Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other

countries, and states in part as follows—I am reading from Page 3 of

the English translation:

“III. Regulations regarding Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and

Finland.

“9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be

made by the OKW together with the Foreign Office and according

to the wish of the respective high commands. In case it should

become necessary during the course of the operations to grant

special rights, applications for this purpose are to be

submitted to the OKW.”

The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is also on

Page 3 of the English Translation:

“IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

“12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops,

no special authority is to be granted to the commander of the

German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure

the immediate protection of railroad transports against sabotage

and attacks.

“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,”—signed—

“Keitel.”

As was hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Number 21,

which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the

attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime,

however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign

in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks.

Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our

Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder

as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War

Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the

Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were

the basis for each entry.

I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136.

Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like at

present to read only an item which appears in the second paragraph of

Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and which is in the text

in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3

April 1941, and reads as follows:

“Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa now in about 5 weeks. All

measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be

stopped according to the Führer’s order.”

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out

to permit the Führer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of June—more

than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our series is a top-secret

report of a conference with the Chief of the Section

“Landesverteidigung” of the “Wehrmacht Führungsstab” on April 30, 1941.

I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-137.

I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this

report:

“1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Führer has decided:

“Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop

movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations

the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.

“2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa:

“Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of the

same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority; Sector

South, Russian superiority.”

Early in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations for the

attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to

issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and

missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

This timetable is Document Number C-39 in our series, and I offer it in

evidence now as Exhibit USA-138.

This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here was

the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy; Page 1

is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows:

“Top secret; Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; Nr. 44842/41

top military secret WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.); Führer’s headquarters;

for chiefs only, only through officer; 21 copies; I Op.

00845/41; received 6 June; no enclosures.

“The Führer has authorized the appended timetable as a

foundation for further preparations for Plan Barbarossa. If

alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme

Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces”—signed—

“Keitel.”

I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which indicates

where the 21 copies went.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary

that you should read all those preliminary matters at the head of these

documents, “top secret,” “only through officer,” and then the various

reference numbers and file information when you give identification of a

document.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.

The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text outlining

the state of preparations as of the 1st of June 1941. The outline is in

six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings:

General, Negotiations with friendly states, Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Camouflage.

I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual

material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with seven

columns headed from left to right at the top of each page: Date, Serial

number, Army, Air Force, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the

items appearing on this chart . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph, for that

seems to be important. There are two lines there.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The heading “General” on Page 2.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.

“1. General. The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in

the East will be put into operation on the 22d of May.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing on this chart,

in my opinion, are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10. These are at Page

8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9 it is provided in the

columns for Army, Navy, and Air Force—and I quote:

“Up to 1300 hours is latest time at which operation can be

cancelled.”

Under the column headed OKW appears the note that—and again I quote:

“Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of

start of attack by code word ‘Dortmund’.”

In the Remarks column appears the statement that:

“Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of

main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be

reckoned with.”

The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for the 22d of June, under

Serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the

Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW, and provides as follows, under the

heading:

“Invasion Day. H-Hour for the start of the invasion by the Army

and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces: 0330 hours.”

In the Remarks column, it states that:

“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting on the

part of the Air Force owing to weather.”

The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and

give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and

missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.

On 9 June 1941 the order of the Führer went out for final reports on

Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941, which was just 8 days

before D-Day. This order is signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, and

is C-78 in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence now

as Exhibit USA-139.

I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading “Conference Barbarossa”:

“1. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has

ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of Army groups,

armies, and naval and air commanders of equal rank.

“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the

Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

“3. Timetable:

“a) 1100 hours, “Silver Fox”; b) 1200 hours-1400 hours, Army

Group South; c) 1400 hours-1530 hours, lunch party for all

participants in conference; d) from 1530 hours, Baltic, Army

Group North, Army Group Center, in this order.”

It is signed by Schmundt.

There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they

will report which I shall not read. The list includes, however, a large

number of the members of the Defendant High Command and General Staff

group as of that date. Among those to participate were, of course, the

Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted from are

more than sufficient to establish conclusively the premeditation and

cold-blooded calculation which marked the military preparations for the

invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting almost a full year before the

commission of the crime, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared

every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with

all of that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be

associated with the German character. Although several of these

defendants played specific parts in this military phase of the planning

and preparation for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading

roles were performed, as we have seen, by the military figures: the

Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.

Next, preparation for plunder—plans for the economic exploitation and

spoliation of the Soviet Union.

Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely

military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning and

preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to ensure that their

aggression would prove economically profitable.

A little later in my presentation I shall discuss with the Tribunal the

motives which led these conspirators to attack, without provocation, a

neighboring power. I shall at that time show that the crime was

motivated by both political and economic considerations. The economic

basis, however, may be simply summarized at this point as the greed of

the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies

which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as

needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To these defendants

such a need was translated indubitably as a right, and they early began

planning and preparing with typical care and detail to ensure that every

bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of

their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit.

I have already put into the record evidence showing that as early as

August of 1940 General Thomas, the chief of the B Group Army, received a

hint from the Defendant Göring about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R.

which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. I also

said at that time that I would later introduce evidence that in November

1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically informed by

Göring of the planned operation in the East and preliminary preparations

were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be

occupied in the course of such operation. Göring, of course, played the

overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the

head of the Four Year Plan.

Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning at

Page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS introduced earlier

as Exhibit USA-35; the part I shall read is at Pages 10 and 11 of the

English translation:

“In November 1940 the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secretaries

of State Körner, Neumann, Backe, and General Von Hanneken were

informed by the Reich Marshal of the action planned in the East.

“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for

the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at

the end of 1940.

“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East

included first of all the following tasks:

“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament

industry, its location, its capacity, and its associate

industries.

“2. Investigation of the capacities of the different big

armament centers and their dependency one on the other.

“3. Determining the power and transport system for the industry

of the Soviet Union.

“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum

(crude oil).

“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament

industries in the Soviet Union.

“These points were concentrated in one big compilation, ‘War

Economy of the Soviet Union,’ and illustrated with detailed

maps.”—I am still quoting.—“Furthermore a card index was made

containing all the important factories in Soviet Russia and a

lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of

the German war economy organization.

“For the processing of these problems a task staff, ‘Russia,’

was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and

later on in charge of Major General Schubert. The work was

carried out according to the directives from the chief of the

office, respectively”—I suppose—“by the group of departments

for foreign territories”—Ausland—“with the co-operation of all

departments, economy offices, and any other persons possessing

information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative

activities an excellent collection of material was made which

proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the

operations and for administering the territories.”

That ends the quotation.

By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a

point where a broader plan of organization was needed, and so General

Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to

call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference, classified top

secret and dated 1 March 1941, was captured, and is our Document

1317-PS. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-140. The text of this

memorandum reads as follows:

“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be

drafted for the Reich Marshal.

“Essential Points:

“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich

Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the

Four Year Plan.

“2. The organization must include everything concerning war

economy, excepting only food which is said to be made already a

special mission of State Secretary Backe.

“3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent

of the military or civil administration. Close co-ordination,

but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.

“4. Scope of activities to be divided into two steps: a)

Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front

lines in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to

secure the removal of important goods; b) Administration of the

occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically

complementary districts.”

And then, on the bottom of Page 1:

“5. In view of the extended field of activity the term ‘war

economy inspection’ is to be used in preference to armament

inspection.

“6. In view of the great field of activity the organization must

be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly

numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of

seizing raw materials and taking over all important

exploitations. For the latter mission reliable persons from

German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning,

since successful operation from the beginning can only be

performed by the aid of their experience. (For example: lignite,

ore, chemistry, petroleum).

“After the discussion of further details Lieutenant Colonel

Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an

organization within a week.

“Close co-operation with the individual sections in the building

is essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi and

Rü with whom the operational staff can remain in constant

contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lieutenant Colonel

Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.

“Lieutenant General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the

second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are

ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to

report to the office chief at the end of the

week.—Signed—Hamann.”

Hamann, who signed the report, is listed among those attending as a

captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presumably it fell

naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the conference.

The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was

organizing at the direction of Göring was clearly recognized by Keitel

in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is Number 447-PS,

and I have already offered it in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA-135. At

that time I quoted the paragraph in the order in which it was stated

that the Führer had entrusted the uniform direction of the

administration of economy in the areas of operation and political

administration to the Reich Marshal who in turn had delegated his

authority to the Chief of the Wi Rü Amt.

The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on

28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a

conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain

the organizational set-up of the Economic Staff “Oldenburg.” Oldenburg

was the code name given to this economic counterpart of Plan Barbarossa.

A report of this conference is captured Document Number 1157-PS, and I

now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-141. Section 1 of this

memorandum deals with the general organization of Economic Staff

Oldenburg as it had developed by this time, and I should like to read

most of that section into the record. The report begins:

“Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours

on Tuesday, 29th April 1941.

“1. Welcome. Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to the

organizational structure of the economic section of the

undertaking Barbarossa-Oldenburg.

“As already known, the Führer, contrary to previous procedure,

has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand

of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal

with the overall direction of the economic administration in the

area of operations and in the areas under political

administration.

“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an Economic

General Staff working under the director of the Economic

Armament Office (Chief, Wi Rü Amt).

“Under the Reich Marshal and the Economic General Staff the

supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is

the”—and then a heading—“Economic Staff Oldenburg for special

duties under the command of Lieutenant General Schubert. His

subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided, are: 5

economic inspectorates, 23 economic commands, and 12 district

offices which are distributed among important places within the

area of the economic command.

“These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea is

that in the territory of each army group an economic

inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander

of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will

supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.

“A distinction must be made between the military rear area and

the battle area proper on the one hand, and the rear area of the

army on the other hand. In the latter, economic matters are

dealt with by the Group IV Economy”—IV Wi—“of the Army

Headquarters Command, that is, the liaison officer of the

Economic Armament Office within the Supreme Command of the Armed

Forces assigned to the Army Headquarters Command. For the battle

area he has attached to him technical battalions, reconnaissance

and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural

machinery, in particular, tractors and means of production.

“In the rear area of the Army situated between the battle and

the military rear area, Group IV Economy with the various field

commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of

the Economic Armament Office for the support of the specialists

of the Army Headquarters Command, who are responsible for

supplying the troops from the country’s resources and for

preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.

“While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates,

economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in

the locality.

“The new feature inherent in the organization under the command

of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal

with military industry but comprises the entire economic field.

Consequently all offices are no longer to be designated as

offices of the military industries or armaments but quite

generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, _et

cetera_.

“This also corresponds with the internal organization of the

individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down

to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into

three large groups, i. e. Group M, dealing with troop

requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization;

Group L, which concerns itself with all questions of feeding and

agriculture, and Group W, which is in charge of the entire field

of trade and industry, including raw materials and supplies;

further, questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy

property, commerce and exchange of commodities, and manpower

allocation.

“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and

Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within

the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General Von

Hanneken.”

The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel

and planning problems, and similar details, which I think it unnecessary

to put into the record.

These documents portray vividly the coldly calculated method with which

those Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended

victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage a

wanton attack on a neighbor to whom they had pledged security, but they

also intended to strip that neighbor of his food, his factories, and all

his means of livelihood.

As I shall point out more fully later when I discuss the question of

motivation, these men made their plans for plunder being fully aware

that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for

millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been informed by the

interpreters that I have been speaking at a great speed this morning, so

I shall try to temper the speed.

Next, the politics of destruction; preparation for the political phase

of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall develop

more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic and

political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in invading

the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of the planning

and preparations for the economic side of the aggression. Equally

elaborate planning and preparation were engaged in by the conspirators

to ensure the effectuation of the political aims of their aggression. It

is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe that political aim

as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a

powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition of Lebensraum.

For the accomplishment of this purpose the Nazi conspirators selected as

their agent the Defendant Rosenberg. As early as the 2d of April 1941

Rosenberg or a member of his staff prepared a memorandum on the U.S.S.R.

This memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement with the

U.S.S.R. which would result in a quick occupation of an important part

of that country. This memorandum then considers what the political goal

of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal.

The memorandum is Number 1017-PS in our series, and I offer it in

evidence now as Exhibit USA-142.

Beginning with the second paragraph it reads, under the subject

“U.S.S.R.”;

“A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an

extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large

section of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action

on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse

of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present

not so many military as administrative and economic

difficulties. Thus arises the first question:

“Is the occupation to be determined by purely military or

economic needs respectively, or is the laying of political

foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor

in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so,

it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to

be attained, for it will without doubt also have an effect on

military operations.

“If the political overthrow of the eastern empire, in the weak

condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of

military operations, one may conclude that:

“1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions.

“2) From the very beginning the treatment of individual sections

of territory should, in regard to administration as well as

economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are

striving to attain.

“3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas

such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for

the continuation of war against England, the maintenance of

production which this necessitates, and the great directives for

the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all

together in one place.

“It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the

arguments which follow only hold good, of course, once the

supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to

Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been

assured.

“Anyone who knows the East sees in a map of Russia’s population

the following national or geographical units:

“(a) Greater Russia, with Moscow as its center; (b) White

Russia, with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital; (c) Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania; (d) The Ukraine and the Crimea, with Kiev

as its center; (e) The Don area, with Rostov as its capital; (f)

The area of the Caucasus; (g) Russian Central Asia or Russian

Turkestan.”

The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or

geographical units in some detail, and I shall not read those pages. At

the end of the paper, however, the writer sums up his thoughts and

briefly outlines his plan. I should like to read that portion into the

record. It is at the bottom of Page 4 of the English translation under

the heading “Summary”:

“The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from

the points briefly outlined here:

“(1) The creation of a central department for the occupied areas

of the U.S.S.R. to be confined more or less to war time. Working

in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it

would be the task of this department:

“(a) To issue binding political instructions to the separate

administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at

the time and the goal which is to be achieved;

“(b) To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from

all the occupied areas;

“(c) To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out

in main outline of, the primarily important questions for all

areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport,

and the production of oil, coal, and food.

“(2) The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the

separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by

reason of political economy for the carrying out of the totally

dissimilar tasks assigned to them.

“As against this, an administrative department regulating

matters in principle and to be set up on a purely economic

basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be

inadequate and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would

be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas,

dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede

the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being

run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent

it.

“The question therefore arises whether the opinions which have

been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be

taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing

the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy.

In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of

administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of

the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally

different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of

the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which

has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that signed?

MR. ALDERMAN: It is not signed. No, Sir.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is it in the Defendant Rosenberg’s

handwriting?

MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is there anything to indicate that he wrote

it?

MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by Rosenberg or under

his authority. We captured the whole set of Rosenberg files, which

constitutes really a large library.

It is evident that the “presently envisaged administration operating on

a purely economic basis” to which this memorandum objects was the

Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already described as having been

set up under Göring and General Thomas.

Rosenberg’s statement—if this be his statement—of the political

purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it

apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Führer order, dated 20 April

1941, Rosenberg was named commissioner for the central control of

questions connected with the east European region. This order is part of

the correspondence regarding Rosenberg’s appointment, which has been

given the Number 865-PS in our series. I ask that this file, all

relating to the same subject and consisting of four letters, all of

which I shall read or refer to, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit

USA-143.

The order itself reads as follows—it is the first item on the English

translation of 865-PS:

“I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my commissioner for the

central control of questions connected with the east European

region. An office, which is to be furnished in accordance with

his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the

carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. The

necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich

Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.

“Führer’s headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Führer, signed,

Adolf Hitler; Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery,

signed, Dr. Lammers.”

This particular copy of the Führer’s order was enclosed in a letter

which Dr. Lammers wrote to the Defendant Keitel requesting his

co-operation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a deputy to

work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows—it is on the

stationery of the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery,

Berlin, 21 April 1941. I omit the salutation:

“Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Führer’s decree of the

20th of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter

Alfred Rosenberg as his commissioner for the central control

connected with the east European region. In this capacity

Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for

the probable emergency with all speed. The Führer wishes that

Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the

closest co-operation of the highest Reich authorities, receive

information from them, and summon the representatives of the

highest Reich authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee

the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be

undertaken, for the time being, only those of the highest Reich

authorities should be informed on whose co-operation

Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: The

Commissioner for the Four Year Plan”—that is Göring—“the Reich

Minister of Economics, and you yourself”—that is

Keitel—“Therefore, may I ask you in accordance with the

Führer’s wishes to place your co-operation at the disposal of

Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the carrying out of the task imposed

upon him. It is recommended in the interests of secrecy that you

name a representative in your office with whom the office of the

Reichsleiter can communicate and who, in addition to your usual

deputy, should be the only one to whom you should communicate

the contents of this letter.

“I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of

this letter.

“Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, signed, Dr. Lammers.”

In the next letter Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt of his

letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel also

writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now, the letter

to Dr. Lammers—I shall read the text:

“Dear Reich Minister:

“I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Führer’s decree in

which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his

commissioner for the central control of questions connected with

the east European region. I have named General of the Artillery

Jodl, head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my

permanent deputy, and Major General Warlimont as his deputy to

Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”

And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date:

“The head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the

Führer’s decree, by which he has appointed you his commissioner

for the central control of questions connected with the east

European region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl,

head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and his deputy,

Major General Warlimont, with the solving of these questions as

far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now

I ask you, as far as your office is concerned, to deal with them

only.”

Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler Rosenberg began

building his organization, conferring with the various ministries,

issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and

preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although

Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with

documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose,

I believe that the citation of a small number which are typical should

be sufficient for the Tribunal and the record. All of those I shall now

discuss were found in the Defendant Rosenberg’s files.

Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8 May 1941,

entitled, “General Instructions for all Reich Commissioners in the

Occupied Eastern Territories.” I offer that in evidence as Exhibit

USA-144.

In these instructions to his chief henchmen Rosenberg outlines the

political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second and third

paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of the

German, the following remarks appear:

“The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free

the German Reich from the ‘grossrussisch’ pressure for centuries

to come. This does not only correspond with German interests but

also with historical justice, for Russian imperialism was in a

position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression

almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again.

Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign

against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the

reconstruction of a great Russian empire, no matter of what

kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various

nationalities against Moscow and Leningrad have to be

scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has

been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to

correspond to the Leader’s political testament as laid down in

his book, that now the military and political threat in the East

shall be eliminated forever.

“Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its

historical and racial conditions into Reich commissions each of

which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich

Commission Eastland”—Ostland—“including White Ruthenia, will

have the task to prepare, by way of development into a

Germanized protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with

Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in

alliance with Germany, and Caucasia with the contiguous northern

territories a federal state with a German plenipotentiary.

Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future.

These general viewpoints are explained in the following

instructions for each Reich commissioner. Beyond that there are

still a few general considerations which possess validity for

all Reich commissioners.”

The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the German,

presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated robbery. It

reads:

“The German people have achieved, in the course of centuries,

tremendous accomplishments in the eastern European area. Nearly

all its land and houses were confiscated without

indemnification; hundreds of thousands (in the south on the

Volga) starved or were deported or, as in the Baltic

territories, deprived of the fruits of their cultural work

during the past 700 years. The German Reich must proclaim the

principle that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories

the former German assets are the property of the people of

Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former

individual proprietors, where the German Reich may reserve the

right (assuming that it has not already been done during

resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of

compensation and restitution of this national property will be

subject to different treatment by each Reich commission.”

Document Number 1029-PS in our series is an “Instruction for a Reich

Commissioner Ostland.” It is typical of the type of instruction which

was issued to each of the appointed commissioners (or Kommissars), and

is amazingly frank in outlining intentions of the Nazi conspirators

toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their

aggression. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit USA-145. I

should like to read into the record the first three paragraphs. It

begins:

“All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been

in close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old

history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the

races living there in a European direction and has in spite of

all Russian threats added this region to the living space of

Greater Germany.

“The aim of a Reich commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

and White Ruthenia”—last words added in pencil—“must be to

strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate and then

transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by

germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic

races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must

become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater

Germany.

“For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a

land of surplus; and the Reich commissioner must endeavor to

make this surplus once more available to the German people and,

if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of

germanizing or resettling, the Estonian people are strongly

germanized to the extent of 50 percent by Danish, German, and

Swedish blood, and can be considered as a kindred nation. In

Latvia the section capable of being assimilated is considerably

smaller than in Estonia. In this country stronger resistance

will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale

will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be

reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the immigration of

racial Germans is called for in order to promote very extensive

germanization (on the East Prussian border).”

Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting and reads

as follows:

“The task of a Reich commissioner with his seat of office in

Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one.

A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights,

built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant

influx of German blood together with Swedish elements was a

predominantly germanized land, is to be established as a mighty

German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are

available everywhere; and the German Reich will be able to

guarantee the right to a later settlement to all those who have

distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of

those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who

fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought

on in the hour of despair, and delivered Baltic civilization

from Bolshevism. For the rest the solution of the colonization

problem is not a Baltic question but one which concerns Greater

Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.”

These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot to

show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation for this

phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped

would be achieved thereby. However, on 28 June 1941, less than a week

after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his

activities since his appointment on the 20th of April. One might almost

think he had so meticulously recorded his activities in order to be of

assistance to this prosecution.

This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as

Exhibit USA-146. To me the most interesting things about this report are

its disclosures concerning the number of these defendants who worked

with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this

phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all of the

ministries and offices of both state and Party are shown to have been

involved in this operation. The report was found in the Defendant

Rosenberg’s files; and although it is rather long, it is of sufficient

importance in implicating persons, groups, and organizations, that it

must, I believe, be read in full in order that it may be made part of

the record. It is headed, “Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern

European Territories”:

“Immediately after the notification of individual supreme Reich

offices regarding the Führer’s Decree of 20.4.41 a conference

with the Chief of the OKW”—Armed Forces High Command—“took

place”—That is the Defendant Keitel—“After presentation of the

various political aims in the proposed Reich commissions and

presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of

the OKW explained that reservation”—UK-Stellung—“would be too

complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried

out best by direct assignment”—Abkommandierung—“by command of

the Chief of the OKW. General Field Marshal Keitel then issued

an appropriate command which established the basis for the

coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer

General Jodl and Major General Warlimont. The negotiations which

then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern

territory including personal needs”—relative to, I suppose it

is—“were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in

collaboration with officials of my office.

“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that

under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no

way deal with any representatives of the people of the east

European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military

intelligence required it and then to name persons to me who

could count as political personalities, over and above the

military intelligence, in order to arrange for their eventual

commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my

wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants

would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed

in accordance with my indications.

“Later on I informed General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and

Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political

conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we

agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme

Commander of the Army, respectively to the Chief Quartermaster,

and to the Army groups for questions relative to political

configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has

been done.

“Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of

Economics”—Reichswirtschaftsminister—“Funk”—the Defendant

Funk—“who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerial

Director Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then

held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic

intentions of the Economic Operational Staff East. In this

connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State

Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director

Riecke, General Schubert, and others.

“Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as

regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few

problems regarding the general relationship of the proposed

Reich ministry toward the Four Year Plan are still open and will

be subject, after submission, to the decision of the Führer. In

principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an

economic department in my office; economics would rather be

handled substantially and practically by the Reich

Marshal”—that is the Defendant Göring—“and the persons

appointed by him. However, the two responsible department heads,

namely, Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial

economy and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economy, would

be placed in my office as permanent liaison men to co-ordinate

here political aims with the economic necessities in a

department which would still have to unite with other persons

for such co-ordinating work, depending on labor conditions as

they may arise later on (political leadership of labor unions,

construction, _et cetera_).

“After notification of the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter

appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my

office. For the requested representation in the political

department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr.

Leibbrandt), the Foreign Ministry released Consul General Dr.

Bräutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian,

and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations, which if necessary

will be placed before the Führer, are under way with the Foreign

Office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its

representatives to the future Reich commissioners (or

Kommissars).

“The Propaganda Ministry”—that is Goebbels—“appointed State

Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete

agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all

political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, _et

cetera_, would be made in my office; a great number of

substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the

papers prepared by the Propaganda Ministry would be modified

here, if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda

will undisputedly be subject to the Reich Ministry of Public

Enlightenment and Propaganda. For the sake of closer

co-operation the Propaganda Ministry assigns yet another person

directly under my department, ‘Enlightenment and Press,’ and in

addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these

activities have been going on for some time, and without

attracting attention to my office in any way this co-ordination

on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

“Thorough discussions took place with Reich Minister Ohnesorge

concerning future transmission of communication and setting up

of all technical necessities in future occupied territories;

with Reich Minister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with

Reich Minister Frick”—that is the Defendant Frick—“(State

Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of

numerous necessary officials for the commissions. According to

the present estimate there will be four Reich commissions as

approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for

political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of

general commissions (24), main commissions (about 80), and

regional commissions (over 900). A general commission would

correspond to a former general government; a main commission to

a main government.

“A regional commission contains three or four

districts”—Kreise—“In view of the huge spaces that is the

minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil

government or administration. A portion of the officials has

already been requested on the basis of the above-named command

of the Chief of the OKW.”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, speaking for myself I don’t understand why

it is necessary to read this document in full. You have already shown

that there was a plan for dividing Russia up into a number of

commissions.

MR. ALDERMAN: Quite true. I should like merely to point out two of three

other individual defendants who are referred to in this document and as

to whom the document shows that they were in immediate complicity with

this whole scheme. The first of those, about three paragraphs further

down, the Reich Youth Leader—that is the Defendant Baldur Von Schirach.

Then of course Gruppenführer SS Heydrich, about the next paragraph . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not a defendant.

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. His organization is, however, if the Tribunal

please, charged as a criminal organization.

In the next paragraph, the Defendant Ministerial Director Fritzsche, who

worked under Goebbels.

Without a long discussion of further evidence I might summarize the

individual implication in this fashion. Those of the individual

defendants now on trial which this report personally involves are

Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Göring, Ribbentrop, Frick, Schirach, and

Fritzsche. The organizations involved by this report include the

following:

OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Economics, Reich

Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of

Communications, the Reich Physicians’ Union, Ministry of Munitions and

Armaments, Reich Youth Leadership, Reich Organization Leadership, German

Labor Front, the SS, the SA, and the Reich Press Chief.

At a later stage in the Trial, and in other connections, I should like

to ask the Tribunal to consider that that document with which I have

just been dealing be considered a part of the record to the extent that

it involves these individuals.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you can treat it as all being in evidence.

MR. ALDERMAN: At a later stage in the Trial and in other connections,

evidence will be introduced concerning the manner in which all of this

planning and preparation for the elimination of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics as a political factor was actually carried out. The

planned execution of intelligentsia and other Russian leaders was, for

example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy

the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection

as a European power.

Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the

Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans;

and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the

U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world Hitler issued a

proclamation on the day of the attack. The text of this statement has

already been brought to the Tribunal’s attention by my British

colleagues, and I should like merely to refer to it in passing here by

quoting therefrom this one sentence, “I have therefore today decided to

give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.”

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast—the plans

darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously

developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. These

conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this

war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.

That brings us to the consideration of the motives for the attack.

Before going into the positive reasons I should like first to point out

that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not to attack the

U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the

invasion in 1941 the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with

Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward territories of the

German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of

“Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy,”

which is our Document Number 2353-PS and which I put in evidence earlier

as Exhibit USA-35, that insofar as the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of

11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries

thereunder up to the very end.

Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made

quickly and well; and since the food and raw materials being thus

delivered were considered essential to the German economy, efforts were

made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the

campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about complying with their

obligations under that agreement. At Page 315 of his book Thomas says,

and I read from Page 9 of the English translation:

“Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as

preparations for the campaign in the East were already under

way.”

By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to Russia, not as to

what the Russians delivered.

“The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned right up

to the start of the attack; even during the last few days

transports of india-rubber from the Far East were completed by

express transit trains.”

Again at Page 404 this author brings this point out even more forcefully

when he states—and I shall read the first paragraph on Page 14 of the

English translation:

“In addition to the Italian negotiations until June 1941, the

negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of

attention.

“The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage

German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany

must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only

made grain deliveries when the Germans delivered orders placed

by the Russians and since, in the case of the individual firms,

these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill

orders for the German Armed Forces, it was necessary for the Wi

Rü office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with

German firms in order to co-ordinate Russian orders with those

of the Germans from the standpoint of priority. In accordance

with the wishes of the Foreign Office German industry was

instructed to accept all Russian orders even if it were

impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for

manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large

deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed

to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance

Commission, then however, to make such a detour during its

transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered

over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.”

Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations with

Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive intentions

toward any German territory. Our Document Number C-170, which is in

evidence as Exhibit USA-136, is as I have previously stated, a file on

Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command

covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in

this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It

will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which

include reports from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June

1941. I shall read the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English

translation; that is 4 June:

“Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia;

Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian

Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict

with Germany.”

In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says:

“6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . . . Russia will only

fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow

much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have

been made quietly—as far as can be recognized, only defensive.

Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best

possible relationship to Germany.”

The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June:

“From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow . . . all

observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are

responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to

avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the

Government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports

all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner,

support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty

with Germany proves the same thing.”

Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you.

The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union

could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt,

as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning

and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the

Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of

them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The

pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to

attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for

expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version

of an earlier imperial imperative—the “Drang nach Osten” (or the drive

to the East)—had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost

since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and

economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant the elimination

of the powerful country to the east, which might constitute a threat to

German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the economic

side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast

quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond

any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for

military purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of the German war economy for

food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness on the

economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was

experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators

the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a

political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein

Kampf_ where he stated, and I quote from Page 641 of the Houghton

Mifflin English edition, as follows:

“There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special

examination the relation of Germany to Russia: (1) Here perhaps

we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German

foreign affairs; and (2) this question is also the touchstone

for the political capacity of the young National Socialist

movement to think clearly and to act correctly.”

And again at Page 654 of the same edition:

“And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath

the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up

where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the endless German

movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the

land in the East. At long last we break off the colonial and

commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil

policy of the future.

“If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in

mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”

The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly reflected in

the stated purposes of the organization which the Defendant Rosenberg

set up to administer the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have already

discussed this material and need not repeat it now. In a speech,

however, which he delivered 2 days before the attack to the people most

interested in the problem of the East, Rosenberg re-stated in his usual

somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its

inter-relationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short

extract from that speech, which is Document Number 1058-PS and which I

now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-147. The part I read is from Page 9

of the German text:

“The job of feeding the German people stands this year, without

a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims in the East;

and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will

have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people.

We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to

feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus

territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any

feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without

any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard

years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to

determine to what extent industries can still be maintained

there (wagon factories, _et cetera_). The consideration and

execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the

German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means

negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh

necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion

of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires

the strongest characters. Perhaps this decision will also be

approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but in a 100

years.”

As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat

Great Britain had served to strengthen them further in their belief of

the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European

factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of

Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was brought out clearly in our

discussion of the organization set up under Göring and General Thomas to

carry out the economic exploitation of the territories they occupied.

The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable; and if

any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion

was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine

regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that

doubt is dispelled by a memorandum, which bears our Number 2718-PS and

which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit

USA-32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans

would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing

them of their food.

Along the similar line, on June 20, 1941 General Thomas wrote a

memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him

Hitler’s present conception of the German economic policy concerning raw

material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievably heartless theory

that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw

materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such

raw materials. This is our Document Number 1456-PS, and I offer it in

evidence as Exhibit USA-148. I should like to read the first two

paragraphs.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is now in

court. Will you stand up, please?

[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner rose in the dock._]

THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, you must

now plead either guilty or not guilty.

ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have

made myself guilty.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just put in evidence our

Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA-148. I now read from that document on

Page 17:

“The following is a new conception of the Führer, which Minister

Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on

by Field Marshal Keitel:

“I. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our

autarkical endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture

everything we lack by synthetic procedures or other measures.

For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy

to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these

autarkical endeavors demand a tremendous amount of manpower, and

it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another

way. What one does not have but needs, one must conquer. The

commitment of men which is necessary for one single action will

not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the

running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must

therefore be to secure all territories which are of special

interest to us for the war economy by conquering them.

“At the time the Four Year Plan was established I issued a

statement in which I made it clear that a completely autarkical

economy is impossible for us because the need of men will be too

great. My solution, however, has always been directed to

securing the necessary reserves for missing stocks by concluding

economic agreements which would guarantee delivery even in

wartime.”

On this macabre note I come to the end of the story of this aggression.

We have seen these conspirators as they planned, prepared, and finally

initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet Union. Others will carry

on the tale and describe the horrible manner in which they waged this

war of aggression and the countless crimes they committed in its wake.

When I consider the solemn pledge of non-aggression, the base and

sinister motives involved, the months of secret planning and

preparation, and the unbelievable suffering intentionally and

deliberately wrought—when I consider all of this, I feel fully

justified in saying that never before—and, God help us, never again—in

the history of relations between sovereign nations has a blacker chapter

been written than the one which tells of this unprovoked invasion of the

territory of the Soviet Union. For those responsible—and they are here

before you, the defendants in this case—it might be just to let the

punishment fit the crime.

I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the

aggressive-war part of the case: German collaboration with Italy and

Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant

portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under Section

IV (F) of Count One, appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the printed English

text of the Indictment. The materials relating to this unholy alliance

of the three fascist powers and to the aggressive war against the United

States have been gathered together in a document book, marked with the

letter “Q,” which I now submit to the Tribunal.

Before moving on to the subject matter of this tripartite collaboration,

I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the

significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation by

the British and American Prosecution in the past several days, we have

seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from a tightly

controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The

elements of a conspiracy that I am now about to discuss project the Nazi

plan upon a universal screen, involving the older world of Asia and the

new world of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of

aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers

of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender

ceremonies upon a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay

of Tokyo.

The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese

Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November

1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities

of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy

on 6 November 1937.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official state

documents in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The German text

of these treaties—the original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and

the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy—is to be found in Volumes

4 and 5 of the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, respectively. The

English translation of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25

November 1936 is contained in our Document 2508-PS; the English

translation of the Protocol of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937 is

contained in our Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included

in the document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal.

It is an interesting fact, especially in the light of the evidence I

shall submit regarding the Defendant Ribbentrop’s active participation

in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed the

Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany at Berlin even though at that time,

November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister but simply

Hitler’s special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27 September 1940 some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was

signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German,

Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin, a

10-year military-economic alliance. Again I note that the Defendant

Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign

Minister. The official German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese

and Italian texts together with an English translation, is contained in

our Document 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and seal

of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer in evidence

Document 2643-PS as Exhibit USA-149.

The Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and

collaboration with, one another in the establishment of a New Order in

Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into the record parts of

this far-reaching agreement:

“The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a

condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the

world be given its own proper place. They have, therefore,

decided to stand together and to co-operate with one another in

their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe,

wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a

new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and

welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of

the three Governments to extend this co-operation to such

nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to

their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that

their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may

thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany,

Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows:

“Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of

Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe.

“Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the

leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in

Greater East Asia.

“Article 3. Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in

their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to

assist one another with all political, economic, and military

means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a

power at present not involved in the European war or in the

Chinese-Japanese conflict.”

I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6.

“The present pact shall come into force immediately upon

signature and remain in force for 10 years from the date of its

coming into force.”

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to

the world that the fascist leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had

cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to

establish a New Order presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in

1931, the ruthless Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi

overflow into Austria early in 1938. I might also comment that this fact

introduces the Führerprinzip into world politics.

I should like to read in this connection a statement by Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State of the United States, at the time of the signing of

this Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official United

States publication, _Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy,

1931-1941_, which has already been put in evidence as Exhibit USA-122.

Mr. Hull’s statement is Number 184 therein. It is also our Document

Number 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German translation

thereof are included in the document books. I now quote a statement by

the Secretary of State, 27 September 1940:

“The reported agreement of alliance does not, in view of the

Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation

which has existed for several years. Announcement of the

alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long

existed in effect, and to which this Government have repeatedly

called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of

conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has

been fully taken into account by the Government of the United

States, in the determining of this country’s policies.”

That ends the quotation.

I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negotiations

leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. I shall note,

however, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship

existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact. This is the

record of the conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and

General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by

the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. This

document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, is our Document Number

2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-150. I now quote the file

memorandum:

“Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over

the following subjects:

“1) The Führer speech, which pleased him very much, especially

because it has been spiritually well founded in every respect.

“2) We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the

triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He also

told me that, together with German

counter-espionage”—Abwehr—“he was undertaking long-range

projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating

from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization

was to become effective only in case of war.

“3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending 10

Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These

Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional

Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the

frontier.”

Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the fascist

triplice, the Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic

alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to

aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and those

with whom they contemplated war. In this the conspirators pursued a

course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with

the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940 in fulfillment of

her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back”

by declaring war against France and Great Britain. These Nazi

conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other

side of the world.

As I shall show, the nations against whom the German-Japanese

collaboration was aimed at various times were the British Commonwealth

of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United

States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations in the order

named.

At least as early as 23 February 1941—on the basis of documents

available to us—these conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance

with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British

Commonwealth. Again the figure of the Defendant Ribbentrop appears. On

that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima,

the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese

open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as

possible.

The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already been

offered in connection with the presentation of the case on aggression

against the Soviet Union as Exhibit USA-129. A part of it has already

been read into the record and I now intend to read other portions. I

shall again come back to this document when dealing with the

German-Japanese collaboration as regards the United States.

As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation, Ribbentrop

on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to

his various ambassadors and ministers for their strictly confidential

and purely personal information with the further note that—and I quote:

“These statements are of fundamental significance for

orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in

early spring 1941.”

I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation of

1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that page, and then skip

to the last three sentences of the second paragraph:

“Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign

Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.

“After particularly cordial mutual greetings the RAM (Reich

Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been

proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in

the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in

the West these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the

RAM)”—that is Ribbentrop—“regretted that the alliance between

Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the

ambassador for many years already, had come into being only

after various detours; but public opinion in Japan had not been

ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are

together now.”

Then, skipping:

“Now that the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded,

Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the

Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of

its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the

situation in this respect?”

Ribbentrop, thereafter in the conference, proceeded to shape the

argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining

the intended air and U-boat warfare by Germany against England, he

said—and I now quote the last two sentences in Paragraph 4, on Page 2,

of the English translation:

“Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape

overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,

however, depends on various factors, above all on weather

conditions.”

And then skipping and picking up at the first full paragraph on Page 3

of the English translation, I quote the Defendant Ribbentrop again:

“The Führer will beat England wherever he encounters her.

Besides, our strength is not only equal but superior to a

combined English-American air force at any time. The number of

pilots at our disposal is unlimited. The same is true of our

airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned,

ours always has been superior to the English—to say nothing

about the American—and we are on the way to enlarge even this

lead. Upon order of the Führer the antiaircraft defense, too,

will be greatly reinforced. Since the Army has been supplied far

beyond its requirements and enormous reserves have been piled

up—the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the

immense stock of material—production now will be concentrated

on submarines, airplanes, and antiaircraft guns.

“Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won

today, militarily, economically, and politically. We have the

desire to end the war quickly, and to force England to sue for

peace soon. The Führer is vigorous and healthy, fully convinced

of victory, and determined to bring the war as quickly as

possible to a victorious close. To this end the cooperation with

Japan is of importance. However, Japan, in her own interest,

should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s

key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would

thus secure her position in the Far East, a position which she

could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for

quick action:

“1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the

center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser warfare,

_et cetera_). The effect upon the morale of the British people

would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick

ending of the war.

“2) A surprise intervention by Japan is bound to keep America

out of the war. America, which at present is not yet armed and

would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks west of

Hawaii, could then less likely do this. If Japan would otherwise

respect the American interests, there would not even be the

possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige

to make war plausible to the Americans. It is very unlikely that

America would declare war if she then would have to stand by

helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America

being able to do anything about it.

“3) In view of the coming New World Order it seems to be in the

interest of Japan also to secure for herself, even during the

war, the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time

of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed entirely with this

line of thought and said that he would do everything to carry

through this policy.”

I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop’s

argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already

practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless he suggested that the

war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and

that the moment was propitious for Japan’s entry. Then referring to the

spoils of the conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to

pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying

that she would have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent

of that statement I read to you earlier from the Führer, that “those who

wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking.”

Continuing Ribbentrop’s argument to show the real nature of the

German-Japanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs on

Page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS:

“The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was

Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the

Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had

been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of

influence in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has

brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great

advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the

Far East (Indo-China). England, too, was considerably weakened;

Japan had been able to close unsteadily on Singapore. Thus,

Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the

future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical

situation, we should have to carry the main burden of the final

battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia

should arise, we should have to carry the main burden also in

this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find

herself confronted by a world coalition within a short time. We

would all be in the same boat. The fate of both nations would be

determined for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy.

The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A

defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese

imperialistic idea.

“Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and

emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep her

imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the

great problems which would arise after the war for the parties

of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in

Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a

bold solution. Thereby no over-centralization should take place;

but a solution should be found on a basis of parity,

particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich

Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of

trade should take place between the two spheres of influence on

a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the

leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East Asian sphere of

interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for

example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements

directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere

as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and

make trade agreements with the independent countries within the

Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China,

_et cetera_. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres,

each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with

regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with

this thought.”

In the document I have just quoted from we have seen the instigation to

war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall

return to him again in this connection.

I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called military

representatives in the encouragement and provocation of further wars of

aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document Number C-75 as

Exhibit USA-151.

This document is a top-secret order signed by the Defendant Keitel as

Chief of the OKW and entitled, “Basic Order Number 24 regarding

Collaboration with Japan.” It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a

half after Ribbentrop’s conference with Oshima that I have just

discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of

the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. We have

turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten

notations, presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have

introduced, is copy Number 2 of the order distributed to the naval war

staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy

number 4, designed for the Wehrmacht Führungsstab (the Operations Staff

of the High Command of the Armed Forces). The head of this Operations

Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy Number 4 was found in the OKW files

at Flensburg. It is our Document Number 384-PS, and was referred to by

the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. I shall not

burden the Tribunal and the record by introducing two identical copies

of the same order.

Basic Order Number 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration

with Japan. I shall, therefore, propose to read it in its entirety, some

two pages of English translation:

“The Führer has issued the following order regarding

collaboration with Japan:

“1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three

Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, _to take active

measures in the Far East_”—The underscoring is in the original

document—“Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and

the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of

America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she

intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for

Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on

the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will

create particularly favorable political and military

prerequisites for this.”

Then there is a marginal note, “Slightly exaggerated.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put

in?

MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of

the order.

THE PRESIDENT: By whom?

MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order,

which was the naval war staff.

“2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to

strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means

available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of

the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous

manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German

war and combat experience, and for assistance in military

economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable,

but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations.

Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests

which would have the most immediate application in waging war.

In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions for himself.

“3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties

is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be

subject to the following guiding principles:

“a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as

forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the

United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no

political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which

would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese

intentions.

“b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile

warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong

Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every

opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be

exploited.

“c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that

Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it

needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United

States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even

after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital

importance to Germany.

“d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the

Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of

war of the three powers.

“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval

power—extending to those of American naval power only if the

entry of the United States into the war cannot be

prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power

in that region and also, just like the attack on sea

communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds

(Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions

cannot yet be fixed.

“4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with

the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with

as equally concern the three participating powers. These will

include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working

out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission

with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command.

“5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the

Barbarossa operations.”

It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution list, you will see that

it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed Forces High Command:

Joint Operation Staff, Intelligence divisions, and to the chief of

foreign affairs, simultaneously for the Foreign Office.

It appears from what I have just read that the Nazis’ cardinal

operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as March

1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other

British far eastern bases. I shall pass over, for the moment, other

references to the United States in Basic Order Number 24 and take up

that point later.

I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which has already been

introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB-122. This document

is the top-secret record of a meeting on 18 March 1941, about 2 weeks

after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24; a meeting attended by

Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant

Jodl. We are concerned only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where

Raeder, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,

since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up

of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war

against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet in

comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making

preparations for this action; but according to all declarations

made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany

proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore,

concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act

immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic

questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved

(Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She

can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as

possible.”

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff

conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the

activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge

their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence

in that paragraph:

“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but

according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she

will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England.”

Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to

eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the

contract.

I now turn to further efforts by the Defendant Ribbentrop to induce the

Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of

March 1941 he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was

then in Berlin. A report of their conversations found in the German

Foreign Office archives is contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I

now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-152.

Relevant portions of this document have been translated into English. I

shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English translation:

“The RAM”—that is Ribbentrop—“resumed, where they had left

off, the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s

impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the

opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole

situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too

far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing

was certain, however, namely that Germany would strike

immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to

give Matsuoka this positive assurance so that Japan could push

forward to the south on Singapore without fear of possible

complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army

was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich anyway and fully

prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however,

believed that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to

war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia,

the U.S.S.R. would be finished off within a few months. In this

case Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid

than ever, if she wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently,

she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of

possible fears of Russia.

“He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would

develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify

his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM)

wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case that a conflict with

Russia was at least within the realm of possibility. In any

case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon

his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was

impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a

conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be

considered possible.”

I now skip five pages of the German text and continue directly with the

English translation:

“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view

of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by

submarines based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of

the British Mediterranean and home fleets, he had again

discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder. The latter had

stated that the British Navy during this year would have its

hands so full in the English home waters and in the

Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single

ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the

United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother

about them at all.

“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very

low estimate of the threat from the British Navy. It also held

the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it

would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it

was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with

their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might

perhaps be dragged out to 5 years. This possibility caused

considerable worry in Japan.

“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against

Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this

reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on

active measures against Japan. For while on the one hand he

could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand

there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan;

for the American President, of course, this would mean a

considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate

rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

“In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing

everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as

if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of

England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his

attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words

and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He

assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British,

but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American

elements in Japan just so long, until one day he would suddenly

open the attack on Singapore.

“In this connection Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based

on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against

Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow.

(‘Nothing succeeds like success,’ the RAM remarked.) He followed

here the example expressed in the words of a famous Japanese

statesman addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the

Russo-Japanese war: ‘You open fire, then the nation will be

united.’ The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all,

as an Oriental, he believed in the fate which would come,

whether you wanted it or not.”

I then skip again in the German text, and continue with what appears in

the English translation:

“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in

the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to

him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written

promise of assistance.

“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions

with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of

Singapore in order that the Führer—who probably must be

considered the greatest expert on military questions at the

present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack

against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would

be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their

European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of

dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British

Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to

disappear from Singapore immediately.

“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the

British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.

“The RAM replied that here, too, the Führer had developed new

methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions,

such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could

make available to the Japanese.

“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger

expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his,

were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces would need 3

months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign

Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could

stave off any danger which threatened from America for 6 months.

If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time

and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year,

the situation with America would become extremely critical; and

he did not know as yet how to meet it.

“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East

Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on

this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be

brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.