CHAPTER XIII.

Another step of the _moral_ intervention which the Russian Government

had been so long and so skilfully engineering came at this juncture

to make the cause of the Porte more hopeless. The negotiations with

France had resulted in a kind of _entente_ on the Eastern question,

by which the French emperor had agreed, under certain contingencies,

to unite with the Russians in deporting the families of the Christian

combatants. The new French agent, Tricou, had from the beginning shown

a tendency to criticise Omar Pasha unfavorably, which the latter had

increased by his contemptuous treatment of the new consul. Tricou

had, consequently, set his agents to find out all the instances of

Turkish barbarity obtainable--a ghastly roll, obtained from easily

read records. It happened during the operations against Sphakia, which

Omar nominally directed from on board the flag-ship of the squadron

off the coast, that news came in of his having blockaded a number of

families in a cave on the sea-side and having attempted unsuccessfully

to stifle them out (or in), and the active Murray went at once to make

his Highness a visit, and ascertain if the catastrophe were avertible.

He obtained from the Generalissimo a promise that the prisoners

should not be attacked by any inhuman appliances, and should be

guaranteed honorable treatment on surrendering.[J] In the course of the

conversation, Omar animadverted on Tricou in terms which Murray, in

narrating his visit to me, declined to repeat, and which, in all their

vagueness and possible malignity, I at once applied as a caustic to

Tricou's already wounded pride, in accordance with a systematic policy

to make all the bad blood possible between the Pasha and my colleagues.

The ruse succeeded to my best hopes, and thenceforward the irritated

Frenchman sought every opportunity to punish the illustrious renegade,

and his activity resulted in the following despatch, sent while Omar

was still engaged in the Sphakian raid:

[J] A promise which Omar kept by violating and keeping on his ship as

his mistress the most beautiful of the young girls who surrendered.

(Translation.)

CANEA, July 21, 1867.

M. LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES:

The situation grows daily worse. I have had the honor of notifying to

you the deplorable excesses which have been committed in the district

of Kissamos; to-day I learn that massacres have broken out in the

eastern part of the country.

For the last month, isolated murders took place daily in the

neighborhood of the town of Candia; the native Mussulmans overran

the country and abandoned themselves to the saddest iniquities in

the Christian villages. These barbarous expeditions over, they would

return to the town, and the gates opened before them to give passage

to their bloody trophies. I had made strong complaints to the local

authorities, but all my representations had remained without effect.

Emboldened by impunity, the bashi-bazouks on the 12th and 13th of

this month spread themselves over the district of Rhizo and massacred

women and children. To revenge themselves, the insurgents carried off

a young Turkish girl and killed her father. The Canadian Government,

which has for a long time forbidden Christians to enter the town,

doubtless counted upon these atrocities remaining buried in silence.

They let them go on, and the irregulars could glut their ferocity

entirely as they pleased.

On the 17th, they invaded the villages of Huméri, Alcolohuri, Aghias

Paraskevi, Shilus, and a great number of the villages of the district

of Pediada, murdering the peaceable and defenceless villagers, old

men, women, and children. The consular agents of Candia unite, and

wish to send their dragomans to the places; but the Governor opposes

this, and the carnage continues.

These sad tidings have deeply moved the consular body. As soon as I

had been informed of them I went to the Imperial Commissioner, whom I

found, I must say, deeply afflicted, but overwhelmed with the feeling

of his impotence. He no longer attempts to deny the evil, but he feels

himself incapable of staying its progress. From all parts of the

island the most sinister reports reach us. Women and children wander

along the shore, dying of hunger and exposed to the most horrible

treatment. I am in a position to inform you, M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

that three young Turkish officers, witnesses of the barbarities which

have taken place at Kissamos, have given in their resignation, to

avoid presiding over such butcheries.

In so serious a situation, my English colleague and I thought it our

duty to inform our respective governments in the promptest manner. We

consequently drew up the following telegraphic despatch, which we sent

this day to the Peiræus to be transmitted to Constantinople, as well

as to the Cabinets of London and Paris:

"Massacres of women and children have broken out in the interior of

the island. The authorities can neither put down the insurrection

nor stay the course of these atrocities. Humanity would imperatively

demand the immediate suspension of hostilities, or the transportation

to Greece of the women and children."

The Russian and Italian consuls address an identical telegram to St.

Petersburg and Florence.

We cannot, M. le Chargé d'Affaires, remain blind to the fact that from

impotence the Turks passed to fury, and from fury to extermination.

I do not hesitate to say that, if this useless struggle were to be

prolonged, the women and children would have no refuge but exile or

death.

Omar Pasha continues his expedition of Sphakia. It is asserted that

he has effected his junction with the corps of Mehmet Pasha, which is

said to be entirely free. It would be very desirable that the Serdar

should make himself master of this position as soon as possible; it

is true that the insurrection would be scarcely weakened by it, but

this success might perhaps induce the Porte to order a suspension of

hostilities.

The aviso of the Imperial navy, the _Prometheus_, which has come

to relieve the _Salamander_, anchored on the 17th in the harbor of

Canéa.--Accept, etc.

(Signed) TRICOU.

The consequence of the Russo-Frankish accord was that, on the receipt

of the above despatch at Constantinople, the French and Russian

squadrons at Peiræus proceeded to Crete, and there commenced to embark

the families gathered along the coast. This undertaking, which had

probably as little as possible to do with humanity in its secret

springs, was evidently concerted, and waited only the arrival of

some signal like Tricou's telegram, followed accordingly by this

preconcerted rejoinder from the French representative at Constantinople:

_M. Outrey to A'ali Pasha_.

"THERAPIA, July 26, 1867.

"HIGHNESS: The consul of France at Canéa sends me the following

telegram [given above].

"In view of such acts, which the Porte can but reprove, and in virtue

of orders which I have received from my Government, I hasten to inform

your highness that I have ordered Admiral Simon to repair to the

Cretan coast with the ships under his orders, to receive and transport

to Greece all the women and children who wander on the shores, dying

of hunger, and exposed to frightful treatment. The mission of Admiral

Simon, having no political character, cannot, I imagine, meet any

difficulty from the Ottoman authorities, and I beg your highness to

have the goodness to instruct his Highness Omar Pasha to lend all his

sympathy to a work of humanity."

Which is made clearer by the extract from the despatch of the English

_chargé_ to Lord Stanley:

(Extract.)

_Mr. Barron to Lord Stanley (Received August 6)._

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 23, 1867.

"The French _chargé d'affaires_ has called to inform me that, having

received instructions from his Government to despatch vessels to Crete

for the purpose of removing homeless victims of the war, whenever

it should be advisable, he deemed the last advices from the French

consul at Canéa (enclosed herewith in copy) to be such as to oblige

him to use the discretionary power placed in his hands. On the

receipt of this despatch he immediately concerted measures with the

Russian Ambassador, who was provided in advance with corresponding

instructions, and they both sent late on the 26th identical

instructions by telegraph to their respective naval officers in the

Mediterranean."

The number of relieving ships sent to Crete in obedience to this

accord was four French, three Russian, followed by two Italian; and,

lest isolation should seem intervention, three Austrian, not over

well-willed, and one small Prussian gunboat, that the now great Power

might not be left out of the new question.

This movement had, in my opinion, no direct effect on the military

question, the Sphakian expedition having already done its worst, and

begun to recoil, before the arrival of Admiral Simon with his ships;

but it did, no doubt, prevent the success of the conciliatory movement

which followed. The Generalissimo, after his return to Canéa, about the

middle of September, issued a proclamation prepared at Constantinople,

offering a general amnesty and an armistice of six weeks, preparatory

to measures of a softer and more persuasive character. The Turkish

officials, in their intercourse with the consuls, frankly admitted that

force had failed, and that no hope of its more successful appliance

remained. The depleted army could only with great difficulty, and

slowly, be refilled. Reinforcements were obtained, but not enough to

keep the cadres at their full condition, and a despatch of the English

consul at Beyrout[K] attests the dread of this service which had

infected the troops in other sections of the Ottoman empire, while

battalions in Crete mutinied and refused to labor any longer.

[K] _Acting Consul-General Rogers to Lord Stanley (Received November

27)._

BEYROUT, November 14, 1867.

MY LORD: I have the honor to report to your lordship that yesterday

the Turkish steam-frigate _Peikizaafar_, 72 guns, commanded by Captain

Selim Bey, having embarked nearly 2,000 soldiers at this port, started

direct for the island of Candia.

Of the soldiers intended to be sent on this mission, I am assured that

about ninety deserted, and most of them were kept in close confinement

till they were sent on board, and they openly expressed their grief at

being sent on this expedition.

They are in considerable arrears of pay.--I have, etc.,

(Signed) E. T. ROGERS.

Early in October, A'ali Pasha arrived, to put in effect the sober

second thought of the head of Islam. The manner and views of the

Grand Vizier impressed me with profound respect and sympathy--his

proffers seemed to me reasonable, and likely to assure to the Cretans

a substantial liberty and reform. But they were too shrewd not to see

that the ablest man in the Turkish empire had only come to Crete to

try the last resort of his persuasion, because his case was nearly

hopeless, and simultaneously with his arrival came stimulating

despatches from the Russian agents, encouraging the Cretans to hold

out and strike now the final blow at the Turkish domination. They

were assured by these despatches in the most positive terms that if

they withstood this temptation, and refused all the conciliatory

propositions of A'ali Pasha, their independence and annexation to

Greece were certain. I feel confident that but for these assurances

the scheme of A'ali Pasha would have been accepted, for the island was

harrowed and ravaged and miserable to the last degree. The campaign of

Omar Pasha had destroyed, according to the declaration of a European

officer engaged, six hundred villages. Except in Sitia, the extreme

eastern peninsula, there was hardly a house with its roof on, and the

people had no means to provide new rafters. The discouragement was

great, and required as counterpoise all the confident promises of

Russia and the means and appliances of Greece to induce the people to

decide to keep up the resistance.

My own opinion was that the Cretans had better accept A'ali Pasha's

propositions, but our minister at Constantinople wrote me to urge

their rejection with all my influence, as the certain condition of

independence. I do not believe that our Government had any part in

these instructions or policy. Mr. Seward had at one time given me the

fullest endorsement of my pro-Cretan views, and at another was ready,

on the remonstrance of the Turkish minister, to recall me for having

done what he approved both in myself and Mr. Morris, and abstained

only on another application being made by the Russian Government.

Being on the spot, and as well able to judge as any one, it seemed to

me wisest for the Cretans to accept autonomy and peace, but I obeyed

the instructions sent me against my own feelings. I communicated the

advices of my minister to those whose business it was to advise the

insurgents. I felt a confidence in A'ali Pasha which no other Turkish

official had ever inspired me with, and a certainty that he would act

in good faith. Humanity demanded peace in defiance of all politics.

Dissensions had arisen between the volunteers and Cretans; and the

chiefs of the former, wearied of a pointless and resultless guerilla

warfare, and sure that the question was only to be settled on the

continent, in order to hasten the preparation of movements on Epirus

and Thessaly, one by one returned to Greece, followed by most of their

retinues. The Cretan combatants, relieved of their families, were

quite sufficient for all the needs of the situation, and, well armed

and provided, could have kept up the struggle for years, if disposed.

But the fatal blow to the insurrection was being prepared by its own

friends. The Russian Government had, during the nuptial visit of the

King of Greece to St. Petersburg, secured a complete ascendency over

him, and immediately on his return to Greece it became evident that

the dismissal of the Comoundouros ministry had been decided in that

conclave with the execution of whose plans no motive of humanity ever

interferes, whose deliberations no curious House of Commons pries into

or clamoring journal opposes. The Russian Government had decided to

take the direction of the insurrection, and to that end, to get rid of

Comoundouros and his friends, whose anti-Russian tendencies were too

strong to be bent to the desired course, the king, when the moment had

arrived, made a difference with the ministry on some trivial point,

and peremptorily dismissed it. But the chamber, with an unexpected

constancy, refused to sanction any change in the administration, and

the Russian minister in Athens then made overtures to the dismissed

president of the council, offering to bring him back to power if he

accepted the programme of St. Petersburg. He refused, and the chamber,

unyielding, was also dissolved, and in the new election, in which

the whole influence of the court and throne was exerted against the

Comoundouros party, by the most violent and illegal measures the

deposed chief and his principal adherents were kept out of the new

chamber, which was, to a sufficient degree, subservient; and Bulgaris,

the evil genius of Greece since her independence, under whose auspices

at all times disorder and dishonesty, brigandage and peculation, had

especially thriven, became the arbiter of the destinies of Crete.

At this time all means and supplies for the war came directly from the

Hellenic treasury. Private contributions had never been great, and were

almost exclusively confined to Greeks abroad--a comparatively trivial

supply of food and clothing from America being the exception. Nearly

50,000 refugees from Crete were dependent on the Hellenic Government,

which, with the means supplied to the war committee for military

operations, constituted a drain on the resources of Greece sufficiently

alarming, yet popular opinion was so strong in favor of continuing the

insurrection that no government dared seem even to be lukewarm towards

it; and with excellent opportunities for observing, I am able to assert

confidently that the Hellenic people were ready to run all the risks

of war with Turkey, rather than allow the Cretans to be reconquered,

and that no government could have lived a day which did not proclaim,

as the chief condition of its existence, the vigorous support of the

Cretan insurrection.

What the views of Russia were in regard to the insurrection no outsider

can, of course, say; but they seemed to be in favor of only making

the Greek agitation a part of a great scheme, having its direction at

St. Petersburg. The only immediate change, however, in the direction

of the insurrection was the gradual suppression of the powers of the

Cretan committee at Athens, and an occasional relaxation in the vigor

of support, as if to try the condition of public feeling. I judge

that Russia had made other combinations, which made the success of

the insurrection as a Hellenic movement undesirable, and that she was

gradually getting it in hand, to be able to suppress it when the

proper moment came. To do this without sacrificing that influence over

the Hellenes which would be so useful in certain contingencies, it

was necessary to have a Hellenic instrument to do the work--hence the

position of Mr. Bulgaris.

The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8 · 第 13 / 14 章