[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
N U R E M B E R G
14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y
1 9 4 7
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME III
O F F I C I A L T E X T
I N T H E
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
P R O C E E D I N G S
1 December 1945 — 14 December 1945
CONTENTS
Tenth Day, Saturday, 1 December 1945,
Morning Session 1
Eleventh Day, Monday, 3 December 1945,
Morning Session 35
Afternoon Session 64
Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 4 December 1945,
Morning Session 91
Afternoon Session 120
Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 5 December 1945,
Morning Session 152
Afternoon Session 178
Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 6 December 1945,
Morning Session 209
Afternoon Session 241
Fifteenth Day, Friday, 7 December 1945,
Morning Session 272
Afternoon Session 303
Sixteenth Day, Monday, 10 December 1945,
Morning Session 335
Afternoon Session 367
Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 11 December 1945,
Morning Session 400
Afternoon Session 402
Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 12 December 1945,
Morning Session 415
Afternoon Session 447
Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 13 December 1945,
Morning Session 477
Afternoon Session 512
Twentieth Day, Friday, 14 December 1945,
Morning Session 542
Afternoon Session 571
TENTH DAY
Saturday, 1 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I will begin the
session by reading the judgment of the Tribunal upon the application
made by counsel for the Defendant Hess.
The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the motion of counsel
for the defense of the Defendant Hess, and it had the advantage of
hearing full argument upon it both from the Defense and the Prosecution.
The Tribunal has also considered the very full medical reports, which
have been made on the condition of the Defendant Hess, and has come to
the conclusion that no grounds whatever exist for a further examination
to be ordered.
After hearing the statement of the Defendant Hess in Court yesterday,
and in view of all the evidence, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the
Defendant Hess is capable of standing his trial at the present time, and
the motion of the Counsel for the Defense is, therefore, denied, and the
Trial will proceed.
Now the witness under examination should come back to the witness box.
[_Erwin Lahousen resumed the stand._]
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it
please the Tribunal, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe yesterday said he had no
questions to ask this witness. He has now requested me very shortly to
cross-examine this witness on one incident mentioned in the Indictment,
namely, the murder of 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft 3
in March of 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: You said to “cross-examine”?
MR. ROBERTS: I realize that this is a matter which falls in the part of
the Indictment which is being dealt with by the prosecutors for the
U.S.S.R. My Lord, I have mentioned that matter to General Rudenko, who
with his usual courtesy and kindness, has said that he has no objection
to my asking some questions on that matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: Much obliged.
[_Turning to the witness._] Might I ask you this? Do you know anything
of the circumstances of the death of 50 R.A.F. officers in March 1944,
who had escaped from Stalag Luft 3 at Sagan and were recaptured?
ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): No, I have nothing to say because at that time
I was on the Eastern front, as commander of my regiment, and no longer
had any contact with my former duties.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you hear of the matter from any of your fellow
officers?
LAHOUSEN: No, I heard nothing about it whatsoever.
MR. ROBERTS: You can’t assist the Court at all with the matter?
LAHOUSEN: No, not at all.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, you
stated yesterday that you were the intimate friend and collaborator of
Admiral Canaris. Since I can no longer address my question directly to
Admiral Canaris, I ask you to answer the following questions for me: Did
Admiral Canaris know of Defendant Von Papen’s attitude toward Hitler’s
war policies, and how did Admiral Canaris express himself to you on this
point?
LAHOUSEN: First, I should like to make a slight correction on the
question addressed to me. I never asserted that I was the intimate
friend of Canaris. Pieckenbrock was a friend of Canaris, whereas I was
merely one of his confidants. From this relationship, however, I recall
that Von Papen’s and Canaris’ attitude toward the matter which the
Counsel has just brought up, was a negative one.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was this negative attitude only toward the war policy, or
was it also toward all the violent methods used in the execution of such
a policy?
LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection I have to answer this question in
the affirmative, judging from a conversation between Admiral Canaris and
Von Papen, during the visit of the latter in Berlin at which I was
present.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know that Von Papen told Canaris that there could
be no resistance against Hitler’s aggressive policies from political
quarters, but that such resistance would have to be sought among the
ranks of the military?
LAHOUSEN: In this connection, that is to say, in the direct connection
as it is now being presented, I personally cannot say anything. In other
words, I personally was not an ear witness at any conversation between
Canaris and Von Papen during which this matter was brought up, and I
cannot recall today whether Canaris ever told me anything regarding such
conversations with Von Papen. It is quite possible, however, but I
cannot recall it and consequently my oath as witness does not permit me
to make any statement other than the one I have made.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you conclude from this that Canaris believed
that Von Papen purposely continued to hold an exposed political office
in order to exercise a mitigating influence?
LAHOUSEN: I believe so, though I have no tangible proof from any of his
statements. But that is my impression, from what I still recollect
today.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): My client has requested
me to ask you the following questions: How long have you known Canaris
and Pieckenbrock?
LAHOUSEN: I have known Canaris and Pieckenbrock since 1937 through my
previous activity in the Austrian Intelligence Department.
DR. NELTE: At that time were there any relations of a military nature
between yourself and the Abwehr, which was being run by Admiral Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: Not only did such connections exist with the Austrian
intelligence, but the Austrian Federal Army and the German Wehrmacht
maintained it that time an absolutely legal and purely military exchange
of information—legal in the sense that this exchange and collaboration
of military intelligence was carried on with the knowledge of the
Austrian authorities. To state it clearly, this was a purely military
collaboration for exchanging intelligence on countries bordering upon
Austria.
DR. NELTE: May I ask if this contact between you and Canaris was also of
a personal nature, in other words I want to determine how the Austrian
Army felt about the question of the Anschluss?
LAHOUSEN: This and similar questions, that is to say, all questions of a
political nature, particularly the question of the Anschluss or the very
intense illegal Nazi activities, at that time, had to be and were
completely ignored. It was generally agreed between Count Marogna, the
official liaison man—he also was executed after the 20th of July—and
Canaris and Generaloberst Beck that this line should be taken.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you wish to imply that this personal contact
did not mean that the Austrian General Staff officers gave information
on everything regarding their attitude to the idea of the Anschluss, or
that they were willing or able to give this information?
LAHOUSEN: This personal contact started on the day when I saw Canaris
for the first time, while I was still an Austrian officer. It was in the
offices of the Federal Ministry of Defense, where Canaris was with the
Chief of the Austrian General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you please repeat the question?
DR. NELTE: I asked the witness to what extent a personal contact existed
between the officers of the German General Staff or the Abwehr and the
officers of the Intelligence Section or the Austrian General Staff for
the purpose of determining the feelings about the Anschluss.
LAHOUSEN: First of all, there was no such personal contact in the sense
that the word is used here. The contact which actually did take
place—and there are witnesses in this room who can confirm this
statement: Von Papen must be informed thoroughly of this—took place on
a single day, during which I never spoke with Canaris alone, but always
in the presence of my superior officers. In any case, no questions
relating to the Anschluss and no political questions on Austrian
internal problems were discussed there. Naturally I myself did not raise
any, and Canaris expressly refrained from doing so.
DR. NELTE: What was your job in the Abwehr Office II?
LAHOUSEN: In the Abwehr Section II, which I took over at the beginning
of 1939—I described it yesterday, and I am willing to repeat it, if you
wish—this particular job had no special name. Actually my task was to
carry out various undertakings and actions, which I can define very
precisely: Nuisance activity, acts of sabotage, or prevention of
sabotage and nuisance activity, or in general those types of activities
that are carried out by Kommandos. All these activities were carried out
in agreement with, and conformed to, the military demands of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff or the General Staff.
DR. NELTE: Who generally gave you your orders regarding co-ordinating
these activities with the military activities?
LAHOUSEN: My immediate chief, Canaris, usually gave me orders concerning
the whole of my activity.
DR. NELTE: I was referring to the office, whether they came from the OKH
or the OKW?
LAHOUSEN: They did not come from the OKW as a rule. Usually they came by
way of the OKW represented by the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, or the chief
of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; and when the General Staff or the Air
Force Operations Staff were interested in any undertaking, the orders,
as far as I can remember, were also transmitted by way of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff, and the representatives of the three Armed
Forces, that is, the Army, Air Force, and Navy, appointed to it. All
these orders came through the same channels to the Canaris Foreign
Intelligence Department (Ausland Abwehr) which transmitted those
concerning my activities to me for necessary action.
DR. NELTE: Are you now describing the official channels through which
you received the orders? Were the orders issued by the Army or the Armed
Forces Operations Staff? Or did the Army give the orders for
transmission by way of the High Command of the Armed Forces?
LAHOUSEN: Actually, speaking of myself, in questions of this kind,
regarding matters which concerned my department, I had dealings only
with my immediate superior, Canaris; and the superior of Canaris at that
time was the OKW under Keitel, and he was in touch with the gentlemen of
the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and now and then with the members of
the General Staff of the Army. I could mention specific cases from
memory. But in general the procedure was such as I described it.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that Keitel, as the Chief of the OKW, at first
every year, and then from 1943 on, at regular and shorter intervals,
spoke to the office and department chiefs of the OKW; and on such
occasions made a point of telling them that anyone who believed that
something was being asked of him which his conscience would not allow
him to carry out should tell him, Keitel, about it personally?
LAHOUSEN: It is true that the Chief of the OKW did several times address
the circle just mentioned. I cannot recall any exact words of his which
could be interpreted in such a way as to mean that one could take the
risk, in cases about which I testified yesterday, of speaking with him
so openly and frankly as myself and others, that is, witnesses still
alive, could speak to Canaris at any time. I definitely did not have
that impression, whatever the meaning might have been which was given to
his words at that time.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you correctly to mean that in principle you
do not wish to challenge the fact that Keitel actually said these words?
LAHOUSEN: I can neither challenge it, nor can I add anything to it,
because I have no exact recollection of it. I do recall that these
addresses or conferences took place, and it is quite possible that the
Chief of the OKW at that time might have used those words. I can only
add what I have already said.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that on several occasions, you, in the company of
Admiral Canaris, as well as alone, had audience with the Chief of the
OKW, in order to discuss with him plans or undertakings of a delicate
nature, which were in the purview of your official duties?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said a great deal about that yesterday; and I do not
feel I have the right to talk about such things unless I was there
personally.
DR. NELTE: I had the impression yesterday that in many respects you were
acting as a mouthpiece for Admiral Canaris, who used you as a mentor for
the entries in his diary. Was that your testimony?
LAHOUSEN: The impression is completely fallacious. I am not a
mouthpiece, and am now, as I was then, completely independent inwardly
in what I say. I have never allowed myself, nor shall I ever allow
myself, to become the mouthpiece for any conception, or to make any
statements that are contrary to my inner convictions and to my
conscience.
DR. NELTE: You misunderstood me if you believe that I used the word
“mouthpiece” derogatorily. I simply wanted to bring out the fact that
yesterday you made frequent references to the remarks in Canaris’ diary,
that is to the remarks of Canaris quoted by you.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I did so in those cases where the matter discussed
affected Canaris. He himself cannot testify, since he is dead. Just
because I know a great deal about this, and because my information is
exact, I felt it my duty to say what I know.
DR. NELTE: Did Keitel ever ask questions or order any inquiries to be
made about the political views of the officers in the Intelligence
Department? Did he ever ask whether there were any National Socialists
in the departments of the intelligence service?
LAHOUSEN: At the afore-mentioned periodical meetings he asked this
question and others of this nature in an unmistakable way, and he left
no doubt that in an office such as the OKW he could not tolerate any
officers who did not believe in the idea of final victory, or who did
not give proof of unswerving loyalty to the Führer and much more
besides.
DR. NELTE: Could these statements be taken to mean that he demanded
obedience in the military sense, or do you think he was speaking from a
political point of view?
LAHOUSEN: Of course, he was speaking from a military point of view, but
no less clearly from the political aspect, for it was not admissible to
make any distinction between the two. The Wehrmacht was to form a single
whole—the National Socialistic Wehrmacht. Here he touched upon the root
problem.
DR. NELTE: You believe, therefore, that the basic attitude was really
the military one, also in the OKW?
LAHOUSEN: The basic attitude was, or should have been, National
Socialistic, and not military. In other words, first and foremost
National Socialistic, and everything else afterwards.
DR. NELTE: You said “should have been.”
LAHOUSEN: Yes, because it actually was not the case.
DR. NELTE: Quite so. You mean, therefore, that in the first place it was
military and not National Socialistic.
LAHOUSEN: It should have been a purely military one, according to our
conception, but according to the point of view put forward by the Chief
of the OKW at that time—whether he received an order in this sense I am
not in a position to say, as I was not there—the basic attitude should
be one of absolute obedience in a National Socialistic sense.
DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about the attitude of the generals to
this problem?
LAHOUSEN: Of course, I do, because immediately after such conferences,
as have been mentioned here, a lively exchange of opinions took place on
this subject and a large number of those who were present—I could name
them and some of them are present—resented that fact that the words
addressed to them had this strong political flavor, and were couched in
this “higher level language” (Sprachregelung von oben) as we used to
call it, and contained so little that was relevant and purely military,
let alone anything else.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday, when discussing the meeting that took place in the
Führer’s train, on the 12th September of 1939, you said, regarding the
communication of the Chief of the OKW to you, that the Defendant Keitel
addressed himself to you, or rather to the gentlemen present; and said
that these measures had been determined between the Führer and Göring.
He, Keitel, had no influence on them. The Führer and Göring telephoned
frequently to one another. Sometimes he knew something about it;
sometimes he knew nothing. Is that what you said?
LAHOUSEN: That is correct. I made a record of everything that was said
in my presence; and I repeated it here because it is true.
DR. NELTE: May I ask whether the remark, “Sometimes I find out something
about it, sometimes I do not,” relates to a concrete, specific case, or
was that a general rule?
LAHOUSEN: That was to be understood as a general statement, to the best
of my recollection.
DR. NELTE: At this conference in the Führer’s train on the 12th of
September 1939, did you first of all speak about the transmission of the
political aims which, according to you, came from Ribbentrop. Did I
understand you correctly?
LAHOUSEN: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: And you said that the Defendant Keitel transmitted these aims
to those who were present. Now, what I am not clear about is whether
this referred to the order regarding the bombardment of Warsaw from the
air. Did I understand rightly?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, as regards the air bombardment of Warsaw, to the best of
my recollection and from what is recorded in the notes, I can only say
in this connection, the same as when the question of shootings in Poland
came up, that Canaris took the initiative by provoking a discussion on
this subject—I no longer remember how he did this—and then pointing
out the terrible political repercussions that this would have,
especially abroad.
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel is anxious that I should put the
question to you, whether, when this order for the bombing of Warsaw was
made known he did not stress the fact that this was to be put into
effect only if the fortress of Warsaw did not surrender after the demand
made by the bearer of the flag of truce, and even then only after an
opportunity to evacuate the city had been given to the civilian
population and the diplomats.
LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall the precise words he used but according to my
knowledge of the situation at that time it is quite possible, indeed
probable, that the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, did make this remark.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that the Commander-in-Chief of the army at that
time, Von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, before the
Polish War began, categorically objected to the use of Gestapo and SD
Kommandos, maintaining that these were unbearable in the Wehrmacht, and
in this connection asked for Hitler’s concurrence and received it?
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that, and could not have known it because
of my subordinate position at that time. Please do not overrate the
importance of my position at that time.
DR. NELTE: As we are also concerned here with taking cognizance of a
document, which, I take it, was transmitted to all departments and
sections of the OKW, I thought you might remember. They were the
so-called directives, were they not? And these directives, mentioned in
connection with the campaign against Poland, in contrast to what
happened later . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think you were going a little bit too fast.
DR. NELTE: I said that in connection with these military actions, the
decrees and directives were always transmitted to the various offices of
the OKW in the form of carbon copies—I mean the offices which were in
any way concerned. I thought, therefore . . .
LAHOUSEN: Yes, but these were things which did not concern my particular
department, I stress the word “particular,” I did not even see them.
DR. NELTE: As later on in the conversation you were drawn into the
discussion on these questions—it is true you did stress that you did
not know the actual wording of the orders . . .
LAHOUSEN: Orders which I did not see and read. Of course, I knew a great
many things, because I came to hear of them.
DR. NELTE: For that reason, I want to ask you whether you recall that
the Gestapo and SD had interfered behind the advance in connection with
Poland, contrary to the intentions expressed in the orders of the
military leaders?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall that today. I can only refer to what I heard
and what is recorded in the files on this matter, namely, the remark of
Hitler’s, which was passed down by Keitel, who was chief at that time,
and which was to the effect, that if the armed forces objected to these
measures, the armed forces as well as the high command—that is
apparently what you mean—would have to put up with it if the Gestapo
and the SS went ahead with these things. That is all I can tell you. I
know that because I was present at these discussions.
DR. NELTE: During this conversation, were you not told that General
Blaskowitz—in other words, the Army—had made a complaint about the
methods of the SS and the SD?
LAHOUSEN: Whether or not this question was brought up at this
conference, I cannot recall. I can hardly assume that it was brought up,
because otherwise this question would have been recorded in the notes of
that conference, particularly since the complaint came from General
Blaskowitz, whose attitude in such matters was quite clear and well
known. But apart from this conversation in the Führer’s train, I do
recall something about the matter just mentioned, that is, the
objections raised by Blaskowitz. I cannot say today how these objections
were made, whether in writing or by word of mouth, neither do I know the
occasion on which they were made. While I do remember the substance of
the matter, I cannot recall whether it came up for discussion at the
meeting where I was present.
DR. NELTE: What appears to me to be important in this matter, is the
fact that the Wehrmacht, the troops, really did protest, or at least
refused . . .
LAHOUSEN: That the Armed Forces did object, is, of course, quite
evident.
DR. NELTE: That is what I wanted to know. Who gave the order . . .
LAHOUSEN: One moment, please. When I say “the Armed Forces,” I mean the
masses of common soldiers, the ordinary simple men. Of course, there
were in these Armed Forces other men whom I wish to exclude. I do not
wish to be misunderstood. The concept “Armed Forces” does not include
everybody, but it does include the mass of simple men with natural
feelings.
DR. NELTE: When using the term “Wehrmacht” I only wanted to bring out
the contrast between the broad masses of the soldiers and the SS and SD,
and I think we are agreed on this.
LAHOUSEN: I think we have ample and fairly conclusive proof of this
contract in the conditions prevailing and the methods used at that time,
which in that form and scope were then for the first time shown openly
enough to become apparent to the broad masses of the Wehrmacht—quite
apart from anything I can say about it in this short, extremely short
exposition.
DR. NELTE: Who gave the order regarding the collaboration with the
Ukrainian group? You spoke yesterday . . .
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have to go back somewhat farther. First of all I must
say that this group was composed of citizens from various countries,
that is, Hungarians, Czechs, and afterwards Polish citizens, who because
of their attitude of opposition, had emigrated or gone to Germany. I
cannot say who gave the order for the collaboration, because at the time
when these things happened—it was some time back, I remember quite
clearly it was in 1938 or even earlier—I was not even working in the
Amt Ausland Abwehr and was not in touch with the Department, which I did
not take over until the beginning of 1939. It was already on a firm
footing when I took it over.
In this connection I must add, since it was also touched upon yesterday,
that these Ukrainians, at least the majority of them, had no ties
whatsoever with Germany. I can say definitely that a large proportion of
these people with whom the Amt Ausland Abwehr had contact at that time
were in German concentration camps, and that some of these people were
fighting for their country in Soviet partisan groups. That is a fact.
DR. NELTE: Did Admiral Canaris not tell you that the Chief of the OKW,
Keitel, when informed by the SS of the demand for Polish uniforms and
military equipment, had given the clear order that the Abteilung Abwehr
should have nothing to do with this game?
LAHOUSEN: As I stated yesterday, this matter was handled very
mysteriously and secretly also in our circle. Not only myself, but the
others also, knew absolutely nothing about the game which was being
played until after it actually happened. The War Diary of the Department
makes this very clear. It records that one day, quite suddenly, like a
bolt from the blue, a demand was received, by order of Canaris, for so
and so many uniforms for an undertaking known as “Himmler”. My amazement
and my enquiry as to how Himmler came to have anything to do with an
undertaking which required Polish uniforms is also recorded in the War
Diary, not by me, but by the officer who kept this diary. In reply I was
merely told that these articles of equipment would be picked up by a
certain person on a certain day, and no further explanation was given.
And there the matter ended. Of course, when the name of Himmler was
mentioned, besides being mysterious, the thing immediately began to
appear suspicious to us. By us, I mean everybody who had to do with it
in the course of his duty, right down to the ordinary sergeant, who, of
course, had to procure these uniforms by some means or other and deliver
them to a certain Hauptsturmführer SS—the name is recorded in the War
Diary. These people had their misgivings. That was a thing which could
not be forbidden.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday you also made statements about the treatment of
prisoners of war. In what way was Abwehr II concerned with
prisoner-of-war questions?
LAHOUSEN: That is quite simple. Abwehr II was naturally very interested
in an objective way that prisoners of war should be treated as well and
as decently as possible, and the same applies to any intelligence
service in the world. That was all.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you to mean that Abwehr II, as a department,
was not concerned with prisoner-of-war questions?
LAHOUSEN: It had absolutely nothing to do with prisoner-of-war
questions.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday you spoke about the problem of the treatment of
prisoners of war in connection with a conference that took place, if I
remember rightly, at the end of July 1941?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, at this conference I did not represent only my section,
but the whole Amt Ausland Abwehr, that is to say—for general questions
of international law and military political questions, that is, those
questions which to the greatest extent generally concerned foreign
countries, and the intelligence sections. Department III which dealt
with espionage was practically interested—because after all, the
officers affiliated with it were in the prisoner-of-war camps.
Naturally, from the point of view of my section it was important to be
informed about those matters—and that my section was only interested
within the frame of the entire problem, that people should not be killed
off, but treated decently, quite apart from any of the other
considerations which were mentioned.
DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that the prisoner-of-war camps in the
operations zone of the Eastern sector were under the OKW. Is that
correct?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, what I said about prisoner-of-war camps yesterday I knew
from the conference with Reinecke, and not from any knowledge of the
orders themselves, which I had neither seen nor read. At this conference
I was able to obtain a clear idea of the prisoner-of-war question owing
to the presence of Reinecke, the chief of the prisoner-of-war
department, who represented his own department and the OKW, and I
repeated everything I remembered about this.
DR. NELTE: What I was really asking was about the limitation of the
jurisdictions.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that in the Army Operational Zone the army on
operations was responsible for the care of prisoners of war?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And that the OKW became responsible for their care only when
the prisoners of war arrived in Germany?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I repeated what I knew about the matter at the time from
what I had heard. This was that the General Staff of the Army had made
all preparations to bring these people back, and Hitler then authorized
the OKW to hold this up, and the OKW was then held responsible by the
General Staff for the consequences. What happened after that I do not
know and have no right to judge. I can only repeat what I saw and heard.
DR. NELTE: I thought that yesterday you expressed the conjecture that
the prisoners were not brought back owing to an order from Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: I did not express a conjecture. I simply repeated what I heard
at the time and what I know. It might, of course, have been wrong.
DR. NELTE: Heard from whom?
LAHOUSEN: I heard this from the people with whom I was in daily contact,
that is, at the daily situation conferences, at which Canaris, the
department chiefs, and other people who came there to report were
present. I heard it there, and a great deal was said about this matter.
I have always made this clear since my first interrogation. I told
Reinecke to his face that what he himself said about this question at
the time . . .
DR. NELTE: That has nothing to do with my question.
LAHOUSEN: I understand your question perfectly. I only want to make it
quite clear how I came yesterday to say what I did—to examine how far
this applies according to the actual, organizational and other divisions
. . .
DR. NELTE: But you know that in principle the OKW had charge of
prisoners of war only in Germany?
LAHOUSEN: There is no question about that.
DR. NELTE: How could it happen that the Abwehr office adopted the
attitude you defined yesterday regarding the question of enemy commando
activities? You were supposed to deal with these things from the German
side, but you—that is, your department—were not officially concerned
with the handling of these things?
LAHOUSEN: No, not immediately concerned. The Amt Ausland had something
to do with these things because somehow it received intelligence of any
order that was under consideration, even before it was put into shape,
and certainly as soon as it was drawn up. The order in question had, of
course, a bearing on an essential point of international law, and the
Ausland section of the Abwehr department—or rather the “Sachbearbeiter”
(expert) as he was called—was naturally concerned with it. As a matter
of fact, my department was directly concerned with these things for
reasons which I have already explained, because it might turn out that
persons for whom I was responsible might be directly affected.
DR. NELTE: Did the department which dealt with international law in the
Amt Ausland Abwehr ever put its official attitude in writing?
LAHOUSEN: As I pointed out yesterday, I wrote a contribution on the
subject, from the point of view of my section, which was transmitted to
Canaris and was to be part of the long document. I only learned what use
was made of it from what Bürckner said at the time, and which was that
his department passed the thing on in this manner, either in writing or
verbally, as a protest or counter remonstrance, at any rate pointing out
the dangers. This happened a second time, and again I cannot say in what
form, whether verbally or in writing or _vice versa_—the first time in
writing and then verbally—after executions had already taken place, and
because I had again started to make myself heard because of the
executions that had already taken place. That was the logical
development.
DR. NELTE: You also said something yesterday about putting a
distinguishing mark on Russian prisoners by branding. Did it become
known to you that such a scheme, as brought out in this question, was
cancelled by a telephoned order from the Chief of the OKW, who had gone
to the Führer’s headquarters for this purpose, and that it was only
because of a regrettable, a terrible misunderstanding, that a few copies
of this order were issued?
LAHOUSEN: No, I do not know about this, because, generally speaking, I
only heard of the things which happened in the Amt Ausland Abwehr, that
is, from Canaris’ section downwards, if I was directly concerned with
them. What happened on the higher levels, that is, from Canaris upwards,
was and could only be known to me if I was in some way connected with
it.
DR. NELTE: You yourself did not see the order?
LAHOUSEN: Which order are you referring to?
DR. NELTE: The one concerning the branding of Russian prisoners.
LAHOUSEN: No. As in the case of the Commando Order and others, I
attended only the very lively discussion of this question, and with
regard to the branding of Russian prisoners I remember Canaris
mentioning that a doctor had furnished a written report on how this
could be done most efficiently.
DR. NELTE: You stated yesterday that Admiral Canaris had said that the
Defendant Keitel had given the order to do away with General Weygand?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel denies that. He now asks whether you
ever saw any document or written proof of this order. He wants to know
the origin of any statement which concerned General Weygand.
LAHOUSEN: This order was not given in writing, but it came to me because
I was supposed to put it into execution, that is, not I, but my
department. It came up through Canaris, in that circle which I have so
often described, and which means that it was known only to a few. I was
brought into the matter through a talk which Canaris gave at Keitel’s
office in the OKW and at which I was present. Keitel had already
addressed me on the matter. I recorded this in my personal notes and I
mentioned the date. After all, such a thing was not an everyday
occurrence, at least not to me. It was 23 December 1940.
DR. NELTE: Do you not remember the actual wording of the question that
Defendant Keitel was supposed to have asked?
LAHOUSEN: Of course I cannot remember the precise wording; the incident
happened too long ago. I remember the gist very well. What he meant was,
“What has been done in this matter? How do things stand?”
DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that you gave an evasive answer.
LAHOUSEN: I said yesterday that I could not remember exactly how I
worded my answer but I certainly did not say what I had said in the
presence of Canaris, namely, “I would not think of executing such a
murderous order; my section and my officers are not an organization of
murderers. Anything but that.” What I probably said to Keitel was
something about how difficult the matter was, or any evasive answer that
I may have thought of.
DR. NELTE: If the Chief of the OKW had ordered such an action on his own
initiative or on higher orders, this would, because of the high rank of
General Weygand, have amounted to an act of state. You did not tell us
yesterday whether after December 23, 1940 anything transpired in this
matter, that is to say, whether the Chief of the OKW took up this
question again.
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not say anything about that yesterday, but I
frequently mentioned during the interrogations that after that the Chief
of the OKW did nothing more about it. Canaris’ attitude made it obvious
that nothing further had been heard of it, for in the hierarchy of
commands which for me was authoritative, he would have had to transmit
orders to me. On the other hand, the information which I received in the
Giraud matter was authoritative.
DR. NELTE: We shall come to that presently. It is extraordinary that if
an act of state, such as the murder of General Weygand, had been
ordered, nothing more should have been heard of it. Can you explain
this?
LAHOUSEN: I can only explain it in the light of the construction which
not only I myself, but also the others, put on the matter at that time.
The situation at that time was very agitated; events followed each other
very rapidly and something happened all the time, and we assumed—I
shall come back to why we assumed it—that this matter and the
importance attached to it had been superseded by some more important
military or political event, and that it had receded into the
background.
DR. NELTE: Do you wish to say anything else?
LAHOUSEN: Yes. I wish to state that what I am saying now has a certain
bearing on the inner development of the Giraud affair. We—that is,
Canaris, myself, and the others—who knew about this when the matter
started, had hoped that it would take the same course as the Weygand
affair; that is, that the matter would be dropped. Whether the order had
been given by Keitel, or Hitler or Himmler, it would have been shelved
when it came to Canaris and to me. In our circles it would have been
relatively easy to intercept it or to divert it. That was what we hoped
when the Giraud affair came up, as we had seen what actually had
happened in the Weygand affair. Whether that was right or wrong I cannot
judge. This is the explanation.
DR. NELTE: For a less important matter your argument might be plausible,
but in such an important matter as the Weygand case it does not seem to
me to hold water. But even if it had been so, had the intention to do
away with Weygand existed in any quarters and for any reason, how do you
explain the fact that Weygand, who later was taken to Germany and housed
in a villa, lived undisturbed and honored and met with no harm? It would
have been understandable if the order to eliminate him had been
seriously expressed in any quarters, that it should have been carried
out on this occasion.
LAHOUSEN: I can only answer to this that the attitude towards
personalities in public life, whether at home or abroad, varied a great
deal. There were high personalities who at one moment were in great
favor and thought of very highly, and at the next moment were to be
found in a concentration camp.
DR. NELTE: Now regarding the Giraud case, you stated that Admiral
Canaris said in your presence and the presence of others that General
Giraud was to be done away with on orders from higher quarters.
LAHOUSEN: Yes. That it is so is borne out by the remark that
Pieckenbrock made, and which I remember very well, that Herr Keitel
should tell these things to Herr Hitler once and for all.
DR. NELTE: So according to the communication made to you by Admiral
Canaris, it was not an order of Keitel’s but an order of Hitler’s.
LAHOUSEN: As far as we knew in the Abwehr office, it was Keitel who gave
the order to Canaris. I can only assume this in view of an order Hitler
made to this effect I do not know who actually gave this order, because
I had no insight into the hierarchy of command beyond Canaris. It was,
as far as I was concerned, an order from Canaris—an order which I could
discuss immediately with him, in the same way as I can discuss it here.
DR. NELTE: You yourself did not hear this order?
LAHOUSEN: No, I personally did not hear it. I never said I did.
DR. NELTE: But you mentioned that later Keitel spoke to you about this
matter?
LAHOUSEN: The procedure was the same as in the case of Weygand.
DR. NELTE: Do you remember whether any precise or positive expression
such as “killing,” “elimination,” or something similar was used on this
occasion?
LAHOUSEN: The word generally used was “elimination” (umlegen).
DR. NELTE: What I mean is whether in this connection such a word was
used by the Defendant Keitel in addressing you?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course—when I gave my report, the notes of which I
have, together with the date, just as in the Weygand case. For reasons
unknown to me, the Giraud affair was apparently carried further than the
Weygand affair, for Canaris and I could determine the different stages
in its development.
DR. NELTE: You did not answer my question. What did the Defendant Keitel
say to you in this instance, when you were present at the occasion of a
report by Canaris and the question of Giraud was brought up? What did he
say?
LAHOUSEN: The same thing: “How does the matter stand?” And by “matter”
he clearly meant Giraud’s elimination, and that was the very subject we
discussed under similar conditions in the Weygand affair.
DR. NELTE: That is your opinion, but that is not the fact on which you
have to give evidence. I wish to find out from you what Keitel actually
said to you. When speaking to you or in your presence, did he use the
expression “dispose of” or “eliminate”?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the expression he used, but it was perfectly
clear what it was all about. Whatever it was, it was not a question of
sparing Giraud’s life or imprisoning him. They had had the opportunity
to do that while he was in occupied territory.
DR. NELTE: That is what I want to speak about now. You are familiar with
the fact that after Giraud’s flight and his return to Unoccupied France,
a conference took place in Occupied France.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that.
DR. NELTE: Ambassador Abetz had a talk with General Giraud which dealt
with the question of his voluntary return to confinement. You know that?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that.
DR. NELTE: Then you probably also know that at that time the local
military commander immediately called up the Führer’s headquarters by
way of Paris. It was believed that an important communication was to be
made; namely, that Giraud was in Occupied France and could be taken
prisoner?
LAHOUSEN: I know about this in its broad outline.
DR. NELTE: Then you know also that the OKW—that is to say in this case,
Keitel—then decided that this should not happen.
LAHOUSEN: No, that I do not know.
DR. NELTE: But you do know that General Giraud returned to Unoccupied
France without having been harmed?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I do know that.
DR. NELTE: Well, in that case, the answer to my previous question is
self-apparent.
LAHOUSEN: I speak the truth when I say I do not know. I could not have
known unless they had talked about it in my presence.
DR. NELTE: Well, it is so, and the facts prove it to be so. Did you know
that General Giraud’s family lived in Occupied France?
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that.
DR. NELTE: I thought the Abwehr division was entrusted with surveillance
of this region?
LAHOUSEN: No, you are mistaken—certainly not my department. I do not
know whether another department was in charge of that.
DR. NELTE: The question was asked simply to prove that the family did
not suffer because General Giraud escaped and later refused to return to
captivity. I have one more question which you may be able to answer.
LAHOUSEN: I beg your pardon. May I return, please, to the question of
Giraud?
DR. NELTE: This question also has to do with General Giraud.
LAHOUSEN: Very well.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that one day your chief, Canaris, received by
special courier a letter from Giraud in which Giraud asked whether he
might return to France? Do you know that?
LAHOUSEN: No. No, I do not know about it. Perhaps I was not in Berlin at
the time. I was not always in Berlin.
DR. NELTE: I am aware of that. I thought it might be mentioned in the
diary.
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not keep the diary. I simply made additions to it so
far as my particular department was concerned, but I was not familiar
with the diary in its entirety.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I would
like to make a motion in connection with the technical side of the
proceedings. In the course of the proceedings, many German witnesses
will be heard. It is important that the Tribunal should know exactly
what the witnesses say. During the hearing of this witness I have tried
to compare what the witness actually said with the English translation.
I think I can state that in many essential points the translation did
not entirely correspond to the statement of the witness. I would,
therefore, like to suggest that German stenographers take down directly
the statements of the witness in German so that Defense Counsel will
have an opportunity of comparing what the witness actually says with the
English translation and, if necessary, of making an application for the
correction of the translation. That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Justice Jackson.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
I just want to inform the Court and Counsel, in connection with the
observation that has just been made, that that has been anticipated and
that every statement of the witness is recorded in German, so that if
any question arises, if Counsel addresses a motion to it, the testimony
can be verified.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that German record available to Defendants’ Counsel?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t think it is. It is not, so far as I know.
It would not be available unless there were some occasion for it.
THE PRESIDENT: It is transcribed, I suppose?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t know how far that process is carried. I
will consult the technicians and advise about it, but I know that it is
preserved. The extent of my knowledge now is that it is preserved in
such a form that, if a question does arise, it can be accurately
determined by the Tribunal, so that if they call attention to some
particular thing, either the witness can correct it or we can have the
record produced. It would not be practicable to make the recording
available without making reproducing machines available. While I am not
a technician in that field, I would not think it would be practicable to
place that at their disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be practicable to have a transcription made
of the shorthand notes in German and, within the course of one or two
days after the evidence has been given, place that transcription in the
Defendants’ Counsel room?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is being done. I think perhaps Colonel
Dostert can explain just what is being done better than I can, because
he is the technician in this field. I am sure that no difficulty need
arise over this matter of correct translations.
COLONEL LEON DOSTERT (Chief of Interpreters): Your Honors, the reports
of the proceedings are taken down in all four languages and every word
spoken in German is taken down in German by German court stenographers.
The notes are then transcribed and can be made available to Defense
Counsel. Moreover, there is a mechanical recording device which
registers every single word spoken in any language in the courtroom, and
in case of doubt about the authenticity of the reporters’ notes, we have
the further verification of the mechanical recording, so that Defense
Counsel should have every opportunity to check the authenticity of the
translation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am advised further by Colonel Dostert that 25
copies of the German transcript are being delivered to the defendants
each day.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was not informed that the
German testimony is being taken down in shorthand in German. I assumed
that the records handed over to us were translations. If German
shorthand notes are being taken in the court, I withdraw my motion.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we shall get on faster if the Defendants’
Counsel, before making motions, inquire into the matters about which
they are making the motions.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Ribbentrop): I would like to ask
a few questions of the witness.
Witness, you previously stated that at some time an order was given,
according to which, Russian prisoners of war were to be marked in a
certain manner and that this order had been withdrawn by the Defendant
Keitel. You did say that, did you not?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said that I have knowledge that there was this purpose.
DR. SAUTER: This is interesting from the point of view of the Defendant
Ribbentrop, and I would like to hear from you whether you know about
this matter. Ribbentrop maintains that when he heard about the order to
brand Russian prisoners of war, he, in his capacity as Reich Foreign
Minister, went immediately to the Führer’s headquarters to inform
General Field Marshal Keitel of this order, and pointed out to him that
he, Ribbentrop, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, as well as in his
capacity as the guarantor of international law, objected to such
treatment of Russian prisoners of war.
I would be interested to know, Witness, whether in your circle something
was said as to who drew Keitel’s attention to this order and asked him
to retract it?
LAHOUSEN: I was not informed of that and I only knew, as I said
yesterday, that there had been this intention, but it was not carried
out.
DR. SAUTER: Then I have another question.
Witness, you spoke yesterday about some remarks of the Defendant
Ribbentrop, especially one statement to the effect that an uprising
should be staged in Poland—not in Russia—and that all Polish farm
houses should go up in flames and all Jews should be killed. That,
roughly, was how the statement ran.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Now, later on, I believe, in answering a question of one of
the Russian prosecutors, you amplified your statement by mentioning an
order of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I would now like to know whether you
really meant to say that it was an order from Ribbentrop to a military
department?
LAHOUSEN: No.
DR. SAUTER: Just a minute please, so that you can answer both questions
together.
I would also like to remind you that yesterday, when this matter was
first discussed, you spoke of a directive which, I believe, your
superior officer had, as you said, received from Ribbentrop?
LAHOUSEN: No, the Chief of the OKW received it, not my superior officer,
who was Canaris. I would like to repeat it, in order to clarify this
matter. It was a matter that came up for discussion on the 12th of
September 1939 in the Führer’s train. These meetings took place in the
following sequence with respect to time and locality: At first a short
meeting took place between the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and
Canaris in his coach.
DR. SAUTER: Were you present?
LAHOUSEN: I was present at that meeting. General political questions
regarding Poland and the Ukrainians in Poland were discussed. I do not
know anything more about this meeting, which was the first.
After that there was another meeting in the coach of Keitel, who was
then Chief of the OKW, and in the course of this meeting Keitel
summarized and commented on the general political directives issued by
Ribbentrop. He then mentioned several possible solutions for the
handling of the Polish problem from the point of view of foreign
policy—this can happen, or something else can happen; it is quite
possible. In this connection he said:
“You, Canaris, have to promote an uprising with the aid of the
Ukrainian organizations which are working with you and which
have the same objectives, namely, the Poles and the Jews.”
And then a third discussion, or rather, a very brief remark at the end
of a very short conversation between the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and
Canaris was made in connection with this subject, after the intention
had been made quite clear. It was about how the uprising was to be
carried out and what was to happen. I remember this so well, because he
demanded that the farm houses must burn. Canaris discussed the matter
with me in detail later on and referred to this remark.
That is what happened, as I have described it. This was the sequence:
Directives from the High Command to Keitel; then passed on by Keitel to
Canaris at this meeting; then repeated to Canaris in the form of a
remark which I remember so well because it contained the words about
farm houses in flames, which is rather an unusual thing to say.
THE PRESIDENT: It would assist the Tribunal if one question at a time
were asked and if the witnesses would answer “yes” or “no” to the
question asked, and explain, if they must, afterwards. But questions and
answers should be put as shortly as possible and only one question
should be asked at a time.
DR. SAUTER: Now, witness, something else has struck me.
THE PRESIDENT: You heard what I said did you? Do you understand it?
DR. SAUTER: [_Continuing._] Yesterday you said that these remarks of
Ribbentrop are not in the diary, if I understood you correctly.
LAHOUSEN: No, this is not from the diary but has a connection with
Canaris’ diary, by means of which I can make this remark.
DR. SAUTER: You said yesterday that this remark struck you as being
rather surprising.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: And today you said that General Blaskowitz also made some
striking statements. You also mentioned, however, that these statements
of Blaskowitz were not entered in the diary.
LAHOUSEN: No.
DR. SAUTER: Now, it occurs to me—and I would like you to answer this
question: Why, if this remark of the Defendant Ribbentrop surprised you,
was it not entered in the diary?
LAHOUSEN: Regarding Blaskowitz, I have to say—or rather—repeat the
following:
I said that I did not hear the Blaskowitz matter mentioned in this
connection during the meeting, and I cannot assume that this subject
came up concurrently, otherwise it would have been entered in these
notes. It may be, of course, that the Blaskowitz matter was discussed at
a time when I was not there. I have only put down what I heard or what
Canaris told me to enter in the record.
DR. SAUTER: But did you yourself hear that from Ribbentrop?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, but the substance was not altered. Whether one speaks of
extermination, elimination, or the burning of farms, they all amount to
terroristic measures.
DR. SAUTER: Did Von Ribbentrop really talk of killing Jews? Are you sure
you remember that?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I definitely remember that, because Canaris talked not
only to me, but also to others in Vienna about this matter and called me
time and again as a witness.
DR. SAUTER: You heard that too?
LAHOUSEN: That did not settle the matter, but these words of
Ribbentrop’s were frequently discussed.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, something else. You have told us about murderous
designs on which you or your department or other officers were employed
or which you were charged to carry out. Did you report these to any
police station as the law required? May I point out that according to
German law failure to report intended crimes is punishable with
imprisonment or in serious cases with death.
LAHOUSEN: Well, when you talk about German law, I cannot follow you. I
am not a lawyer, but just an ordinary man.
DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, that is also punishable according to
Austrian law.
LAHOUSEN: At that time Austrian law, as far as I know, was no longer
valid.
DR. SAUTER: In other words, you never reported the intended crime,
either as a private person or as an official?
LAHOUSEN: I should have had to make a great many reports—about 100,000
projected murders, of which I knew and could not help but know. You can
read about them in the records—and about shootings and the like—of
which of necessity I had knowledge, whether I wanted to know or not,
because, unfortunately, I was in the midst of it.
DR. SAUTER: It is not a matter of shootings which had taken place and
could no longer be prevented, but rather a matter of intended murder at
a time when perhaps it could have been prevented.
LAHOUSEN: I can only answer: Why did the person who received this order
at first hand not do the same thing? Why did he not denounce Hitler for
instance?
DR. SAUTER: You, as a general of the German Wehrmacht, should have asked
Hitler . . .
LAHOUSEN: I am sorry, you overestimate my rank, I had only been a
general in the German Wehrmacht since the first of January 1945, that
is, only for 4 months. At that time I was lieutenant colonel and later
colonel of the General Staff, not in the General Staff.
DR. SAUTER: But in 1938, immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria,
you at once made a request to be taken into the German Wehrmacht by
Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: I did not make a request, and I did not have to do this.
Wherever I was in the service, I was known for my special services. I
was not a stranger. With the knowledge of the Austrian Government and
also, in a restricted sense, with the knowledge of the German
authorities (that is, of certain persons) I was working for the Austrian
Government in a matter which exclusively concerned things outside the
scope of Austrian internal policy. I co-operated with the Wehrmacht, as
well as with the Italian and Hungarian Governments with the knowledge of
the Austrian Government and the competent authorities. There were
matters of politics which were not my domain.
DR. SAUTER: But I believe, Witness, your memory deceives you, because
immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, you called on the General
Staff in Berlin and there you tried to get a commission in the German
Wehrmacht, and you now deny this. You also filled in and signed a
questionnaire, in which you declared your complete allegiance to the
Greater German Reich and to Adolf Hitler; and shortly afterwards you
took the oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, I did it just as everybody else who was in the
position of being transferred from one office and capacity to another.
DR. SAUTER: Before, you said you did not apply for this appointment, and
I have information to the contrary: That you, in the company of two or
three other officers were the first to go to Berlin with the sole
purpose of asking the Chief of the German General Staff Beck to take you
into the German Army.
LAHOUSEN: I am very glad that you mention this subject, because it
allows me to make my position perfectly clear. It was not necessary for
me to make an application for my future position in the German
Wehrmacht. I was known because of my military activities, just as any
military attaché is known in the country where he is accredited.
Moreover, I can easily explain why my rise in office was so rapid. I
have said that my activities and my co-operation with the Austrian
Military Intelligence Service, which were not determined by me but by my
superior Austrian office, were at that time directed against the
neighboring country of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was the country
that was next on the list after Austria. Therefore, it was natural that
my later chief, Canaris, who knew me from my former position, was very
interested in having me promoted in his department. He put in a word for
me, and so did Colonel General Beck, whom I was visiting. Other people
also know this; and I have now told everything that General Beck told me
at that time.
DR. SAUTER: Then it is true, you did go to Berlin and apply to be
transferred into the German Wehrmacht, which you at first denied?
LAHOUSEN: No, that is not true, I did not apply. Others made the
request. I can even say that I did not go there: I flew there. Canaris,
who knew me not only in my military capacity but also in regard to my
personal attitude (just as Marogna had known me and just as Colonel
General Beck, who was informed about me by Canaris), made the request
for me. I myself did not apply, but others applied for me, for reasons
which only later became clear to me, because they knew my personal
attitude, just as my Austrian comrades—they were necessarily few—knew
about this and about me. That is how things stood.
DR. SAUTER: I have no other questions to ask this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Before the cross-examination I wish to announce that
there will be no public session of the Tribunal this afternoon.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): I am counsel for the
Defendant Göring, and I would like to address a few questions to the
witness.
Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said yesterday that it was
Canaris’ personal conviction that his failure to prevent the attack on
Poland would mean the end of Germany and a great misfortune for us. A
triumph of the system would mean an even greater disaster, and it was
the purpose of General Canaris to prevent this. Did I understand you
correctly?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, except for one point: Not that he had not been successful
in preventing it, but that it was not possible to prevent it. Canaris
had no way of knowing this . . .
DR. STAHMER: Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, in the first years
of the war, had very active sabotage organizations behind the enemy
front and that he personally worked very hard for these organizations?
LAHOUSEN: Naturally I knew about that, and I have fully informed the
American authorities who were interested in this subject.
DR. STAHMER: But how is that possible? This would not be in conformity
with his inner political beliefs.
LAHOUSEN: This is explained by the fact that in the circle in which he
was active he could never say what he really thought, and thousands of
others could not do so either—what I said is a truth without saying.
The essential thing is not what he said, or what he had to say in order
to follow a purpose; but what he did and how he did it. This I know and
others know it, too.
DR. STAHMER: This is not a question of what he said, but of what he
actually did. He not only proposed such measures, but also applied
himself to their execution—is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Ostensibly he had, of course, to remain within the limits of
his office, in order to keep his position. That was the important thing,
that he should remain in this position, to prevent in 1939 the thing
that actually happened in 1944: that Himmler should take things in hand.
I place before you these two men, one against the other: Canaris and
Himmler—and I think I need hardly tell you what Canaris was striving
for when he (Canaris) took part—ostensibly took part in these
activities.
DR. STAHMER: You mentioned the name of Himmler, in this connection, I
would like to ask the following question:
Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the
war, laid great stress on his good relations with the SS and the
necessity for close co-operation with the SS, so much so, that the
Defendant Göring had to advise him to be more independent of the SS in
his military functions?
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too quickly and I do not think you are
observing what I said just now, that it will help the Tribunal if you
will ask one question at a time.
DR. STAHMER: I will put my question briefly; did the witness know that
Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the war, had good connections
with the SS and recognized the necessity for close co-operation with the
formation, and never failed to stress this?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, this is known to me. I also know why.
DR. STAHMER: And why?
LAHOUSEN: So that he might be in a position to see and to know and keep
himself informed of everything these people were doing, and be able to
intervene wherever and whenever possible.
DR. STAHMER: Was it the duty of your organization, or the duty of
Canaris’ department to pass on important enemy intelligence to the
military leadership in good time?
LAHOUSEN: I do not understand what the office of Canaris has to do with
this?
DR. STAHMER: Your section of the office of Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, the Department I.
DR. STAHMER: Now, according to my information, your office did not pass
on to the military departments concerned information of the
Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know. Please do not make me responsible for the
department. This is a question which could easily be answered by Colonel
Pieckenbrock, but not by me.
DR. STAHMER: Regarding the Case “Rowehl,” you said yesterday that a
colonel of the Air Force, Rowehl, had formed a special squadron, which
had the tasks of making reconnaissance flights over Poland, England, and
the southeast sector prior to the Polish campaign. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: You also said that Colonel Rowehl went to see Admiral
Canaris to report on the results of these flights and to submit
photographs. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Yes. How should I have known about it otherwise? I did not
invent it.
DR. STAHMER: I did not say that. How did Colonel Rowehl come to report
to Admiral Canaris about this?
LAHOUSEN: I believe I mentioned yesterday, that this was a function of
the Amt Ausland Abwehr, Abteilung I.
DR. STAHMER: Have you yourself seen the photographs that were taken over
England?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have seen them.
DR. STAHMER: When and where were these pictures shown to you?
LAHOUSEN: In the office of Canaris they were shown to me. I had nothing
to do with them in an official way. I happened to be present at the
time. I was interested in seeing what was going on.
DR. STAHMER: What did these photographs show?
LAHOUSEN: I have forgotten the details. They were photographs taken from
airplanes.
DR. STAHMER: The photographs were not shown to you officially?
LAHOUSEN: No, the photographs were not shown to me officially, I was
merely an interested spectator on this occasion, as I have just told
you.
DR. STAHMER: Did Rowehl give any written reports about these flights to
the Amt?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: You do not know? You also said that Rowehl’s squadron made
flights from Budapest?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know that from your own experience or from some
other information?
LAHOUSEN: I know it through personal investigation. The date is entered
in the War Diary kept by the section. At that time I was in Budapest,
and I was asked to attend the conferring of a citation in Budapest.
DR. STAHMER: That was before the Polish campaign?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: And why were these flights carried out from Budapest?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know. I said that yesterday. A gentleman of the Air
Force would have to answer that.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Witness, do you know
Captain Strünck from the Abwehr?
LAHOUSEN: I would like you to tell me something more than the name. The
name alone does not mean anything to me. Give me a few points that will
refresh my memory.
DR. DIX: He is a lawyer who was a reserve officer with the Abwehr. I do
not know in which department, but I would say it was in the department
of Pieckenbrock. However, if you do not know him I will not question you
any further.
LAHOUSEN: If he was with Pieckenbrock I do not know him. I knew a few.
Is Strünck still alive?
DR. DIX: No, he is no longer living.
LAHOUSEN: Was he executed?
DR. DIX: He suffered the same death as Canaris and Oster. For the
information of the Court, I should like to add that I asked this
question because I named Strünck as a witness and the Court has admitted
him as such. I wish to take this opportunity—but if you do not know him
I will not continue questioning you.
LAHOUSEN: When I asked whether he is still alive, I seemed to recall
that this man, together with others whom I knew very well, might have
been killed, but I cannot be more definite on this point.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): I would like to ask
the witness a few questions.
Witness, do you know that the Defendant Fritzsche, when in May 1942 he
was transferred to the 6th Army as a soldier and there heard for the
first time of the existence of an order for executions, recommended to
the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, Paulus, that he should have this
order suspended within the jurisdiction of his army and have this
decision made known by leaflets to be dropped over the Russian front?
THE PRESIDENT: Be careful only to ask one question at a time. You have
just asked three or four questions at once.
DR. FRITZ: Yes, Sir. Is it known to you that Fritzsche gave Paulus the
advice to rescind the order for his army sector?
LAHOUSEN: That order had already been given to his army. Will you kindly
give me the approximate date?
DR. FRITZ: That was during the Russian campaign, as I mentioned
yesterday. Most of these things occurred in May 1942.
LAHOUSEN: No. I do not know anything about this in connection with
Fritzsche. In connection with the name Reichenau, which was mentioned
before, I do remember a conversation between Reichenau and Canaris at
which I was present. It made a great impression on me. During this
conversation, and in this circle, where there were several other
gentlemen present, Reichenau held quite different ideas and judged
things quite differently from what I had expected of him. Apart from
that, I do not know anything about this particular question.
DR. FRITZ: Also nothing concerning the fact that Paulus had rescinded
the order within the sector of his army?
LAHOUSEN: No, not in connection with the name Paulus, but in general I
believe, as I also stated yesterday, that several army commanders, whose
names are no longer in my memory today, or whose names have been
recorded, were mentioned by me.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Do you know
Mr. Kaltenbrunner?
LAHOUSEN: Kaltenbrunner? I met Kaltenbrunner only once in my life, and
that was on a day that will always remain in my memory. It was also the
first meeting between Canaris and Kaltenbrunner. It took place in Munich
in the Regina Hotel, and it was on the day when two young people, a
student and his sister, were arrested and executed. They had distributed
leaflets in the auditorium of the University of Munich. I read the
contents of the leaflets, and I remember, among other things, that they
contained an appeal to the Wehrmacht.
I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time that I
saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was familiar. Of course,
Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, who was completely
shattered because of what had happened that day and was still under the
painful impression—and thank God there are still witnesses available
who can testify to this. When discussing the matter Kaltenbrunner was
very much to the point, but at the same time he was quite cynical about
it. That is the only thing I can tell you about this matter.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner claims that Himmler retained full executive
powers for himself, while he was only in charge of the intelligence
service. Is this borne out by the conversation that you just mentioned?
LAHOUSEN: I would like you to know what bearing that has on the
Kaltenbrunner-Himmler matter—the struggle for power which was taking
place in the SS. I have merely described this event. I can give you the
names of the people present, who like myself were very much impressed
for the reasons which I have mentioned.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): You were asked yesterday whether
the orders regarding the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war were known
to the leaders of the SA and other organizations, and your answer was
that these orders must have been known to them. I would now like to ask
you who these leaders were at the time and what were their names?
LAHOUSEN: Who they were and what their names were, I do not know. I also
stated explicitly yesterday why I said so. They must have been known to
them and to a large circle through the execution of these orders, and,
of course, through the return of the wounded. The German people must
have learned about them.
HERR BÖHM: In other words, it was only an opinion of yours, but in no
way a fact-based on personal observation?
LAHOUSEN: No, it was not. I personally never had anything to do with any
SA leader. I never had anything to do with them, and I do not think any
one of them knows me well.
HERR BÖHM: Could you make a statement on this, that is, whether the
orders which were mentioned yesterday were given to the formations of
the SA?
LAHOUSEN: Would you kindly formulate that question again?
HERR BÖHM: Could you make another statement as to whether the contents
of these orders, which were discussed yesterday, were sent to the
formations of the SA through official channels?
LAHOUSEN: No, not through official channels, but in the way I have
previously indicated; in other words, members of the SA who were also in
the Wehrmacht could see actually what happened out there, and when they
came back they spoke about it, the same as anyone else. It was only in
this connection . . .
HERR BÖHM: Is it known to you whether members of the SA had anything at
all to do with the handling of prisoners of war?
LAHOUSEN: When members of the SA were in the Wehrmacht, yes.
HERR BÖHM: Did you make any personal observations in this connection?
LAHOUSEN: No, I never said that. I said I had already talked about the
SA.
HERR BÖHM: I asked you which leaders of the SA formations knew about
them, and you answered that they should have known about them.
LAHOUSEN: I said the leaders of these organizations came to know about
them in this way.
HERR BÖHM: And today I ask you whether the individual formations of the
SA had received these orders.
LAHOUSEN: I can only repeat what I said yesterday, and I think I was
very clear on the subject, in other words, how these orders were issued.
I myself did not read these orders, but I know the effects they had.
HERR BÖHM: I can imagine myself how this happened, but I asked you
whether you know anything about how these orders reached the SA?
LAHOUSEN: No.
HERR BÖHM: You do not know? Do you know anything from your own personal
observations about members of the SA being employed for the supervision
of prisoner-of-war camps?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, because from my personal observations, once when I was on
my way to the Army Group North, I caught an SA man who was kicking a
Russian prisoner of war and I pulled him up about it. I think that is
mentioned somewhere in my records, and also an episode about an
Arbeitsdienst man.
HERR BÖHM: Did you report any of these incidents through the proper
channels? Did you see to it that the leaders of this organization were
informed about them?
LAHOUSEN: I reported it to my superior officer, or it was mentioned in
my report on my visit either orally or in writing. There were
discussions on this and similar incidents.
HERR BÖHM: Have you got anything in your records?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
HERR BÖHM: Will you please submit it?
LAHOUSEN: I am looking it up. This is about the Arbeitsdienst man, this
document.
HERR BÖHM: It is not about the SA man?
LAHOUSEN: No.
HERR BÖHM: Then you cannot submit anything in answer to my question?
LAHOUSEN: I do not have it here. I would have to look it up.
HERR BÖHM: Do you think you might find some records?
LAHOUSEN: I would have to have an opportunity of going through the whole
of the material which is in the hands of the American authorities to
find this one.
HERR BÖHM: I will ask the Court that you be given this opportunity.
I would also like to inquire whether you were ever able to observe that
members of the SA whom you ascertained were employed on supervisory
duties, ever took any measures which were in line with the orders
against Soviet soldiers.
LAHOUSEN: No, not personally.
HERR BÖHM: Thank you.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to ask the Court for a fundamental ruling on
whether the defendant also has the right personally to ask the witness
questions. According to the German text of the Charter, Paragraph 16, I
believe this is permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the point you have raised and
will let you know later.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The United States Prosecution would desire to be
heard, I am sure, if there were any probability of that view being taken
by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear you now, Mr. Justice Jackson.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think it is very clear that these
provisions are mutually exclusive. Each defendant has the right to
conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of counsel. Certainly
this would become a performance rather than a trial if we go into that
sort of thing. In framing this Charter, we anticipated the possibility
that some of these defendants, being lawyers themselves, might conduct
their own defenses. If they do so, of course they have all the
privileges of counsel. If they avail themselves of the privileges of
counsel, they are not, we submit, entitled to be heard in person.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out once more that Paragraph 16 (e),
according to my opinion, speaks very clearly for my point of view. It
says that the defendant has the right, either personally or through his
counsel, to present evidence, and according to the German text it is
clear that the defendant has the right to cross-examine any witness
called by the Prosecution. According to the German text there reference
can be made only to the defendant—with respect to terms as well as to
the contents. In my opinion it is made clear that the defendant has the
right to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel, defendant’s counsel, wish
to cross-examine the witness?
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I would only like
to point out that in the written forms given to us by the Court, the
defendant, as well as his counsel can make a motion. A place is left for
two signatures on the questionnaire. I conclude, therefore, that the
defendant himself has the right to speak on the floor.
THE PRESIDENT: What I asked was whether any other defendant’s counsel
wished to cross-examine the witness.
[_Herr Böhm approached the lectern._]
THE PRESIDENT: What is it? Would you put the earphones on, please,
unless you understand English. What is it you want to ask now? You have
already cross-examined the witness.
HERR BÖHM: Yes, I have cross-examined him, but he has given me to
understand that he made a report about an incident which occurred during
one of his visits of inspection, and that he has some written notes. As
I am not yet able to release the witness, I should like to move that the
Prosecution allow to be placed at the disposal of the witness any
available notes or reports on the observations made by him at the time,
so that he may find the evidence he wants.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must conclude your cross-examination now.
HERR BÖHM: Certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court thinks it would be better if you want to make
any further application with reference to this witness, that you should
make it in writing later.
HERR BÖHM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, as no other defendant’s counsel wishes to
cross-examine the witness, the Tribunal will now retire for the purpose
of considering the question raised by Dr. Stahmer as to whether a
defendant has the right to cross-examine as well as his own counsel.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered the question raised
by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants who are represented by
counsel have not the right to cross-examine witnesses. They have the
right to be called as witnesses themselves and to make a statement at
the end of the Trial.
Do the Prosecutors wish to ask any questions of this witness in
re-examination?
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United
States): Just one question, your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness come back here.
THE MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): He was taken away.
THE PRESIDENT: Taken away?
THE MARSHAL: That’s right. He was taken away by some captain who brought
him here for the Trial. They have sent after him now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how far he has been taken away?
THE MARSHAL: No, Sir, I do not. I will find out immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are the questions that you wish to ask of
sufficient importance for the Tribunal to wait for this witness or for
him to be recalled on Monday?
COL. AMEN: I don’t believe so, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well then. The Tribunal will adjourn, and it will be
understood that in the future no witness will be removed whilst he is
under examination, from the precincts of this Court except on the orders
of the Tribunal.
COL. AMEN: I do not know how that happened Your Lordship, I understood
he was still here.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
ELEVENTH DAY
Monday, 3 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the prosecutor for the United States.
SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May
it please the Tribunal, it occurs to me that perhaps the Tribunal might
be interested in a very brief outline of what might be expected to occur
within the next week or two weeks in this Trial.
I shall immediately proceed with the aggressive war case, to present the
story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I shall not perhaps be able to
conclude that today.
Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, has asked that he
be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening statement on
Count Two and I shall be glad to yield for that purpose, with the
understanding that we shall resume on Czechoslovakia after that.
Thereafter, the British prosecutor will proceed to present the
aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and England
into the war. Thereupon the British prosecutor will proceed with the
expansion of aggressive war in Europe, the aggression against Norway and
Denmark, against Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia
and Greece. And in connection with those aggressions the British
prosecutor will present to the Tribunal the various treaties involved
and the various breaches of treaties involved in those aggressions.
That, as I understand it, will complete the British case under Count Two
and will probably take the rest of this week.
Then it will be necessary for the American prosecuting staff to come
back to Count One to cover certain portions which have not been covered,
specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration camps, spoliation
in occupied territories, the High Command, and other alleged criminal
organizations, particularly evidence dealing with individual
responsibility of individual defendants.
Roughly, I would anticipate that that would carry through the following
week—two weeks. However, that is a very rough estimate.
Thereupon, the French chief prosecutor will make his opening statement
and will present the evidence as to Crimes against Humanity and War
Crimes under Counts Three and Four as to Western Occupied countries.
Following that, the Russian chief prosecutor will make his opening
statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity in the Eastern countries.
That, in very rough outline, is what we have in mind to present.
I turn now to the third section in the detailed chronological
presentation of the aggressive war case: Aggression against
Czechoslovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in
Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing at Pages 7 and 8 of the
printed English text of the Indictment.
This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts:
(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the assault
both on Austria and Czechoslovakia.
(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria; November 1937 to March
1938.
(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia; April 1938 to
March 1939.
On Thursday, last, I completed the presentation of the documents on the
execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents are gathered
together in a document book which was handed to the Tribunal at the
beginning of the Austrian presentation.
The materials relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia have
been gathered in a separate document book, which I now submit to the
Tribunal and which is marked “Document Book 0.”
The Tribunal will recall that in the period 1933 to 1936 the defendants
had initiated a program of rearmament, designed to give the Third Reich
military strength and political bargaining power to be used against
other nations. You will recall also that beginning in the year 1936 they
had embarked on a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned
out, was to last until March 1939. This was intended to shorten their
frontiers, to increase their industrial and food reserve, and to place
them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they
could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of
aggression.
At the moment—in the early spring of 1938—when the Nazi conspirators
began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia, they had
reached approximately the half-way point in this preliminary program.
The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reich Chancellery on
November 5, 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, Hitler had set forth
the program which Germany was to follow. Those Hossbach minutes, you
will recall, are contained in Document 386-PS as United States Exhibit
Number 25, which I read to the Tribunal in my introductory statement a
week ago today.
“The question for Germany,” the Führer had informed his military
commanders at that meeting, “is where the greatest possible conquest can
be made at the lowest cost.”
At the top of his agenda stood two countries, Austria and
Czechoslovakia.
On March 12, 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the
following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a
redefinition of German intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. A little
more than a month later two of the conspirators, Hitler and Keitel, met
to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak
State.
Among the selected handful of documents which I read to the Tribunal in
my introduction a week ago to establish the corpus of the crime of
aggressive war was the account of this meeting on 21 April 1938. This
account is Item 2 in our Document Number 388-PS, as United States
Exhibit Number 26.
The Tribunal will recall that Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretext
which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and
overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of
diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an
excuse for war. In the alternative—and this alternative they found to
be preferable—they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result
of an incident of their own creation.
Consideration, as we alleged in the Indictment and as the document
proved, was given to the assassination of the German Minister at Prague
to create the requisite incident.
The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in
Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of
transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to overcoming all
Czechoslovak resistance within 4 days, thus presenting the world with a
_fait accompli_ and forestalling outside interventions.
Thus, in mid-April 1938, the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer
Czechoslovakia had already readied the stage of practical planning.
Now all of that occurred, if the Tribunal please, against a background
of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be viewed against
that background. Although they had, in the fall of 1937, determined to
destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German Government
were bound by a treaty of arbitration and assurances freely given, to
observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at
Locarno on 16 October 1925—Document TC-14, which will be introduced by
the British prosecutor—Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain
exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court
of International Justice matters of dispute. I quote, they would so
refer:
“All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia
with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy.”
And the preamble to this treaty stated:
“The President of the German Reich and the President of the
Czechoslovak Republic equally resolved to maintain peace between
Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement
of differences, which might arise between the two countries;
declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or
resulting from the law of nations, is obligatory for
international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights
of a state cannot be modified save with its consent, and
considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful
settlement of international disputes permits of resolving,
without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause
of divisions between states, have decided to embody in a treaty
their common intention in this respect.”
That ends the quotation.
Formal and categoric assurances of their good will towards
Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as late as
March 1938. On March 11 and 12, 1938, at the time of the annexation of
Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia
not to mobilize. At this time the Defendant Göring assured Masaryk, the
Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that
German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the development in
Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions towards
Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity, Defendant Göring
accompanied his assurance with the statement, “Ich gebe Ihnen mein
Ehrenwort (I give you my word of honor).”
At the same time, the Defendant Von Neurath, who was handling German
foreign affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured Masaryk, on
behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that Germany still
considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925.
These assurances are contained in Document TC-27, another of the series
of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal by the British
prosecutor under Count Two of the Indictment.
Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded
with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the
preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German
policy was the elimination both of Austria and of Czechoslovakia. In
both countries the conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist
by propaganda and by Fifth Column activities, while the actual military
preparations were being developed.
The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and
strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938.
Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to “Fall Grün” (Case
Green), the designation given to the proposed operation against
Czechoslovakia.
The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline from as
early as June 1937. The OKW top-secret directive for the unified
preparation of the Armed Forces for war—signed by Von Blomberg on June
24, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year
beginning July 1, 1937,—included, as a probable war-like eventuality
for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, “War on two
fronts, with the main struggle in the southeast.”
This document—our Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69—was introduced in
evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon
copy, signed in ink by Von Blomberg. The original section of this
directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakia—it was
later revised—opens with this supposition. I read _from the bottom_ of
Page 3 of the English translation of this directive, following the
heading II, and Subparagraph (1) headed “Suppositions”:
“The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation
against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of
a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify
such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law
must be created beforehand.”
After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such
action, the directive continues as follows:
“(2) _The task of the German Armed Forces_”—and that much is
underscored—“is to make their preparations in such a way that
the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by
surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the
minimum strength is provided as rear-cover for this attack.
“The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed
Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for
the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the
rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian
Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base
in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy
armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.”
The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding
principles the following statement—and I now read from Page 1 of the
English translation, that is, the third paragraph following Figure 1:
“Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does
not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness
for war on the part of the German Armed Forces:”—and then—“(a)
to counterattack at any time; (b) to make possible the military
exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they
occur.”
This directive ordered further work on the plan for “mobilization
without public announcement.” I quote:
“. . . in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able
to begin a sudden war which will take the enemy by surprise, in
regard to both strength and time of attack.”
This is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of
the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which
resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in
another setting.
Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during
the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-38. On the political level, this
planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and
support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5
November 1937, reported in the Hossbach minutes, to which I have
frequently heretofore referred.
In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, we find the
Defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent of the
information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to
Hungary. On 4 March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for
General Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference
with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an
interchange of views. This is Document 2786-PS, a photostat of the
original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit
USA-81. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:
“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should
discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia,
the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed
about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me
briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.
With best regards and Heil Hitler.”
At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which
I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning (Document 388-PS,
Item 2), specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed
for the first time. This meeting was followed, in the late spring and
summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case
Green (Fall Grün). Those notes and communications were carefully filed
at Hitler’s headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the
Führer’s military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a
cellar at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is
preserved intact, bears out Number 388-PS, and is United States Exhibit
Number 26. We affectionately refer to it as “Big Schmundt”—a large
file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any
narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an
unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the
Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning
Czechoslovakian armament and defense. With the leave of the Tribunal I
shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without
reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt
file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler, in General Jodl’s office of the
OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them?
MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn’t intended to read them in full, unless that may be
necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish to refer to
the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed, “Short Survey of
Armament of the Czech Army,” dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and initialed
“Z” for Zeitzler, and Item 13, “Questions of the Führer,” dated Berlin,
9 June 1938, and classified “Most Secret.” I should like to read four of
the questions which Hitler wanted authoritative information about, as
shown by that document, and I read indicated questions on Pages 23, 24,
25, and 26 of Item 13 of Document 388-PS.
Question 1: Hitler asked about armament of the Czech Army. I don’t think
it necessary to read the answers. They are detailed answers giving
information in response to these questions posed by Hitler.
“Question 2: How many battalions, _et cetera_, are employed in
the West for the construction of emplacements?
“Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still
occupied in unreduced strength?
“Question. 4: Frontier protection in the West.”
As I say, those questions were answered in detail by the OKW and
initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff.
As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on
Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the
preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier in
Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at Page 12 of the Big Schmundt file, a
telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, and I
quote from this telegram. It is, as I say, Item 8 of the Schmundt file,
Page 12 of Document 388-PS: “Inform Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and
General Keitel.” And then, skipping a paragraph: “The Führer repeatedly
emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification
work in the West.”
In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and
his political and military advisors resulted in the issuance of a series
of constantly revised directives for the attack on Czechoslovakia. It
was decided that preparations for X-Day, the day of the attack, should
be completed no later than 1 October. I now invite the attention of the
Tribunal to the more important of these conferences and directives.
On 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his principal advisors. At
this meeting he gave the necessary instructions to his fellow
conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. This fact Hitler
later publicly admitted. I now refer and invite the notice of the
Tribunal to Document 2360-PS, a copy of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of
31 January 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag the preceding day,
reported in this newspaper, reading now from Document 2360-PS, Hitler
spoke as follows:
“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been
aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of
our Germans there, I have determined to solve once and for all,
and this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On 28 May
I ordered first: That preparation should be made for military
action against this state by 2 October. I ordered second: The
immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the
West.”
Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the
revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item 11 in
the Big Schmundt file, Document 388-PS. It is entitled, “Two-front War,
with Main Effort in the Southeast,” and this directive replaced the
corresponding section, Part 2, Section II, of the previous quote,
“Directive for Unified Preparation for War,” which had been promulgated
by Von Blomberg on 26 June 1937, which I have already introduced in
evidence as our Document C-175, United States Exhibit Number 69. This
revised directive represented a further development of the ideas for
political and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their
conference on 21 April. It is an expansion of the rough draft submitted
by the Defendant Keitel to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as Item
5 in the Schmundt file. It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were
made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Defendant
Keitel to General Von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Defendant Raeder for
the Navy, and to Defendant Göring for the Luftwaffe. In his covering
memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured—I quote: “As
from 1 October 1938 at the latest.” I now read from this document, which
is the basic directive under which the Wehrmacht carried out its
planning for Case Green, a rather lengthy quotation from the first page
of Item 11, Page 16 of the English version:
“1. Political prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision to
smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It
is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the
politically and militarily suitable moment.
“An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
or other political events in Europe, creating a surprisingly
favorable opportunity and one which may never come again, may
cause me to take early action.
“The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly
the preparations are to be made at once.
“2. Political possibilities for the commencement of the action.
The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended
invasion:
“a. Suitable obvious cause and with it, b. sufficient political
justification, c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will
find him prepared in the least possible degree.
“From a military as well as a political standpoint the most
favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an
incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way
for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral
justification of military action.
“But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war,
must terminate in sudden action on our part, which must have the
elements of surprise as regards time and extent, before the
enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be
surpassed.
“3. Conclusions for the preparation of Fall Grün.
“a. For the ‘armed war’ it is essential that the surprise
element, as the most important factor contributing to success,
be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already
in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action.
Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first 2 or
3 days which plainly demonstrates to hostile nations, eager to
intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military
situation and which, at the same time, will give nations with
territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene
immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention
by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected,
especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of
Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war
by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give
military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are
to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the
land operations within the first few days, a European crisis
will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of
all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.
“b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and wear down her power of resistance;
on the other hand issue directions to national groups for
support in the ‘armed war’ and influence the neutrals into our
way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination
of the date.
“4. Tasks of the Armed Forces. Armed Forces preparations are to
be made on the following basis:
“a. The mass of all forces must be employed against
Czechoslovakia.
“b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear
cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East
against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the
southern frontiers to be watched.
“c. The sections of the Army which can be rapidly employed must
force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and
must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the
certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with
the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed
in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly
employed cross the frontier at the appointed time, at the same
time as the penetration by the Air Force, before the enemy can
become aware of our mobilization. For this, a timetable between
Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW
and submitted to me for approval.
“5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.
“a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against
Czechoslovakia must not be endangered nor the initiative of the
Air Force be wasted by the inevitable time required for
transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail. Therefore it
is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault
columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise
attack by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition
of each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed
with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their
proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special
measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts
to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at
numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to
achieve a break-through, or to break them down from the rear.
For the success of this operation, co-operation with the
Sudeten-German frontier population, with deserters from the
Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops and
with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The
bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian
plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from
escaping . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail?
MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the
transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before you
pass from the document you ought to read the document on Page 15, which
introduces it and which gives the date of it.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated:
“Berlin, 30 May 1938; copy of the fourth copy; Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces; most secret; access only through officer;
written by an officer. Signed Keitel; distributed to C-in-C
Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force.
“By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2,
Section II, of the directive on the unified preparations for war
of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob. d. W)”—with some
symbols, including “Chefsache” (top secret)—“(two-front war
with main effort on the Southeast—strategic concentration
Green) is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution
must be assured as from 1 October 1938 at the latest.
Alterations in other parts of the directives must be expected
during the next week.
“By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
signed, Keitel.
“Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff.”
In line with the suggestion of the presiding Justice, I shall omit the
detailed instructions which are set out for action by the Luftwaffe and
by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph of the directive,
which will be found on Page 19 of the English version:
“In war economy it is essential that in the field of the
armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made
possible through increased supplies. In the course of
operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of
the total war—economic strength—by rapidly reconnoitering and
restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of
Czechoslovakian industrial and factory installations, insofar as
military operations permit, can be of decisive importance to
us.”
In other words, the Nazi conspirators, 4 months before the date of their
planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution which
the Czech industrial plant would make to further Nazi war efforts and
economy.
And the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page 19:
“All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by
OKW. They will be made, in agreement with, and according to, the
requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their
effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force as
to time and locality.
“Signed Adolf Hitler.
“Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff.”
Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was
prepared and initialed by the Defendant Keitel. This is Item 14 at Pages
27 to 32 of the Big Schmundt file. It did not supersede the 30 May
directive. I shall read the third and fifth paragraphs on Page 28 of the
English translation, and the last paragraph on Page 29:
“The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own
free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political
intentions. I am determined as from 1 October 1938 to use to the
full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.”
Then skipping a paragraph:
“However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia
only if I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the occupation
of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, that
France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.”
And then skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page:
“The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself
will be issued by me from time to time.”
“K”—initial of Keitel, and—“Z”—initial of Zeitzler.
The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions
for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of
the possibility that during the execution of the Fall Grün (or Case
Green) France or England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of
complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not
been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute Item 15
in the Schmundt file, give a timetable of specific measures for the
preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated
action.
Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in General
Jodl’s diary, our Document Number 1780-PS and United States Exhibit
Number 72, from which I quoted portions during the Austrian
presentation. I now quote from three entries in this diary written in
the spring of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated it appears to
have been written several months after the annexation of Austria, and
here I read under the heading on Page 3 of the English translation:
“Later undated entry:
“After annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that there is
no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria had to be
digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will
have to be carried out energetically. They will have to be newly
prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because
of the annexation of Austria. State of preparation, see
Memorandum L-1-A of 19 April, reported to the Führer on 21
April.
“The intention of the Führer not to touch the Czech problem as
yet will be changed because of the Czech strategic troop
concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat
and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Germany’s
self-restraint the consequences lead to a loss of prestige for
the Führer, which he is not willing to take once more.
Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on 30 May.”
And then the entry, 23 May:
“Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Führer. . . . Further
conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the
Führer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June,—see inclosures (War
Diary).”
Then the entry of 30 May:
“The Führer signs directive Green, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions
of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an
immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on
D-Day”—X-Tag—“combined with aerial penetration by the Air
Force.
“Further details are derived from directive for strategic
concentration of the Army. The whole contrast becomes acute once
more between the Führer’s intuition that we must do it this
year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet,
as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are
not as yet equal to them.”
During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in
planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further
expansion of the Reich.
I now offer in evidence Document R-150, as United States Exhibit 82.
This is a top-secret document dated 2 June 1938, issued by Air Group
Command 3, and entitled “Plan Study 1938, Instruction for Deployment and
Combat, ‘Case Red.’”
“Case Red” is the code name for action against the Western Powers if
need be. Twenty-eight copies of this document were made, of which this
is number 16. This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and
employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given
significance by the considerable progress by this date of the planning
for the attack on Czechoslovakia.
I quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation,
referring to the various possibilities under which war with France may
occur. You will note that they are all predicated on the assumption of a
German-Czech conflict.
“France will either (a) interfere in the struggle between the
Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of Case Green, or (b)
start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia. (c) It is
possible but not likely that France will begin the fight while
Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.”
And then, reading down lower on the page under the heading “Intention”:
“Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of Case
Green or whether she makes the opening move of the war
simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the
German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army,
first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.”
By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being
carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attaché in Prague reconnoitered
the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia south of Upper Silesia for
suitable landing grounds.
I offer in evidence Document 1536-PS as Exhibit USA-83, a report of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938.
This was a top-secret document for general officers only, of which only
two copies were made.
Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Moericke, the German
Attaché in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. I quote the first four
paragraphs of the enclosure:
“I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to
reconnoiter the land in the region Freudenthal-Freihermersdorf
. . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. “. . . for landing possibilities.
“For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in
Prague.
“I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me
to Macholdt, particularly about my official position.
“I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to
Freudenthal taking precautions against being observed.”
By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the
issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum,
entitled “Extended Case Green”; in other words, an estimate of possible
action by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia.
I now offer this document in evidence, Number 375-PS as Exhibit USA-84.
This is a top-secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the
Luftwaffe, General Staff, dated Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the
assumption that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany
during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and
air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date
for Case Green. I quote the first two sentences of the document. That is
under the heading “Initial Political Situation”:
“The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the
Case Green. It is presumed that France will decide upon war only
if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely
assured.”
Now, knowledge of the pending or impending action against Czechoslovakia
was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich and
the Nazi Party. During the summer Germany’s allies, Italy and Hungary,
were apprised by one means or another of the plans of the Nazi
conspirators. I offer in evidence Document 2800-PS as Exhibit USA-85.
This is a captured document from the German Foreign Office files, a
confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador
Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938. At the bottom is a handwritten note
headed “For the Reichsminister only”, and the Reichsminister was the
Defendant Ribbentrop. I now read this note. I read from the note the
third and fourth paragraphs:
“Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the
Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He
also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take
perhaps a 2 months’ holiday now which he could not do later on.
“Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments, Attolico
mentioned that the Romanian Government had refused to grant
application for leave to its Berlin Minister.”
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off for 10
minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a month later Mussolini sent a
message to Berlin asking that he be told the date on which Case Green
would take place. I offer in evidence Document Number 2791-PS as Exhibit
USA-86, a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador
Attolico. This note is signed “R” for Ribbentrop and dated 23 August
1938. I now read two paragraphs from this memorandum:
“On the voyage of the _Patria_ Ambassador Attolico explained to
me that he had instructions to request the notification of a
contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from
the German Government.
“In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against
Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in 6
months, or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him that
the German Government, in case of an increasing gravity of the
situation or as soon as the Führer made his decision, would
notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible.
In any case, the Italian Government will be the first one who
will receive such a notification.”
THE PRESIDENT: You did not tell us what the initial was, did you?
MR. ALDERMAN: The initial “R” for Ribbentrop, and the date 23 August
1938.
Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the
pending attack. I offer Document Number 2792-PS as Exhibit
USA-87—another German Foreign Office memorandum, and from that document
I read three paragraphs under the heading “R. M. 251.”
“Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to
communicate the following:
“He had received another written instruction from Mussolini
asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of
action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such
notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able
to take in due time the necessary measures on the French
frontier.’ Berlin, 27 August 1938; ‘R’”—for Ribbentrop, and
then:
“N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
démarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that,
however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be
informed of any decision. Berlin, 2 September 1938.”
Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the
first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. You will
recall that in early March 1938 Defendants Keitel and Ribbentrop had
exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi
plan. At that time the decision was in the negative, but by mid-August
1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join
in the attack.
From August 21 to 26 Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers visited
Germany. Inevitably there were discussions of the Czechoslovak question.
I now offer Document 2796-PS as Exhibit USA-88. This is a captured
German Foreign Office account signed by Von Weizsäcker of the
conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and a Hungarian Delegation
consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23
August 1938. In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian
attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested
that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary.
The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the
Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit
themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement and said
that whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the
cooking as well. I now quote from this document the first two
paragraphs:
“While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Führer and the
Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion, the
Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in conference with Von
Ribbentrop. Von Weizsäcker also attended the conference.
“Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1, the
negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente; and 2, the
Czechoslovakian problem.”
Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph:
“Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the
Führer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech
provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two
kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured
if Hungary marches towards the north and perhaps the east;
moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and one
to two more years time for its development should be allowed.
“Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the
Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the
pincers of the Axis Powers. Romania alone would therefore not
move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England
would not recklessly risk her empire. She knew our newly
acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the
above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted
since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop
repeated that, ‘Whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.’
“The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the
question of Von Ribbentrop as to what purpose the desired
General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was
brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory
of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict.
The clear political basis for such a conflict—the time of a
Hungarian intervention—was not obtained.
“In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy
in his talk with the Führer. He wished not to hide his doubts
with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put on
record Hungary’s intention to participate. The Hungarian
Ministers were, and remained even later, more skeptical since
they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary
with its unprotected flanks.
“When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Führer in the
afternoon he was very relieved when the Führer explained to him
that in regard to the situation in question he demanded nothing
of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted
to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as
well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs he
would have no objections.”
I think perhaps that sentence, “Whoever wanted to join the meal would
have to participate in the cooking as well,” is perhaps as cynical a
statement as any statesman has ever been guilty of.
By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that,
in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would be sufficiently
armed for participation on 1 October. I now offer in evidence Document
Number 2797-PS as Exhibit USA-89, another captured German Foreign Office
memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August
1938. You will note that the English mimeographed translation bears the
date 29 August. That is incorrect; it should read 25 August. I read the
last paragraph from that document, or the last two:
“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a
German-Czech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago that
his country would need a period of one to two years in order to
develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary.
“During today’s conversation Von Kanya corrected this remark and
said that Hungary’s military situation was much better. His
country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to
take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year.”—Signed
with an illegible signature which probably is that of
Weizsäcker.
The account of the German-Hungarian conference again finds its
corroboration in General Jodl’s diary, Document Number 1780-PS, from
which I have already several times read. The entry in that diary for 21
to 26 August on Page 4 of the English version of the document reads as
follows:
“Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied by the
Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the War
Minister Von Raatz.
“They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great war
after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old
State of Hungary can be re-established. They leave with the
understanding that we have neither demands from them nor claims
against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second
provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If
they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.
“Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator
between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe
that when the issue arises a period of 48 hours would be
indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.”
The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff
conference on 6 September.
I quote again from Jodl’s diary, the entry for 6 September, beginning at
the end of that same page:
“Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a
conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the
Führer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact
moment. The same with OAI, General Von Stülpnagel.”
It is somewhat interesting to find a high-ranking general giving a
briefing on such political matters.
Then we come to final actual preparations for the attack. With a 1
October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase
in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September.
Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under
way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical
details, the timing of “X-days,” questions of mobilization, questions of
transport and supplies.
On 26 August the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled, “Timing
of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.” This is Item 17 at
Pages 37 and 38 of the English translation of the Schmundt file on Case
Green, our Number 388-PS.
I should like to invite the special attention of the Tribunal to this
memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of
the OKW and of Defendant Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of
an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit,
the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that
Germany was preparing to launch.
I ask leave to read this document in full:
“Chief Section L; for chiefs only; written by General Staff
officer; top secret; note on progress of report; Berlin, 24
August 1938; access only through officer; 1 copy.
“Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.
“The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by
surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to
oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to demand
that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1
to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming known to
Czechoslovakia on that day.
“The Army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It
intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus
3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid
working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands
that the X-Order be given to the Army not later than 1400 on X
minus 1.
“To this the following must be said:
“‘Operation Green’”—or Aktion Grün—“will be set in motion by
means of an ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany
provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact
time for this incident is of the utmost importance.”—I call
special attention to that sentence—“The fixing of the exact
time for this incident is of the utmost importance.
“It must come at a time when the over-all meteorological
conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into
action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of
it”—news of this prepared incident—“to reach us on the
afternoon of X minus 1.
“It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the
X-Order at 1400 on X minus 1.
“On X minus 2 the Navy, Army, and Air Force will merely receive
an advance warning.
“If the Führer intends to follow this plan of action, all
further discussion is superfluous.
“For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for
which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise
appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely
essential advance measures must be given in good time and
camouflaged with the help of numerous maneuvers and exercises.
“Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether
all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy
territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure
from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.
“Even a warning of diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the
consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming
victims of such an attack (that is the death of representatives
of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).
“If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be
considered desirable for the incident, then the following day
cannot be X-Day, but it must be the day after that.
“In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be
done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and
that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the
incident (X-Fall).
“It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great
interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be
informed of the Führer’s intentions in good time—insofar as the
Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the
incident.
“I request that the Führer’s decision be obtained on these
points.”—Signed—“J”—(Jodl).
In handwriting, at the bottom of the page of that document, are the
notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal
that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler
agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31
August. There follows Jodl’s initials once more.
On 3 September Keitel and Von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the
Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be
found as Item 18 at Pages 39 and 40 of the Document Number 388-PS. I
shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes:
“Colonel General Von Brauchitsch reports on the exact time of
the transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘Grün’. Field
units to be transferred on 28 September. From here will then be
ready for action. When X-Day becomes known field units carry out
exercises in opposite directions.
“Führer has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march
away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.”—Then there is
a question mark.—“OKH must know when X-Day is by 1200 noon, 27
September.”
You will note that Von Brauchitsch reported that field troops would be
transferred to the proper areas for Case Green on 28 September and would
then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when
X-Day is by 12 noon on 27 September.
During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the
strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech
defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote,
“of drawing in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still
troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence
from Page 40 of the English transcript:
“The Führer gives orders for the development of the Western
fortifications: Improvement of advance positions around Aachen
and Saarbrücken; construction of 300 to 400 battery positions
(1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.”
Five days later General Stülpnagel asked Defendant Jodl for written
assurance that the OKH would be informed 5 days in advance about the
impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals
about the co-ordination of ground and air operations at the start of the
attack. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, Page 5
of the English translation of Document 1780-PS.
“General Stülpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the
Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if the plan
is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all
meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only
for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be
changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2)”—or as the German
puts it—“X-2 Tag.”
“General Stülpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders
whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned.
It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere
decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer would stick to
his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion.
It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that . . .
Italy is reserved.”
Now, this is Jodl talking:
“I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the change
of opinion about political and military potentialities,
according to directives of 24 June ’37, 5 November ’37, 7
December ’37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements. In spite of
that, one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will
do everything they can to apply pressure on us. We must pass
this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the
art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only
possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of
officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it
circulate through anterooms as heretofore.
“1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High Command
of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force.
(Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg, and
myself). We agree about the promulgation of the X-Day
order”—X-Befehl—“(X-1, 4 o’clock) and pre-announcement to the
Air Force (X-Day minus 1”—X minus 1 day—“7 o’clock). The ‘Y’
time has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach
flight of one hour.”
Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with
Defendant Keitel and Generals Von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nuremberg.
Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which
lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning.
Schmundt’s minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt
file, on Pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS.
In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of
the German armies being committed to the attack, the 2d, the 10th, the
12th and the 14th German Armies. With his characteristic enthusiasm for
military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic
considerations, which should be taken into account as the attack
developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs, beginning with the
summary of General Von Brauchitsch’s remarks, on the bottom of Page 42:
“General Oberst Von Brauchitsch: ‘Employment of motorized
divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria
and the difficulties in getting other divs’”—that is for
divisions—“‘ready to march into the area at the right time. In
the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September,
if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by
relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army
Command II.’
“The Führer: ‘Does not see why workers have to return home as
early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on
mobilization day. Also the railroad cars will stand around
unnecessarily later on.’
“General Keitel: ‘Workers are not under the jurisdiction of
district commands in the West. Trains must be assembled.’
“Von Brauchitsch: ‘235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be
drafted, 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in
the East). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.’”
From this day forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the
intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On 11
September Defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of the
Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of
international law and of exploiting those of the Czechs. I read the 11
September entry in the Jodl diary at Page 5 of the English translation
of 1780-PS:
“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke, for
the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent
common tasks. These joint preparations for
refutation”—Widerlegung—“of our own violations of
international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the
enemy, were considered particularly important.”
This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L,
that is, Jodl’s section of the OKW.
I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit USA-90, which is a
carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of this
captured document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and
distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and
the Foreign Office.
In this study anticipated violations by Germany of international law in
connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and
counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. It
is a highly interesting top-secret document and with a glance at the
original you can see the careful form in which the study of anticipated
violations of international law and propagandists refutations thereof
were set out.
The document is prepared in tabular form, in which the anticipated
instances of violation of international law are listed in the left hand
column. In the second column are given specific examples of the
incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be taken
toward these incidents, in violation of international law and in
violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth.
The fifth column, which in this document unfortunately is blank, was
reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda Minister.
I first quote from the covering letter:
“Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the
violations of international law which may be expected on the
part of fighting troops.
“Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, Columns
c-1 and c-2 had to be filled in directly therefore, for the time
being.
“The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an
opinion so that a final version may be drawn up.
“The same is requested of the Foreign Office.
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“By order”—signed—“Bürckner.”
I am sorry that I perhaps cannot take the time to read extensively from
this document. I shall confine myself to reading the first 10
hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found from the
second column, Column b of the table:
“First: In an air raid on Prague the British Embassy is
destroyed.
“Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.
“Third: The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.
“Fourth: On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas,
the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
“Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are
caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of an important
bridge, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered
looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.
“Sixth: Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed
to do road work or to load munitions, and so forth.
“Seventh: For military reasons it is necessary to requisition
billets, foodstuffs, and fodder from the Czech population. As a
result, the latter suffer from want.
“Eighth: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily
evacuated to the rear area.
“Ninth: Churches are used for military accommodations.
“Tenth: In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over
Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
Czech aircraft.”
From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing
the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW. This
top-secret order . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the classification with reference to gas?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4.
MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident. “On account of a
report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is
ordered.” Under the column, “Attitude of International Law Group”:
“According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40
states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison
gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances
is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the
reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas
warfare.”
Then, under the column headed “Justification by the Laws of War”:
“If the assertion, that the opponent—in this case the
Czechs—used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by
the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible,
the firing of gas projectiles is justified, and it must be given
out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first
to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly
important to furnish this proof. If the assertion is unfounded
or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented
only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the
same way as the Italians did in the Abyssinian war. In this
case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must
also be proved.”
From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing
the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW . . .
THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems to be
material.
MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole document.
THE PRESIDENT: The justification of number 10.
MR. ALDERMAN: Number 10 was, “In course of their duty, German aircraft
fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
Czech aircraft.”
Under the heading, “Attitude of the International Law Group”:
“According to Article 1 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 18
October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is not to be
violated. A deliberate violation by flying over this territory
is a breach of international law if the neutral powers have
declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes
fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of
international law, provided that this action is not expressly
permitted.”
Now, under the heading, “Justification by the Laws of War,” is this:
“An attempt at denials should first be made; if this is
unsuccessful a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds
of miscalculation of position) to the Polish Government and
compensation for damage guaranteed.”
I had referred to an order issued by Hitler on 10 September 1938 from
Nuremberg, bringing the German Labor Service under the OKW. This
top-secret order, of which 25 copies were made, is Item 20 in the
Schmundt file, Page 44. I will read that order:
“1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the
Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.
“2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this
organization in conjunction with the Reich Labor Leader
(Reichsarbeitsführer) and on assignments from time to time to
the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Where
questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final
decision in accordance with my instructions.
“3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to
the departments and personnel immediately concerned.
“Signed, Adolf Hitler.”
Four days later, on 14 September, Defendant Keitel issued detailed
instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is
Item 21 in the Schmundt file, at Page 45 in the English translation. I
do not think I need read the order.
There is another order issued by the Defendant Jodl on 16 September,
Item 24, at Page 48 in the Schmundt file. I think I need only read the
heading or title of that:
“Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for maneuvers with
Wehrmacht. Effective 15 September the following units will be
trained militarily under direction of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army.”
Two further entries in the Defendant Jodl’s diary give further
indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September,
just 2 weeks before the anticipated X-Day.
I now read the answers for the 15th and 16th September, at Pages 5 and 6
of the English translation of the Jodl diary.
“15 September: In the morning, conference with Chief of Army
High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Force,
the question was discussed as to what could be done if the
Führer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid
development of the situation.
“16 September: General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700
hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference
between Chamberlain and the Führer. The next conference will
take place on the 20th or 21st in Godesberg.
“With consent of the Führer, the order is given in the evening
by the Armed Forces High Command, to the Army High Command, and
to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the v.G.a.D. along the
Czech border.”—That I understand to have reference to the
reinforced border guard.
“In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have
empty rolling stock kept in readiness, clandestinely; for the
strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be
transported starting 28 September.”
The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available, to which
General Jodl referred, appears as Item 22, at Page 47 of the Schmundt
file. In this order the Defendant Keitel told the railroads to be ready
by 28 September but to continue work on the Western fortifications even
after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. I quote the first four
paragraphs of this order:
“The Reichsbahn (the railroads) must provide trains of empty
trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of
mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all
others.
“Therefore the trainloads for the limes job”—I understand the
“limes job” to have reference to defense fortification in the
West—“will have to be cut down after September 17 and those
goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.
“The Supreme Command of the Army (Fifth Division of the Army
General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with
the authorities concerned.
“However, in accordance with the Führer’s directive, every
effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as
large quantities as feasible, even after 20 September 1938, and
this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue
the important work on the limes.”
The penultimate stage of the aggression begins on 18 September. From
that date until the 28th a series of orders was issued advancing
preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt
file and I shall not take the time of the Tribunal by attempting to read
all of it.
On the 18th the commitment scheduled for the five participating Armies,
the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th, was set forth. That is Item 26 in the
Schmundt file at Page 50 of the English translation. Hitler approved the
secret mobilization of five divisions in the West to protect the German
rear during Case Green, and I refer to Item 31 in the Schmundt file at
Page 13—I beg your pardon, it is Page 55, I had a misprint. I might
refer to that. It is a “most-secret” order, Berlin, 27 September 1938,
1920 hours; 45 copies of which this is the 16th:
“The Führer has approved the mobilization, without warning, of
the five regular West divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 33d, and
35th). The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment
in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by the
workers of the Todt organization.
“It is left to the OKH to assemble as far as possible, first of
all the sections ready to march and, subsequently, the remaining
sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the
Western fortifications.”—Signed—“Jodl.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to adjourn.
We will meet again at 2 o’clock.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, my attention has been called
to the fact that I misread a signature on one of the documents to which
I adverted this morning. It is Item 31 of the Schmundt minutes. I read
the name “Jodl” as being the signature on that item. I should have read
Keitel.
In the course of presenting details of the documents which are being
offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a moment, and
recall the setting in which these facts took place. The world will never
forget the Munich Pact, and the international crisis which led to it. As
this crisis was developing in August and September of 1938, and frantic
efforts were being made by the statesmen of the world to preserve the
peace of the world, little did they know of the evil plans and designs
in the hearts and the minds of these conspirators.
What is being presented to the Tribunal today is the inside story, in
their own words, underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now able to
spread upon the pages of history the truth concerning the fraud and
deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in achieving for their own
ends, the Pact of Munich as a stepping stone towards further aggression.
One cannot think back without living again through the dread of war, the
fear of war, the fear of world disaster, which seized all peace-loving
persons. The hope for peace which came with the Munich Pact was, we now
see, a snare and a deceit—a trap, carefully set by the defendants on
trial. The evil character of these men who were fabricating this scheme
for aggression and war is demonstrated by their own documents.
Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about
the time of day at which the attack should be launched. Conference notes
initialed by the Defendant Jodl, dated 27 September, reveal the
difference in views. These notes are Item 54, at Page 90 in the
translation of Document 388-PS. I shall read these first three
paragraphs as follows: The heading is:
“Most secret; for chiefs only; only through officers.
“Conference notes; Berlin, 27 September 1938; 4 copies, first
copy. To be filed Grün.
“Co-ordinated Time of Attack by Army and Air Force on X-Day.
“As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a
co-ordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on 1 X-Day.
“The Army wishes to attack at dawn, that is, about 0615. It also
wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night,
which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
“Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These
could change the time of attack and also limit the area of
operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance,
would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to
low ceiling in Bavaria.”
Then I’ll skip to the last two paragraphs on Page 91:
“Thus it is proposed:
“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the Air
Force—at the time desired by the Army (0615), and permission
for limited operations to take place before then; however, only
to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.”
The initial at the end of that order is “J” meaning, I think clearly,
Jodl.
On the same date, 27 September, the Defendant Keitel sent a most-secret
memorandum to the Defendant Hess, and the Reichsführer SS, Himmler, for
the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is Item 32 in the
Schmundt files at Page 56 of the English translation. I read the first
four paragraphs of this message.
“As a result of the political situation the Führer and
Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed
Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by
issuing the mobilization (X) order, or corresponding code words.
“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is
necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to
the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are
connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order,
the advance measures or special code names.
“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be
met (even if the code word has not been previously issued)
immediately and without being referred to higher authority.
“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate
instructions to this effect, so that the mobilization of the
Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.”
Then I skip to the last paragraph:
“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that
all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken
by Party organizations or Police units, as a result of the
political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of
time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can
it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in
practice.
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel.”
Two additional entries from the Defendant Jodl’s diary reveal the extent
to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their preparations for
an attack, even during the period of negotiations which culminated in
the Munich Agreement. I quote the answers in the Jodl diary for 26 and
27 September, from Page 7 of the translation of Document 1780-PS. 26
September . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the dates of the visits of Mr.
Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement? Perhaps you can
give it later on.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement of the Munich Pact was the 29th of
September, and this answer then was 3 days before the Pact, the 26th of
September:
“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army
High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the
advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet
necessary and because the Führer does not intend to march in
before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech
frontier need be given on the 27th only.
“Fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at
the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda
transmissions.
“Question by Ausland whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave
and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command: ‘Yes.’
“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs
General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations
and about the Führer’s opinion. In no case will X-Day be before
the 30th.
“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn
into military engagements because of false reports, before
Prague replies.
“A question of Stumpf about Y-Hour results in the reply that on
account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of
the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the
dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent
early fogs.
“The Führer has to make a decision as to which of the
Commanders-in-Chief is to have priority.
“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has
to proceed. The Führer has not made any decision as yet about
commitment against Prague.
“2000 hours: The Führer addresses the people and the world in an
important speech at the Sportpalast.”
Then the entry on 27 September:
“1320 hours: The Führer consents to the first wave of attack
being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the
assembly area by 30 September.”
The order referred to by General Jodl was also recorded by the faithful
Schmundt, which appears as Item 33 at Page 57 of the file. I’ll read it
in its entirety. It is the order which brought the Nazi Army to a
jumping-off point for the unprovoked and brutal aggression:
“28.9.38.; most secret; memorandum.
“At 1300 hours 27 September the Führer and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from
their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.
“The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or seven
divisions) must be ready to begin the action against Grün on 30
September, the decision having been made 1 day previously by
1200 noon.
“This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major
Schmundt”—pencil note by Schmundt.
At this point, with the Nazi Army poised in a strategic position around
the borders of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a moment to
examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The military preparations
for action against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out _in vacuo_.
They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to
promote civil disobedience in the Czechoslovak State. Using the
techniques they had already developed in other uncontested ventures
underhandedly, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money,
propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the
Nazis focused their attention on the persons of German descent living in
the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the
northwest and south. I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to
Document Number 998-PS and offer it in evidence as an exhibit.
This exhibit is entitled, “German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” and is
the Czechoslovak Government’s official report for the prosecution and
trial of the German major war criminals. I believe that this report is
clearly included within the provisions of Article 21, of the Charter, as
a document of which the Court will take judicial notice. Article 21
provides:
“The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also
take judicial notice of official governmental documents and
reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and
documents of the committees set up in the various Allied
countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records
and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United
Nations.”
Since, under that provision, the Court will take judicial notice of this
governmental report by the Czech Government, I shall, with the leave of
the Tribunal, merely summarize Pages 9 to 12 of this report to show the
background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue within Czechoslovakia.
Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the
Nazi Party. In the years following the first World War, a German
National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact
with Hitler’s NSDAP, was activated in the Sudetenland. In 1932,
ringleaders of the Sudeten Volkssport, an organization corresponding to
the Nazi SA or Sturmabteilung, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s
program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a
greater Germany. Soon thereafter, they were charged with planning armed
rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy
against the Czech Republic.
Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled
its dissolution by voluntary liquidation and several of its chiefs
escaped across the border into Germany. For a year thereafter, Nazi
activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground.
On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi
conspirators, an instructor of gymnastics, Konrad Henlein, established
the German Home Front or Deutsche Heimatfront, which, the following
spring became the Sudeten German Party (SDP). Profiting from the
experiences of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any
connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism and
professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to honest
democracy and to the Czech State. His party, nonetheless, was built on
the basis of the Nazi Führerprinzip, and he became its Führer.
By 1937, when the powers of Hitler’s Germany had become manifest,
Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note,
demanding without definition, “complete Sudeten autonomy”. The SDP laid
proposals before the Czech Parliament which would in substance, have
created a state within a state.
After the annexation of Austria by Germany in March 1938, the
Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model,
intensified their activities. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda
started in the Henlein press.
The campaign against Bolshevism was intensified. Terrorism in the
Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm-troop organization,
patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS was established,
known as the FS, Freiwilliger Selbstschutz (or Voluntary Vigilantes).
On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary,
Henlein came into the open with what he called his Karlsbad Program. In
this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted
the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess German political philosophy
which, it was clear, meant National Socialism.
As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of
the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in Pages 12 to 16 of the Czech
Government official report, these techniques included:
(a) Espionage. Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, and
by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech
defenses were mapped and information on Czech troop movements was
furnished to the German authorities.
(b) Nazification of German organizations in Czechoslovakia. The
Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German
population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social cultural centers
regularly underwent “Gleichschaltung”, that is purification, by the SDP.
Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sports
societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral
societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating
as many business institutions as possible and bringing over to their
side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, and
the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or
direction, they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and
technical staffs of the institutions.
(c) German direction and leadership. The Henleinists maintained
permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct
operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany, at which
Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity, were
camouflaged by being held in conjunction with “Sänger Feste” (or choral
festivals), gymnastic shows, and assemblies, and commercial gatherings
such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed
incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to
supply them.
(d) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at
Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press.
Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the
false report of Russian troops and airplanes centered in Prague. Under
direction from the Reich, the Henleinists maintained whispering
propaganda in the Sudetenland which contributed to the mounting tension
and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled
from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein
press, more or less openly, espoused Nazi ideology before the German
population in the Sudetenland.
(e) Murder and terrorism. Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists,
and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke
incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarmes,
customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was
established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen.
The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population and the Nazi
Gestapo crossed into the border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens
across the border into Germany. In several cases, political foes of the
Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor
Theodor Lessing in 1933, and engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were
anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and
had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia.
Sometime afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and
deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the
mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence
Document Number 2863-PS, an excerpt from a lecture by Konrad Henlein
quoted in the book _Four Fighting Years_, a publication of the
Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and I quote from Page 29. This
book has been marked for identification Exhibit USA-92, but without
offering it in evidence, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
it. I shall read from Page 29. This lecture was delivered by Henlein on
4 March 1941, in the auditorium of the University of Vienna, under the
auspices of the Wiener Verwaltungsakademie. During a thorough search of
libraries in Vienna and elsewhere, we have been unable to find a copy of
the German text. This text, this volume that I have here, is an English
version. The Vienna newspapers the following day carried only summaries
of the lecture. This English version, however, is an official
publication of the Czech Government and is, under the circumstances, the
best evidence that we can produce of the Henlein speech.
In this lecture on “The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens”
Henlein said:
“National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans. Our
struggle was of a different character from that in Germany.
Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of
course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution
in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for
Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle
could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National
Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Führer,
whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the
leader of the national group in its final struggle. When in the
autumn of 1933, the leader of the NSDAP asked me to take over
the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a
difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party
continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in
the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten Germans and
in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle
under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to
the outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second
alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our
national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier
to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the
heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism
and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than
doubtful whether, by this means, we could have fulfilled the
political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the
alliance against the German Reich.”
The account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia which I have just
presented to the Tribunal is the outline of this conspiracy as it had
been pieced together by the Czechoslovak Government early this summer.
Since then, captured documents and other information made available to
us since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively
demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of
the Nazi conspirators in the agitation in the Sudetenland.
I offer in evidence Document Number 3060-PS, Exhibit USA-93. This is the
original, handwritten draft of a telegram sent from the German Legation
in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Minister in Berlin. It is
presumably written by the German Minister Eisenlohr. It proves
conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument, a puppet of
the Nazi conspirators. The Henlein party, it appears from this document,
was directed from Berlin and from the German Legation in Prague. It
could have no policy of its own. Even the speeches of its leaders had to
be co-ordinated with the German authorities.
I will read this telegram:
“Prague, 16 March 1938.
“Foreign (Office), Berlin; (cipher cable—secret); No. 57 of 16
March.
“With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.
“Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out
matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with
Frank separately and received following promises:
“1. The line of German foreign policy as transmitted by the
German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics
of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied
with implicitly.
“2. Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly
with my approval. The editorial staff of _Zeit_”—_Time_—“is to
be improved.
“3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line,
which in the end might lead to political complications, and
adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests.
The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation
and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the
protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and territorial
autonomy are no longer to be stressed.
“4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or
desired before Henlein issues important statements on his
program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the
Legation.
“5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German
agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.
“6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will
come to Prague at any time if requested.
“I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control,
as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in
the interest of foreign policy. Please inform Ministries
concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans)
and request them to support this uniform direction of the
Sudeten German Party.”
The initials are illegible.
The dressing down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired
effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein
addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal
conversation.
I offer in evidence Document Number 2789-PS as Exhibit USA-94. This is
the letter from Konrad Henlein to Defendant Ribbentrop, captured in the
German Foreign Office files, dated 17 March 1938.
“Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:
“In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in
Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all
those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our
Führer.
“I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the
sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith.
“We shall show our appreciation to the Führer by doubled efforts
in the service of the Greater German policy.
“The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten
German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the
opportunity of a very early personal talk.
“In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have
postponed the nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled
for 26th and 27th of March 1938, for 4 weeks.
“I would appreciate it if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two
of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the
requested talks.
“Heil Hitler. Loyally yours”—signed—“Konrad Henlein.”
You will note that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure of Austria
made possible the adoption of a new policy towards Czechoslovakia. You
will also note that he was already in close enough contact with
Ribbentrop and the German Minister in Prague to feel free to suggest
early personal talks.
Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The
conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in
Berlin on the 29th of March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred
with Hitler himself.
I offer in evidence Document Number 2788-PS as Exhibit USA-95, captured
German Foreign Office notes of the conference on the 29th of March. I
read the first two paragraphs:
“In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed
list participated.
“The Reich Minister started out by emphasizing the necessity to
keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret.
He then explained, in view of the directives which the Führer
himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday
afternoon, that there were two questions which were of
outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten
German Party.”
I will omit the discussion of the claims of the Sudeten Germans and
resume the minutes of this meeting in the middle of the last paragraph
of the first page of the English translation, with the sentence
beginning, “The aim of the negotiations.”
“The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten
German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally
this: To avoid entry into the Government by the extension and
gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be
emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German
Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the
Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet. The Reich
Cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the government in
Prague or toward London and Paris as the advocate or pacemaker
of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite
that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak
Government the Sudeten Germans should be firmly controlled by
Konrad Henlein, should maintain quiet and discipline, and should
avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad
Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.
“Following these general explanations of the Reichsminister, the
demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak
Government, as contained in the enclosure, were discussed and
approved in principle. For further co-operation, Konrad Henlein
was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the
Reichsminister and the head of the Central Office for Racial
Germans, as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local
representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German
Minister in Prague would be to support the demand of the Sudeten
German Party as reasonable—not officially, but in more private
talks with the Czechoslovak politicians, without exerting any
direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.
“In conclusion, there was a discussion whether it would be
useful if the Sudeten German Party would co-operate with other
minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The
Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the
discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if
the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear
appropriate.
“Berlin, 29 March 1938,
“R”—for Ribbentrop.
Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of
those who attended: Konrad Henlein; his principal deputy, Karl Hermann
Frank; and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor
Haushofer, the geopolitician, and SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz
represented the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (the Central Office for
Racial Germans). The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of
eight. These eight included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and
did most of the talking; Von Mackensen; Weizsäcker and Minister
Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague.
In May, Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi
conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, for the attack on
the Czechs, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein
was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months.
I again quote from General Jodl’s diary, Document 1780-PS, the entry for
22 May 1938: “Fundamental conference between the Führer and K. Henlein
(see enclosure).” The enclosure unfortunately is missing from Jodl’s
diary.
The Tribunal will recall that in his speech in Vienna Henlein had
admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall
of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans.
The documents I have just read show conclusively the nature of Henlein’s
mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his propaganda, even
his speeches, were controlled by Berlin.
I will now show that from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party was
secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. I offer in evidence
Document 3059-PS as Exhibit USA-96, another secret memorandum captured
in the German Foreign Office file.
This memorandum, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 August 1938,
was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for additional funds.
I read from that document:
“The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign
Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of
a monthly payment of 15,000 marks; 12,000 marks of this are
transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement and 3,000
marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the Party
(Bureau Bürger). In the course of the last few months the tasks
assigned to the Bureau Bürger have increased considerably due to
the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number
of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has
risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely;
the expense accounts have increased especially because due to
the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for
trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of
travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown
considerably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Bürger
is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of
3,000 marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore Herr
Bürger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount
from 3,000 marks to 5,500 marks monthly. In view of the
considerable increase in the business transacted by the bureau,
and of the importance which marks the activity of the bureau in
regard to the co-operation with the Foreign Office, this desire
deserves the strongest support.
“Herewith submitted to the personnel department with a request
for approval. Increase of payments with retroactive effect from
1 August is requested.”—signed—“Woermann.”
Under this signature is a footnote:
“Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle”—Central Office for Racial
Germans—“will be informed by the Political
Department”—handwritten marginal note.
We may only conjecture what financial support the Henlein movement
received from other agencies of the German Government.
As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in
the late summer and early fall, the Nazi command made good use of
Henlein and his followers. About the 1st of August, the Air Attaché in
the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions
from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten German leader
in Freudenthal. With his assistance and in the company of the local
leader of the FS, the Henlein equivalent of the SS, he reconnoitered the
surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German
use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform
of the Czech Army, a fact which, as the Attaché noted, served as
excellent camouflage.
I now read from the enclosure to Document 1536-PS, which I offered in
evidence earlier and which bears United States Exhibit Number 83. I have
already read the first four paragraphs of the enclosure:
“The manufacturer M. is the head of the Sudeten German Glider
Pilots in Fr.”—that’s Freudenthal—“and said to be absolutely
reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully
confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him,
although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
“At my request, with which he complied without any question, M.
travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s
private car for the trip.
“As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently
well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech
reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on
leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage, I was
entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so.
“As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I
photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said. ‘Aha, so
you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that
in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their
airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had
the intention of looking over the country from that point of
view.”
In the latter part of the Air Attaché’s report, reference is made to the
presence of reliable agents and informers, which he called “V-Leute”
(V-people), apparently drawn from the ranks of the Henlein party in this
area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with the “Abwehr
Stelle” (the Intelligence Office) in Breslau.
In September, when the Nazi propaganda campaign was reaching its height,
the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands
for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On the 19th of
September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent a telegram to the German
Legation in Prague. I offer the document in evidence, Number 2858-PS,
Exhibit USA-97, another captured German Foreign Office document—a
telegram:
“Please inform Deputy Kundt that Konrad Henlein requests to get
in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their
demands for autonomy tomorrow.”—signed—“Altenburg.”
Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague.
As the harassed Czech Government sought to stem the disorders in the
Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic
tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two
countries. I offer in evidence Documents 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS, and
2856-PS, as United States Exhibits respectively 98, 99, 100, and 101.
Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation in
Prague were dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September 1938. They
are self-explanatory. The first is dated 16 September.
“Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were
arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of
Sudeten Germans since the Führer’s speech of 12 September. I
request you to ascertain as soon as possible the number of
Sudeten Germans arrested since 12 September as far as possible.
The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively
at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.”
A handwritten note follows:
“Impossible for me to ascertain these facts as already
communicated to the chargé d’affaires.”
The second telegram is dated September 17:
“Most urgent.
“I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the
following:
“The Reich Government has decided that:
“(a) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,
Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as
Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning
of the week; (b) If any Sudeten Germans should be executed
pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an
equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.”
The third telegram was sent on 24 September. I read it:
“According to information received here, Czechs have arrested
two German frontier policemen, seven customs officials, and 30
railway officials. As counter measure all the Czech staff in
Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the
arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please
approach Government there and wire result.”
On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched, and I read the last
paragraph:
“‘Confidential’. Yielding of Czech hostages arrested here for
the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by
military courts against Sudeten Germans is, of course, out of
question.”
In the latter half of September, Henlein devoted himself and his
followers wholeheartedly to the preparations for the coming German
attack. About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nuremberg speech
in which he accused Beneš of torturing and planning the extermination of
the Sudeten Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his
principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech
Government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful Reichsender
radio station his determination to lead the Sudeten Germans home to the
Reich and denounced what he called the Hussites-Bolshevist criminals of
Prague. From his headquarters in a castle at Donndorf, outside Bayreuth,
he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators, including
Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the border and began
the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military
organization. You will find these events set forth in the Czechoslovak
official government report, 998-PS, which has already been offered as
Exhibit USA-91.
Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of
the German Nazi leaders. Lieutenant Colonel Köchling was assigned to
Henlein in an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free
Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night of September 17,
Köchling received far-reaching military powers.
At this conference, the purpose of the Free Corps was frankly
stated—the maintenance of disorder and clashes. I read from Item 25, a
handwritten note labelled “most secret,” on Page 49 of the Schmundt
file, Document 388-PS:
“Most secret. Last night conference took place between Führer
and Lieutenant Colonel Köchling. Duration of conference 7
minutes. Lieutenant Colonel Köchling remains directly
responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad Henlein in an
advisory capacity. He received far-reaching military plenary
powers from the Führer. The Sudeten German Free Corps remains
responsible to Konrad Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the
Sudeten Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The
Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament only with
Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as
possible.”
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good place to break off for 10 minutes?
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, General Jodl’s diary again
gives a further insight into the position of the Henlein Free Corps. At
this time, the Free Corps was engaged in active skirmishing along the
Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation in the desired
manner. I quote from the entries in the Jodl diary, for the 19th and
20th September 1938, at Page 6 of the Document 1780-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-72.
“19 September: Order is given to the Army High Command to take
care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.
“20 September: England and France have handed over their demands
in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The
activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that
they may bring about, and already have brought about,
consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring
rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the
border.) By checking with Lieutenant Colonel Köchling, I attempt
to lead these activities into normal channels.
“Toward the evening the Führer also takes a hand and gives
permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the
approval of the corps headquarters.”
A report from Henlein’s staff, which was found in Hitler’s headquarters,
boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps. It is Item 30 of
the Schmundt file, Page 54 of Document 388-PS. I read the last two
paragraphs:
“Since 19 September, in more than 300 missions, the Free Corps
has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack,”—now,
that word “attack” was changed by superimposition to
“defense”—“and with a willingness often reaching a degree of
unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its
activities: More than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s”—which I suppose
means machine guns—“and a large amount of other weapons and
equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded
suffered by the enemy.”—And there was superimposed in place of
“enemy”, “the Czech terrorists.”
In his headquarters in the castle at Donndorf, Henlein was in close
touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and
with the SS and the SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein
was Oberführer Gottlob Berger (SS).
I now offer in evidence Document 3036-PS as Exhibit USA-102, which is an
affidavit executed by Gottlob Berger; and in connection with that
affidavit, I wish to submit to the Tribunal that it presents, we think,
quite a different question of proof from the Schuschnigg affidavits
which were not admitted in evidence by the Court. Schuschnigg, of
course, was a neutral and non-Nazi Austrian. He was not a member of this
conspiracy, and I can well understand that the Court rejected his
affidavit for these reasons.
This man was a Nazi. He was serving in this conspiracy. He has made this
affidavit. We think the affidavit has probative value and should be
admitted by the Tribunal under the pertinent provision of the Charter,
which says that you will accept in evidence any evidence having
probative value. We think it would be unfair to require us to bring here
as a witness a man who would certainly be a hostile witness, who is to
us a member of this conspiracy, and it seems to us that the affidavit
should be admitted with leave to the defendants, if they wish, to call
the author of the affidavit as their witness. I should have added that
this man was a prominent member of the SS which is charged before you as
being a criminal organization, and we think the document is perfectly
competent in evidence as an admission against interest by a prominent
member of the SS organization.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, the Defense objects to the use of this
document. This document was drawn up as late as 22 November 1945, here
in Nuremberg, and the witness Berger could, therefore, be brought to
Court without any difficulty. We must insist that he be heard here on
the subjects on which the Prosecution wishes to introduce his testimony.
That would be the only way in which the Defense could have an
opportunity of cross-examining the witness and thereby contribute to
obtaining objective truth.
[_Pause in the proceedings while the Tribunal consulted._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection and will not hear this
affidavit. It is open to either the Prosecution or the defendants, of
course, to call the man who made the affidavit. That is all I have to
say. We have upheld your objection.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I had another affidavit by one
Alfred Helmut Naujocks which, I take it, will be excluded under this
same ruling, and which, therefore, I shall not offer.
THE PRESIDENT: If the circumstances are the same.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, I might merely refer to it for identification because
it is in your document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is Document 3029-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That also will be rejected as evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Offensive operations along the Czechoslovakian border
were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two
SS-Totenkopf (Deathhead) battalions were operating across the border in
Czech territory near Asch.
I quote now from Item 36 in the Schmundt file, an OKW most-secret order,
signed by Jodl, and dated 28 September. This appears at Page 61 Of the
Schmundt file:
“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Berlin, 28 September 1938;
45 copies, 16th copy; most secret.
“Subject: Four SS-Totenkopf battalions subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief Army.
“To: Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police (SS Central
Office) (36th copy).
“By order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces the
following battalions of the SS Deathhead organization will be
under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with
immediate effect.
“Second and Third Battalions of the 2d SS-Totenkopf Regiment
Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia).
“First and Second Battalions of the 3d SS-Totenkopf Regiment
Thuringia, at present in Radebeul and Kötzschenbroda near
Dresden.
“Commander-in-Chief of the Army is requested to deploy these
battalions for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Führer’s
instructions.
“These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory
(I and II Battalions of the SS-Totenkopf Regiment Oberbayern)
will come under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army only when
they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses
the German-Czech frontier.
“It is requested that all further arrangements be made between
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Reichsführer SS (SS Central
Office).
“For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
Jodl.”
According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, these
SS-Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders
from Hitler. As the time X-Day approached, the disposition of the Free
Corps became a matter of dispute.
On 26 September Himmler issued an order to the Chief of Staff of the
Sudeten German Free Corps, directing that the Free Corps come under
control of the Reichsführer SS in the event of German invasion of
Czechoslovakia. This document is Item 37 in the Schmundt file, on Page
62.
On 28 September Defendant Keitel directed that as soon as the German
Army crosses the Czech border, the Free Corps will take orders from the
OKH. In this most-secret order of the OKW, Keitel discloses that
Henlein’s men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory.
I read now from Item 34 of the Schmundt file on Page 58, the last three
paragraphs of this most-secret order:
“For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to it the
principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct
from the Führer and that they carry out their operations only in
conjunction with the competent corps headquarters. The advance
units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local
commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the
frontier.
“Those units remaining forward of the frontier should, in their
own interests, get into communication with the frontier guard as
often as possible.
“As soon as the Army crosses the Czechoslovak border the Henlein
Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be
expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps, even now, which
can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.”
On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich Settlement would
result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, the Defendant Keitel
ordered that the Free Corps Henlein, in its present composition, be
placed under the command of Himmler.
I read from Item 38, at Page 63, of the Schmundt file:
“1. Attachment of the Henlein Free Corps. The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps
in its present composition be placed under command of
Reichsführer SS and the Chief of German Police. It is therefore
not at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the
invasion, but is to be later drawn in, like the rest of the
police forces, for police duties in agreement with the
Reichsführer SS.”
I have been able, if the Tribunal please, to ascertain the dates the
Tribunal asked about before the recess.
The first visit of Chamberlain to Germany in connection with this matter
was 15 September 1938. Chamberlain flew to Munich and arrived at 12:30
o’clock on 15 September. He went by train from Munich to Berchtesgaden,
arriving at 1600 hours, by car to Berghof, arriving about at 1650, for
three talks with Hitler. On 16 September Chamberlain returned by air to
London.
The second visit was on 22 September. Chamberlain met with Hitler at Bad
Godesberg at 1700 hours for a 3-hour discussion, and it was a deadlock.
On 23 September discussions were resumed at 2230 hours. On 24 September
Chamberlain returned to London.
The third visit was on 29 September. Chamberlain flew to Munich and the
meeting of Chamberlain, Mussolini, Daladier, and Hitler took place at
the Brown House at 1330 and continued until 0230 hours on 30 September
1938, a Friday, when the Munich Agreement was signed. Under the threat
of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be
launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded the Munich Pact with
Germany and Italy at that early morning hour of 30 September 1938. This
Treaty will be presented by the British prosecutor. It is sufficient for
me to say of it at this point that it was the cession of the Sudetenland
by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce.
The Munich Pact will be TC-23 of the British documents.
On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland.
During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehrmacht had been fully
deployed for the attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the
assault.
With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30
September the Defendant Keitel promulgated Directive Number 1 on
occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia. This is Item 39
at Page 64 of the Schmundt file. This directive contained a timetable
for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10
October and specified the tasks of the German Armed Forces.
I read now the fourth and fifth paragraphs of that document:
“2. The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be
maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order
for the rescinding of measures taken, is held over.
“The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be
converted into operation Grün.”
It contains one other important provision about the Henlein forces, and
I quote from the list under the heading “a. Army”:
“Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the
Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.”
The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives
giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland. I think I
need not read them, as they are not essential to the proof of our case.
They merely indicate the scope of the preparations of the OKW.
Directives specifying the occupational area of the Army, the units under
its command, arranging for communication facilities, supply, and
propaganda, and giving instructions to the various departments of the
Government were issued over Defendant Keitel’s signature on 30
September. These are Items 40, 41, and 42 in the Schmundt file. I think
it is sufficient to read the caption and the signature.
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
MR. ALDERMAN: Page 66 of the English version. This is the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, most secret:
“Special Orders Number 1 to Directive Number 1. Subject:
Occupation of Territory Ceded by
Czechoslovakia.”—Signature—“Keitel.”
Item 41 is on Page 70 of the Schmundt file.
“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; most secret IV a. Most
secret; subject: Occupation of Sudeten-German
Territory.”—Signed—“Keitel.”
Item 42 in the Schmundt file is on Page 75, again most secret.
“Subject: Occupation of the Sudeten-German
Area.”—Signed—“Keitel.”
By 10 October Von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German
troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the
occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested
Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the
occupied area, and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the
Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. These are Items 46, 47, and 48 in
the Schmundt file.
Item 46, which appears at Page 77, is a letter from Berlin, dated
October 10, 1938, signed by Von Brauchitsch:
“My Führer:
“I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation
line as ordered, by this evening. Insofar as further military
operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the
country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The
guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the
reinforced frontier supervision service in the next few days.
“It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the
administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops
of the Army under the control of one person.
“I therefore ask you, my Führer, to relieve me, with effect from
15 October 1938, of the charge assigned to me: That of
exercising executive powers in Sudeten-German Territory.
“Heil, my Führer, Von Brauchitsch.”
Item 47 of the Schmundt file, appearing on Page 78, is a secret telegram
from the OKW to the Führer’s train, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt:
“If evening report shows that occupation of Zone 5 has been
completed without incident, OKW intends to order further
demobilization.
“Principle: 1) To suspend operation Grün but maintain a
sufficient state of preparedness on part of Army and Luftwaffe
to make intervention possible if necessary. 2) All units not
needed to be withdrawn from the occupied area and reduced to
peacetime status, as population of occupied area is heavily
burdened by the massing of troops.”
Skipping to below the OKW signature, this appears, at the left:
“Führer’s decision:
“1. Agreed.
“2. Suggestion to be made on the 13 October in Essen by General
Keitel. Decision will then be reached.”
On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the
Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Defendant Keitel. Three days later
the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the reversion of the RAD (Labor
Corps) from the control of the Armed Forces. These are Items 52 and 53
in the Schmundt file.
As the German forces entered the Sudetenland, Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche
Partei was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to
Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank,
were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the
Sudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still
free the Sudetendeutsche Partei constituted itself as the National
Socialistic German Worker Party in Czechoslovakia, NSDAP in
Czechoslovakia, under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein’s
deputies.
The Tribunal will find these events set forth in the Czechoslovak
official report, Document 998-PS.
The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators,
the plan for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. With the
occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of German-speaking
Czechs within the Greater Reich, it might have been expected that the
Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in their program of
aggression the defendants had used as a pretext for their conquests the
union of the Volksdeutsche, the people of German descent, with the
Reich. Now, after Munich, the Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia have been
substantially all returned to German rule.
On 26 September, at the Sportpalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke to the
world. I now refer and invite the notice of the Tribunal to the
_Völkischer Beobachter_, Munich edition, special edition for 27
September 1938, in which this speech is quoted. I read from Page 2,
Column 1, quoting from Hitler:
“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be
solved and will be solved. It is the last territorial claim”
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in our documents?
MR. ALDERMAN: No. I am asking the Court to take judicial notice of that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is a well-known German publication.
“It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in
Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve and which
I will satisfy, God willing.” (Document Number 2358-PS.)
And further:
“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for
all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people
want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot
go back beyond the limits of our patience.”
This is Page 2, Column 1.
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the
moment, when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems—that is
to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their
other minorities peacefully and without oppression—I will no
longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I
am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs!”
The major portion of the passage I have quoted will be contained in
Document TC-28, which I think, will be offered by the British
prosecutor.
Yet two weeks later Hitler and Defendant Keitel were preparing estimates
of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in
Bohemia and Moravia.
I now read from Item 48, at Page 82, of the Schmundt file. This is a
top-secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11
October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to
the OKW. I think it is sufficient merely to read the questions which
Hitler had propounded:
“Question 1. What reinforcements are necessary in the situation
to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?
“Question 2. How much time is requested for the regrouping or
moving up of new forces?
“Question 3. How much time will be required for the same purpose
if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return
measures?
“Question 4. How much time would be required to achieve the
state of readiness of 1 October?”
On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the
Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive
outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was
signed by Hitler and initialed by the Defendant Keitel.
I now offer in evidence Document C-136 as Exhibit USA-104, a top-secret
order of which 10 copies were made, this being the first copy, signed in
ink by Keitel.
In this order, issued only 3 weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland,
the Nazi conspirators are already looking forward to new conquests. I
quote the first part of the body of the document:
“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for
the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down
by me in a later directive. Until this directive comes into
force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the
following eventualities:
“1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection
against surprise air attacks.
“2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
“3) The occupation of the Memel.”
And then proceeding, the statement following Number 2:
“Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia: It must be
possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if
her policy should become hostile towards Germany.
“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this
contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those
for Grün; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and
considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned
mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The
organization, order of battle, and state of readiness of the
units earmarked for that purpose are in peacetime to be so
arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will
be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The
object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the
cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such that at
the same time ‘Grenzsicherung West’”—the measures of frontier
defense in the West—“can be carried out.
“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:
“a. Army: The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia
and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a
surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the
forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success
must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack
must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness
in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing
the frontiers or sent after the attack army.
“b. Air Force: The quick advance of the German Army is to be
assured by early elimination of the Czech Air Force. For this
purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases
has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger
forces may be required can be determined from the development of
the military-political situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the
same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the
offensive forces against the West must be prepared.”
And then Part 3 goes on under the heading, “Annexation of the Memel
District.”
It is signed by Adolf Hitler and authenticated by Defendant Keitel. It
was distributed to the OKH, to Defendant Göring’s Luftwaffe, and to
Defendant Raeder at Navy headquarters.
Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Defendant Keitel issued an
appendix to the original order, stating that by command of the Führer
preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue.
I offer in evidence Document C-138 as Exhibit USA-105, and other
captured OKW documents classified top secret.
Distribution of this order was the same as for the 21 October order. I
shall read the body of this order.
“Corollary to Directive of 21. 10. 38.
“Reference: ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia.’ The
Führer has given the following additional order:
“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the
assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be
expected.
“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is
merely an action of pacification, and not a warlike undertaking.
“The action must therefore be carried out by the peacetime Armed
Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilization. The
necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the
most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by
adjustment within the units.
“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must,
as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night
prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously
form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary
for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and
will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if
any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to
the troop training areas situated near the frontier, must have
the approval of the Führer.
“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar
general directives.
“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the
Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly
occupied territory and only for a short
period.”—Signed—“Keitel.”
I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this particular
copy of this order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the
one sent to the OKM, the German Naval headquarters. It bears the
initials of Fricke, head of the Operation Division of the naval war
staff; Schniewind, Chief of Staff; and of Defendant Raeder.
As the Wehrmacht moved forward, with plans for what it clearly
considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part.
In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the
Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky in Berlin on 31 January 1939,
Defendant Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech Government a quick reduction
in the size of the Czech Army. I offer in evidence Document 2795-PS as
Exhibit USA-106, captured German Foreign Office notes of this
discussion. I will read only the footnote, which is in Ribbentrop’s
handwriting:
“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in
the Czech Army would be decisive in our judgment.”
Does the Court propose sitting beyond 4:30?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think not. The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
TWELFTH DAY
Tuesday, 4 December 1945
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I will call on the Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): May it
please the Tribunal, on an occasion to which reference has and will be
made, Hitler, the leader of the Nazi conspirators who are now on trial
before you, is reported as having said, in reference to their warlike
plans:
“I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war, never
mind whether it be true or not. The victor shall not be asked
later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and
making a war, not the right is what matters, but victory—the
strongest has the right.”
The British Empire with its Allies has twice, within the space of 25
years, been victorious in wars which have been forced upon it, but it is
precisely because we realize that victory is not enough, that might is
not necessarily right, that lasting peace and the rule of international
law is not to be secured by the strong arm alone, that the British
nation is taking part in this Trial. There are those who would perhaps
say that these wretched men should have been dealt with summarily
without trial by “executive action”; that their power for evil broken,
they should have been swept aside into oblivion without this elaborate
and careful investigation into the part which they played in bringing
this war about: _Vae Victis!_ Let them pay the penalty of defeat. But
that was not the view of the British Government. Not so would the rule
of law be raised and strengthened on the international as well as upon
the municipal plane; not so would future generations realize that right
is not always on the side of the big battalions; not so would the world
be made aware that the waging of aggressive war is not only a dangerous
venture but a criminal one.
Human memory is very short. Apologists for defeated nations are
sometimes able to play upon the sympathy and magnanimity of their
victors, so that the true facts, never authoritatively recorded, become
obscured and forgotten. One has only to recall the circumstances
following upon the last World War to see the dangers to which, in the
absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement, a tolerant or a
credulous people is exposed. With the passage of time the former tend to
discount, perhaps because of their very horror, the stories of
aggression and atrocity that may be handed down; and the latter, the
credulous, misled by perhaps fanatical and perhaps dishonest
propagandists, come to believe that it was not they but their opponents
who were guilty of that which they would themselves condemn. And so we
believe that this Tribunal, acting, as we know it will act
notwithstanding its appointment by the victorious powers, with complete
and judicial objectivity, will provide a contemporary touchstone and an
authoritative and impartial record to which future historians may turn
for truth, and future politicians for warning. From this record shall
future generations know not only what our generation suffered, but also
that our suffering was the result of crimes, crimes against the laws of
peoples which the peoples of the world upheld and will continue in the
future to uphold—to uphold by international co-operation, not based
merely on military alliances, but grounded, and firmly grounded, in the
rule of law.
Nor, though this procedure and this Indictment of individuals may be
novel, is there anything new in the principles which by this prosecution
we seek to enforce. Ineffective though, alas, the sanctions proved and
showed to be, the nations of the world had, as it will be my purpose in
addressing the Tribunal to show, sought to make aggressive war an
international crime, and although previous tradition has sought to
punish states rather than individuals, it is both logical and right
that, if the act of waging war is itself an offense against
international law, those individuals who shared personal responsibility
for bringing such wars about should answer personally for the course
into which they led their states. Again, individual war crimes have long
been recognized by international law as triable by the courts of those
states whose nationals have been outraged, at least so long as a state
of war persists. It would be illogical in the extreme if those who,
although they may not with their own hands have committed individual
crimes, were responsible for systematic breaches of the laws of war
affecting the nationals of many states should escape for that reason. So
also in regard to Crimes against Humanity. The rights of humanitarian
intervention on behalf of the rights of man, trampled upon by a state in
a manner shocking the sense of mankind, has long been considered to form
part of the recognized law of nations. Here too, the Charter merely
develops a pre-existing principle. If murder, rapine, and robbery are
indictable under the ordinary municipal laws of our countries, shall
those who differ from the common criminal only by the extent and
systematic nature of their offenses escape accusation?
It is, as I shall show, the view of the British Government that in these
matters, this Tribunal will be applying to individuals, not the law of
the victor, but the accepted principles of international usage in a way
which will, if anything can, promote and fortify the rule of
international law and safeguard the future peace and security of this
war-stricken world.
By agreement between the chief prosecutors, it is my task, on behalf of
the British Government and of the other states associated in this
Prosecution, to present the case on Count Two of the Indictment and to
show how these defendants, in conspiracy with each other, and with
persons not now before this Tribunal, planned and waged a war of
aggression in breach of the treaty obligations by which, under
international law, Germany, as other states, has thought to make such
wars impossible.
The task falls into two parts. The first is to demonstrate the nature
and the basis of the Crime against Peace, which is constituted under the
Charter of this Tribunal, by waging wars of aggression and in violation
of treaties; and the second is to establish beyond all possibility of
doubt that such wars were waged by these defendants.
As to the first, it would no doubt be sufficient just to say this. It is
not incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of aggression and
wars in violation of international treaties are, or ought to be,
international crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has prescribed that
they are crimes and that the Charter is the statute and the law of this
Court. Yet, though that is the clear and mandatory law governing the
jurisdiction of this Tribunal, we feel that we should not be discharging
our task in the abiding interest of international justice and morality
unless we showed to the Tribunal, and indeed to the world, the position
of this provision of the Charter against the general perspective of
international law. For, just as in the experience of our country, some
old English statutes were merely declaratory of the common law, so today
this Charter merely declares and creates a jurisdiction in respect of
what was already the law of nations.
Nor is it unimportant to emphasize that aspect of the matter, lest there
may be some, now or hereafter, who might allow their judgment to be
warped by plausible catchwords or by an uninformed and distorted sense
of justice towards these defendants. It is not difficult to be misled by
such criticisms as that resort to war in the past has not been a crime;
that the power to resort to war is one of the prerogatives of the
sovereign state; even that this Charter, in constituting wars of
aggression a crime, has imitated one of the most obnoxious, doctrines of
National Socialist jurisprudence, namely _post factum_ legislation—that
the Charter is in this respect reminiscent of bills of attainder—and
that these proceedings are no more than a measure of vengeance, subtly
concealed in the garb of judicial proceedings which the victor wreaks
upon the vanquished. These things may sound plausible—yet they are not
true. It is, indeed, not necessary to doubt that some aspects of the
Charter bear upon them the imprint of significant and salutary novelty.
But it is our submission and our conviction, which we affirm before this
Tribunal and the world, that fundamentally the provision of the Charter
which constitutes wars, such wars as these defendants joined in waging
and in planning a crime, is not in any way an innovation. This provision
of the Charter does no more than constitute a competent jurisdiction for
the punishment of what not only the enlightened conscience of mankind
but the law of nations itself had constituted an international crime
before this Tribunal was established and this Charter became part of the
public law of the world.
So first let this be said:
Whilst it may be quite true that there is no body of international rules
amounting to law in the Austinian sense of a rule imposed by a sovereign
upon a subject obliged to obey it under some definite sanction; yet for
50 years or more the people of the world, striving perhaps after that
ideal of which the poet speaks:
“When the war drums throb no longer
And the battle flags are furled,
In the parliament of man,
The federation of the world”—
sought to create an operative system of rules based upon the consent of
nations to stabilize international relations, to avoid war taking place
at all and to mitigate the results of such wars as took place. The first
treaty was of course the Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes. That Convention was, indeed, of no
more than precatory effect, and we attach no weight to it for the
purposes of this case, but it did establish agreement that, in the event
of serious disputes arising between the signatory powers, they would as
far as possible submit to mediation. That Convention was followed in
1907 by another convention reaffirming and slightly strengthening what
had previously been agreed. These early conventions fell, indeed, very
far short of outlawing war, or of creating any binding obligation to
arbitrate. I shall certainly not ask the Tribunal to say any crime was
committed by disregarding those conventions.
But at least they established that the contracting powers accepted the
general principle that, if at all possible, war should be resorted to
only if mediation failed.
Although these conventions are mentioned in this Indictment, I am not
relying on them save to show the historical development of the law, and
it is unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their precise effect, for
the place which they once occupied has been taken by far more effective
instruments. I mention them now merely for this, that they were the
first steps towards that body of rules of law which we are seeking here
to enforce.
There were, of course, other individual agreements between particular
states, agreements which sought to preserve the neutrality of individual
countries, as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those agreements were
inadequate, in the absence of any real will to comply with them, to
prevent the first World War in 1914.
Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe, the nations of Europe,
not excluding Germany, and of other parts of the world, came to the
conclusion that, in the interests of all alike, a permanent organization
of the nations should be established to maintain the peace. And so the
Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the Covenant of the League of
Nations.
Now, I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the various
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been criticized, some
of them perhaps justly criticized, and they were certainly made the
subject of much bellicose propaganda in Germany. But it is unnecessary
to inquire into the merits of the matter, for, however unjust one might
for this purpose assume the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to
have been, they contained no kind of excuse for the waging of war to
secure an alteration in their terms. Not only was that treaty a
settlement, by agreement, of all the difficult territorial questions
which had been left outstanding by the war itself, but it established
the League of Nations which, if it had been loyally supported, could so
well have resolved those international differences which might otherwise
have led, as indeed they eventually did lead, to war. It set up in the
Council of the League, in the Assembly and in the Permanent Court of
International Justice, a machine not only for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes, but also for the frank ventilation of all
international questions by open and free discussion. At that time, in
those years after the last war, the hopes of the world stood high.
Millions of men in all countries—perhaps even in Germany itself—had
laid down their lives in what they hoped and believed was a war to end
war. Germany herself entered the League of Nations and was given a
permanent seat on the Council; and on that Council, as in the assembly
of the League, German governments which preceded that of the Defendant
Von Papen in 1932 played their full part. In the years from 1919 to that
time in 1932, despite some comparatively minor incidents in the heated
atmosphere which followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of
the League continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which
gave ground, and good ground, for hope that at long last the rule of law
would replace anarchy in the international field.
The statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars of
aggression an international crime. These are no new terms invented by
the victors to embody in this Charter. They have figured, and they have
figured prominently, in numerous treaties, in governmental
pronouncements, and in the declarations of statesmen in the period
preceding the second World War. In treaties concluded between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and other states, such as Persia in 1927,
France in 1935, China in 1937, the contracting parties undertook to
refrain from any act of aggression whatever against the other party. In
1933 the Soviet Union became a party to a large number of treaties
containing a detailed definition of aggression, and the same definition
appeared in the same year in the authoritative report of the Committee
on Questions of Security set up in connection with the Conference for
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. But at this time states were
going beyond commitments to refrain from wars of aggression and to
assist states which were victims of aggression. They were condemning
aggression in unmistakable terms. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of
Non-Aggression and Conciliation, which was signed on the 10th of October
1933, by a number of American states, subsequently joined by practically
all the states of the American continents and a number of European
countries as well, the contracting parties solemnly declared that “they
condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those of
other states.” And that treaty was fully incorporated into the Buenos
Aires convention of December 1936, signed and ratified by a large number
of American countries, including, of course, the United States. And
previously, in 1928, the 6th Pan-American Conference had adopted a
resolution declaring that, as “war of aggression constitutes a crime
against the human species . . . all aggression is illicit and as such is
declared prohibited.” A year earlier, as long ago as September 1927, the
Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution affirming the
conviction that “a war of aggression can never serve as a means of
settling international disputes and is, in consequence, an international
crime” and going on to declare that “all wars of aggression are, and
shall always be prohibited.”
The first article of the draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance of 1923 read
in these terms:
“The High Contracting Parties, affirming that aggressive war is
an international crime, undertake the solemn engagement not to
make themselves guilty of this crime against any other nation.”
In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924, it was stated that
“offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity and an
international crime.” These instruments that I have just last mentioned
remained, it is true, unratified for various reasons, but they are not
without significance or value.
These repeated declarations, these repeated condemnations of wars of
aggression testified to the fact that with the establishment of the
League of Nations, with the legal developments which followed it, the
place of war in international law had undergone a profound change. War
was ceasing to be the unrestricted prerogative of sovereign states. The
Covenant of the League of Nations did not totally abolish the right of
war. It left, perhaps, certain gaps which were possibly larger in theory
than in practice. But in effect it surrounded the right of war by
procedural and substantive checks and delays, which, if the Covenant had
been faithfully observed, would have amounted to an elimination of war,
not only between members of the League, but also, by reason of certain
provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-members as well. And
thus the Covenant of the League restored the position as it existed at
the dawn of international law, at the time when Grotius was laying down
the foundations of the modern law of nations and established the
distinction, a distinction accompanied by profound legal consequences in
the sphere, for instance, of neutrality, between a just war and an
unjust war.
Nor was that development arrested with the adoption of the Covenant of
the League. The right of war was further circumscribed by a series of
treaties, numbering—it is an astonishing figure but it is right—nearly
a thousand, of arbitration and conciliation embracing practically all
the nations of the world. The so-called Optional Clause of Article 36 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the clause
which conferred upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction in regard to the
most comprehensive categories of disputes, and which constituted in
effect by far the most important compulsory treaty of arbitration in the
postwar period, was widely signed and ratified. Germany herself signed
it in 1927 and her signature was renewed, and renewed for a period of 5
years by the Nazi government in July of 1933. (Significantly, that
ratification was not again renewed on the expiration of its 5 years’
validity in March of 1938 by Germany). Since 1928 a considerable number
of states signed and ratified the General Act for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes which was designed to fill the gaps left by
the Optional Clause and by the existing treaties of arbitration and
conciliation.
And all this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement testified
to the growing conviction throughout the civilized world that war was
ceasing to be the normal or the legitimate means of settling
international disputes. The express condemnation of wars of aggression,
which I have already mentioned, supplies the same testimony. But there
was, of course, more direct evidence pointing in the same direction. The
Treaty of Locarno of the 16th October 1925, to which I shall have
occasion to refer presently, and to which Germany was a party, was more
than a treaty of arbitration and conciliation in which the parties
undertook definite obligations with regard to the pacific settlement of
disputes which might arise between them. It was, subject to clearly
specified exceptions of self-defense in certain contingencies, a more
general undertaking in which the parties to it agreed that “they would
in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each
other.” And that constituted a general renunciation of war, and it was
so considered to be in the eyes of international jurists and in the
public opinion of the world. The Locarno Treaty was not just another of
the great number of arbitration treaties which were being concluded at
this time. It was regarded as a kind of cornerstone in the European
settlement and in the new legal order in Europe in partial, just, and
indeed, generous substitution for the rigors of the Treaty of
Versailles. And with that treaty, the term “outlawry of war” left the
province of mere pacifist propaganda. It became current in the writings
on international law and in the official pronouncements of governments.
No one could any longer say, after the Locarno Treaty—no one could any
longer associate himself with the plausible assertion that at all
events, as between the parties to that treaty, war remained an
unrestricted right of sovereign states.
But, although the effect of the Locarno Treaty was limited to the
parties to it, it had wider influence in paving the way towards that
most fundamental, that truly revolutionary enactment in modern
international law, namely, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War of 27 August 1928, the Pact of Paris, the Kellogg-Briand Pact. That
treaty, a most deliberate and carefully prepared piece of international
legislation, was binding in 1939 on more than 60 nations, including
Germany. It was, and it has remained, the most widely signed and
ratified international instrument. It contained no provision for its
termination, and it was conceived, as I said, as the cornerstone of any
future international order worthy of the name. It is fully part of
international law as it stands today, and it has in no way been modified
or replaced by the Charter of the United Nations. It is right, in this
solemn hour in the history of the world, when the responsible leaders of
a state stand accused of a premeditated breach of this great treaty
which was, which remains, a source of hope and of faith for mankind, to
set out in detail its two operative articles and its Preamble. Let me
read them to the Tribunal—first the Preamble, and it starts like this:
“The President of the German Reich”—and the other states
associated . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we find it among the documents?
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: It will be put in. I don’t think you have it at
the moment.
“The President of the German Reich . . . deeply sensitive of
their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind; persuaded
that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an
instrument of international policy should be made to the end
that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between
their peoples may be perpetuated; convinced that all changes in
their relations with one another should be sought only by
pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly
progress, and that any signatory power which shall hereafter
seek to promote its national interests by resort to war, should
be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty; hopeful that,
encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world
will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present
treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within
the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting civilized
nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an
instrument of their national policy . . . .”
Then, Article I:
“The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies and renounce it as
an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another.”
And Article II:
“The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means.”
In that treaty, that General Treaty for the Renunciation of War,
practically the whole civilized world abolished war as a legally
permissible means of enforcing the law or of changing it. The right of
war was no longer of the essence of sovereignty. Whatever the position
may have been at the time of the Hague Convention, whatever the position
may have been in 1914, whatever it may have been in 1918—and it is not
necessary to discuss it—no international lawyer of repute, no
responsible statesman, no soldier concerned with the legal use of armed
forces, no economist or industrialist concerned in his country’s war
economy could doubt that with the Pact of Paris on the statute book a
war of aggression was contrary to international law. Nor have the
repeated violations of the Pact by the Axis Powers in any way affected
its validity. Let this be firmly and clearly stated. Those very
breaches, except perhaps to the cynic and the malevolent, have added to
the strength of the treaty; they provoked the sustained wrath of peoples
angered by the contemptuous disregard of this great statute and
determined to vindicate its provisions. The Pact of Paris is the law of
nations. This Tribunal will declare it. The world must enforce it.
Let this also be said, that the Pact of Paris was not a clumsy
instrument likely to become a kind of signpost for the guilty. It did
not enable Germany to go to war against Poland and yet rely, as against
Great Britain and France, on any immunity from warlike action because of
the very provisions of the pact. For the pact laid down expressly in its
preamble that no state guilty of a violation of its provisions might
invoke its benefits. And when, on the outbreak of the second World War,
Great Britain and France communicated to the League of Nations that a
state of war existed between them and Germany as from the 3rd of
September 1939, they declared that by committing an act of aggression
against Poland, Germany had violated her obligations assumed not only
towards Poland but also towards the other signatories of the pact. A
violation of the pact in relation to one signatory was an attack upon
all the other signatories and they were entitled to treat it as such. I
emphasize that point lest any of these defendants should seize upon the
letter of the particulars of Count Two of the Indictment and seek to
suggest that it was not Germany who initiated war with the United
Kingdom and France on 3 September 1939. The declaration of war came from
the United Kingdom and from France; the act of war and its commencement
came from Germany in violation of the fundamental enactment to which she
was a party.
The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, this great
constitutional instrument of an international society awakened to the
deadly dangers of another Armageddon, did not remain an isolated effort
soon to be forgotten in the turmoil of recurrent international crises.
It became, in conjunction with the Covenant of the League of Nations or
independently of it, the starting point for a new orientation of
governments in matters of peace, war, and neutrality. It is of
importance, I think, to quote just one or two of the statements which
were being made by governments at that time in relation to the effect of
the pact. In 1929 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom said,
in connection with the question of conferring upon the Permanent Court
of International Justice jurisdiction with regard to the exercise of
belligerent rights in relation to neutral states—and it illustrates the
profound change which was being accepted as having taken place as a
result of the Pact of Paris in international law:
“But the whole situation . . . . rests, and international law on
the subject has been entirely built up, on the assumption that
there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war as an instrument
of national policy, and, as a necessary corollary, that the
position and rights of neutrals are entirely independent of the
circumstances of any war which may be in progress. Before the
acceptance of the Covenant, the basis of the law of neutrality
was that the rights and obligations of neutrals were identical
as regards both belligerents, and were entirely independent of
the rights and wrongs of the dispute which had led to the war,
or the respective position of the belligerents at the bar of
world opinion.”
Then the Government went on:
“Now it is precisely this assumption which is no longer valid as
regards states which are members of the League of Nations and
parties to the Peace Pact. The effect of those instruments,
taken together, is to deprive nations of the right to employ war
as an instrument of national policy, and to forbid the states
which have signed them to give aid or comfort to an offender.”
This was being said in 1929, when there was no war upon the horizon.
“As between such states, there has been in consequence a
fundamental change in the whole question of belligerent and
neutral rights. The whole policy of His Majesty’s present
Government (and, it would appear, of any alternative government)
is based upon a determination to comply with their obligations
under the Covenant of the League and the Peace Pact. This being
so, the situation which we have to envisage in the event of a
war in which we were engaged is not one in which the rights and
duties of belligerents and neutrals will depend upon the old
rules of war and neutrality, but one in which the position of
the members of the League will be determined by the Covenant and
by the Pact.”
The Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America referred in his
opening speech before this Tribunal to the weighty pronouncement of Mr.
Stimson, the Secretary of War, in which, in 1932, he gave expression to
the drastic change brought about in international law by the Pact of
Paris, and it is perhaps convenient to quote the relevant passage in
full:
“War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. This means that it has become illegal
throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be
the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the
principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights
of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter, when two
nations engage in armed conflict, either one or both of them
must be wrongdoers—violators of this general treaty law. We no
longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the
punctilios of the duelist’s code. Instead we denounce them as
law-breakers.”
And nearly 10 years later, when numerous independent states lay
prostrate, shattered or menaced in their very existence before the
impact of the war machine of the Nazi State, the Attorney General of the
United States, subsequently a distinguished member of the highest
Tribunal of that great country, gave significant expression to the
change which had been effected in the law as the result of the Pact of
Paris in a speech for which the freedom-loving peoples of the world will
always be grateful. On the 27th of March 1941—and I mention it now not
as merely being the speech of a statesman, although it was certainly
that, but as being the considered opinion of a distinguished lawyer,—he
said this:
“The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which Germany, Italy and
Japan covenanted with us, as well as with other nations, to
renounce war as an instrument of policy, made definite the
outlawry of war and of necessity altered the dependent concept
of neutral obligations.
“The Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Argentine
Anti-War Treaty deprived their signatories of the right of war
as an instrument of national policy or aggression and rendered
unlawful wars undertaken in violation of these provisions. In
consequence these treaties destroyed the historical and
juridical foundations of the doctrine of neutrality conceived as
an attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to aggressive
wars . . . .
“It follows that the state which has gone to war in violation of
its obligations acquires no right to equality of treatment from
other states, unless treaty obligations require different
handling of affairs. It derives no rights from its illegality.
“In flagrant cases of aggression where the facts speak so
unambiguously that world opinion takes what may be the
equivalent of judicial notice, we may not stymie international
law and allow these great treaties to become dead letters. The
intelligent public opinion of the world which is not afraid to
be vocal, and the action of the American States, has made a
determination that the Axis Powers are the aggressors in the
wars today, which is an appropriate basis in the present state
of international organizations for our policy.”
Thus, there is no doubt that by the time the National Socialist State of
Germany had embarked upon the preparation of the war of aggression
against the civilized world and by the time it had accomplished that
design, aggressive war had become, in virtue of the Pact of Paris and
the other treaties and declarations to which I have referred, illegal
and a crime beyond all uncertainty and doubt. And it is on that
proposition, and fundamentally on that universal treaty, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, that Count Two of this Indictment is principally
based.
The Prosecution has deemed it necessary—indeed, imperative—to
establish beyond all possibility of question, at what I am afraid may
appear to be excessive length, that only superficial learning or
culpable sentimentality can assert that there is any significant element
of retroactivity in the determination of the authors of this Charter to
treat aggressive war as conduct which international law has prohibited
and stigmatized as criminal. We have traced the progressive limitation
of the rights of war, the renunciation and condemnation of wars of
aggression, and above all, the total prohibition and condemnation of all
wars conceived as an instrument of national policy. What statesman or
politician in charge of the affairs of nations could doubt, from 1928
onwards, that aggressive war, or that all war, except in self-defense or
for the collective enforcement of the law, or against a state which had
itself violated the Pact of Paris, was unlawful and outlawed? What
statesman or politician embarking upon such a war could reasonably and
justifiably count upon an immunity other than that of a successful
outcome of the criminal venture? What more decisive evidence of a
prohibition laid down by positive international law could any lawyer
desire than that which has been adduced before this Tribunal?
There are, it is true, some small town lawyers who deny the very
existence of any international law; and indeed, as I have said, the
rules of the law of nations may not satisfy the Austinian test of being
imposed by a sovereign. But the legal regulation of international
relations rests upon quite different juridical foundations. It depends
upon consent, but upon a consent which, once given, cannot be withdrawn
by unilateral action. In the international field the source of law is
not the command of a sovereign but the treaty agreement binding upon
every state which has adhered to it. And it is indeed true, and the
recognition of its truth today by all the great powers of the world is
vital to our future peace—it is indeed true that, as M. Litvinov once
said, and as Great Britain fully accepts:
“Absolute sovereignty and entire liberty of action only belong
to such states as have not undertaken international obligations.
Immediately a state accepts international obligations it limits
its sovereignty.”
In that way and that way alone lies the future peace of the world. Yet
it may be argued that although war itself was outlawed and forbidden, it
was not criminally outlawed and criminally forbidden. International law,
it may be said, does not attribute criminality to states and still less
to individuals. But can it really be said on behalf of these defendants
that the offense of these aggressive wars, which plunged millions of
people to their death, which by dint of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity brought about the torture and extermination of countless
thousands of innocent civilians, which devastated cities, which
destroyed the amenities—nay, the most rudimentary necessities of
civilization in many countries—which has brought the world to the brink
of ruin from which it will take generations to recover—will it
seriously be said by these defendants that such a war is only an
offense, only an illegality, only a matter of condemnation perhaps
sounding in damages, but not a crime justiciable by any Tribunal? No law
worthy of the name can allow itself to be reduced to an absurdity in
that way, and certainly the great powers responsible for this Charter
were not prepared to admit it. They draw the inescapable conclusion from
the renunciation, the prohibition, the condemnation of war which had
become part of the law of nations, and they refuse to reduce justice to
impotence by subscribing to the outworn doctrines that a sovereign state
can commit no crime and that no crime can be committed on behalf of the
sovereign state by individuals acting in its behalf. They refuse to
stultify themselves, and their refusal and their decision has decisively
shaped the law for this Tribunal.
If this be an innovation, it is an innovation long overdue—a desirable
and beneficent innovation fully consistent with justice, fully
consistent with common sense and with the abiding purposes of the law of
nations. But is it indeed an innovation? Or is it no more than the
logical development of the law? There was indeed a time when
international lawyers used to maintain that the liability of the state,
because of its sovereignty, was limited to a contractual responsibility.
International tribunals have not accepted that view. They have
repeatedly affirmed that a state can commit a tort; that it may be
guilty of trespass, of nuisance, and of negligence. And they have gone
further. They have held that a state may be bound to pay what are in
effect penal damages. In a recent case decided in 1935 between the
United States and Canada, an arbitral tribunal, with the concurrence of
its American member, decided that the United States were bound to pay
what amounted to penal damages for an affront to Canadian sovereignty.
And on a wider plane, the Covenant of the League of Nations, in
providing for sanctions, recognized the principle of enforcement of the
law against collective units, such enforcement to be, if necessary, of a
penal character. And so there is not anything startlingly new in the
adoption of the principle that the state as such is responsible for its
criminal acts. In fact, save for reliance on the unconvincing argument
of sovereignty, there is in law no reason why a state should not be
answerable for crimes committed on its behalf. A hundred years ago Dr.
Lushington, a great English Admiralty judge, refused to admit that a
state could not be a pirate. History—very recent history—does not
warrant the view that a state cannot be a criminal. On the other hand,
the immeasurable potentialities for evil, inherent in the state in this
age of science and organization would seem to demand, quite
imperatively, means of repression of criminal conduct even more drastic
and more effective than in the case of individuals. And insofar,
therefore, as this Charter has put on record the principle of the
criminal responsibility of the state, it must be applauded as a wise and
far-seeing measure of international legislation.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: [_Continuing._] I was saying before the recess
that there could be no doubt about the principle of criminal
responsibility on the part of the state which engaged in aggressive war.
Admittedly, the conscience shrinks from the rigors of collective
punishment, which may fall upon the guilty and the innocent alike,
although, it may be noted, most of these innocent victims would not have
hesitated to reap the fruits of the criminal act if it had been
successful. Humanity and justice will find means of mitigating any
injustice in collective punishment. Above all, much hardship can be
obviated by making the punishment fall upon the individuals who were
themselves directly responsible for the criminal conduct of their state.
It is here that the powers who framed this Charter took a step which
justice, sound legal sense, and an enlightened appreciation of the good
of mankind must acclaim without cavil or reserve. The Charter lays down
expressly that there shall be individual responsibility for the crimes,
including the crimes against the peace, committed on behalf of the
state. The state is not an abstract entity. Its rights and duties are
the rights and duties of men. Its actions are the actions of men. It is
a salutary principle, a principle of law, that politicians who embark
upon a particular policy—as here—of aggressive war should not be able
to seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the state. It is a
salutary legal rule that persons who, in violation of the law, plunge
their own and other countries into an aggressive war should do so with a
halter around their necks.
To say that those who aid and abet, who counsel and procure a crime are
themselves criminals, is a commonplace in our own municipal law. Nor is
the principle of individual international responsibility for offenses
against the law of nations altogether new. It has been applied not only
to pirates. The entire law relating to war crimes, as distinct from the
crime of war, is based upon the principle of individual responsibility.
The future of international law, and indeed, of the world itself,
depends on its application in a much wider sphere, in particular, in
that of safeguarding the peace of the world. There must be acknowledged
not only, as in the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental human
rights, but also, as in the Charter of this Tribunal, fundamental human
duties, and of these none is more vital, none is more fundamental, than
the duty not to vex the peace of nations in violation of the clearest
legal prohibitions and undertakings. If this be an innovation, it is an
innovation which we are prepared to defend and to justify, but it is not
an innovation which creates a new crime. International law had already,
before the Charter was adopted, constituted aggressive war a criminal
act.
There is thus no substantial retroactivity in the provisions of the
Charter. It merely fixes the responsibility for a crime already clearly
established as such by positive law upon its actual perpetrators. It
fills a gap in international criminal procedure. There is all the
difference between saying to a man, “You will now be punished for what
was not a crime at all at the time you committed it,” and in saying to
him, “You will now pay the penalty for conduct which was contrary to law
and a crime when you executed it, although, owing to the imperfection of
the international machinery, there was at that time no court competent
to pronounce judgment against you.” It is that latter course which we
adopt, and if that be retroactivity, we proclaim it to be most fully
consistent with that higher justice which, in the practice of civilized
states, has set a definite limit to the retroactive operation of laws.
Let the defendants and their protagonists complain that the Charter is
in this matter an _ex parte fiat_ of the victors. These victors,
composing, as they do, the overwhelming majority of the nations of the
world, represent also the world’s sense of justice, which would be
outraged if the crime of war, after this second world conflict, were to
remain unpunished. In thus interpreting, declaring, and supplementing
the existing law, these states are content to be judged by the verdict
of history. _Securus judicat orbis terrarum._ Insofar as the Charter of
this Tribunal introduces new law, its authors have established a
precedent for the future—a precedent operative against all, including
themselves, but in essence that law, rendering recourse to aggressive
war an international crime, had been well established when the Charter
was adopted. It is only by way of corruption of language that it can be
described as a retroactive law.
There remains the question, with which I shall not detain the Tribunal
for long, whether these wars which were launched by Germany and her
leaders in violation of treaties or agreements or assurances were also
wars of aggression. A war of aggression is a war which is resorted to in
violation of the international obligation not to have recourse to war,
or, in cases in which war is not totally renounced, which is resorted to
in disregard of the duty to utilize the procedure of pacific settlement
which a state has bound itself to observe. There was, as a matter of
fact, in the period between the two world wars, a divergence of opinion
among jurists and statesmen whether it was preferable to attempt in
advance a legal definition of aggression, or to leave to the states
concerned and to the collective organs of the international community
freedom of appreciation of the facts in any particular situation that
might arise. Those holding the latter view argued that a rigid
definition might be abused by an unscrupulous state to fit in with its
aggressive design; they feared, and the British Government was for a
time among those who took this view, that an automatic definition of
aggression might become “a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the
guilty.” Others held that in the interest of certainty and security a
definition of aggression, like a definition of any crime in municipal
law, was proper and useful. They urged that the competent international
organs, political and judicial, could be trusted to avoid in any
particular case a definition of aggression which might lead to
obstruction or to an absurdity. In May of 1933 the Committee on Security
Questions of the Disarmament Conference proposed a definition of
aggression on these lines:
“The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to
the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be
considered to be that state which is the first to commit any of
the following actions:
“(1) Declaration of war upon another state;
“(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration
of war, of the territory of another state;
“(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a
declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of
another state;
“(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
“(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory
which have invaded the territory of another state, or refusal;
notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its
own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those
bands of all assistance or protection.”
The various treaties concluded in 1933 by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and other states followed closely that definition. So did the
draft convention submitted in 1933 by His Majesty’s Government to the
Disarmament Conference.
However, it is unprofitable to elaborate here the details of the problem
or of the definition of aggression. This Tribunal will not allow itself
to be deflected from its purpose by attempts to ventilate in this Court
what is an academic and, in the circumstances, an utterly unreal
controversy as to what is the nature of a war of aggression, for there
is no definition of aggression, general or particular, which does not
cover and cover abundantly and irresistibly in every detail, the
premeditated onslaught by Germany on the territorial integrity and
political independence of so many sovereign states.
This, then, being the law as we submit it to be to this Tribunal—that
the peoples of the world by the Pact of Paris had finally outlawed war
and made it criminal—I turn now to the facts to see how these
defendants under their leader and with their associates destroyed the
high hopes of mankind and sought to revert to international anarchy.
First, let this be said, for it will be established beyond doubt by the
documents which you will see, from the moment Hitler became Chancellor
in 1933, with the Defendant Von Papen as Reich Chancellor, and with the
Defendant Von Neurath as his Foreign Minister, the whole atmosphere of
the world darkened. The hopes of the people began to recede. Treaties
seemed no longer matters of solemn obligation but were entered into with
complete cynicism as a means for deceiving other states of Germany’s
warlike intentions. International conferences were no longer to be used
as a means for securing pacific settlements but as occasions for
obtaining by blackmail demands which were eventually to be enlarged by
war. The world came to know the “war of nerves”, the diplomacy of the
_fait accompli_, of blackmail and bullying.
In October 1933 Hitler told his Cabinet that as the proposed Disarmament
Convention did not concede full equality to Germany, “It would be
necessary to torpedo the Disarmament Conference. It was out of the
question to negotiate: Germany would leave the Conference and the
League”. On the 21st of October 1933 Germany did so, and by so doing
struck a deadly blow at the fabric of security which had been built up
on the basis of the League Covenant. From that time on the record of
their foreign policy became one of complete disregard of international
obligations, and indeed not least of those solemnly concluded by
themselves. Hitler himself expressly avowed to his confederates,
“Agreements are kept only so long as they serve a certain purpose.” He
might have added that again and again that purpose was only to lull an
intended victim into a false sense of security. So patent, indeed, did
this eventually become that to be invited by the Defendant Ribbentrop to
enter a non-aggression pact with Germany was almost a sign that Germany
intended to attack the state concerned. Nor was it only the formal
treaty which they used and violated as circumstances seemed to make
expedient. These defendants are charged, too, with breaches of the less
formal assurances which, in accordance with diplomatic usage, Germany
gave to neighboring states. You will hear the importance which Hitler
himself publicly attached to assurances of that kind. Today, with the
advance of science, the world has been afforded means of communication
and intercourse hitherto unknown, and as Hitler himself expressly
recognized in his public utterances, international relations no longer
depend upon treaties alone. The methods of diplomacy change. The leader
of one nation can speak directly to the government and peoples of
another, and that course was not infrequently adopted by the Nazi
conspirators. But, although the methods change, the principles of good
faith and honesty, established as the fundamentals of civilized society,
both in the national and international spheres, remain unaltered. It is
a long time since it was said that we are part one of another, and if
today the different states are more closely connected and thus form part
of a world society more than ever before, so also, more than before, is
there that need for good faith and honesty between them.
Let us see how these defendants, ministers and high officers of the Nazi
Government, individually and collectively comported themselves in these
matters.
On the 1st of September 1939 in the early hours of the morning under
manufactured and, in any event, inadequate pretexts, the Armed Forces of
the German Reich invaded Poland along the whole length of her frontiers
and thus launched the war which was to bring down so many of the pillars
of our civilization.
It was a breach of the Hague Conventions. It was a breach of the Treaty
of Versailles which had established the frontiers between Germany and
Poland. And however much Germany disliked that treaty—although Hitler
had expressly stated that he would respect its territorial
provisions—however much she disliked it, she was not free to break it
by unilateral action. It was a breach of the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland concluded at Locarno on the 16th of October 1925. By
that treaty Germany and Poland expressly agreed to refer any matters of
dispute not capable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic machinery to
the decision of an arbitral tribunal or of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. But that is
not all. It was also a breach of a more recent and, in view of the
repeated emphasis laid upon it by Hitler himself, in some ways a more
important engagement into which Nazi Germany had entered with Poland.
After the Nazi Government came into power, on the 26th of January 1934
the German and Polish Governments had signed a 10 year pact of
non-aggression. It was, as the signatories themselves stated, to
introduce a new era into the political relations between Poland and
Germany. It was said in the text of the pact itself that “the
maintenance and guarantee of lasting peace between the two countries is
an essential prerequisite for the general peace of Europe.” The two
governments therefore agreed to base their mutual relations on the
principles laid down in the Pact of Paris, and they solemnly declared
that:
“In no circumstances . . . will they proceed to the application
of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such
disputes.”
That declaration and agreement was to remain in force for at least 10
years and thereafter it was to remain valid unless it was denounced by
either Government 6 months before the expiration of the 10 years, or
subsequently by 6 months’ notice. Both at the time of its signature and
during the following 4 years Hitler spoke of the German-Polish agreement
publicly as though it were a cornerstone of his foreign policy. By
entering into it, he persuaded many people that his intentions were
genuinely pacific, for the re-emergence of a new Poland and an
independent Poland after the war had cost Germany much territory and had
separated East Prussia from the Reich. And that Hitler should, of his
own accord, enter into friendly relations with Poland—that in his
speeches on foreign policy he should proclaim his recognition of Poland
and of her right to an exit to the sea, and the necessity for Germans
and Poles to live side by side in amity—these facts seemed to the world
to be convincing proof that Hitler had no “revisionist” aims which would
threaten the peace of Europe; that he was even genuinely anxious to put
an end to the age-old hostility between the Teuton and the Slav. If his
professions were, as embodied in the treaty and as contained in these
declarations, genuine, his policy excluded a renewal of the “Drang nach
Osten”, as it had been called, and was thereby going to contribute to
the peace and stability of Europe. That was what the people were led to
think. We shall have occasion enough to see how little truth these
pacific professions in fact contained.
The history of the fateful years from 1934 to 1939 shows quite clearly
that the Germans used this treaty, as they used other treaties, merely
as an instrument of policy for furthering their aggressive aims. It is
clear from the documents which will be presented to the Tribunal that
these 5 years fall into two distinct phases in the realization of the
aggressive aims which always underlay the Nazi policy. There was first
the period from the Nazi assumption of power in 1933 until the autumn of
1937. That was the preparatory period. During that time there occurred
the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish
rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, the
reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all those other
necessary preparatory measures for future aggression which my American
colleagues have already so admirably put before the Tribunal.
During that period—the preparatory period—Germany was lulling Poland
into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, but the Defendant
Göring and the Defendant Ribbentrop made statements approbating the
non-aggression pact. In 1935 Göring was saying that, “The pact was not
planned for a period of 10 years but forever; there need not be the
slightest fear that it would not be continued.” Even though Germany was
steadily building up the greatest war machine that Europe had ever
known, and although, by January 1937, the German military position was
so strong and so secure that, in spite of the treaty breaches which it
involved, Hitler could openly refer to his strong Army, he took pains,
at the same time, to say—and again I quote—that:
“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions
and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the
European atmosphere. I merely recall the agreement with Poland
which has worked out to the advantage of both sides.”
And so it went on: abroad, protestations of pacific intentions; at home,
“guns before butter.”
In 1937 this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi policy moved
from general preparation for future aggression to specific planning for
the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And there are two
documents in particular which mark that change.
The first of these was called “Directive for Unified Preparation for
War”; issued in June 1937—June 29, 1937—by the Reich Minister for War,
who was then Von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That
document is important, not only for its military directions, but for the
appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the
revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it.
“The general political position”—Von Blomberg stated, and I am
quoting from the document—“justifies the supposition that
Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for
this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost
all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies
in the preparedness for war of a number of states, and of Russia
in particular.”
It is true, he added, “The intention of unleashing a European war is
held just as little by Germany.” And it may be that that phrase was
carefully chosen because, as the documents will show, Germany hoped to
conquer Europe, perhaps to conquer the world in detail; to fight on one
front at a time, against one power at a time, and not to unleash a
general European conflict.
But Von Blomberg went on:
“The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude
surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war
of the German Armed Forces (a) to counter attack at any
time”—yet he had just said that there was no fear of any
attack—and “(b)”—and I invite the Tribunal again to notice
this phrase—“to enable the military exploitation of politically
favorable opportunities, should they occur.”
That phrase is no more than a euphemistic description of aggressive war.
It reveals the continued adherence of the German military leaders to the
doctrine that military might, and if necessary war, should be an
instrument of policy—the doctrine which had been explicitly condemned
by the Kellogg Pact, which was renounced by the pact with Poland, and by
innumerable other treaties.
The document goes on to set out the general preparations necessary for a
possible war in the mobilization period of 1937-1938. It is evidence at
least for this, that the leaders of the German Armed Forces had it in
mind to use the military strength which they were building up for
aggressive purposes. No reason, they say, to anticipate attack from any
side—there is a lack of desire for war. Yet they prepare to exploit
militarily favorable opportunities.
Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned aggression
is the record of the important conference which Hitler held at the Reich
Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937, at which Von Blomberg, Reich
Minister for War; Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army;
Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; Raeder, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and Von Neurath, then the Foreign
Minister, were present. The minutes of that conference have already been
put in evidence. I refer to them now only to emphasize those passages
which make apparent the ultimate intention to wage an aggressive war.
You will remember that the burden of Hitler’s argument at that
conference was that Germany required more territory in Europe. Austria
and Czechoslovakia were specifically envisaged. But Hitler realized that
the process of conquering those two countries might well bring into
operation the treaty obligations of Great Britain and of France. He was
prepared to take the risk. You remember the passage:
“The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire has
proved that every space expansion can be effected only by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable: Neither formerly nor today has space been found
without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the
proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest
possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost.”
In the course of that conference Hitler had foreseen and discussed the
likelihood that Poland would be involved if the aggressive expansionist
aims which he put forward brought about a general European war in the
course of their realization by the Nazi State. And when, therefore, on
that very day on which that conference was taking place, Hitler assured
the Polish Ambassador of the great value of the 1934 Pact with Poland,
it can only be concluded that its real value in Hitler’s eyes was that
of keeping Poland quiet until Germany had acquired such a territorial
and strategic position that Poland was no longer a danger.
That view is confirmed by the events which followed. At the beginning of
February of 1938 the change from Nazi preparation for aggression to
active aggression itself took place. It was marked by the substitution
of Ribbentrop for Neurath as Foreign Minister, and of Keitel for
Blomberg as head of the OKW. Its first fruits were the bullying of
Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938 and the forcible
absorption of Austria in March. Thereafter the Green Plan for the
destruction of Czechoslovakia was steadily developed in the way which
you heard yesterday—the plan partially foiled, or final consummation at
least delayed, by the Munich Agreement.
With those aspects, those developments of Nazi aggression, my American
colleagues have already dealt. But it is obvious that the acquisition of
these two countries, their resources in manpower, their resources in the
production of munitions of war, immensely strengthened the position of
Germany as against Poland. And it is, therefore, perhaps not surprising
that, just as the Defendant Göring assured the Czechoslovak Minister in
Berlin, at the time of the Nazi invasion of Austria, that Hitler
recognized the validity of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of
1925, and that Germany had no designs against Czechoslovakia
herself—you remember, “I give you my word of honor,” the Defendant
Göring said—just as that is not surprising, so also it is not perhaps
surprising that continued assurances should have been given during 1938
to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with the Nazi
aggression on Poland’s neighbors.
Thus, on the 20th of February of 1938, on the eve of his invasion of
Austria, Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish Pact,
permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag—and I quote:
“. . . and so a way to a friendly understanding has been
successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with
Danzig, has today in spite of the attempt of some mischief
makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the
relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into
a sincere friendly co-operation . . . Relying on her
friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save
that ideal which provides the foundation for the task ahead of
us—peace.”
Still more striking, perhaps, are the cordial references to Poland in
Hitler’s speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26th of September
1938. He then said:
“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that
of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and
Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted
to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been
successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For
these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the
most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no
democracy, but a man. And with him I succeeded, in precisely 12
months, in coming to an agreement which, for 10 years in the
first instance, removed in principle the danger of a conflict.
We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting
pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must
live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A
people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the
sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found, and it will
be further extended. But the main fact is that the two
governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among
the two peoples within the two countries, possess the firm will
and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work
of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of
Nations palace at Geneva.”
And so flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of Austria and renewed
flattery of Poland preceded the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia.
The realities behind these outward expressions of good will are clearly
revealed in the documents relating to the Fall Grün, which are already
before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was a
risk of Poland, England, and France being involved in war to prevent the
German annexation of Czechoslovakia and that this risk, although it was
realized, was also accepted. On 25 August of 1938 top-secret orders to
the German Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against
England and France, if they intervened, pointed out that, as the
French-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the event of
an “unprovoked” attack, it would take a day or two for France and
England, and I suppose for their legal advisors to decide whether
legally the attack had been unprovoked or not, and consequently a
Blitzkrieg, accomplishing its aims before there could be any effective
intervention by France or England, was the object to be aimed at.
On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future organization was
issued, and to it there was attached a map on which the Baltic States,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were all shown as part of Germany,
and preparations for expanding the Air Force, and I quote, “as the Reich
grows in area,” as well as dispositions for a two-front war against
France and Russia, were discussed. And on the following day Von
Ribbentrop was being minuted about the reaction of Poland towards the
Czechoslovak problem. I quote: “The fact that after the liquidation of
the Czechoslovakian question it will be generally assumed that Poland
will be next in turn is not to be denied,” is recognized, but it is
stated, “The later this assumption sinks in, the better.”
I will pause for a moment at the date of the Munich Agreement and ask
the Tribunal to remind itself of what the evidence of documents and
historical facts shows up to that day. It has made undeniable both the
fact of Nazi aggressiveness and of active and actual aggression. Not
only does that conference of 1937 show Hitler and his associates
deliberately considering the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia,
if necessary by war, but the first of the operations had been carried
through in March of 1938; and a large part of the second, under threat
of war—a threat which as we now see was much more than a bluff—a
threat of actual and real war, although without the actual need for its
initiation, secured, as I said, a large part of the second objective in
September of 1938. And, more ominous still, Hitler had revealed his
adherence to the old doctrines of _Mein Kampf_—those essentially
aggressive doctrines to the exposition of which in _Mein Kampf_, long
regarded as the Bible of the Nazi Party, we shall draw attention in
certain particular passages. Hitler is indicating quite clearly not only
to his associates, but indeed to the world at this time, that he is in
pursuit of Lebensraum and that he means to secure it by threat of force,
or if threat of force fails, by actual force—by aggressive war.
So far actual warfare had been avoided because of the love of peace, the
lack of preparedness, the patience, the cowardice—call it what you
will—of the democratic powers; but after Munich the question which
filled the minds of all thinking people with acute anxiety was “where
will this thing end? Is Hitler now satisfied as he declared himself to
be? Or is his pursuit of Lebensraum going to lead to future aggressions,
even if he has to embark on open, aggressive war to secure it?”
It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to Poland that
the answer to these questions was to be given. So far, up to the time of
the Munich Agreement, no direct and immediate threat to Poland had been
made. The two documents from which I have just quoted, show of course,
that high officers of the Defendant Göring’s air staff already regarded
the expansion of the Reich and, it would seem, the destruction and
absorption of Poland, as a foregone conclusion. They were already
anticipating, indeed, the last stage of Hitler’s policy as expounded in
_Mein Kampf_—war to destroy France and to secure Lebensraum in Russia.
And the writer of the minute to Ribbentrop already took it for granted
that, after Czechoslovakia, Poland would be attacked. But more
impressive than those two documents is the fact that, as I have said, at
the conference of 5 November 1937, war with Poland, if she should dare
to prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had been quite
coolly and calmly contemplated, and the Nazi leaders were ready to take
the risk. So also had the risk of war with England and France under the
same circumstances been considered and accepted. As I indicated, such a
war would, of course, have been aggressive war on Germany’s part, and
they were contemplating aggressive warfare. For to force one state to
take up arms to defend another state against aggression, in other words,
to fulfill its treaty obligations is undoubtedly to initiate aggressive
warfare against the first state. But in spite of those plans, in spite
of these intentions behind the scenes, it remains true that until Munich
the decision for direct attack upon Poland and her destruction by
aggressive war had apparently not as yet been taken by Hitler and his
associates. It is to the transition from the intention and preparation
of initiating aggressive war, evident in regard to Czechoslovakia, to
the actual initiation and waging of aggressive war against Poland that I
now pass. That transition occupies the 11 months from the 1st of October
1938 to the actual attack on Poland on the 1st of September 1939.
Within 6 months of the signature of the Munich Agreement the Nazi
leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by that
Agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee. On the 14th
of March 1939 the aged and infirm president of the “rump” of
Czechoslovakia, Hacha and his Foreign Minister were summoned to Berlin.
At a meeting held between 1 o’clock and 2:15 in the small hours of the
15th of March in the presence of Hitler, of the Defendants Ribbentrop,
Göring, and Keitel, they were bullied and threatened and even bluntly
told that Hitler “had issued the orders for the German troops to move
into Czechoslovakia and for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the
German Reich.”
It was made quite clear to them that resistance would be useless and
would be crushed “by force of arms with all available means,” and it was
thus that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that
Slovakia was turned into a German satellite, though nominally
independent state. By their own unilateral action, on pretexts which had
no shadow of validity, without discussion with the governments of any
other country, without mediation, and in direct contradiction of the
sense and spirit of the Munich Agreement, the Germans acquired for
themselves that for which they had been planning in September of the
previous year, and indeed much earlier, but which at that time they had
felt themselves unable completely to secure without too patent an
exhibition of their aggressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted
the appetite for aggression to come. There were protests. England and
France sent diplomatic notes. Of course, there were protests. The Nazis
had clearly shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the
outside world that their claims went beyond incorporating into the Reich
persons of German race living in bordering territory. Now for the first
time, in defiance of their solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German
territory and non-German people had been seized. This acquisition of the
whole of Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation of
Memel on the 22d of March 1939, resulted in an immense strengthening of
the German positions, both politically and strategically, as Hitler had
anticipated it would, when he discussed the matter at that conference in
November of 1937.
But long before the consummation by the Nazi leaders of their aggression
against Czechoslovakia, they had begun to make demands upon Poland. The
Munich settlement achieved on the 25th of October 1938, that is to say
within less than a month of Hitler’s reassuring speech about Poland to
which I have already referred, and within, of course, a month of the
Munich Agreement, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, reported
to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, that at a luncheon at
Berchtesgaden the day before, namely, on the 24th of October 1938, the
Defendant Ribbentrop had put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig
with the Reich and for the building of an extra-territorial motor road
and railway line across Pomorze, the province which the Germans called
“The Corridor”. From that moment onwards until the Polish Government had
made it plain, as they did during a visit of the Defendant Ribbentrop to
Warsaw in January 1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig
to German sovereignty, negotiations on these German demands continued.
And even after Ribbentrop’s return from the visit to Warsaw, Hitler
thought it worthwhile, in his Reichstag speech on the 30th of January
1939, to say:
“We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion
of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be
any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace
as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself
what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which
brought such relief, had not been entered into 5 years ago. In
signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his
people just as great a service as the leaders of the National
Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled
months of the past year, the friendship between Germany and
Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political
life of Europe.”
But that utterance was the last friendly word from Germany to Poland,
and the last occasion on which the Nazi Leaders mentioned the
German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence
fell upon German demands in relation to Poland. But as soon as the final
absorption of Czechoslovakia had taken place and Germany had also
occupied Memel, Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed. In two
conversations which he and the Defendant Ribbentrop held on the 21st of
March and the 26th of March, respectively, with the Polish Ambassador,
German demands upon Poland were renewed and were further pressed. And in
view of the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia, in view of the
grave deterioration in her strategical position towards Germany, it is
not surprising that the Polish Government took alarm at the
developments. Nor were they alone. The events of March 1939 had at last
convinced both the English and the French Governments that the Nazi
designs of aggression were not limited to men of German race, and that
the specter of European war resulting from further aggressions by Nazi
Germany had not, after all, been exorcised by the Munich Agreement.
As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland and of England and of
France at the events in Czechoslovakia, and at the newly applied
pressure on Poland, conversations between the English and Polish
Governments had been taking place, and, on the 31st of March 1939, Mr.
Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His
Majesty’s Government had given an assurance to help Poland in the event
of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the
Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist. On the 6th
of April 1939 an Anglo-Polish communiqué stated that the two countries
were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal
character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance
given by His Majesty’s Government.
The justification for that concern on the part of the democratic powers
is not difficult to find. With the evidence which we now have of what
was happening within the councils of the German Reich and its Armed
Forces during these months, it is manifest that the German Government
were intent on seizing Poland as a whole, that Danzig—as Hitler himself
was to say in time, a month later—“was not the subject of the dispute
at all.” The Nazi Government was intent upon aggression and the demands
and negotiations in respect to Danzig were merely a cover and excuse for
further domination.
Would that be a convenient point to stop?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Before the Attorney General continues his opening
statement, the Tribunal wishes me to state what they propose to do as to
time of sitting for the immediate future. We think it will be more
convenient that the Tribunal shall sit from 10:00 o’clock in the morning
until 1:00 o’clock, with a break for 10 minutes in the middle of the
morning; and that the Tribunal shall sit in the afternoon from 2:00
o’clock until 5:00 o’clock with a break for 10 minutes in the middle of
the afternoon; and that there shall be no open sitting of the Tribunal
on Saturday morning, as the Tribunal has a very large number of
applications by the defendants’ counsel for witnesses and documents and
other matters of that sort which it has to consider.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: May it please the Tribunal, when we broke off I
had been saying that the Nazi Government was intent upon aggression, and
all that had been taking place in regard to Danzig—the negotiations,
the demands that were being made—were really no more than a cover, a
pretext and excuse for further domination.
As far back as September 1938 plans for aggressive war against Poland,
England, and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at Munich, was
telling the world that the German people wanted peace, and that having
solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial
problems in Europe, the staffs of his Armed Forces were already
preparing their plans. On the 26th of September 1938 he had stated:
“We have given guarantees to the states in the West. We have
assured all our immediate neighbors of the integrity of their
territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no mere
phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a
breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples.”
And the world was entitled to rely on those assurances. International
co-operation is utterly impossible unless one can assume good faith in
the leaders of the various states and honesty in the public utterances
that they make. But, in fact, within 2 months of that solemn and
apparently considered undertaking, Hitler and his confederates were
preparing for the seizure of Danzig. To recognize those assurances,
those pledges, those diplomatic moves as the empty frauds that they
were, one must go back to inquire what was happening within the inner
councils of the Reich from the time of the Munich Agreement.
Written some time in September 1938 is an extract from a file on the
reconstruction of the German Navy. Under the heading
“Opinion on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England,” this is
stated:
“1. If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to
acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only
sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval
communications and secure access to the ocean.
“2. Both requirements can be fulfilled only in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore,
forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding
preparations for war.
“3. War against England means at the same time war against the
Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a
large number of countries overseas, in fact, against one-third
to one-half of the world.
“It can only be justified and have a chance of success”—and it
was not moral justification which was being looked for in this
document—“It can only be justified and have a chance of success
if it is prepared economically as well as politically and
militarily, and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an
outlet to the ocean.”
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to know at what stage you
propose to put the documents, which you are citing, in evidence.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, Sir, my colleagues, my American and my
British colleagues, were proposing to follow up my own address by
putting these documents in. The first series of documents, which will be
put in by my noted colleague, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, will be the
treaties.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that what you quote will have to be read again.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, I am limiting my quotations as far as I
possibly can. I apprehend that technically you may wish it to be quoted
again, so as to get it on the record when the document is actually put
into evidence. But I think it will appear, when the documents themselves
are produced, that there will be a good deal more in most of them than I
am actually citing now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: This document on naval warfare against England is
something which is both significant and new. Until this date the
documents in our possession disclose preparations for war against
Poland, England, and France, purporting on the face of them at least to
be defensive measures to ward off attacks which might result from the
intervention of those states in the preparatory German aggressions in
Central Europe. Hitherto aggressive war against Poland, England, and
France has been contemplated only as a distant objective. Now, in this
document for the first time, we find a war of conquest by Germany
against France and England openly recognized as the future aim, at least
of the German Navy.
On 24 November 1938 an appendix was issued by Keitel to a previous order
of the Führer. In that appendix were set out the future tasks for the
Armed Forces and the preparation for the conduct of the war which would
result from those tasks.
“The Führer has ordered”—I quote—“that besides the three
eventualities mentioned in the previous directive . . .
preparations are also to be made for the surprise occupation by
German troops of the Free State of Danzig.
“For the preparation the following principles are to be borne in
mind.”—This is the common pattern of aggression—“The primary
assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig by exploiting a
favorable political situation, and not war with Poland. Troops
which are going to be used for this purpose must not be held at
the same time for the seizure of Memel, so that both operations
can take place simultaneously, should such necessity arise.”
Thereafter, as the evidence which is already before the Tribunal has
shown, final preparations were taking place for the invasion of Poland.
On the 3rd of April 1939, 3 days before the issue of the Anglo-Polish
communiqué, the Defendant Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed
Forces a directive in which it was stated that the directive for the
uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces in 1939-40, was being
re-issued and that part relating to Danzig would be out in April. The
basic principles were to remain the same as in the previous directive.
Attached to this document were the orders Fall Weiss, the code name for
the proposed invasion of Poland. Preparation for that invasion was to be
made, it was stated, so that the operation could be carried out at any
time from the 1st of September 1939 onwards.
On the 11th of April Hitler issued his directive for the uniform
preparation of the war by the Armed Forces, 1939-40, and in it he said:
“I shall lay down in a later directive future tasks of the Armed
Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these
for the conduct of war. Until that directive comes into force
the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following
eventualities:
“1. Safeguarding of the frontiers . . .
“2. Fall Weiss,
“3. The annexation of Danzig.”
Then, in an annex to that document which bore the heading “Political
Hypotheses and Aims,” it was stated that quarrels with Poland should be
avoided. But should Poland change her policy and adopt a threatening
attitude towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary,
notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The Free City of Danzig was to be
incorporated in the Reich at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest.
The policy aimed at limiting the war to Poland, and this was considered
possible at that time with the internal crises in France and resulting
British restraint.
The wording of that document—and the Tribunal will study the whole of
it—does not directly involve the intention of immediate aggression. It
is a plan of attack “if Poland changes her policy and adopts a
threatening attitude.” But the picture of Poland, with her wholly
inadequate armaments, threatening Germany, now armed to the teeth, is
ludicrous enough, and the real aim of the document emerges in the
sentence—and I quote: “The aim is then to destroy Polish military
strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satisfies the
requirements of defense”—a sufficiently vague phrase to cover designs
of any magnitude. But even at that stage, the evidence does not suffice
to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland on any given date had
yet been taken. All the preparations were being set in train. All the
necessary action was being proceeded with, in case that decision should
be reached.
It was within 3 weeks of the issue of that last document that Hitler
addressed the Reichstag on the 28th of April 1939. In that speech he
repeated the demands which had already been made upon Poland, and
proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agreement of 1934. Leaving
aside, for the moment, the warlike preparations for aggression, which
Hitler had set in motion behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to
consider the nature of this denunciation of an agreement to which, in
the past, Hitler had attached such importance.
In the first place, of course, Hitler’s denunciation was _per se_
ineffectual. The text of the agreement made no provision for its
denunciation by either party until a period of 10 years had come to an
end. No denunciation could be legally effective until June or July of
1943, and here was Hitler speaking in April of 1939, rather more than 5
years too soon.
In the second place, Hitler’s actual attack upon Poland, when it came on
1 September was made before the expiration of the 6 months’ period after
denunciation required by the agreement before any denunciation could be
operative. And in the third place, the grounds for the denunciation
stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag were entirely specious.
However one reads its terms, it is impossible to take the view that the
Anglo-Polish guarantee of mutual assistance against aggression could
render the German-Polish Pact null and void, as Hitler sought to
suggest. If that had been the effect of the Anglo-Polish assurances,
then certainly the pacts which had already been entered into by Hitler
himself with Italy and with Japan had already invalidated the treaty
with Poland. Hitler might have spared his breath. The truth is, of
course, that the text of the English-Polish communiqué, the text of the
assurances, contains nothing whatever to support the contention that the
German-Polish Pact was in any way interfered with.
One asks: Why then did Hitler make this trebly invalid attempt to
denounce his own pet diplomatic child? Is there any other possible
answer but this:
That the agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which he chose
for its denunciation were chosen merely in an effort to provide Germany
with some kind of justification—at least for the German people—for the
aggression on which the German leaders were intent.
And, of course, Hitler sorely needed some kind of justification, some
apparently decent excuse, since nothing had happened, and nothing seemed
likely to happen, from the Polish side, to provide him with any kind of
pretext for invading Poland. So far he had made demands upon his treaty
partner which Poland, as a sovereign state, had every right to refuse.
If dissatisfied with that refusal, Hitler was bound, under the terms of
the agreement itself, “To seek a settlement”—I am reading the words of
the pact:
“To seek a settlement through other peaceful means, without
prejudice to the possibility of applying those methods of
procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such a
case in the other agreements between them that are in force.”
And that presumably was a reference to the German-Polish Arbitration
Treaty, signed at Locarno in 1925.
The very facts, therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leaders cannot get
what they want but are not entitled to from Poland by merely asking for
it and that, on their side, they made no further attempt to settle the
dispute “by peaceful means”—in accordance with the terms of the
agreement and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the agreement pledged both
parties—in themselves constitute a strong presumption of aggressive
intentions against Hitler and his associates. That presumption becomes a
certainty when the documents to which I am about to call the attention
of the Tribunal are studied.
On the 10th of May Hitler issued an order for the capture of economic
installations in Poland. On the 16th of May the Defendant Raeder, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum setting out the
Führer’s instructions to prepare for the operation Fall Weiss at any
time from the 1st of September.
But the decisive document is the record of the conference held by Hitler
on the 23rd of May 1939, in conference with many high-ranking officers,
including the Defendants Göring, Raeder, and Keitel. The details of the
whole document will have to be read to the Tribunal later and I am
merely summarizing the substantial effect of this part of it now. Hitler
stated that the solution of the economic problems with which Germany was
beset at first, could not be found without invasion of foreign states
and attacks on foreign property. “Danzig”—and I am quoting:
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a
question of expanding our living space in the East. There is,
therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with
the decision to attack Poland at the earliest opportunity. We
cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be
fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this
isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter
of skillful politics.”
So he explained to his confederates. He anticipated the possibility that
war with England and France might result, but a two-front war was to be
avoided if possible. Yet England was recognized—and I say it with
pride—as the most dangerous enemy which Germany had. “England,” he
said, I quote, “England is the driving force against Germany . . . the
aim will always be to force England to her knees.” More than once he
repeated that the war with England and France would be a life and death
struggle. “But all the same,” he concluded, “Germany will not be forced
into war but she would not be able to avoid it.”
On the 14th of June 1939 General Blaskowitz, then Commander-in-Chief of
the 3rd Army group, issued a detailed battle plan for the Fall Weiss.
The following day Von Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in which it was
stated that the object of the impending operation was to destroy the
Polish Armed Forces. “High policy demands,” he said, “High policy
demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to
achieve quick results.” The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22d of
June the Defendant Keitel submitted a preliminary timetable for the
operation, which Hitler seems to have approved, and suggested that the
scheduled maneuver must be camouflaged, “in order not to disquiet the
population.” On the 3rd of July, Brauchitsch wrote to the Defendant
Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval moves should be abandoned,
in order not to prejudice the surprise of the attack. On the 12th and
13th of August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a conference with Ciano, the
Italian Foreign Minister.
It was a conference to which the Tribunal will have to have regard from
several points of view. I summarize now only one aspect of the matter:
At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the strength of
the German position, of Germany’s Western and Eastern Fortifications,
and of the strategic and other advantages they held in comparison with
those of England, France, and Poland. Now I quote from the captured
document itself. Hitler said this:
“Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear
that, in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would stand
on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick
liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for
the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a
hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only
would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also
further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This
would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.”
Then this:
“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to
liquidate the false neutrals one after the other. This process
could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one
partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with
an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a
neutral of that kind.”
Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready. She
believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a general
European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with the Western
Democracies was inevitable, but he was making plans for a period 2 or 3
years ahead. But the Führer said that the Danzig question must be
disposed of, one way or the other, by the end of August. I quote: “He
had, therefore, decided to use the occasion of the next political
provocation which has the form of an ultimatum . . . .”
On the 22d of August Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together and
gave the order for the attack. In the course of what he said he made it
clear that the decision to attack had, in fact, been made not later than
the previous spring. He would give a spurious cause for starting the
war. And at that time the attack was timed to take place in the early
hours of the 26th of August. On the day before, on the 25th of August,
the British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be reluctant
to plunge the world into war, and in the belief that a formal treaty
would impress him more than the informal assurances which had been given
previously, entered into an agreement, an express agreement for mutual
assistance with Poland, embodying the previous assurances that had been
given earlier in the year. It was known to Hitler that France was bound
by the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921, and by the Guarantee Pact signed at
Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland’s favor in case of aggression.
And for a moment Hitler hesitated. The Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop,
in the interrogations which you will see, have agreed that it was the
Anglo-Polish Treaty which led him to call off, or rather postpone, the
attack which was timed for the 26th. Perhaps he hoped that after all
there was still some chance of repeating what he had called the Czech
affair. If so, his hopes were short-lived. On the 27th of August Hitler
accepted Mussolini’s decision not at once to come into the war; but he
asked for propaganda support and for a display of military activity on
the part of Italy, so as to create uncertainty in the minds of the
Allies. Ribbentrop on the same day said that the armies were marching.
In the meantime, and, of course, particularly during the last month,
desperate attempts were being made by the Western Powers to avert war.
You will have details of them in evidence, of the intervention of the
Pope, of President Roosevelt’s message, of the offer by the British
Prime Minister to do our utmost to create the conditions in which all
matters in issue could be the subject of free negotiations, and to
guarantee the resultant decisions. But this and all the other efforts of
honest men to avoid the horror of a European conflict were predestined
to failure. The Germans were determined that the day for war had come.
On the 31st of August Hitler issued a top-secret order for the attack to
commence in the early hours of the 1st of September.
The necessary frontier incidents duly occurred. Was it, perhaps, for
that, that the Defendant Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to supply
Heydrich with Polish uniforms? And so without a declaration of war,
without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of seeing
Germany’s final demands—and you will hear the evidence of the
extraordinary diplomatic negotiations, if one can call them such, that
took place in Berlin—without giving the Poles any opportunity at all of
negotiating or arbitrating on the demands which Nazi Germany was making,
the Nazi troops invaded Poland.
On the 3rd of September Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini thanking him
for his intervention but pointing out that the war was inevitable and
that the most promising moment had to be picked after cold deliberation.
And so Hitler and his confederates now before this Tribunal began the
first of their wars of aggression for which they had prepared so long
and so thoroughly. They waged it so fiercely that within a few weeks
Poland was overrun.
On the 23rd of November 1939 Hitler reviewed the situation to his
military commanders and in the course of what he said he made this
observation:
“One year later Austria came; this step was also considered
doubtful. It brought about an essential reinforcement of the
Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step
also was not possible to accomplish in one move. First of all
the Western Fortifications had to be finished . . . . Then
followed the creation of the Protectorate, and with that the
basis for action against Poland was laid. But I was not quite
clear at the time whether I should start first against the East
and then in the West, or vice versa . . . . The compulsion to
fight with Poland came first. One might accuse me of wanting to
fight again and again. In struggle, I see the fate of all
beings.”
He was not sure where to attack first. But that sooner or later he would
attack, whether it were in the East or in the West, was never in doubt.
And he had been warned, not only by the British and French Prime
Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini, that an attack on
Poland would bring England and France into the war. He chose what he
thought was the opportune moment, and he struck.
Under these circumstances the intent to wage war against England and
France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not to be
denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obligations. Here
was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked
and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the horrified and heroic
resistance of all civilized peoples, but which, before it was finished,
was to tear down much of the structure of our civilization.
Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to secure the
domination of Europe, if not of the world, the Nazi Government proceeded
to attack other countries, as occasion offered. The first actually to be
attacked, actually to be invaded, after the attack upon Poland, were
Denmark and Norway.
On the 9th of April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Norway and
Denmark without any warning, without any declaration of war. It was a
breach of the Hague Convention of 1907. It was a breach of the
Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and
Denmark on 2 June 1926. It was, of course, a breach of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. It was a violation of the Non-Aggression
Treaty between Germany and Denmark made on the 31st of May 1939. And it
was a breach of the most explicit assurances which had been given. After
his annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world,
Hitler attempted to reassure the Scandinavian states. On the 28th of
April 1939 he affirmed that he had never made any request to any of them
which was incompatible with their sovereignty and independence. On the
31st of May 1939 he signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark.
On the 2d of September 1939, the day after he had invaded Poland and
occupied Danzig, he again expressed his determination, so he said, to
observe the inviolability and integrity of Norway in an _aide-mémoire_,
which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German
Minister in Oslo on that day.
A month later, in a public speech on the 6th of October 1939, he said:
“Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
of controversy with the northern states, neither has she any
today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression
pacts by Germany, and have both refused them, solely because
they do not feel themselves threatened in any way.”
When the invasion of Denmark and Norway was already begun in the early
morning of 9 April 1940, a German memorandum was handed to the
governments of those countries attempting to justify the German action.
Various allegations against the governments of the invaded countries
were made. It was said that Norway had been guilty of breaches of
neutrality. It was said that she had allowed and tolerated the use of
her territorial waters by Great Britain. It was said that Britain and
France were themselves making plans to invade and occupy Norway and that
the Government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such an event.
I do not propose to argue the question whether or not these allegations
were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the issues before
this Court. Even if the allegations were true—and they were patently
false—they would afford no conceivable justification for the action of
invading without warning, without declaration of war, without any
attempt at mediation or conciliation.
Aggressive war is none the less aggressive war because the state which
wages it believes that other states might, in the future, take similar
action. The rape of a nation is not justified because it is thought she
may be raped by another. Nor even in self-defense are warlike measures
justified except after all means of mediation have been tried and failed
and force is actually being exercised against the state concerned.
But the matter is irrelevant because, in actual fact, with the evidence
which we now possess, it is abundantly clear that the invasion of these
two countries was undertaken for quite different purposes. It had been
planned long before any question of breach of neutrality or occupation
of Norway by England could ever have occurred. And it is equally clear
that the assurances repeated again and again throughout 1939 were made
for no other purpose than to lull suspicion in these countries, and to
prevent them taking steps to resist the attack against them which was
all along in active preparation.
For some years the Defendant Rosenberg, in his capacity as Chief of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau—APA—of the NSDAP, had interested himself in the
promotion of Fifth Column activities in Norway and he had established
close relationship with the Nasjonal Samling, a political group headed
by the now notorious traitor, Vidkun Quisling. During the winter of
1938-39, APA was in contact with Quisling, and later Quisling conferred
with Hitler and with the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. In August 1939
a special 14-day course was held at the school of the Office of Foreign
Relations in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to
attend. The plan was to send a number of selected and “reliable” men to
Germany for a brief military training in an isolated camp. These
“reliable men” were to be the area and language specialists to German
special troops who were taken to Oslo on coal barges to undertake
political action in Norway. The object was a _coup_ in which Quisling
would seize his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and
prevent all military resistance from the beginning. Simultaneously with
those Fifth Column activities Germany was making her military
preparations. On the 2d of September 1939, as I said, Hitler had assured
Norway of his intention to respect her neutrality. On 6 October he said
that the Scandinavian states were not menaced in any way. Yet on the 3rd
October the Defendant Raeder was pointing out that the occupation of
bases, if necessary by force, would greatly improve the German strategic
position. On the 9th of October Dönitz was recommending Trondheim as the
main base, with Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. The
Defendant Rosenberg was reporting shortly afterwards on the possibility
of a _coup d’état_ by Quisling, immediately supported by German military
and naval forces. On the 12th of December 1939 the Defendant Raeder
advised Hitler, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, that
if Hitler was favorably impressed by Quisling, the OKW should prepare
for the occupation of Norway, if possible with Quisling’s assistance,
but if necessary, entirely by force. Hitler agreed, but there was a
doubt whether action should be taken against the Low Countries or
against Scandinavia first. Weather conditions delayed the march on the
Low Countries. In January 1940 instructions were given to the German
Navy for the attack on Norway. On the 1st of March a directive for the
occupation was issued by Hitler. The general object was not said to be
to prevent occupation by English forces but, in vague and general terms,
to prevent British encroachment in Scandinavia and the Baltic and “to
guarantee our ore bases in Sweden and to give our Navy and Air Force a
wider start line against Britain.” But the directive went on (and here
is the common pattern):
“. . . on principle we will do our utmost to make the operation
appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the
military protection of the Scandinavian states . . . . It is
important that the Scandinavian states as well as the western
opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures . . . . In
case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept
secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious objectives.”
The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the early hours
of the 9th of April, seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and a number of
torpedo boats and other small craft carried advance elements of six
divisions, totalling about 10,000 men, forced an entry and landed troops
in the outer Oslo Fjord, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and
Narvik. A small force of troops was also landed at Arendal and Egersund
on the southern coast. In addition, airborne troops were landed near
Oslo and Stavanger in airplanes. The German attack came as a complete
surprise. All the invaded towns along the coast were captured according
to plan and with only slight losses. Only the plan to capture the King
and Parliament failed. But brave as was the resistance, which was
hurriedly organized throughout the country—nothing could be done in the
face of the long-planned surprise attack—and on the 10th of June
military resistance ceased. So another act of aggression was brought to
completion.
Almost exactly a month after the attack, on Norway, on the 10th of May
1940, the German Armed Forces, repeating what had been done 25 years
before, streamed into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg according
to plan—a plan that is, of invading without warning and without any
declaration of war.
What was done was, of course, a breach of the Hague Convention, and is
so charged. It was a violation of the Locarno Agreement of 1925, which
the Nazi Government affirmed in 1935, only illegally to repudiate it a
couple of years later. By that agreement all questions incapable of
settlement by ordinary diplomatic means were to be referred to
arbitration. You will see the comprehensive terms of all those treaties.
It was a breach of the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation signed
between Germany and the Netherlands on the 20th of May 1926. It was a
breach of a similar treaty with Luxembourg of 11 September 1929. It was
a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But those treaties, perhaps, had
not derived in the minds of the Nazi rulers of Germany any added
sanctity from the fact that they had been solemnly concluded by the
governments of pre-Nazi Germany. Let us then consider the specific
assurances and undertakings which the Nazi rulers themselves gave to
these states which lay in the way of their plans against France and
England and which they had always intended to attack. Not once, not
twice, but 11 times the clearest possible assurances were given to
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On those assurances, solemnly
given and formally expressed, these countries were entitled to rely and
did rely. In respect of the breach of those assurances these defendants
are charged. On the 30th of January 1937, for instance, Hitler had said:
“As for the rest, I have more than once expressed the desire and
the hope of entering into similar good and cordial relations
with our neighbors. Germany has, and here I repeat this
solemnly, given the assurance time and time again that, for
instance, between her and France there cannot be any humanly
conceivable points of controversy. The German Government has
further given the assurance to Belgium and Holland that it is
prepared to recognize and to guarantee the inviolability and
neutrality of these territories.”
After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had repudiated the
Locarno Pact, England and France sought to re-establish the position of
security for Belgium which Hitler’s action had threatened. And they,
therefore, gave to Belgium on the 24th of April 1937 a specific
guarantee that they would maintain, in respect of Belgium, the
undertakings of assistance which they had entered into with her both
under the Locarno Pact and under the Covenant of the League. On the 13th
of October 1937 the German Government also made a declaration assuring
Belgium of its intention to recognize the integrity of that country.
It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances as we
review the evidence which is available as to the preparations and
intentions of the German Government prior to their actual invasion of
Belgium on the 10th of May 1940.
As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and Denmark, so also
here the dates speak for themselves.
As early as August of 1938 steps were being taken to utilize the Low
Countries as bases for decisive action in the West in the event of
France and England opposing Germany in the aggressive plan which was on
foot at that time against Czechoslovakia.
In an Air Force letter dated the 25th of August 1938 which deals with
the action to be taken if England and France should interfere in the
operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated:
“It is not expected for the moment that other states will
intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the Belgian area
assumes in this connection much more importance for the conduct
of war in Western Europe than during the World War, mainly as
advance base for the air war.”
In the last paragraph of that order it is stated:
“Belgium and the Netherlands, when in German hands, represent an
extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France . . .”
That was in August 1938. Eight months later, on the 28th of April 1939,
Hitler is declaring again:
“I was pleased that a number of European states availed
themselves of this declaration by the German Government to
express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality.”
A month later, on the 23rd of May 1939, Hitler held that conference in
the Reich Chancellery, to which I already referred. The minutes of that
meeting report Hitler as saying:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be considered of any
value. If England and France want a general conflict on the
occasion of the war between Germany and Poland they will support
Holland and Belgium in their neutrality . . . . Therefore, if
England intends to intervene at the occasion of the Polish war,
we must attack Holland with lightning speed. It is desirable to
secure a defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.”
Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he would
observe the neutrality of these countries. On the 26th of August 1939,
when the crisis in regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its climax,
on the very day he had picked for the invasion of Poland, declarations
assuring the governments concerned of the intention to respect their
neutrality were handed by the German Ambassadors to the King of the
Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and to the Government of the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army
Hitler was saying:
“If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, a
successful war against England will be secured.”
On the 1st of September Poland was invaded, and 2 days later England and
France came into the war against Germany, in pursuance of the treaty
obligations already referred to. On the 6th of October Hitler renewed
his assurances of friendship to Belgium and Holland, but on the 9th of
October, before any kind of accusation had been made by the German
Government of breaches of neutrality, Hitler issued a directive for the
conduct of the war. And he said this:
“1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England and
France, acting under her leadership, are not disposed to end the
war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action without
letting much time elapse.
“2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending of
Belgian and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality to the advantage of
the Western Powers, but also strengthens the military power of
our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the
neutrals in final German victory to wane, and does not help to
bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms.
“3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further
conduct of military operations:
“(a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried
out as soon and as forcefully as possible.
“(b) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong
sections of the French fighting army as possible, and her ally
and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as
great an area of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as
possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging
aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample
coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.”
Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object behind
the invasion of these three countries than that document expresses it.
On the 15th of October 1939 the Defendant Keitel wrote a most-secret
letter concerning “Fall Gelb” which was the name given to the operation
against the Low Countries. In it he said that:
“The protection of the Ruhr area by moving aircraft reporting
service and the air defense as far forward as possible in the
area of Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the war.
The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective can the
defense of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view must
determine the choice of objectives of the Army, even if the Army
and Navy are not directly interested in such territorial gain.
It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to
occupy, on receipt of a special order, the territory of Holland,
in the first instance in the area of the Grebbe-Maas line. It
will depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch,
as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether
objectives can and must be further extended.”
The Fall Gelb operation had apparently been planned to take place at the
beginning of November 1939. We have in our possession a series of 17
letters, dated from 7th November until the 9th May postponing almost
from day to day the D-Day of the operation, so that by the beginning of
November all the major plans and preparations had in fact been made.
On the 10th of January 1940 a German airplane force-landed in Belgium.
In it was found the remains of an operation order which the pilot had
attempted to burn; setting out considerable details of the Belgian
landing grounds that were to be captured by the Air Force. Many other
documents have been found which illustrate the planning and preparation
for this invasion in the latter half of 1939 and early 1940, but they
carry the matter no further, and they show no more clearly than the
evidence to which I have already referred, the plans and intention of
the German Government and its Armed Forces.
On the 10th of May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning, the German
invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began.
And so once more the forces of aggression moved on. Treaties,
assurances, the rights of sovereign states meant nothing. Brutal force,
covered by as great an element of surprise as the Nazis could secure,
was to seize that which was deemed necessary for striking the mortal
blow against England, the main enemy. The only fault of these three
unhappy countries was that they stood in the path of the German invader,
in his designs against England and France. That was enough, and they
were invaded.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: On the 6th of April 1941 German Armed Forces
invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. Again the blow was struck without warning
and with the cowardice and deceit which the world now fully expected
from the self-styled “Herrenvolk”. It was a breach of the Hague
Convention. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. It was a breach of a
specific assurance given by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939.
He had then said this:
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss, I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country will
also be an unalterable one and that we desire only to live in
peace and friendship with her.”
But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course, been in
hand well before that. In the aggressive action eastward towards the
Ukraine and the Soviet territories, security of the southern flank and
the lines of communication had already been considered by the Germans.
The history of the events leading up to the invasion of Yugoslavia by
Germany is well known. At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 28th of
October 1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been presented by the Italian
Government to the Greek Government, and the presentation of that
ultimatum was immediately followed by the aerial bombardment of Greek
provincial towns and the advance of Italian troops into Greek territory.
The Greeks were not prepared. They were at first forced to withdraw. But
later the Italian advance was at first checked, then driven towards the
Albanian frontier, and by the end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered
severe reverses at Greek hands.
Of the German position in the matter there is, of course, the evidence
of what occurred when, on the 12th of August 1939, Hitler had this
meeting with Ciano.
You will remember that Hitler said then:
“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to
liquidate false neutrals one after the other. This process could
be carried out more easily if, on every occasion, one partner of
the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with an
uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a
neutral of this kind.”
Then the conference went on and it met again on the 13th of August, and
in the course of lengthy discussions, Hitler said this:
“In general, however, on success by one of the Axis partners,
not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the
other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy
carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia,
Spain, and Albania, and each time against the wishes of the
democratic entente. These individual actions have not only
strengthened Italian local interests, but have also . . .
reinforced her general position. The same was the case with
German action in Austria and Czechoslovakia . . . . The
strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of
the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the
Western Powers.”
And so once again we see the same procedure being followed. That meeting
had taken place on the 12th and the 13th of August of 1939. Less than 2
months later, Hitler was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that Germany
only desired to live in peace and friendship with her, with the state,
the liquidation of which by his Axis partner, he had himself so recently
suggested.
Then came the Italian ultimatum to Greece and war against Greece and the
Italian reverse.
We have found, amongst the captured documents, an undated letter from
Hitler to Mussolini which must have been written about the time of the
Italian aggression against Greece:
“Permit me”—Hitler said—“at the beginning of this letter to
assure you that within the last 14 days my heart and my thoughts
have been more than ever with you. Moreover, Duce, be assured of
my determination to do everything on your behalf which might
ease the present situation for you. When I asked you to receive
me in Florence, I undertook the trip in the hope of being able
to express my views prior to the beginning of the threatening
conflict with Greece, about which I had received only general
information. First, I wanted to request you to postpone the
action, if at all possible, until a more favorable time of the
year, at all events until after the American presidential
election. But in any case, however, I wanted to request you,
Duce, not to undertake this action without a previous
lightning-like occupation of Crete and, for this purpose, I also
wanted to submit to you some practical suggestions in regard to
the employment of a German parachute division and a further
airborne division . . . Yugoslavia must become disinterested, if
possible, however, from our point of view, interested in
co-operating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without
assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful
operation in the Balkans . . . Unfortunately, I must stress the
fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is
impossible. Hence it would also serve to make any threatening
influence upon Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian
General Staff is well aware of the fact that no practical action
could follow such a threat before March. Hence, Yugoslavia must,
if at all possible, be won over by other means and in other
ways.”
On the 12th of November 1939, in his top-secret order, Hitler ordered
the OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and Bulgaria, if
necessary. Apparently 10 divisions were to be used in order to prevent
Turkish intervention. I think I said 1939; it should, of course, have
been the 12th of November 1940. And to shorten the time, the German
divisions in Romania were to be increased.
On the 13th of December Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL, OKH, OKM,
and the General Staff on the operation Marita, as the invasion of Greece
was to be called. In that order it was stated that the invasion of
Greece was planned and was to commence as soon as the weather was
advantageous. A further order was issued on the 11th of January of 1941.
On the 28th of January of 1941 Hitler saw Mussolini. The Defendants
Jodl, Keitel, and Ribbentrop were present at the meeting. We know about
it from Jodl’s notes of what took place. We know that Hitler stated that
one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Romania was for
use in the plan Marita against Greece.
On the 1st of March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and moved
towards the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an attack on
Greece by German as well as Italian forces, British troops were landed
in Greece on the 3rd of March, in accordance with the declaration which
had been given by the British Government on the 13th of April 1939; that
Britain would feel bound to give Greece and Romania, respectively, all
the support in her power in the event of either country becoming the
victim of aggression and resisting such aggression. Already, of course,
the Italian operations had made that pledge operative.
On the 25th of March of 1941, Yugoslavia, partly won over by the “other
means and in other ways” to which Hitler had referred, joined the Three
Power Pact which had already been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan.
The preamble of the pact stated that the three powers would stand side
by side and work together.
On the same day the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav
Prime Minister assuring him of Germany’s full intention to respect the
sovereignty and independence of his country. That declaration was just
another example of the treachery employed by German diplomacy. We have
already seen the preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler’s
attempts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia. We
have seen, in January, his own orders for preparations to invade
Yugoslavia and then Greece. And now, on the 25th of March, he is signing
a pact with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing assurances
of respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity.
As a result of the signing of that pact, the anti-Nazi element in
Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a _coup d’état_ and established a
new government. And thereupon, no longer prepared to respect the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of her ally, Germany immediately
took the decision to invade. On the 27th of March, 2 days after the
Three Power Pact had been signed, Hitler issued instructions that
Yugoslavia was to be invaded and used as a base for the continuance of
the combined German and Italian operation against Greece.
Following that, further deployment and instructions for the action
Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on the 30th of March 1941.
It was said—and I quote:
“The orders issued with regard to the operation against Greece
remain valid so far as not affected by this order . . . . On the
5th April, weather permitting, the Air Forces are to attack
troops in Yugoslavia, while simultaneously the attack of the
12th Army begins against both Yugoslavia and Greece.”
And as we now know, the invasion actually commenced in the early hours
of the 6th of April.
Treaties, pacts, assurances, obligations of any kind, are brushed aside
and ignored wherever the aggressive interests of Germany are concerned.
I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe—my American
colleagues will deal with the position in relation to Japan—I turn now
to the last act of aggression in Europe with which these Nazi
conspirators are charged, the attack upon Russia.
In August of 1939 Germany, although undoubtedly intending to attack
Russia at some convenient opportunity, concluded a treaty of
non-aggression with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When
Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and France collapsed in June
of 1940, England—although with the inestimably valuable moral and
economic support of the United States of America—was left alone in the
field as the sole representative of democracy in the face of the forces
of aggression. At that moment only the British Empire stood between
Germany and the achievement of her aim to dominate the Western World.
Only the British Empire—and England as its citadel. But it was enough.
The first, and possibly the decisive, military defeat which the enemy
sustained was in the campaign against England; and that defeat had a
profound influence on the future course of the war.
On the 16th of July of 1940 Hitler issued to the Defendants Keitel and
Jodl a directive—which they found themselves unable to obey—for the
invasion of England. It started off—and Englishmen will forever be
proud of it—by saying that:
“Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation, shows
no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to
prepare a landing operation against England and if necessary to
carry it out. The aim is . . . to eliminate the English homeland
as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany . . . .
Preparations for the entire operation must be completed by
mid-August.”
But the first essential condition for that plan was, I quote:
“. . . the British Air Force must morally and actually be so far
overcome that it does not any longer show any considerable
aggressive force against the German attack.”
The Defendant Göring and his Air Force, no doubt, made the most
strenuous efforts to realize that condition, but, in one of the most
splendid pages of our history, it was decisively defeated. And although
the bombardment of England’s towns and villages was continued throughout
that dark winter of 1940-41, the enemy decided in the end that England
was not to be subjugated by these means, and, accordingly, Germany
turned back to the East, the first major aim unachieved.
On the 22d of June 1941 German Armed Forces invaded Russia, without
warning, without declaration of war. It was, of course, a breach of the
usual series of treaties; they meant no more in this case than they had
meant in the other cases. It was a violation of the Pact of Paris; it
was a flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of Non-Aggression which
Germany and Russia had signed on the 23rd of August a year before.
Hitler himself said, in referring to that agreement, that “agreements
were only to be kept as long as they served a purpose.”
The Defendant Ribbentrop was more explicit. In an interview with the
Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on the 23rd of February 1941, he made it
clear that the object of the agreement had merely been, so far as
Germany was concerned, to avoid a two-front war.
In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop and the rest of them were
planning within the secret councils of Germany, we know what they were
saying to the rest of the world.
On the 19th of July, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:
“In these circumstances”—he said—“I considered it proper to
negotiate as a first priority a sober definition of interest
with Russia. It would be made clear once and for all what
Germany believes she must regard as her sphere of interest to
safeguard her future and, on the other hand, what Russia
considers important for her existence. From this clear
delineation of the sphere of interest there followed the new
regulation of Russian-German relations. Any hope that now, at
the end of the term of the agreement, a new Russo-German tension
could arise is childish. Germany has taken no step which would
lead her outside her sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But
England’s hope to achieve an amelioration of her own position
through the engineering of some new European crisis, is, insofar
as it is concerned with Russo-German relations, an illusion.
“English statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but they
too will learn to understand this in the course of time.”
The whole statement was, of course, a tissue of lies. It was not many
months after it had been made that the arrangements for attacking Russia
were put into hand. And the Defendant Raeder gives us the probable
reason for the decision in a note which he sent to Admiral Assmann:
“The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the Autumn
of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which the
Führer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who
were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on
England (our own losses), surely caused the Führer, as far back
as August and September”—this was August and September of
1940—“to consider whether, even prior to victory in the West,
an Eastern campaign would be feasible, with the object of first
eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent . . . .
The Führer did not openly express this fear, however, until well
into September.”
He may not have spoken to the Navy of his intentions until later in
September, but by the beginning of that month he had undoubtedly told
the Defendant Jodl about them.
Dated the 6th of September 1940, we have a directive of the OKW signed
by the Defendant Jodl, and I quote:
“Directions are given for the occupation forces in the East to
be increased in the following weeks. For security reasons”—and
I quote—“this should not create the impression in Russia that
Germany is preparing for an Eastern offensive.”
Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service pertaining to
the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence Service, and I
quote:
“The respective strength of the German troops in the East is to
be camouflaged by . . . frequent changes in this area . . . .
The impression is to be created that the bulk of the troops is
in the south of the Government General and that the occupation
in the North is relatively small.”
And so we see the beginning of the operations.
On the 12th of November 1940 Hitler issued a directive, signed by the
Defendant Jodl, in which it was stated that the political task to
determine the attitude of Russia had begun, but that without reference
to the result of preparations against the East, which had been ordered
orally.
It is not to be supposed that the U.S.S.R. would have taken part in any
conversations at that time if it had been realized that on the very day
orders were being given for preparations to be made for the invasion of
Russia, and that the order for the operation, which was called “Plan
Barbarossa”, was in active preparation. On the 18th of December the
order was issued, and I quote:
“The German Armed Forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet
Russia in a swift campaign before the end of the war against
Great Britain.”
And later, in the same instruction—and I quote again:
“All orders which shall be issued by the High Commanders in
accordance with this instruction have to be clothed in such
terms that they may be taken as measures of precaution in case
Russia should change her present attitude towards ourselves.”
Germany kept up the pretense of friendliness and, on the 10th of January
1941, well after the Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of Russia had been
decided upon, Germany signed the German-Russian Frontier Treaty. Less
than a month later, on the 3rd of February of 1941, Hitler held a
conference, attended by the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, at which it was
provided that the whole operation against Russia was to be camouflaged
as if it was part of the preparation for the “Plan Seelöwe”, as the plan
for the invasion of England was described.
By March of 1941 plans were sufficiently advanced to include provision
for dividing the Russian territory into nine separate states to be
administered under Reich Commissars, under the general control of the
Defendant Rosenberg; and at the same time detailed plans for the
economic exploitation of the country were made under the supervision of
the Defendant Göring, to whom the responsibility in this matter—and it
is a serious one—had been delegated by Hitler.
You will hear something of the details of these plans. I remind you of
one document which has already been referred to in this connection.
It is significant that on the 2d of May of 1941 a conference of State
Secretaries took place in regard to the Plan Barbarossa, and in the
course of that it was noted:
“1. The war can be continued only if all Armed Forces are fed
out of Russia in the third year of the war.
“2. There is no doubt that, as a result, many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us.”
But that apparently caused no concern. The “Plan Oldenbourg”, as the
scheme for the economic organization and exploitation of Russia was
called, went on. By the 1st of May 1941, the D-Day of the operation had
been fixed. By the 1st of June preparations were virtually complete and
an elaborate timetable was issued. It was estimated that, although there
would be heavy frontier battles, lasting perhaps 4 weeks, after that no
serious opposition was to be expected.
On the 22d of June, at 3:30 in the morning, the German armies marched
again. As Hitler said in his proclamation to them, “I have decided to
give the fate of the German people and of the Reich and of Europe again
into the hands of our soldiers.”
The usual false pretexts were, of course, given. Ribbentrop stated on
the 28th of June that the step was taken because of the threatening of
the German frontiers by the Red Army. It was a lie, and the Defendant
Ribbentrop knew it was a lie.
On the 7th of June 1941 Ribbentrop’s own Ambassador in Moscow was
reporting to him, and I quote, that, “All observations show that Stalin
and Molotov, who are alone responsible for Russian foreign policy, are
doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany.” The staff records
which you will see make it clear that the Russians were making no
military preparations and that they were continuing their deliveries
under the Trade Agreement to the very last day. The truth is, of course,
that the elimination of Russia as a political opponent and the
incorporation of the Soviet territory in the German Lebensraum had been
one of the cardinal features of Nazi policy for a very long time,
subordinated latterly for what the Defendant Jodl called diplomatic
reasons.
And so, on the 22d of June, the Nazi armies were flung against the power
with which Hitler had so recently sworn friendship, and Germany embarked
upon that last act of aggression in Europe, which, after long and bitter
fighting, was eventually to result in Germany’s own collapse.
That, then, is the case against these defendants, as amongst the rulers
of Germany, under Count Two of this Indictment.
It may be said that many of the documents which have been referred to
were in Hitler’s name, and that the orders were Hitler’s orders, and
that these men were mere instruments of Hitler’s will. But they were the
instruments without which Hitler’s will could not be carried out; and
they were more than that. These men were no mere willing tools, although
they would be guilty enough if that had been their role. They are the
men whose support had built Hitler up into the position of power he
occupied; these are the men whose initiative and planning often
conceived and certainly made possible the acts of aggression done in
Hitler’s name; and these are the men who enabled Hitler to build up the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the war economy, the political
philosophy, by which these treacherous attacks were carried out, and by
which he was able to lead his fanatical followers into peaceful
countries to murder, to loot, and to destroy. They are the men whose
cooperation and support made the Nazi Government of Germany possible.
The government of a totalitarian country may be carried on without
representatives of the people, but it cannot be carried on without any
assistance at all. It is no use having a leader unless there are also
people willing and ready to serve their personal greed and ambition by
helping and following him. The dictator who is set up in control of the
destinies of his country does not depend on himself alone either in
acquiring power or in maintaining it. He depends upon the support and
the backing which lesser men, themselves lusting to share in dictatorial
power, anxious to bask in the adulation of their leader, are prepared to
give.
In the criminal courts of our countries, when men are put on their trial
for breaches of the municipal laws, it not infrequently happens that of
a gang indicted together in the dock, one has the master mind, the
leading personality. But it is no excuse for the common thief to say, “I
stole because I was told to steal”, for the murderer to plead, “I killed
because I was asked to kill.” And these men are in no different
position, for all that it was nations they sought to rob, and whole
peoples which they tried to kill. “The warrant of no man excuseth the
doing of an illegal act.” Political loyalty, military obedience are
excellent things, but they neither require nor do they justify the
commission of patently wicked acts. There comes a point where a man must
refuse to answer to his leader if he is also to answer to his
conscience. Even the common soldier, serving in the ranks of his army,
is not called upon to obey illegal orders. But these men were no common
soldiers: They were the men whose skill and cunning, whose labor and
activity made it possible for the German Reich to tear up existing
treaties, to enter into new ones and to flout them, to reduce
international negotiations and diplomacy to a hollow mockery, to destroy
all respect for and effect in international law and, finally, to march
against the peoples of the world to secure that domination in which, as
arrogant members of their self-styled master race, they professed to
believe.
If these crimes were in one sense the crimes of Nazi Germany, they also
are guilty as the individuals who aided, abetted, counselled, procured,
and made possible the commission of what was done.
The total sum of the crime these men have committed—so awful in its
comprehension—has many aspects. Their lust and sadism, their deliberate
slaughter and degradation of so many millions of their fellow creatures
that the imagination reels, are but one side of this matter. Now that an
end has been put to this nightmare, and we come to consider how the
future is to be lived, perhaps their guilt as murderers and robbers is
of less importance and of less effect to future generations of mankind
than their crime of fraud—the fraud by which they placed themselves in
a position to do their murder and their robbery. That is the other
aspect of their guilt. The story of their “diplomacy”, founded upon
cunning, hypocrisy, and bad faith, is a story less gruesome no doubt,
but no less evil and deliberate. And should it be taken as a precedent
of behavior in the conduct of international relations, its consequences
to mankind will no less certainly lead to the end of civilized society.
Without trust and confidence between nations, without the faith that
what is said is meant and that what is undertaken will be observed, all
hope of peace and security is dead. The Governments of the United
Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, of the United States of America,
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of France, backed by and
on behalf of every other peace-loving nation of the world, have
therefore joined to bring the inventors and perpetrators of this Nazi
conception of international relationship before the bar of this
Tribunal. They do so, so that these defendants may be punished for their
crimes. They do so, also, that their conduct may be exposed in all its
naked wickedness and they do so in the hope that the conscience and good
sense of all the world will see the consequences of such conduct and the
end to which inevitably it must always lead. Let us once again restore
sanity and with it also the sanctity of our obligations towards each
other.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Attorney, would it be convenient to the prosecutors
from Great Britain to continue?
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: The proposal was that my friend, Mr. Sidney
Alderman, should continue with the presentation of the case with regard
to the final acts of aggression against Czechoslovakia and that that
being done, my British colleagues would continue with the presentation
of the British case. As the Tribunal will appreciate, Counts One and Two
are in many respects complementary, and my American colleagues and
ourselves are working in closest cooperation in presenting the evidence
affecting those counts.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, would it be convenient for you to go on
until 5 o’clock?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. May it please the Tribunal, it is quite convenient
for me to proceed. I can but feel that it will be quite anticlimactic
after the address which you just heard.
When the Tribunal rose yesterday afternoon, I had just completed an
outline of the plans laid by the Nazi conspirators in the weeks
immediately following the Munich Agreement. These plans called for what
the German officials called “the liquidation of the remainder of
Czechoslovakia.” You will recall that 3 weeks after Munich, on 21
October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was
handed over to the civilian authorities, Hitler and Keitel had issued an
order to the Armed Forces. This document is C-136, Exhibit USA-104.
In this order Hitler and Keitel ordered the beginning of preparations by
the Armed Forces for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
You will also recall that 2 months later, on 17 December, the Defendant
Keitel issued an appendix to the original order directing the
continuation of these preparations. This document is C-138, Exhibit
USA-105, and both these documents have already been introduced.
Proceeding on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning was to
be expected, this order emphasized that the attack on Czechoslovakia was
to be well camouflaged so that it would not appear to be a warlike
action. “To the outside world,” it said, and I quote, “it must appear
obvious that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike
undertaking.”
Thus, in the beginning of 1939 the basic planning for military action
against the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic had already been carried out
by the German High Command.
I turn now to the underhand and criminal methods used by the Nazi
conspirators to ensure that no resistance worth mentioning would, in
fact, be met by the German Army. As in the case of Austria and the
Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on the
Wehrmacht alone to accomplish their calculated objective of liquidating
Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia,
they could no longer use the cry, “Home to the Reich.” One sizable
minority, the Slovaks, still remained within the Czechoslovak state.
I should mention at this point that the Czechoslovak Government had made
every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the
cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with
an autonomous Cabinet and Parliament at Bratislava. Nevertheless,
despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators
found fertile ground for their tactics. The picture which I shall now
draw of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak
official Government Report, Document Number 998-PS, already admitted in
evidence as Exhibit USA-91, and of which the Court has already taken
judicial notice.
Nazi propaganda and research groups had long been interested in
maintaining close connection with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When
Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of
Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence
established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups
within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with the
Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more
profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic People’s Party
of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the
Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka’s party and
agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their
respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the
September agitation when at the proper moment the Foreign Office in
Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to
start their demands for autonomy.
This telegram, our Document Number 2858-PS, Exhibit USA-97, has already
been introduced in evidence and read.
By this time—midsummer 1938—the Nazis were in direct contact with
figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the
higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render
impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the
Slovak parties in the government at Prague.
Hans Karmasin, later to become Volksgruppenführer, had been appointed
Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak
autonomy while actually on the Nazi payroll. On 22 November the Nazis
indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation
in Prague, and I offer in evidence Document 2859-PS as Exhibit USA-107,
captured from the German Foreign Office files. I read this telegram
which was sent from the German Legation at Prague to Pressburg:
“Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin he would
appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being
kept for him at the treasury of the Embassy.”—signed—“Hencke.”
Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. Although it is
out of its chronological place in my discussion, I should like now to
offer in evidence Document 2794-PS, a captured memorandum of the German
Foreign Office which I offer as Exhibit USA-108, dated Berlin, 29
November 1939.
This document, dated 8 months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia,
throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign
Office, and I now read from this memorandum:
“On the question of payments to Karmasin.
“Karmasin receives 30,000 marks monthly from the VDA”—Peoples’
League for Germans Abroad—“until 1 April 1940; from then on
15,000 marks monthly.
“Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial
Germans”—Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle—“has deposited 300,000
marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in
Bratislava”—Pressburg—“on which he could fall back in an
emergency.
“Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister
Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to
determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the
payments still continue.
“Therefore, it appears that Karmasin has been provided with
sufficient money; thus one could wait to determine whether he
would put up new demands himself.
“Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign
Minister.”—signed—“Woermann.”
This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the
subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows
that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their
undercover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds, even
after the declaration of the so-called Independent State of Slovakia.
Sometime in the winter of 1938-39, the Defendant Göring conferred with
Durkansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were
accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Göring of their desire for
what they called independence, with strong political, economic, and
military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be
solved as it had been solved in Germany; that the Communist Party would
be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Göring considered
that the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, but
as the document will show, his motives were scarcely altruistic.
I now offer in evidence Document 2801-PS as Exhibit USA-109, undated
minutes of a conversation between Göring and Durkansky. This document
was captured among the files of the German Foreign Office.
I now read these minutes, which are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic
style. To begin with:
“Durkansky (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration.
Contents: Friendship for the Führer; gratitude, that through the
Führer, autonomy has become possible for the Slovaks: The
Slovaks never want to belong to Hungary. The Slovaks want full
independence with strongest political, economic, and military
ties to Germany. Bratislava to be the capital. The execution of
the plan only possible if the army and police are Slovak.
“An independent Slovakia to be proclaimed at the meeting of the
first Slovak Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority
would favor a separation from Prague. Jews will vote for
Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the March, where
a large Slovak population lives.
“The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany.
The Communist Party to be prohibited.
“The Germans in Slovakia do not want to belong to Hungary but
wish to stay in Slovakia.
“The German influence with the Slovak Government considerable;
the appointment of a German Minister (member of the Cabinet) has
been promised.
“At present negotiations with Hungary are being conducted by the
Slovaks. The Czechs are more yielding towards the Hungarians
than the Slovaks.
“The Field Marshal”—that is Field Marshal Göring—“considers
that the Slovak negotiations towards independence are to be
supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia
is still more at our mercy.
“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German
Air Force for use against the East.”
On 12 February a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of
Tuka, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and
Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia.
They conferred with Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop in the Reich
Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939.
I now offer in evidence Document 2790-PS as Exhibit USA-110, the
captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting:
“After a brief welcome Tuka thanks the Führer for granting this
meeting. He addresses the Führer with ‘My Führer’ and he voices
the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might
well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and
prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states
that the Führer had not only opened the Slovak question but that
he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the
Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the
leadership of the Führer for the maintenance of European
civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had
become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as
an economic point of view.”
Then skipping to the last sentence: “‘I entrust the fate of my people to
your care.’”—addressing that to the Führer!
During the meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in
planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. I refer to
the final sentence of the document, which I have just read, the sentence
spoken by Tuka, “I entrust the fate of my people to your care.”
It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis
had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them
drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal
attention of such men as Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and
subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools
in the hands of the Nazi conspirators.
In addition to Slovaks, the conspirators made use of the few Germans
still remaining within the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic. Kundt,
Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority,
created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible.
Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from
Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and
to make it a center of aggressive Nazism.
With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of
Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried
out, and the Henleinists gave full co-operation to Gestapo agents from
the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi political activity was
designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands
from Germany.
In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and
propaganda levels, the Czech Government was unable to take adequate
measures against these trespassers upon its sovereignty.
I am using as the basis of my remarks the Czechoslovak official
Government report, Document Number 998-PS.
In early March, with the date for the final march into Czechoslovakia
already close at hand, Fifth Column activity moved into its final phase.
In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in
touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork of
the events of 14 and 15 March.
I now offer in evidence Document 2826-PS as Exhibit USA-111. This is an
article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann Frank, published in the
publication _Böhmen and Mähren_, the official periodical of the Reich
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, edition May 1941, Page 179.
This is an article written by one of the Nazi leaders in Czechoslovakia
at the moment of Germany’s greatest military successes. It is a boastful
article and reveals with a frankness rarely found in the Nazi press both
the functions which the FS and the SS served and the pride the Nazi
conspirators took in the activities of these organizations. It is a long
quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going on with this tomorrow, Mr. Alderman?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take the whole day?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, not more than an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that the British prosecutors will go on?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 December 1945 at 1000 hours._]
THIRTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 December 1945
_Morning Session_
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose
yesterday afternoon, I had just offered in evidence Document 2826-PS,
Exhibit USA-111. This was an article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann
Frank, published in _Böhmen und Mähren_ (or _Bohemia and Moravia_), the
official periodical of the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the
issue of March 1941, at Page 79. It is an article which reveals with
considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS had, and shows
the pride which the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these
organizations. I read from that article, under the heading “The SS on
March 15, 1939”:
“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable
without political troops. To these are allotted the special task
of being the advance guard of the political will and the
guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German
folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state.
Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized
its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes”—or, in German,
“Freiwilliger Selbstschutz”, called FS for short.—“This troop
was trained especially in accordance with the principles of the
SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time.
The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of
protecting the homeland actively, if necessary. It stood up well
in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall
crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland,
arms in hand.
“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau the tasks of the FS
were transferred essentially to the German student organizations
as compact troop formations in Prague and Brünn, aside from the
isolated German communities which remained in the Second
Republic. This was also natural because many active students
from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the SS. The student
organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other
Germans, during, the crisis of March 1939 . . . .
“In the early morning hours of 15 March, after the announcement
of the planned entry of German troops, German men had to act in
some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events,
either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in
Brünn, or by corresponding instructions of the police president.
In some Czech offices men had likewise, in the early hours of
the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of
political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in
order to prevent foolish destruction . . . . How significant the
many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the
competent German agencies follows from the fact that many of the
men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were
admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even
through the Reich leader of the SS himself or through SS Group
Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were
thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS
. . . .
“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had
marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had
assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here
placed themselves at once at their further disposition and
became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators.”
I now ask the Court to take judicial notice under Article 21 of the
Charter of three official documents. These are identified by us as
Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer them in evidence,
respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA-112; D-572, Exhibit USA-113; and
2943-PS, which is the _French Official Yellow Book_, at Pages 66 and 67,
as Exhibit USA-114.
The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly
certified to by the British Government, which gave the background of
intrigue in Slovakia—German intrigue in Slovakia. The third document,
2943-PS or Exhibit USA-114, consists of excerpts from the _French Yellow
Book_, principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M. Coulondre, the
French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office between 13 and
18 March 1939. I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely
in the further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take
judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and therefore, it
may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript. In
Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the
Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet
who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Foreign
Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this
act of the Czechoslovak Government as an excuse for intervention. On the
following day, March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the
Slovak capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is USA-112. That is
the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British Government.
“Herr Bürckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals came
at about 10 o’clock in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of
March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava and told
the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence
of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed
hesitation, Herr Bürckel took him on one side and explained that
Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czechoslovakia
definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her
independence, because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest
himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Bürckel for this
information, but said that he must discuss the situation with
the Government at Prague.”
A very strange situation that he should have to discuss such a matter
with his own Government, before obeying instructions of Herr Hitler
delivered by five German generals and Herr Bürckel and Herr
Seyss-Inquart.
Events went on moving rapidly, but Durcansky, one of the dismissed
ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities
of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and
ammunition were brought from German offices in Engerau across the Danube
into Slovakia, where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to
create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an
excuse for military action. The German press and radio launched a
violent campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and,
significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava.
Tiso, the dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an
audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna.
At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what
the Nazi leaders like to call the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were
progressing with what to them must have been very satisfying smoothness.
The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi
conspirators was moving in close co-ordination. All during the process
of the Fall Grün (or Case Green) of the preceding summer, the Nazi
conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in this new attack.
Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by
this invitation.
I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS as Exhibit USA-115. This is a
letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which,
incidentally, had no navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and which
we captured in the German Foreign Office files.
“Your Excellency, my sincere thanks.
“I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this headwater
region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the
life of Hungary.”—I suppose he needed some headwaters for the
non-existent navy of which he was admiral.
“In spite of the fact that our recruits have been serving for
only 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager
enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On
Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take
place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday.”—He
doesn’t like to use big words; “big blow” is sufficient.
“I shall never forget this proof of friendship, and Your
Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.
Your devoted friend, Horthy.”
From this cynical and callous letter from the distinguished Admiral
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian Ambassador at
Berlin?
MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the President
please.
THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look like a
Hungarian name.
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the letter heading. As I understand it, the letter
was addressed to Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was—it ended with the . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indicates that?
MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the Berlin Foreign
Office, and the wording of the letter and the address “Your Excellency.”
We may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was addressed; but it was
found in the Berlin Foreign Office.
From that cynical and callous letter it may be inferred that the Nazi
conspirators had already informed the Hungarian Government of their
plans for further military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned
out the timetable was advanced somewhat. I would draw the inference that
His Excellency, Adolf Hitler, informed his devoted friend Horthy of this
change in good time.
On the diplomatic level the Defendant Ribbentrop was quite active. On 13
March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a
cautionary telegram to the German Minister in Prague outlining the
course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic
pressure. I offer in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit USA-116. This
is the telegram sent by Ribbentrop to the German Legation in Prague on
13 March.
“Berlin, 13 March 1939.
“Prague. Telegram in secret code.
“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.
In case you should get any written communication from President
Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
any other action on them, but pass them on here by cipher
telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the
legation to make a point of not being available if the Czech
Government wants to communicate with you during the next few
days.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.”
On the afternoon of 13 March Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky
and Herr Meissner and the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in
response to the summons from Hitler to which I have heretofore referred.
Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the
Reich Chancellery and presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were
given him: Either declare the independence of Slovakia, or be left
without German assistance to what were referred to as the emergence of
Poland and Hungary. This decision Hitler said was not a question of
days, but of hours. I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as Exhibit
USA-117—again a document captured in the German Foreign Office—German
Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13
March. I read the bottom paragraph on Page 2 and the top paragraph on
Page 3 of the English translation. The first paragraph I shall read is a
summary of Hitler’s remark. You will note that in the inducements he
held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for the
truth. I quote:
“Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to
make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no
interest east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to
him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia
wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for
anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people, or even
a single soldier, to something which was not in any way desired
by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation
as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that
reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving
something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a
liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this
connection unrest was only an outward indication of interior
instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason
permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not
a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time
that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would
support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by
his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished
for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve
the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of
Slovakia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer
responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German
interests, and those did not lie east of the Carpathians.
Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged
to Germany.
“The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister”—the Defendant
Ribbentrop—“if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign
Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in
this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He
showed the Führer a message he had just received which reported
Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Führer
read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope
that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.”
A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in Slovakia;
Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was invited there. And this
is what happened: Those present at that meeting included the Defendant
Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State
Secretary Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the
attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on
this occasion, as on so many other occasions, where purely political
measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and
where apparently there was no need for technical military advice.
While in Berlin the Slovaks also conferred separately with the Defendant
Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials, Ribbentrop very
solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak language, of
the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of the
13th a German plane was conveniently placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry
him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators,
the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. With
Slovak extremeness acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the
Czechoslovak Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move
against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of the
German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the President of the Czechoslovak
Republic, and M. Chvalkowsky, his Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin.
The atmosphere in which they found themselves might be described as
somewhat hostile. Since the preceding weekend, the Nazi press had
accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks, and especially
against the members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich.
Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in
danger. Such a situation was intolerable. It was necessary to smother as
quickly as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in
the heart of Europe.—These peacemakers!
After midnight on the 15th, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and
Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancellery. They found there
Adolf Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Göring, and Keitel and other
high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document 2798-PS as Exhibit
USA-118. This document is the captured German Foreign Office account of
this infamous meeting. It is a long document. Parts of it are so
revealing and give so clear a picture of Nazi behavior and tactics that
I should like to read them in full.
It must be remembered that this account of the fateful conference on the
night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of course it must be
read as an account biased by its source, or as counsel for the
defendants said last week “a tendentious account”. Nevertheless, even
without too much discounting of the report on account of its source, it
constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by pure and simple
international banditry forced the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I
interpolate to suggest that international banditry has been a crime
against international law for centuries.
I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the English
mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an
incorrect translation of the original. It should read 0115 to 0215:
“Conversation between the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the
President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich
Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian
Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15
March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours.”
Others present were General Field Marshal Göring, General Keitel,
Secretary of the State Von Weizsäcker, Minister of the State Meissner,
Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counselor of the Legation Hewel. Hacha
opened the conference. He was conciliatory—even humble, though the
President of a sovereign state. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and
he said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Führer’s
hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask
Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the
President. Hacha was then, I believe, in his seventies. But this
journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his
country because, and I quote, “It was only a matter of hours until
Germany would intervene.” I quote now from the top of Page 3 of the
English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are
rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said:
“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had
kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation to
Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation
now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the
Little Carpathian Mountains. He did not want to draw the final
consequences in the autumn. . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don’t you think you ought to read the last
sentence on Page 2?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the preceding page
was:
“For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means
to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really
stand up for Czechoslovakia.
“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him.”
Then I had read down to:
“But even at that time and also later in his conversations with
Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this
State if Beneš’ tendencies were not completely revised.
Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Führer to have
patience.”—He often bragged of his patience.—“The Führer saw
this point of view, but the months went by without any change.
The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one
psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth-to-mouth
propaganda, dismissals of Germans, and many other things which,
to him, were a symbol of the total perspective.
“At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to
him he drew his consequences because, had the development
continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would
in a few years have become the same as 6 months ago. Why did
Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its Army to a reasonable
size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state,
because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political
mission of the state. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a
foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He
enumerated several examples which proved to him that the spirit
in the Army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the
Army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the
future. Added to this were the inevitable development of
economic necessities, and, further, the protests of national
groups which could no longer endure life as it was.”
I now interpolate, if the Tribunal please, to note the significance of
that language of Adolf Hitler to the President of a supposed sovereign
state and its Prime Minister, having in his presence General Field
Marshal Göring, the Commander of the Air Force, and General Keitel. And
continuing to quote:
“Thus it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday.”—This is
still the language of Hitler.—“I sent for the Hungarian
minister and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this
country. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the
order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to
incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to
give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a
larger extent than she had ever enjoyed during Austrian rule.
Germany’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined
tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and depends on the
attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian
military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the
Government. He believes in the honesty and straightforwardness
of Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the Government will be
able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had
already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance
was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had
given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.
“At 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army would invade
Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force would
occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The
first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would
lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by
all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the
invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that
case, it would be easy for the Führer to give Czechoslovakia in
the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own,
autonomy, and a certain national liberty.
“We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He
would not like to torture and denationalize the Czechs. He also
did not do all that because of hatred, but in order to protect
Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not
have yielded”—I suppose that is a bad translation for “had not
yielded”—“the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody
could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that
the Czech people should live a full national life and he
believed firmly that a way could be found which would make
far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting
should break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in
counter-pressure. One would annihilate another and it would then
not be possible any more for him to give the promised
alleviations. Within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any
more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would
result in a hatred which would force him”—that is,
Hitler—“because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to
grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He
felt pity for the Czech people when he was reading the foreign
press. It would leave the impression on him which could be
summarized in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the
Moor may go.’
“That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in
Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and
wished, in memory to the past, that Czechoslovakia would be
conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which
corresponded with his just-mentioned suggestions.
“That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This
invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the
Czech people. If it should come to a fight, the bloodshed would
also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps
prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a
form of construction which would be so far-reaching for
Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old
Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for
the German people.
“The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He
was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to
each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but
planned with all generosity. He would advise him”—that is,
Adolf Hitler advised poor old Hacha—“now to retire with
Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done.”
In his reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German
minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He
expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to
the Czech Army, in the 4 hours left to him, before the German Army
crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to
disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated that might possibly be
arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final; that it was well
known what a decision of the Führer meant. He turned to the circle of
Nazi conspirators surrounding him, for their support, and you will
remember that the Defendants Göring, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all
present. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said,
was by the intervention of the German Army.
I read now one paragraph from Page 4 of the English version of the
German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is the next to the last
paragraph on Page 4.
“The Führer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was
well known what a decision of the Führer meant. He did not see
any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other
gentlemen”—that is, including Göring, Ribbentrop, and
Keitel—“whether they shared his opinion, which was answered in
the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech Army
was by the German Army.”
At this sad point, Hacha and Chvalkowsky retired from the room.
I now offer in evidence Document 2861-PS, an excerpt from the official
_British War Blue Book_, at Page 24, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-119.
This is an official document of the British Government, of which the
Tribunal will take judicial notice under the provisions of Article 21 of
the Charter. The part from which I read is a dispatch from the British
Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, describing a conversation with the
Defendant Göring, in which the events of this early morning meeting are
set forth.
“Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax, Berlin, May 28, 1939.
“My Lord: I paid a short visit to Field Marshal Göring at
Karinhall yesterday.”
Then I skip two paragraphs and begin reading with Paragraph 4. I am
sorry, I think I better read all of those paragraphs:
“Field Marshal Göring, who had obviously just been talking to
someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the
attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything
German and, particularly, in respect of the gold held there on
behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. Before, however,
I had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his
return did not revert to this specific question. He complained,
instead, of British hostility in general, of our political and
economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he
described as the war party in England. . . .
“I told the Field Marshal that before speaking of British
hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of
feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew
quite well, the basis of all the discussions between Mr.
Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect
that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany
would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere
with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite
assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of
the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his ‘wild men’
and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had
not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed
the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich
Agreement rested.
“At this point, the Field Marshal interrupted me with a
description of President Hacha’s visit to Berlin. I told Field
Marshal Göring that it was not possible to talk of free will
when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard
Prague with his airplanes, if Doctor Hacha refused to sign. The
Field Marshal did not deny the fact but explained how the point
had arisen. According to him, Doctor Hacha had from the first
been prepared to sign everything but had said that
constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to
Prague. After considerable difficulty, telephonic communication
with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed,
while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech
battalion at least would not fire on German troops. It was, he
said, only at that stage that he had warned Doctor Hacha that,
if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The Field
Marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the
story that the advance occupation of Vitkovice had been effected
solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known
to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first
opportunity.”
I also invite the attention of the Tribunal and the judicial notice of
the Tribunal, to Dispatch Number 77, in the _French Official Yellow
Book_, at Page 96 of the book, identified as our Document 2943-PS,
appearing in the Document Book under that number, and I ask that it be
given an identifying number, Exhibit USA-114. This is a dispatch from M.
Coulondre, the French Ambassador, and it gives another well-informed
version of this same midnight meeting. The account, which I shall
present to the Court, of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from
these two sources, the _British Blue Book_ and the _French Yellow Book_.
I think the Court may be interested to read somewhat further at large,
in those two books, which furnish a great deal of the background of all
of these matters.
When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reich Chancellery,
he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention
from a physician who was conveniently on hand for that purpose, a German
physician. When the two Czechs returned to the room, the Nazi
conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the
Wehrmacht. They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You are not reading? I beg your pardon!
MR. ALDERMAN: I am not reading, I am summarizing.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. ALDERMAN: They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning,
the German Army would cross the border. The Defendant Göring boasted of
what the Wehrmacht would do if the Czech forces dared to resist the
invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Defendant Göring said, his
Luftwaffe would blaze half of Prague into ruins in 2 hours and that,
Göring said, would be only the beginning.
Under this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the
aged President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 o’clock in the morning, signed
the document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him and which
they had already had prepared. This Document is TC-49, the declaration
of 15 March 1939, one of the series of documents which will be presented
by the British prosecutor, and from it I quote this, on the assumption
that it will subsequently be introduced.
“The President of the Czechoslovakian State . . . entrusts with
entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech
country to the hands of the Führer of the German Reich”—really
a rendezvous with destiny.
While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the
representatives of the Czech Government, the Wehrmacht had in some areas
already crossed the Czech border.
I offer in evidence Document 2860-PS, another excerpt from the _British
Blue Book_, of which I ask the Court to take judicial notice. This is a
speech by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from
which I quote one passage:
“It is to be observed”—and the fact is surely not without
significance—“that the towns of Mährisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice
were actually occupied by German SS detachments on the evening
of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign Minister
of Czechoslovakia were still on their way to Berlin and before
any discussion had taken place.”
At dawn on March 15, German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all
sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a
proclamation to the German people, which stated distinctly,
“Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.”
On the following day, in contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty of
Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German
Reich under the name of “The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” The
decree is Document TC-51, another of the documents which the British
Delegation will present to the Tribunal later in this week. It was
signed in Prague on 16 March 1939, by Hitler, Lammers, and the
Defendants Frick and Von Ribbentrop.
I should like to quote the first sentence of this decree, “The Bohemian
and Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the
Lebensraum”—living space—“of the German people.” The remainder of the
decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia
henceforth was subjected to Germany. A German Protector was to be
appointed by the German Führer for the so-called “Protectorate”—the
Defendant Von Neurath. God deliver us from such protectors! The German
Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs
and of their excises. It was specified that German garrisons and
military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. At the
same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia who, at German Nazi
insistence, had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that
the independence of their week-old state was itself, in effect,
qualified.
I offer in evidence Document 1439-PS as Exhibit USA—I need not offer
that. I think it is a decree in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, of which I ask
the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and it is identified as our
Document 1439-PS. It appears at Page 606, 1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
Part II.
The covering declaration is signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and then there is a heading:
“Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the
State of Slovakia.”
“The German Government and the Slovakian Government have agreed,
after the Slovakian State has placed itself under the protection
of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences
resulting from this fact. For this purpose, the undersigned
representatives of the two governments have agreed on the
following provisions:
“Article 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political
independence of the State of Slovakia and integrity of its
territory.
“Article 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
undertaken by the German Reich, the German Armed Forces shall
have the right, at all times, to construct military
installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they
deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side, by the
frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a
line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the
White Carpathians, and the Javornik Mountains.”—Then I skip—
“The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in
close agreement with the German Armed Forces.”
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t that be a convenient time to break off? I
understand, too, that it would be for the convenience of the Defense
Counsel if the Tribunal adjourn for an hour and a quarter rather than
for an hour at midday, and accordingly, the Tribunal will retire at
12:45 and sit again at 2:00.
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, this secret protocol between
Germany and Slovakia provided for close economic and financial
collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and
subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German Government.
I offer in evidence Document 2793-PS, Exhibit USA-120, and from it I
read Paragraph 3:
“Investigation, development, and utilization of the Slovak
natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that,
insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own
requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s
disposal. The entire soil research”—“Bodenforschung” is the
German word—“will be placed under the Reich Agency for soil
research.”—that is the Reichsstelle für Bodenforschung—“The
Government of the Slovak State will soon start an investigation
to determine whether the present owners of concessions and
privileges have fulfilled the industrial obligations prescribed
by law and it will cancel concessions and privileges in cases
where these duties have been neglected.”
In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant
evidence that they considered Slovakia a mere puppet state—in effect a
German possession.
I offer in evidence Document R-100 as Exhibit USA-121. This document is
a memorandum of information given by Hitler to Von Brauchitsch on 25
March 1939. Much of it deals with problems arising from recently
occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. I quote, beginning at the
sixth paragraph:
“Colonel General Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via
Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison
armed Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border
formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new
Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.
“Slovakia shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to
us, against payment, any arms we want and which are still kept
in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made
between Army and Czech troops. For this payment those millions
should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.
“Czech Protectorate:
“H. Gr.”—the translator’s note indicates that that probably
means army groups, but I can’t vouch for it—“shall be asked
again whether the request shall be repeated again for the
delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the
threat of severe penalties.
“We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without
paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February,
though, shall be paid for . . . . Bohemia and Moravia have to
make annual contributions to the German Treasury. Their amount
shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly
for the Czech Army.”
The German conquest of Czechoslovakia, in direct contravention of the
Munich Agreement, was the occasion for the formal protest by the British
and French Governments. These documents, Numbers TC-52 and TC-53, dated
17 March 1939, will be presented to the Tribunal by the British
prosecutor.
On the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the
United States Government issued a statement, which I will offer in
evidence and I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the entire
volume, Document 2862-PS as Exhibit USA-122, which is an excerpt from
the official volume entitled _Peace and War: United States Foreign
Policy, 1931-1941_ issued under the seal of the Department of State of
the United States of America. Incidentally, this volume which happens to
be my own copy—and I hope I can get another one—I am placing in
evidence, because I am quite certain that in its study of the background
of this whole case, the Court will be very much interested in this
volume, which is a detailed chronological history of all the diplomatic
events leading up to and through the second World War of 1941. But what
I am actually offering in evidence at the moment appears on Pages 454
and 455 of the volume, a statement by the Acting Secretary of State
Welles, dated 17 March 1939:
“The Government of the United States has on frequent occasions
stated its conviction that only through international support of
a program of order based upon law can world peace be assured.
“This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles
of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making
known this country’s condemnation of the acts which have
resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a
free and independent people with whom, from the day when the
Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people
of the United States have maintained specially close and
friendly relations.
“The position of the Government of the United States has been
made consistently clear. It has emphasized the need for respect
for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, and for
non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other
nations; and it has on repeated occasions expressed its
condemnation of a policy of military aggression.
“It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary
force are threatening the world peace and the very structure of
modern civilization. The imperative need for the observance of
the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly
demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during
the past 3 days.”
With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had
accomplished the program they had set themselves in the meeting in
Berlin on 5 November 1937. You will recall that this program of conquest
was intended to shorten their frontiers, to increase their industrial
and food reserves, and to place them in a position, both industrially
and strategically, from which they could launch more ambitious and more
devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this
program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi
leaders, and at that point I would again invite the Court’s attention to
the large chart on the wall. I think it is no mere figure of speech to
make reference to the wolf’s head, what is known in Anglo-American law
as _caput lupinum_.
The lower jaw formed near Austria was taken—the red part on the first
chart—12 March 1938. Czechoslovakia thereby was encircled, and the next
step was the absorption of the mountainous part, the Sudetenland,
indicated on the second chart in red. On 1 October 1938 Czechoslovakia
was further encircled and its defenses weakened, and then the jaws
clamped in, or the pincers, as I believe General Keitel or General Jodl
called them—I believe it was General Jodl’s diary—and you see what
they did to Czechoslovakia. On 15 March 1939 the borders were shortened,
new bases were acquired, and then Czechoslovakia was destroyed. Bohemia
and Moravia are in black and Slovakia in what might be called light tan.
But I have read to you the documents which showed in what condition
Slovakia was left; and with the German military installations in
Slovakia, you see how completely the southern border of Poland was
flanked, as well as the western border, the stage being set for the next
aggression, which the British prosecutor will describe to you.
Of all the Nazi conspirators the Defendant Göring was the most aware of
the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the
possession by Germany of Czechoslovakia.
I now offer in evidence Document 1301-PS, which is a rather large file,
and we offer particularly Item 10 of the document, at Page 25 of the
English translation. I offer it as Exhibit USA-123; Page 25 of the
English translation contained the top-secret minutes of a conference
with Göring in the Luftwaffe Ministry (the Air Ministry). The meeting
which was held on 14 October 1938, just 2 weeks after the occupation of
the Sudetenland, was devoted to the discussion of economic problems. As
of that date, the Defendant Göring’s remarks were somewhat prophetic. I
quote from the third paragraph, from the bottom of Page 26 of the
English translation:
“The Sudetenland has to be exploited by every means. General
Field Marshal Göring counts upon a complete industrial
assimilation of Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German
dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The
Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore
have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary
Keppler.”
In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia
into the German Reich, Defendant Göring again revealed the great
interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czech economic potential.
I offer in evidence Document R-133 as Exhibit USA-124. This document is
the minutes, dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, signed by Müller, of a
conference between Göring and a group of officials from the OKW and from
other agencies of the German Government concerned with war production.
This meeting had been held 2 days previously, on 25 July. I read the
first part of the account of this meeting.
“In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the
incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had
taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war
potential, by exploitation of the industry there. Directives,
such as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics (S 10
402/39 of 10 July 1939) as well as a letter with similar meaning
to the Junkers firm, which might possibly lower the kind and
extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate are contrary
to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives,
this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he
insists,”—that is Defendant Göring insists—“in agreement with
the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the
Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full
and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible.”
In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for the
following wars of aggression, the conquest of Czechoslovakia provided
the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next war of
aggression, the attack on Poland.
You will recall the minutes of the conference between Göring and a
pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-1939. Those minutes are
Document 2801-PS, which I introduced into evidence earlier, as Exhibit
USA-109. You will recall the last sentence of those minutes, a statement
of Defendant Göring’s conclusions. I quote this sentence again, “Air
bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for
use against the East.”
I now offer in evidence Document 1874-PS, as Exhibit USA-125. This
document is the German minutes of a conference which Defendant Göring
held with Mussolini and Ciano on 15 April 1939, one month after the
conquest of Czechoslovakia.
In this conference, Göring told his junior partners in the Axis of the
progress of German preparations for war. He compared the strength of
Germany with the strength of England and France. Not unnaturally, he
mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in this connection. I
read two paragraphs of these thoughts, on Page 4, Paragraph 2, of the
German minutes.
“However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any
case, how dangerous this could have been, even after Munich, in
the event of a serious conflict. Because of German action, the
situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated—among other
reasons—because of the economic possibilities which resulted
from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity of
Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable
strengthening of the Axis against the Western Powers.
“Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division
for protection against that country in case of bigger conflict.
This, too, is an advantage by which both Axis countries will, in
the last analysis, benefit.”
Then on Page 5, Paragraph 2, of the German version:
“The action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed
as an advantage for the Axis in case Poland should finally join
the enemies of the Axis powers. Germany could then attack this
country from two flanks and would be within only 25 minutes
flying distance from the new Polish industrial center, which had
been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to
the other Polish industrial districts because of its proximity
to the border. Now, by the turn of events, it is located again
in the proximity of the border.”
And that flanking on two fronts is illustrated on the four-segment
chart.
I think the chart itself demonstrates, better than any oral argument,
the logic and cold calculation, the deliberation of each step to this
point of the German aggression. More than that, it demonstrates what I
might call the master fight of the aggressive war case, that is, that
each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately planned, as a
stepping stone to new and more ambitious aggression.
You will recall the words of Hitler, at the conference in the Reich
Chancellery on 23 May 1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign,
Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. I quote from it:
“The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good
use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in
harmony with our aims.”
It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In
his lecture in Munich on 7 November 1943, the Defendant Jodl spoke as
follows, and I quote from Page 5 of Document L-172, already received in
evidence as Exhibit USA-34—on Page 8 of the German text:
“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded
off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now
became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of
more or less favorable strategic premises.”
In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler
described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the
Reich. This is our Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23. I quote one passage
from the second paragraph:
“The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also
was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all,
the Western fortifications had to be finished. It was not
possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me
from the first moment, that I could not be satisfied with the
Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The
decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the
erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
action against Poland was laid. . . .”
Before I leave the subject of the aggression against Czechoslovakia, I
should like to submit to the Court a document which became available to
us too late to be included in our document book. It reached me Saturday,
late in the afternoon or late at night. This is an official document,
again from the Czechoslovakian Government, a supplement to the
Czechoslovakian report, which I had previously offered in evidence. I
now offer it, identified as Document 3061-PS, as Exhibit USA-126.
The document was furnished us, if the Court please, in the German text
with an English translation, which didn’t seem to us quite adequate and
we have had it re-translated into English and the translation has just
been passed up, I believe, to the Tribunal. That mimeographed
translation should be appended to our Document Book O.
I shall not read the report; it is about 12 pages long. The Court will
take judicial notice of it, under the provisions of the Charter. I
merely summarize. This document gives confirmation and corroboration to
the other evidence which I presented to the Tribunal. In particular, it
offers support to the following allegations:
First, the close working relationship between Henlein and the SDP, on
the one hand, and Hitler and Defendants Hess and Ribbentrop, on the
other;
Second, the use of the German Legation in Prague to direct the German
Fifth Column activities;
Third, the financing of the Henlein movement by agencies of the German
Government, including the German diplomatic representatives at Prague;
Fourth, the use of the Henlein movement to conduct espionage on direct
orders from the Reich.
In addition, this document gives further details of the circumstances of
the visit of President Hacha to Berlin on the night of 14 March. It
substantiates the fact that President Hacha required the medical
attention of Hitler’s physician and it supports the threat which the
Defendant Göring made to the Czech Delegation.
Now, if it please the Tribunal, that concludes my presentation of what,
to me, has always seemed one of the saddest chapters in human history,
the rape and destruction of the frail little nation of Czechoslovakia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
May it please the Tribunal, before I tender the evidence which I desire
to place before the Tribunal, it might be convenient if I explained how
the British case is to be divided up and who will present the different
parts.
I shall deal with the general treaties. After that, my learned friend,
Colonel Griffith-Jones, will deal with Poland. Thirdly, Major Elwyn
Jones will deal with Norway and Denmark. Fourthly, Mr. Roberts will deal
with Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. Fifthly, Colonel Phillimore will
deal with Greece and Yugoslavia. After that, my friend, Mr. Alderman, of
the American Delegation, will deal on behalf of both delegations with
the aggression against the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
May I also, with the Tribunal’s permission, say one word about the
arrangements that we have made as to documents. Each of the defendants’
counsel will have a copy of the document book—of the different document
books—in English. In fact, 30 copies of the first four of our document
books have already been placed in the defendants’ Information Center. We
hope that the last document book, dealing with Greece and Yugoslavia,
will have the 30 copies placed there today.
In addition, the defendants’ counsel have at least six copies in German
of every document.
With regard to my own part of the case, the first section on general
treaties, all the documents on this phase are in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_
or _Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, of which 10 copies have been
made available to the defendants’ counsel, so that with regard to the
portion with which the Tribunal is immediately concerned, the
defendants’ counsel will have at least 16 copies in German of every
document referred to.
Finally, there is a copy of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and _Die Dokumente_
available for the Tribunal, other copies if they so desire, but one is
placed ready for the Tribunal if any member wishes to refer to a German
text.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you propose to call any oral witnesses?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, no oral witnesses.
If the Tribunal please, before I come to the first treaty I want to make
three quotations to deal with a point which was mentioned in the speech
of my learned friend, the Attorney General, yesterday.
It might be thought from the melancholy story of broken treaties and
violated assurances, which the Tribunal has already heard, that Hitler
and the Nazi Government did not even profess it necessary or desirable
to keep the pledged word. Outwardly, however, the professions were very
different. With regard to treaties, on the 18th of October 1933, Hitler
said, “Whatever we have signed we will fulfill to the best of our
ability.”
The Tribunal will note the reservation, “Whatever we have signed.”
But on the 21st of May 1935 Hitler said, “The German Government will
scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, even though it
was concluded before their accession to power and office.”
On assurances Hitler was even more emphatic. In the same speech, the
Reichstag Speech on May 21, 1935, Hitler accepted assurances as being of
equal obligation, and the world at that time could not know that that
meant of no obligation at all. What he actually said was:
“And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that
such assurances are nothing and that the only proof of sincerity
is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr.
Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of an
assurance in any case. It is sometimes much easier to sign
treaties with the mental reservations that one will reconsider
one’s attitude at the decisive hour than to declare before an
entire nation and with full opportunity one’s adherence to a
policy which serves the course of peace because it rejects
anything which leads to war.”
And then he proceeds with the illustration of his assurance to France.
Never having seen the importance which Hitler wished the world to
believe he attached to treaties, I shall ask the Tribunal in my part of
the case to look at 15 only of the treaties which he and the Nazis
broke. The remainder of the 69 broken treaties shown on the chart and
occurring between 1933 and 1941 will be dealt with by my learned
friends.
There is one final point as to the position of a treaty in German law,
as I understand it. The appearance of a treaty in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ makes it part of the statute law of Germany, and
that is by no means an uninteresting aspect of the breaches which I
shall put before the Tribunal.
The first treaty to be dealt with is the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, signed at The Hague on the 29th of
July 1899. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the
Convention, and for convenience I hand in as Exhibit GB-1 the British
Document TC-1. The German reference is to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ for
1901, Number 44, Sections 401 to 404, and 482 and 483. The Tribunal will
find the relevant charge in Appendix C as Charge 1.
As the Attorney General said yesterday, these Hague Conventions are only
the first gropings towards the rejection of the inevitability of war.
They do not render the making of aggressive war a crime, but their
milder terms were as readily broken as the more severe agreements.
On 19 July 1899, Germany, Greece, Serbia, and 25 other nations signed a
convention. Germany ratified the convention on 4 September 1900, Serbia
on 11 May 1901, and Greece on 4 April 1901.
By Article 12 of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, signed at the St.
Germaine-en-Laye on 10 September 1919, the new Kingdom succeeded to all
the old Serbian treaties, and later, as the Tribunal knows, changed its
name to Yugoslavia.
I think it is sufficient, unless the Tribunal wish otherwise, for me to
read the first two articles only:
“Article 1: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse
to force in the relations between states, the signatory powers
agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
of international differences.
“Article 2: In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before
an appeal to arms the signatory powers agree to have recourse,
as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation
of one or more friendly powers.”
After that the Convention deals with machinery, and I don’t think,
subject to any wish of the Tribunal, that it is necessary for me to deal
with it in detail.
The second treaty is the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, signed at The Hague on the 18th of October 1907.
Again I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this, and for
convenience I hand in as Exhibit GB-2 the Final Act of the Conference at
The Hague, which contains British Documents TC-2, 3, and 4. The
reference to this Convention in German is to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ for
1910, Number 52, Sections 22 to 25; and the relevant charge is Charge 2.
This Convention, was signed at The Hague by 44 nations, and it is in
effect as to 31 nations, 28 signatories, and 3 adherents. For our
purposes it is in force as to the United States, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Russia.
By the provisions of Article 91 it replaces the 1899 Convention as
between the contracting powers. As Greece and Yugoslavia are parties to
the 1899 Convention and not to the 1907, the 1899 Convention is in
effect with regard to them, and that explains the division of countries
in Appendix C.
Again I only desire that the Tribunal should look at the first two
articles:
“1. With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to
force in the relations between states, the contracting powers
agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
of international differences.”
Then I don’t think I need trouble to read 2. It is the same article as
to mediation, and again, there are a number of machinery provisions.
The third treaty is the Hague Convention relative to the opening of
hostilities, signed at the same time. It is contained in the exhibit
which I put in. Again I ask that judicial notice be taken of it. The
British Document is TC-3. The German reference is the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ for 1910, Number 2, Sections 82 to 102, and the
reference in Appendix C to Charge 3.
This Convention applies to Germany, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia. It relates to a procedural step
in notifying one’s prospective opponent before opening hostilities
against him. It appears to have had its immediate origin in the
Russo-Japanese war, 1904, when Japan attacked Russia without any
previous warning. It will be noted that it does not fix any particular
lapse of time between the giving of notice and the commencement of
hostilities, but it does seek to maintain an absolutely minimum standard
of international decency before the outbreak of war.
Again, if I might refer the Tribunal to the first article:
“The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between them
must not commence without a previous and explicit warning in the
form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an
ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.”
Then there are a number again of machinery provisions, with which I
shall not trouble the Tribunal.
The fourth treaty is the Hague Convention 5, respecting the rights and
duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, signed at
the same time. That is British Document TC-4, and the German reference
is _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1910, Number 2, Sections 168 and 176. Reference
in Appendix C is to Charge 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to give the German reference? If it is
necessary for defendants’ counsel, all right, but if not it need not be
done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I may omit them it will save some time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If any of the defendants’ counsel want any
specific reference perhaps they will be good enough to ask me.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was an original signatory to the
Convention, and the Treaty is in force as a result of ratification or
adherence between Germany and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the U.S.S.R., and the United States.
I call the attention of the Tribunal to the short contents of Article 1,
“The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.”
A point does arise, however, on this Convention. I want to make this
clear at once. Under Article 20, the provisions of the present
Convention do not apply except between the contracting powers, and then
only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.
As Great Britain and France entered the war within 2 days of the
outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and one of these powers
had not ratified the Convention, it is arguable that its provisions did
not apply to the second World War.
I do not want the time of the Tribunal to be occupied by an argument on
that point when there are so many more important treaties to be
considered. Therefore, I do not press that as a charge of a breach of
treaty. I merely call the attention of the Tribunal to the terms of
Article 1 as showing the state of international opinion at that time and
as an element in the aggressive character of the war which we are
considering.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As the Tribunal adjourned I had come to the
fifth treaty, the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles the 28th of June 1919. I again
ask the Tribunal to take judicial cognizance of this treaty, and I again
hand in for convenience Exhibit GB-3, which is a copy of the treaty,
including the British documents TC-5 to TC-10 inclusive. The reference
in Appendix C is to Charge 5.
Before I deal with the relevant portions, may I explain very briefly the
layout of the treaty.
Part I contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, and Part II sets
the boundaries of Germany in Europe. These boundaries are described in
detail but Part II makes no provision for guaranteeing these boundaries.
Part III, Articles 31 to 117, with which the Tribunal is concerned,
contains the political clauses for Europe. In it, Germany guarantees
certain territorial boundaries in Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, Memel, Danzig, and so forth.
It might be convenient for the Tribunal to note, at the moment, the
interweaving of this treaty with the next, which is the Treaty for the
Restoration of Friendly Relations between the United States and Germany.
Parts I, II, and III of the Versailles Treaty are not included in the
United States treaty. Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV
are all repeated verbatim in the United States treaty from the Treaty of
Versailles.
The Tribunal is concerned with Part V—the military, naval, and air
clauses. Parts VII and XIII are not included in the United States
treaty.
I don’t think there is any reason to explain what the parts are, but if
the Tribunal wishes to know about any specific part, I shall be very
happy to explain it.
The first part that the Tribunal is concerned with is that contained in
the British Document TC-5, and consists of Articles 42 to 44 dealing
with the Rhineland. These are very short, and as they are repeated in
the Locarno Treaty, perhaps I had better read them once, just so that
the Tribunal will have them in mind.
“Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east
of the Rhine.
“Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the
assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and
military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all
permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.
“Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the
provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as
committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the
present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the
world.”
I am not going to put in evidence, but I simply draw the Tribunal’s
attention to a document of which they can take judicial notice, as it
has been published by the German State, the memorandum of March 7, 1936,
giving their account of the breach. The matters regarding the breach
have been dealt with by my friend, Mr. Alderman, and I don’t propose to
go over the ground again.
The next part of the treaty is in the British Document TC-6, dealing
with Austria:
“Article 80: Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the
independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed
in a treaty between that state and the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be
inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the
League of Nations.”
Again in the same way, the proclamation of Hitler dealing with Austria,
the background of which has been dealt with by my friend, Mr. Alderman,
is attached as TC-47. I do not intend to read it because the Tribunal
can again take judicial notice of the public proclamation.
Next is Document TC-8, dealing with Memel:
“Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territories
included between the Baltic, the northeastern frontier of East
Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II, (Boundaries of
Germany) of the present treaty, and the former frontier between
Germany and Russia.
“Germany undertakes to accept the settlement made by the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these
territories, particularly insofar as concerns the nationality of
inhabitants.”
I don’t think that the Tribunal has had any reference to the formal
document of incorporation of Memel, of which again the Tribunal can take
judicial notice; and I put in, for convenience, a copy as GB-4. It is
British Document TC-53A, and it appears in our book. It is very short,
so perhaps the Tribunal will bear with me while I read it:
“The Transfer Commissioner for the Memel territory, Gauleiter
und Oberpräsident Erich Koch, effected on 3 April during a
conference at Memel, the final incorporation of the Memel
territory into the National Socialist Party Gau of East Prussia
and into the state administration of the East Prussian
Regierungsbezirk of Gumbinnen . . . .”
Then, next we come to TC-9, which is the article relating to Danzig,
Article 100, and I shall read only the first sentence, because the
remainder consists of geographical boundaries;
“Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territory
comprised within the following limits . . . .”
—And then the limits are set out and are described in a German map
attached to the treaty.
Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, who will deal with this part of the
case, will formally prove the documents relating to the occupation of
Danzig, and I shall not trouble the Tribunal with them now.
So if the Tribunal would go on to British Document TC-7—that is Article
81, dealing with the Czechoslovak State:
“Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the
Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete
independence of the Czechoslovak State, which will include the
autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the south of the
Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontiers of this
state as determined by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers and other interested states.”
Mr. Alderman has dealt with this matter only this morning, and he has
already put in an exhibit giving in detail the conference between Hitler
and President Hacha, and the Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky, at which the
Defendants Göring and Keitel were present. Therefore, I am not going to
put in to the Tribunal the British translation of the captured Foreign
Office minutes, which occurs in TC-48; but I put in formally, as Mr.
Alderman asked me to this morning, as GB-6, the Document TC-49, which is
the agreement signed by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop for Germany
and Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkowsky for Czechoslovakia. It is an agreement
of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice. I am afraid I can’t
quite remember whether Mr. Alderman read it this morning; it is Document
TC-49. He certainly referred to it.
THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then perhaps I might read it. Text of the:
“Agreement between the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler
and the President of the Czechoslovak State Dr. Hacha . . . .
“The Führer and Reich Chancellor today received in Berlin, at
their own request, the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr.
Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chvalkowsky,
in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of
the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation which had
arisen within the previous territory of Czechoslovakia, owing to
the events of recent weeks, was subjected to a completely open
examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on both
sides that the object of all their efforts must be to assure
quiet, order, and peace in this part of Central Europe. The
President of the Czechoslovak State declared that, in order to
serve this end and to reach a final pacification, he confidently
placed the fate of the Czech people and of their country in the
hands of the Führer of the German Reich. The Führer accepted
this declaration and expressed his decision to assure to the
Czech people, under the protection of the German Reich, the
autonomous development of their national life, in accordance
with their special characteristics. In witness whereof this
document is signed in duplicate.”
The signatures I mentioned appear.
The Tribunal will understand that it is not my province to make any
comment; that has been done by Mr. Alderman. And I am not putting
forward any of the documents I read as having my support; they are
merely put forward factually as part of the case.
The next document, which I put in as GB-7, is the British Document
TC-50. That is Hitler’s proclamation to the German people, dated the
15th of March 1939. Again, I don’t think that Mr. Alderman read that
document.
THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall read it:
“Proclamation of the Führer to the German people, 15 March 1939.
“To the German People:
“Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect her
fellow countrymen, living in well-defined settlements, against
the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and during the
last weeks the same thing has happened on an ever-increasing
scale. This is bound to create an intolerable state of affairs
within an area inhabited by citizens of so many nationalities.
“These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks
against their freedom and life, have now broken away from the
Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.
“Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out,
amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the
number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is
increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking
inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by
German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal
belongings are streaming into the Reich.
“Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the
destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which
Germany is vitally interested particularly as for over 1,000
years it formed a part of the German Reich.
“In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to
create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living
space, I have today resolved to allow German troops to march
into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and
the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the
lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations
for introducing a fundamental re-ordering of affairs which will
be in accordance with the 1,000-year-old history and will
satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech
peoples.”—Signed—“Adolf Hitler, Berlin, 15 March 1939.”
Then there is a footnote, an order of the Führer to the German Armed
Forces of the same date, in which the substance is that they are told to
march in, to safeguard lives and property of all inhabitants, and not to
conduct themselves as enemies, but as an instrument for carrying out the
German Reich Government’s decision.
I put in, as GB-8, the decrees establishing the Protectorate, which is
TC-51.
I think again, as these are public decrees, the Tribunal can take
judicial knowledge of them. Their substance has been fully explained by
Mr. Alderman. With the permission of the Tribunal, I won’t read them in
full now.
Then again, as Mr. Alderman requested, I put in, as GB-9, British
Document TC-52, the British protest. If I might just read that to the
Tribunal—it is from Lord Halifax to Sir Neville Henderson, our
Ambassador in Berlin:
“Foreign Office, March 17, 1939.
“Please inform the German Government that His Majesty’s
Government desire to make it plain to them that they cannot but
regard the events of the past few days as a complete repudiation
of the Munich Agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the
negotiators of that Agreement bound themselves to co-operate for
a peaceful settlement.
“His Majesty’s Government must also take this occasion to
protest against the changes effected in Czechoslovakia by German
military action, which are in their view, devoid of any basis of
legality.”
And again at Mr. Alderman’s request, I put in as GB-10 the Document
TC-53, which is the French protest of the same date, and if I might read
the third paragraph:
“The French Ambassador has the honor to inform the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Reich, of the formal protest made by the
Government of the French Republic against the measures which the
communication of Count de Welczeck records.
“The Government of the Republic consider, in fact, that in face
of the action directed by the German Government against
Czechoslovakia, they are confronted with a flagrant violation of
the letter and the spirit of the agreement signed at Munich on
September 29, 1938.
“The circumstances in which the agreement of March 15 has been
imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic do not, in
the eyes of the Government of the Republic, legalize the
situation registered in that agreement.
“The French Ambassador has the honor to inform His Excellency,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, that the
Government of the Republic cannot recognize under these
conditions the legality of the new situation created in
Czechoslovakia by the action of the German Reich.”
I now come to Part 5 of the Versailles Treaty, and the relevant matters
are contained in the British Document TC-10. As considerable discussion
is centered around them, I read the introductory words:
“Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses: In order to render
possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments
of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the
military, naval, and air clauses which follow.
“Section 1. Military Clauses. Chapter I. Effectives and Cadres
of the German Army.
“Article 159. The German military forces shall be demobilized
and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.
“Article 160. (1) By a date which must not be later than March
31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven
divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.
“After that date, the total number of effectives in the Army of
the states constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men,
including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall
be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the
territory and to the control of the frontiers.
“The total effective strength of officers, including the
personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed
4,000.
“(2) Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs, shall be
organized in accordance with Table Number 1 annexed to this
Section. The number and strength of the units of infantry,
artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in
the aforesaid table constitute maxima which must not be
exceeded.”
Then there is a description of units that can have their own depots and
the grouping of divisions under corps headquarters, and then the next
two provisions are of some importance:
“The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or
of other organizations for the command of troops or for
preparation for war is forbidden.
“The great German General Staff and all similar organizations
shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.”
I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with Article 161, which deals
with administrative services.
Article 163 provides the steps by which the reduction will take place,
and then we come to Chapter 2, dealing with armament, and that provides
that up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of the
League of Nations, armaments shall not be greater than the amounts fixed
in Table Number 11.
If the Tribunal will note the second part, Germany agrees that after she
has become a member of the League of Nations, the armaments fixed in the
said table shall remain in force until they are modified by the Council
of the League. Furthermore, she hereby agrees strictly to observe the
decisions of the Council of the League on this subject.
Then, 165 deals with guns and machine guns, and so forth, and 167 deals
with notification of guns, and 168, the first part, says:
“The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall
only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which
shall be communicated to and approved by the governments of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which
they retain the right to restrict.”
Article 169 deals with the surrender of material. Number 170 prohibits
importation; 171 prohibits gas, and 172 provides for disclosure. Then
173, under the heading, “Recruiting and Military Training” deals with
one matter, the breach of which is of great importance:
“Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in
Germany. The German Army may only be constituted and recruited
by means of voluntary enlistment.”
Then the succeeding articles deal with the method of enlistment in order
to prevent a quick rush through the army of men enlisted for a short
time.
I think that all I need do is to draw the attention of the Tribunal to
the completeness and detail with which all these points are covered in
Articles 174 to 179.
Then, passing to TC-10, Article 180. That contains the prohibition of
fortress works beyond a certain limit and in the Rhineland. The first
sentence is:
“All fortified works, fortresses, and field works situated in
German territory to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to
the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.”
I shall not trouble the Tribunal with the tables which show the amounts.
Then we come to the naval clauses. If the Tribunal will be good enough
to go on four pages, they will come to Article 181, and I will just read
that to show the way in which the naval limitations are imposed and
refer briefly to the others.
Article 181 says:
“After the expiration of a period of 2 months from the coming
into force of the present treaty the German naval forces in
commission must not exceed:
“Six battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, six
light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal
number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in
Article 190.
“No submarines are to be included.
“All other warships, except where there is provision to the
contrary in the present treaty, must be placed in reserve or
devoted to commercial purposes.”
Then 182 simply deals with the mine sweeping necessary to clear up the
mines, and 183 limits the personnel to 15,000, including officers and
men of all grades and corps, and 184 deals with surface ships not in
German ports, and the succeeding clauses deal with various details, and
I pass at once to Article 191, which says:
“The construction or acquisition of any submarines, even for
commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.”
Article 194 makes corresponding obligations of voluntary engagements for
longer service, and 196 and 197 deal with naval fortifications and
wireless stations.
Then, if the Tribunal please, would they pass to Article 198, the first
of the air clauses. The essential and important sentence is the first:
“The Armed Forces of Germany must not include any military or
naval air forces.”
I don’t think that I need trouble the Tribunal with the detailed
provisions which occur in the next four clauses, which are all
consequential.
Then, the next document, which for convenience is put next to that, is
the British Document TC-44. For convenience I put in a copy as GB-11,
but this again is merely ancillary to Mr. Alderman’s argument. It is the
report of the formal statement made at the German Air Ministry about the
restarting of the Air Corps, and I respectfully submit that the Tribunal
can take judicial notice of that.
Similarly, without proving formally the long Document, TC-45, the
Tribunal can again take judicial notice of the public proclamation,
which is a well-known public document in Germany, the proclamation of
compulsory military service. Mr. Alderman has again dealt with this
fully in his address.
I now come to the sixth treaty, which is the treaty between the United
States and Germany restoring friendly relations, and I put in a copy as
Exhibit GB-12. It is Document TC-11, and the Tribunal will find it as
the second last document in the document book. The purpose of this
treaty was to complete official cessation of hostilities between the
United States of America and Germany, and I have already explained to
the Tribunal that it incorporated certain parts of the Treaty of
Versailles. The relevant portion for the consideration of the Tribunal
is Part V, and I have just concluded going through the clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles which are repeated verbatim in this treaty. I
therefore, with the approval of the Tribunal, will not read them again,
but at Page 11 of my copy, they will see the clauses are repeated in
exactly the same way.
Then I pass to the seventh treaty, which is the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy,
negotiated at Locarno, October 16, 1925. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of that, and I put in as Exhibit GB-13, the British
Document TC-12.
I was dealing with the Treaty of Locarno, and it might be convenient if
I just reminded the Tribunal of the treaties that were negotiated at
Locarno, because they do all go together and are to a certain extent
mutually dependent.
At Locarno, Germany negotiated five treaties:
(A) The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France,
Great Britain, and Italy; (B) the Arbitration Convention between Germany
and France; (C) the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium;
(D) the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland; and (E) an
Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee provided that it should
come into force as soon as ratifications were deposited at Geneva, in
the archives of the League of Nations, and as soon as Germany became a
member of the League of Nations. The ratifications were deposited on the
14th September 1926 and Germany became a member of the League of Nations
on the 10th of September 1926.
The two arbitration conventions and the two arbitration treaties which I
mentioned provide that they shall enter into force under the same
conditions as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. That is Article 21 of the
Arbitration Conventions and Article 22 of the Arbitration Treaties.
The most important of the five agreements is the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee. One of its purposes was to establish in perpetuity the
borders between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France. It contains
no provision for denunciation or withdrawal therefrom and provides that
it shall remain in force until the Council of the League of Nations
decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the
parties to the treaty—an event which never happened—in which case the
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee shall expire 1 year later.
The general scheme of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is that Article 1
provides that the parties guarantee three things:
The border between Germany and France, the border between Germany and
Belgium, and the demilitarization of the Rhineland.
Article 2 provides that Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium,
agree that they will not attack or invade each other with certain
inapplicable exceptions, and Article 3 provides that Germany and France,
and Germany and Belgium, agree to settle all disputes between them by
peaceful means.
The Tribunal will remember, because this point was made by my friend,
Mr. Alderman, that the first important violation of the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee appears to have been the entry of German troops into the
Rhineland on 7 March 1936. The day after, France and Belgium asked the
League of Nations Council to consider the question of the German
re-occupation of the Rhineland and the purported repudiation of the
treaty, and on the 12th of March, after a protest from the British
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy
recognized unanimously that the re-occupation was a violation of this
treaty, and on the 14th of March, the League Council duly and properly
decided that it was not permissible and that the Rhineland clauses of
the pact were not voidable by Germany because of the alleged violation
by France in the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact.
That is the background to the treaty with the international
organizations that were then in force, and if I might suggest them to
the Tribunal without adding to the summary which I have given, the
relevant articles are 1, 2, and 3, which I have mentioned, and 4, which
provides for the bringing of violations before the Council of the
League, as was done, and 5 I ask the Tribunal to note, because it deals
with the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which I have already
mentioned. It says:
“The provisions of Article 3 of the present treaty are placed
under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided
by the following stipulations:
“If one of the powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit
a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral
or judicial decision and commits a violation of Article 2 of the
present treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of
Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 of the present treaty
shall apply.”
That is the procedure of going to the League or in the case of a
flagrant breach, of taking more stringent action.
I remind the Tribunal of this provision because of the quotations from
Hitler which I mentioned earlier, when he said that the German
Government will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed,
even though they were concluded before their accession to power and
office. Whatever may be said of the Treaty of Versailles, whatever may
be argued and has been argued, no one has ever argued for a moment, to
the best of my knowledge, that Herr Stresemann was in any way acting
involuntarily when he signed, along with the other representatives, the
Locarno pact on behalf of Germany. It was signed not only by Herr
Stresemann, but by Herr Hans Luther, so that there you have a treaty
freely entered into, which repeats the Rhineland provisions of
Versailles and binds Germany in that regard. I simply call the attention
of the Tribunal to Article 8, which deals with the remaining in force of
the treaty. I might perhaps read it because as I told the Tribunal all
the other treaties have the same lasting qualities, the same provisions
as to the time they will last, as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. It
says:
“Article 8. The present treaty shall be registered at the League
of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It
shall remain in force until the Council, acting on a request by
one or other of the High Contracting Parties notified to the
other signatory powers 3 months in advance, and voting at least
by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations
ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties;
the treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a
period of 1 year from such decision.”
That is, that in signing this treaty, the German representatives clearly
placed the question of repudiation or avoidance of the treaty in hands
other than their own. They were at the time, of course, a member of the
League, and a member of the Council of the League, but they left the
repudiation and avoidance to the decision of the League.
Then the next treaty on my list is the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Czechoslovakia, which was one of the Locarno group and to
which I have already referred, but for convenience I have put in Exhibit
GB-14, which is British Document TC-14. As a breach of this treaty, as
charged in Charge 8, of Appendix C, I mentioned the background of the
treaty, and I shall not go into it again but I think the only clauses
that the Tribunal need look at, are Article 1, which is the governing
clause, and says as follows (Document TC-14):
“All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia
with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted
for decision either to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Permanent
Court of International Justice as laid down hereafter. It is
agreed that the disputes referred to above include, in
particular, those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.
“This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events
prior to the present treaty and belonging to the past.
“Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is
laid down in other conventions in force between the High
Contracting Parties, shall be settled in conformity with the
provisions of these conventions.”
Articles 2 to 21 of the machinery. In Article 22 the second sentence
says it—that’s the present treaty—shall enter into and remain in force
under the same conditions as the said treaty, which is the Treaty of
Mutual Guarantee.
Now that, I think, is all I need mention about that treaty. I think I am
right that my friend, Mr. Alderman, referred to it. It is certainly the
treaty to which President Beneš unsuccessfully appealed during the
crisis in the autumn of 1938. Now the ninth treaty which I should deal
with is not in this document book, and I merely am putting it in
formally, because my friend, Mr. Roberts, will deal with it and read the
appropriate parts—if the Tribunal will be good enough to note it
because it is mentioned in Charge 9 of Appendix C. It is the Arbitration
Convention between Germany and Belgium also done at Locarno, of which I
hand in a copy for convenience as GB-15. In fact, I can tell the
Tribunal all these arbitration conventions are in the same form, and I
am not going to deal with it because it is essentially part of the case
concerned with Belgium, the Low Countries, and Luxembourg, which my
friend, Mr. Roberts, will present. Therefore, I only ask the Tribunal to
accept the formal document for the moment. And the same applies to the
tenth treaty, which is mentioned in Charge 10 of Appendix C. That is the
Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, of which I ask the
Tribunal to take notice, and I hand in as GB-16. That again will be
dealt with by my friend, Colonel Griffith-Jones, when he is dealing with
the Polish case.
I therefore can take the Tribunal straight to a matter which is not a
treaty, but is a solemn declaration, and that is TC-18, which I now put
in as Exhibit GB-17, and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of, as
a Declaration of the Assembly of the League of Nations. The importance
is the date which was the 24th of September 1927. The Tribunal may
remember that I asked them to take judicial notice of the fact that
Germany had become a member of the League of Nations on 10 September
1926, a year before.
The importance of this Declaration is not only its effect in
international law, to which my learned friend, the Attorney General,
referred, but the fact that it was unanimously adopted by the Assembly
of the League, of which Germany was a free, and let me say at once, an
active member at the time. I think that all I need read of TC-18 is, if
the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, the speech which begins
“M. Sokal of Poland (Rapporteur),” and then the translation after the
Rapporteur had dealt with the formalities, that this had gone to the
third committee and been unanimously adopted, and he had been asked to
act as Rapporteur, he says—the second paragraph:
“The committee was of opinion that, at the present juncture, a
solemn resolution passed by the Assembly, declaring that wars of
aggression must never be employed as a means of settling
disputes between states, and that such wars constitute an
international crime, would have a salutary effect on public
opinion, and would help to create an atmosphere favorable to the
League’s future work in the matter of security and disarmament.
“While recognizing that the draft resolution does not constitute
a regular legal instrument, which would be adequate in itself
and represent a concrete contribution towards security, the
Third Committee unanimously agreed as to its great moral and
educative value.”
Then he asked the Assembly to adopt the draft resolution, and I will
read simply the terms of the resolution, which shows what so many
nations, including Germany, put forward at that time:
“The Assembly, recognizing the solidarity which unites the
community of nations, being inspired by a firm desire for the
maintenance of general peace, being convinced that a war of
aggression can never serve as a means of settling international
disputes, and is in consequence an international crime;
considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression
would tend to create an atmosphere of general confidence
calculated to facilitate the progress of the work undertaken
. . . with a view to disarmament:
“Declares: 1. That all wars of aggression are and shall always
be prohibited: 2. That every pacific means must be employed to
settle disputes of every description, which may arise between
states.
“The Assembly declares that the states, members of the League,
are under an obligation to conform to these principles.”
After a solemn vote taken in the form of roll call the President
announced—which you will see at the end of the extract:
“All the delegations having pronounced in favor of the
declaration submitted by the Third Committee, I declare it
unanimously adopted.”
The last general treaty which I have to place before the Tribunal is the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact of Paris of 1928, which my learned friend,
the Attorney General, in opening this part of the case read _in extenso_
and commented on fully, I hand in as Exhibit GB-18—the British Document
TC-19, which is a copy of that pact. I did not intend, unless the
Tribunal desired otherwise, that I should read it again, as the Attorney
General yesterday read it in full, but of course I am at the service of
the Tribunal and therefore I leave that document before the Tribunal in
that way.
Now all that remains for me to do is to place before the Tribunal
certain documents which Mr. Alderman mentioned in the course of his
address, and left to me. I am afraid that I haven’t placed them in a
special order, because they don’t really relate to the treaties I have
dealt with, but to Mr. Alderman’s argument. The first of these I hand in
as Exhibit GB-19. It is British Document TC-26, and comes just after
that resolution of the League of Nations to which the Tribunal had just
been giving attention—TC-26. It is the assurance contained in Hitler’s
speech on 21 May 1935, and it is very short, and unless the Tribunal has
it in mind from Mr. Alderman’s speech, I will read it again; I am not
sure of his reading it:
“Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic
affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that country
to her. The German people and the German Government have,
however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of the
simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent,
that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not
only to foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere. I
myself believe that no regime which is not anchored in the
people, supported by the people, and desired by the people, can
exist permanently.”
The next document which is TC-22, and which is on the next page, I now
hand in as Exhibit GB-20. It is the copy of the official proclamation of
the agreement between the German Government and the Government of the
Federal State of Austria on 11 July 1936, and I am almost certain that
Mr. Alderman did read this document, but I refer the Tribunal to
Paragraph 1 of the agreement to remind them of the essential content:
“The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the
Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of
the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st of May 1935.”
I now have three documents which Mr. Alderman asked me to hand in with
regard to Czechoslovakia. The first is TC-27, which the Tribunal will
find two documents further on from the one of Austria, to which I have
just been referring. That is the German assurance to Czechoslovakia, and
what I am handing in as GB-21 is the letter from M. Masaryk, Jan
Masaryk’s son, to Lord Halifax, dated the 12th of March 1938. Again I
think that if Mr. Alderman did not read this, he certainly quoted the
statement made by the Defendant Göring, which appears in the third
paragraph. In the first statement the Field Marshal used the expression,
“ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort,” which I understand means, “I give you
my word of honor,” and if you will look down three paragraphs, after the
Defendant Göring had asked that there would not be a mobilization of the
Czechoslovak Army, the communication continues:
“M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding
assurances on this subject, and today spoke with Baron Von
Neurath—that is the Defendant Von Neurath—who, among other
things assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still
considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration
Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.”
So there I remind the Tribunal that in 1925 Herr Stresemann was speaking
on behalf of Germany in an agreement voluntarily concluded. Had there
been the slightest doubt of that, here is the Defendant Von Neurath
giving the assurance on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considers
herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention on 12
March 1938, 6 months before Dr. Beneš made a hopeless appeal to it,
before the crisis in the autumn of 1938. Of course the difficult
position of the Czechoslovak Government is set out in the last
paragraph, but M. Masaryk says—and the Tribunal may think with great
force—in his last sentence:
“They cannot however fail to view with great apprehension the
sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bilateral
agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July 1936, and
yesterday, 11 March 1938.”
I refrain from comment, but I venture to say that is one of the most
pregnant sentences relating to this period.
Now the next document which is on the next page is the British Document
TC-28, which I hand in as Exhibit GB-22. And that is an assurance of the
26th of September 1938, which Hitler gave to Czechoslovakia, and
again—the Tribunal will check my memory—I don’t think that Mr.
Alderman read this but . . .
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I think if he did not, the Tribunal ought
to have it before them, because it gives very important point as to the
alleged governing principle of getting Germans back to the Reich, which
the Nazi conspirators purported to ask for a considerable time, while it
suited them. It says:
“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for
all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people
want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot
go back beyond the limits of our patience.”
The Tribunal will remember this is between the Godesberg visit and the
Munich Pact:
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the
moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to
say, when the Czechs have come to an agreement with their other
minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I will no longer
be interested in the Czech State, and that, as far as I am
concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs. But I
must also declare before the German people that in the
Sudeten-German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an
offer to Herr Beneš which was no more than the realization of
what he had already promised. He has now peace or war in his
hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the
Germans their freedom, or we shall get this freedom for
ourselves.”
Less than 6 months before the 15th of March Hitler was saying in the
most violent terms that “he didn’t want any Czechs.” The Tribunal has
heard the sequel from my friend, Mr. Alderman, this morning. The last
document which I have been asked to put in, and which I now ask the
Tribunal to take notice of, and hand in, is Exhibit GB-23, which is the
British Document TC-23 and a copy of the Munich Agreement of September
29, 1938. That was signed by Hitler, the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain,
M. Daladier, and Mussolini, and it is largely a procedural agreement by
which the entry of German troops into the Sudeten-Deutsche territory is
regulated. That is shown by the preliminary clause:
“Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into
consideration the agreement which has been already reached in
principle, for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten-German
territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions
governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon,
and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for
the steps necessary to secure fulfillment.”
Then I don’t think, unless the Tribunal want me, I need go through the
steps. In Article 4, it said that “The occupation by stages of the
predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1
October.” The four territories are marked on a map. And by Article 6,
“The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the
international commission.” And it provides also for rights of option and
release from the forces—the Czech forces of Sudeten Germans.
That is what Hitler was asking for in the somewhat rhetorical passage
which I have just read out, and it will be observed that there is an
annex to the agreement which is most significant.
“Annex to the Agreement:
“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the French
Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis
that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph 6 of the
Anglo-French Proposals of the 19th September, relating to an
international guarantee of the new boundaries of the
Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.
“When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in
Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for their
part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.”
The Polish and Hungarian minorities, not the question of Slovakia which
the Tribunal heard this morning. That is why Mr. Alderman submitted—and
I respectfully joined him in his submission—that the action of the 15th
of March was a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of that
agreement.
That, My Lord, is the part of the case which I desired to present.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases. Thank you.
[_A recess was taken._]
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the
United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, Count Two of the Indictment
charges these defendants with participating in the planning, the
preparation, the initiation, and waging of various wars of aggression,
and it charges that those wars are also in breach of international
treaty. It is our purpose now to present to the Tribunal the evidence in
respect of those aggressive wars against Poland and against the United
Kingdom and France.
Under Paragraph (B) of the particulars to Count Two, reference is made
to Count One in the Indictment for the allegations charging that those
wars were wars of aggression, and Count One also sets out the
particulars of the preparations and planning for those wars, and in
particular those allegations will be found in Paragraph (F) 4. But, My
Lord, with the Tribunal’s approval I would propose first to deal with
the allegations of breach of treaties which are mentioned in Paragraph
(C) of the particulars, and of which the details are set out in Appendix
C. My Lord, those sections of Appendix C which relate to the war against
Poland are Section 2, which charges a violation of the Hague Convention
in respect of the pacific settlement of international disputes, on which
Sir David has already addressed the Court, and I do not propose, with
the Court’s approval, to say more than that.
Section 3 of Appendix C and Section 4 charge breaches of the other Hague
Conventions of 1907. Section 5, Sub-section 4, charges a breach of the
Versailles Treaty in respect of the Free City of Danzig, and Section 13,
a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
All those have already been dealt with by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and it
remains, therefore, only for me to deal with two other sections of
Appendix C: Section 10, which charges a breach of the Arbitration Treaty
between Germany and Poland, signed at Locarno on the 16th of October
1925; and Section 15 of Appendix C which charges a violation of the
Declaration of Non-Aggression which was entered into between Germany and
Poland on the 26th of January 1934.
If the Tribunal would take Part I of the British Document Book Number 2,
I will describe in a moment how the remaining parts are divided. The
document book is divided into six parts. If the Tribunal will look at
Part I for the moment—the document books which have been handed to the
Counsel for the Defense are in exactly the same order, except that they
are bound in one and not in six separate covers, in which the Tribunal’s
documents are bound for convenience.
The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty, the subject matter of Section 10
of Appendix C, is Document TC-15 and appears the one but end document in
the book. It has already been put in under the Number GB-16.
My Lord, I would quote the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 from that
treaty:
“The President of the German Empire and the President of the
Polish Republic:
“Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland
by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might
arise between the two countries;
“Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or
resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for
international tribunals;
“Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a state cannot be
modified save with its consent;
“And considering that sincere observance of the methods of
peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of
resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become
the cause of division between states;
“Have decided. . . .”
Then, go on to Article 1:
“All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland with
regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted
for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter.”
I go straight to Article 2:
“Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by
agreement between the parties, be submitted, with a view to
amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission,
styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in
accordance with the present treaty.”
My Lord, thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for
arbitration and for conciliation.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in the same terms, is it not, as the arbitration
treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and Germany and Belgium?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well—yes, it is, My Lord, both signed at
Locarno.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The words of the charge in Section 10, will be
noted particularly in that Germany did, on or about the 1st of September
1939, unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having attempted
to settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means.
The only other treaty to which I refer, the German-Polish Declaration of
the 26th of January 1934, will be found as the last document in Part I
of the Tribunal’s document book, which is the subject of Section 10 of
Appendix C:
“The German Government and the Polish Government consider that
the time has come to introduce a new era in the political
relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding
between the states. They have therefore decided to establish by
the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those
relations.
“The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance
of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential
condition for general peace in Europe.”
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to read all this? We are
taking judicial notice of it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged; I am only too anxious
to shorten this, if I can.
In view of what is later alleged by the Nazi Government, I would
particularly draw attention to the last paragraph in that declaration.
“The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of 10 years
counting from the day of exchange of instruments of
ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two
governments 6 months before the expiration of that period of
time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by
either Government at any time 6 months in advance.”
My Lord, I pass then from the breach of treaties to present to the Court
the evidence upon the planning and preparation of these wars and in
support of the allegations that they were wars of aggression. For
convenience, as I say, the documents have been divided into separate
parts and if the Tribunal would look at the index, the total index to
their document, which is a separate book, on the front page it will be
seen how these documents have been divided. Part I is the “Treaties”;