enemy annoyed or injured by the capture of their works on shore, it may be
asked, what advantages could have resulted from persevering in the attack?
It has been already shewn that the primary object of this expedition was
the destruction of the enemy's flotilla on the Lake. Had that object been
accomplished, Plattsburg might have been occupied by our troops, and from
thence, with the assistance of our squadron, they might have been
transported to other parts of the Lake for the further annoyance of the
enemy. The loss of our squadron, however, immediately rendered all these
important operations impracticable. Without the assistance of a fleet,
nothing beyond the occupation of Plattsburg could have been accomplished.
That Plattsburg would have fallen, neither the Commander of the forces,
nor a man under him, could have entertained a doubt. The enemy were indeed
strongly entrenched, and under works, which afforded complete shelter to
several thousand expert marksmen, from whose fire our troops must have
suffered most severely; but granting, that after a considerable loss, we
had carried the enemy's works, what adequate advantages should we have
gained? To retain Plattsburg was not possible without the assistance of a
fleet, which would have been necessary to the provisioning of our army; a
retreat, therefore, after destroying all we could not carry away, would
have been indispensable. Such was, however, the state of the season and of
the weather, that 24 hours delay in retiring with our troops to Canada,
would not only have made such a measure dangerous, from the advance of the
enemy in every direction, but would have rendered the conveyance of our
ordnance and stores exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The militia
of the state of New York and Vermont were turning out, and rapidly
increasing in numbers; and although in the open field our troops would
justly have despised them, they would have proved most formidable in the
woods, and hanging upon the flank and rear of a retreating army. Sir George
Prevost knew that he had only to give the word, and that his gallant troops
would accomplish all his wishes,[90] but he knew at the same time how
useless the acquisition would be, and how costly the sacrifice at which it
was probable it would be made. He was also bound to bear in mind the
instructions of His Majesty's Government, with regard to the committal of
the force under him, so necessary for the preservation of the Provinces
entrusted to his care.
He therefore wisely determined to retreat, whilst retreat was practicable,
and whilst it could be effected with the least possible loss. The order was
accordingly given for that purpose, and such was the energy and promptitude
of the execution, that the retreat was conducted without the smallest
molestation from the enemy, who, in fact, were not aware of it until it was
nearly completed. Notwithstanding the almost impassable state of the roads,
from the rains which were falling, not a gun was left behind; and, although
the subject has been much exaggerated, yet in fact only a very small
quantity of provisions and stores, together with _fifteen_ wounded men in
hospital, was left to the enemy. Of deserters, the utmost amount was under
300 men, which was the consequence, not as has been falsely asserted, of
the _retreat_,[91] but of the _advance_, many of them having deserted upon
our entry, and as we afterwards penetrated into the American territory; a
consequence which almost invariably attended every attack upon their
frontier, and was most strongly manifested in Colonel Scott's expedition,
in December, 1813, against part of General Wilkinson's army, when, out of a
force of not more than 500 men, he lost upwards of 90 by desertion.
The exaggerated account of this retreat having induced his Majesty's
government to call upon Sir George Prevost for a more particular detail of
the losses attending it, it appears, by Sir George Prevost's reply to Lord
Bathurst's despatch on the subject, together with the documents
accompanying it, that the whole loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and
deserters, from the time of the army entering the American territory, until
it was withdrawn, did not amount to 500 men. This affords a complete answer
to one of the Reviewer's concluding mis-statements, that when Sir George
Prevost wrote the despatch from Montreal, though dated at Plattsburg,[92]
"he knew that the desertion of 800 men had attended his shameful defeat."
The unfortunate loss of our fleet, and the consequent withdrawing of our
troops from the American territory, afforded an opportunity to the party
opposed to Sir George Prevost's civil administration in Canada, of which
they immediately and eagerly availed themselves, of circulating the most
unfounded statements, and the most exaggerated accounts, with respect to
both those transactions. These were industriously transmitted to England by
a private ship belonging to one of Sir George Prevost's most violent
opponents, and upon their arrival, and in the absence of any official
accounts of the transactions to which they referred, they created a general
belief that the disastrous result of the naval action had been occasioned
by a want of co-operation from the shore; that the retreat had been
conducted in a precipitate and disgraceful manner; that a severe loss of
men, guns, stores, and provisions, had been the consequence of it; and that
the whole army was indignant at the conduct of their commander. The arrival
of Sir George Prevost's despatches, together with the explanations
afforded, as well by them as by the person to whom they had been given in
charge, could not fail to undeceive His Majesty's Government on this
subject, and to convince them of the grossness of the misrepresentations
which had gone forth. Had not some expressions in Sir James Yeo's letter,
accompanying the account of the naval action, been construed into charges
against Sir George Prevost, which, in justice to him, as well as to the
public, it was deemed proper to call upon him to answer, there cannot be a
doubt but that the further management of the war in the Canadas would still
have been entrusted to the Commander who had hitherto so successfully
conducted it. Even if the subsequent conduct of Sir James Yeo did not
afford ample proof of the fact, there is not wanting other evidence to shew
that the letter in question was written by him under the irritation of the
moment, and in consequence of Captain Pring's communication to him of the
result of the naval action, but without any intention of making a charge
against Sir George Prevost, and without the most distant idea that it could
be so construed. Sir James Yeo must have possessed too honourable a mind to
become a guest in Sir George Prevost's family, and to partake of his
attention and hospitality, had he for a moment supposed that his public
letter, on the subject of the naval action at Plattsburg, could have been
construed into a formal accusation. Had he really meant it as such, he
would most undoubtedly, in a manly and open manner, have communicated the
proceeding he had adopted to the party accused; and, under such
circumstances, would, no less certainly, have refused the kindness and
attention of the person of whom he had publicly expressed so unfavourable
an opinion. That this must have been the case may further be inferred, from
the circumstance that, although Sir George Prevost was recalled to answer
the charges, amounting to three in number, supposed to be contained in Sir
James Yeo's letter, it was not until more than four months after both these
officers arrived in England, that the precise charges upon which he was to
take his trial, were officially communicated to him, and which charges
differed materially from those in Sir James Yeo's letter. Whether, under
these circumstances, Sir James Yeo would have supported the charges, had
the investigation taken place, cannot now be determined; but a confident
appeal may be made to the intelligent reader, whether, upon the facts
disclosed in these pages being made known, such an attempt must not have
utterly failed.
With regard to the naval action on Lake Champlain, we are unwilling to say
more than may be necessary for the vindication of the character and conduct
of Sir George Prevost. The real causes of the disastrous result of that
affair, were such, as particularly belong to naval actions, and which, when
they do occur, must materially influence the issue of the conflict. It is
not a little remarkable, that the naval Court-martial on Captain Pring and
his officers, should have overlooked or disregarded these causes; and it is
greatly to be regretted, that they should have thought themselves justified
in ascribing the disaster to the conduct of Sir George Prevost, and in
passing so severe a censure upon an officer of another service, of whose
orders and instructions they must necessarily have been ignorant, and who
was neither present to defend himself, nor amenable to their jurisdiction.
It is clear that it was Captain Downie's intention, on going into action,
to lay his own ship, in the size and strength of which he seemed to place
great confidence, along side of the American Commodore; but the unfortunate
failure of the wind, before he could accomplish this object, obliged him to
anchor at a distance of more than half a mile from his opponent; the same
circumstance also induced Captain Pring, in the Linnet, to take his
situation still farther from the enemy. But even this disadvantage would
probably not have been attended with the consequences which afterwards
ensued, had Captain Downie's invaluable life been spared, and had all under
him done their duty. The Finch, in going into action, grounded out of the
line of fire, and was shortly afterwards taken possession of by the enemy.
The gun-boats, when the action commenced, were considerably distant from
the enemy's line, and slowly pulling up in apparent confusion. The Chub,
very shortly after the action, having her cables shot away, drifted into
the enemy's line, and was obliged to surrender. The Confiance, it would
thus appear, being left nearly alone to bear the brunt of the whole action;
the greater part of the enemy's fire being directed against her; the two
schooners gone, and the gun-boats, with the exception of two or three,
taking no part in the contest, it is not to be wondered at, that against
such fearful odds, the men could not be kept to their guns, and that,
notwithstanding the exertions and bravery of the officers, she was
compelled to surrender. The real causes of the disaster must, therefore, be
sought for in the unfavourable circumstances under which the action
commenced; in the squadron's not taking the station which Captain Downie
had designed they should; in the early loss of that officer; the grounding
of the Finch; the surrender of the Chub, and the desertion of the
gun-boats--circumstances more than sufficient to account for the capture of
our squadron, without having recourse to a reason which the gallant Downie
would have scorned to assign, and which we have already shewn to be without
the slightest foundation--namely, the want of a co-operation from the army.
Had even the gun-boats done their duty, the result of the action might,
and probably would, have been widely different, as the men on board of the
Confiance assigned it as one reason for their refusing to stand to their
guns, that the gun-boats keeping at a distance, the whole fire of the enemy
was directed against the Confiance. The Commander of these gun-boats, it is
to be observed, was so sensible of his own misconduct, that he shortly
after the action, made his escape from Kingston, and was not afterwards
heard of. The removal of Captain Fisher from the command of the Lake
Champlain squadron, precisely at the period when it was about to be
employed in the service before mentioned, was particularly unfortunate; and
it was no less so that his zealous offer to Captain Downie, to serve under
him in command of the gun-boats, could not be accepted by that officer.
In the month of March, 1815, Sir George Prevost received the despatch
communicating to him the Prince Regent's pleasure, that he should return to
England to answer the charges preferred against him by Sir James Yeo, and a
commission was, at the same time, transmitted to Lieutenant-General
Drummond, revoking the appointment of Sir George Prevost as
Governor-in-Chief and Commander of the forces in the Canadas, and
authorizing General Drummond to assume, provisionally, the chief civil and
military command of those Provinces. By this measure, Sir George Prevost
was compelled either to remain for six weeks, until the navigation of the
St. Lawrence should be open--a private individual in the country over which
he had so lately presided as its chief magistrate, and exposed to the
observations of all who had been hostile to his measures,--or to encounter
at a most inclement season the fatigue and dangers of a journey, to be
performed, frequently on foot, through the wilderness to New Brunswick. His
high and honourable feelings did not permit him to hesitate for a moment as
to the course which it was his duty to pursue, and he immediately quitted
his government. It was no inconsiderable consolation to him, under
circumstances like these, to know that he carried with him on his departure
the regret and the good wishes of the inhabitants of Canada, which were
manifested, not only by the different addresses and letters[93] which were
presented to him upon this occasion, but in a still more striking manner,
by the terms of a vote of the House of Representatives, who proposed to
present to their late Governor-General a service of plate of the value of
5,000_l._ This munificent act, though honoured with the approbation of the
Prince Regent, was not carried into effect, in consequence of a refusal to
accede to it on the part of the legislative council.[94]
On the arrival of Sir George Prevost in England, in the month of May, 1815,
it was evident that his constitution had suffered a fatal injury. His
health had yielded to the excessive fatigues of his journey to New
Brunswick, and his illness was aggravated by the delays which he
experienced in urging forward the investigation which he so earnestly
desired. Notwithstanding all his efforts, the Court-martial was not
directed to assemble before the month of January, 1816--a delay which
proved fatal to his hopes. He died on the 5th January, 1816, in the 49th
year of his age.[95]
That Sir George Prevost was a zealous, active, and faithful servant to his
king and country, the preceding pages are amply sufficient to prove. The
defence of Dominica, and the preservation of the Canadas against greatly
superior forces, attested his merits as officer, and excited the admiration
of some of the first soldiers of the age. His system, upon both occasions,
was necessarily a defensive one; and he has, therefore, lost much of that
eclat which attaches to more active operations. But had his field of action
been different, he would, doubtless, have displayed the same gallant and
enterprising spirit which distinguished him on former occasions, and
particularly when he led the assault on Morne Fortunee, in the island of
St. Lucie. Of his total disregard of personal considerations, and of his
readiness to sacrifice his own fame for the promotion of the great
interests committed to him in America, there cannot be a stronger proof
than that afforded by his conduct at Plattsburg. He must have been well
aware that the capture of the works, especially after the loss of the
fleet, would be considered by the public in general as a brilliant exploit,
which could not fail to add to his military reputation; and he must also
have foreseen the popular outcry which the resolution he adopted would
occasion. But those personal feelings gave way to considerations of far
greater weight in the mind of a wise, humane, and honourable soldier. Sir
George Prevost had justly calculated the consequences of his probable
success--a great loss of valuable lives, the immediate abandonment of his
conquest, and an unavoidable and difficult retreat. Although these
considerations were far from obvious, and not of a nature to be justly
appreciated by the public at large, he chose, without hesitation, that line
of conduct which his judgment and heart approved, and, notwithstanding his
conviction that this determination would necessarily expose him to much
unmerited odium, he resolutely adopted it. His subsequent recal, and
premature decease, were undoubtedly the consequences of this measure; but
his country will not fail, finally, to do justice to the purity of his
motives, and, on an impartial review of his conduct, to rank him amongst
its ablest and most faithful defenders.[96]
As a civil governor, Sir George Prevost had the gratification of knowing
that he was invariably esteemed and respected by the people over whom he
was placed. His zeal and devotion to his duties, both in his civil and
military character, were eminently conspicuous. No personal considerations,
no fatigue, no dangers, ever interfered with what he esteemed the good of
the service. Over the public interests he watched with the most sedulous
attention. In private life, he was remarkable for the purity of his moral
character, for the generosity of his heart, and for his pleasing and
conciliatory manners.
In consequence of the lamented death of Sir George Prevost, at the very
period when he was on the point of substantiating, before a competent
tribunal, his innocence of the charges preferred against him, the care of
his honour and reputation devolved upon his widow; nor did she neglect this
sacred trust. Soon after Sir George Prevost's decease, his brother, Colonel
William Augustus Prevost, addressed a letter to His Royal Highness the
Commander-in-Chief, in which, after stating the distressing situation in
which Sir George Prevost's family were placed, he requested that an
investigation of his brother's conduct might be ordered before a court of
inquiry. A reference to the Judge-Advocate was made upon the subject, who
was of opinion that such an inquiry could not properly be instituted.
Immediately after this determination, Lady Prevost represented, by letter,
to the Commander-in-Chief, the painful circumstances in which she was
placed. She intreated his Royal Highness to extend his protection to
herself and her family, and to procure from His Royal Highness the Prince
Regent a gracious consideration of their claims, to such marks of
distinction as might be due to the memory of the deceased. The receipt of
this letter was acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief, who assured Lady
Prevost, that he would gladly do any thing calculated to alleviate her
distress, but that he declined interfering with the Prince Regent on the
subject, to whom he was of opinion it could only be regularly submitted by
His Majesty's ministers.
A memorial was accordingly drawn up by Lady Prevost, which was submitted to
the Prince Regent through the regular channel. His Royal Highness, having
taken the same into consideration, was graciously pleased publicly to
express the high sense entertained by him of the services of Sir George
Prevost; conferring, at the same time, as a mark of his approbation,
additional armorial bearings to the arms of his family.
The following grant of heraldic distinctions appeared in the London Gazette
of 11th September, 1816.
_"Whitehall, September 3rd._--His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, taking
into his royal consideration the distinguished conduct and services of the
late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Baronet, during a long period
of constant active employment in situations of great trust, both military
and civil, in the course of which his gallantry, zeal, and able conduct
were particularly displayed at the conquest of the island of St. Lucie, in
1803, and of Martinique, in 1809; as also, in successfully opposing, with a
small garrison, the attack made in 1805 by a numerous French force upon the
island of Dominica, then under his government; and while Governor-General
and Commander-in-Chief of the British provinces in North America, in the
defence of Canada against the repeated invasions perseveringly attempted by
the American forces during the late war; and His Royal Highness being
desirous of evincing, in an especial manner, the sense which his Royal
Highness entertains of these services, by conferring upon his family a
lasting memorial of His Majesty's royal favour, hath been pleased, in the
name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to ordain that the supporters
following may be borne and used by Dame Catherine Anne Prevost, widow of
the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, during her widowhood; viz.
"On either side a grenadier of the 16th (or Bedfordshire) regiment of foot,
each supporting a banner; that on the dexter side inscribed "West Indies,"
and that on the sinister, "Canada;" and the said supporters, together with
the motto _servatum cineri_, may also be borne by Sir George Prevost,
Baronet, son and heir of the said late Lieutenant-General, and by his
successors in the said dignity of a baronet, provided the same be first
duly exemplified according to the laws of arms, and recorded in the
Herald's office. And His Royal Highness hath also been pleased to command,
that the said concession and especial mark of Royal favour be registered in
His Majesty's College of Arms."
Whilst the impartiality of His Majesty's Government towards the servants of
the public is strongly evidenced by the recal of Sir George Prevost from
his command in the Canadas, under the circumstances before stated, their
sense of justice is no less strongly manifested by the above grant of
posthumous honours to his family, whose feelings of satisfaction were
greatly heightened by the gratifying manner in which His Royal Highness the
Commander-in-Chief was pleased to express himself upon this occasion, in
the following letter.
"_Horse Guards, 17th September, 1816._
"Madam,
"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Ladyship's
letter of the 12th inst., and to assure you that I am
highly gratified to find that His Majesty's Government
has adopted a measure grateful to your feelings and
honorable to the memory of your late distinguished
husband.
I am, Madam,
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) FREDERICK."
_Lady Prevost._