enemy's position, on shore and in the bay, satisfied his own mind that
their fleet was moored too far from the shore to receive any support from
their own batteries, or any injury from ours, he communicated the enemy's
force and situation to Captain Downie, by a letter[84] dated the 7th
September, seven o'clock a. m., and stated, that if Captain Downie felt the
vessels under his command equal to the contest, the present moment afforded
advantages that might not again occur, requesting, at the same time, his
decision on the subject. This letter was delivered by Major Fulton,
Aid-de-Camp to Sir George Prevost, who was ordered particularly to explain
to Captain Downie the position of the enemy's squadron, and that they were,
in his opinion, anchored out of range of shot from the shore. Major
Fulton's statement[85] on this subject, shews most clearly the views which
Captain Downie then entertained, and the confidence which he felt in the
result of the contest, for which he declared he would be ready in 24 hours.
Captain Downie's letter, in reply to Sir George Prevost's communication,
although more guarded in expression, contained in substance what he had
said to Major Fulton, and confirmed the expectation of his being able to
meet the enemy in a day or two. On the 8th of September Sir George Prevost
again despatched a letter to Captain Downie, stating that he had sent his
Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, to give him correct information with regard to
the enemy's naval force in the bay, and that he, Sir George Prevost, only
waited the arrival of Captain Downie to proceed against General Macomb's
position. In this letter he particularly points out the co-operation which
he expected from Captain Downie. That officer's answer, dated on the same
day, states, "that his ship was _not ready, and that until she should be,
it was his duty not to hazard her before the enemy_;" and this
determination of Captain Downie's appears to have been still more strongly
expressed by him in his conversation with Major Coore. Hitherto, therefore
it may be assumed as an incontrovertible fact, that nothing had been either
said or written by Sir George Prevost to Captain Downie which might lead
the latter to expect any assistance in his approaching contest with the
American fleet, from the forces on shore, or that any simultaneous attack
was to be made upon the enemy's works, with a view to afford such aid or
support. Being thus perfectly aware of the number, force, and position of
the enemy's fleet, and finding himself ready for a conflict, of the
successful issue of which we may be assured that he had not a doubt,
Captain Downie, on the 9th of September, wrote to Sir George Prevost,
informing him that it was his intention to weigh and proceed with his
squadron, so as to approach Plattsburg Bay at day-break on the 10th, and to
commence an immediate attack on the enemy's squadron, if it should be found
anchored in a position to afford any chance of success. Immediately upon
the receipt of this letter, Sir George Prevost gave orders for the troops
to be held in readiness to assault the enemy's works at the same time that
the naval action should commence. On the 10th, the fleet not making its
appearance, Sir George Prevost addressed a letter to Captain Downie,
acknowledging the receipt of his communication of the 9th, and acquainting
him that, in consequence of it, the troops had been held in readiness since
six o'clock in the morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same
moment as the naval action should commence in the bay; that he ascribed the
disappointment he had experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and
should rejoice to learn from him that his expectations had been frustrated
by no other cause. At day-break, on the 11th, Sir George Prevost proceeded
to the quarters of Lieutenant-General de Rottenburg, (who was second in
command,) in company with the Adjutant-General, and acquainted him that, as
the wind was then fair, the fleet, unless prevented by accident, might
soon be expected, and therefore directed him immediately to circulate the
orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness, as directed on the
preceding day. This was immediately done by Captain Burke,
Assistant-Adjutant-General, who personally delivered these orders to
Major-Generals Brisbane, Robinson, and Power, viz. to cook, and hold
themselves in readiness as on the preceding day. These orders were so
delivered by Captain Burke _before the fleet had made its appearance, and
before the scaling of their guns was heard_. It seems by the time on shore
to have been about eight o'clock when the fleet was first discovered, and
about nine when it rounded Cumberland head, and stood into the Bay. Orders
having been given by the Commander of the forces that the batteries should
open upon the enemy's works, the moment the naval action should commence,
they were accordingly opened, and actually commenced the fire a full
quarter of an hour before the Confiance had fired a shot at the enemy's
vessels. The fire from our shore-battery was so well served, that the
enemy's Lake battery, the only one which could possibly annoy our squadron,
or afford protection to that of the enemy (but from which not a shot was
fired in the direction of the Lake) was very soon silenced, and the men
driven from it to seek shelter in the higher redoubt. Almost immediately
upon the commencement of the naval action, orders were despatched for the
troops to take their allotted positions for the assault of the enemy's
works. In consequence of these orders, the two brigades under
Major-Generals Robinson and Power, proceeded in the rear of their Bivouacs,
to approach the ford of the Saranac, which it was intended they should
cross and proceed through the wood, in order to conceal their movements
from the enemy, whose position it was then contemplated to attack in
reverse, the ground being broken and uneven, and the works much too strong
to be attempted in front. Whilst these movements were making by our troops,
which from their nature, must have been equally concealed from the fleet on
the Lake, and from the enemy, Major-General Brisbane's brigade had formed,
and was ready to force the bridge of the Saranac, on the right of the
enemy's position, as soon as the troops under Generals Robinson and Power
should have passed the ford, and made their appearance before the enemy's
works. These movements must necessarily have required time for their
completion, but no person in the army for an instant doubted that the
duration of the naval action would enable the troops to accomplish the
design of penetrating, by the ford, and through the road, to the foot of
the works which were the object of attack. Unfortunately, during this
period, and whilst the two fleets were still engaged, a wrong direction,
by the mistake of the guides, was taken through the wood which led to the
ford of the Saranac. As soon as the error was discovered, the troops were
counter-marched, but before they could recover the right direction, full
three-quarters of an hour, and perhaps an hour was lost--an invaluable
portion of time, which, had not the mistake occurred, must have brought the
troops to the very foot of the enemy's position. On approaching the ford,
it was found to be guarded by a strong force of the enemy on the other
side. At this period cheers were distinctly heard, which General Robinson
supposed to proceed, either from our squadron that had been successful, or
from General Brisbane's brigade advancing to the assault. Major Cochrane
was therefore despatched to head-quarters to ascertain the fact, and to
learn whether there were any further orders. Upon his arrival there, the
fleet having at that time surrendered, Sir George Prevost most reluctantly
gave the order for the recal of the troops from the attack of the forts,
and it is well known to those who were in his confidence, with what
poignant regret he thus sacrificed his private feelings to what he
considered his paramount public duty. Upon Major Cochrane's return with
these orders, he found that the troops had only been enabled to force the
ford of the Saranac, and were then in the act of advancing through the
wood to the enemy's position. Under these circumstances, General Robinson
felt himself bound to obey the orders, and the forces retired from the
attack.
Having thus given a full and correct statement of the circumstances which
attended the enterprise against Plattsburg, it is necessary to notice the
animadversions which have been made upon the military character of Sir
George Prevost, in consequence of the unfortunate result of that
expedition. In no instance has the conduct of Sir George Prevost been
attacked with more virulence and injustice, than by the writer in the
Quarterly Review, whose representations are, as the reader must already
have perceived, in the highest degree incorrect.
The charges which have been brought forward by the Reviewer and by others
are, that Sir George Prevost improperly urged Captain Downie into action
before his ship was adequately prepared; that he disregarded the signal for
the supposed co-operation between the army and the fleet, as solemnly
agreed upon by himself and Captain Downie, and neglected to assault the
fort when our fleet was engaged with the enemy; and lastly, that he did
not, after the defeat of our squadron, persist in his attack upon the fort,
by which it is pretended, that our fleet might still have been saved.
With regard to the accusation, that Captain Downie was prematurely
hurried, against his better judgment, into an unequal contest with the
enemy, the correspondence between that officer and Sir George Prevost
already referred to, fully negatives any such supposition. The co-operation
of the fleet being deemed essentially necessary to the success of the
land-forces, Sir George Prevost was naturally anxious that Captain Downie
should be prepared as early as possible to meet the enemy. It has been
seen, that upon the 7th of September, Captain Downie informed the Commander
of the forces, that it would take a day or two at least, before the
Confiance would be in an efficient state, and that the engagement did not
take place till the 11th, four days after the above communication. So far
was Sir George Prevost from attempting by "taunt and inuendo"[86]
improperly to hurry the fleet into action, that in his letter to Captain
Downie, of the 9th of September, he says, "I need not dwell with you on the
evils resulting to both services from delay, _as I am well convinced you
have done every thing in your power to accelerate the armament and
equipment of your squadron_, and I am also satisfied that nothing will
prevent its coming off Plattsburg the moment it is ready." On the same day
Captain Downie announced his intention of commencing an attack on the
enemy's squadron the ensuing morning. Up to this time, therefore, it
appears that however anxious Sir George Prevost was to make an immediate
attack upon Plattsburg, for which purpose the assistance of the fleet was
requisite, he never urged Captain Downie to engage the enemy while
unprepared, but on the contrary, expressed his confidence that the moment
_the fleet was ready_, it would appear before Plattsburg.
An expression in Sir George Prevost's letter, of the 10th, has indeed been
construed by the Quarterly Reviewer into a "taunt," which is supposed to
have driven Captain Downie to an engagement against his cooler judgment. In
that letter the Commander of the forces, after informing Captain Downie
that in consequence of his communication of the 9th, the troops had been
held in readiness since six in the morning to storm the enemy's works: thus
continues, "I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the
unfortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my expectations
have been frustrated by no other cause." It must be obvious that many other
causes, independent of the wind, might have prevented Captain Downie from
sailing as he had intended to do on the 9th, although the state of the wind
was in fact the real cause of the delay. In consequence of the despatch
used in equipping his ship, articles might have been overlooked or
omitted, which at the last moment only might have been discovered to be
indispensably necessary; accidents might have happened to different parts
of the squadron in their progress, and even the reinforcements of soldiers
from the 39th, although they had been immediately ordered upon his
requisition, might not, from various circumstances, have been supplied in
time. All, or any of these causes might, as they naturally did, suggest
themselves to the mind of the Commander of the forces, and his anxiety to
be correctly informed upon the subject, as naturally induced him to express
himself to Captain Downie in the terms above stated. It is in the highest
degree improbable, that Captain Downie could for a moment construe those
expressions in an unfavourable sense. But whatever might have been his
impression, it is evident, that a letter written on the 10th, could not
have influenced the determination which he took on the 9th, of engaging the
enemy the following morning.
Nor will the assertion, that Sir George Prevost disregarded the supposed
signal of co-operation, and neglected to attack the fort according to his
promise, be more difficult to disprove. No such signal was in fact ever
arranged, nor was any such promise ever given. The destruction of the
enemy's fleet being the primary object of the expedition, and until that
was effected, the ulterior operations not being practicable, Sir George
Prevost resolved not to assault the fort until he was satisfied that our
squadron was actually proceeding to attack the enemy. Of the result of the
action when the fleets were once engaged, neither the Commander of the
forces, nor any one in our army allowed themselves to entertain a single
doubt. That Sir George Prevost intended to assault the enemy's works
simultaneously, or nearly so, with the commencement of the naval action,
and that Captain Downie was aware of that determination, appears from the
correspondence between those officers. But that Captain Downie should have
gathered from these communications any thing like a promise or agreement on
the part of the Commander of the forces to support, assist, or co-operate
with him during the naval engagement, is quite impossible. Sir George
Prevost had satisfied himself by personal observation, and by the most
accurate intelligence, that the American fleet was anchored out of range of
the batteries, and he must therefore have known that it was out of his
power to offer any support to Captain Downie. To have held forth to that
officer any hope or promise of assistance was consequently out of the
question. It was of the first importance, with a view to the success of Sir
George Prevost's operations, that the fleet should be engaged at the same
time, or before the fort was assaulted, but of no consequence whatever to
Captain Downie, that the fort should be attacked simultaneously with the
naval force. Sir George Prevost, therefore, in his communications with the
naval Commander, and particularly in his letter of the 10th, mentioned his
intention of making nearly a simultaneous attack, _as part of his own plan
of operations_, with which it was necessary that Captain Downie should be
acquainted. It is highly probable, that Captain Downie inferred from this
communication, that the attack on the fort which Sir George Prevost had
been in readiness to make on the morning of the 10th, would be made at the
time when the fleets should engage, but there is not the _slightest_ ground
for believing that this expectation led him to place any reliance upon the
land attack, as a co-operation in support of the naval force, or that it
induced him to hasten into action, at a time when he felt unequal to it, or
unprepared for the contest. Had he considered the expressions used by Sir
George Prevost, in his letter of the 10th, as importing an agreement to
assist him by a simultaneous attack on shore, he would certainly have
answered that communication, and have availed himself of the services of
Captain Watson, who was left with him for that purpose, to express to the
Commander of the forces his reliance on the promised aid, and his assurance
that it was the state of the wind alone, which had prevented him from
appearing with the fleet on the morning of the 10th, as he had intended. At
the time when this letter was written by the Commander of the forces, he
was ignorant of the causes which had delayed the fleet, and he was
ignorant, likewise, of Captain Downie's further intentions, with regard to
the time when he would be prepared to attack the enemy's squadron. Had
Captain Downie, therefore, relied, in the slightest degree, on the
co-operation of the land forces, he would have informed Sir George Prevost
of the exact time when he contemplated an engagement, that the troops on
shore might be prepared to second his efforts. No reply, however, was
despatched by him to the Commander of the forces, who thus remained in
uncertainty with regard to the actual state and condition of the squadron,
and the intentions of its commander. Captain Watson, whose directions were
to proceed immediately to head-quarters, with intelligence of the sailing
of the squadron, should not Captain Downie have previously despatched him,
did not arrive until after the fleet had made its appearance. It has,
indeed, been asserted, by the Quarterly Reviewer, that the scaling of the
guns of our squadron was to be the signal for the advance of the columns of
attack. This misstatement appears to have arisen out of the evidence which
was given before the Court-Martial on Captain Pring; for in no other place
is any allusion to such a fact to be discovered. The error of that
statement, which, without doubt, was unintentional, is manifest. The signal
in question is said to have been concerted with Major Coore on the 10th,
when, in fact, no interview or communication whatever took place between
him and Captain Downie on that day; and that no such signal was mentioned
to the former on the 8th, the day on which he _did_ see Captain Downie, is
a fact to which the Major (now Colonel Coore) is ready to bear witness. In
all probability Captain Watson, who was with Captain Downie on the 10th,
was the person who was mistaken for Major Coore, and to him Captain Downie
might have communicated his intention of scaling his guns, previous to
rounding Cumberland Head, in order to announce to the Commander of the
forces the approach of the squadron. Whatever may have been the nature of
Captain Downie's communication by Captain Watson, it is certain that it
never reached Sir George Prevost.
It has thus been shewn, that there was not even an understanding between
Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, that the attack by land and sea
should take place simultaneously, for the purpose of affording protection
or support to our squadron, much less that there existed any "solemn
agreement" to that effect. It must also be evident, from the previous
statement, that the attack on shore did actually take place at the
commencement of the naval action, and that the sudden and unexpected
termination of the latter engagement alone prevented the prosecution of the
military operations. Orders, as we have already shewn, had been given by
Sir George Prevost, on the 9th, for the troops to hold themselves in
readiness for the attack of the enemy's works on the morning of the 10th,
and those orders were accompanied, as every military man knows, and as the
Reviewer[87] himself must have known, is usual, by an order _to cook_, when
the time will admit.[88] It has also been shewn, that early on the morning
of the 11th, and before the fleet was in sight, or the scaling of their
guns was heard, similar orders were circulated for the troops to hold
themselves in readiness for the attack, and so well prepared were the
forces on shore to make the attack, that almost at the same moment when the
Confiance began to engage the enemy, the troops were in motion for the
assault. Our batteries, as mentioned above, opened on the enemy's works
some time before the commencement of the naval action on the part of the
Confiance. Until confidently assured that the fleets would engage (and many
circumstances might have intervened to prevent it even after the appearance
of our squadron) Sir George Prevost felt that it would be highly imprudent
in him to commence the attack; but the moment he learned that Captain
Downie was actually in contact with the enemy, the troops were immediately
ordered to take their position for the assault.
Although our naval official accounts of the transaction state the
engagement to have lasted for two hours and a half, that is from eight
o'clock in the morning until half-past ten, when the Confiance struck, the
American naval account, which is corroborated by the testimony of all who
witnessed the action from the shore, represents the engagement to have
terminated in about an hour and a half. The American account also
corresponds with the statements of our officers on shore, that our fleet
did not round Cumberland Head until between eight and nine o'clock, before
which time all the statements of persons on shore agree in admitting that
the action did not begin on the part of our fleet. With regard to the
period when the engagement terminated, all the accounts appear to coincide.
It has already been shewn, that notwithstanding the unfortunate mistake of
the attacking columns taking a wrong route, they had at that very period
forced the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the vicinity of the
enemy's works, and prepared to make an instant assault, and that the
unexpected result of the naval action was the sole cause which induced Sir
George Prevost to countermand that assault. It now remains to explain more
fully the reasons of the Commander of the forces for giving those orders,
which will afford an answer to the last charge brought against him.
It has been often and confidently asserted, that both the enemy's squadron
and our own were within reach, of the guns of the works. It is not,
therefore, surprising that an unfavourable impression should have been made
upon the minds of many persons with regard to the policy of not persevering
in an attack, which might, under such circumstances, have led to the
recovery of our own fleet, or the destruction of that of the enemy. The
fact of the relative situation of the two squadrons and of the enemy's
works, has, like most of the other facts connected with this expedition,
been grossly misrepresented. Had an opportunity been offered by a public
investigation of the transaction, it could and would have been
satisfactorily proved, that neither of the fleets was within the range of
the enemy's guns from any part of their works, and that their own squadron
was anchored more than a mile and a half from the shore.
The grounds of the Reviewer's statement upon this subject it is impossible
to ascertain; but, in opposition to what he affirms[89] on the testimony of
Captain Pring, and "_numerous_ other _eye-witnesses_" it can be proved by
testimony from on board the Confiance, as well as by officers without
number on shore, that she was taken possession of within half an hour after
she struck; and it can also be proved, in opposition to the decided opinion
of the number of officers, who are stated to have visited Plattsburg after
the peace, that the anchorage of the American squadron was not within range
of the forts.
The evidence of the greater part of the General Officers accompanying the
expedition to Plattsburg, who viewed the naval action; of the commanding
officer, and others of the Artillery; of naval men on board of our fleet,
and of various other persons on shore, could and would have been produced
upon the trial of the question, had it taken place, in proof of the fact as
here stated. But independently of all opinion upon the subject, is it
probable or credible that the American naval Commander would have placed
his squadron in such a situation, that by possibility they could be
annoyed or injured from works which he saw it was the evident intention of
Sir George Prevost to attack, and which he must have felt convinced would
in such a case have fallen? That he was aware of the danger to which his
squadron was exposed by its vicinity to the forts, appears from the
circumstance before adverted to, of his having moved further into the Bay
from the station which he occupied on the 6th, the day of the arrival of
our troops before Plattsburg. The position which the American Commander
thus took, was one in which, according to his judgment, he could not have
been annoyed by the fall of the works on shore, an event for which he was
prepared. This opinion was expressed in the presence of a British officer
who had been made prisoner during the naval action. The same opinion was
entertained by Captain Henley, of the American brig, Eagle, who had himself
reconnoitred the position in which the fleet was anchored, and which upon
his report was selected by the American Commander, because it was evidently
out of the range of the guns from the shore. If any thing more were wanting
in confirmation of this fact, it will be amply supplied by the opinions of
the two officers most capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject.
The following letters of Commodore Macdonough and General Macomb, the
American Naval and Military Commanders, will, it is apprehended, set the
question at rest in the mind of every unprejudiced person.
"_Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
July 3, 1815._
"Dear Sir,
Your letter of the 26th ult. came to hand yesterday;
the letter you addressed to me at Washington has not
been received, or it assuredly should have been
attended to.
In reply to yours of the 26th ult. it is my opinion
that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from
the batteries at Plattsburg, during the contest between
it and the British squadron on the 11th September,
1814.
I am, with much respect,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) J. MACDONOUGH."
"_Cadwr. Colden, Esq._"
* * * * *
"_City of New York, June 15, 1815._
"Sir,
I should have replied earlier to your letter of the
26th ultimo, had it not been mislaid amidst a mass of
communications on the subject of the army.
With respect to the distance of the American squadron
from the batteries at Plattsburg, I will state that it
is my decided opinion that the squadron was moored
beyond the effectual range of the batteries, and this I
know from a fruitless attempt made to elevate our guns
so as to bear on the British squadron during the action
of the 11th of September last. No guns, however, were
fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond
their reach. This opinion was strengthened by
observations on the actual range of the guns of the
Confiance--her heaviest metal falling several hundred
yards short of the shore when closely engaged with our
vessels.
With a hope that this reply will be satisfactory, I
subscribe myself,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) ALEX. MACOMB."
"_Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq._"
* * * * *
"_New York, August 1, 1815._
"Sir,
In reply to your letter of the 30th ult. asking the
distance of the American squadron from the batteries of
Plattsburg, on the 11th day of September, 1814, while
engaged with the British squadron, I will state that it
is my decided opinion that the American squadron was
upwards of three thousand yards distant from the
batteries, being confirmed in that belief from
observations made on the actual range of the heaviest
guns of the British ship, Confiance, when fired towards
the batteries, the balls falling short upwards of five
hundred yards.
With respectful consideration,
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) ALEX. MACOMB."
"_To Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq._"