with regard to the force retained by Sir George Prevost in Lower Canada.
That Lower Canada, in the middle of April, 1814,[74] had nothing to dread,
may be confidently denied. On the 22d and 30th March, two attempts had been
made by General Wilkinson to penetrate into that Province by the Montreal
frontier, and in the latter instance, in considerable force. Though he was
repulsed in both cases, and in the latter with severe loss, he still
continued to keep a considerable body of men on the frontier line, from
which he did not withdraw until towards the middle of May.[75] Sackett's
Harbour, instead of being weakly garrisoned, had been strengthened by two
regiments from General Wilkinson's army, besides other reinforcements; and
our fleet on Lake Ontario was so far from being at that period ready for
sea, that it was not until the 14th of April, that the two ships, which
were to constitute its principal strength, had been launched, nor was our
squadron in a situation to take the Lake until the beginning of May. The
only reinforcements which, up to this period in 1814, and even until the
beginning of June, had arrived in Lower Canada, were the 2d battalion of
the 8th regiment, which the foresight of the Commander of the forces had
induced him to draw in the depth of winter by land from New Brunswick,
whence they arrived in the month of March, together with 200 picked seamen
from Admiral Griffiths for the fleet on Lake Ontario, without a single
accident. This regiment is enumerated by the Reviewer amongst his nine
regular regiments of infantry, with three squadrons of dragoons, six
strong battalions of militia, and a numerous _division_ of artillery, the
_whole_ of which he has untruly asserted, were crowded together in
inactivity at Chambly, behind a strong frontier, without an enemy to oppose
them;[76] adding, that although reinforcements were daily arriving or
expected, not a man was sent to strengthen the inadequate force on the
Niagara frontier, until the middle of July, when only two of the Peninsular
regiments were reluctantly yielded for that service. Of the nine regular
regiments of infantry, of which the Reviewer speaks, one was De Meuron's
foreign corps, another the Canadian Fencibles, a third a battalion of
Marines, a fourth the Canadian Voltigeurs, militia-men, subject to militia
law, and whose force at the utmost was 450 men. Of the real regular
regiments, viz. the 8th, 13th, 16th, 49th, and 70th, the 16th did not
arrive until June, together with two companies of artillery. This regiment
was almost immediately stationed at Montreal, where it remained the whole
of July, and in August was despatched to Upper Canada. The 70th garrisoned
Quebec, with a portion of artillery, and a small corps, composed of the
recruits of the other regiments in the Province. The 13th was in advance at
St. John, and La Cole Mill, and the battalion of marines garrisoned Isle
aux Noix. Of the six battalions of embodied militia, one was at La
Prairie, and another, if not two of the others, at different parts of the
frontier; the Voltigeurs were also in advance, and part of the Canadian
fencibles were at Coteau du Lac. From this statement, made out from
documents, the authenticity of which cannot be doubted, it will appear that
the troops under Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province, which were
barely adequate to its defence, in lieu of being all assembled at Chambly,
were stationed in different parts of the Province, where their services
were most required, and that they did not at any time, collectively form
the camp of instruction of which the Reviewer speaks. Previous even to the
1st of May, when the Reviewer has stated that Sir James Yeo was ready with
his fleet for any operation, no part of this force could, consistently with
the safety of Lower Canada, have been despatched for the reinforcement of
General Drummond. Still less could a sufficient portion of it have been
spared, to have enabled that officer, with any prospect of success, to
attempt an attack on Sackett's Harbour. General Drummond was, in fact,
aware that, from the period of the first attack on that place, in May,
1813, the enemy had been indefatigable in fortifying it, and that it was at
all times guarded by a large body of regular troops and militia, together
with a number of able and experienced seamen. Nothing, therefore, short of
the full co-operation of a superior fleet, and a large body of troops,
could have afforded him a well-grounded expectation of succeeding. General
Drummond well knew that, up to May, 1814, and for some time afterwards, no
force of this description could be spared from the Lower Province. However
desirable he might have thought it, to destroy the naval depot at Sackett's
Harbour, he knew that no adequate means were within his power, or that of
the Commander of the forces; and until, by fresh reinforcements from
England, those means should be acquired, he was obliged to content himself
with operations compatible with his resources. We accordingly find that, as
soon as the fleet was in readiness to take the Lake, General Drummond, in
consequence of the previous communication which had taken place between Sir
George Prevost and himself, undertook the expedition against Oswego, which
terminated in the capture of that place, together with a quantity of
stores, provisions, and ordnance, most of which being designed for the
squadron at Sackett's Harbour, must have materially delayed its equipment.
Of this enterprise the Reviewer has thought proper to say nothing, because
he knew that it might in a great degree be attributed to the measures of
Sir George Prevost. For a similar reason he has altogether omitted to
notice the extraordinary and energetic measures which had been adopted by
the Commander of the forces, for relieving Michilimachinac, and affording
to that garrison an important reinforcement of troops, seamen, and
provisions, under the command of an able and experienced officer, who
afterwards gave ample proofs of his courage and talents in his successful
defence of that post against a powerful attack of the enemy. The
reinforcement of that distant position, whilst the enemy were in possession
of the whole of the Michigan territory, and by a route never before
attempted, reflected the greatest credit upon the Commander of the forces
who directed, and upon Lieutenant Colonel M'Douall, who executed, this
arduous enterprise, which was highly important in its consequences as
respected our Indian allies, and the safety of the Upper Province.
Independently of this reinforcement to the troops in Upper Canada, we shall
find that Sir George Prevost continued mindful of Lieutenant-General
Drummond's situation, and desirous of assisting him, as soon as the means
of doing so were placed within his power. It has been already shewn, that
out of the force which the Commander of the forces possessed for the
defence of Lower Canada, and of which the Reviewer has given so incorrect a
statement, the 2nd battalion of the 8th arrived from New Brunswick in
March, and the 16th with two companies of artillery in June. It was not
until the month of July that the next reinforcements, consisting of the
90th regiment, from the West Indies, and the 6th and 82nd from the army
under the Duke of Wellington, reached Montreal. These three regiments were
immediately sent forward to the Niagara frontier. The despatch to the
Secretary of State, announcing the arrival of these troops, sufficiently
and satisfactorily explained the reasons which had hitherto prevented Sir
George Prevost from strengthening General Drummond's force in the Upper
Province. In the beginning of June, and previously to the arrival of these
reinforcements, Sir James Yeo had retired into port after blockading
Sackett's Harbour; and from that period, until October, the enemy had the
ascendancy on Lake Ontario. Our operations in Upper Canada were, therefore,
necessarily confined to the defensive; and although the superior numbers of
the enemy gave them at times an advantage over us, and occasioned a
considerable loss of valuable lives, the efforts made by the Commander of
the forces, to supply these losses, enabled General Drummond successfully
to maintain the contest, and to prevent the Americans from gaining any
permanent footing in the Province. Upon the arrival of the Nova Scotia
Fencibles, a battalion of the Royals, and the 97th regiment towards the end
of July, the latter regiment was immediately sent to Kingston, and Sir
George Prevost continued to make every exertion to reinforce the army on
the Niagara frontier.
Before we proceed to the consideration of the much misrepresented affair of
Plattsburg, the orders under which Sir George Prevost acted, and the plan
of operations proposed upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the Duke
of Wellington's army, it will be necessary to expose the perverted
statement with which the Quarterly Reviewer has introduced his account of
this expedition. "In _June_ and _July_," he says, "a numerous fleet arrived
in the St. Lawrence from Bourdeaux, with the flower of the Duke of
Wellington's army."[77] Now connecting this paragraph with the one that
follows soon afterwards--"that the Peninsular troops were suffered to
ascend no higher than the ill-fated camp of Chambly, where they were
detained _during the whole month of August_"[78]--it is evident that the
Reviewer meant his readers to believe that the brigades, under Generals
Robinson, Brisbane, Power, and Kempt, had arrived in Canada in June and
July, so as to enable Sir George Prevost to assemble them for any service
at Chambly by the beginning of August, and yet that he kept them the whole
of that month unemployed. It appears, however, from Sir George Prevost's
despatches to Lord Bathurst, dated 28th June, 1814, that the only part of
the Duke of Wellington's army, which arrived in June, were the 6th and 82nd
regiments. The transports having those regiments on board passed Quebec for
Montreal, about the 26th of that month, but did not reach the latter place
until the first or second week in July, from whence they were immediately
pushed forward to reinforce Lieutenant-General Drummond on the Niagara
frontier. The brigade under Major-General Power, which was accompanied by
Major-General Brisbane, did not arrive at Quebec until late in July; indeed
so late, that Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst
announcing their arrival, states, that they would scarcely be able to
arrive at Montreal, with every exertion, before the _20th of August_. The
two last brigades, under Generals Kempt and Robinson, arrived still later;
and Sir George Prevost's despatch of the 5th August, 1814, announcing their
approach to Quebec, stated that it would be impossible, with every
exertion, to collect the whole force, viz. all the brigades in the
neighbourhood of Montreal, _before the end of that month_. In fact, it was
not until towards the end of August, that two of the brigades above
mentioned were assembled at Chambly, and in the neighbourhood; the other
brigade, under Major-General Kempt, being stationed partly at Montreal,
and partly in advance towards Kingston, in order to be in readiness for the
service for which it was designed, whenever our ascendancy on Lake Ontario
should be required.
In his next observations, the Reviewer has confounded both dates and facts,
in order to make it appear that Sir George Prevost knew not how to dispose
of the succours which had reached him; with which, in the Reviewer's
opinion,[79] he ought instantly to have made a rapid movement towards Lake
Ontario, for the purpose of attacking Sackett's Harbour; an attempt which,
it is stated, should have been made whilst Sir James Yeo was blockading
that place, instead of wasting some of the most valuable months of the
summer in the camp at Chambly:[80] and further, that the march of General
Izzard to Sackett's Harbour, with 3,000 or 4,000 regular troops, was a
proof that the American Government felt (although our Commander did not),
that all objects on the frontier were insignificant, in comparison with the
protection of the numerous squadron which was blockaded in their ports on
Lake Ontario.
Unfortunately for the Reviewer's consistency, he had previously stated,
that in consequence of Commodore Chauncey having prepared two new frigates
for sea, Sir James Yeo discontinued his blockade of Sackett's Harbour, and
retired to Kingston, to await the equipment of the St. Lawrence, and that
during the months of _August_ and _September_, Chauncey _held the Lake_.
General Izzard was despatched to Sackett's Harbour about the _end of
August_, or _1st of September_, and consequently the American Government,
from the Reviewer's own shewing, could not at that time have any
apprehensions for their _numerous squadron_, blockaded _in their Port on
Lake Ontario_. So far indeed from the American squadron being at this time
in danger, Kingston, and Sir James Yeo's numerous squadron, were actually
at the period of General Izzard's march to Sackett's Harbour, most
rigorously blockaded by Chauncey, and so continued for nearly six weeks
afterwards. Sackett's Harbour was in fact only blockaded by Sir James Yeo,
from the beginning of May to the beginning of June, at which latter period
he relinquished the blockade, and did not make his appearance on the Lake
until the middle of October following.
It has been already shewn what Sir George Prevost's force really consisted
of, in the Lower Province, during the period of this blockade, and until
the month of July, when the first reinforcements from France reached him.
These reinforcements were immediately sent to the Upper Province. It is
consequently most evident that he did not then possess the means of
attacking Sackett's Harbour, and that after the blockade had ceased,
tenfold the means he possessed would not have sufficed for the service,
without the co-operation of the fleet.[81]
It is in the highest degree improbable, that any man in Sir George
Prevost's army, or in the Provinces, possessing a knowledge of these facts,
which were within the reach of all, should have thought it possible that on
the arrival of the troops from Bourdeaux, Sackett's Harbour was or could be
the point of attack, so long as our squadron was not able to take the Lake.
It will, it is apprehended, tend very materially to elucidate the
subsequent operations of the war, to state the views which probably
influenced His Majesty's Government in sending so large a force from the
Duke of Wellington's army to Canada, and the manner in which it was
directed to be employed. The circumstances under which the war had been
commenced on the part of the Americans, and the refusal of their Government
to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council, the ostensible ground
of war as a cause for pacification, had justly offended both the
Government and people of Great Britain. The efforts, however, which they
were called upon to make in Europe, had, until the termination of the
contest by the abdication of Buonaparte, prevented the British Government
from furnishing any other reinforcements for the army in the Canadas, than
such as were barely sufficient, aided by the bravery of the troops, and the
talents, zeal, and energy of their Commander, for the defence of the
country from the repeated attacks of the enemy. As soon, however, as the
peace with France placed a larger force at their disposal, His Majesty's
Government resolved to avail themselves of a portion of it, in order to
retaliate upon America her unjust aggressions, and to carry the war into
such parts of her territory as might prove most assailable. In consequence
of this determination, the expeditions to the Chesapeake and the Mississipi
were planned; and with the same views three brigades were ordered from
Bourdeaux to Canada. The objects contemplated in sending this reinforcement
to Canada, will be best understood by a reference to Lord Bathurst's
despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 3d June, 1814, in which it is said,
"The object of your operations will be, First, To give immediate
protection, secondly, to obtain, if possible, ultimate security, to His
Majesty's possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's
Harbour, and the naval establishment on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, come
under the first description."--"Should there be any advanced position on
that part of our frontier which extends towards _Lake Champlain_, the
occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province,
you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it
by detachments of the troops under your command, _always, however, taking
care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off by too extended a
line of advance_"--"At the same time, it is by no means the intention of
His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the
interior of the American territory, _as might commit the safety of the
force placed under your command_." It must be evident to every person in
the least acquainted with the territories of America bordering upon the
Canadas, that none of the objects of offensive warfare contemplated in the
foregoing despatch could be undertaken without the aid and co-operation of
a fleet able to contend with that of the enemy. That His Majesty's
Government might be aware of the impossibility of complying with the views
and wishes above described, until the naval ascendancy should be secured on
Lakes Ontario and Champlain, Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord
Bathurst, of the 12th July, before referred to, expresses his opinion on
this head, stating that he did not expect from the reports he had received
from Sir James Yeo, and the officer commanding our naval forces on the
Richelieu, that their fleets would be in readiness before the middle of
September.
Upon the arrival of the troops from France, and upon their being assembled
as before stated in the neighbourhood of Montreal towards the end of
August, it was ascertained that the new ship at Kingston would not be
launched until towards the middle of September, and consequently, that Sir
James Yeo would not be ready to take the Lake, at the earliest, until the
beginning of October. All, therefore, that could be done with regard to the
projected expedition against Sackett's Harbour, was to make such a
disposition of the troops designed for the service, that they might be in
readiness for it, whenever it might be deemed advisable to make the
attempt. Major-General Sir James Kempt, who was to have the command, was
accordingly dispatched to Kingston, and two brigades were quartered partly
at Montreal and partly in advance, wherever he judged they might be best
placed, with a view to the ultimate service for which they were designed.
The employment of the remainder of the force from France next became the
subject of Sir George Prevost's consideration. The enemy had at that time
a strong squadron on Lake Champlain, and their naval depot at Vergennes
furnished them with the means of continually adding to it. They had also
since the first attack fortified Plattsburg, a position which, provided we
had the ascendancy on the Lake, it might be expedient for us to occupy for
the security of the Lower Province. Should, therefore, our squadron,
equipping in the Richelieu, be ready to co-operate with the army before the
season was too far advanced for offensive operations, it was clear that one
of the objects contemplated by Government might be undertaken with every
prospect of success. The enemy's fleet, if they waited the attack upon them
in Plattsburg bay, or elsewhere, might be destroyed, or the depot at
Vergennes might fall into our hands by the occupation of Plattsburg, and
the further advance of the army aided by the fleet. That the enemy were not
assailable in any other quarter, (Sackett's Harbour being out of the
question from what has been before stated,) it can scarcely be necessary to
mention, nor has it ever been pretended that they were.
The State of Vermont on the east shore of the Lake might, indeed, have been
entered from St. Amand, and our townships on that frontier, without the
assistance of our squadron. But independently of there not being any
object of sufficient consequence in that quarter to make an attack upon it
advisable, it was deemed highly imprudent to molest that State by a mere
predatory expedition, whilst two-thirds of the supplies of fresh meat for
the army in Canada were furnished by American contractors, and whilst
droves of cattle, as well as large sums of money in specie were constantly
passing by that route from the United States into Canada; a fact which is
not generally known, and which strongly marks the wisdom of that policy
which Sir George Prevost pursued during the American warfare. As the
destruction of the enemy's naval depot on Lake Champlain was then the only
operation contemplated by His Majesty's Government, which could be
undertaken with any prospect of success, Sir George Prevost with a view to
that object, had, immediately after the receipt of the despatch of the 3rd
June, above referred to, used every possible exertion to accelerate the
building of the new ship at Isle aux Noix, and the efficient arming and
equipment of the squadron there, for the service in which it was proposed
to be employed. Some time previous to this period it appears from Sir
George Prevost's correspondence with Sir James Yeo, that he had repeatedly
called the particular attention of that officer to the manning of the
squadron for Lake Champlain.[82] In addition to this, his correspondence
with Captain Fisher, and Vice Admiral Otway, tends to establish the fact of
his unwearied and successful exertions to accomplish that object.
The Confiance was launched on the 26th of August, and Sir George Prevost
having reason to believe that the efforts which were making for her
equipment would enable Captain Fisher to take the Lake in the course of a
few days, proceeded, on the 30th, to inspect the first brigade of troops
quartered at Chambly; and on the 31st. established his head-quarters at
Odell Town, close upon the enemy's frontier. Having here received
information that General Izzard had suddenly quitted his position at
Champlain Town, and had marched with a body of troops in the direction of
Niagara, evidently for the purpose of joining General Brown, who had
established a footing on the Niagara frontier, and was pressing upon
Lieutenant General Drummond, Sir George Prevost determined to lose no time
in entering the enemy's territory, (even though our fleet was not ready to
co-operate,) in the hope by this movement of checking General Izzard's
progress, and of thus making a diversion in favour of General Drummond. Our
troops accordingly crossed the frontier line, and on the 3d of September
took possession of Champlain Town, which the enemy had abandoned on their
approach. Our forces advanced the following day to Chazy and Simpson's Inn,
about eight miles from Plattsburg, where they halted on the 5th. Previously
to this advance Captain Fisher, who had superintended the building of the
Confiance, and whose local knowledge would have rendered his services
peculiarly useful in the joint operations contemplated, had been suddenly
and unexpectedly superseded by Sir James Yeo in the command of our naval
force on the Richelieu, and Captain Downie had been appointed to succeed
him. This officer did not arrive at Montreal from Lake Ontario until the
3rd September, and on the following day repaired to Isle aux Noix to
superintend the equipment of the new ship. On the 5th of September, the day
on which the troops halted at Simpson's Inn, an interview took place
between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, when the latter assured the
Commander of the forces, that his flotilla would be ready to co-operate
with the army in less than forty-eight hours; that he had correctly
ascertained the state and condition of the enemy's fleet; and that in
consequence he entertained no apprehensions of the result of an action.
Sir George Prevost then explained to Captain Downie the reason of his
having pressed forward before the latter was ready. On the following day,
the 6th September, the army advanced to Plattsburg, and took possession of
that part of it situate on the northern side of the Saranac, the enemy's
troops having retreated thence to the south side, and to their fortified
position on the crest of the hills.
No sooner had this position been taken, than Sir George Prevost, conceiving
that the enemy, on the first approach of our troops, might not be fully
prepared to receive them, proposed that the works should be immediately
attacked;[83] but it being represented to him that one of the brigades was
extremely harassed, having been brought forward from Chazy with great
celerity, and that after allowing the men a reasonable time to rest, the
afternoon would be too far advanced to attempt an operation for which it
was desirable to have day-light, as the movement was to be made through so
thick and intricate a country, Sir George was induced to acquiesce in this
reasoning; and being likewise satisfied, from the assurance given him, by
Captain Downie, that the fleet would be ready to co-operate in a day or two
at farthest, he finally resolved to defer the attack until the junction of
the squadron. The enemy's fleet had retired from the mouth of the Chazy
(where it was placed, when our troops entered the American territory), to
Plattsburg Bay, and there, on the arrival of our army, it was found
anchored; their gun-boats, which had been employed to interrupt the march
of our army on the Lake road, being placed so as to manifest a
determination to support their troops and position on the south side of the
Saranac. On the morning of the 7th, it was discovered that the enemy's
flotilla had changed their position since the preceding evening, and had
moved further into the bay, out of the range of cannon from the shore,
evidently with the object of avoiding the fire from the works, in case they
should be attacked and carried.