Part II is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.”

It might perhaps be more accurately described as “pre-March 1939

evidence,” and it will be with that part that I would now deal.

My Lord, it has been put to the Tribunal that the actions against

Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation

for further aggression, and I now—dealing with the early history of

this matter—wish to draw the Court’s particular attention only to those

parts of the evidence which show that even at that time, before the

Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly

prepared to fight England, Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve

those preliminary aims; that they appreciated the whole time that they

might well have to do so. And, what is more, although not until after

March 1939 did they commence upon their immediate and specific

preparations for war against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a

considerable time before had it in mind specifically to attack Poland

once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs.

During this period also—and this happens throughout the whole story of

the Nazi regime in Germany—during this period, as afterwards, while

they are making their preparations and carrying out their plans, they

are giving to the outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull

them out of any suspicion of their real object.

The dates, I think—as the learned Attorney General said in addressing

you yesterday—the dates in this case, almost more than the documents,

speak for themselves. The documents in this book are arranged in the

order in which I will refer to them, and the first that I would refer to

is Document TC-70, which will go in as GB-25.

It is only interesting to see what Hitler said of the agreement with

Poland when it was signed in January 1934:

“When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the

relations between the two countries seemed to me more than

unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing

differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the

Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom,

would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which, if

persisted in, might only too easily acquire the character of a

dangerous traditional enmity.”

I go down to the one but last paragraph.

“In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing

and prepared also to cultivate economic-political relations with

Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable

suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation.

It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this

same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been

enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with

its Polish neighbor.”

That was in 1934. Three years later, again on the 30th of January,

speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said—this is Document PS-2368, which

will be GB-26. I will, if I may, avoid so far as possible repeating

passages which the Attorney General quoted in his speech the other day.

The first paragraph, in fact, he quoted to the Tribunal. It is a short

paragraph but perhaps I might read it now, but I will—dealing with this

evidence—so far as possible avoid repetition:

“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension

and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the

European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland

which has worked out to the advantage of both sides . . . . True

statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them.

The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The

German nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to

my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and

the Polish State have also become a reality.”

That was on the 30th of January 1937.

On the 24th of June 1937 we have a top-secret order, C-175, which has

already been put in as USA-69. It is a top-secret order issued by the

Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,

signed “Von Blomberg.” It has at the top, “Written by an officer . . . .

Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it

. . . are to be written by an officer.” So it is obviously highly

secret. And with it is enclosed a directive for the unified preparation

for war of the Armed Forces to come into force on the 1st of August

1937. The directive enclosed with it is divided into Part 1, “General

Guiding Principles”; Part 2, “Likely Warlike Eventualities”; Part 3,

“Special Preparations.”

The Tribunal will remember that the Attorney General quoted the opening

passages:

“The general political position justifies the supposition that

Germany need not consider an attack from any side.”

It goes on—the second paragraph:

“The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little

by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation,

which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a

continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces to

counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military

exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they

occur.”

It then goes on to set out the preparations which are to be made, and I

would particularly draw the Tribunal’s attention to Paragraph 2b:

“The further working on mobilization without public announcement

in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war

suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time.”

On the next page, under Paragraph 4:

“Special preparations are to be made for the following

eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike

entanglements with Red Spain.”

And thirdly, and this shows so clearly how they appreciated at that time

that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve

them in war:

“England, Poland, and Lithuania take part in a war against us.”

If the Tribunal would turn over to Part 2 of that directive, Page 5 of

that document:

“For the treatment of probable warlike eventualities

(concentrations) the following suppositions, tasks, and orders

are to be considered as basic:

“1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.

“Suppositions. In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may

side with France, either at once or later, or not at all. It is

also possible that France may violate Belgium’s neutrality if

the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of

Luxembourg.”

I pass to Part 3, which will be found on Page 9 of that Exhibit, and I

particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the heading

“Special Case—Extension Red-Green”. It will be remembered that Red was

Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia.

“The military political starting point used as a basis for

concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either

England, Poland, or Lithuania . . . join the side of our

opponents. Thereupon our military position would deteriorate to

an unbearable, even hopeless extent. The political leadership

will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral,

above all England and Poland.”

Thereafter, it sets out the conditions which are to be the basis for the

discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be noted: June

1937; and it shows clearly that at that date anyway, the Nazi Government

appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England,

and Poland, and France, and were perfectly prepared to do so, if they

had to. On the 5th of November 1937—the Tribunal will remember—Hitler

held his conference in the Reich Chancellery, the minutes of which have

been referred to as the Hossbach notes. I refer to only one or two lines

of that document to draw the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler

said in respect to England, Poland, and France. On Page 1 of that

Exhibit, the middle of the page:

“The Führer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the

security and preservation of the nation and its propagation.

This is consequently a problem of space.’”

He then went on, you will remember, to discuss what he described

“participation in world economy,” and at the bottom of Page 2 he said:

“The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the

securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times

has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of

nations.”

And at the end of that first paragraph on Page 3:

“The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has

proved that every space expansion can be effected only by

breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are

unavoidable. Neither formerly, nor today, has space been found

without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the

proprietor.”

My Lord, it is clear that that reference was not only . . .

THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] It has been read already.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My object was only to try to collect, so far as

England and Poland were concerned, the evidence that had been given. I

would welcome in actual fact if the Tribunal thought that it was

unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity to . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish you not to read anything that has

been read already.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I would pass then to the next document in that

part of your document book. I put that document in. It was referred to

by the Attorney General in his address yesterday, and it shows that on

the same date the Hossbach meeting was taking place, a communiqué was

being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador’s audience with

Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation that it

was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with

difficulties because of the Danzig question. That Document is TC-73. I

put it in as GB-27. On the 2d of January . . .

THE PRESIDENT: That hasn’t been read before, has it?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his

opening.

THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2d of January 1938 some unknown person

wrote a memorandum for the Führer. This document was one of the German

Foreign Office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied

troops when they came into Germany. It is headed, “Very

confidential—personal only,” and is called, “Deductions on the Report,

German Embassy, London, regarding the Future Form of Anglo-German

Relations”:

“With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a

_status quo_ in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a

military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an

agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British

politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that

has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will

Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate

camps and will they march once more against each other one day?

To answer this question, one must realize the following:

“A change of the _status quo_ in the East in the German sense

can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows that

England, which so to speak, has taken on a guarantee to aid

France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for

her eastern allies is probable, in any case, always possible,

and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies

then even if England does not want war. England, believing she

must defend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in

automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between

England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who

could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way

of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows, therefore,

that war between Germany and England on account of France can be

prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s

forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common

victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby

France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-French

coalition would never tolerate.

“This position would arise for instance if England, through

insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by

a superior coalition of powers, for example, Germany, Italy,

Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places,

would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in

Europe.”

The next page goes on to discuss the possibilities of a strong

partnership between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my quotation

to the next page where the writer is summarizing his ideas.

Paragraph 5:

“Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.

“1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to

the protection of the interests of our friends.

“2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted

tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a

tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the

winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours

directly or indirectly.

“Close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the

three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we

confront England, be it in a settlement or in war. England is

going to be a hard and astute opponent in this game of

diplomacy.

“The particular question whether, in the event of a war by

Germany in Central Europe . . .”—I am afraid the translation of

this is not very good—“The particular question whether, in the

event of a war by Germany in Central Europe, France, and thereby

England, would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the

time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military

considerations which cannot be gone into here.”

And whoever it was that wrote that document appears to be on a fairly

high level, because he concludes by saying:

“I should like to give the Führer some of these points of view

verbally:”

That document is GB-28.

Well, I am afraid that the next two documents have gotten into your

books in the wrong order. If you would refer to 2357-PS which is the one

following our L-43—it will be remembered that document to the Führer

which I have just read was dated the 2d of January 1938.

On the 20th of January 1938 Hitler spoke in the Reichstag.

THE PRESIDENT: February, the document said.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon—February 1938. That is

2357-PS, and will be GB-30. In that speech he said:

“In the fifth year following the first great foreign political

agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification

to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with

which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has

there been a _détente_, but in the course of these years there

has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work,

which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has

stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations

finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and

appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new

commissioner, the most dangerous spot from this point of view of

European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The

Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and

both the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And

so the way to friendly understanding has been successfully

paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today,

in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded

in finally taking the poison out of the relations between

Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere,

friendly co-operation.

“To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone

unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for

the task which is ahead of us—peace.”

I turn back to the next—to the document which was in your document

books, the one before that, L-43, which will be GB-29. This is a

document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday. It is dated

the 2d of May 1938, and is entitled “Organizational Study of 1930.” It

comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the

General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to be:

“The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly

conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization

of the Air Force. The result gained is termed ‘Distant

Objective.’ From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in

the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942. This will be

called ‘Final Objective 1942.’ This in turn yields what is

considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of

the staffs of the Air Force group commands, air Gaue, air

divisions, _et cetera_.”

The table of contents, the Tribunal will see, is divided into various

sections, and Section I is entitled “Assumptions.” If the Tribunal will

turn over to the next page one finds the assumption under the heading

“Assumptions I, frontier of Germany, see map, Enclosure 1.”

The Tribunal sees a reproduction of that map on the wall and it will be

seen that on the 2d of May 1938, the Air Force were envisaging Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all

coming within the bounds of the Reich. The original map is here attached

to this file and if the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it

will be seen that this organizational study has been prepared with the

greatest care and thoroughness, with a mass of charts attached as

appendices.

I would refer also to the bottom of the second page, to the Tribunal’s

copy of the translation:

“Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of

the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I:

1) Attack forces: Principal adversaries: England, France,

Russia.”

And it then goes on to say if all the 144 Geschwader are employed

against England, they must be concentrated in the western half of the

Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by

making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down

to the last corner.

THE PRESIDENT: It is perhaps involved in the map. I think perhaps you

should refer to the organization of the Air Force, with group commands

at Warsaw and Königsberg.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under the paragraph

“Assumptions,” Sub-heading 2, “Organization of the Air Force in

Peacetime,” seven group commands:

1-Berlin, 2-Brunswick, 3-Munich, 4-Vienna, 5-Budapest, 6-Warsaw, and

7-Königsberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. And lastly, in

connection with that document, on Page 4 of the Tribunal’s translation,

the last paragraph:

“The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air Force

grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have

locally bound commands . . . .”

I emphasize only the opening, “The more the Reich grows in area, and the

more the Air Force grows in strength . . .” Now I would say one word on

that document. The original, I understand, is signed by an officer who

is not at the top rank in the Air Force and I, therefore, don’t want to

overemphasize the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is

submitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the General Staff

of the Air Force were thinking at that date.

The Tribunal will remember that in February 1938 the Defendant

Ribbentrop succeeded Von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We have another

document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the 26th of August

1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed

to him as “the Reich Minister via the State Secretary.” It is a

comparatively short document and one that I will read in whole:

“The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem,

might easily, but must not, lead to a conflict with the

Entente.”—TC-76 becomes GB-31—“Neither France nor England is

looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps

leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct

foreign interference and through internal signs of

disintegration due to her own faults, suffer the fate she

deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step

by step, and would have to lead to a loss of power in the

remaining territory, by means of a plebiscite and an annexation

of territory.

“The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any

immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and

not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly.

Germany cannot fix any definite time when this fruit could be

plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the

desired developments.”

I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave out the

intervening lines, Paragraph 5.

THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph, “For this purpose

. . .”?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “For this purpose the slogan emanating

from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten

Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to

be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the

choice of nationality is being withheld from these Germans will

do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical

process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may

not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate

of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet

be clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely

sealed.

“This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be

recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is

unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of

boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and

northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact is”—I put in an

“is” because I think it is obviously left out of the copy that I

have in front of me.—

“The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question,

it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in

turn.

“But the later this assumption sinks in in international

politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however,

it is important for the time being, to carry on the German

policy, under the well-known and proved slogans of ‘the right to

autonomy’ and ‘racial unity.’ Anything else might be interpreted

as pure imperialism on our part, and provoke resistance by the

Entente at an earlier date and more energetically than our

forces could stand up to.”

That was on the 26th of August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was

leading up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or rather a day or

two before the Munich Agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech.

On the 26th of September he said—I think Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has

just read this document to the Tribunal. I’ll refer to only two lines of

it:

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this

problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems

for Germany in Europe.”

And again, the last document in your book, which is another extract from

that same speech, I will not read to the Tribunal unless the Tribunal

desire, because the Attorney General did quote it in full in his address

yesterday. These two documents are already in, TC-28 as GB-2, and TC-29,

which is the second extraction of that same speech, as GB-32.

My Lord, I would refer the Tribunal to one more document under this part

which has already been put in by my American colleagues. It is C-23, now

USA-49, and which appears before TC-28 in your document book. The

particular passage of that exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter

from Admiral Carls, which appears at the bottom of the second page. It

is dated some time in September, with no precise date, and is entitled,

“Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England.’ There is

full agreement with the main theme of the study.” Again, the Attorney

General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the

Tribunal will remember.

“If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire a

position of security as a world power she needs not only

sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval

communications and secure access to the ocean.”

That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich Agreement in

September 1938.

The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government

had hoped and had intended, and as a result, they were not prepared

straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or

elsewhere, but Your Lordships heard this morning, when Mr. Alderman

dealt in his closing remarks with the advantages that were gained by the

seizure of Czechoslovakia, what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent

occasions, that Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack

on Poland. It is, of course, obvious now that they intended and indeed

had taken the decision to proceed against Poland as soon as

Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. We know now, from what Hitler

said in talking to his military commanders at a later date. The Tribunal

will remember the speech where he said that from the first, he never

intended to abide by the Munich Agreement but that he had to have the

whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in

full force against Poland after September 1938, they did at once begin

to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig. Until—as the Tribunal

will see—until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March, no

pressure was put on; but immediately after the Sudetenland had been

occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland,

which would and was to lead eventually to their excuse, or so-called

justification for their attack on that country.

If the Tribunal would turn to Part 3. . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until 10 o’clock

tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 December at 1000 hours._]

FOURTEENTH DAY

Thursday, 6 December 1945

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request from the

defendants’ counsel that the Trial should be adjourned at Christmas for

a period of 3 weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the many interests which

must be considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and, as

the Trial must inevitably last for a considerable time, the Tribunal

considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and

their counsel but of every one concerned in the Trial that there should

be a recess. On the whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas

rather than at a later date when the Prosecution’s case has been

completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the Christmas week and

over the 1st of January, and will not sit after the session on Thursday,

the 20th of December, and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2d of

January.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to note the

American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the Tribunal will

return to Part III of that document book in which I included the

documents relating to the earlier discussions between the German and

Polish Governments on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the

Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the Munich

crisis in September 1938, and started, in the first place, as cautious

and friendly discussions until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had

finally been seized in March of the following year.

I would refer the Tribunal to the first document in that part, TC-73,

Number 44. That is a document taken from the official _Polish White

Book_, which I put in as Exhibit GB-27 (a). It gives an account of a

luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 24th

of October, where Ribbentrop saw Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to

Germany:

“In a conversation of the 24th of October, over a luncheon at

the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present,

Von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement

of issues between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion

of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the

retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would

agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and a

railway line across Pomorze (northern part of the corridor). In

exchange Von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an

extension of the Polish-German Agreement to 25 years and a

guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.”

I do not think I need read the following lines. I go to the last but one

paragraph:

“Finally, I said to Von Ribbentrop that I could see no

possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free

City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the

substance of this conversation to you.”

I would emphasize the submission of the Prosecution as to this part of

the case and that is that the whole question of Danzig was, indeed, as

Hitler has himself said, no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as

an excuse, a so-called justification, not for the seizure of Danzig, but

for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it

starting now. As we progress with the story it will become ever more

apparent that that is what the Nazi Government were really aiming

at—only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would

provide some kind of justification for walking into the rest of Poland.

I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from the

_Polish White Book_, TC-73, Number 45, which will be GB-27 (b). TC-73

will be the _Polish White Book_, which I shall put in later. That

document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign

Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Government in reply

to the suggestion put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on the 24th

of October. I need not read the first page. The history of Polish-German

relationship is set out, and the needs of Poland in respect of Danzig

are emphasized. I turn to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph

6:

“In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish

Government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: The

right of the German population of the city and the surrounding

villages to freedom of life and development, and the fact that

in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is

connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the

majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely

bound up with Poland.”

It then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the existing statute,

and I pass to Paragraph 7:

“Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and

desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a

friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich,

the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of

Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bilateral

Polish-German agreement. This agreement should guarantee the

existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of

national and cultural life to its German majority, and also

should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the

complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government

must state that any other solution, and in particular any

attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must

inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form

of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of

Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.”

And then finally in Paragraph 8:

“In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am

ready to have final conversations personally with the governing

circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you

should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that

my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would

be dangerous for the future.”

The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from

the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal, the return of

the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would

have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable, and the Polish Government

had warned the Nazi Government that it would be. They had offered to

enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what

the German Government had hoped. They had not agreed to the return of

Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been

accomplished.

Shortly afterward, within a week or so of that taking place, after the

Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions with the German

Government, we find another top-secret order, issued by the Supreme

Command of the Armed Forces, signed by the Defendant Keitel. It goes to

the OKH, OKM, and OKW and it is headed, “The First Supplement to the

Instruction Dated the 21st of October 1938”:

“The Führer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies

mentioned in the instructions of that date of 21 October 1938,

preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of

Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise . . . .

“The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition

is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a

politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.”

We remember, of course, that at that moment the remainder of

Czechoslovakia had not been seized and therefore they were not ready to

go to war with Poland. That document does show how the German Government

answered the proposal to enter into discussions. That is C-137 and will

become GB-33.

On the 5th of January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. It

is unnecessary to read the first part of that document, which is the

next in the Tribunal’s book, TC-73, Number 48, which will become GB-34.

In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an

account, Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always

followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discusses the

Danzig question and emphasizes that in the German view it must sooner or

later return to Germany. I quote the last but one paragraph of that

page:

“Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult

problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not

see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish

opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest

spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this

matter.

“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this

problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite

new, some new form, for which he used the term Körperschaft,

which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the

German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In

addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be

quite at ease, there would be no _faits accomplis_ in Danzig,

and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of

the Polish Government.”

The Tribunal will remember that in the very last document we looked at,

on the 24th of November, orders had already been received, or issued,

for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise;

yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign Minister that there is to be

no _fait accompli_ and he can be quite at his ease.

I turn to the next step, Document TC-73, Number 49, which will become

GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop, on the day after

the one to which I have just referred between Beck and Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the last

conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you. No, I did not. As I

say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The date in actual fact

does not appear on the copy I have got in my book. It does appear in the

_White Book_ itself.

“Mr. Beck asked Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas

previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German

statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today, for the first

time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the

Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw

no possibility whatever of agreement.”

I emphasize this last paragraph:

“In answer Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not

seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards

Poland was still a desire for the further building up of

friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of

clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and

interests of the two parties concerned.”

The Defendant Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one

expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939,

some fortnight or three weeks later, he was in Warsaw and made another

speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530, which will become

GB-36:

“In accordance with the resolute will of the German national

leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly

relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing

agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German

foreign policy. The political foresight and the principles

worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take

the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all

other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of

events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard

to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of

both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the

future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual

relations.”

And even so, the Nazi Government must have been still anxious that the

Poles were beginning to sit up—Your Lordship will remember the

expression “sit up” used in the note to the Führer—and to assume they

would be the next in turn, because on the 30th of January Hitler again

spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of January 1939, and gave further

assurances of their good faith.

That document, that extract, was read by the Attorney General in his

address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit. That is

TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37.

That, then, brings us up to the March 1939 seizure of the remainder of

Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and

Moravia.

If the Tribunal will now pass to the next part, Part IV, of that

document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where Hitler

and Jodl were setting out the advantage gained through the seizure of

the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will remember that Mr.

Alderman, in his closing remarks yesterday morning, dealt very fully

with that matter showing what advantages they did gain by that seizure

and showing on the chart that he had on the wall the immense

strengthening of the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave

that matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the Tribunal

should wish to refer to them, they are found in their correct order in

the story in that document book.

As soon as that occupation had been completed, within a week of marching

into the rest of Czechoslovakia, the heat was beginning to be turned on

against Poland.

If the Tribunal would pass to Document TC-73, which is about half way

through that document book—it follows after Jodl’s lecture, which is a

long document—TC-73, Number 61. It is headed: “Official Documents

concerning Polish-German Relations.” This will be GB-38.

On the 21st of March Mr. Lipski again saw Ribbentrop and the nature of

the conversation was generally very much sharper than that that had been

held a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden:

“I saw Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to

call in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their

entirety.

“He complained about our press, and the Warsaw students’

demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.”

I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which commences

with “further”:

“Further, Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at

Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler

put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in

exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig into

the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations

between you and him in Warsaw”—that is, between him, of course,

and Mr. Beck—“He said that there had been further conversations

between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had

pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these

suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an

unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had

received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his

suggestions. Ribbentrop had talked to the Chancellor, only

yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favor of

good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a

thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual

relations. Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression

that difficulties arising between us were also due to some

misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The problem needed to

be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion, our two States

were dependent on each other.”

I think it unnecessary that I should read the next page. Briefly,

Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Danzig should return

to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the following page:

“I stated”—that is Mr. Lipski—“I stated that now, during the

settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no

understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already

hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our

disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But

in regard to Slovakia, the position was far worse. I emphasized

our community of race, language, and religion, and mentioned the

help we had given in their achievement of independence. I

pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that

the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich

had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being

directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question

was a serious blow to our relations.

“Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered that this

could be discussed.

“I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation

between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might

go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk the matter over.

He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the

Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was

rejecting all his offers.

“Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his

conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Ribbentrop

answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter’s

return from Rome, and that they had discussed the Memel

question, which called for a solution.”

That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It was not very long

before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day

German Armed Forces marched in.

If the Tribunal would turn over—I think the next document is

unnecessary—turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39.

As a result of these events, not unnaturally, considerable anxiety was

growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish

Government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking

conversations with each other.

On the 31st of March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the

House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations

that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments—I

quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement:

“As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding

with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the

position of His Majesty’s Government in the meantime, before

those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the

House that during that period, in the event of any action which

clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish

Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their

national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves

bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their

power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to

this effect.

“I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make

it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as

do His Majesty’s Government.”

On the 6th of April, a week later, a formal communiqué was issued by the

Anglo-Polish Governments which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister

had given a week before and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her

support should she, Great Britain, be attacked. I need not read it all.

In fact, I need not read any of it. I put it in. It is TC-72, Number 18.

I put it in as GB-40.

The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain

were feeling at that time appear to have been well justified. During the

same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal will see in the next

document an order signed by Keitel. It emanates from the High Command of

the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3rd of April 1939. Its subject is:

“Directive for the Armed Forces 1939-40”:

“‘Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed

Forces for 1939-40’ is being reissued.

“Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued

in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

“Part II, Case White”—which is the code name for the operation

against Poland—“Part II, Case White, is attached herewith. The

signature of the Führer will be appended later.

“The Führer has added the following directives to Case White:

“1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation

can be carried out at any time from 1st of September 1939

onwards.”—This is in April, the beginning of April.

“2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to

draw up a precise timetable for Case White and to arrange by

conferences the synchronized timings among the three branches of

the Armed Forces.

“3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the

details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the

1st of May.”

That document, as the Tribunal will see on the following page under the

heading “Distribution”, went to the OKH, OKM, OKW.

THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the document, or are

they just notes?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document.

THE PRESIDENT: Directives from Hitler and Keitel, preparing for war.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are not. The

document starts from under the words “Translation of a document signed

by Keitel.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The first words being “top-secret.”

If the Tribunal will look at the second page, following after

“Distribution”, it will be seen that there follows a translation of

another document, dated the 11th of April, and that document is signed

by Hitler:

“I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the

Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with

these for the conduct of the war.”—No question about

war—“conduct of the war.”

“Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be

prepared for the following eventualities:

“I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and

protection against surprise air attacks;

“II. Case White;

“III. The Annexation of Danzig.

“Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military

authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike

development.” Again that document goes to the OKH, OKM, OKW.

On the next page of the copy the Tribunal have, the translation of Annex

I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German

Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under “Special Orders”:

“Legal Basis. It should be anticipated that a state of defense

or a state of war, as defined in the Reich defense law of the

4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and

demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be

based on the laws valid in peacetime.”

My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains some

other later documents to which I shall refer in chronological order.

The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by

the Anglo-Polish communiqué of the 6th of April, was seized upon by the

Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the crisis which they were

developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland.

On the 28th of April the German Government issued a memorandum in which

they alleged that the Anglo-Polish Declaration was incompatible with the

1934 agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of

entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had

unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement.

I would only quote three short passages, or four short passages, from

that document. It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42. Some of these

passages are worth quoting, if only to show the complete dishonesty of

the whole document on the face of it:

“The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British

declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations

recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According

to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish

Government and the British Government a temporary understanding,

to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement, which will

provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great

Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two

states being directly or indirectly threatened.”

Thereafter, the document sets out in the next three paragraphs the

history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the last

paragraph, Paragraph 5, on that page:

“The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish

Government with the British Government is in such obvious

contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago

that the German Government can take note only with surprise and

astonishment of such a violent and fundamental reversal of

Polish policy.

“Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may

be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement

is intended as a regular pact of alliance which, by reason of

its general sense and of the present state of political

relations, is directed exclusively against Germany. From the

obligation now accepted by the Polish Government, it appears

that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active

part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of

aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect

Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against

the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934

declaration.”

I think I can omit Paragraph 6. Paragraph 7:

“The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to

accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to

be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third

power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government.

In view of this, the German Government are obliged to conclude

that the Polish Government do not at present attach any

importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by

means of direct, friendly discussion with the German Government.

The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path, traced out

in 1934, to the shaping of German-Polish relations.”

All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that

orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed

Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.

The document goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and

discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st, which the German

Government had made; the return of Danzig, the Autobahn, the railway,

the promise by Germany of the 25 years’ guarantee, and I go down to the

last but one paragraph on Page 3 of the Exhibit, under the heading (1):

“The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the

opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just

settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of

Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent

strengthening of the friendly, neighborly relations between the

two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German

proposals made with this object.

“At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to

another state, political obligations which are not compatible

either with the spirit, the meaning, or the text of the

German-Polish declaration of the 26th of January 1934. Thereby,

the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this

declaration null and void.”

In the last paragraph the German Government says that, nevertheless,

they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland.

On the same day as that memorandum was issued Hitler made a speech in

the Reichstag, 28 April, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of

the memorandum. This is Document TC-72, Number 13, which becomes GB-43.

I would only refer the Tribunal to the latter part of the second page of

the translation. He has again repeated the demands and offers that

Germany made in March, and he goes on to say that the Polish Government

have rejected his offer and lastly:

“I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the

Polish Government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The

worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago,

believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign,

that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has

not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in

any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very

regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was

really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me.

This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a

question which intimately affects the German people by a truly

unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both

countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving

party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party,

because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never

become Polish. The intention to attack, on the part of Germany,

which was merely invented by the international press, led, as

you know, to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation

on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance

. . . .”

It is unnecessary, My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us, as I say,

how completely dishonest was everything that the German Government was

saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably with a copy of the

orders for Fall Weiss in his pocket as he spoke, saying that the

intention to attack, by Germany, was an invention of the international

press.

In answer to that memorandum and that speech the Polish Government

issued a memorandum on the 28th of April. It is set out in the next

exhibit, TC-72, Number 16, which becomes GB-44. It is unnecessary to

read more than . . .

THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 5th of May, not the 28th of April.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the 5th of May.

It is unnecessary to read more than two short paragraphs from that

reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out the objects

of the 1934 agreement: to renounce the use of force and to carry on

friendly relationship between the two countries, to solve difficulties

by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish Government

appreciate that there are difficulties about Danzig and have long been

ready to carry out discussions. They set out again their part in the

recent discussions, and I turn to the second page of the document, the

one but last paragraph or, perhaps, I should go back a little to the top

of that page, the first half of that page. The Polish Government allege

that they wrote, as indeed they did, to the German Government on the

26th of March giving their point of view, that they then proposed joint

guarantees by the Polish and German Governments of the City of Danzig

based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal

affairs. They said they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a

motor road and railway facilities and that they received no reply to

those proposals:

“It is clear that negotiations in which one state formulates

demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands

unaltered, are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration

of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and

dignity of Poland.”

Which, of course, in a word summarizes the whole position of the Polish

point of view. And thereafter they reject the German accusation that the

Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish

agreement. They state that Germany herself has entered into similar

agreements with other nations and lastly, on the next page, they too say

that they are still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should

Germany wish to do so.

If the Tribunal would turn back to the Document C-120, to the first two

letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it becoming GB-41.

On the bottom of the page there is a figure 614, on the first page of

that exhibit, “Directives from Hitler and Keitel Preparing for War and

the Invasion of Poland”. I would refer to Page 6 of that particular

exhibit. The page number will be found at the bottom of the page, in the

center. It is a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,

signed by Hitler and dated the 10th of May. It goes to OKW, OKH, OKM,

various branches of the OKW and with it apparently were enclosed

“Instructions for the Economic War and the Protection of Our Own

Economy.” I only mention it now to show better that throughout this time

preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing. That document

will still be part of the same exhibit.

Again on the next page, which is headed Number C-120(1), I am afraid

this is a précis only, not a full translation and therefore, perhaps, I

will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the “Directives for the

War against the Enemy Economy and Measures of Protection for Our Own

Economy.”

As we will see later, not only were the military preparations being

carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every

other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment.

I think this period of preparation, translated up to May 1939, finishes

really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reich Chancellery

on the 23rd of May about which the Tribunal has already heard. It was

L-79 and is now Exhibit USA-27; and it was referred to, I think, and has

been known as the “Schmundt minutes.” It is the last document which is

in the Tribunal’s document book of this part and I do not propose to

read anything of it. It has been read already and the Tribunal will

remember that it was the speech in which Hitler was crying out for

Lebensraum and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a

question of expanding their living space in the East, where he said that

the decision had been taken to attack Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. Your Lordship will

remember that Göring, Raeder, and Keitel, among many others, were

present. It has three particular lines of which I want to remind the

Tribunal, where he said:

“If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia

against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to

attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The

Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with

England.”

So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack

Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France,

also.

I pass to the next period, which I have described as the final

preparations taken from June up to the beginning of the war, at the

beginning of September—Part V of the Tribunal’s document book. If the

Tribunal will glance at the index to the document book, they will find I

have, for convenience, divided the evidence up under four subheadings:

Final preparations of the Armed Forces; economic preparation; the famous

Obersalzberg speeches; and the political or diplomatic preparations

urging on the crisis and the justification for the invasion of Poland.

I refer the Tribunal to the first document in that book, dealing with

the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an exhibit

containing various documents, and I refer particularly to the second

document, dated the 22d of June 1939. This is Document C-126, which will

become GB-45.

It will be remembered that a precise timetable had been called for. Now,

here it is:

“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the

Führer and Supreme Commander, a ‘preliminary timetable’ for Case

White based on the particulars so far available from the Navy,

Army, and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the

attack and the start of the attack were not included in this

timetable.

“The Führer and Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement

with the intentions of the Navy, Army, and Air Force and made

the following comments on individual points:

“1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up

reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers

scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments,

employers or other private persons who make inquiries should be

told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and

for the exercise units it is intended to form for these

maneuvers.

“It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to

subordinate establishments.”

All this became relevant, particularly relevant, later when we find the

German Government making allegations of mobilization on the part of the

Poles. Here we have it in May, or rather June—they are mobilizing, only

doing so secretly:

“2. For reasons of security, the clearing of hospitals in the

area of the frontier must not be carried out.”

If the Tribunal will turn to the top of the following page, it will be

seen that that order is signed by the Defendant Keitel. I think it is

unnecessary to read any further from that document. There is—which

perhaps will save turning back, if I might take it rather out of date

now—the first document on that front page of that exhibit, a short

letter dated the 2d of August. It is only an extract, I am afraid, as it

appears in the translation:

“Attached are operational directions for the employment of

U-boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of

precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out Case

White remaining unchanged. Commander, U-boats is handing in his

operation orders by the 12th of August to the operations staff

of the Navy.”

One must assume that the Defendant Dönitz knew that his U-boats were to

go out into the Atlantic “by way of precaution in the event of the

intention to carry out Case White remaining unchanged.”

I turn to the next document in the Tribunal’s book, C-30, which becomes

GB-46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July. It contains orders for

the air and sea forces for the occupation of the German Free City of

Danzig:

“The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has

ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the

Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy Danzig Free

State immediately in order to protect the German population.

There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long

as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.”

It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again

becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action of the last

few days before the war, when Germany was purporting to make specious

offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. I would

like to offer this as evidence that the decision had been taken and

nothing was going to move him from that decision. That document, as set

out, says that, “There will be no hostile intention on the part of

Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.”

Nevertheless, that was not the only condition upon which the occupation

was to take place and we find that during July, right up to the time of

the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to

prepare them to take part in the coming occupation.

I refer the Tribunal to the next Document, TC-71, which becomes GB-47,

where there are set out a few only of the reports which were coming back

almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, the Consul-General in

Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The sum total of those reports

can be found in the _British Blue Book_. I now would refer to only two

of them as examples of the kind of thing that was happening.

I refer to the first that appears on that exhibit, dated the 1st of July

1939.

“Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived

here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr.

All approaches to hills and dismantled forts, which constitute a

popular public promenade on the western fringe of the city, have

been closed with barbed wire and ‘verboten’ notices. The walls

surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades keep your

mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’

“Master of British steamer _High Commissioner Wood_, while he

was roving Königsberg from the 28th of June to 30th of June,

observed considerable military activity, including extensive

shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material, by

small coasting vessels. On the 28th of June four medium-sized

steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, and so

forth, left Königsberg ostensibly returning to Hamburg after

maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of steamers

. . . .”

And again, as another example, the report Number 11, on the next page of

the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states:

“The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me

that on the 8th of July, he personally saw about 30 military

lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg,

where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges.

There were also eight large antiaircraft guns in position, which

he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three

six-barreled light antiaircraft machine guns. There were about

500 men, drilling with rifles, and the whole place is

extensively fortified with barbed wire.”

I do not think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal’s time in reading

more. Those, as I say, are two reports only, of a number of others that

can be found in the _British Blue Book_, which sets out the arming and

preparation of the Free City of Danzig.

On the 12th of August and the 13th of August, when preparations were

practically complete—and it will be remembered that they had to be

complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September—we find

Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions

to their allies, the Italians.

One of the passages in Hitler’s speech of the 23rd of May, it will be

remembered—I will not quote it now because the document has been read

before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his

proposed attack on Poland, had said, “Our object must be kept secret

even from the Italians and the Japanese.”

Now, when his preparations are complete, he discloses his intentions to

his Italian comrades, and does so in hope that they will join him.

The minutes of that meeting are long, and it is not proposed to read

more than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized generally by

saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to

come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most

surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter; and

they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from

starting off so soon until the Duce can have had a little more time to

prepare himself.

The value—perhaps the greatest value—of the minutes of that meeting is

that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and

France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland.

I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying

to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war; and,

therefore, he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in:

“At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements

in prospect.”—I quote from the top of the second page.—“Some

time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction

could be taken into service. As far as the land army was

concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had

been called to the colors.”

I quote this passage particularly to show the intention to attack

England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his

thoughts are turned entirely towards England:

“If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she

could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and

one armored division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber

squadrons, but hardly any fighters, since, at the outbreak of

war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the

English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of

their own country.

“With regard to the position of France, the Führer said that in

the event of a general war, after the destruction of

Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a

position to assemble a hundred divisions along the West Wall and

France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available

forces from the colonies, from the Italian frontier and

elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line for the life and death

struggle which would then ensue. The Führer also thought that

the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian

fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano

showed signs of extreme doubt.”—Doubts which, perhaps, in view

of the subsequent performances, were well justified.

“The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few

parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less

value. Poland was very weak in antitank and antiaircraft defense

and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in

this respect.”

What this Tribunal will appreciate, of course, is that Poland formed

such a threat to Germany on Germany’s eastern frontier.

“If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers

over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German

superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the

fanatics of Warsaw and Kraków, the population of their areas is

indifferent. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the

position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one

and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews,

and approximately nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles

were much less in number than the total population and, as

already said, their striking power was to be valued variably. In

these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by

Germany in the shortest time.

“Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it

clear that in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would

stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick

liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for

the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a

hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only

would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down; but also

further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This

would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”

The argument goes on on those lines.

I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page:

“Coming back to the Danzig question, the Führer said to Count

Ciano that it was impossible for him to go back now. He had made

an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from

South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care

to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal

could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he

had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly

and northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and

northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been

Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial,

as the Mediterranean had been the appropriate sphere for Italy.

For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and

timber from these eastern regions.”

Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German

minorities on the Polish frontiers, but the economic reasons, the need

for foodstuffs and timber from Poland:

“In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material,

although the city had the greatest harbor in the Baltic—the

transshipment by tonnage was 40 percent of that of Hamburg—but

Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city

awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Führer

was bound to take account of this psychological element in

public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano

should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a

large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav

soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long

remain quiet over anything of this kind.

“Count Ciano, in replying to the Führer’s statement, first

expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the

completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in

the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during

his Berlin visit had there been any sign, from the German side,

that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the

contrary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said that in his

opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of

time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that

a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed

that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made

plans for a period of 2 or 3 years. If immediate conflict was

unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly

stand on the German side; but for various reasons he would

welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later

time.”

No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the

only concern of anybody is as to time.

“Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy

in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict

with Poland would not be limited to that country but would

develop into a general European war.”

Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade Hitler

from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the

top of Page 5 of the exhibit:

“For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should

make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful

intentions of Italy and Germany.”

Then we get the Führer’s answer to those arguments, half-way down Page

5:

“The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem

no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn,

the more difficult would military operations in eastern Europe

become. From the middle of September weather conditions made air

operations hardly possible in these areas, while the conditions

of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the

autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for

motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great

marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations.

Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in October . . . and

Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they

obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.”

They couldn’t possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened

to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London—I wonder

whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard

to those places.

“Ciano asked how soon, according to the Führer’s view, the

Danzig question must be settled. The Führer answered that this

settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August.

To the question of Ciano as to what solution the Führer

proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political

control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would

obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must

contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted

whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to

the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Führer

had made this proposal personally to Beck, at his visit to

Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return

for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete

guarantee of Polish interests, and the establishment of a

connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would

have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship,

and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck

had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to

examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of

English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen

clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia,

and even proposed to advance to Berlin . . . .”—That was

something quite different.

The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following

day.

On Page 7, in the middle of the page, it will be seen:

“The Führer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1)

in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately

attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her

political intention, she must be forced to do so.”

I go to the last line on that page:

“As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist

further in the world through the lack of space; not only was

there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded

by its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps

of gold and deluded themselves about their riches . . . . The

Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the

world and would not regard Germany and Italy as in their class.

This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst

thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a

life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet

more easily because their interests did not clash on any point.

“The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for

which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself . . .

had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy,

because of its geographic location, was already the dominant

power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Führer said

that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that

this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that

Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in

the Mediterranean. Bismarck . . . had recognized it and had said

as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The interests of

Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there

never could be a conflict between them.

“The Minister of Foreign Affairs added that if the two problems

mentioned in yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and

Germany would have their backs free for work against the West.

The Führer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 10

years”—there appears to have been a query raised in the

translation—“for so many years long she would have been

incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could

be settled.

“Ciano thanked the Führer for his extremely clear explanation of

the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would

give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite

information on one point, in order that the Duce might have all

the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no

decision because the Führer believed that the conflict with

Poland could be localized. On the basis of long experience

he”—Ciano—“quite saw that so far the Führer had always been

right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini

had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of

precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following

question:

“The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he would

take Poland: (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation,

and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The

first of these conditions did not depend on the decision of the

Führer, and German reaction would follow in a moment. The second

condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore

asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied

Germany about her political condition. He realized that this

date depended upon climatic conditions.

“The Führer answered that the decision of Poland must be made

clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the

decisive part of military operations against Poland could be

carried out within a period of 14 days, and the final

liquidation would need another . . . 4 weeks, it could be

finished at the end of September or the beginning of October.

These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore,

that the last date on which he could begin to take action was

the end of August.

“Finally, the Führer reassured Ciano that since his youth he had

favored German-Italian co-operation, and that no other view was

expressed in his publications. He had always thought that

Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since

there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was

personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from

himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great

and unique in history; that he could be this man’s friend was

for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour

of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of

the Duce for better or for worse.”

THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never actually put

that last document that I was referring to in as an exhibit. It is

Document TC-77, which becomes GB-48.

Having referred the Tribunal to those documents showing that the

military preparations were throughout the whole period in hand and

nearing their completion, I would refer to one letter from the Defendant

Funk, showing that at the same time the economists had not been idle. It

is a letter dated the 26th of August 1939, in which Funk is writing to

his Führer. He says:

“My Führer! I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most

friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How

happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being granted

the favor of experiencing these overwhelmingly great and

world-changing times and taking part in the mighty events of

these days.

“The information given to me by Field Marshal Göring, that you,

my Führer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures

prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the

relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through

emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to

you, with all respect, that I have succeeded by means of

precautions taken during the last few months in making the Reich

Bank internally so strong and externally so unassailable that

even the most serious shocks in the international money and

credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime, I

have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of

the Reich Bank and of the whole of the German economy abroad on

which it was possible to lay hands. Under the proposals I have

prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is

not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public

works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be

in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy

without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the

general plenipotentiary for economy, appointed by you, to make

this report and solemn promise to you, my Führer. Heil my

Führer”—signed—“Walter Funk.”

That document is PS-699, and it goes in as GB-49.

It is difficult in view of that letter to see how the Defendant Funk can

say that he did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of

the German Government to wage war.

I come now to the speech which Hitler made on the 22d of August at

Obersalzberg to his commanders-in-chief. By the end of the third week of

August, preparations were complete. That speech has already been read to

the Tribunal. I would, perhaps, ask the Tribunal’s patience if I quoted

literally half a dozen lines so as to carry the story on in sequence.

On the first page of PS-1014, which is already USA-30, the fourth line:

“Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were

determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.”

The second paragraph:

“Destruction of Poland is in the foreground. The aim is the

elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.

Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of

Poland shall be the primary objective.”

Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph:

“I shall give a propagandists cause for starting the war, never

mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be

asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and

making a war, not the right is what matters but victory.”

We are going to see only too clearly how that propagandistic cause,

which already had been put in hand, was brought to its climax.

I turn to the next page (798-PS, USA-29), the third paragraph:

“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come

sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring,

but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few

years, and only afterwards against the East.”

I refer to these passages again particularly to emphasize the intention

of the Nazi Government, not only to conquer Poland, but ultimately, in

any event, to wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies.

I refer lastly to the last page, a passage which becomes more and more

significant as we continue the story of the last few days: I quote from

the fourth paragraph:

“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us

with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which

demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute

some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.

“The political aim is set farther. A beginning has been made for

the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the

soldier, after I have made the political preparations.”

And, again, the very last line becomes significant later:

“Göring answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that

the Armed Forces will do their duty.”

We pass from the military-economic preparations and his exhortations to

his generals to see how he was developing the position in the diplomatic

and political field.

On the 23rd of August 1939 the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby

Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the Free City of

Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute setting up the

constitution of the Free City. I put in the next document, which is

taken from the _British Blue Book_, only as evidence of that event, an

event that was, of course, aimed at stirring up the feeling in the Free

City at that time. That is TC-72, Number 62, which becomes GB-50.

At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi

Government with the aid of the SS. The Tribunal has already heard the

evidence of General Lahousen the other day in which he referred to the

provision of Polish uniforms to the SS forces for these purposes, so

that dead Poles could be found lying about the German side of the

frontier. I refer the Tribunal now to three short reports which

corroborate the evidence that that gentleman came and gave before you,

and they are found in the _British Blue Book_. They are reports from the

British Ambassador in Warsaw.

The first of them, TC-72, Number 53, which becomes GB-51, is dated 26th

of August.

“A series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German

frontier.

“Polish patrol met a party of Germans one kilometer from the

East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish

patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.

“German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo,

twice near Rybnik, and twice elsewhere, firing shots and

attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and

hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.

“_Gazeta Polska_, in an inspired lead article today, says these

are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of

aggression of para-military disciplined detachments, supplied

with regular army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army

detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.

“These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong

attitude of defense. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of

aggression came from German side. This was the best answer to

the ravings of German press.

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment

has since shot a Pole across frontier and wounded another.”

I pass to the next report, TC-72, Number 54, which becomes GB-52. It is

dated the same date, the 26th of August.

“Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted

by Hitler to the French Ambassador that 24 Germans were recently

killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. The story is without any

foundation whatever.”

And lastly, TC-72, Number 55, which becomes GB-53, the report of the

next day, the 27th of August.

“So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment

of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration,

if not complete falsification.

“2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by

Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain,

the rest of Poland is still completely calm.

“3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods

regarding Czechoslovakia last year.

“4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German

provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since

March”—since the date when the rest of Czechoslovakia was

seized and they were ready to go against Poland—“that has since

March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I

suppose this has been done with the object:

“(a) Creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public

opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent

aggression in Poland.

“5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter

objects.

“6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr

Hitler.

“7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is

apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of

Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more

than 10 per cent of the population in any commune.

“8. In the face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if

Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of

destroying Polish independence.

“9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for

Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove

that Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are false.”

And yet, again, we have further corroboration of General Lahousen’s

evidence in a memorandum, which has been captured, of a conversation

between the writer and Keitel. It is 795-PS, and it becomes GB-54. That

conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th of August, and from the

memorandum I quote the first paragraph:

“I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he

would not pay any attention to this action, as the Führer had

not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to

furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct

the General Staff. He says he does not think much of actions of

this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they

have been ordered by the Führer; that he could not ask the

Führer how he had planned the execution of this special action.

In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action would be

executed only by the Army.”

That then, My Lord, was the position at the end of the first week in

August—I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the 22d of

August the Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, and

we have heard in Hitler’s speech of that date to his commanders-in-chief

how it had gone down as a shock to the rest of the world. In fact, the

orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that

treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of the

25th of August. Orders were given to invade Poland in the early hours of

the 25th of August, and that I shall prove in a moment.

Oh the same day—the 23rd of August—that the German-Russian agreement

was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was being signed. And

of course the significance of it from a military point of view as to

Germany, particularly in the present circumstances, was obvious; and the

British Government immediately made their position clear in one last

hope—and that one last hope was that if they did so the German

Government might possibly think better of it. And I refer to Document

TC-72, Number 56; it is the first document in the next to the last part

of the Tribunal document book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to

Hitler. That document becomes GB-55:

“Your Excellency:

“Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures

taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press

and on the wireless this evening.

“These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government,

been rendered necessary by the military movements which have

been reported from Germany and by the fact that apparently the

announcement of a German-Soviet agreement is taken in some

quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great

Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need

be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may

prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot

alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His Majesty’s

Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and

which they are determined to fulfill.

“It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made

their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would

have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that

allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this

occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

“If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to

employ without delay all the forces at their command; and it is

impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It

would be a dangerous delusion to think that, if war once starts,

it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the

several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been

secured.”

Thereafter the Prime Minister urged the German Government to try and

resolve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force; and he

suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions

between the two Governments, the Polish and German Governments, might

take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamberlain’s language:

“At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a

catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the

grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action

of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with

the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put

before you.”

On the following day, the 23rd of August, Hitler replied to Prime

Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC-72, Number 60, and it

becomes GB-56. He starts off by saying that Germany has always wanted

England’s friendship, and has always done everything to get it; on the

other hand, she has some essential interests which it is impossible for

Germany to renounce. I quote the third paragraph:

“Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of

the corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a

proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegation which

is disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization

against Poland”—we see here the complete dishonesty of the

whole business—“the assertion of aggressive designs towards

Romania, Hungary, and so forth as well as the so-called

guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had,

however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of

this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.

“The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland, that

she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances

regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring,

could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement

thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave

of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German

inhabitants living in Poland.”

Again I cannot help remembering the report by the British Ambassador, to

which I just referred:

“The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that

country are terrible for the victims but intolerable for a great

power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a

passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty

of numerous breaches of her obligations towards the Free City of

Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has

initiated a process of economic strangulation.”

It goes on to say that “Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the

persecution” and the fact that there is a British guarantee to Poland

makes no difference to her determination to end this state of affairs. I

quote from Paragraph 7:

“The German Reich Government has received information to the

effect that the British Government has the intention to carry

out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements

contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against

Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since

Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures

other than those of a defensive character against England or

France and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended,

and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France,

it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime

Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated

act of menace directed against the Reich. I, therefore, inform

your Excellency that in the event of these military

announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate

mobilization of the German forces.”

If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful, if they

really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of these lies;

these lies saying that they had never intended to attack England or

France, carried out no mobilization, statements which, in view of what

we now have, we know to be lies? What can have been their object if

their intention had always been for a peaceful settlement of the Danzig

question only? Then I quote again from the last paragraph:

“The question of the treatment of European problems on a

peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but

primarily on those who since the crime committed by the

Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any

peaceful revision. Only after a change of the spirit on the part

of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the

relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life

fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by

British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however,

convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be

any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be

happier than I.”

On the 25th of August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of mutual

assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read the document.

The Tribunal will be well aware of its contents where both Governments

undertake to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression

against either by any third power. I point to Document TC-73; it is

Number 91 and it becomes GB-57. I shall refer to the fact of its signing

again in a moment but perhaps it is convenient while we are dealing with

a letter between the British Prime Minister and Hitler to refer also to

a similar correspondence which took place a few days later between the

French Prime Minister M. Daladier and Hitler. I emphasize these because

it is desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set

about their pattern of aggression. “The French Ambassador in Berlin has

informed me of your personal communication,” written on the 26th of

August:

“In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility

which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon

themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great

nations who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to

you, personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of

peace still rests in your hands alone.

“You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards Germany,

nor France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman

has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations

not only peace but also sincere co-operation in their own

interests as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world.

Unless you credit the French people with a lower sense of honor

than I credit to the German nation, you cannot doubt that France

loyally fulfills her obligations toward other powers, such as

Poland, which, as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace

with Germany. These two convictions are fully compatible.

“Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution

of the international crisis with all honor and dignity for all

nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

“Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all

her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s

readiness, which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual

application of a method of open settlement as it can be imagined

between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the

clearest conscience I can assure you that, among the differences

which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question

of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such

a method with a purpose of reaching a peaceful and just

solution.

“Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in

France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies,

which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my

country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not

prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state

of mind.

“In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no high-minded

human being could understand it if a war of destruction were

started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful

settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace

could, in all certainty, work for this aim without any prejudice

to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French

and the German people, and who am, on the other hand, bound to

Poland by bonds of friendship and by a promise, am prepared, as

head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man

can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.

“You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I

do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war

have left in the conscience of the people without any regard to

its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your

outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road

of peace, toward the fulfillment of its task in the common work

of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.

“If French and German blood should be shed again as it was shed

25 years ago in a still longer and more murderous war, then each

of the two nations will fight believing in its own victory. But

the most certain victors will be destruction and barbarity.”

THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United

States): If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of Lieutenant

Colonel Griffith-Jones, may I make an announcement to the Defense

Counsel.

At 7:30 in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the motion

pictures which the United States will offer in evidence will be shown

for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come at 7:30.

DR. DIX: I believe I can say on behalf of all members of the Defense

that they do not consider it necessary that the films be shown to them

before the proceedings, that is, shown to them twice. We fully and with

gratitude appreciate the courtesy and readiness to facilitate our work;

but our evenings are very much taken up by the preparation of our cases

and by the necessary consultations with our clients.

The question of films is on a level different from that of documents.

Documents one likes to read in advance or simultaneously or later; but

since we can hear and take note of the testimony of witnesses only

during the main proceedings, we are, of course, to an even greater

degree in a position and prepared to become acquainted with the films

submitted as evidence only during the proceedings. We believe the

Prosecution need not take the trouble of showing every film to us on

some evening before it is shown again in the proceedings. We hope this

will not be construed as, shall I say, a sort of demonstration in some

respect, for the reason really is that our time is so fully taken up by

our preparations that all superfluous work might well be spared both the

Prosecution and us. I repeat and emphasize that we fully and gratefully

appreciate the Prosecution’s manifest readiness to facilitate our work,

and I ask that my words be understood in this light.

THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be unnecessary for

the defendants’ counsel to have a preview of the films, to see them

before they are produced in evidence? Is that what you are saying?

DR. DIX: Yes, that is what I said.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were here when Dr.

Dix began his observation; but I understand that what he says is that in

view of the amount of preparation which the defendants’ counsel have to

undertake, they do not consider it necessary to have a view of these

films before they are produced in evidence, but at the same time he

wishes to express his gratification at the co-operation of the Counsel

for the Prosecution.

COL. STOREY: Very agreeable. It’s all right with us. We were doing it

for their benefit.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the adjournment, I

had just read the letter from M. Daladier to Hitler, of the 26th of

August. On the 27th of August Hitler replied to that letter, and I think

it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of it was very much the same

as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the

letter that he had received earlier in the week.

Those two letters are taken from the _German White Book_ which I put in

evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat both those

letters as of the same number. After that, nobody could say that the

German Government could be in any doubt as to the position that was to

be taken up by both the British and French Governments in the event of a

German aggression against Poland.

But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August

President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and the President of the Polish

Republic. I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter:

“In the message which I sent you on April the 14th, I stated

that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it

in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that

impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made,

with goodwill on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive

solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world

was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe

appears to be very near at hand indeed.

“To the message which I sent you last April I have received no

reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world

peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all

other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with

the hope that the war which impends, and the consequent disaster

to all peoples, may yet be averted.

“I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging

the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Governments of

Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any

positive act of hostility for a reasonable, stipulated period;

and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the

controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three

following methods:

“First, by direct negotiation; second, by the submission of

these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they

can both have confidence; third, that they agree to the solution

of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation.”

I think it is unnecessary to read any more of that letter. As I have

already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was the order to

his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning.

That document is Exhibit TC-72, Number 124, which becomes GB-59.

I put in evidence also the next document, TC-72, Number 126, GB-60,

which is the reply to that letter from the President of the Polish

Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences by any

of the peaceful methods suggested.

On the 25th of August, no reply having been received from the German

Government, President Roosevelt wrote again:

“I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply

to the message which I addressed to Your Excellency and to him

last night.”

The text of the Polish reply is then set out.

“Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims

and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.

“In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it

plain that the Polish Government are willing, upon the basis set

forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has

arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by

direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.

“Countless human lives can yet be saved, and hope may still be

restored that the nations of the modern world may even now

construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier

relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will

agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the

Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too,

will accept.”

But, My Lord, Germany would not accept, nor would she accept the appeals

by the Pope which appear in the next document.

I am sorry—the President of Poland’s reply, TC-72 becomes Number 127,

GB-61.

They would not agree to those proposals, nor would they pay heed to the

Pope’s appeal, which is TC-72, Number 139 on the same date, the 24th of

August, which becomes GB-62. I do not think it is necessary to read

that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And there is yet a further

appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August, TC-72, Number 14, which

becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your pardon. It is TC-72, Number 141. I

think the printing is wrong in the Tribunal’s translation:

“The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations

may lead to a just pacific solution, such as the whole world

continues to pray for.”

I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that. If the Pope had

realized that those negotiations to which he referred as the “pending

negotiations” in the last days of August, which we are about to deal

with now, were completely bogus negotiations, bogus insofar as Germany

was concerned, and put forward, as indeed they were—and as I hope to

illustrate to the Tribunal in a moment—simply as an endeavor to

dissuade England either by threat or by bribe from meeting her

obligations to Poland, then perhaps he would have saved himself the

trouble in ever addressing that last appeal.

It will be seen quite clearly that those final German offers, to which I

now turn, were no offers in the accepted sense of the word at all; that

there was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions,

negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with

Poland. They were just an attempt to make it rather easier to seize and

conquer Poland than appeared likely if England and France observed the

obligations that they had undertaken.

Perhaps I might, before dealing with the documents, summarize in a word

those last negotiations.

On the 22d of August, as we have seen, the German-Soviet Pact was

signed. On the 24th of August, orders were given to his armies to march

the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news

apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish

Governments had actually signed a formal pact of non-aggression and of

mutual assistance. Until that time, it will be remembered, the position

was that the Prime Minister had made a statement in the House and a

joint communiqué had been issued—I think on the 6th of April—that they

would in fact assist one another if either were attacked, but no formal

agreement had been signed.

Now, on the 24th of August after those orders had been given by him, the

news came that such a formal document had been signed; and the invasion

was postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep

England and France out of the war—not to end the war, not to cancel the

war, but to keep them out.

And to do that, on the 25th of August, having postponed the invasion,

Hitler issued a verbal communiqué to Sir Nevile Henderson which, as the

Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and threat with which he hoped

to persuade England to keep out.

On the 28th of August Sir Nevile Henderson handed the British

Government’s reply to that communiqué to Hitler. That reply stressed

that the difference ought to be settled by agreement. The British

Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed and,

indeed, any agreement come to should be guaranteed by other powers,

which, of course, in any event would have been quite unacceptable to the

German Reich.

As I say, one really need not consider what would have been acceptable

and not acceptable because once it had been made clear—as indeed it was

in that British Government’s reply of the 28th of August—that England

would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression,

the German Government really had no concern with further negotiation but

were concerned only to afford themselves some kind of justification and

to prevent themselves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the

appeals to reason that were being put forward.

On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15, Hitler handed to Sir

Nevile Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British

Government’s reply of the 28th. And here again in this document it is

quite clear that the whole object of it was to put forward something

which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to enter into direct

conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demands

that those conversations must be based upon the return of Danzig to the

Reich and also of the whole of the Corridor.

It will be remembered that hitherto, even when he alleged that Poland

had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put forward as his

demands the return of Danzig alone and the arrangement for an

extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to

East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make quite certain, he now

demands the whole of the Corridor; no question of an Autobahn or

railway. The whole thing must become German.

Even so, even to make doubly certain that the offer would not be

accepted, he says:

“. . . on those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion;

but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a

plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to

be here in Berlin by Wednesday, the 30th of August 1939.”

This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer

had to be transmitted first to London, and from London to Warsaw; and

from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their

Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible to get

authority to their Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night.

It allowed them no kind of opportunity for discussing the matters at

all. As Sir Nevile Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an

ultimatum.