct of modern war, which demands a much greater spirit
of combination and initiative from the individual than formerly,
very difficult for us. Consequently, while behaving with the utmost
gallantry when in close order—in mass—our men, when left to themselves
without officers, were more inclined to retire than to advance. In
the mass they were formidable; but very few of them were fit for
individual action, and this is a point in which the Japanese had a
great advantage. Their non-commissioned officers in particular were
better educated than ours, and on many prisoners—private soldiers
as well as non-commissioned officers—we found diaries written not
only grammatically, but with a general knowledge of what was going on
and of what the Japanese were trying to do. Many of them drew well.
One prisoner—a private—drew on the sand an excellent diagram of our
position and that of the enemy.
It is never easy to turn in a short time an ignorant, illiterate
recruit into an intelligent and keen soldier, capable of individual
action; and the recent reduction[33] of the term of service has made
the task still harder. The greatest difficulty, however, is to get good
non-commissioned officers; even with the four to five year period with
the colours we were not able to do this satisfactorily. The mass of
our recruits are so illiterate, and so much book knowledge is required
in the schools from our non-commissioned officers, that there is a
natural tendency to pick the men for these posts on account of their
education and outward sharpness. This is a mistake, as these qualities
are often superficial. The simple recruits of the deepest and strongest
characters are usually slow and uncouth and do not shine externally;
consequently many of them never become selected for non-commissioned
rank, and finish their service as private soldiers. But a surly man
of some character often makes a better soldier than his smarter
comrade. With the reduced term of service we can do nothing without
a considerable number of time-expired men. The present conditions
under which these men are kept on in the ranks are sound enough, but
the men dislike doing time-expired, or what they characterize as
“mercenary,” service. We must get over this dislike, and therefore
as much as possible raise the position of sergeant-major and other
non-commissioned officers.
Another burning question, and one with which we shall be confronted
more and more in the future, is how to keep the destructive tenets of
the revolutionary parties out of our barracks. Drastic action will of
course be taken, but if we do not succeed in crushing these parties
among the people, we can hardly expect to be able to keep the army from
infection.
One of the most important requirements with our short term of service
is that our men should not be taken away from their work for police
duties. The part so frequently taken by the troops in putting down
civil disorders by force of arms is particularly harmful to discipline.
To turn to another point, owing to the inadequate funds allotted, our
soldiers have always been treated worse than those of other armies.
The Germans, for instance, spend twice as much per head upon the
maintenance of their army as we do. Some improvement in this direction
has already been made, especially in the feeding. With a serviceable
cadre of time-expired sergeant-majors and non-commissioned officers,
and with the living conditions of the men improved, we can face the
future calmly even with a three-year term of service. But we shall
only succeed if we relieve the troops of the large amount of extra
regimental work which falls to them (tailoring, shoemaking, and other
workshop work, care of reserve stores, etc.), and if we lighten their
guard duties. Our recruits are free from this work and from guards only
in the first year of service.
IMPROVEMENT OF THE RESERVISTS.
Our infantry in the recent war can be classified in four groups,
according to the relative number of old regular soldiers and reservists:
1. The East Siberian Rifle Regiments, which were maintained almost on a
war footing[34] in peace.
2. The infantry in the 1st Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions,
which were filled up to war strength with regulars at the beginning of
the war.
3. The infantry of the regular army corps brought up to war strength
with reservists.
4. The infantry units formed from reserve troops.
According to the opinion of competent officers who served in the war
(which I fully share), other conditions being equal, _the more regular
soldiers there were in a unit, the more it could be relied on in
battle_. The best troops we had were the East Siberian Rifle Regiments,
and after them the brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions. In the case
of the army corps, which proceeded to the front direct from Russia,
sufficient care was not taken to regulate the proportion of regulars
to reservists. Some units—the 10th Army Corps, for instance—arrived at
the front 20 per cent. below strength in men, and more in officers.
In the first fight in which it was engaged, several companies of this
corps had only sixty regular soldiers—thirty trained men and thirty
recruits—who had not _even passed their recruit’s musketry course_. All
the remainder were reservists, among whom were a large number of 2nd
Category men. These regular units consequently were, to all intents and
purposes, nothing but reserve units. Finally, our reserve units arrived
almost without any permanent peace cadres, so swallowed up were they in
the great mass of reservists. In the early fighting these reservists,
particularly those of the 2nd Category, were vastly inferior to the
regulars; many of them took advantage of every opportunity to leave
the ranks with or without permission. There is little doubt that if
the war had been a national one, and if the country had supported its
sons at the front instead of doing the opposite, these men would have
done better in the first fights; but it is also quite certain that,
other conditions being equal, the man with the colours must be better
than the other as a soldier. He is not torn from his family at a time
when he has begun to think that his military liability is over; he is
better trained, and possesses _esprit de corps_. Therefore, the best
way of improving our infantry is to maintain it with a stronger peace
establishment than at present.
In Manchuria a peace establishment of 100 men per company became
so weak from the various causes incidental to active service that
companies went into action with one-third regulars to two-thirds
reservists. Nominally regular forces, they were in reality more like
reserve troops. Regulars should be in the majority in every company,
but the great difficulties and expense of maintaining troops on a
strong peace footing compel us to pay special attention to the question
of improving our reserve men. Modern war must be fought mainly with men
temporarily called up from amongst the people.
The only thing that will insure devotion to their country among
reservists proceeding to the front is the existence of a spirit of
patriotism in the nation. Discontent and feelings of oppression
among the people are naturally reflected in the minds of those of
them leaving for war. But, independent of such all-important general
considerations, there are certain definite things that can be taken to
improve the tone of the reservists. According to the present system,
when a man passes from the colours into the reserve his connection with
his own unit—in fact, with the Service generally—almost ceases. The
practice concentrations are not carried out on a large enough scale,
and though valuable, are often dispensed with altogether on account of
financial considerations. So it happens that a man passing into the
reserve takes his uniform with him, but, with rare exceptions, never
even wears his forage-cap; this he generally gives to some neighbour or
relation—hardly ever a soldier—to wear out. The reservist himself only
too gladly dons peasant’s clothes or other mufti; he is glad to feel
that he is a peasant again. He starts in business, takes up peaceful
occupations, and raises a family. When he reaches the age of forty,
he begins to put on flesh. And it is under these conditions that he
is suddenly torn from the bosom of his family, and sent to fight in a
strange, “hired”[35] land for a cause for which he feels no sympathy,
and which he does not understand. To this are added the general
discontent all around him, and a flood of revolutionary proclamations.
The separation of the reservist from all touch with the army once he
has left it does not tend to his rapid retransformation from “mujik”
into trained soldier. In the case of Manchuria he certainly became a
good man after some months in the school of war, but so long a period
of grace cannot be counted on in the future.
Coming here into the heart of the country as I did nine months ago, and
staying here continuously, I have been in a position to observe our
reservists returning from the war. When the return stream first began
in March, April, and May, there were large numbers. Sometimes when I
passed they would fall in—in line—and receive me after the military
fashion. They wore fur caps, very often military great-coats, and
looked, as they were, a fine body of young soldiers. Nine months of
hard work in the fields soon turned them again into peasants, and now,
when they come to me, on business or otherwise, instead of saluting,
they take off their caps and call me “Barin.”[36]
In Japan mothers counted it a dishonour if their sons were rejected as
medically unfit to go to the front. With us how different it was! Women
often came to thank me heartily for having “had pity” on their sons
and husbands, because these latter happened to have been told off for
duty with transport units or with hospitals, etc., instead of being
sent into action,[37] and they did the same when their men returned
safe and sound. In Japan, Germany, and other countries, some endeavour
is made in education to inculcate patriotism into the people. A love
of country and pride in the Fatherland is created in the children. As
has been said before, the schools in Japan do everything they can to
create and foster a martial spirit in the youth of the nation, and to
practise them in military matters. There and in other countries the
formation of various patriotic societies is approved, and all kinds of
physical sport are encouraged. The authorities are not afraid to issue
thousands of rifles to the people for rifle practice, etc. We do not do
this; we are afraid for political reasons. Little is done to inculcate
patriotism by education in our schools, and the great gulf between
Church, rural, and Government schools makes matters worse. Students in
the highest educational establishments have long ago abandoned study
for politics; it has for long been the fashion to abuse everything
Russian, and military service is thought to be dishonourable. Our
infantry soldier is undersized and overloaded; he is usually untidy,
often dirty, and wears an ugly and ill-fitting uniform. Is it a wonder
that, as he slouches along, he excites more pity than pride in the man
in the street? And yet it is on this undersized man that the integrity
of the Empire depends. Money is tight, as we all know, but still, we
do not keep the soldier clean and smart enough when he is serving, and
when we pass him into the reserve we give him a dress which he can
display with no pride to his neighbours or even his own family. Under
such conditions, how can we hope that he will then suddenly turn into a
martial warrior?
Only by the reformation of our schools, and the introduction into the
life of the lower classes of reforms, which, besides increasing their
comfort, will develop in them a love for, and pride in, their country,
and a deep sense of the necessity for some sacrifice for it, shall we
get in the reserve a thorough soldier of the right sort. The attainment
of such a result cannot depend entirely on any actions of the War
Department, which must, after all, be secondary; but the things that
can be effected by it are nevertheless important, and I will enumerate
those which seem to be the most pressing.
In an army discipline is the foundation of all efficiency; but to
maintain discipline in an army is impossible when the mass of the
nation have no respect for authority, and where the authorities
actually fear those under them. The term of service with the colours
is now so short that there is no time to overcome in the soldier
the disorderliness of the people from whom he comes, yet to effect
improvement in the reservist demands an iron military discipline. It
must not be allowed for a moment that a soldier need not be afraid of
his officer. The present greatest enemy to discipline is the employment
of soldiers in the political struggle now going on. On the one hand,
the force is corrupted by propaganda; on the other, men are taken
away from military duties and detailed for almost continual police
work, in putting down disorder not only of a military nature, such as
mutiny, where the situation can only be saved by the assistance of
reliable troops, but riots which should be dealt with by the police
and the gendarmes. Officers are taken away to sit on field courts,[38]
to judge, shoot, and hang political and other criminals. These duties
make the populace hate the troops, and among the soldiers who suffer
in killed and wounded it arouses a feeling of hatred not only for the
civilians who shoot at them, but against the officers who order them
to kill the civilians. The result is demoralizing to a degree. What
impression can the man passing into the reserve take home with him
if, during the two or three years of his colour service, he has been
“maintaining order” in various ways with the aid of his rifle? The
army can and must do all that is necessary to suppress mutinies, and
to break down all organized opposition, but it should then return at
once to its ordinary work. If this sort of duty becomes frequent, if
the soldier sees that the Government is powerless to restore order
even with the aid of troops, doubts will creep into his mind as to the
expediency of the Government’s policy and as to his own commanders.
According to what I hear, it seems that the heavy task which has
recently fallen to the lot of the army is now coming to an end, and
that order is beginning once more to be restored in our great country.
Please God may it soon be the case, as otherwise the force must
deteriorate instead of improving.
Under ordinary conditions our work should tend to make the man passed
into the reserve arrive in his native village or town well disciplined,
knowing his work, taking a pride in his old corps, and respecting
those under whom he has served. We must therefore endeavour to prevent
him from losing touch with the Service and quickly forgetting what he
has learned in it. In some armies to obviate this they have what is
called the territorial system, by which reservists maintain touch
to the end of their term with those units in which they have served.
This system is not possible for us in its entirety, but it might be
applied partially and adopted on a fairly large scale. One of its great
advantages would be that reservists would on mobilization at once
join the units in which they had previously served. They would not be
strangers, but would be known to the cadre of time-expired, but still
serving, non-commissioned officers and the officers, and would soon
settle down. Men of the same district would be more inclined to hold
together under fire, and every man would feel that if he behaved badly
his comrade would send news of it to his home. Units territorially
connected with the people would be more dashing than corps collected
from anywhere. There would, of course, be many difficulties, which
would have to be overcome before the system could be adopted. For
instance, men taken from a certain locality would, if employed to
suppress disorders in that place, be more likely to waver than men from
another unit and district. Cases have been known where non-commissioned
officers who had been strict with their men have requested, on being
passed into the reserve, not to be sent off in the same compartment
of a train with their late subordinates, who had threatened to “make
things even” so soon as they both passed into the reserve together.
With us such a settling up of old scores might easily be effected under
a territorial system, by which both officers and soldiers would, after
their service, come together in one district.
It must be more frequently impressed on the reservists that they still
are soldiers. Local concentrations should be organized for them so that
they may get some training, and these should be arranged at such a time
of the year as to interfere as little as possible with the crops. This
would vary, of course, according to locality. Our recruiting officers
are now mainly occupied, like everyone else, with office work; they
should be more in touch with the reservists, who should look to them
as their commanding officer, adviser, and protector. The relationship
now is too purely official. An important matter also is the division of
reservists in peace-time. In my opinion it is essential to have three
classes. For the first two years after the man leaves the colours he
should be considered on furlough; he should be made to wear uniform,
and always be ready to be recalled in case of partial or general
mobilization. The men of the last two classes should be on a different
footing, and should be used on mobilization to fill up services in
rear, hospitals, bakeries, parks, transport units, and to guard camps
on the communications, etc.
REFORMS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RESERVE TROOPS.
We have already seen (Chapter VI.) how, when the war began, we found
it necessary, in the absence of any assurance arranged by diplomacy
against other contingencies, to be ready for any military eventuality
on our Western frontier. Consequently, too great a number of reserve
units were included amongst the troops told off to take the field in
the Far East. Another reason for this was that we did not really know
the qualities of different sections of our army. Our crack troops,
taking both officers and men together, of three Guard and three
Grenadier divisions, six divisions in all, were left in European
Russia, while newly formed corps composed of reserve units were sent
into the field. I have already mentioned how my recommendation to
mobilize the reinforcements being sent to us immediately after Easter
was for various reasons rejected, how they were mobilized a month
later than they should have been, and arrived in Manchuria unsettled,
untrained, knowing scarcely anything of the new rifle, without having
fired a course of musketry, and not having done any combined tactical
operations with the other arms.
The troops of the 6th Siberians, which certainly had been in camp for
a short time before starting, had not been given a gun or a squadron
to enable them to practise combined operations. Of the 4th Siberian
Corps, which mobilized under most favourable conditions, only the
Omsk Regiment had been trained in artillery, and this was of an old
pattern; yet it had to go into action with quick-firing guns. Cavalry
were hardly seen. Indeed, if we consider the haphazard selection of
commanding officers, the lack of any community of thought amongst the
officers generally, the almost complete absence of proper tactical
training, the large number of 2nd Category reservists, general dislike
of the war, and, finally, the absence of military spirit, it will be
evident why some units of the reserve troops failed. In the first
battles the troops of the 4th Siberian Corps won a good reputation in
the army. The reasons for this were:
1. The splendid character of the men in them. Bluff, surly fellows of
Siberia, they were strong in body and stout of heart, and understood
better than others the reasons for which we were fighting in the Far
East.
2. The careful selection of those in command.
3. The bravery of the officers.
4. The long time they had, compared with other troops, to train and
acquire cohesion.
But, after the reserve troops which came out from European Russia had
received their baptism of fire, they also did well. It is sufficient
to call to mind the behaviour of the regiments of the 54th and 71st
Divisions at Mukden, as well as those of the 55th and 61st Divisions.
But this result was not reached till late, and cost many lives. In
a European conflict the fate of a campaign will be far more rapidly
decided than it was in Manchuria, for the first battles fought after
the declaration of hostilities will have a deciding influence. In the
recent war, owing to the slow concentration possible on a single-track
railway, the reserve troops might have been collected sooner and given
several months to settle down, and have thus arrived at the front more
ready for battle. In a European war they will have to be transported
into the theatre of operations in a very short time after mobilization.
We made a great mistake in forming the reserve troops into separate
army corps. In my opinion, it would have been much better to have
put them into existing corps—either as third divisions or separate
brigades. This would have improved our corps organization, which is too
unwieldy and too big for a strength of only twenty-four battalions.
With strong corps consisting of efficient self-contained brigades the
confusion of units in battle would be minimized.
Before the war no army corps organization had been worked out for
the reserve troops; everything had been arranged for a divisional
organization. In my opinion, neither corps nor divisions are
necessary. It would be more advantageous to form the reserve units
into independent brigades of eight battalions, and to use them as army
troops, or possibly as corps troops. The mobilization of the reserve
artillery, sapper, and cavalry, should take place together with that of
the infantry. Every reserve brigade of eight battalions (8,000 rifles)
should have, with two batteries of twelve guns, one company of sappers
and one reserve squadron of cavalry or a _sotnia_ of Cossacks. This
arrangement would permit of reserve troops being employed on secondary
objects without the organization of the army being broken up, and it
would no longer be necessary to find so many divisional and corps
commanders, with their numerous staffs.
STEPS TO AUGMENT THE COMBATANT ELEMENT IN OUR INFANTRY.
Amongst the causes of our disasters has been mentioned (Chapter
VI.) the small number of rifles per company we had in action as
compared with the Japanese. We often had more battalions than they,
but fewer men. The various reasons for this I have already enumerated.
To lessen the number of subsidiary duties which take men away from
the fighting-line of the regular army, we must create cadres for the
troops of the rear services; we must also arrange that the casualties
are quickly made good from the reserve troops, which should be kept
up permanently and closely connected with the regular troops. (Every
regular regiment should have one reserve or depôt battalion.) To
augment the numbers fighting compared with the numbers fed, and, in
particular, to increase the number of men in the firing-line, we must
bring up the combatant establishment of our companies from 220 to 250
rifles. With 220 rifles on the roll of a company, we were never able
to put even 200 in action; and in bringing the strength of these units
up to 250, we must take steps to see that they all really can take the
field. According to the “War Establishments,” a line infantry regiment
has an establishment of 3,838 combatants and 159[39] non-combatants
(total 3,997), which gives 235 rifles per company. But in this
number are included 35 bandsmen, 33 drummers, 1 bugler, 3 regimental
quartermaster-sergeants, 1 sergeant-major of the non-combatant company,
5 baggage non-commissioned officers, and, moreover, another 240 (15
per company) detailed for supply work, etc. Excluding these, 3,520
combatants are left, which gives 220 per company; but experience has
shown that there is much leakage from this number.
The peculiarities of Manchuria necessitated the employment of men on
duties that would have been quite unnecessary, or less necessary, in
a European war. Thus, in addition to the authorized transport, we had
pack transport, which swallowed up fifty men per regiment. The large
herds of cattle with regiments required twenty-four men to look after
and guard them. There were nine regimental butchers. Two or three
donkeys were told off to each company. (Indeed, they were of such
great use in taking water and ammunition up into the firing-line that
I consider they should be included in the establishments of troops
in European Russia.) In each company one man was told off to these
animals. The number of officers on the regimental rolls included those
who had been wounded and were away convalescent, and many of these took
their orderlies with them on leaving the front. The expenditure in
these orderlies alone amounted to more than 100 men. For the special
pack transport which was formed for the scout sections for carriage
of ammunition and supplies, thirteen men per regiment were required.
Judging by the experience of the war, I consider the following
duties ought to be allowed for in every regiment in addition to the
establishment of 159 non-combatants:
Company clerks 16
Mess caterers 18
Officers’ mess cooks 4
Men’s cooks 18[40]
Butchers and cattle guard 12
Officers’ grooms 27
Transport drivers with scout sections 13
Instructors 4
Stretcher-bearers 128
Baggage guard 48[41]
With water donkeys 16
Officers’ orderlies 80
Sergeant-major of non-combatant company 1
Transport driver non-commissioned officers 5
Despatch riders 20
Bandsmen 35
Drummers 33
Reserve in case of sickness and wounded 13
―――
Total 491
All these must be classed as non-combatants. Adding to these the
prescribed establishment of 159 non-combatants, we shall get a total of
650 with each regiment of four battalions. They should all be armed,
and be ready to fight either in the advanced lines or with the baggage.
The value of machine-guns is now so great that we cannot afford to be
without them. In my opinion, each company should have one gun, and six
men should be detailed to carry it and its ammunition. Thus, there
would be 100 men with the machine-guns in a regiment (including four
reserve men). The scout sections also did such useful service in the
recent war that we ought certainly to have dismounted and small mounted
scout sections in each regiment. This would take up 200 more men.
Finally, the strength of every company, exclusive of all these extras,
should be fixed at 250 rifles, which would make 4,000 in the regiment.
The strength of a regiment would, therefore, total as follows:
Combatants (in sixteen companies) 4,000
Scout sections 200
Machine-gun sections 150
Non-combatants 650
―――――
Total 5,000
The present establishment of a four-battalion regiment is 3,838
combatants and 159 non-combatants; total, 3,997. Therefore a total
increase of 1,003 per regiment is desirable. Including fifteen men in
every company for supply duties, the authorized non-combatant element
works out at:
Non-combatants 159
Bandsmen, drummers, buglers 69
Regimental quartermaster-sergeants 3
Sergeant-majors and baggage non-commissioned officers 6
For supply duties 240
―――
Total 477
Fixing the total number of non-combatants required at 650, I thus add
to the expenditure authorized by existing establishments 173. These,
including stretcher-bearers, would never go into action. Thus, the
addition necessary to bring the fighting element of a regiment up to
5,000 comes out as follows:
Increase of thirty rifles per company (so
as to have 250 instead of 220) 480
Scout sections 200
Machine-gun sections 150
―――
Total 830
This increase would greatly add to its present strength.
MACHINE-GUNS.
At the beginning of the war the army had only a small number of
machine-guns. Recognizing the value of this weapon, the Japanese
quickly introduced it, and furnished their field troops with a large
number. We did the same, and several machine-gun companies and sections
arrived from Russia during the summer of 1905. But the type of weapon
did not satisfy tactical requirements—(1) as regards its weight; and,
(2) adaptability to the ground. A pattern must be invented that can be
carried even into the outpost line. Our high, unwieldy weapons, with
their shields, more resembled light field-guns; and their unsuitable
construction, combined with the difficulty of adapting them to the
ground, was responsible for the decision that these guns should be
organized into batteries, and be treated and used as artillery. Such an
opinion is absolutely wrong, for the great volume of fire which they
can deliver calls for their distribution at the most important points
along the firing-line, and, therefore, a capability of advancing with
assaulting columns. The organization of machine-gun companies did not
meet the above tactical requirements. Each battalion should have four
guns.
RESERVE (OR DEPÔT) TROOPS.
The reserve or depôt troops should be developed and given an
organization which will permit of the wastage in units, both in
officers and men, being made good from them immediately after a battle
or during a long series of battles. Each infantry regiment should have
its reserve (depôt) battalion, which should be formed on mobilization
at a strength of 40 per cent. of the combatant establishment of a
regiment—_i.e._, at 1,600 men.[42] Of these, 400, or 10 per cent. of
the regiment’s strength, should be in the theatre of war. This number
should be formed into one company, and should constitute the reserve
depôt company of its particular regiment, and be continually feeding
it. With every division these companies should be organized together
into a reserve battalion of 1,600 men for the immediate replacement of
casualties in the regiments of the division. All wounded and sick who
are not sent to the base should be attached to this battalion till they
are passed as fit. After great battles this reserve would be depleted,
and would require filling up from the base depôt. The establishment of
the other arms should be kept up to strength by a parallel arrangement.
The casualties amongst non-combatants are less, but in their case a
reserve is necessary, distinct from the combatant reserve, to make good
their wastage. It should be mainly composed of 2nd Category reservists
and those of the convalescent combatants not considered fit enough for
the ranks.
The war shows very clearly the immense importance of rapidly repairing
the wastage in units directly after an action. The Japanese succeeded
in doing this, with the result that they were greatly superior to
us in numbers. It was more important for us to be able to replace
casualties by drafts than to receive reinforcements, and it would have
made us stronger. For instance, with five troop trains available in the
twenty-four hours, a complete army corps with its baggage and parks
took twenty days to reach the front, and increased our strength by some
25,000 rifles. If drafts had been sent up during those twenty-days
instead of an army corps, we should have received 90,000 to 100,000
men. In place of cavalry, baggage, artillery, parks, and a small number
of infantry, we should have got a large number of the latter. It was
infantry we wanted, for in our big battles it was the infantry that
suffered so heavily. The number of guns per 1,000 rifles was too large,
and the amount of transport and baggage was prodigious, with the result
that the 10,000 to 12,000 rifles left in corps resembled an escort to
the artillery, parks, baggage, etc.,[43] more than anything else.
TROOPS IN REAR—COMMUNICATION TROOPS.
By troops in rear I mean those at rest camps, railway troops, road
working parties, telegraph sections, motor troops, transport of various
kinds, all of which should be under the general officer commanding
communications. There is also a large number of men in the departments,
institutions, and depôts of all the field administrations, but as in
Manchuria these were mostly fixed by the authorized establishment,
I will not refer to them. The absence of any prepared organization
of troops for the line of communication, however, led to their being
formed at the expense of the fighting strength of the infantry. While
officers commanding regiments complained of the great wastage of their
men on duties in the rear, those in rear complained that the numbers
they had were insufficient. Troops for the duties in rear should of
course be formed on mobilization. In the part of my report upon the 1st
Army which deals with the organization of the communications there is
much valuable material which is based on war experience, and may be a
useful guide for the future. By the end of August, 1905, the strength
of the 1st Army alone was 300,000. Its own communications in rear
had a depth of 150 miles and a frontage of 330 miles, including the
detachments guarding the extreme left flank and the left flank corps
under General Rennenkampf, with which we permanently occupied a front
of about 70 miles. Under the general commanding the communications of
the 1st Army, which consisted of six army corps, were 650 officers
and officials, 12,000 men, and 25,000 horses, and this number was
considered inadequate. In my report, I gave as my estimate for the
numbers required for one army corps per day’s march in length of
communications—
Men.
1. Half company infantry 120
2. Transport 320
3. Road troops 25
4. Postal telegraph working parties 5
―――
Total 470
ENGINEER TROOPS.
The great development of science in warfare is very marked, but the
late war did not display the employment of scientific forces that will
be made in a struggle between two European Powers. In this respect
the Japanese were much better served than we were, but even they were
not technically equipped in the way that will soon be necessary. The
speedy construction of strong fortifications, the laying of railways
(especially of field railways) and construction of metalled roads,
the organization of aerial and wireless telegraphy, of signalling by
heliograph, lamps, and flags, the employment of balloons, motors, and
bicycles, are all duties for which the demand increases every day,
while the great quantity also of artificial obstacles, wire, mines,
hand-grenades, explosives, reserves of entrenching tools, etc., now
required must exist ready for use in large quantities. A much larger
number of engineer troops, including sappers, telegraph and railway
units, than we had available in Manchuria is necessary, in order
that all this technical equipment may be used to the best advantage.
Without touching here upon the railway troops necessary for the proper
service of the communications, the number of which must depend upon the
length of the existing lines, and of those proposed to be laid during
operations, let us consider the question of the number of sapper and
telegraph troops required for one army corps of three divisions.
The spade, which had been forgotten since the Turkish War, has once
more regained its true position. With the volume and murderous
effectiveness of modern fire, neither the attack nor the defence can be
conducted without enormous losses, unless proper and intelligent use is
made of digging. For a protracted defence strong fortified positions
with both open and closed works and all possible kinds of artificial
obstacles are absolutely necessary. Consequently, for the attack of
such positions, special troops are required trained in the use of
explosives and the destruction of obstacles, and in road-making, for
heavy artillery demands good roads and strong bridges.
While every Japanese division of twelve infantry battalions had one
strong sapper battalion, we had on an average only one company of
sappers with each division. This proved to be too small a proportion.
Our sappers worked nobly in the construction of earthworks and roads,
but they did little in actual contact with the enemy, and, strange as
it may appear, were often forgotten when an action began, even when we
attacked the enemy’s strongly fortified positions. In the 2nd Army we
had several sapper battalions, and yet in the assault on San-de-pu[44]
not a single company was told off to accompany the storming columns.
As our sappers were so scarce, we took the greatest care of them, as
their small number of casualties as compared with those of the infantry
proves. To get the best results from this arm, it seems to me necessary
to associate them more with other troops, and therefore _to attach
them to divisions_, instead of including them in the corps troops. If
we succeed in getting strong regiments of 4,000 rifles, I consider
it essential that every regiment should have attached to it, for
offensive as well as defensive operations, one sapper company of 250
men, which would mean a four-company sapper battalion, 1,000 strong,
for every division. They should be trained to put up obstacles very
rapidly, and should possess the necessary tools and equipment for their
destruction. A large supply of wire is also very important; it may be
taken that every division should have a sufficient supply of wire for
two defensive points, say 1 ton for each.
Moreover, there should be attached to each division a field-telegraph
company of six sections, in order to organize rapid communication
between each party of troops thrown out in front and the divisional
staff. Each regiment should have with it a section which should be
equipped to establish communication by telephone,[45] flag, cycle
or motor. With every three-division army corps there should be a
sapper brigade of three battalions, a field-telegraph battalion of
five companies, a mining company, a balloon section, and a railway
battalion. Two of the telegraph companies should keep up communication
from the corps to army headquarters, to other corps, to its own
divisions, to the parks, the baggage, and reserves.
One of our principal failings, as I have repeatedly mentioned, was
lack of information. Owing to this, and the consequent loss of touch,
commanders could not conduct operations intelligently or keep corps
and army commanders and the Commander-in-Chief informed of what was
happening. Every Japanese regiment laid down telephones as it advanced;
we used to find their dead operators in our _trous de loup_, which
showed that they were right up with the firing-line. With us touch
was not infrequently lost even between whole corps and armies! The
necessity for remedying this grave defect is obvious, and we must
practise how to do this in peace. Not a regiment should be allowed to
advance at manœuvres without at once being connected up by telephone
with its brigade commander and the divisional staff, and it is
essential that, as the information comes in by telegraph and telephone,
the divisional corps and army staffs should at once fix on the maps
the positions of both forces. Formerly commanders could watch the
whole battlefield through a telescope from an eminence, could see their
own troops, and could trace the position of the hostile infantry and
artillery from the smoke. Now there is nothing to be seen. Often the
troops are out of sight, and all that meets the eye are the puffs of
smoke from the bursting shrapnel. Therefore orders and dispositions
have to be worked out on the map, and we must learn how to keep these
maps constantly up to time. In order that all intelligence may be at
once noted, a “service of communication,” by means of motors, cyclists,
and particularly of telegraph and telephone, might be organized, in
addition to the ordinary reports brought in by mounted men. To attain
these important results, considerable expense must be incurred in the
creation of this “service of communication” or “service of information”
of such a nature as to meet in every way the requirements of battle, of
movement, and of rest.
An adequate number of sapper units with regiments will not only help us
in the capture of fortified positions strengthened by obstacles, but
will assist us rapidly to adapt them for defence when taken. The work
of the mining company in future wars will be great both in attack and
defence, especially in defence. It should have charge of all explosives
required for demolitions, including mines, pyroxyline bombs, and
hand-grenades. The great effect of the bombs thrown by revolutionaries
and anarchists points to their extensive use in war in the future. If
fanatics can be found who will rush to certain death in order to kill
peaceful citizens, it should certainly be possible to find devoted
soldiers who will advance ahead of the firing-line and throw bombs into
the enemy’s obstacles.
Besides supply of field railway material for the army, each corps
should have enough for thirty miles of line (steam or horse draught,
according to circumstances).
ARTILLERY.
We have learnt by experience that skill in the employment of guns is
more important than their number. Under modern battle conditions, when
the position of a battery cannot be seen, a great deal of ammunition
is fired during the artillery duel without any result. Two to four
well-concealed guns cleverly moved from one position to another can
hold their own with a brigade of artillery, and, if they can only
range on the enemy’s guns first, rapid fire gives them the power of
inflicting heavy loss. Our keenest and most experienced gunners got
on to the enemy on many occasions with great effect, but as a rule
our artillery did little damage. One occasion when very ineffective
results were obtained by us was at Hei-kou-tai, where, in our
endeavour to get possession of San-de-pu, we fired 70,000 rounds into
every square,[46] except the one which actually contained the village.
Our immense expenditure of ammunition also emphasized how carefully
the question of the right proportion of guns in a force must be
considered. In this war, owing to the great delay in sending up drafts
to repair wastage, we were often actually handicapped by having too
many guns! We frequently had to fight with divisions containing only
some 6,000 to 8,000 men in the four regiments and the full forty-eight
guns—a proportion of six to eight guns per 1,000 rifles, which is far
too many. And our guns were literally an embarrassment, especially
when they had run out of ammunition. Even assuming that we shall be
able (as I have suggested) to place in the field regiments with a
strength of 4,000 rifles, I consider it will be quite sufficient if we
maintain the proportion of guns at forty-eight per division, or three
guns per 1,000 rifles. The fire from quick-firing guns is nowadays
quite powerful and effective enough for four guns to be considered a
tactically independent fighting unit; but the formation of batteries
of such a size is expensive, and requires too many men. It appears
to be preferable, therefore, to abandon the artillery divisional
organization, and return to the former twelve-gun battery, dividing
it into three companies, each of which would be in a tactical sense
independent. The 48 guns—_i.e._, four batteries—with an infantry
division, would then be organized into an artillery regiment under the
command of the divisional general. Each company would be commanded by a
captain, the battery by a lieutenant-colonel, the regiment by a colonel.
We found that for mutual and smooth co-operation in battle it is most
important that batteries should operate as far as possible with the
same regiments of infantry. Close touch is established, and each arm
unselfishly supports the other. I often heard the expression, “our
battery,” “our regiment,” and in these simple words a deep, underlying
sentiment was expressed. Each battery should be capable of acting
independently of the artillery regiment to which it belongs. For hill
warfare mountain artillery should be allotted to infantry in the same
proportion as I have suggested for field artillery.
Our gun proved an excellent weapon; but our shrapnel, which was very
effective against objects and troops in the open, was of no use against
invisible targets, earthworks, and mud walls. Our artillery fire
against villages held by the enemy, therefore, produced very little
result. I consider that a new pattern of shell should be introduced
with thicker walls and a heavier bursting charge; but even then the
effect of such light projectiles as our field-guns fire will not be
great against the earthworks which are nowadays so quickly thrown up on
positions. To prepare the way for the assault on such fortifications,
and to obtain any speedy result in attacking defended localities, we
must have field howitzers of a modern type. They should be organized
in regiments of two batteries (twenty-four howitzers), and attached to
a corps as corps artillery. Finally, it is essential that every army
should have a light siege-train to assist in the capture of strongly
defended posts and heavy works.
The organization of park units was well conceived, but the vehicles
were unsuited to the Manchurian roads. I am afraid to express an
opinion in favour of a further increase of mobile parks, because we
were so overburdened with baggage of different kinds. I think it is
preferable to improvise local parks at railway-stations and junctions,
as we did in Manchuria.
Small-arm ammunition rarely ran short, but there was often a great lack
of gun ammunition, and after the battles of Liao-yang, the Sha Ho,
and Mukden, our reserves for filling up battery and park stocks were
exhausted. The average expenditure of rifle ammunition worked out as
follows: For a whole-day battle for one battalion, 21,000 rounds, with
a maximum of 400,000; an hour’s fighting for one battalion, 1,700,
with a maximum of 67,000. The total reserve taken with a four-battalion
infantry regiment was 800,000. The average expenditure per quick-firing
field-gun in a one-day battle worked out at 55 rounds, with a maximum
of 522; an hour’s fighting, 10 rounds, with a maximum of 210.
In the earlier fights the work of the artillery varied a good deal, and
was not very successful; but as they gained experience, many batteries
fought splendidly, not only against guns, but against rifle-fire.
Compared with the work of our artillery in 1877–78 (in the European
theatre of operations), we have made considerable progress in skill,
and the very heavy losses in killed and wounded in many batteries prove
that our gunners know how to die. The horse artillery work depended
entirely on the commanders of the cavalry units to which the batteries
were attached, and when these commanders really meant fighting the
batteries did good work. As a proof of this, it is enough to recall
the gallant conduct of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery
Battery attached to Mischenko’s Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade. This
battery and its young commander were known to the whole army; more
than once it successfully fought several of the enemy’s batteries,
and yet its losses were insignificant. Sometimes our cavalry leaders
were unnecessarily anxious to retire, as was the case in the cavalry
of the 2nd Army at the battle of Mukden, when the two batteries which
were with it lost _only two men wounded and one missing in eleven
days’ fighting_. One six-gun battery was sufficient for four mounted
regiments of such strength as we had. As said above, there should be
one artillery regiment of four batteries (48 guns) with each infantry
division, or a total of 144 guns for the three divisions. These three
regiments would be organized in a brigade. There should also be one
regiment of 24 howitzers with each corps.
CAVALRY.
Though our cavalry was numerous, its work hardly came up to our
expectations, but where it was properly commanded it did well enough.
In my opinion, the main reform that is necessary in the cavalry is to
improve their training. Till it is educated to feel that it should
fight as _obstinately as infantry_, the money expended on our mounted
Arm will be thrown away. If infantry can still continue fighting after
losing 50 per cent. of their strength, cavalry should be able to do
the same. In action we nursed the cavalry too much; out of action we
did not take sufficient care of it. Though they had not lost a man,
whole regiments were moved to the rear as soon as the first shrapnel
began bursting near them. The four regiments of cavalry—two dragoon
and two Cossack—on whom fell the most difficult but the most honourable
duty of obtaining information and opposing the leading units of Nogi’s
enveloping forces at the battle of Mukden, lost in killed and wounded:
Men.
February 25 2
March 2 1
March 4 1
March 5 7
March 6 2
March 7 6
March 8 1
March 9 1
March 10 1
――
Total 22
Which works out at less than one man per squadron and _sotnia_. The
casualties in almost every company of infantry were more than in these
twenty-four squadrons and _sotnias_. It is quite plain that these units
did not fight, but merely avoided the enemy; and it is equally plain
that, by avoiding battle, the cavalry neither checked the enemy’s
movement nor got any information about him. The material of which our
cavalry was composed was excellent, but everything depended on those in
command. In the battle of Te-li-ssu the infantry of the 1st Siberian
Corps lost 2,500 men; the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment, belonging to the
same corps, lost one!
But I repeat that where their leaders meant fighting the cavalry did
their duty and suffered heavily. Take, for example, the Trans-Baikal
Cossacks, which did so well under Mischenko, and the Caucasian Brigade.
The Siberian Cossacks, under Samsonoff, fought at Liao-yang and the
Yen-tai Mines with greater bravery than was displayed by some of
Orloff’s infantry, while the independent _sotnias_ of the Don and
Orenburg Voiskos, and the dragoons under Stakhovitch, were no whit
behind them. Indeed, the men of the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment were good
enough; it was the officers who failed in not getting the best out
of them. The independent units of all the Cossacks did well, but it
was out of the question to expect martial ardour or a keen desire to
perform feats of gallantry in old men such as formed the 3rd Category
Cossack regiments. But even these 3rd Category regiments could do good
work when skilfully handled. The Cossack horses generally, and the
Trans-Baikal horses in particular, were too small; while those of the
Don regiments were sturdy, but rather soft. The Trans-Baikal Cossacks
on their shaggy little ponies reminded one more of mounted infantry
than cavalry. On the whole, however, our cavalry worked far better
than in the Russo-Turkish War under Generals Kuiloff and Loshkareff at
Plevna. The great difficulty now is to find and train cavalry leaders;
in Manchuria, according to most accounts, the juniors were good, the
field officers moderate, and the general officers, with few exceptions,
bad.
The personality of the officer in command of a regiment of cavalry is a
very important factor, as his merits and weak points are very quickly
known, and as soon as a man in such a post shows himself unsuitable he
should be removed. (This also applies to the general officers.) But I
rarely found a divisional or corps commander who would report on the
unsuitability of senior commanders under them; they even concealed
cases of cowardice. It was only at the conclusion of hostilities that
it transpired that several had not only shown a lack of keenness, but
even of personal courage. Some of the regimental commanders were very
old; at fifty-five a man is too old for the command of a regiment. As
in the infantry, the post of cavalry brigadier should be improved, and
made a more important appointment. To it should be given the executive
and administrative powers now wielded by divisional generals.
Three brigades should be formed into a division, the divisional
general being given the powers of an army corps commander. There is no
necessity for a higher organization. To the division of three brigades
should be allotted a twelve-gun battery of horse artillery (three
companies of four guns each). To every three-division army corps
should be added one cavalry or Cossack brigade. One of the regiments
of this brigade should act as divisional cavalry, two squadrons
or _sotnias_ with each division. If it is thought desirable that
commanders of infantry divisions become acquainted with cavalry in
peace-time, then two squadrons should be stationed in the area of the
divisions under them.
INFANTRY.
As in former wars, so in Manchuria was the heat and burden of the day
borne by our infantry, and there is no doubt that, in the future,
infantry will retain its name as the principal Arm. The importance
of other Arms depends entirely on the extent to which they assist
infantry to defeat the enemy, for the latter is the final arbiter of
victory or defeat. But infantry cannot work alone, and nowadays, if
it is not assisted in action by artillery, cavalry, and sappers, if
every resource of modern science is not brought into play to lighten
its heavy task, it will either fail or will buy victory at too high a
price. It is to infantry, as the principal Arm, that we must pay our
chief attention. _And yet with us service in the Line is not considered
so honourable as service in the other branches!_ From the moment of
the selection of its recruits we do everything to weaken it. Even
the pattern of uniform worn by our Line infantryman is particularly
ugly. In his old-fashioned, badly fitting tunic, overburdened with
haversacks and equipment of all sorts, he is anything but a martial
sight. This is an aspect of the case which cannot be ignored, and it
is almost as important that a man’s uniform should be comfortable and
attractive as that it should meet all the purely military requirements.
All ranks should be enabled to admire their own dress and be proud of
it. Up to the present, the majority of Line officers have not been
given a good enough general or military education. Officers of all arms
should receive a general education not lower than the intermediate
standard of the national educational establishments, and a military
education not lower than that of the military schools. We should teach
the line officer to have a love and respect for the Arm in which he
serves, as well as a knowledge of its particular rôle in battle,
and must therefore raise his social position so that he may be a
welcome guest in any society. We must provide him with a comfortable,
inexpensive, and smart uniform. We must protect him from being abused
by his seniors in the presence of his juniors, and in every possible
manner encourage the development in him of an independent spirit.
Bravery alone is not sufficient nowadays to attain victory; knowledge,
initiative, and willingness to accept responsibility are also required.
Infantry have always had a hard part in action, and have always
suffered great loss, but the modern battle which lasts for days makes
greater demands upon their mental and physical endurance than ever
before. With a large proportion of reservists and short-service men,
we cannot rely on perfection in the soldier; it is therefore all the
more necessary that we should take steps to obtain it in our officers,
and for this purpose we are lucky in having excellent and responsive
material. Under all the arduous conditions under which the majority of
our regiments had to fight, the greatest trials fell to the infantry
officer, and right well he did his duty. It is quite enough to compare
the casualties amongst those officers with those of their brothers
in the cavalry, artillery, and sappers to see on whom fell the chief
hardships and dangers. In some regiments the whole set of officers was
changed several times. The following figures serve as an illustration
of how they suffered:
Killed and
Wounded.
The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 102
The 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 89
The 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 73
The 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 71
The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 61
The 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 50
It is impossible to recall the gallant war services of these and of the
officers of many other regiments without profound respect and emotion.
It must always be borne in mind that the infantry of the Line is the
backbone of our Service in peace as well as in war. Consequently, we
should make much more of those who serve in it than we do, and give
them a better chance. At present the list of regimental commanding
officers includes far too many Guardsmen or officers of the General
Staff. I am convinced that if the importance of service in the Line is
to be maintained, we must put an end to the present unfair acceleration
of promotion amongst Guards and General Staff officers as compared with
that of their brothers. The latter produce a great many men capable
of being good regimental commanders; all that is wanted is to know
how to select them. Since the last Turkish War they have undoubtedly
made considerable progress, and it is for us to arrange that this
improvement is continued by fostering it in every way.
Owing to casualties, the company commanders were changed too often
for efficiency, but they generally performed good service, lack of
initiative being, as usual, their chief fault. It is most important
for the good of the Service that captains (of all arms) displaying
distinguished military qualifications should be quickly promoted to
field rank. Yet recommendations sent to St. Petersburg were not acted
on for a very long time, if ever. In such a matter some discretion
should be allowed the Commander-in-Chief, and he should be empowered
to promote junior officers to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel for
distinguished service in the field. Special men would thus arrive
at the command of independent units and regiments, posts where the
personality of the man in command is so important. It often happened
that a regiment which had done badly absolutely changed its character
with a change of commanding officers. Seniority should not be the
only guide for promotion, and the establishment of field-officers
in Manchuria constituted a quite adequate number from which good
regimental commanders could have been liberally selected. During the
period when we were occupying the Hsi-ping-kai positions, many of
the regimental commanders in all the armies were good men, and the
1st Army was particularly lucky in this respect. Though many of the
infantry brigadiers who came out to the war proved failures, amongst
the regimental commanders were many capable field-officers, whose
advancement to the rank of General gave us some first-class brigade
commanders. In the 1st Army alone were Major-Generals Lechitski,
Stelnitski, Dushkevitch, Lesha, Riedko, Dobotin, etc. Thus, even under
the unfavourable conditions under which they served, we found enough
good material amongst our infantry officers to give us some confidence
for the future. Had the war been continued, many of the colonels
promoted to generals for distinguished service would have commanded
divisions. This is as it should be, for it ought to be possible for a
regimental commander to rise within a year to the command even of an
army corps, if he be sufficiently brilliant.
I repeat that the tasks which fall upon infantry in battle nowadays are
of such exceptional difficulty that the promotion of its officers for
distinguished field service should be made exceptionally rapid. I am
aware that even a good regimental commander may make a bad divisional
general; but I also maintain that a regimental commander who has
successfully commanded in several fights, has shown a knowledge of
his work, keenness, enterprise, and personal bravery, and has won the
confidence of his men, should be promoted as quickly as possible. He
may find it difficult at first to get his bearings under the new and
more complicated conditions of a high command, where he has to rely
upon maps and the reports of others instead of upon the direct evidence
of his own eyes and ears, but still he will grapple with the situation,
even of an army corps commander, far better than some general whose
experience has been confined to office-work and peace manœuvres.
Finally, in order to give due importance to the principal Arm—infantry
(infantry of the Line in particular)—I consider the following measures
necessary:
1. To give a better education to the officers entering it.
2. To improve their material and social position.
3. To provide officers and men with a smarter uniform.
4. To accelerate their promotion and put an end to the system by which
Guardsmen and officers of the General Staff get more rapid advancement,
and so block the way of their unfortunate brothers to regimental and
divisional commands.
5. To facilitate as much as possible the special promotion in war of
distinguished company officers to field rank.
6. To award regimental commanders who display particular merit on
service rapid advancement to the rank of General, without regard to
their seniority or the speed of their promotion.
The two last of these recommendations also obviously apply to officers
of the other Arms.
ORGANIZATION.
In my opinion, our experiences in the recent war have shown the
necessity for such an organization in our army as I will now describe:
_Infantry Regiment_: To consist of 4 battalions, each of 4 companies.
Each company to have a strength of 250 combatants. In addition to the
16 combatant companies per regiment, there should be scout sections
(mounted and dismounted), and machine-gun sections with 16 portable
guns. Strength of regiment, 5,000 men.
_Cavalry and Cossack Regiments_: As at present.
_Infantry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 8 battalions.
_Cavalry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 12 squadrons or _sotnias_.
All brigades should be capable of acting independently.
_Infantry Division_: To consist of 2 infantry brigades, 1 regiment of
artillery,[47] 1 sapper battalion, 1 telegraph company, 2 squadrons or
_sotnias_ of cavalry, transport company, parks, bakeries, hospitals.
Total, 17 battalions, 48 guns, and 2 squadrons or _sotnias_.
_Cavalry Division_: To consist of 3 separate brigades, 1 horse
artillery battery. Total, 36 squadrons or _sotnias_, and 12 guns.
_Army Corps_: To consist of 3 infantry divisions, 1 artillery brigade,
including a regiment of howitzers, 1 cavalry brigade,[48] 1 sapper
brigade,[49] 1 transport battalion, 1 battalion for camps on the line
of communication. Total, 48 battalions, 169 guns, 12 squadrons or
_sotnias_, and 3 sapper battalions.
_Reserve Troops_: To be formed into independent brigades, to which
the reserve units of artillery, cavalry, and sappers should be
attached. Each brigade to consist of 8 battalions, 2 batteries (24
guns), 1 squadron or _sotnia_, 2 sapper companies, half a company of
telegraphists, transport, hospitals, and bakeries. These brigades,
being organized on an independent footing, would be attached to the
armies; they would be detailed either as part of the army reserve or
for independent work in guarding the flanks and rear, or be joined to
corps, according to circumstances.
This, I think, will give great independence to all units, and the
creation of independent reserve brigades, outside of the divisional
and corps organization, would often prevent the breaking up of this
organization when a battle was in progress. To organize reserve field
troops beforehand in field formations, such as divisions of three
brigades, or corps, is not a convenient or suitable arrangement, as
they will not be ready to take part in the fighting as soon as the
regulars.
* * * * * *
Amongst steps which will raise the status of regimental service, and
so attract the best men to it, I consider it necessary, in addition
to providing an attractive uniform, to establish ranks distinct from
those borne by officers on the staff, in administrative offices, and
in departments. According to the scale of our military hierarchy, the
various commands (exclusive of the Cossack troops) carry ranks as
follows:
Sub-Lieutenant, Cornet, Lieutenant, and Staff-Captain in the different
Arms are the ranks given to the junior officers in companies,
squadrons, and batteries.
A Captain commands a company or a squadron.
A Lieutenant-Colonel commands a battalion, a battery, and a cavalry
division.[50]
A Colonel commands a regiment and a division of artillery.
A Major-General commands a brigade.
A Lieutenant-General commands a division.
A Lieutenant-General or a full General commands an army corps or a
military district.
All these ranks are also conferred on officers serving on the staff
and in departments. Thus, the rank of Colonel, which ought only to
be given to men in command of regiments, is also borne by those on
the administrative and police staffs, while generals of all grades,
who have never held command of troops or even of small units, fill
up our Generals list. At the time I framed the regulation to limit
the number of promotions to General’s rank of men not actually in the
army I was much bothered by numerous officers who feared that their
further promotion might be blocked. The present large number of ranks
amongst the officer class is not required. It is quite possible to
reduce them, and to give to these their old Russian names (to which
the Cossack[51] troops still adhere), for officers of all Arms doing
regimental service—namely, _Khorunji_, _Sotnik_, and _Esaoul_. The
rank of _Pod-esaoul_, which was adopted later, might be excluded.
_Esaouls_ would command companies, squadrons, _sotnias_, and companies
(of artillery); _Sotniks_ would command half-companies, half-squadrons;
and _Khorunjis_ would command sections. The normal establishment of a
company would be one _Esaoul_, two _Sotniks_, and four _Khorunjis_. The
same should be done in the cavalry. For those not serving regimentally
the ranks of Ensign, Lieutenant, and Captain might be maintained,
those of Sub-Lieutenant and Staff-Captain being abolished. The present
ranks of field-officers might be conferred on those officers not
doing regimental service, and the titles of _Voiskovoi Starshina_ and
Colonel on those with regiments. The first would command a battalion,
a division of cavalry or artillery; the second, regiments of all Arms.
The rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to be kept for staff and departmental
officers, and the rank of Major should be introduced instead of that
of Colonel. The names of the ranks of those serving with troops to
correspond generally to the nature of the appointment; thus, officers
commanding brigades should be called Brigadiers, those in charge of
divisions, Divisional Generals, of an army corps, Corps Generals. The
latter rank should also be given to commanders of military districts
and their assistants. The only officers not actually serving with
troops who should be allowed to have the title of Corps General
should be three: the War Minister and the chiefs of the General and
Headquarter Staffs. For service away from troops only two ranks of
General should be maintained—Major-General and Lieutenant-General. The
titles Generals of Infantry and Cavalry, etc., should be abolished. The
grading would then be as follows:
A.—FOR REGIMENTAL SERVICE.
Commander of section Khorunji.
Commander of half-company, half-squadron,
half-_sotnia_ Sotnik.
Commander of company, squadron, _sotnia_,
artillery company Esaoul.
Commanding battalion, battery,
division of cavalry Voiskovoi Starshina.
Commanding regiment Colonel.
Commander of brigade Brigadier.
Commander of division Divisional General.
Commander of corps Corps General.
B.—FOR EXTRA REGIMENTAL SERVICE.
Ensign, Lieutenant, Captain, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,
Major-General, and Lieutenant-General.
Except in the case of the chief staff-officers of districts, the
transfer of general officers not with troops to service with troops
should be forbidden. The appointments of Corps Chief Staff-officers
and Quartermaster-Generals on the staffs of districts should carry
the rank of Major. Officers going into other departments should take
purely civil rank, and promotion on retirement should be abolished.
To accelerate the advancement of specially distinguished colonels,
it should be possible to appoint them to brigades with the rank of
Brigadier. There is at present great confusion in this matter of
accelerated promotion in deserving cases, for colonels can be given the
command of independent brigades, and yet not of non-independent ones.
As war is a greater strain on the officers than on the men, it is
important, when granting special privileges for regimental service to
the latter, that great care should be taken to insure their physical
fitness. A particularly bad form of unfitness is that caused by
corpulence, and, unfortunately, many even of our company officers
suffered from this in Manchuria. One of our regimental commanders was
so stout that he was practically helpless, and was taken prisoner at
Te-li-ssu, though unwounded! As to the rank and file, hill-climbing
with an 80-pound equipment makes campaigning very arduous for those
of forty years of age or over. Company and field officers can well
serve up to fifty, but commanding officers of cavalry should not be
over fifty, and of infantry regiments over fifty-five. The age-limit
for generals in command of brigades and divisions should be sixty,
and of corps sixty-three. The necessity for the age regulations we
now have became apparent during the war, for as a result of them our
field-officers were relatively young; but our experience proves that
the limit should be still further lowered in the direction I have
mentioned.
The proposals set forth above, which it is thought would tend to
increase our fighting efficiency, are, after all, only details of
organization and of preparation. The main factors contributing to
insure victory are the same as they always have been—a high _moral_
and the power of rapid concentration in superior strength. Diplomacy
must prepare for the struggle so as to enable all the armed forces of
the Empire to be put into the field if necessary, and we must have
numerous efficient railways to facilitate the rapid massing of superior
numbers. On these two most important factors will depend the plan
of campaign. The ability to assume the offensive bestows an immense
superiority, for it gives the initiative to the side which undertakes
it. The defender’s leading troops are compelled to fall back, his
less prepared troops are perhaps crushed, while his reinforcements
are destroyed piecemeal. The result is that the _moral_ of the
attacker increases, while that of the enemy inevitably diminishes. To
re-establish a balance under such conditions is not only a matter of
time, but is extremely difficult. With a defensive plan of operations,
unshakeable belief in eventual success and immense patience are
necessary in order to overcome all difficulties, and to defeat the foe
with a final assumption of the offensive.
From the short sketch I have given of what was accomplished by the
Russian armed forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it
is seen that we took the offensive in the majority of the wars we
were engaged in. Without railways, but with a large peace standing
army (period of service twenty-five years with the colours), with
equality and often a superiority[52] in armament and training, Russia
was able to commence operations, and to force her will upon the
enemy—_i.e._, to assume the offensive. Nowadays we have been left
behind by our Western neighbours in readiness for hostilities, and
the recent war disclosed the fact that we had been outdistanced by
our Eastern neighbour also. Russia will, no doubt, in time find the
strength and means once more to take her former place amongst other
Powers as regards fighting efficiency; but it will take years of
unceasing effort, for rapid concentration and an offensive strategy are
impossible without great developments in our railway system. No one can
say whether we shall be allowed to wait for everything to be perfected,
or whether we shall again be drawn into war before we are ready. It is
therefore absolutely necessary to prepare without loss of time to make
war under conditions as unfavourable as those of the recent conflict.
Without referring here to the necessity for diplomatic preparation for
hostilities, and the proper attitude of all grades of Russian society
during war, I will comment in the most general lines on those measures
which should, in my opinion, be taken for the more useful employment
of resources already at our disposal. The principle which is of such
importance in field operations, that troops once engaged will not be
relieved, must be finally accepted. Therefore, every unit going into
action should know that it will be supported, but not replaced. The
principle in its broadest sense applies without distinction to all
ranks who join the field army, and till victory has been attained not
a soul should be able to return home or receive another appointment
outside the theatre of operations. Those who prove themselves unfit
for their appointments at the actual front should be given other
employments for which their bodily and mental qualifications are
fitted. In such a serious business as war in defence of country no
personal ambition should or can have place, and the removal of a
person from the field army should be considered the greatest possible
disgrace—a stain which the service of a lifetime cannot efface.
Officers thus removed should be deprived of their military rank,
dismissed the Service, and should forfeit all rights and privileges
gained in the Service, and officers and men so removed should be
deprived of the right to hold any Government post whatever, whether
under the War Department or not.
The punishment for cowardice should be death.
I have touched upon the question of accelerated promotion for good
service in the field, and the converse applies. Senior commanders
who show themselves unfit for their appointments ought to be at once
removed from their commands and given posts corresponding to their
capabilities. Commanders of corps and divisions considered unfit
may, in order to guard their military honour, request to be allowed
to remain in the army in command of divisions or brigades. Only one
kind of seniority can be acknowledged in war—namely, the ability to
gain the victory. General officers incompetent for field service can
do very useful work on the lines of communications, in the direction
and training of the reserve troops, the management of hospitals, the
administration of the inhabitants of the country, etc. If we ever mean
to be capable of defeating a powerful enemy, we must not allow an army
corps commander who is struck off from the command of his corps, and
who does not even display personal courage, to become a member of the
Committee of Imperial Defence; nor must we allow junior commanders who
fail when tested by war to receive appointments in non-mobilized units,
nor permit hundreds of officers who leave the front on account of
ill-health, and under various pretexts, to remain away and not return.
I say nothing of the case where an army commander leaves his army
during active hostilities without even reporting his departure to the
Commander-in-Chief.
If courts of honour are found to be a necessity in peace-time, how
much more are they necessary in war? In addition to being formed in
regiments, they should be formed in corps and armies to adjudicate
upon the conduct in action of senior commanders up to the rank of
Divisional General. It is vital that the existing immunity of men who
show cowardice in action, or who are guilty of disgraceful conduct out
of action, should at once cease. For this purpose I consider we should
form soldiers’ courts of honour in every company and independent unit,
as a means for suppressing the worst elements found in the ranks. For,
with the lack of moral development of the modern man in the street,
it is absolutely necessary to have some such tribunals upon whose
verdict corporal punishment can be awarded to private soldiers. To
leave the field under the pretext of assisting or carrying away the
wounded—except for the men specially detailed for this duty—should be
punished with the utmost rigour. And to fight an action to a finish,
officers must not hesitate to sacrifice their last reserves, if
necessary, and also themselves. It is necessary to draw attention to
this, as instances occurred in the war where officers, having given
orders for a retirement, were themselves the first to go. Such an
example is always infectious, and leads to disorganization of units
and loss of confidence in the commander. Commanders of forces who do
not in battle support neighbouring units when able to do so should be
deprived of their appointments, tried, and, if necessary, punished by
death. Commanders of all ranks should be thoroughly alive to the value
of every man in the ranks. Therefore, every endeavour should be made to
keep units as strong as possible during an action.
Finally, I will touch briefly on several points. I will permit myself
to express the opinion that the existing regulations as to rewards
in war require revision and considerable alteration. At present far
too many honours are bestowed. Another point that demands attention
is that of malingering. As we have seen, sickness was more prevalent
amongst the officers, in spite of their better living, than among
the men. Unfortunately, also, the medical officers more than once
called my attention, when I was inspecting hospitals, to cases of
malingering amongst officers as well as men. The great majority of
patients, of course, were really ill, but much of the sickness was due
to the individual not taking proper care of himself. Officers must
realize that, however honourable a thing it is to be wounded, it is as
dishonourable to remain in hospital when their comrades are fighting.
It should be ruled for all ranks that in such cases the period of
sickness should not count as service, and that during it pay should
be forfeited. All officers and officials absenting themselves for
more than two months should be removed from their appointments, and
appointed to the reserve or depôt troops. Amongst the many regrettable
things to be noted in the late war was the disgraceful conditions
under which both men and officers were often taken prisoner. The
existing regulations, which lay down that all the circumstances of
a case of capture should be investigated, were not complied with.
Officers who returned straight to Russia from being prisoners in Japan
were appointed by the War Department even to the command of divisions.
There is only one thing which justifies capture—the fact of being
wounded. All those who surrender when they have not been wounded should
be tried by court-martial for not fighting to the last.
The regulations regarding fortresses should be revised, and the
occasions upon which a fortress is allowed to surrender should be
absolutely cut out, for fortresses may be taken, but should never,
under any circumstances, surrender. Commandants of fortresses who
surrender them, captains who surrender their ships, officers in command
of units that lay down their arms, should be considered as forfeiting
all rights, and should be condemned to be shot without trial, and all
those not in command who surrender unwounded should be deprived of
their military rank from the day of their surrender. During the war
the Press did much to undermine the authority of officers in command,
and to lower the _moral_ of the men, by indiscriminate revelations.
In the next war only such events should be allowed to appear in the
newspapers as may help to encourage the men. When active operations
are over, the circumstances are changed, and it is then essential for
the good of the Service to have a thorough investigation into all
shortcomings.
But it is not sufficient that all ranks of the army should be
imbued with the spirit of fighting on till victory is won; it is
necessary that the whole nation should have the same feeling, and
to the best of their ability assist towards a happy issue of the
struggle being carried on by the army. In our state of backwardness
(especially as regards railways) we are doomed in our next war to a
slow concentration, and therefore to a protracted campaign. Being
unable at once to put large forces into the field, and to seize the
initiative, we may again be compelled to bear the consequences of our
unreadiness—frequent reverses, and retirement; but we must, without
wavering, firmly believe in eventual success, however unfavourable the
conditions at the start. The moral and material resources of Russia are
immense, and the fixed determination on the part of the army and the
whole nation to win is our principal guarantee of victory.