will also shew that the Naval Commander on the Lakes entertained a very
different opinion on this subject from the Reviewer.
"_Kingston, 23d March, 1814._
"Dear Sir,
"I have had the honor of your Excellency's letter of
the 14th inst.
"It is impossible any person can be more truly sensible
of your Excellency's unremitting attention and
assiduity to every thing connected with the naval
department in this country than myself, &c.
* * * * *
I have the honour to remain,
With the highest respect,
Dear Sir,
Your Excellency's
Most obedient servant,
JAMES LUCAS YEO."
With regard to the naval action on Lake Erie, we shall only observe, that
it certainly was not lost from the want of skill or courage on the part of
the officers and men of our squadron. The decided superiority of the enemy
in their weight of metal and seamen, gave them an advantage which the
bravest efforts of our squadron, directed and encouraged by the
distinguished gallantry and conduct of their Commander, were insufficient
to resist. The causes of the disastrous result of that action are best
told, in the words of the sentence of the Court-martial upon Captain
Barclay and his officers, which will be found in the Appendix.[66] The
situation of General Procter was such, after this disaster, as to render it
indispensable for him to take the most prompt and energetic measures for
withdrawing his troops from posts which were no longer tenable, and to join
the main body of the army on the Niagara frontier, to whose force he knew
his men would prove a seasonable and powerful accession. Upon this
disastrous retreat it is unnecessary to dwell. It must, however, be
remarked, that from the sentence of the Court-martial upon General Procter,
and the subsequent remarks upon that sentence by order of His Royal
Highness the Prince Regent, it certainly appears that General Procter did
not avail himself, with sufficient energy and activity of the period which
elapsed between the loss of our fleet and the action at the Moravian
village, to effect the important object of retiring with his troops to a
place of safety.
However meritorious had been the conduct of General Procter, and of the
troops serving under him previous to his retreat from Amherstburgh, it was
not possible for Sir George Prevost to avoid noticing in the public orders,
which announced to the army the capture of the greater part of those troops
at the Moravian town, what appeared to him the disgraceful circumstances
with which the affair had been attended. Although General Procter might
feel hurt by the reflections thus passed upon his conduct, yet the
Commander of the forces, in consideration of his former services, was
unwilling to make that conduct the subject of public investigation, until
His Majesty's Government, to whom General Procter's explanation had been
submitted, should determine upon the course to be pursued. It was in
obedience to their orders that General Procter was at length put upon his
trial.[67]
That the charges against General Procter could only rest upon the events of
the retreat which he was accused of misconducting, and that "a long period
of arduous services and neglected representations"[68] could form _no part
of such charges_, must be obvious to the lowest capacity. General Procter
had, of course, the opportunity of availing himself of those services
before the Court-martial, and that he did so the nature of the sentence
would lead us to suppose. But it surely cannot be inferred from the opinion
of the Court, that Sir George Prevost had any other motive in preferring
the charges, than the good of the service, and obedience to the commands of
his superiors. Whether, under these circumstances, and with the knowledge
of Sir George Prevost's military life, which the Reviewer must have
possessed, he is justified in making the gross insinuation with which he
concludes his strictures on this subject, will be left to the candid reader
to determine.
The greater part of the troops under General Procter having been captured,
General Vincent was compelled immediately to retreat to Burlington Heights,
a measure which the information received by that officer of the extent of
General Procter's loss, and the probable immediate advance of the enemy,
seemed to render indispensable.
The first intelligence received of General Procter's defeat was through a
Staff-Adjutant, who had escaped from the field of battle, and who, by
exaggerated accounts of this disaster, and of the consequences to be
expected from it, spread terror and dismay through the country as he
passed rapidly along to Kingston, where he arrived on the 12th October. In
the mean time, General Vincent, whom these reports had reached, and who had
also on the 8th received from General Procter intelligence of the action,
had begun his retreat from the four-mile creek, and had halted at the
twelve-mile creek, when a communication from Colonel Young, at Burlington,
induced him immediately to fall back upon that place as a post where he
might with less difficulty maintain himself if attacked, and where he might
wait for instructions from General de Rottenburg, the officer commanding in
Upper Canada.
General de Rottenburg, who was on his way from York to Kingston, when the
intelligence of General Procter's defeat overtook him on the road,
immediately sent to General Vincent, directing him, in his despatch of the
10th October, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to hold
out against the superior force of the enemy, to destroy the stores, &c. and
to fall back on Kingston. These directions, it is to be observed, were
given under the impression created by the Staff-Adjutant's account, which,
in a very short time was discovered to be greatly exaggerated; and it
appears from General Vincent's letter to General de Rottenburg, previous to
the receipt of the despatch last mentioned, as well as from the one in
answer to it, that he had no immediate intention of retreating from the
position he then occupied, although he thought circumstances might
afterwards render such a measure necessary. In the mean time the same
exaggerated accounts of the action at the Moravian village, which had been
carried to Kingston, having been received at Montreal by the Commander of
the forces, together with General de Rottenburg's despatches, communicating
the orders he had sent to General Vincent in consequence of that
intelligence, Sir George Prevost in his letter to General de Rottenburg of
the 18th October, approved of those orders, and directed them to be carried
into execution.
On the 18th October, the very day on which this last despatch was dated,
General de Rottenburg informed Sir George Prevost, by letter, that the
Staff-Adjutant's account, by which he had been induced to give the
directions to General Vincent to retreat to York, preparatory to falling
back on Kingston, was false and scandalous. As soon as it was thus
ascertained at head-quarters at Montreal, what the real nature of General
Procter's disaster was, the Commander of the forces having also reason to
believe, from the information transmitted to him by General de Rottenburg,
that the enemy had designs upon York from Sackett's Harbour, instructions,
dated the 29th October, were sent to that officer, directing him to
prevent General Vincent's further retreat, and to order him to occupy both
Burlington and York with the force under his command. The orders, which
were accordingly sent from General de Rottenburg to General Vincent to that
effect on the 1st November, were received by him on the 4th, and he in
consequence remained in the position he then occupied at Burlington
Heights, which undoubtedly led afterwards to the recovery of the Niagara
frontier.
From the above correspondence it incontrovertibly appears, that the orders
transmitted from the Commander of the forces, through General de Rottenburg
to Major-General Vincent, were the real and only cause of that officer's
_not retreating_ to York, and of his continuing to hold his position at
Burlington; which, as appears by his own letter of the 27th October, before
referred to, he was preparing to leave on the 1st November.
Sir George Prevost's orders to General Vincent, to fall back upon Kingston,
had not reached him on the 23rd October; previous to which, his orders to
retreat had been discretionary. On the 27th he was preparing to obey them,
and on the 4th of November he received orders to remain where he was.
There cannot, therefore, be a doubt of the gross incorrectness of all the
Reviewer's statements,[69] of the repeated peremptory orders to retreat;
of the advice which the firmness of General Procter and others had induced
them to give General Vincent to disobey those orders, and of his being
persuaded upon their responsibility to adopt it.
It was, in fact, the prompt and decided measures of Sir George Prevost, as
soon as the truth, with regard to General Procter's defeat, was made known
to him, that alone prevented General Vincent from continuing his retreat,
and that led to those offensive operations which followed shortly
afterwards on the Niagara frontier, and which, notwithstanding the attempt
made by the Reviewer to give the sole credit of them to General Vincent and
Colonel Murray, originated in the instructions which the former officer had
received from General de Rottenburg, then commanding in Upper Canada. Even
the attack upon Fort Niagara had previously been pressed upon the
consideration of Major-Generals de Rottenburg and Sheaffe, by the Commander
of the forces, as desirable, whenever circumstances might render such a
measure practicable.
In summing up the events of the campaign of 1813, the Reviewer
observes,[70] "that on the British side, the occurrences of the year, on
the part of the _subordinate commanders_ and troops, presented a brilliant
series of achievements, the greater number of which were rendered nugatory
or imperfect in result, from the absence of all energy, talent, and
enterprise, in their Commander-in-Chief."
In support of this opinion, which is sufficiently singular, considering
what the Reviewer has himself stated to have been the result of the
campaign, he adds, that the successes obtained by General Vincent and
Colonel Harvey, by General Procter, Colonel Murray, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Morrison, were ALL obtained either against the positive commands of Sir
George Prevost, or without any instructions from him; and that in the only
measure which could be ascribed to him, he endeavoured to wrest the merit
from Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, because he happened to arrive when the
enemy were beaten.
The following observations will afford a full answer to this unfounded and
disgraceful attack upon the character and reputation of Sir George Prevost.
The brilliant affair at Stoney Creek, under Major-General Vincent and
Colonel Harvey, and the equally successful operation on the Michigan
frontier, when General Procter defeated the forces of Winchester and Clay,
arose out of the circumstances of the moment, of which those officers
immediately, with great judgment and gallantry, availed themselves. There
could, therefore, be no time for communication with the Commander of the
forces, and consequently the operations in question could not have taken
place in direct opposition to commands which were never received. With
regard to the general instructions under which the subordinate Commanders
acted, it has already been shewn that General Procter had discretionary
orders from Sir George Prevost to act on the defensive or otherwise, as
circumstances might require; so likewise had General Vincent; and the
marked approbation expressed, both in general orders, and in the despatches
to the Secretary of State announcing these events, is a further strong
proof that the conduct of those officers was in perfect accordance with the
orders and instructions which they had received from the Commander of the
forces. Colonel Murray's expedition against Plattsburg was, as appears by
the despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st August, 1813, planned altogether
by Sir George Prevost, who had previously endeavoured to place our marine
on the Richelieu, which had been increased by the capture of the two
schooners from the enemy, on a respectable footing; first, by the
appointment of Captain Pring to the naval command there, and subsequently
by obtaining the services of Captain Everard, and the officers and seamen
of the Wasp sloop of war, then lately arrived at Quebec from Halifax, to
man these vessels and the gun-boats. Colonel Murray was the officer
particularly selected by Sir George Prevost to command on this expedition,
from the opinion he entertained of his zeal and energy. The event amply
justified his expectations, and this enterprise, undertaken by the orders
and under the instructions of the Commander of the forces, was in every
respect successful.
The daring exploit which was subsequently achieved by Colonel Murray, in
the capture of Fort Niagara, so far from being in opposition to Sir George
Prevost's orders, or in the absence of any instructions respecting it, was
the consequence of the verbal instructions given by Sir George Prevost to
Lieutenant-General Drummond, previous to his assuming the command in Upper
Canada, and confirmed in his letter to him of the 3rd December, 1813.
Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison had been detached from Kingston with the 49th,
the 2nd battalion of the 89th, and the Voltigeurs, as a corps of
observation, to follow the motions of General Wilkinson's army, then
threatening Montreal from Sackett's Harbour, in consequence of the _express
orders and directions of Sir George Prevost_; a fact established by his
despatch to Lord Bathurst of the 15th November, 1813.
The foresight of the Commander of the forces in providing this force to
watch the enemy, and his judgment in the selection of Lieut.-Colonel
Morrison to command it, led beyond all doubt, to the defeat which General
Boyd received at Chrystler's farm, and ultimately, by the interruptions
thus occasioned to General Wilkinson's plans, to the safety of Lower
Canada. That the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost might in some
degree have contributed to the success which attended Lieut.-Colonel De
Salaberry's defence of his position at Chateaugay, the Reviewer seems most
unwillingly to admit, while at the same time he imputes to him the base and
unworthy attempt of endeavouring to assume to himself the merit which on
that occasion was alone due to Colonel De Salaberry.
In Sir George Prevost's despatch to Lord Bathurst on this subject, of the
date of 30th October, 1813, he expresses himself fortunate at having
arrived at the scene of action shortly after it commenced, as it enabled
him personally to witness the conduct of the officers and men engaged in
it, and to form a proper judgment of their merits, which he then severally
details in his letter. The unqualified praise which he bestows upon the
officer immediately commanding, (Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry) is of itself
a sufficient refutation of this libel on the part of the Reviewer.[71]
The checks thus received by the forces under Generals Wilkinson and
Hampton, from Lieut.-Colonel Morrison, and Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry,
were, without doubt, no inconsiderable causes of their repulse in the
attempt upon Lower Canada; but it was also the duty of the Reviewer to have
noticed the prompt and judicious measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, as
soon as he had ascertained that General Wilkinson was descending the St.
Lawrence to attack Montreal, for the defence of that place, by calling out
the whole militia of the district, and by collecting all his disposable
force at La Chine, where he commanded in person. The formidable defences
which he had prepared both at Coteau du Lac, and at the Cedars, together
with the imposing force of militia which had been assembled at a very short
notice, must have convinced General Wilkinson that he could not hope to
make any impression upon a people who shewed so much zeal and alacrity in
defending themselves, and who were commanded by one who possessed their
entire confidence and affection. Under these circumstances, and from the
opposition already experienced to his attempt, the American Commander
resolved to abandon it as impracticable, more particularly as he found
himself without support from General Hampton, who had retired towards Lake
Champlain.
In detailing the events of the campaign of 1814, the Reviewer has again not
scrupled, in his account of Captain Pring's expedition to Vergennes, to
distort the truth, for the purpose of attaching the blame of this failure
to Sir George Prevost. So far from the Commander of the forces refusing to
Captain Pring the assistance of the troops stationed at Isle aux Noix, as
the Reviewer asserts,[72] a strong detachment of the marines then in
garrison at that post, was embarked on board of his squadron, and the
despatch to Lord Bathurst from Sir George Prevost, of the 18th of May,
1814,[73] proves that this expedition was planned and directed by the
Commander of the forces, and probably failed from the circumstance alone of
Captain Pring being prevented by baffling winds for four days from reaching
his destination, before the enemy had time to mature their preparations for
defence.