Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Nevile Henderson saw
Ribbentrop; and I shall read to you the account of that interview, in
which Sir Nevile Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in
reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening,
and at which Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document
which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the
discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out
quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British
Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So
that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having
before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and
magnanimously offering to discuss.
On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw Ribbentrop and
could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers.
When he did not—when he said he did not come with full powers,
Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Führer. But,
in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Führer
by that time, because on the 31st of August—I am afraid I am unable to
give you the exact time—but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already
issued his Directive Number 1 for the conduct of the war, in which he
laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, the
1st of September. And on the evening of the 31st of August at 9 o’clock
the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out
to Sir Nevile Henderson the night before, saying that these were the
proposals which had been made for discussion but that, as no Polish
Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government
assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o’clock on the
evening of the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever
heard of the proposals, and the first, in fact, that the British
Government or their representatives in Berlin knew about them, other
than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused
to give a written copy, on the evening of the 30th.
After that broadcast at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was in its
course, a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Nevile Henderson,
for the first time.
Having thus summarized for the convenience, I hope, of the Tribunal, the
timing of events during that last week, I would ask the Tribunal to
refer briefly to the remaining documents in that document book. I first
put in evidence an extract from the interrogation of the Defendant
Göring, which was taken on the 29th of August 1945.
DR. STAHMER: As defense counsel for the Defendant Göring, I object to
the use of this document which is an extract from testimony given by the
Defendant Göring. Since the defendant is present here in court, he can
at any time be called to the stand and give direct evidence on this
subject before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground of your
objection, in view of Article 15 (c) and Article 16 (b) and (c) of the
Charter. Article 15 (c) provides that the Chief Prosecutors shall
undertake, among others, the duty of “the preliminary examination of all
necessary witnesses and of the defendants”; and Article 16 provides
that:
“In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following
procedure shall be followed: . . . (b) During any preliminary
examination . . . of a defendant he shall have the right to give
any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; (c) A
preliminary examination of a defendant . . . shall be conducted
in, or translated into, a language which the defendant
understands.”
Those provisions of the Charter, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show
that the defendants may be interrogated and that their interrogations
may be put in evidence.
DR. STAHMER: I was prompted by the idea that when it is possible to call
a witness, direct examination in court is preferable, since the evidence
thus obtained is more concrete.
THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of summoning the
defendant for whom you appear to give evidence himself, but that has
nothing to do with the admissibility of his interrogation—his
preliminary examination.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This extract is TC-90, which I put in as GB-64.
I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is at the end of the 7th
line. The Defendant Göring says there:
“On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland,
the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that he had
stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether
this was just temporary or for good. He said ‘No, I will have to
see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’”
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not read the question before the answer?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I go back to the question:
“When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London
brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty, at the end of March or
the beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly obvious that a
peaceful solution was impossible?”—answer—“Yes, it seemed
impossible after my conviction”—I think that must be a bad
translation—“according to my conviction.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Continuing._] “. . . but not
according to the convictions of the Führer. When it was
mentioned to the Führer that England had given her guarantee to
Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Romania, but
then when the Russians took Bessarabia, nothing happened; and
this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At
this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The
guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of
the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to
Poland, the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that
he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then
whether this was just temporary, or for good. He said, ‘No, I
will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’
So, then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any
different within 4 or 5 days?’ At this same time—I do not know
whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in communication
with Lord Halifax by a special courier, outside the regular
diplomatic channels, to do everything to stop war with England.
After the guarantee, I held an English declaration of war
inevitable. I already told him in the spring of 1939, after
occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on, if he
tried to solve the Polish question, he would have to count on
the enmity of England—1939, that is, after the Protectorate.
“Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign
against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed
by the end of August 1939?’
“Answer: ‘Yes.’
“Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the
campaign against Poland came sometime between the 15th and 20th
of August 1939, after the signing of the treaty with Soviet
Russia?’”—The dates obviously are wrong there.
“Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’
“Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign
was ordered for the 25th of August but on the 24th of August in
the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order
to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the
English Ambassador?’
“Answer: ‘Yes.’”
My only comment upon that document is in respect to the second paragraph
where Göring is purporting not to want war with England. The Court will
remember how it was Göring, after the famous speech of the 22d of August
to his commanders-in-chief, who got up and thanked the Führer for his
exhortation and assured him that the Armed Forces would play their part.
I omit the next document in the document book, which carries the matter
a little further, and we go on to Hitler’s verbal communiqué, as it is
called in the _British Blue Book_, that he handed to Sir Nevile
Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had heard of the signing of
the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from meeting
her obligations. He states in the first paragraph, after hearing the
British Ambassador, that he is anxious to make one more effort to save
war. In the second paragraph, he asserts again that Poland’s
provocations were unbearable; and I quote Paragraph 2:
“Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these
Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more,
to do so in the interests of quiet and order and also in the
interests of European peace.
“The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The
British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the
least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At
the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and
incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would
be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last
war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts.”—One
sees the threats, veiled threats, appearing in this
paragraph—“Agreement with Russia was unconditional and
signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would
last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never again take
up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements
reached with Russia would also render Germany secure
economically for the longest possible period of war.
“The Führer had always wanted Anglo-German understanding. War
between England and Germany could at best bring some profit to
Germany, but none at all to England.”
Then we come to the bribe:
“The Führer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved
and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined,
after the solution of this problem, to approach England once
more with a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great
decisions; and in this case also, he will be capable of being
great in his action.”—and then, magnanimously—“He accepts the
British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its
continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich
at its disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which
are limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means . . . . His
obligations to Italy remain untouched.”
Again he stresses irrevocable determination never to enter into war with
Russia. I quote the last two paragraphs:
“If the British Government would consider these ideas, a
blessing for Germany . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not read the first few lines of Paragraph 3?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes; I did summarize it—Paragraph 3:
“He also desired to express the irrevocable determination of
Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote the last two paragraphs:
“If the British Government would consider these ideas, a
blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might
result. If they reject these ideas, there will be war. In no
case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it.
The Führer repeats that he himself is a man of far-reaching
decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last offer
. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn and then the matter can be
investigated.
[_A recess was taken._]
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had just finished reading the offer from
Hitler to the British Government, which was TC-72, Number 68, and which
becomes GB-65.
The British Government were not, of course, aware of the real object
that lay behind that message; and, taking it at its face value and
desirous to enter into discussions, they wrote back on the 28th of
August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They
agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, and I quote
from Paragraph 4:
“In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, a reasonable
solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and
should be effected by agreement between the two countries on
lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential
interests; and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of
April, the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these
interests to Poland.
“But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the
German Chancellor of the 22d of August, His Majesty’s Government
consider it essential for the success of the discussions, which
would precede the agreement, that it should be understood
beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by
other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be ready, if
desired, to make their contribution to the effective operation
of such a guarantee.”
I go to the last paragraph on that page, Paragraph 6:
“His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own
attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between
Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will
not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous
concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to
use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution
which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.”
That, of course, knocked the German hopes on the head. They had failed
by their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her
obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of
their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving their face as much
as possible. The last document becomes GB-66. And I put in also Sir
Nevile Henderson’s account of that interview, TC-72, Number 75, which
becomes GB-67.
During that interview, the only importance of it is that Sir Nevile
Henderson again emphasized the British attitude and that they were
determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. One
paragraph I would quote, which is interesting in view of the letters
that were to follow, paragraph 10:
“In the end I asked him two straight questions: ‘Was he willing
to negotiate directly with the Poles?’ and ‘Was he ready to
discuss the question of an exchange of population?’ He replied
in the affirmative as regards the latter, although there I have
no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a
rectification of frontiers. As regards the first, he said he
could not give me an answer until after he had given the reply
of His Majesty’s Government the careful consideration which such
a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Ribbentrop
and said, ‘We must summon Field Marshal Göring to discuss it
with him.’”
Then in the next paragraph, again Sir Nevile Henderson finally repeated
to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation, so far as
he was concerned.
I pass to the next document, which is TC-72, Number 78, which becomes
GB-68.
The German reply, as I outlined before, was handed to Sir Nevile
Henderson at 7:15 p.m. on the 29th of August. The reply sets out the
suggestion submitted by the British Government in their previous note;
and it goes on to say that the German Government are prepared to enter
into discussion on the basis that the whole of the Corridor, as well as
Danzig, are returned to the Reich. I quote particularly the next to the
last paragraph on the first page of that document:
“The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the
revision of the Versailles Treaty, which has always been
recognized as being necessary, in regard to this territory,
namely: return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the
safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in
the territories remaining to Poland.”
It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that that right has been
recognized for so long. On the 28th of April his demands consisted only
of Danzig, of an Autobahn, and of the railway.
The Tribunal will remember the position which he is trying to get out of
now. He is trying to manufacture justification by putting forth
proposals which under no possible circumstances could either Poland or
Great Britain accept. But, as I said before, he wanted to make doubly
certain.
I go to the second page, and start with the third paragraph:
“The British Government attach importance to two considerations:
(1) That the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be
eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation; and (2)
that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it
would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded
in the economic and political sphere by means of international
guarantees.
“On this subject the German Government make the following
declaration:
“Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome,
they are, nevertheless, prepared to accept the English proposal
and to enter into direct discussion. They do so, as has already
been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made
upon them by the written statement received from the British
Government that they, too, desire a pact of friendship in
accordance with the general lines indicated to the British
Ambassador.”
And then, to the last but one paragraph:
“For the rest, in making these proposals, the German Government
have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital
interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish
State.”
These letters really sound like the letters of some common swindler
rather than of the government of a great nation.
“The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances
agree to accept the British Government’s offer of their good
offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary
with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on
Wednesday, the 30th August 1939.
“The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a
solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place
these at the disposal of the British Government before the
arrival of the Polish negotiator.”
That was at 7:15 in the evening of the 29th of August and as I have
explained, it allowed little time in order to get the Polish Emissary
there by midnight the following night. That document was GB-68.
The next document, Sir Nevile Henderson’s account of the interval,
summarizes what had taken place; and I quote particularly Paragraph 4:
“I remarked that this phrase”—that is the passage about the
Polish Emissary being there by midnight the following
night—“sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks
both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was
only intended to stress the urgency of the moment when the two
fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.”
That was the interview on the evening of the 29th of August. The last
document becomes GB-69.
Again the British Government replied, and Sir Nevile Henderson handed
this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of the 30th
of August at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. I need not
read at length. The British Government reciprocate the desire for
improved relations. They stress again that they cannot sacrifice the
interest of other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the
situation. They understand, they say, that the German Government accept
the condition that the settlement should be subject to international
guarantee. They make a reservation as to the demands that the Germans
put forward in their last letter and they are informing the Polish
Government immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German
Government are drawing up the proposals. That Document TC-72, Number 89,
will be GB-70. For the account of the interview, we go to the next
document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-72, Number 92, which becomes GB-71.
It is not a very long document. It is perhaps worth reading in full:
“I told Herr Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s
Government found it difficult to advise the Polish Government to
accept the procedure adumbrated in the German reply and
suggested that he should adopt the normal contact, i.e. that
when German proposals were ready, to invite the Polish
Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to
his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations.
I added that if this basis afforded prospect of settlement, His
Majesty’s Government could be counted upon to do their best in
Warsaw to temporize negotiations.
“Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document which he
read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Imagining that he would
eventually hand it to me, I did not attempt to follow too
closely the 16 or more articles which it contained. Though I
cannot, therefore, guarantee the accuracy, the main points were
. . . .”—and I need not read out the main points.
I go to Paragraph 3:
“When I asked Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in
accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he
asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had
not arrived in Berlin by midnight.
“I observed that to treat the matter in this way meant that the
request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on the
30th of August constituted in fact an ultimatum, in spite of
what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he
denied, saying that the idea of an ultimatum was a figment of my
imagination. Why then, I asked, could he not adopt the normal
procedure and give me a copy of the proposals, and ask the
Polish Ambassador to call on him just as Hitler had summoned me
a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to the
Polish Government? In the most violent terms Ribbentrop said
that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted
that if the Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might
be different. I said that I would, naturally, inform my
Government so at once. Whereupon he said, while those were his
personal views, he would bring all that I had said to Hitler’s
notice. It was for the Chancellor to decide.
“We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Von
Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping
Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against the
Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly
surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler
himself had admitted to me yesterday.”
Nevertheless, Sir Nevile Henderson did not know at that time that
Germany had also already given the orders to attack Poland some days
before. The following day, the 31st of August at 6:30 in the evening,
Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop.
This document, the next Document TC-73, Number 112, becomes GB-72, and
is a short account in a report to Mr. Beck:
“I carried out my instructions. Ribbentrop asked if I had
special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I
said, ‘No’. He then asked whether I had been informed that on
London’s suggestion the German Government had expressed their
readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish
Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to
have arrived on the preceding day, the 30th of August. I replied
that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion,
Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to
negotiate. He would communicate my _démarche_ to the
Chancellor.”
As I have indicated already, it was too late. The orders had already
been given on that day to the German Army to invade.
I turn to C-126. It is already in as GB-45. Other portions of it were
put in, and I refer now to the letter on the second page, for the order
(most-secret order). It is signed by Hitler and is described as his
“Directive Number 1 for the Conduct of the War,” dated 31st of August
1939. Paragraph 1:
“(1) Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by
peaceful means of a situation on the eastern frontier, which is
intolerable for Germany, are exhausted, I have determined on a
solution by force.
“(2) The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance
with the preparations made for Case White with the alterations
which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it
has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.
“Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.
“The date of attack: 1st of September 1939; time of attack:
4:45”—inserted in red pencil—“this time also applies to the
operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.
“(3) In the West it is important that the responsibility for the
opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England
and France. At first, purely local action should be taken
against insignificant frontier violations.”
There it sets out the details of the order which, for the purpose of
this Court, it is unnecessary to read. That evening at 9 o’clock the
German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which
they were so willing to enter into discussions with the Polish
Government. It sets out the proposals at length. It will be remembered
that by this time neither Sir Nevile Henderson nor the Polish Government
nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them, and
it is indeed a document which is tempting to read—or to read extracts
of it simply as an exhibition or an example of pure hypocrisy. I refer
to the second paragraph Document TC-72, Number 98, exhibit GB-39:
“Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able
to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding
available to the British Government by the time the Polish
negotiator arrived in Berlin.”
Now, we have heard the manner in which they did that. They then say
that:
“Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of authorized
Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich
received of their readiness for an understanding was the news of
the Polish mobilization; and only toward 12 o’clock on the night
of the 30th of August 1939, did they receive a somewhat general
assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement
of negotiations.
“Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the
Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary
conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views
of the German Government as regards a possible basis for
negotiation, since His Majesty’s Government themselves had
pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop gave the British
Ambassador, on the occasion of the presentation of the last
British note, precise information as to the text of the German
proposals which will be regarded as a basis of negotiation in
the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary.”
And, thereafter, they go on to set out the story, or rather their
version of the story, of the negotiations over the last few days.
I pass to the next but one document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-54, which
becomes GB-73. On the 1st of September when his armies were already
crossing the frontier and the whole of the frontier, he issued this
proclamation to his Armed Forces:
“The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly
relations as aimed at by me, want to force the issue by way of
arms.
“The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror
and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation,
which cannot be tolerated by a great power, show that Poland is
no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an
end to these mad acts, I can see no other way but from now
onwards to meet force with force.
“The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up
the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the
resuscitated German people.
“I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of
the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the
last.
“Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the
representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.
“Long live our people and the Reich.”
And so we see that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He
had afforded them their propagandistic justification; and at that time,
anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards. “The
victor shall not be asked later on, whether he told the truth or not.”
Might is what counts—or victory is what counts and not right.
On that day, the 1st of September, when news came of this violation of
Polish ground, the British Government in accordance with their treaty
obligations sent an ultimatum to the German Government in which they
stated—I quote from the last paragraph:
“I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the
German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government
satisfactory assurances that the German Government have
suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without
hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.”
By the 3rd of September no withdrawal had taken place, and so at 9
o’clock—the document, TC-72, Number 110, I have just referred to will
be GB-74—at 9 o’clock on the 3rd of September, a final ultimatum was
handed to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. I quote from the third
paragraph:
“Although this communication was made more than 24 hours ago, no
reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been
continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honor to
inform you that, unless not later than 11 o’clock British summer
time today, the 3rd of September, satisfactory assurances to the
above effect have been given by the German Government and have
reached His Majesty’s Government in London, a state of war will
exist between the two countries as from that hour.”
And so it was that at 11 o’clock on the 3rd of September a state of war
existed between Germany and England and between Germany and France. All
the appeals to peace, all the appeals to reason we now see completely
stillborn; stillborn when they were made. Plans, preparations,
intentions, determination to carry out this assault upon Poland, had
been going on for months, for years before. It mattered not what anybody
but the German Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else
but the German nation thought they had; and, if there is any doubt left
at all after what we have seen, I would ask you to look at two more
documents.
If you would look at the last document first of all, in your document
book—1831-PS, which becomes GB-75. Even now on the 3rd of September,
Mussolini offers some chance of peace.
We have here a telegram. It is timed 6:30 hours, and I am afraid I am
unable to say whether that is 6:30 in the morning or evening; but it is
dated the 3rd of September, and I quote:
“The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the
Duce’s order the following copy for the Führer and Reich
Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
“‘Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every
decision to the Führer, that it still has a chance to call a
conference with France, England, and Poland on the following
basis:
“‘1. An armistice which would leave the army corps where they
are at present’”—and it will be remembered that on the 3rd of
September they had advanced a considerable way over the
frontier—“‘2. calling a conference within 2 or 3 days;—“‘3.
solution of the Polish-German controversy would be certainly
favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
“‘This idea, which originated from the Duce, has its foremost
exponent in France.
“‘Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already
securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany
has had already her “moral satisfaction.” If she would accept
the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at
the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect
of being universal and of extremely long duration.’”
But, My Lord, perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all
Germany’s aims were; and, of course, the offer was turned down in the
illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply. I refer you back
to the document before that. It is still part of the same Exhibit GB-75.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, the “GB” references you give are not
on the documents at all; they are the exhibit numbers themselves, which
are to be put on the document after they have been put in.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. That is correct. They will be put in by
the Court, of course.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you try to make clear the references which are on
the document so that the Tribunal could find the document itself?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. The last document was 1831-PS, and it is
the very last one in the document book. That is the one I have just
referred to—the telegram from Mussolini. The document to which I am
about to refer is the one before last in the Tribunal’s book but it has
the same number on it as the last because it forms part of the same
exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: I think if you would just explain the system in which the
exhibits are numbered, it would help us.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The exhibits are numbered at the present moment
before they are put in evidence with a variety of serial numbers, such
as “PS”, “TC”, “L” and other letters. There is no significance attached
to that at all. It depends on whom they have been found by and what
files they have come from. When the documents are put in as exhibits,
they are marked by the Court with a court number. The documents put in
by the United States representatives were all prefixed with the letters
“USA.” The documents which have been put in by the British prosecutors
have all been prefixed with the letters “GB.” If it would be of any
assistance to members of the Tribunal, I will have their document books
marked up this evening with the new court numbers that have been put
upon them by the Court officials, during the course of the day.
THE PRESIDENT: We will talk about that later.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If there is any document missing from any of
these books, I have a copy.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 1831-PS?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, that is GB-75.
“Duce:
“I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation,
I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition that
there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that
the conference would be successful. Because for the last 2 days
the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid
advance in Poland, it would have been impossible to devaluate
the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues.
Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found if
England would not have been determined to wage war under all
circumstances. I have not given in to the English because, Duce,
I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more
than one-half a year or a year. Under these circumstances I
thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was
better for resistance. At present the superiority of the German
Armed Forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all the fields that
the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt
whether this fast success could have been achieved in 1 or 2
years. England and France would have armed their allies to such
an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German
Armed Forces could not have become so apparent any more. I am
aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter is one for life and
death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am
also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and
that one has to choose, after cold deliberation, the moment for
resistance in such a way that the probability of success is
guaranteed; and I believe in this success, Duce, with the
firmness of a rock. Recently you have given me the kind
assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few
fields. I acknowledge this in advance, with sincere thanks. But
I believe also—even if we march now over different roads—that
fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany
were destroyed by the Western Democracies, the Fascist Italy
would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always
aware of this community of the future of our two governments and
I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in
Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside,
of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man
on unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of
great operational considerations. The northern Polish Army,
which is in the Corridor, has already been completely encircled
by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender.
Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily
achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The
superiority of our Air Force is complete, although scarcely
one-third of it is in Poland. In the West, I will be on the
defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the
moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with
the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all
your assistance which you have given to me in the past; and I
ask you not to deny it to me in the future.”
That completes the evidence which I propose to offer upon this part of
the case in respect of the war of aggression against Poland, England,
and France, which is charged in Count Two.
MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it
please the Tribunal, in the early hours of the morning of the 9th of
April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. It is my duty to
present to the Tribunal the Prosecution’s evidence which has been
prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Major Hinely, with
regard to these brutal wars of aggression, which were also wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances. With
the Court’s permission I would like, first of all, to deal with the
treaties and agreements and assurances that were in fact violated by
these two invasions of Norway and Denmark.
The invasions were, of course, in the first instance violations of the
Hague Convention and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. My learned friend, Sir
David Maxwell-Fyfe, has already dealt with those matters in the course
of his presentation of the evidence. In addition to these general
treaties, there were specific agreements between Germany and Norway and
Denmark. In the first instance there was the Treaty of Arbitration and
Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on
2 June 1926. The Court will find that treaty, TC-17, on the first page
of British Document Book Number 3; and to that exhibit it may be
convenient to give the Number GB-76. I am proposing to read only the
first article of that treaty, which is in these terms:
“The contracting parties undertake to submit to the procedure of
arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present
treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise
between Germany and Denmark, and which it has not been possible
to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring
with the consent of both parties, before the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
“Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been
laid down in other conventions in force between the contracting
parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
such conventions.”
Then there follows in the remaining articles the establishment of the
machinery for arbitration.
I would next refer to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and
Denmark, which was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 31st of May
1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was 10 weeks after the Nazi
seizure of Czechoslovakia. The Court will find that as Document TC-24 in
the document book and it will now bear the Exhibit Number GB-77.
With the Court’s permission, in view of the identity of the signatory of
that treaty, I would like to read the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2.
“The Chancellor of the German Reich and His Majesty, the King of
Denmark and Iceland, being firmly resolved to maintain peace
between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to
confirm this resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as
their Plenipotentiaries: The Chancellor of the German Reich
. . . and His Majesty, the King of Denmark and Iceland . . . .”
Article 1 reads as follows:
“The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark shall in no case
resort to war or to any other use of force, one against the
other.
“Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken
by a third power against one of the contracting parties, the
other contracting party shall not support such action in any
way.”
Then Article 2 deals with the ratification of the treaty, and the second
paragraph states:
“The treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the
instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a
period of 10 years from that date . . . .”
As the Tribunal will observe, the treaty is dated the 31st of May 1939.
At the bottom of the page there appears the signature of the Defendant
Ribbentrop. The Tribunal will shortly see that less than a year after
the signature of this treaty the invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces
was to show the utter worthlessness of treaties to which the Defendant
Ribbentrop put his signature.
With regard to Norway, the Defendant Ribbentrop and the Nazi
conspirators were party to a similar perfidy. In the first instance I
would refer to Document TC-30, which is the next document in the British
Document Book 3 and which will bear the Exhibit Number GB-78. The
Tribunal will observe that that is an assurance given to Denmark,
Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939. That, of
course, was after the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the
confidence of the world; and this was presumably an attempt, now
submitted by the Prosecution to be a dishonest attempt, to try to
reassure the Scandinavian States. The assurance is in a speech by Hitler
and reads:
“. . . I have given binding declarations to a large number of
states. None of these states can complain that even a trace of a
demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany.
None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend
that a request has ever been put to them by the German
Government or by German public opinion which was incompatible
with the sovereignty and integrity of their state.
“I was pleased that a number of European states availed
themselves of these declarations by the German Government to
express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality.
This applies to the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark,
_et cetera_.”
A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on the 2d of
September 1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was the day after
the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Court will observe the next document in
British Document Book 3 is the Document TC-31, which will be Exhibit
GB-79. That is an _aide-mémoire_ that was handed to the Norwegian
Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on the 2d of September
1939. It reads:
“The German Reich Government are determined, in view of the
friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under
no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of
Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In
making this declaration, the Reich Government naturally expect
on their side that Norway will observe an unimpeachable
neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches
of Norwegian neutrality by any third party. Should the attitude
of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any
such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich
Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the
interest of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation
might dictate.”
There follows, finally, the further German assurance to Norway, which
appears as the next document in the book, TC-32, which will be Exhibit
GB-80. That is a speech by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939; and if the
Court will observe Paragraph 2 at the top of the page, the extract from
the speech reads as follows:
“Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any
today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression
pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they
did not feel themselves threatened in any way.”
Those are clear and positive assurances which Germany gave. The Court
will see that violation of those assurances is charged in Paragraph XXII
of Appendix C of the Indictment at Page 43. The Court will notice that
there is a minor typographical error in the date of the first assurance
which is alleged in the Indictment to have been given on the 3rd of
September 1939. The Court will see from Document TC-31, which is Exhibit
GB-79, that the assurance was in fact given on the 2d of September 1939.
Now those treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the
brutal Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark, and the evidence which the
Prosecution will now place before the Court will in my submission
establish beyond reasonable doubt that these assurances were simply
given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi
aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For we now know
that as early as October 1939 these conspirators and their confederates
were plotting the invasion of Norway, and the evidence will indicate
that the most active conspirators in that plot were the Defendants
Raeder and Rosenberg.
The Norwegian invasion is, in one respect, not a typical Nazi aggression
in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief
instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he
thought Norway strategically important and because he coveted glory for
his Navy, Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway which
he sought to develop.
As the Tribunal will shortly see, in the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling the
Defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent, the
very personification of perfidy.
The evidence as to the early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade
Norway is found in a letter which the Defendant Raeder wrote on the 10th
of January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German naval historian.
I put in this letter, the document C-66, which will be Exhibit GB-81,
and which the Court will find further on in this book of documents. I
should explain that in this book of documents the documents are inserted
in the numerical order of the series to which they belong and not in the
order of their submission to the Court. I am trusting that that will be
a more convenient form of bundling them together than to set them down
in the order of presentation.
THE PRESIDENT: 66?
MAJOR JONES: C-66. It is headed, “Memorandum to Admiral Assmann; for his
own information; not to be used for publication.”
The Court will observe that the first page deals with Barbarossa. If the
Tribunal turns to the next page headed “(b) Weserübung,” the Tribunal
will find from documents which I shall shortly be submitting to the
Court that Weserübung was the code name for the invasion of Norway and
Denmark.
I will omit the first sentence. The document which, as I have said, is a
communication from the Defendant Raeder to Assmann reads as follows:
“During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an
occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this
letter on to C/SKL”—which is the Chief of Staff of the Naval
War Staff—“for their information and prepared some notes based
on this letter . . . for my report to the Führer, which I made
on the 10th of October 1939, since my opinion was absolutely
identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time SKL was
more dubious about the matter. In these notes I stressed the
disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would
have for us: Control of the approaches to the Baltic,
outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on
Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for
us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast: Outlet to the North
Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the
years 1917-18. Naturally, at the time, only the coast and bases
were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the
course of our correspondence, thought that Narvik could be
excluded . . . . The Führer saw at once the significance of the
Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated
that he wished to consider the question himself.”
I will pause in the reading of that document at that point and return to
it later so that the story may be revealed to the Court in a
chronological order.
That report of Raeder, in my submission, shows that the whole evolution
of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the
participation of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to
attack inoffensive neighbors.
This letter, an extract from which I have just read, has revealed that
Raeder reported to Hitler on the 10th of October 1939 . . .
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?
MAJOR JONES: The report, C-66, was made in January 1944 by the Defendant
Raeder to Assmann, who was the German naval historian, and so,
presumably, was for the purposes of history.
Before Raeder’s report of 10 October 1939 was made to the Führer, Raeder
got a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On the 3rd of October
Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I now invite the Court’s
attention. It is Document C-122 and the Court will find it next but one
to C-66 in the document book. That will now be Exhibit GB-82.
That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed “Gaining of Bases in
Norway (extract from War Diary)” and bears the date of the 3rd of
October 1939. It reads:
“The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff”—who was the Defendant
Raeder—“considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as
soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval Operations Staff
on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the
north. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain
bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and
Germany, with the basic aim of improving our strategic and
operational position. The following questions must be given
consideration:
“(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
“(b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will
if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
“(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
“(d) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases
or have they already decisive advantages suitable for supply
position?”
Then there follows in parenthesis:
“The Commander of the U-boat Fleet”—which is a reference, of
course, to the Defendant Dönitz—”. . . considers such harbors
already extremely useful as equipment and supply bases at which
Atlantic U-boats can call temporarily.”
And then Question (e):
“What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war
at sea in gaining bases in north Denmark, e.g. Skagen?”
There is, in our possession, a document C-5, to find which it will be
necessary for the Court to go back in the document book to the first of
the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit GB-83.
This is a memorandum written by the Defendant Dönitz on Norwegian bases.
It presumably relates to the questionnaire of the Defendant Raeder
which, as I have indicated, was in circulation at about that time. The
document is headed, “Commander of the U-boat Fleet; Operations
Division,” and is marked “most secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.”
Then there are set out “suppositions,” “advantages and disadvantages,”
and, over one page, “conclusions”. I am proposing to read the last
paragraph, III:
“The following is therefore proposed:
“(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
“a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen,
provisions;
“b) Repair opportunities for normal overhaul work after an
encounter;
“c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews;
“d) Flak protection, L.A. antiaircraft armament, patrol and M/S
units.
“(2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
Narvik as an alternative.”
That is a Dönitz memorandum.
Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann, in October
1939, Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not
yet committed himself to it, although, as the Tribunal will see very
shortly, Hitler was most susceptible to any suggestions of aggression
against the territory of another country.
The documents will show that the Defendant Raeder persevered in pressing
his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a
powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg.
The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a
political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but should
proof be required of that statement it is found in the remarkable
document which I now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Document
007-PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book. That
will be Exhibit GB-84.
That is headed on Page 1, “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign
Affairs Bureau of the Party”—Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP—“from
1933 to 1943.” It reads:
“When the Foreign Affairs Bureau”—Aussenpolitisches Amt—“was
established on the 1st of April 1933, the Führer directed that
it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency; but
should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and
suggestions.
“Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted
by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the
newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to
internal conditions in the Soviet Union as well as to the
effects of world Bolshevism, primarily in other European
countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated
groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting
Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and states
bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand those nations and
states constituted an insulating ring encircling the Bolshevist
neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of German
living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western
Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired
influence by one means or another”—and the Court will shortly
see the significance of that phrase—“the bureau was compelled
to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the
completely different living conditions, the ties of blood and
intellect, and historical dependence of the movements observed
by the bureau in those countries.
“In Scandinavia a progressively more outspoken pro-Anglo-Saxon
attitude based on economic considerations had become more
dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the bureau put
the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations
with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic
Society in Lübeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of
this society were attended by many outstanding personalities,
especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely
political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association
based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very
close relations, which led to further consequences, were
established with its founder.”
If the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the statement
which is 4 pages forward—in the intervening pages, I may say, there is
an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s bureau in various parts of
Europe, and indeed of the world, which I am not proposing to call the
Tribunal’s attention to at this stage—but if the Tribunal will look at
the last paragraph of the main body of the report which bears the
signature of the Defendant Rosenberg, the last two sentences read:
“With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task
as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections
in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.”
If the Tribunal will turn to the annex to the document, which is on the
next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what “exploitation of personal
connections” involved.
Annex I to the document is headed, “Brief Report on Activities of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.” It is
headed, “The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway
during the War Years 1939-40,” and it reads:
“As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
Scandinavia only Nasjonal Samling, led in Norway by the former
Minister of War and retired major, Vidkun Quisling, deserved
serious political attention. This was a fighting political group
possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic community. Naturally
all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent by any
means its success among the population. The bureau maintained
constant relation with Quisling and attentively observed the
attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class,
which had been taken in tow by the English. From the beginning
it appeared probable that without revolutionary events which
would stir the population from their former attitude no
successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected.
During the winter 1938-39 Quisling was privately visited by a
member of the bureau. When the political situation in Europe
came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the
convention of the Nordic Society in Lübeck in June. He expounded
his conception of the situation and his apprehensions concerning
Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically
decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area and to
the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the
Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German
Reich and Great Britain.
“Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to
the Marshal of the Reich, Göring, for aero-strategical reasons,
Quisling was referred to State Secretary Körner by the bureau.
The Staff Director of the bureau handed the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Führer . . . .”
In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a later stage of
my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will see how
Quisling came into contact with Raeder. The Prosecution’s submission
with regard to this document is that it is another illustration of the
close interweaving between the political and the military leadership of
the Nazi State, of the close link between the professional soldiers and
the professional thugs.
The Defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his
collaboration with Rosenberg; and I will invite the Court’s attention
once more to Document C-66, which is Exhibit GB-81. In the page headed
“Weserübung,” the second paragraph of the Raeder report reads as
follows:
“In the further developments, I was supported by Commander
Schreiber, Naval Attaché in Oslo, and the M-Chief personally—in
conjunction with the Rosenberg organization. Thus we got in
touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in the
beginning of December and were taken to the Führer by me—with
the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg . . . .”
I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the developments in
December.
The details of the manner in which the Defendant Raeder did make contact
personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I would draw the
Court’s attention to the Document C-65, which precedes . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?
MAJOR JONES: With your Lordship’s permission, I would like to revert to
that in a later stage in my unfolding of the evidence.
In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB-85, we have a report of
Rosenberg to Raeder in which the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness
for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was
reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder.
Paragraph 1 of that report deals with matters which I have already dealt
with in reading Rosenberg’s statement, 007-PS. But if the Court will
look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB-85, C-65, it reads as
follows:
“The reasons for a _coup_, on which Quisling made a report,
would be provided by the fact that the Storthing”—that is to
say the Norwegian parliament—“had, in defiance of the
constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which
is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains
in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister
of War the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed
me the original of a letter which he had received only a short
time previously from the commanding officer in Narvik, Colonel
Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the
fact that if things went on as they were going at present,
Norway was finished.”
If the Court will turn to the next page of that document, the last two
paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow the
government of his own country, by the traitor Quisling in collaboration
with the Defendant Rosenberg, will be indicated to the Court.
“A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of
a _coup_ and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians
to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a
purpose, being allotted their exact tasks and provided with
experienced and die-hard National Socialists who are practiced
in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with
all speed to Norway where details would then require to be
further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to
be taken over forthwith, and at the same time, the German Fleet
together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go
into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian
Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo.
Quisling has no doubts that such a _coup_, having been carried
out with instantaneous success, would immediately bring him the
approval of those sections of the army with which he at present
has connections; and thus it goes without saying that he has
never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the King
is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an
accomplished fact.”
How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of course, by
subsequent developments. The last sentence reads:
“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required
which accord with German calculations.”
The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole vocabulary
of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of treachery.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?
MAJOR JONES: That document does not bear a date.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 December 1945 at 1000 o’clock._]
FIFTEENTH DAY
Friday, 7 December 1945
_Morning Session_
MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the
Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy
against Norway at which the activities of the Defendants Raeder and
Rosenberg converged. And the Court will remember that I submitted in
evidence Document C-65, which was a report from the Defendant Rosenberg
to Raeder regarding Quisling and ending with the infamous words,
“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which
accord with German calculations.”
The Court has already received in evidence and has heard read material
parts of Document C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral
Assmann which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the Defendant Raeder
did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin.
I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for the purpose
of the record, will be Exhibit GB-86. The Court will observe that that
is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on the
12th of December 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the Defendants
Keitel and Jodl, and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to
Hitler.
The report is headed “Norwegian Question,” and the first sentence reads:
“Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—who of course was the Defendant
Raeder—“has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the
impression of being reliable.”
And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement of
Quisling’s views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because
of my reading of extracts from the Document 007-PS; but I draw the
Court’s attention to the fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning:
“The Führer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that
he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg
once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a
long while. Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—that is, of course,
Raeder—“suggests that if the Führer forms a favorable
impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with
Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation:
(a) By peaceful means—that is to say, German forces summoned by
Norway; (b) to agree to do so by force.”
That was the 12th of December, the meeting at which Raeder made this
report to Hitler.
If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is Raeder’s record of
these transactions for the purpose of history, the Court will observe,
in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66
headed “(b) Weserübung,” these words:
“. . . thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came
to Berlin at the beginning of December, and were taken to the
Führer by me with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.”
And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page:
“At the crucial moment R”—presumably Rosenberg—“hurt his foot,
so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th
December.”
That is, of course, Raeder’s note; and it indicates the extent of his
contact in this conspiracy. The report continues:
“On the grounds of the Führer’s discussion with Quisling and
Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December 1939, the
Führer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian
operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.
“Until that moment the naval operations staff had taken no part
in the development of the Norwegian question and continued to be
somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations which were
undertaken by Captain Krancke in the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces were founded, however, on a memorandum of the naval
war staff.”
The Court may well think that the note of the Defendant Raeder referring
to the crucial moment was an appropriate one because the Court will see
that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler gave the order that
preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.
If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is further on in
the document book and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg’s
report on the activities of his organization—it is after the “D”
documents—if the Court will turn to about 10 lines from the bottom of
the first page of Annex I dealing with Norway, the Court will see that
there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in
December; and I am going to read now the section beginning:
“As a result of these steps Quisling was granted a personal
audience with the Führer on the 16th of December, and once more
on the 18th of December. In the course of this audience the
Führer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a
completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of
Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and
to draw still other nations into the conflict.”
As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the case,
here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler
to induce him to take part in these operations.
The report continues:
“Should the enemy attempt”—there is a mis-translation here—“to
extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further
throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he
would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking.
In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity,
the Führer promised Quisling financial support of this movement,
which is based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military
exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the
special military staff which transmitted special missions to
Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political
exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs”—that is to say, by Ribbentrop’s
organization—“the Minister for Foreign Affairs”—that is to
say, Ribbentrop—“being kept continuously informed by the
Foreign Affairs Bureau”—which, of course, was Rosenberg’s
organization.
“Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison
with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was
assigned to the Naval Attaché in Oslo . . . . Orders were given
that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.”
Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi
politicians and the Nazi service chiefs.
The information that is available to the Prosecution as to the events of
January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of
the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the
Court to consider a letter of Keitel’s, Document C-63, which for the
purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-87. The Court will observe
that that is an order—a memorandum—signed by the Defendant Keitel
dated the 27th of January 1940. It is marked “Most secret, five copies;
reference, Study ‘N’;”—which was another code name for the Weserübung
preparations—“access only through an officer.” It is indicated that
“C-in-C of the Navy”—that is to say, the Defendant Raeder—“has a
report on this.” The document reads:
“The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes
that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and
personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the
general war policy. For these reasons the Führer has
commissioned me to take over the direction of further
preparations.
“A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces headquarters for this purpose, and this represents
at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.”
Then, at the end of the memorandum:
“All further plans will be made under the cover name
Weserübung.”
I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the
importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to
the date of this important decision.
Prior to this date, the 27th of January 1940, the planning of the
various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined
to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of
the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation. The issuance
of this directive of Keitel’s on the 27th January 1940 was the signal
that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had
accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for this
Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German
military machine to the task of producing practical and co-ordinated
plans for the Norwegian operation.
The Court will observe that from January onward the operational planning
for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal
channels.
And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary of the
Defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations progressed. That is Document
Number 1809-PS, which will be for the purposes of the record Exhibit
GB-88. That, the Court will observe, is the last document in the
document book.
There is a slight confusion in the order in which the entries are set
out in the diary because the first three pages relate to entries which
will be dealt with in another part of the case.
I invite the Court’s attention to Page 3 of these extracts from Jodl’s
diary beginning at the bottom February the 6th. The entry under the date
line of February the 6th 1940 starts, “New idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser
Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of
the war.”
I would like to repeat that entry if I may be permitted to do so. “New
idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s
neutrality for the duration of the war.”
The next entry to which I invite the Court’s attention is the entry of
the 21st of February.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean, to “carry out ‘H’”?
MAJOR JONES: That is a reference to another code word, “Hartmut,” which
the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document. That is another
code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation.
The entry of February 21st in Jodl’s diary reads:
“Führer has talked with General Von Falkenhorst and charges him
with preparation of Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly.
Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces.”
Then the next entry, on the next page . . .
THE PRESIDENT: “Weser Exercise”—is that Norway too?
MAJOR JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a translation of
“Weserübung.”
The entry on the next page, under the date of February the 28th:
“I propose first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Führer that
Case Yellow”—which as the Court knows is the code name for the
invasion of the Netherlands—“and Weser Exercise”—the invasion
of Norway and Denmark—“must be prepared in such a way that they
will be independent of one another as regards both time and
forces employed. The Führer completely agrees, if this is in any
way possible.”
So that the Court will observe that the new idea of February the 6th
that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved had been abandoned by
February the 28th.
The next entry is of February the 29th—I am not troubling the Court
with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to the forces
to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark. February 29th, the
second paragraph:
“Führer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen
and a plan elaborated in detail showing how individual coastal
batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chief
of Land Defense, instructed to make out immediately the order of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and Chief ‘WZ’ to make out a
similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff.”
And there for the moment, I will leave the entries in Jodl’s diary and
refer the Court to the vital Document C-174, which for the purposes of
the record will be Exhibit GB-89. The Court will see from that document
that it is Hitler’s operation order to complete the preparations for the
invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of the 1st of March
1940, and it is headed, “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces; most secret.” Then, “Directive for Case Weserübung”:
“The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and
Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—Weser Exercise.
This operation should prevent British encroachment on
Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore
base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start
line against Britain.”
The second part of Paragraph 1 reads:
“In view of our military and political power in comparison with
that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the
Weser Exercise will be kept as small as possible. The numerical
weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise
execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the
operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which
is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian
States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the
governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary,
demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the
necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be
met with, all military means will be used to crush it.”
There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page:
“I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the
operation against Denmark and Norway the commanding general of
the 21st Army Corps, General Von Falkenhorst.”
Paragraph 3:
“The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway
must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations
must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy
seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply
immediately our own counter measures.
“It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as
the western opponents should be taken by surprise by our
measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and
of readiness, drafting, and embarkation of the troops, must be
made with this factor in mind.
“In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious objectives.”
Then Paragraph 4 on the next page, “The Occupation of Denmark,” which is
given the code name of “Weserübung Süd”:
“The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of
Fünen immediately after occupation of Zealand.
“Added to this, having secured the most important places, the
group will break through as quickly as possible from Fünen to
Skagen and to the east coast.”
Then there follow other instructions with regard to the operation.
Paragraph 5:
“Occupation of Norway, ‘Weserübung Nord’”:
“The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most
important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.
“The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the
transport by sea of the landing troops.”
And there follows a reference to the part of the Air Force, and I would
like particularly to draw the Court’s attention to that reference. This
is Paragraph 5 on Page 3 of Hitler’s directive:
“The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will
ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air
warfare against Britain.”
I am underlining that entry at this stage because I shall be referring
to it in connection with a later document.
Whilst these preparations were being made and just prior to the final
decision of Hitler . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the defendant by whom it
was initialed, Frick, on the first page of that document.
MAJOR JONES: That is an initial by Fricke. That is a different person
altogether. That is a high functionary in the German Admiralty and has
no connection with the defendant who is before the Tribunal.
As I was saying, My Lord, while these decisions were being made reports
were coming in through Rosenberg’s organization from Quisling; and if
the Court will again turn for the last time to Document 007-PS, which is
Rosenberg’s report, the Tribunal will observe the kind of information
which Rosenberg’s organization was supplying at this time. The third
paragraph, “Quisling’s reports”—that is in Annex I in Rosenberg’s
report, the section dealing with Norway, Page 6 on my copy—referring to
the second page of the annex, the paragraph beginning with:
“Quisling’s reports transmitted to his representative in
Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers in Norway, with tacit consent
of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January.
These increasingly better substantiated communications were in
sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo
which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian
Nygardsvold Cabinet and was convinced of that government’s
intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in
Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany
maintained closest relations with him; he therefore succeeded in
gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the
Nygardsvold Cabinet and in listening to the Cabinet members’
true views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the
bureau”—Rosenberg’s bureau—“which conveyed the news to the
Führer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the
16th to 17th February English destroyers attacked the German
steamer _Altmark_ in Jössingfjord.”
The Tribunal will remember that that is a reference to the action by the
British destroyer _Cossack_ against the German naval auxiliary vessel
_Altmark_ which was carrying 300 British prisoners captured on the high
seas to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of
the British Delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that
was being made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in
fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality and the action
taken by _H.M.S. Cossack_ which was restricted to rescuing the 300
British prisoners on board—no attempt being made to destroy the
_Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board of her—was fully
justified under international law.
Now the Rosenberg report which I interrupted to give that statement of
the British view on the _Altmark_ episode—the Rosenberg report
continues:
“The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted
the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived
at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such
assumption was confirmed by reports of Chief of Section Scheidt,
who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling.
But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo
championed the opposite view and went on record as believing in
the good intentions of the Norwegians.”
And so the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred the
reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German
diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of
reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and
Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion
are again found in Jodl’s diary, which is the last document in the
document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of the 3rd of March.
“The Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a
swift entry into N”—which is Norway—“with strong forces.
“No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid
acceleration of the attack necessary.”
Then the last entry on March the 3rd:
“Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow
with a few days interval.”
So that the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the
German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the
fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low
Countries; and the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that
by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a
Norwegian aggression.
The next entry in Jodl’s diary of the 5th of March:
“Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about Weser
Exercise; Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till
now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all
preparations so far made are worthless.
“Result:
“(a) Stronger forces to Narvik; (b) Navy to leave ships in the
ports (_Hipper_ or _Lützow_ in Trondheim); (c) Christiansand can
be left out at first; (d) six divisions envisaged for Norway;
(e) a foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen also.”
Then the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court’s attention is
the entry of the 13th of March, which the Court may think is one of the
most remarkable in the whole documentation of this case:
“Führer does not give order yet for ‘W.’”—Weser Exercise—
“He is still looking for justification.”
The entry of the next day, the 14th of March, shows a similar
pre-occupation on the part of Hitler with seeking justification for this
flagrant aggression. It reads:
“English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines;
doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent
operations by Germans. Führer has not yet decided what reason to
give for Weser Exercise.”
And then I would like the Court to look at the entry for the 21st of
March, which by inadvertence has been included in the next page at the
bottom of Page 6:
“Misgivings of Task Force 21 . . .”
The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already that Task
Force 21 was Falkenhorst’s force, which was detailed to conduct this
invasion.
“Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval between
taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and closing of
diplomatic negotiations. Führer rejects any earlier negotiations
as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If
resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political
plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken and
even exaggerate them.”
Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next entry, if the
Court will turn to Page 5, of the 28th of March, the third sentence:
“Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the
Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the
other three commanders are worrying about matters which are none
of their business. Krancke sees more disadvantages than
advantages.
“In the evening the Führer visits the map room and roundly
declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the
Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will
have to remain occupied by naval forces.”
There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the faithful
collaborator of Hitler.
Then April the 2d:
“1530 hours. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force,
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Von Falkenhorst with
the Führer. All confirm preparations completed. Führer orders
carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April the 9th.”
Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th of April:
“Führer drafts the proclamations. Pieckenbrock, Chief of
Military Intelligence I, returns with good result from the talks
with Quisling in Copenhagen.”
Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued most active.
The Prosecution has in its possession a large number of operation orders
that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and
Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court’s attention to two of them
to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and the deception that was used
by the defendants and their confederates in the course of that
aggression. I would now draw the Court’s attention to Document C-115,
which for the purpose of the record will be Exhibit GB-90. First of all
I will draw the Court’s attention to the second paragraph, “General
Orders,” with a date, “4th of April 1940”:
“The barrage-breaking vessels”—Sperrbrecher—“will penetrate
inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fjord disguised as
merchant steamers.
“Challenge from coastal signal stations and look-outs are to be
answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers.
I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the
operation before zero hour.”
Then the next entry is an order for reconnaissance forces dated the 24th
of March 1940, “Behavior during entrance into the harbor.” The third
paragraph is the part to which I wish to draw the Court’s attention:
“The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as
possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be
answered in English. In answer to questions a text with
something like the following content will be chosen:
“‘Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.’
“Challenges to be answered, with names of British warships:
“_Köln_—_H.M.S. Cairo; Königsberg-_-_H.M.S. Calcutta;
Bremse_—_H.M.S. Faulkner; Karl Peters_—_H.M.S. Halcyon;
Leopard_—British destroyer; _Wolf_—British destroyer;
S-boats—British motor torpedo boats.
“Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be
illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke screen.”
And then finally the next order dated the 24th of March 1940, Annex 3,
“From Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces; most secret.” Next page, page
two:
“Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our
own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of
passing craft. To challenge in case of the _Köln_—‘_H.M.S.
Cairo_’; then to order to stop—‘(1) Please repeat last signal,
(2) Impossible to understand your signal’; in case of a warning
shot—‘Stop firing, British ship, good friend’; in case of an
inquiry as to destination and purpose—‘Going Bergen, chasing
German steamers.’”
Then I would draw the Court’s attention to Document C-151, which for the
purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-91, which is a Dönitz order in
connection with this operation. If the Court will observe, it is headed:
“Top secret, Operation Order—‘Hartmut.’ Occupation of Denmark
and Norway.
“This order comes into force on the code word Hartmut. With its
coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking
part lose their validity.
“The day and hour are designated as Weser-Day and Weser-Hour,
and the whole operation is known as Weser Exercise.
“The operation ordered by the code word has as its objective the
rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously
Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land
side.”
And there is at the end of that paragraph another contribution by Dönitz
to this process of deception:
“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British
flag until the troops have landed except, presumably, at
Narvik.”
The Tribunal now knows as a matter of history that on the 9th of April
1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of
Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun a
German memorandum was handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark
attempting to justify the German action; and I would like to draw the
Court’s attention to Document TC-55, Exhibit GB-92. That is at the
beginning of the book of documents—the sixth document of the book. I am
not proposing to read the whole of that memorandum; I have no doubt the
defending counsel will deal with any parts which they consider relevant
to the defense. The Court will observe that it is alleged that England
and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of
international law and that Britain and France were making plans
themselves to invade and occupy Norway and that the Government of Norway
was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation.
The memorandum states—and I would now draw the Court’s attention to
Page 3 of the memorandum to the paragraph just below the middle of the
page beginning “The German Troops”:
“The German troops, therefore, do not set foot on Norwegian soil
as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use
of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations
against England as long as it is not forced to do so by measures
taken by England and France; German military operations aim much
more exclusively at protecting the north against proposed
occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces.”
In connection with that statement I would remind the Court that in his
operation order of the 1st of March Hitler had then given orders to the
Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against
Britain. That is the 1st of March. And this is the memorandum which was
produced as an excuse on the 9th of April. The last two paragraphs of
the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark, the Court may think, are a
classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat.
They read:
“The Reich Government thus expect that the Royal Norwegian
Government and the Norwegian people will respond with
understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to
them. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all
possible means by the German forces employed, and would
therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal
Norwegian Government are therefore requested to take all
measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of
the German troops can take place without friction and
difficulty. In the spirit, of the good German-Norwegian
relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declare
to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention
of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the
future.”
What the Nazis meant by the protection of the Kingdom of Norway was
shown by their conduct on the 9th of April. I now refer the Court to
Document TC-56, which will be Exhibit GB-93, which is a report by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces. It is at the beginning
of the document book, the last of the TC documents.
I will not trouble the Court with the first page of the report. If the
Tribunal will turn to the second page:
“The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and
the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity
of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to
paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their
country and at the same time to prevent Allied intervention, it
was planned to capture all the more important towns along the
coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament
and other military and civilian people occupying important
positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could
be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new
government with Quisling as its head.”
The next paragraph was read by the learned British Attorney General in
his speech and I will only refer to the last paragraph but one:
“The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns
along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight
losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser _Blücher_,
carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division,
technical staffs, and specialists who were to take over the
control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and
members of the Government and Parliament failed. In spite of the
surprise of the attack resistance was organized throughout the
country.”
That is a brief picture of what occurred in Norway.
What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the
Royal Danish Government, a copy of which I hand in as Exhibit GB-94 and
an extract from which is in Document D-628, which follows the C
documents.
“Extracts from the memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude
towards Denmark”—before and during the occupation—“prepared by
the Royal Danish Government.
“On the 9th of April 1940 at 0420 hours”—in the morning that
is—“the German Minister appeared at the private residence of
the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air
Attaché of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a
telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4 o’clock the same
morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive
proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and
Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this
reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and
landing at various points in Zealand, including the port of
Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over
Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice.
It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance, as any
resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany
would guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political
independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal
government of Denmark but wanted only to make sure of the
neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the
German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war . . . .
“The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the
allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was
completely without foundation; there was no possibility of
anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested
against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which, according
to the German Minister’s statement, was in progress. The
Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not
give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the
King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the
German Minister knew as everybody else that the Danish Armed
Forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality
so that fighting presumably had already taken place. In reply
the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent,
not least to avoid air bombardment.”
What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British
Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary, which the
Tribunal will find in D-627, the document preceding the one which I have
just read. That document, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-95.
That dispatch reads:
“The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by
members of my staff, from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable
information subsequently received and are given below. Early in
the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports
steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor while a number of
airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery guarding the
harbor approach fired a warning shot at these planes when it was
seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this the
Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels
fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these
airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the
population to keep calm and co-operate with the Germans. I
enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a
bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of
detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers
landed with full equipment and marched to Kastellet, the old
fortress of Copenhagen and now barracks. The door was locked so
the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and rounded
up all the Danish soldiers within together with the womenfolk
employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it
appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer
tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot
before they could get away. He died in hospital 2 days later.
After seizing the barracks a detachment was sent to Amalienborg,
the King’s palace, where they engaged the Danish sentries on
guard wounding three, one of them fatally . . . . Meanwhile a
large fleet of bombers flew over the city at low altitude.”
Then, the last paragraph of the dispatch reads:
“It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in
Jutland . . . . It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded
Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th of April and were at
first resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties
. . . . The chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to
which the forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The
chief permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance,
motored into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th of April and
drove blithely past a sentry who challenged him in blissful
ignorance that this was not one of his own men. It took a
bullet, which passed through the lapels of his coat, to
disillusion him.”
The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish Governments spoke of
the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political
independence of those two small countries.
I will close by drawing the Court’s attention to two documents which
indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political independence
the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression.
I will first draw the Court’s attention to an entry in Jodl’s diary,
which is the last document in the book, on the last page of the book,
the entry dated 19th April:
“Renewed crisis. Envoy Brauer”—that is the German Minister to
Norway—“is recalled. Since Norway is at war with us, the task
of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Führer’s opinion force
has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given
a post. Field Marshal”—which, as the Court will see from the
other entries, is presumably a reference to the Defendant
Göring—“is moving in the same direction. He criticizes as
defect that we did not take sufficiently energetic measures
against the civilian population, that we could have seized
electrical plant, that the Navy did not supply enough troops.
The Air Force cannot do everything.”
The Court will see from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter
Terboven that already by the 19th of April rule by Gauleiter had
replaced rule by Norwegians.
The final document is Document C-41, which will be Exhibit GB-96, which
is a memorandum dated the 3rd of June 1940 signed by Fricke, who, of
course, has no connection with the Defendant Frick. Fricke was at that
date the head of the operations division of the German naval war staff,
a key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations.
That is why, as the Tribunal noticed, he came to be initialing the
important naval documents.
That memorandum is as I have said, dated 3rd June 1940 and relates to
questions of territorial expansion and bases:
“These problems are pre-eminently of a political character and
comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it
is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially
affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in
which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and
operation of the Navy.
“It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s
present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in
the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of states and
under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of
Greater Germany. If over and above this one extends these
strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not
continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural
geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other
an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the
war.
“The solution could perhaps be found among the following
possibilities:
“1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and northern France
acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied
and organized that they can in the future be considered as
German possessions.
“This solution will recommend itself for areas where the
severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy
and where a gradual germanizing of the territory appears
practicable.
“2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct
connection with Germany’s main body and which, like the Russian
solution in Hangö, remain permanently as an enclave in the
hostile state. Such areas might be considered possible around
Brest and Trondheim . . . .
“3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired
in this war should result in the existing population of these
areas feeling themselves and being politically, economically,
and militarily completely dependent on Germany. If the following
results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I
shall describe later) by means of the military measures for
occupation taken during the war, that French powers of
resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, armed
forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of
the question, that the smaller states such as the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which
will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to
occupy these countries again—then in practice the same, but
psychologically much more, will be achieved.”
Then Fricke recommends:
“The solution given in 3), therefore, appears to be the proper
one—that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium and part of
northern and eastern France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark,
and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above.”
Then, the culminating paragraph of this report of Fricke reads as
follows:
“Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will
make an extension of these demands possible.”
The submission of the Prosecution is that that and other documents which
have been submitted to the Court tear apart the veil of the Nazi
pretenses. These documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of
Göring; they expose as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show
the reality behind the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in
treason like Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid
the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present that
part of Count Two which relates to the allegations with regard to
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In Charges II, III, IV, IX,
XI, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX, and XXIII there are charges of violating
certain treaties and conventions and violating certain assurances. So
far as the treaties are concerned, some of them have been put in
evidence already, and I will indicate that when I come to them. May I,
before I come to the detail, remind the Tribunal of the history of these
unfortunate countries, the Netherlands and Belgium; especially Belgium,
which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe.
The independence of Belgium was guaranteed as the Tribunal will
remember, in 1839 by the great European powers. That guarantee was
observed for 75 years until it was shamelessly broken in 1914 by the
Germans, who brought all the horrors of war to Belgium and all the even
greater horrors of a German occupation of Belgium. History was to repeat
itself in a still more shocking fashion some 25 years after in 1940 as
the Tribunal already knows.
The first treaty which was mentioned in these charges is the Hague
Convention of 1907. That has been put in by my learned friend, Sir
David, and I think I need say nothing about it.
The second treaty is the Locarno Convention, the Arbitration and
Conciliation Convention of 1925. My Lord, that was between Germany and
Belgium. That was put in by Sir David. It is GB-15, and I think I need
say nothing more about that.
Belgium’s independence and neutrality was guaranteed by Germany in that
document.
My Lords, the next treaty is the Hague Arbitration Convention of May
1926 between Germany and the Netherlands. That Document I ought formally
to put in. It is in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, which perhaps I may call
RGB in the future for brevity; and it, no doubt, will be treated as a
public document. But in my bundle of documents, which goes in the order
in which I propose to refer to them, I think it is more convenient for
the presentation of my case. That is the second or third document,
TC-16.
THE PRESIDENT: It is Book 4, is it?
MR. ROBERTS: It is Book 4, My Lord. This is the Convention of
Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands signed
at The Hague in May 1926. Your Lordships have the document; perhaps I
need read only Article I:
“The contracting parties”—those are the Netherlands and the
German Reich—“undertake to submit all disputes of any nature
whatever which may arise between them which it has not been
possible to settle by diplomacy and which have not been referred
to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be dealt with
by arbitration or conciliation as provided.”
And then, My Lords, there follow all the clauses which deal merely with
the machinery of conciliation, which are unnecessary for me to read. May
I just draw attention to the last article, Article 21, which provides
that the Convention shall be valid for 10 years, and then shall remain
in force for successive periods of 5 years until denounced by either
party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all.
I put that document in as Document TC-16, which will be Exhibit GB-97;
and a certified copy is put in and a translation for the Court.
As the Tribunal already knows, in 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact was made
at Paris, by which all the powers renounced recourse to war. That is put
in as GB-18, and I need not, I think, put it in or refer to it again.
Then the last treaty—all of which, of course, belong to the days of the
Weimar Republic—is the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and
Luxembourg executed in 1929. That is Document TC-20 in the bundle. It is
two documents further on than the one the Tribunal has last referred to.
That is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and
Luxembourg signed at Geneva in 1929. May I just read the first few words
of Article 1, which are familiar:
“The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means
in accordance with the present treaty all disputes of any nature
whatever which may arise between them and which it may not be
possible to settle by diplomacy.”
And then there follow the clauses dealing with the machinery for
peaceful settlement of disputes, which follow the common form.
My Lord, those were the treaty obligations. May I put in that last
treaty, TC-20, which will be Exhibit GB-98.
My Lord, those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium
at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933; and as you have
heard from my learned friend, Hitler adopted and ratified the
obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with regard to the
treaties which had been entered into. My Lord, nothing more occurred to
alter the position of Belgium until in March 1936. Germany reoccupied
the Rhineland, announced, of course, the resumption of conscription, and
so on. And Hitler on the 7th of March 1936 purported in a speech to
repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno
Pact; the reason given being the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of
1935. Sir David has dealt with that and has pointed out that there was
no legal foundation for this claim to be entitled to renounce
obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was, of course, left in
the air in the sense that it had entered itself into various obligations
under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations
acknowledged; and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of
Germany to observe the pact, had been renounced.
And so My Lord, on the 30th of January 1937, perhaps because Hitler
realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler, in the
next document in the bundle, TC-33 and 35, which I hand in and which
will be Exhibit GB-99, gave the solemn assurance—he used the word
“solemn”—to Belgium and to the Netherlands. That has already been read
by the Attorney General and so I don’t want to read it again. But the
Tribunal will see that it is a full guarantee. In April of 1937 in a
document which is not before the Court, France and England released
Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. It is a matter of
history and it does occur in an exhibit, but it hasn’t been copied.
Belgium, of course, gave guarantees of strict independence and
neutrality; and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should
Belgium be attacked. And it was because of that that Germany on the 13th
of October 1937—in the next document—gave a very clear and
unconditional guarantee to Belgium—Document TC-34, which I offer in
evidence as Exhibit GB-100—the German declaration of the 13th of
October 1937, which shows the minutes:
“I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the
following communication to Your Excellency:
“The German Government have taken cognizance with particular
interest of the public declaration in which the Belgian
Government define the international position of Belgium. For
their part they have repeatedly given expression, especially
through the declaration of the Chancellor of the German Reich in
his speech of the 30th of January 1937, to their own point of
view. The German Government have also taken cognizance of the
declaration made by the British and French Governments on the
24th of April 1937.”
That is a document to which I have previously referred.
“Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of
Locarno may still take some time and being desirous of
strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the
German Government regard it as appropriate to define now their
own attitude towards Belgium. To this end they make the
following declaration:
“First: The German Government have taken note of the views which
the Belgian Government have thought fit to express. That is to
say, (a) of the policy of independence which they intend to
exercise in full sovereignty; (b) of their determination to
defend the frontiers of Belgium with all their forces against
any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory from
being used for purposes of aggression against another state as a
passage or as a base of operation by land, by sea, or in the
air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an efficient
manner to this purpose.
“Second: The German Government consider that the inviolability
and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western
Powers. They confirm their determination that in no
circumstances will they impair this inviolability and integrity,
and that they will at all times respect Belgian territory
except, of course, in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a
military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in
which Germany is involved.
“Third: The German Government, like the British and French
Governments, are prepared to assist Belgium should she be
subjected to an attack or to invasion.”
And then, on the following page:
“The Belgian Government have taken note with great satisfaction
of the declaration communicated to them this day by the German
Government. They thank the German Government warmly for this
communication.”
My Lord, may I pause there to emphasize that document. There in October
of 1937 is Germany giving a solemn guarantee to this small nation of its
peaceful aspiration towards her and its assertion that the integrity of
the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her and Belgium and
the other Western Powers.
You have before you to try the leaders of the German Government and the
leaders of the German Armed Forces. One doesn’t have to prove, does one,
that every one of those accused must have known perfectly well of that
solemn undertaking given by his government? Every one of these accused
in their various spheres of activity—some more actively than the
others—were party to the shameless breaking of that treaty two and a
half years afterwards, and I submit that on the ordinary laws of
inference and justice all those men must be fixed as active
participators in that disgraceful breach of faith which brought misery
and death to so many millions.
Presumably it will be contended on the part, for instance, of Keitel and
Jodl that they were merely honorable soldiers carrying out their duty.
This Tribunal, no doubt, will inquire what code of honor they observe
which permits them to violate the pledged word of their country.