That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders

and to the High Command of Germany can be seen by the next document,

which is Document PS-375 in the bundle. It is already an exhibit,

USA-84, and has been referred to many times already. May I just

refer—or remind the Tribunal—to one sentence or two. The document

comes into existence on the 25th of August 1938 at the time when the

Czechoslovakian drama was unfolding, and it was uncertain at that time

whether there would be war with the Western Powers. It is top secret,

prepared by the 5th section of the General Staff of the German Air

Force. The subject: “Extended Case Green—Estimate of the Situation.”

Probably the more correct words would be: “Appreciation of the Situation

with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some staff officer

had been asked to prepare this appreciation. In view of the fact that it

has been read before, I think I need only read the last paragraph which

is Paragraph H and it comes at the bottom of Page 6, the last page but

one of the document. Now H, “Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command,

Army and Navy”. This, you see, was an appreciation addressed by an Air

Force staff officer. So these are requests to the Army and Navy. And

then if one turns over the page, Number 4:

“Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent

an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war

against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is

held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the

conditions under which an occupation of this area could be

carried out and how long it would take. And in this case it

would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great

Britain.”

The point that the Prosecution desires to make on that document is that

it is apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this, and

assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German nation and the

High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the fact that

Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium. They are

recommending it as a militarily advantageous thing to do, strong in the

knowledge that if the commanders and the Führer agree with that view

treaties are to be completely ignored. Such, I repeat, was the honor of

the German Government and of their leaders.

Now in March of 1939 as has been proved, the remainder of Czechoslovakia

was peacefully annexed; and then came the time for further guarantees in

the next document, the assurances—TC-35 and 39—which were given to

Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939.

Those have been read by my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones. They bear

the number GB-78. I need not read them again.

There is also a guarantee to Luxembourg, which is on the next page,

TC-42 (a). That was given in the same speech by Hitler in the Reichstag

where Hitler was dealing with a communication from Mr. Roosevelt who was

feeling a little uneasy on the other side of the Atlantic as to Hitler’s

intentions. May I, before I read this document, say that I believe the

Tribunal will be seeing a film of the delivery by Hitler of this part of

this speech; and you will have the privilege of seeing Hitler in one of

his jocular moods, because this was greeted and was delivered in a

jocular vein. And you will see in the film that the Defendant Göring who

sits above Hitler in the Reichstag appreciates very much the joke, the

joke being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany

could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors—and that was the

point of the joke that everybody appears to have appreciated very much.

Now, if I may read this document:

“Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an

assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the

territory or possessions of the following independent nations

and above all that they will not march into them. And he goes on

to name the following as the countries in question:

“Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,

Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal,

Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary,

Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia,

Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.

“Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the

case of the countries listed firstly, whether they feel

themselves threatened and secondly, and particularly, whether

this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result

of a démarche by them or at least with their consent.

“The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the

form of a blunt rejection. Actually this counter-question of

mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations

listed, since they are not at present in possession of their

liberty (as for instance Syria) but are occupied by the military

forces of democratic states and therefore deprived of all their

rights.

“Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany

have received much more binding assurances and above all much

more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his

peculiar telegram.”

You will see that although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is

suggesting in the presence, certainly, of the accused Göring as being

quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling against her

neighbors. But the hollow falsity of that and the preceding guarantee is

shown by the next document. May I put this document, TC-42 (a) in as

Exhibit GB-101.

The next document (L-79) which is Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May

has been referred to many times and is Exhibit USA-27. Therefore I need

only very shortly remind the Tribunal of two passages. First of all, on

the first page it is interesting to see who was present: The Führer,

Göring, Admiral Raeder, Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, and various

others who are not accused. Colonel Warlimont was there. He, I

understand, was Jodl’s deputy.

Well now, the purpose of the conference was an analysis of the

situation. Then may I refer to the third page down at the bottom. The

stencil number is 819:

“What will this struggle be like?”

And then these words:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed

force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

Then, at the bottom:

“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,

we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at

securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee.”

There is that decision made, “Declarations of neutrality must be

ignored,” and there is the Grand Admiral present, and there is the Air

Minister and Chief of the German Air Force, and there is General Keitel

present. They all appear, and all their subsequent actions show that

they acquiesced in that: Give your word and then break it. That is their

code of honor. And you will see that at the end of the meeting, the very

last page—the stencil number is 823—Field Marshal Göring asked one or

two questions.

There was the decision of the 23rd of May. Is it overstating the matter

to submit that any syllable of guarantee, any assurance given after that

is just purely hypocrisy, is just the action—apart from the

multiplicity of the crimes here—of the common criminal?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, I think we would like you so far as possible

to confine yourself to the document.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord, then we go to the 22d of August, 798-PS. That

has already been put in and is Exhibit USA-29. My Lord, that was

Hitler’s speech of the 22d of August. It has been read and re-read. I,

My Lord, refer only to one passage, and that is at the bottom of the

second page:

“Attack from the west from the Maginot Line: I consider this

impossible.

“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and

Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well

as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available

means.”

My Lord, I desire to emphasize the next sentence:

“England and France will not violate the neutrality of these

countries.”

Then I desire to comment: I ask Your Lordship to bear that sentence in

mind, that correct prophecy, when remembering the excuses given for the

subsequent invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands.

My Lord, the next documents are TC-36, 40, and 42. Those are three

assurances. Number 36 is by the Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian

Government:

“In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am

expressly instructed by the head of the German Reich to transmit

to Your Majesty the following communication:

“Though the German Government are at present doing everything in

their power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at

issue between the Reich and Poland, they nevertheless desire to

define clearly here and now the attitude which they propose to

adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become

inevitable.

“The German Government are firmly determined to abide by the

terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October

13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no

circumstances impair the inviolability and integrity of Belgium

and will at all times respect Belgian territory. The German

Government renew this undertaking, however, in the expectation

that the Belgian Government for their part will observe an

attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no

violations on the part of a third power, but that on the

contrary, she will oppose it with all the forces at her

disposal. It goes without saying that if the Belgian Government

were to adopt a different attitude the German Government would

naturally be compelled to defend their interests in conformity

with the new situation thus created.”

My Lord, may I make one short comment on the last part of that document?

I submit it is clear that the decision having been made to violate the

neutrality, as we know, those last words were put in to afford some

excuse in the future.

That document will be Exhibit GB-102.

My Lord, TC-40, the next document, is a similar document communicated to

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, the 26th of

August 1939. Subject to the Tribunal’s direction, I don’t think I need

read it. It is a public document in the German document book, and it has

exactly the same features.

That will be Exhibit GB-103.

Then My Lords, TC-42, the next document (Exhibit GB-104) is a similar

document relating to Luxembourg. That is dated the 26th of August, the

same day. I am not certain; it has two dates. I think it is the 26th of

August. My Lords, that is in the same terms a complete guarantee with

the sting in the tail as in the other two documents. Perhaps I need not

read it.

My Lords, as the Tribunal knows, Poland was occupied by means of the

lightning victory; and in October German Armed Forces were free for

other tasks. The first step that was taken so far as the Netherlands and

Belgium are concerned is shown by the next document, which is, I think,

in as GB-80; but the two central portions refer to Belgium and the

Netherlands. It is the next document in Your Lordships’ bundle: Number

4.

THE PRESIDENT: TC-32?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. It begins with TC-32, and then if you go to the next

one, My Lords will see TC-37 on the same page—and then TC-41; both 37

and 41 refer to this matter. Now, this is a German assurance on the 6th

of October 1939:

“Belgium.

“Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I

tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any

revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any

demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in

Belgium as a threat.”

My Lord, there is a similar assurance to the Netherlands—the next part

of the document:

“The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional

friendship with the Netherlands. It has not taken over any

existing differences between the two countries and has not

created any new ones.”

I submit it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of those

assurances of Germany’s good faith.

My Lord, the value of that good faith is shown by the next document

which is of the very next day, the 7th of October. Those two guarantees

were the 6th of October. Now we come to Document 2329-PS dated the 7th

of October. It is from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von

Brauchitsch, and it is addressed to his Army groups. He said, third

paragraph:

“The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.

“At the same time Army Group B has to make all preparations

according to special orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and

Belgian territory if the political situation so demands.”

“If the political situation so demands”—the day after the guarantee!

It is quite clear from the next document. I put in the last document;

that bears an original typewritten signature of Von Brauchitsch, and it

will be Exhibit GB-105.

My Lord, the next document is in two parts. Both are numbered C-62. The

first part is dated the 9th of October 1939, 2 days after the document I

have read. My Lord, that was all read by the Attorney General in opening

down to the bottom of Paragraph (b). Therefore, I won’t read it again.

May I remind the Tribunal just of one sentence.

“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the

northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of

Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This attack must be

carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible.”

In the next paragraph, may I just read six words:

“The object of this attack is . . . to acquire as great an area

of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as possible.”

That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the three

accused: The Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and

Air Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Göring. That appears

from the distribution.

I will hold that document over and will put that other one in with it.

My Lord, the next document is the 15th of October 1939. It is from the

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It is signed by Keitel in what is

to some of us his familiar red pencil signature, and it is again

addressed to Raeder and Göring and to the General Staff of the Army.

Now that also has been read by the Attorney General; may I just remind

the Tribunal that at the bottom of the page:

“It must be the object of the Army’s preparations to occupy—on

receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland in the

first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas”—or Meuse—“line”.

The second paragraph deals with taking possession of the West Frisian

Islands.

It is clear, in my submission, beyond discussion that from that moment

the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been

made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the

weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that

Germany’s word was about to be broken again. Otherwise these small

countries might have had some chance of combining among themselves and

with their neighbors.

It will be Exhibit GB-106.

Well, the next document is a Keitel directive. It is Document 440-PS

(Exhibit GB-107). It, again, is sent to the Supreme Command of the Army,

the Navy, and the Air Force; and it gives details of how the attack is

to be carried out. I want to read only a very few selected passages.

Paragraph 2 on the first page:

“Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended

against Holland may be carried out without a special order when

the general attack will start.

“The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be anticipated

ahead of time.”

And then may I comment here: Would Your Lordship note this as a German

concession?

“Wherever there is no resistance the entry should carry the

character of a peaceful occupation.”

Then Paragraph (b) of the next paragraph:

“At first the Dutch area including the West Frisian Islands

. . . is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.”

The next two paragraphs, I need not read them, deal with action against

the Belgian harbor; and in Paragraph 5):

“The 7th Airborne Division”—they were parachutists—“will be

committed for the airborne operation after the possession of

bridges across the Albert Canal”—which is in Belgium as the

Court knows—“is assured.”

And then in Paragraph 6) (b) Luxembourg is mentioned. It is mentioned in

Paragraph 5) as well. The signature is “Keitel,” but that is typed. It

is authenticated by a staff officer.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that document in?

MR. ROBERTS: GB-107, My Lord.

Then the next document is C-10 (Exhibit GB-108) and it is dated the 28th

of November 1939. That is a signature of Keitel in his red pencil and it

is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It deals with the fact

that if a quick break-through should fail north of Liége—I think, My

Lord, only machinery for carrying out the attack.

Paragraph 2) shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It

speaks of “the occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing,” and

the “taking of one or more of the Meuse crossings between Namur and

Dinant.”

That will be 108.

My Lord, the documents show that from November until March of 1940 the

High Command and the Führer were waiting for favorable weather before

A-Day, as they called it. That was the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium,

and the Netherlands.

My Lord, the next document, C-72, consists of 18 documents which range

in date from the 7th of November until the 9th of May 1940. They are

certified photostats I put in and they are all signed either by Keitel

personally or by Jodl personally, and I don’t think it is necessary for

me to read them. The Defense, I think, have all had copies of them, but

they show that successively A-Day is being postponed for about a week,

having regard to the weather reports. That will be Exhibit GB-109.

My Lord, on the 10th of January 1940, as the Attorney General informed

the Tribunal, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The

occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in

possession, but they were only partially successful. And the next

document I offer is Document TC-58 (a); it will be Exhibit GB-110. The

original is a photostat certified by the Belgian Government which, of

course, came into possession of the original.

My Lord, I can summarize it. They are orders to the Commander of the 2d

Air Force Fleet (Luftflotte) clearly for offensive action against

France, Holland, and Belgium. One looks at the bottom of the first page.

It deals with the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army

covers the Liége-Antwerp Line with its main force, its lighter forces in

front of the Meuse-Schelde Canal. Then it deals with the disposition of

the Dutch Army; and then if you turn over the page Number 3, you see

that the German western army directs its attack between the North Sea

and the Moselle with the strongest possible airforce support through the

Belgian-Luxembourg region.

My Lord, I think I need read no more. The rest are operational details

as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland.

My Lord, the next document I think is rather out of place for my

purpose. My learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, put in Jodl’s diary,

which is GB-88, and I desire to refer very, very briefly to some

extracts which are printed first in bundle Number 4.

If one looks at the entry for the 1st of February 1940 and then some

lines down . . .

THE PRESIDENT: 1809-PS?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that’s right, My Lord, and GB-88.

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got the GB numbers on the documents.

MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry, My Lord, it’s my mistake.

If Your Lordship will look about eight lines down it says, “1700 hours

General Jeschonnek”—and then:

“1) Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have

to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute

force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.

“2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent

action against the Dutch Air Force.”

My Lord, I think the rest I need not read; it is operational detail.

“2d February”—I refer again to Jodl’s entry under “a” as to “landings

can be made in the center of The Hague.”

If Your Lordship will turn over the page—I omit February the 5th—you

come to 26th February:

“Führer raises the question whether it is better to undertake

the Weser Exercise before or after Case Yellow.”

And then on the 3rd of March, the last sentence:

“Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow

with a few days’ interval.”

And then My Lord, there is an entry to which I desire to call Your

Lordship’s attention, on May the 8th, that is, 2 days before the

invasion—the top of the page:

“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs,

evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures. According

to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked

for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.”

My Lord, may I make two short comments on that? The first is that the

Germans are rather objecting because the Dutch are actually making some

preparations to resist their invasion: “Alarming news” as they wrote.

The second point is that Jodl is there recording that the Dutch

according to their intelligence reports are still adhering properly to

their neutrality. But I need not read any more of the diary extracts.

My Lord, that is the story except for the documents which were presented

to Holland and to Belgium and to Luxembourg after the invasion was a

_fait accompli_, because as history now knows at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th

of May these three small countries were violently invaded with all the

fury of modern warfare. No warning was given to them by Germany and no

complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of any neutrality before

this action was taken.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a convenient place to break off

until 2 o’clock.

MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship pleases.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, when the Court adjourned I had

just come to the point at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th of May 1940 when the

Germans invaded these three small countries without any warning—a

violation which, the Prosecution submits, it is clear from the documents

had been planned and decided upon months before.

My Lord, before I close this part of the case, may I refer to three

documents in conclusion. My Lord, the invasion having taken place at

4:30 in the morning in each of the three countries, the German

Ambassadors called upon representatives of the three governments some

hours later and handed in a document which was similar in each case and

which is described as a memorandum or an ultimatum. My Lord, an account

of what happened in Belgium is set out in our Document TC-58, which is

about five documents from the end of the bundle. It is headed, “Extract

from Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened 1939-1940,” and I

hand in an original copy, certified by the Belgian Government, which is

Exhibit GB-111.

My Lord, might I read short extracts? I read the third paragraph:

“From 4:30 a.m. information was received which left no shadow of

doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the

east. At 5 o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands’

airdromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of

German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the

Jemelle station.”

My Lord, then I think I can go to two paragraphs lower down:

“At 8:30 a.m. the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began

to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak”—that is the Belgian

Minister—“stopped him: ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I

will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the

Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army

has just attacked our country. This is the second time in 25

years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a

neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps

even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no

note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the

Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium

has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by

her on October 13th 1937 and renewed spontaneously at the

beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany

for which there is no justification whatever will deeply shock

the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held

responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself.

Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished.’”

Then I think I shall omit the next paragraph: “The Ambassador read the

note . . . .” And in the last paragraph:

“In the middle of this communication M. Spaak, who had by his

side the Secretary-General, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me

the document,’ he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a

task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to

pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had

just made.”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read what the Ambassador

read.

MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry. I was thinking of the next document I was going

to read. I read the last paragraph on the first page:

“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought:

“‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to

make the following declaration:

“‘In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and

Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making

preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the

Reich are compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three

countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose the

Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the

greatest size so that resistance of any kind will be useless.

The Government of the Reich guarantee Belgium’s European and

colonial territory as well as her dynasty on condition that no

resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium

will risk the destruction of her country and the loss of her

independence. It is, therefore, in the interests of Belgium that

the population be called upon to cease all resistance and that

the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make

contact with the German Military Command.’”

My Lord, the so-called ultimatum handed in some hours after the invasion

had started is Document TC-57, which is the last document but three in

the bundle. It is the document I handed in and it becomes Exhibit

GB-112. My Lord, it is a long document and I will read to the Tribunal

such parts as the Tribunal thinks advisable:

“The Reich Government”—it begins—“have for a long time had no

doubts as to what was the chief aim of British and French war

policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other

countries and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and

mercenary troops for England and France.

“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy

Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new

front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last

minute action which upset this project. Germany has furnished

documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.

“Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia

miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war

expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the

retreat . . . from Norway was still going on, the English Prime

Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in

Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead

with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to the

Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on

the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center

of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over

the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before

their own people and before the world, and partly to make it

appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of

war against Germany.

“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the

Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another

purpose. It was nothing but a diversion maneuver in grand style

to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next

English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government have long

been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully

prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the

West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region

of the Ruhr.

“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of

Belgium and Holland, it being, of course, understood that these

two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England

and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.

“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, do you think it is necessary to read this in

full?

MR. ROBERTS: No, I don’t. I was going to summarize these charges. If

your Lordship would be good enough to look at the bottom of the first

page, you will see the so-called ultimatum complaining of the hostile

expressions in the Belgian and Netherlands press; and then, My Lord, in

the second paragraph over the page there is an allegation of the

attempts of the British Intelligence to bring a revolution in Germany

with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands.

Then, My Lord, in Paragraph 3 reference is made to military preparation

of the two countries; and in Paragraph 4 it is pointed out that Belgium

has fortified the Belgian-German frontier.

A complaint is made in regard to Holland in Paragraph 5 that British

aircraft have flown over the Netherlands’ country.

There are, My Lord, other charges made against the neutrality of these

two countries although no instances are given. I don’t think I need

refer to anything on Page 3 of the document.

Page 4, My Lord—I would like, if I might, to read the middle paragraph:

“In this struggle for existence, forced upon the German people

by England and France, the Reich Government are not disposed to

await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow

them to carry the war over Belgium and the other Netherlands

into German territory.”

And, My Lord, I just emphasize this sentence and then I read no further:

“They have, therefore, now issued the command to German troops

to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military

means at the disposal of the Reich.”

My Lord, it is unnecessary, in my submission, to emphasize the falsity

of that statement. The world now knows that for months preparations had

been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This

document is saying the orders to do so have now been issued.

My Lord, a similar document, similar in terms altogether was handed to

the representatives of the Netherlands Government; My Lord, TC-60—that

will be GB-113, which is the last document but one in the bundle. My

Lord, that is a memorandum to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed

with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and

the Netherlands.

My Lord, I only desire to emphasize the second paragraph of TC-60:

“In defense against the imminent attack the German troops have

now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two

countries . . . .”

My Lord, the last document, TC-59, which I formerly put in, that is

GB-111.

My Lord, that is the dignified protest of the Belgian Government against

the crime which was committed against her. My Lord, those are the facts

supporting the charges of the violation of treaties and assurances

against these three countries and supporting the allegation of the

making of an aggressive war against them. My Lord, in the respectful

submission of the Prosecution here the story is a very plain, a very

simple one, a story of perfidy, dishonor, and shame.

COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it

please the Tribunal, it is my task to present the evidence on the wars

of aggression and wars in breach of treaties against Greece and

Yugoslavia. The evidence which I shall put in to the Tribunal has been

prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Lieutenant Colonel

Krucker.

The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place

in the early hours of the morning of the 6th of April 1941, constituted

direct breaches of the Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific

Settlement of International Disputes and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of

1928. Those breaches are charged, respectively, at Paragraphs I and XIII

of Appendix C of the Indictment. Both have already been put in by my

learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who also explained the

obligation of the German Government to the Governments of Yugoslavia and

Greece under those pacts.

In the case of Yugoslavia the invasion further constituted a breach of

an express assurance by the Nazis, which is charged at Paragraph XXVI of

Appendix C. This assurance was originally given in a German Foreign

Office release made in Berlin on the 28th of April 1938 but was

subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on the 6th of October 1939 in a

speech he made in the Reichstag, and it is in respect of this last

occasion that the assurance is specifically pleaded in the Indictment.

May I ask the Tribunal to turn now to the first document in the document

book, which is Book Number 5. The first document is 2719-PS, which is

part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-58.

This is the text of the German Foreign Office release on the 28th of

April 1938, and I would read the beginning and then the last paragraph

but one on the page:

“Berlin, the 28th of April 1938. The State Secretary of the

German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.

“As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich we

have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland,

Liechtenstein and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as

final and inviolable. On this point the following special

declarations have been made . . . .”

And then to the last paragraph:

“3. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have been informed by

authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims

beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case

remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on the 3rd of April

of that year the Führer and Chancellor stated that in regard to

the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the

same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there

which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military

protection for them.”

Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book, TC-92,

and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a speech made

by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of

Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the extract in full:

“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a

spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of

the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier then

learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent.

I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual

respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural, and

economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’

present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and

at the same time, on that account we derive from it the hope

that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop

in the future and to grow ever closer.

“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also

perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange

of views which—and of this I am convinced—in this sense can

only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this

all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship

of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events

we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all

time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two

peoples and countries but can also represent an element of calm

to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who

are disposed to perform really constructive work.”

As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already

decided upon the European war. I think I am right in saying it was a

week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known as the Schmundt note,

to which the Tribunal has been referred more than once. The reference to

“nerve-racked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of

nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months.

Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Paragraph XXVI

as the assurance breached; it is the next document in the bundle,

TC-43—German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of October 1939. It is

part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-80.

This is an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_:

“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed

Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would

also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in

peace and friendship with her.”

Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899 and the

Kellogg-Briand Pact and under the assurances which I have read, the fate

of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know, been sealed ever

since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ciano

at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of August 1939.

We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77. That

document has already been put in as GB-48; and the passages to which I

would draw Your Lordship’s attention already have been quoted, I think,

by my learned friend, the Attorney General. Those passages are on Page 2

in the last paragraph from “Generally speaking . . .” until “. . .

neutral of this kind,” and then again on Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted

by the Attorney General and emphasized particularly by Colonel

Griffith-Jones at the foot of Page 7 on the second day of the meeting,

the words beginning “In general, however, success by one of the Axis

partners . . .” to “. . . Italy and Germany would have their backs free

for work against the West.”

Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might sum up

the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as a whole, it

shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only 2 months after the

dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade the Italians to make

war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany commences hostilities

against Poland, as Hitler had decided to do in the very near future.

Ciano, while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as

to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to

secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general

European war.

Despite all the persuasion which Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop

exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to

reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy

maintained her position and did not enter the war when the Germans

invaded Poland, while the Germans themselves were not yet ready to

strike in the Balkans. It was just for this reason that on the 6th of

October through Hitler’s speech they repeated the assurance they had

given in April 1938. It is, of course, a matter of history that after

the defeat of the Allied armies in May and June 1940 the Italian

Government declared war on France and that subsequently at 3 o’clock in

the morning of the 28th October 1940 the Italian Minister at Athens

presented the Greek Government with a 3 hours’ ultimatum upon the expiry

of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.

If I may quote to the Tribunal the words in which His Majesty’s Minister

reported that event, “The President of the Council has assured himself

an outstanding . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: You have referred to a document?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not in any of my documents. It is merely carrying

the story to the next document:

“The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding

place in Greek history, and whatever the future may bring, his

foresight in quietly preparing his country for war, and his

courage in resisting without demur the Italian ultimatum when

delivered in the small hours of that October morning will surely

obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft.

He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated, and this

reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”

I turn now to the next document in the bundle. That is 2762-PS, a letter

from Hitler to Mussolini, which I put in as GB-115. Although not dated,

I think it is clear from the contents that it was written shortly after

the Italian invasion of Greece. It has been quoted in full by the

Attorney General, but I think it would assist the Tribunal if I read

just the last two paragraphs of the extract:

“Yugoslavia must become disinterested if possible, however, from

our point of view interested in co-operating in the liquidation

of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is

useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.

“Unfortunately I must stress the fact that waging a war in the

Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore any threatening

move towards Yugoslavia would be useless since the impossibility

of a materialization of such threats before March is well known

to the Serbian General Staff. Therefore Yugoslavia must, if at

all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.”

You may think the reference in the first two lines to his

thoughts—having been with Mussolini for the last 14 days—probably

indicates that it was written in about the middle of November, shortly

after the Italian attack.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Italian attack?

COL. PHILLIMORE: 28th October 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

COL. PHILLIMORE: As the Tribunal will see from the succeeding document,

it was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive

in the spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the

north. This letter shows that it was an integral part of those plans

that Yugoslavia should be induced to co-operate in them or at least to

maintain a disinterested attitude toward the liquidation of the other

Balkan states.

I pass now to the next document in the bundle, 444-PS, which becomes

Exhibit GB-116. It is a top-secret directive issued from the Führer’s

headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by the Defendant Jodl, and

dated the 12th of November 1940. I will read the first two lines and

then pass to Paragraph 4 on the third page:

“Directive Number 18. The preparatory measures of Supreme

Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future

are to be made along the following lines . . .”

Omitting the serious dealings with operations against Gibraltar and an

offensive against Egypt, I will read Paragraph 4 on the third page:

“Balkans . . . The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make

preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the

Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus

make possible the use of German Air Force units against targets

in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those

English air bases which are threatening the Romanian oil area.

“In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep

Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate

strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and

the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count

on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for moving these

forces into position.

“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment,

preparations will be made for an early increase in the German

Army mission in Romania, the extent of which must be submitted

to me.

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations

for the use of German Air Force units in the southeast Balkans

and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria

in accordance with the intended ground operations.”

I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next

document in the bundle, 1541-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit

GB-117, is the directive issued for the actual attack on Greece. Before

reading it, it might be convenient if I summarized the position of the

Italian invading forces at that time as this is one of the factors

mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put it very shortly. I again

use the words in which His Majesty’s Minister reported:

“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the

highest, and our own naval and land successes at Taranto and in

the western desert have done much to maintain it.

“With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and

modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior

Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the

bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not

unworthy of the ancient traditions of their country and that

they, like their distant forefathers, are prepared to fight

against odds to maintain their freedom.”

In fact the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that

Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly this directive was issued on 13

December 1940; it is top-secret Directive Number 20 for the Operation

Marita. The distribution included, of course, the Commander of the Navy,

that would, of course, be the Defendant Raeder; one to the Commander of

the Air Force, which would be the Defendant Göring; one to the Supreme

Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; and one to the Command Staff, which

I take it, would be the Defendant Jodl. I shall read the first two

paragraphs and then summarize the next two, if I may:

“The result in the battles of Albania is not yet decisive.

Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly

necessary that the British endeavor to create air bases under

the protection of a Balkan front—which would be dangerous above

all to Italy as well as to the Romanian oil fields—be foiled.

“My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task

force in southern Romania within the next months (b) after the

setting in of favorable weather—probably in March—to send this

task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way

of Bulgaria and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek

mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be

expected.”

The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and Paragraph 4

deals with the Operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:

“The military preparations which will produce exceptional

political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all

the necessary measures by the High Command. The transport

through Hungary and the arrival in Romania will be reported step

by step by the High Command of the Armed Forces and are to be

explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission

in Romania. Consultations with the Romanians or the Bulgarians

which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the

Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of

scouting missions and advanced parties.”

I think I need not trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next

document, 448-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-118, is again a

top-secret directive carrying the plan a little further; it deals with

decidedly different aspects, the direct support of the Italian forces in

Albania. I read, if I may, the first short paragraph and then the

paragraph at the foot of the page.

“The situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations

demands German assistance for strategical, political, and

psychological reasons due to employment of superior forces by

England against our allies.”

And in Paragraph 3 after dealing with the forces to be transferred to

Albania the directive sets out what the duties of the German forces will

be:

“a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an

emergency case should new crises arise there.

“b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later

attacking with the aim:

“To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a

far-reaching operation.

“To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order

to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s army.”

That directive was signed by Hitler and, as can be seen on the original

which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant Keitel and

the Defendant Jodl. Here again, of course, a copy went to the Defendant

Raeder, and I take it that the copy sent to foreign intelligence would

probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop.

I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which becomes Exhibit

GB-119. This records a conference which took place on the 19th and 20th

of January between the Defendant Keitel and the Italian General Guzzoni

and which was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at

which the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present.

I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the Italians, but

if you would pass to Page 3 of the document, there is a paragraph there

in the speech, which the Führer made, which is perhaps just worth

reading—the speech by the Führer on the 20th of January 1941, in the

middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech was made after the

conference with the Italians and then shows who was present.

On the German side I would call your attention to the presence of the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the

Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff. That

is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl; and on the

Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then three generals. It is the last

paragraph that I would wish to read:

“The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose:

“a. An operation against Greece;

“b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;

“c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Romania.

“Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces;

altogether, therefore, very strong forces whose deployment far

from our base requires a long time.

“Desirable that this deployment is completed without

interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late

as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the

last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest

possible moment.”

I pass to the next document, 1746-PS, which I offer as GB-120. That

document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a

conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians on the 8th of

February. The second part and the third part deal with later events, and

I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate time. I would read

the first and the last paragraphs on the first page of this document:

“Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of

the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German High

Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the

possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their

commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she

should involve herself in the war.”

And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being concerted

with the Bulgarians—Paragraph 3:

“The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all

measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the

operations and to assure in this way the most favorable

conditions for the execution of the German operations as

planned.

“The representatives of the two general staffs consider it

suitable to inform their governments that it will be advisable

of necessity to take secrecy and surprise into consideration

when the Three Power Treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to

assure the success of the military operations.”

I pass then to the next document, C-59. I offer that as Exhibit GB-121.

It is a further top-secret directive of the 19th of February. I need

not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the date for

the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the Danube is

to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed on the 2d of

March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of February at the

latest.

It is perhaps worth noting that on the original which I have put in, the

actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant Keitel.

It is perhaps just worth setting out the position of Bulgaria at this

moment. Bulgaria adhered to the Three Power Pact on the 1st of March

. . .

THE PRESIDENT: What year?

COL. PHILLIMORE: In 1941, and on the same day the entry of German troops

into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and the

directives to which I have referred the Tribunal.

The landing of British troops in Greece on the 3rd of March in

accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His

Majesty’s Government may have accelerated the movement of the German

forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of Greece had

been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time.

I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which I put in as

GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy, but the original

which I have put in shows that both the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were

present at the interview with Hitler which this extract records. It is a

short extract from a report by the Defendant Raeder on an interview with

Hitler in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps

interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German intention.

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy asks for confirmation that

the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event

of a peaceful settlement.

“Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any

settlement.”

The above document . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at 1600 hours.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows, it is submitted,

that the Nazi conspirators in accordance with their principle of

liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinterested had made every

preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process

of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of

Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better of their

Italian allies.

They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia towards which

their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting

victim. On the 25th of March 1941 in accordance with this policy, the

adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact was secured. This

adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February 1941 by the Yugoslav

Premier Cvetković and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markovic to the

Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at

Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact

at Vienna on the 25th of March. On this occasion the Defendant

Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance, which are set out in the

next document in the bundle, 2450-PS, which I put in as GB-123. If I

might read from half-way down the page:

“Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.

“At the same time when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia

to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the Governments of the Axis

Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following

identical notes:

“‘Mr. Prime Minister:

“‘In the name of the German Government and at their behest I

have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

“‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the

Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirm their

determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’”

That letter was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, who you will

remember, was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when he and

Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. In fact it

was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade

Yugoslavia and 2 days after the letter was written that they issued the

necessary order.

If I might read the second letter:

“Mr. Prime Minister:

“With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection

with the entry of Yugoslavia into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have

the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of

the Reich Cabinet”—Reichsregierung—“that in the agreement

between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government the

Governments of the Axis Powers during this war will not direct a

demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of

troops through Yugoslavian national territory.”

The position at this stage, the 25th of March 1941, was therefore, that

German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek

frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter

to Mussolini, “become disinterested” in the cleaning-up of the Greek

question.

The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact

appears very clearly from the next document in the bundle, 2765-PS,

which I put in as GB-124. It is an extract from the minutes of a meeting

between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might just read the first paragraph:

“The Führer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s

joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her

position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed

military action against Greece, for if one considers that for

350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication

through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav

border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia

an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an

extremely foolhardy venture.”

Again it is a matter of history that on the night of the 26th of March,

when the two Yugoslav Ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic

and his colleagues effected their removal by a _coup d’état_; and

Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March ready to defend,

if need be, her independence. The Yugoslav people had found themselves.

The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and

the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on.

I ask the Tribunal to turn back to 1746-PS, which I put in as GB-120, to

the second part on Page 3 of the document consisting of a record of a

conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in

Yugoslavia dated 27th of March 1941.

It shows that those present included the Führer; the Reich Marshal, that

is of course, the Defendant Göring; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant

Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab, that is the Defendant Jodl.

Then over the page—“later on the following persons were added.” I call

the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that those who came in later

included the Defendant Ribbentrop.

If I might read the part of Hitler’s statement set out on Page 4:

“The Führer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the _coup

d’état_. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in

regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to

the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were

never pro-Germans.”

I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:

“The present moment is for political and military reasons

favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the

country and the country’s attitude towards us. For if the

overthrow of the government would have happened during the

Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have

been considerably more serious.”

And then the next paragraph to which I would particularly draw the

Tribunal’s attention:

“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty

declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in

order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit.

No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented.

Assurances of the Yugoslav Government which cannot be trusted

anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will

start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

“It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible.

An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate

in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia

is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of

Bulgaria too. Romania’s main task is the protection against

Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian Ministers have already

been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed

to the Duce.

“Politically it is especially important that the blow against

Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the

military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In

this way Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the

campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a

favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to

our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment

(autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against

Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and

Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to

these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for

Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

“This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all

preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav

collapse will take place within the shortest time.”

Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that third

paragraph—2 days after the pact had been signed and the assurances

given—because there has been a _coup d’état_ and it is just possible

that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of

Yugoslavia is decided upon without any question of taking the trouble to

ascertain the views of the new government.

Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of the

document, which I would like to read:

“5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as

possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force

ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in

attacks by waves . . . .”

I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this

bombing was done when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7

o’clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th.

THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April?

COL. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April.

Then again still in the same document, the last part of it, Part V at

Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by the Defendant Jodl and

I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, Page

6:

“In the event that the political development requires an armed

intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to

attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to

destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national

territory.”

I read that because the plan is issued from the office of the Defendant

Jodl.

Now passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I put that in as

Exhibit GB-125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting

from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the

27th of March recorded in 1746-PS, Part II. It is worth reading the

first paragraph:

“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political

situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her

protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an

enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.”

I pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in evidence as GB-126.

It is an original telegram containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini

forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the

Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of the course

decided on and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce is

given his orders. If I might read the first five paragraphs:

“Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest

means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which

may result from it.

“(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most

dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from

the purely military point of view, German intervention in the

war in Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the

attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and she could threaten

the left flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.

“(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have

endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together

by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet

with success, or they were begun too late to produce any

definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the

imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.

“(3) I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but

nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any

mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole

position.

“(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary

measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary

military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has

been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request

you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in

the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that

you should cover and screen the most important passes from

Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces.

“These measures should not be considered as designed for a long

period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent

for at least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising.

“I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce

your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available

means and with utmost speed.

“(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which

we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only

personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything

about them. These measures will completely lose their value

should they become known . . . .”

Then he goes on to emphasize further the importance of secrecy.

I pass to R-95; the next document in the bundle, which I put in as

Exhibit GB-127. It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney

General. It is an operational order signed by General Von Brauchitsch

which is merely passing to the armies the orders contained in Directive

Number 25, which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in as

Exhibit GB-125. I won’t trouble the Tribunal with reading it.

I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as GB-114. The

invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this morning, the 6th of

April, on which Hitler issued the proclamation from which this passage

is an extract:

“From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s

steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theater of war. British

diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War,

succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her

and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes.

“The documents published today afford”—that refers to the

_German White Book_ which they published of all the documents

leading up to the invasion—“The documents published today

afford a glimpse of a practice which in accordance with very old

British recipes is a constant attempt to induce others to fight

and bleed for British interests.

“In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The

German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that

(2) we shall never as in the World War tolerate a power

establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a

given time, of being able to advance thence from the southeast

into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free

of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in

the south.”

Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal’s particular

attention:

“In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has

been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above

all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have

consciously put out of mind everything that once took place

between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian

people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made

efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all

difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and

various nations allied to Germany.”

One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must

momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August of 1939 and

the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a

few days earlier.

I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has

already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as Exhibit USA-34. It is a

record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November

1943. At Page 4 there is a short passage which sets out his views two

and a half years later on the action taken in April 1941. I refer to

Paragraph 11 on Page 4:

“What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of

affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in

consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece.

The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from

Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all

agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part

which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become

necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on

Greece from the north was not executed merely as an operation in

aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from

gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Romanian oil

area from that country.”

If I might summarize the story:

The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or

November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April

1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under

treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of

international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that

the German forces might have an unsuspecting victim.

In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course,

was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to

secure her co-operation for the offensive against Greece or at least to

ensure that she would abstain from any interference.

The _coup d’état_ of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then

decided that irrespective of whether or not his government had any

hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks,

Yugoslavia must be liquidated.

It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia’s

intentions when it would be so little trouble now that the German troops

were deployed to destroy her militarily and as a national unit.

Accordingly in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April,

German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece

simultaneously with the formality of handing a note to the Greek

Minister in Berlin informing him that the German forces were entering

Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in

replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied

that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by

Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same

reply as in the preceding October.

That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia. But as

I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like, if the

Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed,

to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I

can do it, I think, in 5 minutes.

It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which was

used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis themselves but also

by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon

securing the maximum advantage from surprise even though only a few

hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting

victim could thus be secured. Thus there was, of course, no declaration

of war in the case of Poland.

The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the

night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a military operation before

the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish

Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th and to the

Norwegian Minister between half past 4 and 5 on that morning.

The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than 5

o’clock, in most cases earlier in the small hours of the 10th of May,

while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case with the diplomatic

excuses and explanations was not presented until afterwards.

In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the

morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already been bombed

that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Kleffens. In the case of

Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the German Minister did not see M.

Spaak until 8.

The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when the German

Minister asked to see M. Beck.

Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of the

28th of October in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a 3-hour

ultimatum to General Metaxas.

The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both began in

the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no

diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation

was issued by Hitler—a proclamation from which I read an extract—at 5

o’clock that Sunday morning some 2 hours before Belgrade was bombed.

In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 20 minutes past 5 that M.

Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory.

The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is

in itself further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous

character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure

an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their

method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the state

which has no respect for its own pledged word nor for the rights of any

people but its own.

One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the

honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short

adjournment? That’s what you were intending to do?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We’ll adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the

presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the

Soviet Union, I shall take about 15 minutes to offer two further

documents relating to the aggression against Austria.

These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book, supplement to

Document Book N. Both documents are correspondence of the British

Foreign Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy

of our British colleagues.

First I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA-127. This is

in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador

Nevile Henderson at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It

reads:

“My Lord:

“With reference to your telegram Number 79 of March 11th, I have

the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a

letter which I addressed to Baron Von Neurath in accordance with

the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on

the same evening.

“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron Von

Neurath at the same time.”

The enclosure is the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to

Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows:

“Dear Reich Minister:

“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was

delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, _inter alia_, the

resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the

Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of

the members were to be National Socialists and the readmission

of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping

order in Vienna.

“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to

the German Government that if this report is correct His

Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to

register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of

coercion backed by force against an independent state in order

to create a situation incompatible with its national

independence.

“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been

informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest

reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.”

I now offer Document 3287-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-128. This consists

of a transmittal from the British Embassy, Berlin, to the British

Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath’s letter of response dated 12

March 1938. The letter is identified in the document with the letter

“L”.

First the Defendant Von Neurath objected to the fact that the British

Government were undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s

independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his letter:

“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that

the Royal British Government have no right to assume the role of

a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of

diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German

Government never left any doubt with the Royal British

Government that the formation of relations between Germany and

Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern

of the German people and that it did not affect a third power.”

Then in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von

Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events. I quote

the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the English translation I

start at the bottom of Page 1 of the letter:

“Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced on the

evening of the 9th of March the surprising and arbitrary

resolution decided on by himself to hold an election within a

few days which, under the prevailing circumstances and

especially according to the details provided for the execution

of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of

oppressing politically the predominant majority of the

population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this

procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of

Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s

internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the

then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for

an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore a

crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of

March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and

in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich

used forceful pressure to bring about this development.

Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former

Chancellor that the German Government had presented the Federal

President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention;

according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed

candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the

proposals of the German Government otherwise the invasion of

Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the

matter is that the question of sending military or police forces

from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed

Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the

press, to the German Government urgently asking for the dispatch

of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace

and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately

threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German

Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to

it.

“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the

attitude of the German Government as asserted in your letter

could lead to some unforseeable reactions. A complete picture of

the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at

noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the

German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take

place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise

its influence contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate

aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in

Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of

self-government of the German people.”

That ends the quotation.

Now in the light of the evidence which has already been presented to the

Tribunal, this version of the events given by the Defendant Von Neurath

is a hollow mockery of the truth.

We have learned, from the portions quoted from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit

Number USA-72, Jodl’s diary, the entry for March 10, 1938, the fact that

Von Neurath was taking over the duties of the Foreign Office while

Ribbentrop was detained in London, that the Führer wished to send an

ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet, that he had dispatched a letter to

Mussolini of his reasons for taking action, and that army mobilization

orders were given.

We have seen the true facts about the ultimatum from two different

documents. I refer to 812-PS, Exhibit Number USA-61, report of Gauleiter

Rainer to Reichskommissar Bürckel, dated 6 July 1939, which was

transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on 22 August 1939. The

portions reporting on the events of March 11 have already been read to

the Tribunal.

I also refer to Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, the transcripts of

Göring’s telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I have

already read to the Tribunal.

These documents emphatically show and with unmistakable clarity, that

the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the Austrian Government

that they would send troops across the border if Schuschnigg did not

resign and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were not appointed Chancellor.

These documents also show that the impetus of the famous telegram came

from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Göring composed the telegram and

Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but merely said “agreed.”

The transcript of Göring’s telephone call to Ribbentrop is indicated as

Part W of that document. In it the formula was developed and recited for

English consumption that there had been no ultimatum and that the German

troops crossed the border in response only to the telegram.

And now in this document from which I have just read we find the same

bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant Von Neurath. He was

at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of which we have the Hossbach

minutes, Exhibit USA-25. And so he knew very well the firmly held Nazi

ideas with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia. And yet in the period

after March 10, 1938 when he was handling the foreign affairs for this

conspiracy and particularly after the invasion of Austria, he played out

his part in making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr.

Mastny regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the

document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27, Exhibit

GB-21.

And we see him here still handling foreign affairs, although using the

letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council as the exhibit shows, reciting

this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian situation, a story

also encountered by us in the transcript of the Göring-Ribbentrop

telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims of what we call the

conspiracy.

Now, if the Tribunal please, it might have been fitting and appropriate

for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan and the attack on

the United States on this December 7, 1945, the fourth anniversary of

the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our plan was to proceed

chronologically so that part of the case must wait its turn for the

presentation next week.

We now come to the climax of this amazing story of wars of aggression,

perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history, when Hitler’s

intuition led him and his associates to launch an aggressive war against

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In my last appearance before the Tribunal I presented an account of the

aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime our British

colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formulation of the

plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initiation of actual

aggressive war. In addition they have laid before the Tribunal the story

of the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression involving

the planning and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and

the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece; and in doing so the

British Prosecution has marshalled and presented to the Court various

international treaties, agreements, and assurances, and the evidence

establishing the breaching of those treaties and assurances.

I should like to present to the Tribunal now the account of the last but

one of the defendants’ acts of aggression, the invasion of the U.S.S.R.

The section of the Indictment in which this crime is charged is Count

One, Section IV (F), Paragraph 6, German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the

U.S.S.R. territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August

1939. The first sentence of this paragraph is the one with which we

shall be concerned today. It reads:

“On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the

Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without

any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby

beginning a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.”

The documents having a bearing on this phase of the case are contained

in document book marked “P,” which we now hand to the Court.

First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a point of

departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet Union, I should

like to take the date 23 August 1939. On that date just a week before

the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter

into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. which is referred to

in this section of the Indictment which I have just quoted. This treaty,

Document Number TC-25, will be introduced in evidence by our British

colleagues, but it contains two articles which I should like to bring to

the attention of the Tribunal. Article I provides as follows:

“The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act

of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one

another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.”

Article V provides that, should disputes or conflicts arise between the

contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two

parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly

exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration commissions.

It is well to keep these solemn pledges in mind during the course of the

story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the German

Government by the Defendant Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as

somewhat of a surprise to the world since it appeared to constitute a

reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation

for this about-face has been provided, however, by no less eminent a

witness than the Defendant Ribbentrop himself in a discussion which he

had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A

report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German

diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely

personal information. This report we now have. It is Number 1834-PS. I

offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-129, the original German document.

On Page 2 of the English translation, Ribbentrop tells Oshima the reason

for the pact with the U.S.S.R. That is Page 2 of the German:

“Then when it came to war the Führer decided on a compromise

with Russia—as a necessity for avoiding a two-front war.”

In view of the spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazis in

entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggression, it

is not very surprising to find that they regarded it as they did all

treaties and pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was

expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is evidenced

by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was still in

progress they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of

aggression against the U.S.S.R.

In a speech to Reichs- and Gauleiter at Munich in November 1943, which

is set forth in our Document L-172 already in evidence as Exhibit Number

USA-34, the Defendant Jodl admitted—and I shall read from Page 7 of the

English translation, which is at Page 15 of the original German text:

“Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily

growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the

Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little

perceived in Germany and of late, for diplomatic reasons, had

deliberately to be ignored. However, the Führer himself has

always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as

during the Western campaign had informed me of his fundamental

decision to take steps against this danger the moment our

military position made it at all possible.”

At the time this decision was made, however, the Western campaign was

still in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily had to be

postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the

Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiègne, and the campaign in the

West with the exception of the war against Britain came to an end. The

view that Germany’s key to political and economic domination lay in the

elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor and in the acquisition

of Lebensraum at her expense had long been basic in Nazi ideology. As we

have seen, this idea had never been completely forgotten even while the

war in the West was in progress. Now flushed with the recent success of

their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat

Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the

Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving their

traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union.

The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear

both desirable and practical. As early as August of 1940 General Thomas

received a hint from the Defendant Göring that planning for a campaign

against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was

the Chief of the “Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt” of the OKW.

I should, perhaps, mention that this office is generally referred to in

the German documents by the abbreviation Wi Rü.

General Thomas tells of receiving this information from Göring in his

draft of a work entitled _Basic Facts for a History of German War and

Armament Economy_, which he prepared during the summer of 1944. This

book is our Document 2353-PS and has already been admitted into evidence

as Exhibit USA-35. I am sorry, it was marked that for identification

purposes. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-35.

On Pages 313 to 315 of this work Thomas discusses the Russo-German Trade

Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets were delivering

quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials

in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early in 1940 for

increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at Page 315 he

has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the

German leaders in August of 1940. I read from Page 9 of the English

translation:

“On August 14 the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt during a

conference with Reich Marshal Göring, was informed that the

Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until

spring 1941. Later on we were to have no further interest in

completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved

the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt to give priority to

matters concerning Russian war economy.”

I shall refer to this statement again later when I discuss the

preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected

to be captured. At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which will

show that in November of 1940 Göring informed Thomas that a campaign was

planned against the U.S.S.R.

Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet

Union necessarily entailed even these many months in advance of the date

of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction

projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be

expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet Intelligence Service.

Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for.

In an OKW directive signed by the Defendant Jodl and issued to the

counter-intelligence service abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures

were ordered. This directive is our Number 1229-PS and I offer it in

evidence as Exhibit USA-130, a photostat of the captured German

document. This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must

not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an

offensive was being prepared, and outlined the line for the

counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of

the directive indicates by implication the extent of the preparations

already under way, and I should like to read it to the Tribunal:

“The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to

come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map

is supposed to be reached.

“These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that

we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand,

Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops

are stationed in the Government General, in the Eastern

Provinces and in the Protectorate; she should draw the

conclusion that we can at any time protect our

interests—especially in the Balkans—with strong forces against

Russian seizure.

“For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the

answer to questions of the Russian Intelligence Service, the

following directives apply:

“1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the

East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a

frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be

explained by movements into training camps, regroupings, _et

cetera_.

“2) The impression is to be created that the center of the

massing of troops is in the southern part of the Government, in

the Protectorate, and in Austria, and that the massing in the

north is relatively unimportant.

“3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units,

especially of the armored divisions, things are to be

exaggerated, if necessary.

“4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the

antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased

considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that

it continues to be increased with captured French material on

all important targets.

“5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, _et

cetera_, it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal

limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won eastern

territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.

“The Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent

correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of

garrisons, _et cetera_, will be made available to the defense

for purposes of counter espionage.

“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order

of”—signed—“Jodl.”

Early in November of 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and

called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more

definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a

general outline of the Army’s operational plan. This order was contained

in a top-secret directive from the Führer’s headquarters, Number 18,

dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl. It is

Number 444-PS in our numbered series and is already in evidence as

Exhibit Number GB-116.

The directive begins by saying:

“The preparatory measures of supreme headquarters for the

prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along

the following lines . . . .”

It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding

relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.—and I

read now from Page 3, Paragraph Number 5 of the English translation:

“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of

clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of

the results of these discussions all preparations for the East

which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

“Instructions on this will follow as soon as the general outline

of the Army’s operational plans have been submitted to, and

approved by me.”

On the 5th of December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army,

at that time General Halder, reported to the Führer concerning the

progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A

report of this conference with Hitler is contained in captured Document

Number 1799-PS. This is a folder containing many documents all labeled

annexes and all bearing on Fall Barbarossa, the plan against the

U.S.S.R. This folder was discovered in the War Diary of the

Wehrmachtführungsstab and was apparently an enclosure to that diary.

The report I am here referring to is Annex Number 1 and is dated

December 1940.

I now offer in evidence Document Number 1799-PS as United States Exhibit

Number 131. I should also like to read into the record a few sentences

from the report of 5 December 1940 as they indicate the state of the

planning for this act of aggression six and a half months before it

occurred.

“Report to the Führer on 5 December 1940.

“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported about

the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the

geographical fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are

in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”

Then skipping:

“The Führer declares that he has agreed with the discussed

operational plans and adds the following:

“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from

withdrawing on a closed front. The eastward advance should be

combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to attack

the territory of the German Reich and on the other hand the

German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy

Russian war industrial territory. In this way we should be able

to achieve the annihilation of the Russian Army and to prevent

its regeneration. The first commitment of the forces should take

place in such a way as to make the annihilation of strong enemy

units possible.”

Then, skipping again:

“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions

in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as planned

for the entire operation is sufficient.”

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?

MR. ALDERMAN: Very convenient, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then we shall not sit in open session tomorrow. We will

sit again on Monday at 10 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]

SIXTEENTH DAY

Monday, 10 December 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received a letter from Dr. Dix on behalf

of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that the Tribunal wishes the

defendants’ counsel to know that they will be permitted to make one

speech only in accordance with Article 24 (h) of the Charter, and this

speech will be at the conclusion of all the evidence.

At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the defendants’

counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they

propose to call; but they will be strictly confined to the names of the

witnesses and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and

this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In

case there should be any misunderstanding, what I have just said will be

posted up on the board in the defendants’ Counsel Room so that you can

study it there.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday,

I had just reached the point in my discussion of aggression against the

U.S.S.R. where, with the campaign in the West at an end, the Nazi

conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the

Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning and action was in

progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed

and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued as soon

as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans had been

submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in

the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of

the Plan Barbarossa.

By the 18th of December 1940, the general outline of the Army’s

operational plan having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical

directive to the High Command of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force for

Barbarossa—Directive Number 21—was issued. This directive, which for

the first time marks the plan to invade the Soviet Union, was

specifically referred to in an order although the order was classified

top secret. It also marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to

denote this operation.

The directive is Number 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the

course of my opening statement as Exhibit USA-31. Since it was fully

discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to

recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in

that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English

translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence

with which the order begins:

“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia

in a quick campaign even before the end of the war with

England.”

On the same page it is stated:

“Preparations requiring more time to start are, if this has not

yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by 15

May 1941. Great caution has to be exercised that the intention

of the attack will not be recognized.”

The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended

invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various services (Army,

Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and calls for oral reports to

Hitler by the commanders-in-chief, closing as follows:

“V.”—that is on Page 2—“I am expecting the reports of the

commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter

of instructions.

“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces

are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in

regard to their time.”

Signed by Hitler, and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one

illegible name.

It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well

as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no

mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to prepare for an

act of aggression, which was intended to occur and which actually did

occur.

The various services which received the order certainly understood it as

an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as a hypothetical

staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation

which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general

scheme set forth in this basic directive.

So we come to the military planning and preparation for the

implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January

1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of

Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation to be reported

to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in

the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in

evidence as Exhibit USA-132.

This document contains a substantial amount of technical information

concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in

which it was preparing itself to play the part. I feel, however, that it

will be sufficient for the establishment of our point that the Navy was

actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a

small portion of the entry into the record, beginning on Page 1 of the

English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry

reads:

“30 January 1941.

“7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the

Barbarossa Case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed

Forces.”

I should note that “Ia” is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy

chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives

in the war against Russia. Under the latter many tasks for the Navy are

listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an

idea of all. I quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation:

“II. Objectives of War Against Russia . . . .

“d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: 1)

Lightning-like actions at the outbreak of the war by air force

units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic,

Black Sea, and Polar Sea.”

The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it indicates

the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to

implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation actually got

under way. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which

demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet

Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly premeditated attacks on a

neighboring power in the history of the world. Similarly the Naval War

Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to

the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such

references are contained in Document C-33, which I am now offering in

evidence as Exhibit USA-133.

I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the

entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English

translation and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.

“In regard to the impending operation Barbarossa for which all

S-boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer can only be

considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.”

On the 3rd of February 1941 the Führer held a conference to assess the

progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference

also discussed the plans for “Sonnenblume,” which was the code name for

the North African operation—“Sunflower.” Attending this conference

were, in addition to Hitler: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the

Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces

Operations Staff, the Defendant Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the

Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well

as several others, including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant.

A report of this conference is contained in our Document Number 872-PS,

which I now offer as Exhibit USA-134.

During the course of this conference the Chief of the Army General Staff

gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own

strength and the general overall operational plans for the invasion.

This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the

Führer.

At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which is at

Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which,

although written in a semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to

inform us that elaborate timetables had already been set out for the

deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote:

“The proposed time schedule is charted on the map. First

Deployment Echelon”—Aufmarschstaffel—“now being transferred,

Front-Interior-East. Second Deployment Echelon from the middle

of March gives 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West, but

Army groups and Army High Commands are withdrawn from the West.

In the East there are already considerable reinforcements though

still in the rear area. From now on, ‘Attila’”—I might state

here parenthetically that this was the code word for the

operation for the occupation of unoccupied France—“Attila can

be carried out only with difficulty. Economic traffic is

hampered by transport movements. From the beginning of April,

Hungary will be approached about the march-through. Third

Deployment Echelon, from the middle of April. ‘Felix’ is now no

longer possible, as the main part of the artillery has been

shipped.”—Felix was the name for the proposed operation against

Gibraltar.—“In industry the full capacity timetable is in

force. No more camouflage. Fourth Deployment Echelon, from 25.

IV to 15. V, withdraws considerable forces from the West

(‘Seelöwe’ can no longer be carried out).”—“Seelöwe” (or Sea

Lion) was a code word for the planned operation against England,

and “Marita,” which we shall see a little later in the

quotation, was the code word for the action against

Greece.—“The concentration of troops in the East is clearly

apparent. The full capacity timetable is maintained. The

complete picture of the disposition of forces on the map shows 8

Marita divisions.

“Commander-in-Chief, Army, requests that he no longer have to

assign 5 control divisions for this; but might hold them ready

as reserves for commander in the West.

“Führer: ‘When Barbarossa commences the world will hold its

breath and make no comment.’”

This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions, which I

shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as

the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along

with their preparations even as early as February 1941—almost 5 months

prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched. The

conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar

as they affected Barbarossa, as follows; I am now reading from Page 6 of

the English translation, which is on Page 7 of the German:

“Conclusions:

“1. Barbarossa.

“a. The Führer on the whole is in agreement with the operational

plan. When it is being carried out it must be remembered that

the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and

Leningrad.

“b. The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of

the deployment of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.

“c. Agreements with neighboring states who are taking part may

not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for

camouflage. The exception is Romania with regard to reinforcing

the Moldau.

“d. It must, in any case, be possible to carry out Attila. (With

the means available.)

“e. The concentration for Barbarossa will be carried out as a

feint for Sea Lion and the subsidiary measure Marita.”

On 13th March 1941 the Defendant Keitel signed an operational directive

to Führer Order Number 21, which was issued in the form of “Directives

for Special Areas.” This detailed operational order is Number 447-PS in

our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-135.

This order which was issued more than 3 months in advance of the attack

indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the

operation. Section I of the directive is headed, “Area of Operations and

Executive Power,” and outlines who was to be in control of what and

where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory

through which the Army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army

has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsführer

SS is entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in

Paragraph 2b, which appears on Page 1 of the English translation and

reads as follows:

“b) In the area of operations of the Army the Reichsführer SS

is, on behalf of the Führer, entrusted with special tasks for

the preparation of the political administration—tasks which

result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two

opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks the

Reichsführer SS shall act independently and under his own

responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme

Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him

shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the

Reichsführer SS that through the execution of his tasks military

operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged

directly through the OKH with the Reichsführer SS.”

The order then states that in time political administration will be set

up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of

these officials to the Army. This is contained in Paragraph 2c and

Paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:

“c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient

depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied

territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given

its own political administration. For the present it is to be

divided on the basis of nationality and according to the

positions of the Army groups into North (Baltic countries),

Center (White Russia), and South (Ukraine). In these territories

the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners

of the Reich who receive their orders from the Führer.

“3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas

under the political administration in the rear of the area of

operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

“The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the

Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the

military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a territorial

commander and the rights of a supreme Army commander or a

commanding general. In this capacity he is responsible primarily

for the following tasks:

“a) Close co-operation with the Commissioner of the Reich in

order to support him in his political tasks; b) exploitation of

the country and securing its economic values for use by German

industry.”

The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of

economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully

later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, Paragraph

4, which I shall read:

“4) The Führer has entrusted the uniform direction of the

administration of economy in the area of operations and in the

territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal,

who has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rü Amt’ with the

execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the

OKW/Wi Rü Amt.”

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at some time who these

people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?

MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Göring.

THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsführer of the SS at that time?

MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and

communication traffic, and I shall not read it here.