action of the 13th was so far salutary, that they did not
venture to annoy us again for several days. Advantage was taken
of this respite to throw magazine supplies from time to time
into the Bala Hissar, a duty which was ably performed by
Lieutenant Walker, with a resalah of irregular horse, under
cover of night. But even in this short interval of comparative
rest, such was the wretched construction of the cantonment,
that the mere ordinary routine of garrison duty, and the
necessity of closely manning our long line of rampart both by
day and night, was a severe trial to the health and patience of
the troops; especially now that the winter began to show
symptoms of unusual severity. There seemed, indeed, every
probability of an early fall of snow, to which all looked
forward with dread, as the harbinger of fresh difficulties and
of augmented suffering.
"These considerations, and the manifest superiority of the Bala
Hissar as a military position, led to the early discussion of
the expediency of abandoning the cantonment, and consolidating
our forces in the above-mentioned stronghold. The Envoy himself
was, from the first, greatly in favour of this move, until
overruled by the many objections urged against it by the
military authorities; to which, as will be seen by a letter
from him presently quoted, he learned by degrees to attach some
weight himself; but to the very last it was a measure that had
many advocates, and I venture to state my own firm belief that,
had we at this time moved into the Bala Hissar, Cabul would
have been still in our possession.
"But Brigadier Shelton having firmly set his face against the
movement from the first moment of its proposition, all serious
idea of it was gradually abandoned, though it continued to the
very last a subject of common discussion."
"_Nov_. 18. Accounts were this day received from Jellalabad, that
General Sale, having sallied from the town, had repulsed the enemy with
considerable loss.... The hope of his return has tended much to support
our spirits; our disappointment was therefore great, to learn that all
expectation of aid from that quarter was at an end. Our eyes were now
turned towards the Kandahar force as our last resource though an advance
from that quarter seemed scarcely practicable so late in the year."
The propriety of attacking Mahomed Khan's fort, the possession of which
would have opened an easy communication with the Bala Hissar, was
discussed; but, on some sudden objection raised by Lieutenant Sturt of
the engineers, the project was abandoned.
On the 19th, a letter was addressed by the Envoy to the General, the
object of which seems not to be very apparent. He raises objections to a
retreat either to Jellalabad or to the Bala Hissar, and expresses a
decided objection to abandon the cantonment under any circumstances, if
food can be procured; but, nevertheless, it is sufficiently evident
that his hopes of successful resistance had even now become feeble, and
he refers to the possibility that succours may arrive from Kandahar, or
that "something might turn up in our favour."
The village of Beymaroo, (or Husbandless, from a beautiful virgin who
was nursed there,) within half a mile of the cantonments, had been our
chief source of supply, to which the enemy had in some measure put a
stop by occupying it every morning. It was therefore determined to
endeavour to anticipate them by taking possession of it before their
arrival. For this purpose, a party moved out under Major Swayne of the
5th native infantry; but the Major, "it would seem, by his own account,
found the village already occupied, and the entrance blocked up in such
a manner that he considered it out of his power to force a passage." It
does not appear that the attempt was made. Later in the day there was
some skirmishing in the plain, in the course of which Lieutenant Eyre
was wounded.
"It is worthy of note that Mahomed Akber Khan, second son of the late
Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, arrived in Cabul this night (22d Nov.) from
Bameean. This man was destined to exercise an evil influence over our
future fortunes. The crisis of our struggle was already nigh at hand."
"_Nov_. 23.--This day decided the fate of the Cabul force." It had been
determined by a council, at the special recommendation of the Envoy,
that a force under Brigadier Shelton should storm the village of
Beymaroo, and maintain the hill above it against any numbers of the
enemy that might appear. At two A.M., the troops[22] moved out of
cantonments, ascended the hill by the gorge, dragging up the gun, and
moved along the ridge to a point overlooking the village. A sharp fire
of grape created great confusion, and it was suggested by Captain Bellew
and others to General Shelton, to storm the village, while the evident
panic of the enemy lasted. To this the Brigadier did not accede.
[22] Five companies 44th; six companies 5th native infantry;
six companies 37th native infantry; 100 sappers; 2-1/2
squadrons cavalry; one gun.
When day broke, the enemy, whose ammunition had failed, were seen
hurrying from the village--not 40 men remained. A storming party, under
Majors Swayne and Kershaw, was ordered to carry the village; but Major
Swayne missed the gate, which was open, and arrived at a barricaded
wicket, which he had no means of forcing. Major Swayne was wounded, and
lost some men, and was ultimately recalled. Leaving a reserve of three
companies of the 37th native infantry, under Major Kershaw, at the point
overhanging Beymaroo, the Brigadier moved back with the rest of the
troops and the gun to the part of the hill which overlooked the gorge.
It was suggested to raise a sungar or breastwork to protect the troops,
for which purpose the sappers had been taken out, but it was not done.
Immense numbers of the enemy, issuing from the city, had now crowned the
opposite hill--in all, probably 10,000 men. Our skirmishers were kept
out with great difficulty, and chiefly by the exertions and example of
Colonel Oliver. The remainder of the troops were formed into two
squares, and the cavalry drawn up _en masse_ immediately in their rear,
and all suffered severely--the vent of the only gun became too hot to be
served. A party of cavalry under Lieutenant Walker was recalled to
prevent its destruction, and a demonstration of the Affghan cavalry on
our right flank, which had been exposed by the recall of Lieutenant
Walker, was repulsed by a fire of shrapnell, which mortally wounded a
chief of consequence. The enemy surrounded the troops on three sides.
The men were faint with fatigue and thirst--the Affghan skirmishers
pressed on, and our's gave way. The men could not be got to charge
bayonets. The enemy made a rush at the guns, the cavalry were ordered to
charge, but would not follow their officers. The first square and the
cavalry gave way, and were with difficulty rallied behind the second
square, leaving the gun in the hands of the enemy, who immediately
carried off the limber and horses. News of Abdoolah Khan's wound spread
amongst the Affghans, who now retired. Our men resumed courage, and
regained possession of the gun; and fresh ammunition having arrived from
cantonments, it again opened on the enemy: but our cavalry would not
act, and the infantry were too much exhausted and disheartened to make a
forward movement, and too few in number. The whole force of the enemy
came on with renewed vigour--the front of the advanced square had been
literally mowed down, and most of the gallant artillerymen had fallen.
The gun was scarcely limbered up preparatory to retreat, when a rush
from the Ghazees broke the first square. All order was at an end, the
entreaties and commands of the officers were unheeded, and an utter rout
ensued down the hill towards the cantonments, the enemy's cavalry making
a fearful slaughter among the unresisting fugitives. The retreat of
Major Kershaw's party was cut off, and his men were nearly all
destroyed. The mingled tide of flight and pursuit seemed to be about to
enter the cantonments together; but the pursuers were checked by the
fire of the Shah's 5th infantry and the juzailchees, and by a charge of
a fresh troop of cavalry under Lieutenant Hardyman, and fifteen or
twenty of his own men rallied by Lieutenant Walker, who fell in that
encounter. Osman Khan, too, a chief whose men were amongst the foremost,
voluntarily halted them and drew them off, "which may be reckoned,
indeed, (says Lieutenant Eyre,) the chief reason why _all_ of our people
who on that day went forth to battle were not destroyed." The gun and
the second limber which had arrived from the cantonments, in attempting
to gallop down hill, was overturned and lost. "Our loss was
tremendous--the greater part of the wounded, including Colonel Oliver,
having been left in the field, where they were miserably cut to
pieces."[23]
[23] In Mr Eyre's observations on this disastrous affair, he
enumerates six errors, which he says must present themselves to
the most unpractised military eye. "The first, and perhaps the
most fatal mistake of all, was the taking only one gun;" but he
admits that there was only one gun ready, and that, if the
Brigadier had waited for the second, he must have postponed the
enterprise for a day. This would probably have been the more
prudent course.
The second error was, that advantage was not taken of the panic
in the village, to storm it at once in the dark; but it appears
from his own account, that there were not more than forty men
remaining in the village when it was attacked, after daylight,
and that the chief cause of the failure of that attack, was
Major Swayne's having missed the gate, a misfortune which was,
certainly, at least as likely to have occurred in the dark.
The third was, that the sappers were not employed to raise a
breastwork for the protection of the troops. This objection
appears to be well founded.
The fourth was, that the infantry were formed into squares, to
resist the distant fire of infantry, on ground over which no
cavalry could have charged with effect. It appears to be so
utterly unintelligible that any officer should have been guilty
of so manifest an absurdity, that the circumstances seem to
require further elucidation; but that the formation was
unfortunate, is sufficiently obvious.
Fifthly, that the position chosen for the cavalry was
erroneous; and sixthly, that the retreat was too long deferred.
Both these objections appear to be just.
Thus terminated in disaster the military struggle at Cabul, and then
commenced that series of negotiations not less disastrous, which led to
the murder of the Envoy, to the retreat of the army, and to its ultimate
annihilation. In Lieutenant Eyre's account of their military operations,
we look in vain for any evidence of promptitude, vigour, or decision,
skill or judgment, in the commanders; and we have abundant evidence of a
lamentable want of discipline and proper spirit in the troops,
especially amongst the Europeans. Instances of high personal courage and
gallantry amongst the officers are numerous, and they always will be,
when the occasion requires them; but if the facts of this narrative had
been given without the names, no man would have recognised in it the
operations of a British army.
"_Nov_. 24.--Our troops (says Eyre) had now lost all
confidence; and even such of the officers as had hitherto
indulged the hope of a favourable turn in our affairs, began at
last reluctantly to entertain gloomy forebodings as to our
future fate. Our force resembled a ship in danger of wrecking
among rocks and shoals, for want of an able pilot to guide it
safely through them. Even now, at the eleventh hour, had the
helm of affairs been grasped by a hand competent to the
important task, we might perhaps have steered clear of
destruction; but, in the absence of any such deliverer, it was
but too evident that Heaven alone could save us by some
unforeseen interposition. The spirit of the men was gone; the
influence of the officers over them declined daily; and that
boasted discipline, which alone renders a handful of our troops
superior to an irregular multitude, began fast to disappear
from among us. The enemy, on the other hand, waxed bolder every
day and every hour; nor was it long ere we got accustomed to be
bearded with impunity from under the very ramparts of our
garrison.
"Never were troops exposed to greater hardships and dangers;
yet, sad to say, never did soldiers shed their blood with less
beneficial result than during the investment of the British
lines at Cabul."
Captain Conolly now wrote from the Bala Hissar, urging an immediate
retreat thither; "but the old objections were still urged against the
measure by Brigadier Shelton and others," though several of the chief
military, and all the political officers, approved of it. Shah Shoojah
was impatient to receive them.
The door to negotiation was opened by a letter to the Envoy from Osman
Khan Barukzye, a near relation of the new king, Nuwab Mahomed Zuman
Khan, who had sheltered Captain Drummond in his own house since the
first day of the outbreak. He took credit to himself for having checked
the ardour of his followers on the preceding day, and having thus saved
the British force from destruction; he declared that the chiefs only
desired we should quietly evacuate the country, leaving them to govern
it according to their own rules, and with a king of their own choosing.
The General, on being referred to, was of opinion that the cantonments
could not be defended throughout the winter, and approved of opening a
negotiation on the basis of the evacuation of the country. On the 27th,
two deputies were sent by the assembled chiefs to confer with Sir W.
Macnaghten; but the terms they proposed were such as he could not
accept. The deputies took leave of the Envoy, with the exclamation, that
"we should meet again in battle." "We shall at all events meet," replied
Sir William, "at the day of judgment."
At night the Envoy received a letter, proposing "that we should deliver
up Shah Shoojah and all his family--lay down our arms, and make an
unconditional surrender--when they might, perhaps, be induced to spare
our lives, and allow us to leave the country on condition of never
returning."
The Envoy replied, "that these terms were too dishonourable to be
entertained for a moment; and that, if they were persisted in, he must
again appeal to arms, leaving the result to the God of battles."
Active hostilities were not renewed till the 1st of December, when a
desperate effort was made by the enemy to gain possession of the Bala
Hissar; but they were repulsed by Major Ewart with considerable
slaughter. On the 4th, they cannonaded the cantonment from the Beymaroo
hills, but did little mischief, and at night they made an unsuccessful
attempt on Mahomed Shereef's fort. On the 5th, they completed, without
opposition, the destruction of the bridge over the Cabul river. On the
6th, the garrison of Mahomed Shereef's fort disgracefully abandoned it,
the men of the 44th apparently being the first to fly; and a garrison of
the same regiment, in the bazar village, was with difficulty restrained
from following their example. On the 7th, this post of honour was
occupied by the 37th native infantry; the 44th, who had hitherto been
intrusted with it, being no longer considered worthy to retain it.
It is but justice to Mr Eyre to give in his own words some remarks which
he has thought it right to make, with reference to what he has recorded
of the conduct of that unhappy regiment:--
"In the course of this narrative, I have been compelled by
stern truth to note down facts nearly affecting the honour and
interests of a British regiment. It may, or rather I fear it
must, inevitably happen, that my unreserved statements of the
Cabul occurrences will prove unacceptable to many, whose
private or public feelings are interested in glossing over or
suppressing the numerous errors committed and censures
deservedly incurred. But my heart tells me that no paltry
motives of rivalry or malice influence my pen; rather a sincere
and honest desire to benefit the public service, by pointing
out the rocks on which our reputation was wrecked, the means by
which our honour was sullied, and our Indian empire endangered,
as a warning to future actors in similar scenes. In a word, I
believe that more good is likely to ensue from the publication
of the whole unmitigated truth, than from a mere garbled
statement of it. A kingdom has been lost--an army slain;--and
surely, if I can show that, had we been but true to ourselves,
and had vigorous measures been adopted, the result might have
been widely different, I shall have written an instructive
lesson to rulers and subjects, to generals and armies, and
shall not have incurred in vain the disapprobation of the
self-interested or the proud."
The Envoy having again appealed to the General, again received an
answer, stating the impossibility of holding out, and recommending that
the Envoy should lose no time in entering into negotiations. This letter
was countersigned by Brigadiers Shelton and Anquetil, and Colonel
Chambers.
On the 11th December, the Envoy, accompanied by Captains Lawrence,
Trevor, and Mackenzie, and a few troopers, went out by agreement to meet
the chiefs on the plain towards the Seah Sung hills. A conciliatory
address from the Envoy was met by professions of personal esteem and
approbation of the views he had laid before them, and of gratitude for
the manner in which the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan had been treated. The
Envoy then read to them a sketch of the proposed treaty, which was to
the following effect:--
"That the British should evacuate Affghanistan, including
Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, Jellalabad, and all the other
stations absolutely within the limits of the country so called;
that they should be permitted to return not only unmolested to
India, but that supplies of every description should be
afforded them in their road thither, certain men of consequence
accompanying them as hostages; that the Ameer Dost Mahomed
Khan, his family, and every Affghan now in exile for political
offences, should be allowed to return to their country; that
Shah Shoojah and his family should be allowed the option of
remaining at Cabul, or proceeding with the British troops to
Loodiana, in either case receiving from the Affghan Government
a pension of one lac of rupees per annum; that means of
transport, for the conveyance of our baggage, stores, &c.,
including that required by the royal family, in case of their
adopting the latter alternative, should be furnished by the
existing Affghan Government: that an amnesty should be granted
to all those who had made themselves obnoxious on account of
their attachment to Shah Shoojah and his allies, the British;
that all prisoners should be released; that no British force
should be ever again sent into Affghanistan, unless called for
by the Affghan government, between whom and the British nation
perpetual friendship should be established on the sure
foundation of mutual good offices."
After some objections on the part of Mahomed Akber Khan, the terms were
agreed to, and it was further arranged that provisions should be
supplied to our troops, and that they should evacuate the cantonment in
three days.
Preparations were immediately commenced for the retreat. Arms were
ordered to be distributed from the stores, now about to be abandoned, to
some of the camp-followers, and such of the soldiers as might require
them; and a disgraceful scene of confusion and tumult followed, which
showed the fearful extent to which the army was disorganized.
The troops in the Bala Hissar were moved into cantonments, not without a
foretaste of what they had to expect on their march to Jellalabad, under
the safe conduct of Akber Khan.
The demands of the chiefs now rose from day to day. They refused to
supply provisions until we should further assure them of our sincerity,
by giving up every fort in the immediate vicinity of the cantonment. The
troops were accordingly withdrawn, the forts were immediately occupied
by the Affghans, and the cantonment thus placed at their mercy. On the
18th, the promised cattle for carriage had not yet been supplied, and a
heavy fall of snow rendered the situation of the troops more desperate.
On the 19th, the Envoy wrote an order for the evacuation of Ghuznee. On
the 20th, the Envoy had another interview with the chiefs, who now
demanded that a portion of the guns and ammunition should be given up.
This also was agreed to. At this stage of the proceedings, Lieutenant
Sturt of the engineers proposed to the General to break off the treaty,
and march forthwith to Jellalabad; but the proposal was not approved.
The arrangements for giving effect to the treaty were still carried on;
and the Envoy again met Akber Khan and Osman Khan on the plain, when
Captains Conolly and Airey were given up as hostages, and the Envoy sent
his carriage and horses, and a pair of pistols, as presents to Akber
Khan, who further demanded an Arab horse, the property of Captain Grant,
assistant adjutant-general:--
"Late in the evening of the 22d December," (says Capt.
Mackenzie, in a letter to Lieut. Eyre,) "Capt. James Skinner,
who, after having been concealed in Cabul during the greater
part of the siege, had latterly been the guest of Mahomed
Akber, arrived in cantonments, accompanied by Mahomed Sudeeq
Khan, a first cousin of Mahomed Akber, and by Sirwar Khan, the
Arhanee merchant, who, in the beginning of the campaign, had
furnished the army with camels, and who had been much in the
confidence of Sir A. Burnes, being, in fact, one of our
stanchest friends. The two latter remained in a different
apartment, while Skinner dined with the Envoy. During dinner,
Skinner jestingly remarked that he felt as if laden with
combustibles, being charged with a message from Mahomed Akber
to the Envoy of a most portentous nature.
"Even then I remarked that the Envoy's eye glanced eagerly
towards Skinner with an expression of hope. In fact, he was
like a drowning man catching at straws. Skinner, however,
referred him to his Affghan companions, and after dinner the
four retired into a room by themselves. My knowledge of what
there took place is gained from poor Skinner's own relation, as
given during my subsequent captivity with him in Akber's house.
Mahomed Sudeeq disclosed Mahomed Akber's proposition to the
Envoy, which was, that the following day Sir William should
meet him (Mahomed Akber) and a few of his immediate friends,
viz. the chiefs of the Eastern Giljyes, outside the
cantonments, when a final agreement should be made, so as to be
fully understood by both parties; that Sir William should have
a considerable body of troops in readiness, which, on a given
signal, were to join with those of Mahomed Akber and the
Giljyes, assault and take Mahmood Khan's fort, and secure the
person of Ameenoolah. At this stage of the proposition Mahomed
Sudeeq signified that, for a certain sum of money, the head of
Ameenoolah should be presented to the Envoy; but from this Sir
William shrunk with abhorrence, declaring that it was neither
his custom nor that of his country to give a price for blood.
Mahomed Sudeeq then went on to say, that, after having subdued
the rest of the khans, the English should be permitted to
remain in the country eight months longer, so as to save their
_purdah_, (veil, or credit,) but that they were then to
evacuate Affghanistan, as if of their own accord; that Shah
Shoojah was to continue king of the country, and that Mahomed
Akber was to be his wuzeer. As a further reward for his
(Mahomed Akber's) assistance, the British Government were to
pay him thirty lacs of rupees, and four lacs of rupees per
annum during his life! To this extraordinary and wild proposal,
Sir William gave ear with an eagerness which nothing can
account for but the supposition, confirmed by many other
circumstances, that his strong mind had been harassed until it
had in some degree lost its equipoise; and he not only assented
fully to these terms, but actually gave a Persian paper to that
effect, written in his own hand, declaring as his motives that
it was not only an excellent opportunity to carry into effect
the real wishes of Government--which were to evacuate the
country with as much credit to ourselves as possible--but that
it would give England time to enter into a treaty with Russia,
defining the bounds beyond which neither were to pass in
Central Asia. So ended this fatal conference, the nature and
result of which, contrary to his usual custom, Sir William
communicated to none of those who, on all former occasions,
were fully in his confidence, viz. Trevor, Lawrence, and
myself. It seemed as if he feared that we might insist on the
impracticability of the plan, which he must have studiously
concealed from himself. All the following morning his manner
was distracted and hurried, in a way that none of us had ever
before witnessed.
* * * * *
"After breakfast, Trevor, Lawrence, and myself were summoned to
attend the Envoy during his conference with Mahomed Akber Khan.
I found him alone, when, for the first time, he disclosed to me
the nature of the transaction he was engaged in. I immediately
warned him that it was a plot against him. He replied hastily,
'A plot! let me alone for that--trust me for that!' and I
consequently offered no further remonstrance. Sir William then
arranged with General Elphinstone that the 54th regiment, under
Major Ewart, should be held in readiness for immediate service.
The Shah's 6th, and two guns, were also warned."
Sir W. Macnaghten, halting the troopers of the escort, advanced about
500 or 600 yards from the eastern rampart of the cantonment, and there
awaited Akber Khan and his party:--
"Close by where some hillocks, on the further side of which
from the cantonment a carpet was spread where the snow lay
least thick, and there the khans and Sir William sat down to
hold their conference. Men talk of presentiment; I suppose it
was something of the kind which came over me, for I could
scarcely prevail upon myself to quit my horse. I did so,
however, and was invited to sit down among the Sirdars. After
the usual salutations, Mahomed Akber commenced business by
asking the Envoy if he was perfectly ready to carry into effect
the proposition of the preceding night? The Envoy replied, 'Why
not?' My attention was then called off by an old Affghan
acquaintance of mine, formerly chief of the Cabul police, by
name Gholam Moyun-ood-deen. I rose from my recumbent posture,
and stood apart with him conversing. I afterwards remembered
that my friend betrayed much anxiety as to where my pistols
were, and why I did not carry them on my person. I answered,
that although I wore my sword for form, it was not necessary to
be armed _cap-à-pie_. His discourse was also full of
extravagant compliments, I suppose for the purpose of lulling
me to sleep. At length my attention was called off from what he
was saying, by observing that a number of men, armed to the
teeth, had gradually approached to the scene of conference, and
were drawing round in a sort of circle. This Lawrence and
myself pointed out to some of the chief men, who affected at
first to drive them off with whips; but Mahomed Akber observed,
that it was of no consequence, as they were in the secret. I
again resumed my conversation with Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, when
suddenly I heard Mahomed Akber call out, 'Begeer, begeer,'
(seize! seize!) and, turning round, I saw him grasp the Envoy's
left hand, with an expression in his face of the most
diabolical ferocity. I think it was Sultan Jan who laid hold of
the Envoy's right hand. They dragged him in a stooping posture
down the hillock; the only words I heard poor Sir William utter
being, 'Az barae Khooda' (for God's sake!) I saw his face,
however, and it was full of horror and astonishment. I did not
see what became of Trevor, but Lawrence was dragged past me by
several Affghans, whom I saw wrest his weapons from him. Up to
this moment I was so engrossed in observing what was taking
place, that I actually was not aware that my own right arm was
mastered, that my urbane friend held a pistol to my temple, and
that I was surrounded by a circle of Ghazees, with drawn swords
and cocked juzails. Resistance was in vain, so, listening to
the exhortations of Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, which were enforced
by the whistling of divers bullets over my head, I hurried
through the snow with him to the place where his horse was
standing, being despoiled _en route_ of my sabre, and narrowly
escaping divers attempts made on my life. As I mounted behind
my captor, now my energetic defender, the crowd increased
around us, the cries of 'Kill the Kafir' became more vehement,
and, although we hurried on at a fast canter, it was with the
utmost difficulty Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, although assisted by
one or two friends or followers, could ward off and avoid the
sword-cuts aimed at me, the rascals being afraid to fire lest
they should kill my conductor. Indeed he was obliged to wheel
his horse round once, and taking off his turban, (the last
appeal a Mussulman can make,) to implore them for God's sake to
respect the life of his friend. At last, ascending a slippery
bank, the horse fell. My cap had been snatched off, and I now
received a heavy blow on the head from a bludgeon, which
fortunately did not quite deprive me of my senses. I had
sufficient sense left to shoot a-head of the fallen horse,
where my protector with another man joined me, and clasping me
in their arms, hurried me towards the wall of Mahomed Khan's
fort. How I reached the spot where Mahomed Akber was receiving
the gratulations of the multitude I know not, but I remember a
fanatic rushing on me, and twisting his hand in my collar until
I became exhausted from suffocation. I must do Mahomed Akber
the Justice to say, that, finding the Ghazees bent on my
slaughter, even after I had reached his stirrup, he drew his
sword and laid about him right manfully, for my conductor and
Meerza Bàoodeen Khan were obliged to press me up against the
wall, covering me with their own bodies, and protesting that no
blow should reach me but through their persons.
"Pride, however, overcame Mahomed Akber's sense of courtesy,
when he thought I was safe, for he then turned round to me, and
repeatedly said, in a tone of triumphant derision, 'Shuma
moolk-i-ma me geered!' (_You'll_ seize my country, will
you!)--he then rode off, and I was hurried towards the gate of
the fort. Here new dangers awaited me, for Moolah Momin, fresh
from the slaughter of poor Trevor, who was killed riding close
behind me--Sultan Jan having the credit of having given him the
first sabre-cut--stood here with his followers, whom he
exhorted to slay me, setting them the example by cutting
fiercely at me himself. Fortunately a gun stood between us, but
still he would have effected his purpose, had not Mahomed Shah
Khan at that instant, with some followers, come to my
assistance. These drew their swords in my defence, the chief
himself throwing his arm round my neck, and receiving on his
shoulder a cut aimed by Moollah Momin at my head. During the
bustle I pushed forward into the fort, and was immediately
taken to a sort of dungeon, where I found Lawrence safe, but
somewhat exhausted by his hideous ride and the violence he had
sustained, although unwounded. Here the Giljye chiefs, Mahomed
Shah Khan, and his brother Dost Mahomed Khan, presently joined
us, and endeavoured to cheer up our flagging spirits, assuring
us that the Envoy and Trevor were not dead, but on the contrary
quite well. They stayed with us during the afternoon, their
presence being absolutely necessary for our protection. Many
attempts were made by the fanatics to force the door to
accomplish our destruction. Others spit at us and abused us
through a small window, through which one fellow levelled a
blunderbuss at us, which was struck up by our keepers and
himself thrust back. At last Ameenoollah made his appearance,
and threatened us with instant death. Some of his people most
officiously advanced to make good his word, until pushed back
by the Giljye chiefs, who remonstrated with this iniquitous old
monster, their master, whom they persuaded to relieve us from
his hateful presence. During the afternoon, a human hand was
held up in mockery to us at the window. We said that it had
belonged to an European, but were not aware at the time that it
was actually the hand of the poor Envoy. Of all the Mahomedans
assembled in the room discussing the events of the day, one
only, an old moollah, openly and fearlessly condemned the acts
of his brethren, declaring that the treachery was abominable,
and a disgrace to Islam. At night they brought us food, and
gave us each a postheen to sleep on. At midnight we were
awakened to go to the house of Mahomed Akber in the city.
Mahomed Shah Khan then, with the meanness common to all
Affghans of rank, robbed Lawrence of his watch, while his
brother did me a similar favour. I had been plundered of my
rings and every thing else previously, by the understrappers.
"Reaching Mahomed Akber's abode, we were shown into the room
where he lay in bed. He received us with great outward show of
courtesy, assuring us of the welfare of the Envoy and Trevor,
but there was a constraint in his manner for which I could not
account. We were shortly taken to another apartment, where we
found Skinner, who had returned, being on parole, early in the
morning. Doubt and gloom marked our meeting, and the latter was
fearfully deepened by the intelligence which we now received
from our fellow-captive of the base murder of Sir William and
Trevor. He informed us that the head of the former had been
carried about the city in triumph. We of course spent a
miserable night. The next day we were taken under a strong
guard to the house of Zuman Khan, where a council of the Khans
were being held. Here we found Captains Conolly and Airey, who
had some days previously been sent to the hurwah's house as
hostage for the performance of certain parts of the treaty
which was to have been entered into. A violent discussion took
place, in which Mahomed Akber bore the most prominent part. We
were vehemently accused of treachery, and every thing that was
bad, and told that the whole of the transactions of the night
previous had been a trick of Mahomed Akber, and Ameenoollah, to
ascertain the Envoy's sincerity. They declared that they would
now grant us no terms, save on the surrender of the whole of
the married families as hostages, all the guns, ammunition, and
treasure. At this time Conolly told me that on the preceding
day the Envoy's head had been paraded about in the court-yard;
that his and Trevor's bodies had been hung up in the public
bazar, or _chouk_; and that it was with the greatest difficulty
that the old hurwah, Zuman Khan, had saved him and Airey from
being murdered by a body of fanatics, who had attempted to rush
into the room where they were. Also, that previous to the
arrival of Lawrence, Skinner, and myself, Mahomed Akber had
been relating the events of the preceding day to the _Jeerga_
or council, and that he had unguardedly avowed having, while
endeavouring to force the Envoy either to mount on horseback or
to move more quickly, _struck_ him; and that, seeing Conolly's
eyes fastened upon him with an expression of intense
indignation, he had altered the phrase and said, 'I mean I
_pushed_ him.' After an immense deal of gabble, a proposal for
a renewal of the treaty, not, however, demanding all the guns,
was determined to be sent to the cantonments, and Skinner,
Lawrence, and myself were marched back to Akber's house,
enduring _en route_ all manner of threats and insults. Here we
were closely confined in an inner apartment, which was indeed
necessary for our safety. That evening we received a visit from
Mahomed Akber, Sultan Jan, and several other Affghans. Mahomed
Akber exhibited his double-barrelled pistols to us, which he
had worn the previous day, requesting us to put their locks to
rights, something being amiss. _Two of the barrels had been
recently discharged_, which he endeavoured in a most confused
way to account for by saying, that he had been charged by a
havildar of the escort, and had fired both barrels at him. Now
all the escort had run away without even attempting to charge,
the only man who advanced to the rescue having been a Hindoo
Jemadar of Chuprassies, who was instantly cut to pieces by the
assembled Ghazees. This defence he made without any accusation
on our part, betraying the anxiety of a liar to be believed. On
the 26th, Captain Lawrence was taken to the house of
Ameenoollah, whence he did not return to us. Captain Skinner
and myself remained in Akber's house until the 30th. During
this time we were civilly treated, and conversed with numbers
of Affghan gentlemen who came to visit us. Some of them
asserted that the Envoy had been murdered by the unruly
soldiery. Others could not deny that Akber himself was the
assassin. For two or three days we had a fellow-prisoner in
poor Sirwar Khan, who had been deceived throughout the whole
matter, and out of whom they were then endeavouring to screw
money. He, of course, was aware from his countrymen, that not
only had Akber committed the murder, but that he protested to
the Ghazees that he gloried in the deed. On one occasion a
moonshee of Major Pottinger, who had escaped from Charekhar,
named Mohun Beer, came direct from the presence of Mahomed
Akber to visit us. He told us that Mahomed Akber had begun to
see the impolicy of having murdered the Envoy, which fact he
had just avowed to him, shedding many tears, either of
pretended remorse or of real vexation at having committed
himself. On several occasions Mahomed Akber personally, and by
deputy, besought Skinner and myself to give him advice as to
how he was to extricate himself from the dilemma in which he
was placed, more than once endeavouring to excuse himself for
not having effectually protected the Envoy, by saying that Sir
William had drawn a sword-stick upon him. It seems that
meanwhile the renewed negotiations with Major Pottinger, who
had assumed the Envoy's place in cantonments, had been brought
to a head; for on the night of the 30th, Akber furnished me
with an Affghan dress, (Skinner already wore one,) and sent us
both back to cantonments. Several Affghans, with whom I fell in
afterwards, protested to me that they had seen Mahomed Akber
shoot the Envoy with his own hand; amongst them Meerza Báoodeen
Khan, who, being an old acquaintance, always retained a
sneaking kindness for the English.
"I am, my dear Eyre, yours very truly,
"C. MACKENZIE.
"Cabul, 29th July, 1842."
The negotiations were now renewed by Major Pottinger, who had been
requested by General Elphinstone to assume the unenviable office of
political agent and adviser.
"The additional clauses in the treaty now proposed for our
renewed acceptance were--1st. That we should leave behind our
guns, excepting six. 2nd. That we should immediately give up
all our treasures. 3d. That the hostages should be all
exchanged for married men, with their wives and families. The
difficulties of Major Pottinger's position will be readily
perceived, when it is borne in mind that he had before him the
most conclusive evidence of the late Envoy's ill-advised
intrigue with Mahomed Akber Khan, in direct violation of that
very treaty which was now once more tendered for
consideration."
A sum of fourteen lacs of rupees, about L.140,000, was also demanded,
which was said to be payable to the several chiefs on the promise of the
late Envoy.
Major Pottinger, at a council of war convened by the General, "declared
his conviction that no confidence could be placed in any treaty formed
with the Affghan chiefs; that, under such circumstances, to bind the
hands of the Government by promising to evacuate the country, and to
restore the deposed Ameer, and to waste, moreover, so much public money
merely to save our own lives and property, would be inconsistent with
the duty we owed to our country and the Government we served; and that
the only honourable course would be, either to hold out at Cabul, or to
force our immediate retreat to Jellalabad."
"This however, the officers composing the council, one and all declared
to be impracticable, owing to the want of provisions, the surrender of
the surrounding forts, and the insuperable difficulties of the road at
the present season." The new treaty was therefore, forthwith accepted.
The demand of the chiefs, that married officers with their families
should be left as hostages, was successfully resisted. Captains
Drummond, Walsh, Warburton, and Webb, were accepted in their place, and
on the 29th went to join Captains Conolly and Airey at the house of
Nuwab Zuman Khan. Lieutenant Haughton and a portion of the sick and
wounded, were sent into the city, and placed under the protection of the
chiefs. "Three of the Shah's guns, with the greater portion of our
treasure, were made over during the day, much to the evident disgust of
the soldiery." On the following day, "the remainder of the sick went
into the city, Lieutenant Evans, H.M. 44th foot, being placed in
command, and Dr Campbell, 54th native infantry, with Dr Berwick of the
mission, in medical charge of the whole. Two more of the Shah's guns
were given up. It snowed hard the whole day."
"_January_ 5.--Affairs continued in the same unsettled state to this
date. The chiefs postponed our departure from day to day on various
pretexts.... Numerous cautions were received from various well-wishers,
to place no confidence in the professions of the chiefs, who had sworn
together to accomplish our entire destruction."
It is not our intention to offer any lengthened comments on these
details. They require none. The facts, if they be correctly stated,
speak for themselves; and, for reasons already referred to, we are
unwilling to anticipate the result of the judicial investigation now
understood to be in progress. This much, however, we may be permitted to
say, that the traces of fatal disunion amongst ourselves will, we fear,
be made every where apparent. It is notorious that Sir William
Macnaghten and Sir Alexander Burnes were on terms the reverse of
cordial. The Envoy had no confidence in the General. The General was
disgusted with the authority the Envoy had assumed, even in matters
exclusively military--and, debilitated by disease, was unable always to
assert his authority even in his own family. The arrival of General
Shelton in the cantonments does not appear to have tended to restore
harmony, cordiality, or confidence, or even to have revived the drooping
courage of the troops, or to have renovated the feelings of obedience,
and given effect to the bonds of discipline, which had been too much
relaxed. But, even after admitting all these things, much more still
remains to be explained before we can account for all that has
happened--before we can understand how the political authorities came to
reject every evidence of approaching danger, and therefore to be quite
unprepared for it when it came. Why no effort was made on the first day
to put down the insurrection: Why, in the arrangements for the defence
of the cantonments, the commisariat fort was neglected, and the other
forts neither occupied nor destroyed: Why almost every detachment that
was sent out was too small to effect its object: Why, with a force of
nearly six thousand men, we should never on any one occasion have had
two thousand in the field, and, as in the action at Beymaroo, only one
gun: Why so many orders appear to have been disregarded; why so few were
punctually obeyed.
"At last the fatal morning dawned (the 6th January) which was
to witness the departure of the Cabul force from the
cantonments in which it had endured a two months' siege.
* * * * *
"Dreary indeed was the scene over which, with drooping spirits
and dismal forebodings, we had to bend our unwilling steps.
Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain with one
unspotted sheet of dazzling whiteness; and so intensely bitter
was the cold, as to penetrate and defy the defences of the
warmest clothing."
Encumbered with baggage, crowded with 12,000 camp-followers, and
accompanied by many helpless women and children, of all ranks and of all
ages--with misery before, and death behind, and treachery all around
them--with little hope of successful resistance if attacked, without
tents enough to cover them, and without food or fuel for the march, 4500
fighting men, with nine guns, set out on this march of death.
At 9 A.M. the advance moved out, but was delayed for upwards of an hour
at the river, having found the temporary bridge incomplete; and it was
noon ere the road was clear for the main column, which, with its long
train of loaded camels, continued to pour out of the gate until the
evening, by which time thousands of Affghans thronged the area of the
cantonment rending the air with exulting cries, and committing every
kind of atrocity. Before the rearguard commenced its march it was night;
but by the light of the burning buildings the Affghan marksmen laid
Lieut. Hardyman, and fifty rank and file, lifeless on the snow. The
order of march was soon lost; scores of sepoys and camp-followers sat
down in despair to perish, and it was 2 A.M. before the rearguard
reached the camp at Bygram, a distance of five miles. Here all was
confusion; different regiments, with baggage, camp-followers, camels,
and horses, mixed up together. The cold towards morning became more
intense, and thousands were lying on the bare snow, without shelter,
fire, or food. Several died during the night, amongst whom was an
European conductor; and the proportion of those who escaped without
frostbites was small. Yet this was but the _beginning_ of sorrows.
_January 7th_.--At 8 A.M. the force moved on in the same inextricable
confusion. Already nearly half the sepoys, from sheer inability to keep
their ranks, had joined the crowd of non-combatants. The rearguard was
attacked, and much baggage lost, and one of the guns having been
overturned, was taken by the Affghans, whose cavalry charged into the
very heart of the column.
Akber Khan said, that the force had been attacked because it had marched
contrary to the wish of the chiefs. He insisted that it should halt, and
promised to supply food, forage, and fuel for the troops, but demanded
six more hostages, which were given. These terms having been agreed to,
the firing ceased for the present, and the army encamped at Bootkhak,
where the confusion was indescribable. "Night again," says Lieutenant
Eyre, "closed over us, with its attendant horrors--starvation, cold,
exhaustion, death."
At an early hour on the 8th the Affghans commenced firing into the camp;
and as they collected in considerable numbers, Major Thain led the 44th
to attack them. In this business the regiment behaved with a resolution
and gallantry worthy of British soldiers. Again Akber Khan demanded
hostages. Again they were given, and again the firing ceased. This seems
to prove that Akber Khan had the power, if he had chosen to exert it, to
restrain those tribes. Once more the living mass of men and animals was
put in motion. The frost had so crippled the hands and feet of the
strongest men, as to prostrate their powers and to incapacitate them for
service.
The Khoord-Cabul pass, which they were about to enter, is about five
miles long, shut in by lofty hills, and by precipices of 500 or 600 feet
in height, whose summits approach one another in some parts to within
about fifty or sixty yards. Down the centre dashed a torrent, bordered
with ice, which was crossed about eight-and-twenty times.
While in this dark and narrow gorge, a hot fire was opened upon the
advance, with whom were several ladies, who, seeing no other chance of
safety, galloped forwards, "running the gauntlet of the enemy's bullets,
which whizzed in hundreds about their ears, until they were fairly out
of the pass. Providentially the whole escaped, except Lady Sale, who was
slightly wounded in the arm." Several of Akber Khan's chief adherents
exerted themselves in vain to restrain the Giljyes; and as the crowd
moved onward into the thickest of the fire, the slaughter was fearful.
Another horse-artillery gun was abandoned, and the whole of its
artillerymen slain, and some of the children of the officers became
prisoners. It is supposed that 3000 souls perished in the pass, amongst
whom were many officers.
"On the force reaching Khoord-Cabul, snow began to fall, and
continued till morning. Only four small tents were saved, of
which one belonged to the General: two were devoted to the
ladies and children, and one was given up to the sick; but an
immense number of poor wounded wretches wandered about the camp
destitute of shelter, and perished during the night. Groans of
misery and distress assailed the ear from all quarters. We had
ascended to a still colder climate than we had left behind, and
we were without tents, fuel, or food: the snow was the only bed
for all, and of many, ere morning, it proved the
_winding-sheet_. It is only marvellous that any should have
survived that fearful night!
"_January 9th_.--Another morning dawned, awakening thousands to
increased misery; and many a wretched survivor cast looks of
envy at his comrades, who lay stretched beside him in the
quiet sleep of death. Daylight was the signal for a renewal of
that confusion which attended every movement of the force."
Many of the troops and followers moved without orders at 8 A.M., but
were recalled by the General, in consequence of an arrangement with
Akber Khan. "This delay, and prolongation of their sufferings in the
snow, of which one more march would have carried them clear, made a very
unfavourable impression on the minds of the native soldiery, who now,
for the first time, began very generally to entertain the idea of
deserting." And it is not to be wondered at, that the instinct of
self-preservation should have led them to falter in their fealty when
the condition of the whole army had become utterly hopeless.
Akber Khan now proposed that the ladies and children should be made over
to his care; and, anxious to save them further suffering, the General
gave his consent to the arrangement, permitting their husbands and the
wounded officers to accompany them.
"Up to this time scarcely one of the ladies had tasted a meal
since leaving Cabul. Some had infants a few days old at the
breast, and were unable to stand without assistance. Others
were so far advanced in pregnancy, that, under ordinary
circumstances, a walk across a drawing-room would have been an
exertion; yet these helpless women, with their young families,
had already been obliged to rough it on the backs of camels,
and on the tops of the baggage yaboos: those who had a horse to
ride, or were capable of sitting on one, were considered
fortunate indeed. Most had been without shelter since quitting
the cantonment--their servants had nearly all deserted or been
killed--and, with the exception of Lady Macnaghten and Mrs
Trevor, they had lost all their baggage, having nothing in the
world left but the clothes on their backs; _those_, in the case
of some of the invalids, consisted of _night dresses_ in which
they had started from Cabul in their litters. Under such
circumstances, a few more hours would probably have seen some
of them stiffening corpses. The offer of Mahomed Akber was
consequently their only chance of preservation. The husbands,
better clothed and hardy, would have infinitely preferred
taking their chance with the troops; but where is the man who
would prefer his own safety, when he thought he could by his
presence assist and console those near and dear to him?
"It is not, therefore, wonderful, that from persons so
circumstanced the General's proposal should have met with
little opposition, although it was a matter of serious doubt
whether the whole were not rushing into the very jaws of death,
by placing themselves at the mercy of a man who had so lately
imbrued his hands in the blood of a British envoy, whom he had
lured to destruction by similar professions of peace and
good-will."
Anticipating an attack, the troops paraded to repel it, and it was now
found that the 44th mustered only 100 files, and the native infantry
regiments about sixty each. "The promises of Mahomed Akber to provide
food and fuel were unfulfilled, and another night of starvation and cold
consigned more victims to a miserable death."
_January_ 10.--At break of day all was again confusion, every one
hurrying to the front, and dreading above all things to be left in the
rear. The Europeans were the only efficient men left, the Hindostanees
having suffered so severely from the frost in their hands and feet, that
few could hold a musket, much less pull a trigger. The enemy had
occupied the rocks above the gorge, and thence poured a destructive fire
upon the column as it slowly advanced. Fresh numbers fell at every
volley. The sepoys, unable to use their arms, cast them away, and, with
the followers, fled for their lives.
"The Affghans now rushed down upon their helpless and
unresisting victims sword in hand, and a general massacre took
place. The last small remnant of the native infantry regiments
were here scattered and destroyed; and the public treasure,
with all the remaining baggage, fell into the hands of the
enemy. Meanwhile, the advance, after pushing through the Tungee
with great loss, had reached Kubbur-i-Jubbar, about five miles
a-head, without more opposition. Here they halted to enable the
rear to join, but, from the few stragglers who from time to
time came up, the astounding truth was brought to light, that
of all who had that morning marched from Khoord-Cabul they were
almost the sole survivors, nearly the whole of the main and
rear columns having been cut off and destroyed. About 50
horse-artillerymen, with one twelve-pounder howitzer, 70 files
H.M.'s 44th, and 150 cavalry troopers, now composed the whole
Cabul force; but, notwithstanding the slaughter and dispersion
that had taken place, the camp-followers still formed a
considerable body."
Another remonstrance was now addressed to Akber Khan. He declared, in
reply, his inability to restrain the Giljyes. As the troops entered a
narrow defile at the foot of the Huft Kotul, they found it strewn with
the dead bodies of their companions. A destructive fire was maintained
on the troops from the heights on either side, and fresh numbers of dead
and wounded lined the course of the stream. "Brigadier Shelton commanded
the rear with a few Europeans, and but for his persevering energy and
unflinching fortitude in repelling the assailants, it is probable the
whole would have been there sacrificed." They encamped in the Tezeen
valley, having lost 12,000 men since leaving Cabul; fifteen officers had
been killed and wounded in this day's march.
After resting three hours, they marched, under cover of the darkness, at
seven P.M. Here the last gun was abandoned, and with it Dr Cardew, whose
zeal and gallantry had endeared him to the soldiers; and a little
further on Dr Duff was left on the road in a state of utter exhaustion.
"Bodies of the neighbouring tribes were by this time on the
alert, and fired at random from the heights, it being
fortunately too dark for them to aim with precision; but the
panic-stricken camp-followers now resembled a herd of startled
deer, and fluctuated backwards and forwards, _en masse_, at
every shot, blocking up the entire road, and fatally retarding
the progress of the little body of soldiers who, under
Brigadier Shelton, brought up the rear.
"At Burik-àb a heavy fire was encountered by the hindmost from
some caves near the road-side, occasioning fresh disorder,
which continued all the way to Kutter-Sung, where the advance
arrived at dawn of day, and awaited the junction of the rear,
which did not take place till 8 A.M."
_January_ 11.-- ...
"From Kutter-Sung to Jugdulluk it was one continued conflict;
Brigadier Shelton, with his brave little band in the rear,
holding overwhelming numbers in check, and literally performing
wonders. But no efforts could avail to ward off the withering
fire of juzails, which from all sides assailed the crowded
column, lining the road with bleeding carcasses. About three
P.M. the advance reached Jugdulluk, and took up its position
behind some ruined walls that crowned a height by the
road-side. To show an imposing front, the officers extended
themselves in line, and Captain Grant, assistant
adjutant-general, at the same moment received a wound in the
face. From this eminence they cheered their comrades under
Brigadier Shelton in the rear, as they still struggled their
way gallantly along every foot of ground, perseveringly
followed up by their merciless enemy, until they arrived at
their ground. But even here rest was denied them; for the
Affghans, immediately occupying two hills which commanded the
position, kept up a fire from which the walls of the enclosure
afforded but a partial shelter.
"The exhausted troops and followers now began to suffer greatly
from thirst, which they were unable to satisfy. A tempting
stream trickled near the foot of the hill, but to venture down
to it was certain death. Some snow that covered the ground was
eagerly devoured, but increased, instead of alleviating, their
sufferings. The raw flesh of three bullocks, which had
fortunately been saved, was served out to the soldiers, and
ravenously swallowed."
About half-past three Akber Khan sent for Capt. Skinner, who promptly
obeyed the call, hoping still to effect some arrangement for the
preservation of those who survived. The men now threw themselves down,
hoping for a brief repose, but the enemy poured volleys from the heights
into the enclosures in rapid succession. Captain Bygrave, with about
fifteen brave Europeans, sallied forth, determined to drive the enemy
from the heights or perish in the attempt. They succeeded; but the
enemy, who had fled before them, returned and resumed their fatal fire.
At five P.M. Captain Skinner returned with a message from Akber Khan,
requesting the presence of the General at a conference, and demanding
Brigadier Shelton and Capt. Johnson as hostages for the surrender of
Jellalabad. The troops saw the departure of these officers with despair,
feeling assured that these treacherous negotiations "were preparatory to
fresh sacrifices of blood." The General and his companions were received
with every outward token of kindness, and they were supplied with food,
but they were not permitted to return. The Sirdar put the General off
with promises; and at seven P.M. on the 12th, firing being heard, it was
ascertained that the troops, impatient of further delay, had actually
moved off. Before their departure Captain Skinner had been treacherously
shot. They had been exposed during the whole day to the fire of the
enemy--"sally after sally had been made by the Europeans, bravely led by
Major Thain, Captain Bygrave, and Lieutenants Wade and Macartney, but
again and again the enemy returned to worry and destroy. Night came, and
all further delay in such a place being useless, the whole sallied
forth, determined to pursue the route to Jellalabad at all risks."
The sick and the wounded were necessarily abandoned to their fate. For
some time the Giljyes seemed not to be on the alert; but in the defile,
at the top of the rise, further progress was obstructed by barriers
formed of prickly trees. This caused great delay, and "a terrible fire
was poured in from all quarters--a massacre even worse than that of the
Tunga Tarikee[24] commenced, the Affghans rushing in furiously upon the
pent-up crowd of troops and followers, and committing wholesale
slaughter. A miserable remnant managed to clear the barriers. Twelve
officers, amongst whom was Brigadier Anquetil, were killed. Upwards of
forty others succeeded in pushing through, about twelve of whom, being
pretty well mounted, rode on a-head of the rest with the few remaining
cavalry, intending to make the best of their way to Jellalabad."
[24] Strait of Darkness.
The country now became more open--the Europeans dispersed, in small
parties under different officers. The Giljyes were too much occupied in
plundering the dead to pursue them, but they were much delayed by the
amiable anxiety of the men to carry on their wounded comrades. The
morning of the 13th dawned as they approached Gundamuk, revealing to the
enemy the insignificance of their numerical strength; and they were
compelled, by the vigorous assaults of the Giljyes, to take up a
defensive position on a height to the left of the road, "where they
made a resolute stand, determined to sell their lives at the dearest
possible price. At this time they could only muster about twenty
muskets." An attempt to effect an amicable arrangement terminated in a
renewal of hostilities, and "the enemy marked off man after man, and
officer after officer, with unerring aim. Parties of Affghans rushed up
at intervals to complete the work of extermination, but were as often
driven back by the still dauntless handful of invincibles. At length,
all being wounded more or less, a final onset of the enemy, sword in
hand, terminated the unequal struggle and completed the dismal tragedy."
Captain Souter, who was wounded, and three or four privates, were spared
and led away captive. Major Griffiths and Captain Blewitt, having
descended to confer with the enemy, had been previously led off. Of the
twelve officers who had gone on in advance eleven were destroyed, and Dr
Brydon alone of the whole Cabul force reached Jellalabad.
"Such was the memorable retreat of the British army from Cabul, which,
viewed in all its circumstances--in the military conduct which preceded
and brought about such a consummation, the treachery, disaster, and
suffering which accompanied it--is, perhaps, without a parallel in
history."
* * * * *