Forgetting many of the topics and all of the heats heretofore mingling
with the controversy, I shall strive to present the question in its
juridical light, as becomes the habits of this tribunal. It is a
question of jurisprudence on which you are to give judgment. But I
cannot forget that the principles of morals and of natural justice lie
at the foundation of all jurisprudence. Nor can any reference to these
be inappropriate in a discussion before this Court.
Of Equality I shall speak, not only as a sentiment, but as a principle
embodied in the Constitution of Massachusetts, and obligatory upon
court and citizen. It will be my duty to show that this principle,
after finding its way into our State Constitution, was recognized in
legislation and judicial decisions. Considering next the circumstances
of this case, it will be easy to show how completely they violate
Constitution, legislation, and judicial proceedings,--_first_, by
subjecting colored children to inconvenience inconsistent with the
requirements of Equality, and, _secondly_, by establishing a system of
Caste odious as that of the Hindoos,--leading to the conclusion that
the School Committee have no such power as they have exercised, and
that it is the duty of the Court to set aside their unjust by-law. In
the course of this discussion I shall exhibit the true idea of our
Common Schools, and the fallacy of the pretension that any exclusion or
discrimination founded on race or color can be consistent with Equal
Rights.
In opening this argument, I begin naturally with the fundamental
proposition which, when once established, renders the conclusion
irresistible. According to the Constitution of Massachusetts, _all men,
without distinction of race or color, are equal before the law_. In the
statement of this proposition I use language which, though new in our
country, has the advantage of precision.
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