On the march forward through Mylopotamos the troops avenged themselves
for their flight and losses in the most barbarous manner. Olive-trees
were burned and cut down, every house burned, and every luckless
Christian who fell into their hands sent with short shrift to his
account. The European officer above alluded to declared to me that he
was an eye-witness of the oft-repeated incident of burning the refugees
in one of the caves, around the mouth of which a huge pile of green
wood was piled, and fired while the troops hurried on, without waiting
to see what the result might be; and so reached Damasta only slightly
opposed, and debouched on the open country of Candia.
This occupied from the 18th to the 20th of May. The Turkish army then
concentrated near the remains of Gnossus, and without entering into
Candia moved on to Pediada, where Omar established his headquarters at
Castale, near the foot of the Lasithe Mountains. He now announced his
plan, which was to sweep round the insurgent forces, and push them all
westward into Sphakia, where he would shut them up and finish the war.
That he entertained no such expectation, however, was evident from the
order of his attack on Lasithe, which he made at a single point, so
as rather to disperse than gather in the insurgents. The 3d of June
he sent Reschid to attack the northern pass of Lasithe, by Abdou.
The column of irregulars entered the little plateau, which is as an
ante-chamber to the great plain of Lasithe, without opposition, and
his men at once camped, and began to cook their supper, or whatever
else the desire of the bashi-bazouk might be. They were, in this
state of confusion and security, suddenly attacked by the Cretans,
and utterly routed and driven back to the plains below, leaving their
dead and wounded on the ground. The news of the disaster followed the
despatch announcing the entry so closely, that both became known in
Candia that same night. Reinforcements were continually arriving, and
the Pasha had now in the field for the attack 18,000 men. With these
he renewed the attack on Lasithe in two directions, from Abdou on the
north, and from the west by Mathea and the pass which was defended by
the mountain called Lasithe Effendi--a very strong position, but in
a state of defence in no ways equal to its natural advantages. The
insurgent force gathered in the Lasithe at this time was the largest
the insurrection had ever seen assembled, and is estimated by competent
assistants at about 5,000, but with no head, though many commanders.
The force was sufficiently well organized to have defeated Omar Pasha,
but, after three days' cautious skirmishing, the Turks penetrated
on several sides, the irregulars turning Abdou by a difficult and
undefended approach at the east, and the insurgents retired in disorder
and in every direction; some by Messara into the Ida district, but the
larger portion into Rhizo Castron, south of Lasithe, and the higher
ridges of the Lasithe range, which Omar did not attempt to penetrate.
On hearing that Omar had arrived at Candia, and was about attacking
Lasithe, I ran down in the _Kestrel_ to watch his movements from
nearer, and get more reliable information than the consular agents
there generally furnished, as well as to convey more promptly the news
to Greece and Constantinople, the agents only reporting back to their
superiors at Canéa. On the arrival of the first news of the entry of
Reschid into Abdou, Omar sent off an express with the news to Syra and
Constantinople, but when the later report came, of the surprise and
repulse, I was able, to the great annoyance of the authorities, to
send by the Austrian post steamer, which left the next day, to correct
the advices by the new information which I received from the son of
Reschid Pasha, who was in great anxiety for the fate of his father, a
raid of the Christians having temporarily cut his communications with
headquarters. For two or three days the panic and confusion in Candia
were extreme.
Orders were then issued for the bulk of the army to concentrate at
Dibaki, and Omar moved across the plains of Pediada and Messara,
Reschid taking a line further west by St. Thomas and the slopes of
Ida, while the troops who had moved further into the Lasithe country
attempted to pass directly to the coast. Two battalions of Egyptians
in this movement were caught in the ravines of Sime, and almost
annihilated, leaving baggage, arms, and mules, loaded with ammunition
and provisions, in the hands of the Cretans, who hung on the rear of
every detachment, harassing more successfully than they had opposed
them.
At Dibaki the army was reorganized for the Sphakian campaign. It
was the beginning of July when it began to move. The fleet had been
waiting at Dibaki some time, and embarking the bulk of the regulars,
still strengthened by fresh troops from Constantinople, they were
landed at Franco Castelli, and took immediate possession of the
heights commanding Kallikrati. The forces under Coroneos were on
their way to oppose this movement, but, moving by land, were too
late, and Zimbrakaki and his Sphakiotes made no opposition. Reschid,
meanwhile, moved from Dibaki through Agios Basilios, his march being
facilitated by the assassination of the chief of that district, which
left the Christians without a head, and paralyzed their defence in
great measure, though opposition enough was made to render his march
slower than the plans of Omar had provided, and gave time to Coroneos
to get to Kallikrati, where he immediately commenced operations by an
attack on Omar's positions on the hills south of the plain. He began
the combat with forty men, who were rapidly increased to 1,500, whom
he divided into two bodies, of which the heavier, massing unperceived
on the left flank of the Turkish position, after the defence had been
concentrated against the feint made by Coroneos himself, charged
energetically, and carried the two positions on the Turkish left. The
ground was very favorable to irregular operations, rocky, with much
small growth of trees, making artillery useless. The Cretans held the
positions taken, and in them prepared an attack for the day after.
On this day the insurgent force had augmented to 2,000 men, and the
plan of operation was a slight variation only of that of the day
before, the feint being on the left, but, unfortunately for it, the
order to the commander who should have made the real attack was kept
in the pocket of the officer who carried it until an hour after the
time at which the assault was ordered to be made, so that though the
diversion of Coroneos was very well carried out, and the Sphakiotes
under him penetrated to an abattis which had been constructed around
the principal position of the Turkish army on a conical hill called
Avgon (the egg), the expected flank attack was not delivered, and the
troops who had held the positions on the right had time to concentrate
against Coroneos, and he was driven back. Preparations were, however,
made for the third day, with forces still increasing, when the news
that Reschid had arrived at Gaiduropolis, and consequently menaced
their rear, demoralized the Cretans, compelling Coroneos with his
volunteers to fall back on Askyfó.
Mehmet Pasha, once more attacking Askyfó by Krapi, while Omar's
troops and Reschid with his bashi-bazouks passed by the mountains
from Kallikrati to Asfendu, and so into Askyfó, had been opposed by
Zimbrakaki, Soliotis, and the Sphakiote chiefs for three days, when,
finding the defence concentrated at the head of the gorge, he climbed
the hills at his right, passed over into Askyfó, took possession of
Kares, on the edge of the plain, barricading himself there without
attempting to advance further. Coroneos, on his retreat to Askyfó,
threw a force of several hundred Sphakiotes and volunteers behind
him, and for several days his communications with Canéa and his base
at Vryses were cut off, when Reschid succeeded in getting into Askyfó
and supplying him with provisions, of which he stood much in need,
having left Vryses with six days' rations, and now been twelve days out
without further supplies. Zimbrakaki had retired to the heights between
Askyfó and Anopolis, followed by Omar's forces, while Reschid occupied
the southeastern part of Askyfó, Mehmet being in the northeastern. The
indefatigable Coroneos took position at Muri with about 800 men, and
thence menaced the communications between the latter chiefs, and so
effectually that Mehmet was obliged to evacuate Askyfó, and get back
to Vryses, when, falling on the rear of Reschid, Coroneos compelled him
to fall back to Kallikrati. The Greek chief then placed himself between
Omar and his auxiliaries, and watched both, ready to attack either when
the development of their plans should tell him what to do. Omar pushed
on to Anopolis, and thence to Aradena, where he was gallantly opposed
by a small force of Greek volunteers under Smolenski and Nicolaïdes.
The Greeks, attacked in front and on both flanks, while Zimbrakaki,
at an hour's journey, remained idle, and Petropoulaki, a league away,
guarded an unattacked pass, were forced to fall back, and leave
Aradena to the Turkish troops, after a display of courage which called
forth the praises of their enemies. But here the defences of nature
stopped the invaders. The great stronghold of Sphakia, Samaria, was
impregnable from the side of Aradena, the mountains hardly giving place
for undisputed passage to pedestrians. The troops were accordingly
withdrawn to the sea-side, and as the shore gives no passage, a
detachment was carried by ships to the entrance of the gorge of Agios
Roumeli. An energetic assault penetrated as far as the village which
gives name to this valley, a distance of half a mile, but here the
Cretans, concentrating in numbers, and aided by the masses of rock and
torrents, stopped all further advance, and the troops were withdrawn;
and, their passage through Sphakia to Canéa being barred, they were
sent round by sea, leaving the country as hostile as they had found
it, but desolated and ravaged as the "_paese guasta_" never had been
before. The losses of the army in this campaign had been frightful. The
sun of July, beating on those bare rocks with southern slopes, with
rare and unhealthy wells, fatigues of climbing and battle, merciless
driving and pushing to enable Omar to telegraph to the Sultan at Paris
the conquest of Sphakia, had been a hundredfold more fatal to the Turks
than Cretan bullets. Sunstrokes and dysenteries carried off hundreds.
Amongst the deaths was that of Geissler, Omar's chief of artillery, in
whose journal the writer read after his death these words: "Who could
have believed that I could ever have assisted in the subjugation of
these unhappy Christians!" He had done his utmost at the beginning of
the campaign to check the barbarities by which it was sought to terrify
the Cretans into submission, and having remonstrated with Omar for one
case of peculiar and repulsive atrocity, a coolness arose between them,
which continued until Geissler's death.
Omar reached Canéa by ship August 30, not having even done as much
towards the conquest of the island as Mustapha, no division of his
troops having passed from sea to sea except by the plain of Pediada,
etc. His losses since leaving Canéa cannot be estimated at less than
20,000 to 25,000 men--the estimate made by the most competent persons
of the total force employed in the Sphakian campaign being not less
than 45,000, while, on leaving, he himself declared that he had not
over 20,000 troops, all told, in the island, and European officers in
the service declared to me that this was an overestimate.
Returning for a moment to follow Reschid in his retreat from Sphakia,
we shall so conclude this campaign. Waiting a day or so at Kallikrati,
he seemed undecided what course to take, and Coroneos watched him,
fearing a raid on the undevastated district near Kallikrati, but,
urgently summoned by the Assembly to Sphakia to resist Omar, he was
on the way to obey, when he received news that Reschid had broken up
his camp, and was in retreat on Dibaki. He instantly sent messengers
to the men of Agios Basilios to hasten to stop the way at Halará, a
most difficult pass of their canton, while he followed him with all
the forces he could muster. Flight and pursuit were rapid, but when
at Halará Coroneos overtook the Mussulmans, he found no force in
Reschid's way, and that he had occupied the pass without resistance.
Pursuit recommenced next day, and in passing by Amari, Reschid escaped
an ambush of the Amariotes by taking an unused and difficult way in
preference to the commonly travelled one at which they lay in wait for
him, and, incessantly harassed, and losing men and baggage continually,
was caught again by his Greek adversary near Melambos, in a parting
fight, in which, it is said, he received a wound from which (or from
some other cause) he died a few weeks later at Candia.
This was the general result of the great expedition which would end the
insurrection in two weeks. Nothing had been gained, an army wasted; and
when, on October 3, the remnant of Egyptian troops left, there was no
Turkish force out of gunshot of the fortresses except a small garrison
at Dibaki, under the guns of the fleet.
With the practical and complete failure of Omar Pasha to subdue the
island, all hope of military success seemed to fail the Turkish
authorities. Omar returned from Sphakia with his army by sea, save a
body left in Selinos, who made an expedition on Omalos, and, after
penetrating with slight resistance to the plain, found themselves
unable to keep up their communications with the coast, and abruptly
evacuated it again, suffering considerable loss in forcing the passes
outwardly. The elastic system of resistance adopted by the Cretans, and
finally acceded to by the Greek chiefs, wore out the Turkish forces
without giving them the prestige of tangible victory. There were no
fortresses to capture, no accumulation of stores to destroy, and the
very poverty and want of military coherence made a strength for the
insurgents in face of the wretched strategy of the Turks.