To compensate myself for the slights of my fellow-countrymen, and at
the same time escape from and retaliate for the annoyances of the
Turkish officials, I sent to Corfu for a little cutter-yacht, and until
it came sent my family to Syra. All official intercourse had ceased
between the Commissioner and myself, and, encouraged by our Secretary
of Legation, who maintained a correspondence with the dragoman of the
Commission, the Pasha showed his determination to drive me out of
the island. It was forbidden to let me a house, the one I had having
become untenable from the number of military hospitals gathered round
it. I found it almost impossible to be served in the market, which was
under official control, and every movement I made was so watched, and
locomotion made so dangerous by the random discharges of the muskets
of the irregulars, which were fired off on all occasions, and even
with none, the balls constantly being heard passing overhead, that
I determined on passing the summer on board the _Kestrel_, which I
did, running from port to port in the island, and over to the Greek
islands, whenever the fancy took me. In this way I revenged myself most
agreeably. My satisfaction was greatly increased by seeing the disgrace
of my adversary, the Commissioner, who was recalled, having utterly
failed in everything but devastation. He was replaced by Hussein Avni,
a cautious and heavy-witted man, a good disciplinarian, but a most
fanatical Mussulman, and so forewarned of my dangerous qualities that I
found, to my great amusement, that I was considered the head and front
of the insurrection. As with all the espionage they could apply, no
act of complicity could be discovered, I was credited with superhuman
cunning, it never entering the heads of the _rusés_ Mussulmans that I
had nothing to conceal, and that, while they were watching my house
at Kalepa, the insurgent messengers came in at the city gates almost
every day. In fact, except as a witness of events, I had ceased to be
of any importance to the insurrection; and, entirely unsupported by
any moral or diplomatic influence of my own Government, and wearied
of a struggle which brought to me but a succession of spectacles of
misery and barbarity, I would gladly have left the island, where the
extraordinary expense of living was devouring my substance without any
recompense, but that I had become in public opinion, both in Greece
and Crete, so identified with the existence of the insurrection that
my resignation or recall would have been a danger to it in the eyes
of its friends. The moral intervention of my own Government amounted
to the despatch before quoted, a fustian despatch from Mr. Seward to
Mr. Morris about "the brave and suffering Cretans," and a buncombe
resolution of Congress, in view of which the people of the East, having
to deal generally with governments whose words have a positive value,
supposed that we were the friends of the Cretans, and I determined to
avail myself of the delusion, as far as my own position was concerned,
and conform to what was really public opinion in America, confident
that the Government cared nothing about the matter _pro_ or _con_. The
Porte threatened to revoke my exequatur. Nothing would have pleased
me better, for I knew that this would compel my Government to do
something, and Ali Pasha seemed to have the same opinion, for the
threat was dropped. A strong pressure was then applied at Washington
to have me recalled, and Mr. Seward had consented, and decided to call
me home, I was informed, under pretext of consultation on some public
affairs; but General Ignatieff, getting wind of it, telegraphed to
St. Petersburg that I must be retained, and a telegram from there to
Washington settled the matter, I conjecture, as nothing more was heard
of it. This I believe was the extent of the part performed by the
American Government, and, trivial as it was, it seems to me the least
creditable played by any government concerned.
Hussein Avni was only the _locum tenens_ of the Serdar Ekrem, Omar
Pasha, whom the Porte had decided on sending to Crete as a final and
reliable agent, his name being, as was supposed, so formidable as to
discourage any protraction of the resistance. In the interregnum,
Hussein undertook no measures against the insurrection. Ali Riza Pasha,
being beaten at Topolia in an attempt to penetrate into Selinos,
where a new gathering of volunteers and insurgents had been made,
contented himself with ravaging the plain districts of Kissamos which
had hitherto escaped. Whole villages, which had submitted without
any resistance, were plundered, the women violated by order of the
officers, until in some cases death ensued; and of the men, some were
killed, others beaten and tortured in many ways, all who could escape
taking refuge in the caves and hiding-places along the shore, where
they escaped by small boats to Cerigotto. I ran over later in the
_Kestrel_, and saw several hundred of these miserable wretches, women
and children mainly, and saw two row-boats arrive with their lading, so
crowded that it was a marvel how they could have made the passage of
twenty miles or more of open sea, in any weather. I saw one old blind
man of ninety who had been wrapped by the soldiers in cloths on which
they poured oil, and then, setting them on fire, left him to his fate.
His friends came back in time to save his life, but I saw the broad
scar of the burning, covering nearly his whole chest.
Omar Pasha arrived on the 9th of April, and on the 11th a body of 2,000
insurgents came down to the heights of Boutzounaria, and attacked the
guard of the aqueduct, to show his Highness, apparently, that they
were not discouraged. They were driven back with the loss of three
killed, the plan of attack having been betrayed by a miller in the
neighborhood, and the troops been reinforced in the night before the
appointed day. At the same time, a more decidedly offensive strategy
seemed to be adopted by the whole insurrection, owing to the new
material brought over by the _Arkadi_, and in several places combats
of comparative importance took place. The insurgent chiefs made no
concealment of their satisfaction at the change in the command,
fearing the wiles and personal influence of Mustapha more than all the
artillery and discipline of the Generalissimo. Omar had landed with
great pomp and circumstance--horses and guns, cavalry and a staff, new
and splendid uniforms. Amongst the others I paid my respects to the new
victim, and found him, to my surprise, a weak, conceited, bombastic
old man. He assured me that his plan and appliances were so complete
and irresistible that within two weeks from the time he set out the
insurrection would be crushed. I ventured to suggest that he would find
on getting into the interior that the work was much more difficult than
he imagined, and that the neglect of the Porte to construct good roads
when they had command of the island made their work very difficult. He
replied that it could not be more difficult than Montenegro, and he
had conquered that, etc. I left him with much less apprehension for the
success of the campaign than I had previously entertained. He was a
strong contrast to the quiet, concentrated, _rusé_ Mustapha.
The political intervention of Russia commenced at this juncture by
the negotiation of a secret arrangement with the Viceroy, by which he
engaged to withdraw his troops from Crete, and a division was actually
embarked for Egypt before the Serdar Ekrem succeeded in arresting
the defection, which was completed on his return from the campaign,
seven months later, when a number, which, with the previous departure,
amounted to about 10,000 men, the remainder of a total of 24,000
Egyptians landed in Crete, returned to Egypt. The change in French
policy was also marked by the recall of the slavishly pro-Turkish
consul Derché, incapable either of honesty or good policy, and whose
demoralization had made him worthless even to his own government, and
the replacing of him by M. Tricou, a clever, quick-witted Parisian,
but long in the service, and lately stationed at Alexandria. There
seems to be little doubt that he was authorized to use his eyes to
the disadvantage of Omar Pasha if possible. [Tricou arrived just too
late to be received by Omar before setting out, and followed him to
Candia with the intention, if not the order, to follow him through his
campaign; a surveillance which Omar bluntly declined, to his cost, as
events proved.]
He occupied about two weeks in organizing his troops, receiving heavy
reinforcements from Turkey, including some splendid-looking regiments
with full ranks, and then, with about 15,000 men, set out for the
conquest of Sphakia. The Cretans, as if to reply to the new manifesto
of the Porte, formed a provisional government, and chose Mavrocordato,
an able Greek administrator, and most trustworthy and patriotic man,
as president, decreeing at the same time that all authority should be
exercised in the name of the King of the Hellenes. But the difficulty,
not to say impossibility, of reconciling the claims of the rival
chieftains, and of enforcing any kind of administrative system in
the island, deterred Mavrocordato from assuming his post, though the
_brutum fulmen_ of proclamation on both sides still continued, the
only practical question being which side would stand most killing.
Strategy on either side was of trivial importance, tactics of none.
The Cretans rolled stones and felled trees into the passes, already
nearly impassable, and Omar and his staff planned, on the chart,
a campaign for a country none of them had ever seen, and with the
greatest contempt for the judgment of those who knew it. Mehmet Pasha,
who still retained command in the Apokorona, though he had been obliged
to retreat to the seaside, advanced anew, and formed an entrenched
camp near Vrysses, while Omar, with the bulk of the army, moved on to
Episkopi, and waited there the arrival of the troops at Retimo. When
all were ready, a joint attack was made, by Mehmet on Krapi and the
Serdar Ekrem on Kallikrati, a much longer but less precipitous pass,
which led into Askyfó from the east.
Zimbrakaki, with Veloudaki and other Cretan chiefs, and Soliotis of
the Greeks, commanded at Krapi, and Coroneos at Kallikrati, and the
affair ended as had all the former attacks, Mehmet being driven back
to his camp, and Omar to Episkopi. These were affairs of sharpshooters
entirely, where no opportunity of employing discipline for the attack
offered, and the troops exposed themselves to a fusillade which
they could not reply to. But, with the irritation of defeat, the
Ottoman Generalissimo gave way to the most brutal impulses of revenge.
Villages which had just submitted, and whose people had remained within
the Turkish lines, were put to sack, and the last outrages of war
perpetrated on the inhabitants.
The rumor which accompanied the Serdar Ekrem, that in spite of his
professions of moderation and legality (as opposed to Mustapha's
policy) he had secret orders to stamp out the disaffection by
the severest rigor, found now clear confirmation. What under the
Commissioner, subsequent to Arkadi, was variable and overlooked
barbarity in the subordinates, was, under the Generalissimo, the law
and order of things, and he himself partook of the plunder of the
defenceless, and rejuvenated the lusts of his old age with the pick of
the captive Cretan maidens. The testimony of several of the European
officers in the army was offered me, proving that Omar Pasha dishonored
even his adopted country by his violation of his word, by his depravity
and his cruelty, and himself set the example to his army of everything
which could add to the misery and despair of unhappy Crete.
It is as natural for the Turkish authorities to deny as for the
Christians to exaggerate the atrocities committed, but evidence of a
nature not to be rejected, or even questioned in its general import,
establishes that the policy adopted was one of subduing Crete by
terror, and to this end full license was given to the soldiery. One
entry in a memorandum book kept by Geissler (Dilaver Pasha), Omar's
chief of artillery, and which I had the chance to read, said, noting
the entry into one of the villages near Goïdaropolis: "O. Pasha ordered
the division to ravage and rape." All villages were burned, and all
prisoners murdered or worse. The chiefs of four villages who came to
make their submission were at once beheaded. The population invariably
fled to the high mountains on the approach of the troops.
It will hardly be edifying to follow further in detail this barbarity;
and with the general statement that the policy here indicated was
followed throughout Omar's campaign unflinchingly, and that the French
consul was refused permission to accompany Omar in his movements, that
no civilized witness might bring his deeds to light, I shall drop the
theme, which sickens me to recall even at this long interval. My duty
then compelled me to investigate, as now to declare, these things, but
I spare the civilized world and myself any further recital of the deeds
of the Croat Pasha.
The 6th of May a force of volunteers, commanded by Dimitrikarakos,
landed in the eastern provinces, where up to that time hostilities
had been very unimportant. A large body of insurgents quickly rallied
round the volunteers, and, establishing their headquarters at Lasithe,
they swept the country up to the walls of Candia. This compelled
a new concentration of forces to meet the new emergency, and Omar
set out, via Retimo, through Mylopotamo to Candia, sending word to
Reschid Effendi to come to meet him _en route_. Coroneos, meanwhile,
had not been idle, and while Zimbrakaki and Costa Veloudaki, with the
Apokoroniotes, some volunteers, and most of the Sphakiotes, remained
to keep Mehmet in check, and profit by an unguarded moment to attack
him, Coroneos and his followers kept near the army of Omar Pasha,
waiting until he should be entangled in the ravines of Mylopotamo to
attack him, and when he had reached Margaritas, he was beset furiously
by the whole body of the men of Agios Basilios and the Amariotes,
with the volunteers who accompanied Coroneos. The Turks, shut into
narrow ravines overlooked by bold heights, defended themselves with
difficulty, and were soon entirely hemmed in, unable to advance or
retreat. The fire of the Cretan rifles penetrated into every part of
the Turkish encampment, Omar's tent being several times pierced. At a
council of war, called on the emergency, the opinion was general that
the position was critical, and some considered it as next to hopeless.
There was nothing to do but take shelter and wait for Reschid and his
irregulars, who, well acquainted with the mountains and the Cretan
method of fighting, would be able to form an advance-guard, and, by
skirmishing vigorously, protect the march of the regulars, utterly
helpless in this kind of warfare.
The passage of the troops through this section was described to me by
several eye-witnesses as anything but military. They cowered at the
first attack, and refused to move forward in the ravines except when
preceded by a cloud of irregulars to drive back the Christians, every
onslaught of whom produced a panic; but, as they were behind as well
as before, retreat was impossible, and there was no alternative to the
Turks but to take to such defences as the ground permitted and defend
themselves as they best could. The Albanians and Circassians were not
sufficiently acquainted with the country, cut up with interminable
ravines, covered with olive groves, and defended by men who knew every
inch of the ground. The wretched Turks lost all courage, even that of
despair, and a European officer in the Egyptian service who was present
said to me that most of his comrades entertained no hope of escape, and
Coroneos has since assured me that if the other chiefs had responded
to his call for help, the total destruction of the army, including the
Serdar Ekrem and his staff, was practicable.
As has generally been the case in Greek wars, the jealousies of the
chiefs were the safety of the Turks. Petropoulaki, a Mainote palikari
of the old war, who commanded in Malavisi and Temenos, and watched
Candia from the eastern slopes of Ida, refused to come to the aid of
Coroneos; and when Reschid moved from the east, entered the defiles
of Mylopotamo at Damasta, instead of throwing himself before the
Turkish division and delaying their advance, he attacked them in the
rear after they had gone through, and, though he inflicted severe
losses on them and took much of the baggage, he rather facilitated
than otherwise the junction of the two Turkish corps, and, after a
short pursuit, abandoned him, instead of following up and uniting
with Coroneos. Skoulas, chief of Mylopotamo, alone kept up the chase,
and Coroneos, warned in time of the advance of Reschid, despatched a
small body of men to oppose his junction with Omar. Reschid, however,
with the greatest obstinacy and gallantry, hammered away regardless
of loss, and, fighting all night long, effected his junction, with
which Coroneos's hope of bottling up Omar was lost. The Generalissimo
embraced Reschid as his saviour, and promoted him on the spot.
What made the matter still worse for the Cretans was that their
ammunition was exhausted, and supplies did not arrive in time, so
Coroneos reluctantly fell back, leaving the way open. The next day his
ammunition arrived.