CHAPTER XXIII.

AGAINST IMMODERATE SORROW FOR THE DEATH OF FRIENDS.

Next to the encounter of death in our own bodies, the most sensible

calamity to an honest man is the death of a friend; and we are not in

truth without some generous instances of those that have preferred

a friend’s life before their own; and yet this affliction, which by

nature is so grievous to us, is by virtue and Providence made familiar

and easy.

To lament the death of a friend is both natural and just; a sigh

or a tear I would allow to his memory: but no profuse or obstinate

sorrow. Clamorous and public lamentations are not so much the effects

of grief as of vain-glory. He that is sadder in company than alone,

shows rather the ambition of his sorrow than the piety of it. Nay, and

in the violence of his passion there fall out twenty things that set

him a-laughing. At the long-run, time cures all, but it were better

done by moderation and wisdom. Some people do as good as set a watch

upon themselves, as if they were afraid that their grief would make

an escape. The ostentation of grief is many times more than the grief

itself. When any body is within hearing, what groans and outcries! when

they are alone and private, all is hush and quiet: so soon as any body

comes in, they are at it again; and down they throw themselves upon the

bed; fall to wringing of their hands, and wishing of themselves dead;

which they might have executed by themselves; but their sorrow goes off

with the company. We forsake nature, and run over to the practices of

the people, that never were the authors of anything that is good. If

destiny were to be wrought upon by tears, I would allow you to spend

your days and nights in sadness and mourning, tearing of your hair, and

beating of your breast; but if Fate be inexorable, and death will keep

what it has taken, grief is to no purpose. And yet I would not advise

insensibility and hardness; it were inhumanity, and not virtue, not to

be moved at the separation of familiar friends and relations: now, in

such cases, we cannot command ourselves, we cannot forbear weeping, and

we ought not to forbear: but let us not pass the bounds of affection,

and run into imitation; within these limits it is some ease to the mind.

A wise man gives way to tears in some cases, and cannot avoid them in

others. When one is struck with the surprise of ill-news, as the death

of a friend, or the like; or upon the last embrace of an acquaintance

under the hand of an executioner, he lies under a natural necessity

of weeping and trembling. In another case, we may indulge our sorrow,

as upon the memory of a dead friend’s conversation or kindness, one

may let fall tears of generosity and joy. We favor the one, and we are

overcome by the other; and this is well: but we are not upon any terms

to force them: they may flow of their own accord, without derogating

from the dignity of a wise man; who at the same time both preserves

his gravity, and obeys nature. Nay, there is a certain _decorum_ even

in weeping; for excess of sorrow is as foolish as profuse laughter.

Why do we not as well cry, when our trees that we took pleasure in,

shed their leaves, as at the loss of our satisfactions; when the next

season repairs them, either with the same again, or others in their

places. We may _accuse_ Fate, but we cannot _alter_ it; for it is hard

and inexorable, and not to be removed either with reproaches or tears.

They may carry _us_ to the _dead_, but never bring _them_ back again

to us. If reason does not put an end to our sorrows, fortune never

will: one is pinched with poverty; another solicited with ambition, and

fears the very wealth that he coveted. One is troubled for the loss

of children; another for the want of them: so that we shall sooner

want tears than matter for them; let us therefore spare that for which

we have so much occasion. I do confess, that in the very parting of

friends there is something of uneasiness and trouble; but it is rather

voluntary than natural; and it is custom more than sense that affects

us: we do rather impose a sorrow upon ourselves than submit to it; as

people cry when they have company, and when nobody looks on, all is

well again. To mourn without measure is folly, and not to mourn at

all is insensibility. The best temper is betwixt piety and reason;

to be sensible, but neither transported nor cast down. He that can

put a stop to his tears and pleasures when he will is safe. It is an

equal infelicity to be either too soft or too hard: we are overcome

by the one, and put to struggle with the other. There is a certain

intemperance in that sorrow that passes the rules of modesty; and yet

great piety is, in many cases, a dispensation to good manners. The

loss of a son or of a friend, cuts a man to the heart, and there is no

opposing the first violence of his passion; but when a man comes once

to deliver himself wholly up to lamentations, he is to understand,

that though some tears deserve compassion, others are yet ridiculous. A

grief that is fresh finds pity and comfort, but when it is inveterate

it is laughed at, for it is either counterfeit or foolish. Beside that,

to weep excessively for the dead is an affront to the living. The most

justifiable cause of mourning is to see good men come to ill ends, and

virtue oppressed by the iniquity of Fortune. But in this case, too,

they either suffer resolutely, and yield us delight in their courage

and example, or meanly, and so give us the less trouble for the loss.

He that dies cheerfully, dries up my tears; and he that dies whiningly,

does not deserve them. I would bear the death of friends and children

with the same constancy that I would expect my own, and no more lament

the one than fear the other. He that bethinks himself, how often

friends have been parted, will find more time lost among the living,

than upon the dead; and the most desperate mourners are they that cared

least for their friends when they were living; for they think to redeem

their credits, for want of kindness to the living, by extravagant

ravings after the dead. Some (I know) will have grief to be only the

perverse delight of a restless mind, and sorrows and pleasures to be

near akin; and there are, I am confident, that find joy even in their

tears. But which is more barbarous, to be insensible of grief for the

death of a friend, or to fish for pleasure in grief, when a son perhaps

is burning, or a friend expiring? To forget one’s friend, to bury the

memory with the body, to lament out of measure, is all inhuman. He that

is gone either would not have his friend tormented, or does not know

that he is so: if he does not feel it, it is superfluous; if he does,

it is unacceptable to him. If reason cannot prevail, reputation may;

for immoderate mourning lessens a man’s character: it is a shameful

thing for a wise man to make the _weariness_ of grieving the _remedy_

of it. In time, the most stubborn grief will leave us, if in prudence

we do not leave that first.

But do I grieve for my friend’s sake or for my own? Why should I

afflict myself for the loss of him that is either happy or not at all

in being? In the one case it is envy, and in the other it is madness.

We are apt to say, “What would I give to see him again, and to enjoy

his conversation! I was never sad in his company: my heart leaped

whenever I met him; I want him wherever I go.” All that is to be said

is, “The greater the loss, the greater is the virtue to overcome it.”

If grieving will do no good, it is an idle thing to grieve; and if that

which has befallen one man remains to all, it is as unjust to complain.

The whole world is upon the march towards the same point; why do we

not cry for ourselves that are to follow, as well as for him that has

gone first? Why do we not as well lament beforehand for that which we

know will be, and can not possibly but be? He is not _gone_, but _sent

before_. As there are many things that he has lost, so there are many

things that he does not fear; as anger, jealousy, envy, etc. Is he not

more happy in desiring nothing than miserable in what he has lost? We

do not mourn for the absent, why then for the dead, who are effectually

no other? We have lost one blessing, but we have many left; and shall

not all these satisfactions support us against one sorrow?

The comfort of having a friend may be taken away, but not that

of having had one. As there is a sharpness in some fruits, and a

bitterness in some wines that please us, so there is a mixture in the

remembrance of friends, where the loss of their company is sweetened

again by the contemplation of their virtues. In some respects, I have

lost what I had, and in others, I retain still what I have lost. It

is an ill construction of Providence to reflect only upon my friend’s

being taken away, without any regard to the benefit of his being

once given me. Let us therefore make the best of our friends while

we have them; for how long we shall keep them is uncertain. I have

lost a hopeful son, but how many fathers have been deceived in their

expectations! and how many noble families have been destroyed by luxury

and riot! He that grieves for the loss of a son, what if he had lost a

friend? and yet he that has lost a friend has more cause of joy that

he once had him, than of grief that he is taken away. Shall a man bury

his friendship with his friend? We are ungrateful for that which is

past, in hope of what is to come; as if that which is to come would not

quickly be past too. That which is past we are sure of. We may receive

satisfaction, it is true, both from the future and what is already

past; the one by expectation, and the other by memory; only the one may

possibly not come to pass, and it is impossible to make the other not

to have been.

But there is no applying of consolation to fresh and bleeding sorrow;

the very discourse irritates the grief and inflames it. It is like an

unseasonable medicine in a disease; when the first violence is over,

it will be more tractable, and endure the handling. Those people

whose minds are weakened by long felicity may be allowed to groan and

complain, but it is otherwise with those that have led their days

in misfortunes. A long course of adversity has this good in it, that

though it vexes a body a great while, it comes to harden us at last;

as a raw soldier shrinks at every wound, and dreads the surgeon more

than an enemy; whereas a _veteran_ sees his own body cut and lamed with

as little concern as if it were another’s. With the same resolution

should we stand the shock and cure of all misfortunes; we are never the

better for our experience, if we have not yet learned to be miserable.

And there is no thought of curing us by the diversion of sports and

entertainments; we are apt to fall into relapses; wherefore we had

better overcome our sorrow than delude it.

Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · 第 23 / 26 章