The Military Operations at Cabul, which ended in the Retreat
and Destruction of the British Army, January 1842; with a
Journal of Imprisonment in Affghanistan. By Lieutenant Vincent
Eyre, Bengal Artillery, late Deputy-Commissary of Ordnance at
Cabul. London: John Murray.
This is the first connected account that has appeared of the military
disasters that befell the British army at Cabul--by far the most signal
reverse our arms have ever sustained in Asia. The narrative is full of a
deep and painful interest, which becomes more and more intense as we
approach the closing catastrophe. The simple detail of the daily
occurrences stirs up our strongest feelings of indignation, pity; scorn,
admiration, horror, and grief. The tale is told without art, or any
attempt at artificial ornament, and in a spirit of manly and
gentlemanlike forbearance from angry comment or invective, that is
highly creditable to the author, and gives us a very favourable opinion
both of his head and of his heart.
That a British army of nearly six thousand fighting men--occupying a
position chosen and fortified by our own officers, and having
possession, within two miles of this fortified cantonment, of a strong
citadel commanding the greater part of the town of Cabul, a small
portion only of whose population rose against us at the commencement of
the revolt--should not only have made no vigorous effort to crush the
insurrection; but that it should ultimately have been driven by an
undisciplined Asiatic mob, destitute of artillery, and which never
appears to have collected in one place above 10,000 men, to seek safety
in a humiliating capitulation, by which it surrendered the greater part
of its artillery, military stores, and treasure, and undertook to
evacuate the whole country on condition of receiving a safe conduct from
the rebel chiefs, on whose faith they placed, and could place, no
reliance; and finally, that, of about 4500 armed soldiers and twelve
thousand camp-followers, many of whom were also armed, who set out from
Cabul, only one man, and he wounded, should have arrived at Jellalabad;
is an amount of misfortune so far exceeding every rational anticipation
of evil, that we should have been entitled to assume that these
unparalleled military disasters arose from a series of unparalleled
errors, even if we had not had, as we now have, the authority of Lord
Ellenborough for asserting the fact.
But every nation, and more particularly the British nation, is little
inclined to pardon the men under whose command any portion of its army
or of its navy may have been beaten. Great Britain, reposing entire
confidence in the courage of her men, and little accustomed to see them
overthrown, is keenly jealous of the reputation of her forces; and, as
she is ever prompt to reward military excellence and success, she heaps
unmeasured obloquy on those who may have subjected her to the
degradation of defeat. When our forces have encountered a reverse, or
even when the success has not been commensurate with the hopes that had
been indulged; the public mind has ever been prone to condemn the
commanders; and wherever there has been reason to believe that errors
have been committed which have led to disaster, there has been little
disposition to make any allowances for the circumstances of the case, or
for the fallibility of man; but, on the contrary, the nation has too
often evinced a fierce desire to punish the leaders for the
mortification the country has been made to endure.
This feeling may tend to elevate the standard of military character, but
it must at the same time preclude the probability of calm or impartial
examination, so far as the great body of the nation is concerned; and it
is therefore the more obviously incumbent on those who, from a more
intimate knowledge of the facts, or from habits of more deliberate
investigation, are not carried away by the tide of popular indignation
and invective, to weigh the circumstances with conscientious caution,
and to await the result of judicial enquiry before they venture to
apportion the blame or even to estimate its amount.
"The following notes," says Lieutenant Eyre in his preface,
"were penned to relieve the monotony of an Affghan prison,
while yet the events which they record continued fresh in my
memory. I now give them publicity, in the belief that the
information which they contain on the dreadful scenes lately
enacted in Affghanistan, though clothed in a homely garb, will
scarcely fail to be acceptable to many of my countrymen, both
in India and England, who may be ignorant of the chief
particulars. The time, from the 2d November 1841, on which day
the sudden popular outbreak at Cabul took place, to the 13th
January 1842, which witnessed the annihilation of the last
small remnant of our unhappy force at Gundamuk, was one
continued tragedy. The massacre of Sir Alexander Burnes and his
associates,--the loss of our commissariat fort--the defeat of
our troops under Brigadier Shelton at Beymaroo--the treacherous
assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, our envoy and
minister--and lastly, the disastrous retreat and utter
destruction of a force consisting of 5000 fighting men and
upwards of 12,000 camp-followers,--are events which will
assuredly rouse the British Lion from his repose, and excite an
indignant spirit of enquiry in every breast. Men will not be
satisfied, in this case, with a bare statement of the facts,
but they will doubtless require to be made acquainted with the
causes which brought about such awful effects. We have lost six
entire regiments of infantry, three companies of sappers, a
troop of European horse-artillery, half the mountain-train
battery, nearly a whole regiment of regular cavalry, and four
squadrons of irregular horse, besides a well-stocked magazine,
which _alone_, taking into consideration the cost of transport
up to Cabul, may be estimated at nearly a million sterling.
From first to last, not less than 104 British officers have
fallen: their names will be found in the Appendix. I glance but
slightly at the _political_ events of this period, not having
been one of the initiated; and I do not pretend to enter into
_minute_ particulars with regard to even our _military_
transactions, more especially those not immediately connected
with the sad catastrophe which it has been my ill fortune to
witness, and whereof I now endeavour to portray the leading
features. In these notes I have been careful to state only what
I know to be undeniable facts. I have set down nothing on mere
hearsay evidence, nor any thing which cannot be attested by
living witnesses or by existing documentary evidence. In
treating of matters which occurred under my personal
observation, it has been difficult to avoid _altogether_ the
occasional expression of my own individual opinion: but I hope
it will be found that I have made no observations bearing hard
on men or measures, that are either uncalled for, or will not
stand the test of future investigation."
After the surrender of Dost Mahomed Khan, there remained in Affghanistan
no chief who possessed a dominant power or influence that made him
formidable to the government of Shah Shoojah, or to his English allies;
and the kingdom of Cabul seemed to be gradually, though slowly,
subsiding into comparative tranquillity. In the summer of the year 1841,
the authority of the sovereign appears to have been acknowledged in
almost every part of his dominions. A partial revolt of the Giljyes was
speedily suppressed by our troops. The Kohistan, or more correctly,
Koohdaman of Cabul, a mountainous tract, inhabited by a warlike people,
over whom the authority of the governments of the country had long been
imperfect and precarious, had submitted, or had ceased to resist. A
detachment from the British force at Kandahar, after defeating Akter
Khan, who had been instigated by the Vezeer of Herat to rebel, swept the
country of Zemindawer, drove Akter Khan a fugitive to Herat, received
the submission of all the chiefs in that part of the kingdom, and
secured the persons of such as it was not thought prudent to leave at
large in those districts.
The Shah's authority was not believed to be so firmly established, that
both Sir William Macnaghten, the British envoy at Cabul, who had
recently been appointed governor of Bombay, and Sir Alexander Burnes, on
whom the duties of the envoy would have devolved on Sir W. Macnaghten's
departure, thought that the time had arrived when the amount of the
British force in Affghanistan, which was so heavy a charge upon the
revenues of India, might with safety be reduced, and General Sale's
brigade was ordered to hold itself in readiness to march to Jellalabad,
on its route to India.
Even at this time, however, Major Pottinger, the political agent in
Kohistan, including, we presume, the Koohdaman, thought the force at his
disposal too small to maintain the tranquillity of the district; and the
chiefs of the valley of Nijrow, or Nijrab, a valley of Kohistan Proper,
had not only refused to submit, but had harboured the restless and
disaffected who had made themselves obnoxious to the Shah's government.
But although Major Pottinger had no confidence in the good feelings of
the people of his own district to the government, and even seems to have
anticipated insurrection, no movement of that description had yet taken
place.
Early in September, however, Captain Hay, who was with a small force in
the Zoormut valley, situated nearly west from Ghuznee and south from
Cabul, having been induced by the representations of Moollah Momin--the
collector of the revenues, who was a Barikzye, and a near relation of
one of the leaders of the insurrection, in which he afterwards himself
took an active part--to move against a fort in which the murderers of
Colonel Herring were said to have taken shelter, the inhabitants
resisted his demands, and fired upon the troops. His force was found
insufficient to reduce it, and he was obliged to retire; a stronger
force was therefore sent, on the approach of which the people fled to
the hills, and the forts they had evacuated were blown up. This
occurrence was not calculated seriously to disturb the confident hopes
that were entertained of the permanent tranquillity of the country; but
before the force employed upon that expedition had returned to Cabul, a
formidable insurrection had broken out in another quarter.
"Early in October," says Lieutenant Eyre, "three Giljye chiefs
of note suddenly quitted Cabul, after plundering a rich cafila
at Tezeen, and took up a strong position in the difficult
defile of Khoord-Cabul, about ten miles from the capital, thus
blocking up the pass, and cutting off our communication with
Hindostan. Intelligence had not very long previously been
received that Mahomed Akber Khan, second son of the ex-ruler
Dost Mahomed Khan, had arrived at Bameean from Khooloom, for
the supposed purpose of carrying on intrigues against the
Government. It is remarkable that he is nearly connected by
marriage with Mahomed Shah Khan and Dost Mahomed Khan, also
Giljyes, who almost immediately joined the above-mentioned
chiefs. Mahomed Akber had, since the deposition of his father,
never ceased to foster feelings of intense hatred towards the
English nation; and, though often urged by the fallen ruler to
deliver himself up, had resolutely preferred the life of a
houseless exile to one of mean dependence on the bounty of his
enemies. It seems, therefore, in the highest degree probable
that this hostile movement on the part of the Eastern Giljyes
was the result of his influence over them, combined with other
causes which will be hereafter mentioned."
The other causes here alluded to, appear to be "the deep offence given
to the Giljyes by the ill-advised reduction of their annual stipends, a
measure which had been forced upon Sir William Macnaghten by Lord
Auckland. This they considered, and with some show of justice, as a
breach of faith on the part of our Government."
We presume that it is not Mr Eyre's intention to assert that this
particular measure was ordered by Lord Auckland, but merely that the
rigid economy enforced by his lordship, led the Envoy to have recourse
to this measure as one of the means by which the general expenditure
might be diminished.
Formidable as this revolt of the Giljyes was found to be, we are led to
suspect that both Sir W. Macnaghten and Sir A. Burnes were misled,
probably by the Shah's government, very greatly to underrate its
importance and its danger. The force under Colonel Monteath,[16] which
in the first instance was sent to suppress it, was so small that it was
not only unable to penetrate into the country it was intended to
overawe or to subdue, but it was immediately attacked in its camp,
within ten miles of Cabul, and lost thirty-five sepoys killed and
wounded.
[16] 35th Reg. N.I.; 100 sappers; 1 squadron 5th Cav.; 2 guns.
Two days afterwards, the 11th October, General Sale marched from Cabul
with H.M.'s 13th light infantry, to join Colonel Monteath's camp at
Bootkhak; and the following morning the whole proceeded to force the
pass of Khoord-Cabul, which was effected with some loss. The 13th
returned through the pass to Bootkhak, suffering from the fire of
parties which still lurked among the rocks. The remainder of the brigade
encamped at Khoord-Cabul, at the further extremity of the defile. In
this divided position the brigade remained for some days, and both camps
had to sustain night attacks from the Affghans--"that on the 35th native
infantry being peculiarly disastrous, from the treachery of the Affghan
horse, who admitted the enemy within their lines, by which our troops
were exposed to a fire from the least suspected quarter. Many of our
gallant sepoys, and Lieutenant Jenkins, thus met their death."
On the 20th October, General Sale, having been reinforced, marched to
Khoord-Cabul; "and about the 22d, the whole force there assembled, with
Captain Macgregor, political agent, marched to Tezeen, encountering much
determined opposition on the road."
"By this time it was too evident that the whole of the Eastern Giljyes
had risen in one common league against us." The treacherous proceedings
of their chief or viceroy, Humza Khan, which had for some time been
suspected, were now discovered, and he was arrested by order of Shah
Shoojah.
"It must be remarked," says Lieutenant Eyre, "that for some
time previous to these overt acts of rebellion, the always
strong and ill-repressed personal dislike of the Affghans
towards Europeans, had been manifested in a more than usually
open manner in and about Cabul. Officers had been insulted and
attempts made to assassinate them. Two Europeans had been
murdered, as also several camp-followers; but these and other
signs of the approaching storm had unfortunately been passed
over as mere ebullitions of private angry feeling. This
incredulity and apathy is the more to be lamented, as it was
pretty well known that on the occasion of the _shub-khoon_, or
first night attack on the 35th native infantry at Bootkhak, a
large portion of our assailants consisted of the armed
retainers of the different men of consequence in Cabul itself,
large parties of whom had been seen proceeding from the city to
the scene of action on the evening of the attack, and
afterwards returning. Although these men had to pass either
through the heart or round the skirts of our camp at Seeah
Sung, it was not deemed expedient even to question them, far
less to detain them.
"On the 26th October, General Sale started in the direction of
Gundamuk, Captain Macgregor having half-frightened,
half-cajoled the refractory Giljye chiefs into what proved to
have been a most hollow truce."
On the same day, the 37th native infantry, three companies of the Shah's
sappers under Captain Walsh, and three guns of the mountain train under
Lieutenant Green, retraced their steps towards Cabul, where the sappers,
pushing on, arrived unopposed; but the rest of the detachment was
attacked on the 2d November--on the afternoon of which day, Major
Griffiths, who commanded it, received orders to force his way to Cabul,
where the insurrection had that morning broken out. His march through
the pass, and from Bootkhak to Cabul, was one continued conflict; but
the gallantry of his troops, and the excellence of his own dispositions,
enabled him to carry the whole of his wounded and baggage safe to the
cantonments at Cabul, where he arrived about three o'clock on the
morning of the 3d November, followed almost to the gates by about 3000
Giljyes.
The causes of the insurrection in the capital are not yet fully
ascertained, or, if ascertained, they have not been made public.
Lieutenant Eyre does not attempt to account for it; but he gives us the
following memorandum of Sir W. Macnaghten's, found, we presume, amongst
his papers after his death:--
"The immediate cause of the outbreak in the capital was a
seditious letter addressed by Abdoollah Khan to several chiefs
of influence at Cabul, stating that it was the design of the
Envoy to seize and send them all to London! The principal
rebels met on the previous night, and, relying on the
inflammable feelings of the people of Cabul, they pretended
that the King had issued an order to put all infidels to death;
having previously forged an order from him for our destruction,
by the common process of washing out the contents of a genuine
paper, with the exception of the seal, and substituting their
own wicked inventions."
But this invention, though it was probably one of the means employed by
the conspirators to increase the number of their associates, can hardly
be admitted to account for the insurrection. The arrival of Akber Khan
at Bameean, the revolt of the Giljyes, the previous flight of their
chiefs from Cabul, and the almost simultaneous attack of our posts in
the Koohdaman, (called by Lieutenant Eyre, Kohistan,) on the 3d
November--the attack of a party conducting prisoners from Candahar to
Ghuznee--the immediate interruption of every line of communication with
Cabul--and the selection of the season of the year the most favourable
to the success of the insurrection, with many other less important
circumstances, combine to force upon us the opinion, that the intention
to attack the Cabul force, so soon as it should have become isolated by
the approach of winter, had been entertained, and the plan of operations
concerted, for some considerable time before the insurrection broke out.
That many who wished for its success may have been slow to commit
themselves, is to be presumed, and that vigorous measures might, if
resorted to on the first day, have suppressed the revolt, is probable;
but it can hardly be doubted that we must look far deeper, and further
back, for the causes which united the Affghan nation against us.
The will of their chiefs and spiritual leaders--fanatical zeal, and
hatred of the domination of a race whom they regarded as infidels--may
have been sufficient to incite the lower orders to any acts of violence,
or even to the persevering efforts they made to extirpate the English.
In their eyes the contest would assume the character of a religious
war--of a crusade; and every man who took up arms in that cause, would
go to battle with the conviction that, if he should be slain, his soul
would go at once to paradise, and that, if he slew an enemy of the
faith, he thereby also secured to himself eternal happiness. But the
chiefs are not so full of faith; and although we would not altogether
exclude religious antipathy as an incentive, we may safely assume that
something more immediately affecting their temporal and personal
concerns must with them, or at least with the large majority, have been
the true motives of the conspiracy--of their desire to expel the English
from their country. Nor is it difficult to conceive what some of these
motives may have been. The former sovereigns of Affghanistan, even the
most firmly-established and the most vigorous, had no other means of
enforcing their commands, than by employing the forces of one part of
the nation to make their authority respected in another; but men who
were jealous of their own independence as chiefs, were not likely to aid
the sovereign in any attempt to destroy the substantial power, the
importance, or the independence of their class; and although a
refractory chief might occasionally, by the aid of his feudal enemies,
be taken or destroyed, and his property plundered, his place was filled
by a relation, and the order remained unbroken. The Affghan chiefs had
thus enjoyed, under their native governments, an amount of independence
which was incompatible with the system we introduced--supported as that
system was by our military means. These men must have seen that their
own power and importance, and even their security against the caprices
of their sovereign, could not long be preserved--that they were about to
be subjected as well as governed--to be deprived of all power to resist
the oppressions of their own government, because its will was enforced
by an army which had no sympathy with the nation, and which was
therefore ready to use its formidable strength to compel unqualified
submission to the sovereign's commands.
The British army may not have been employed to enforce any unjust
command--its movements may have been less, far less, injurious to the
countries through which it passed than those of an Affghan army would
have been, and its power in the moment of success may have been far less
abused; but still it gave a strength to the arm of the sovereign, which
was incompatible with the maintenance of the pre-existing civil and
social institutions or condition of the country, and especially of the
relative positions of the sovereign and the noble. In the measures we
adopted to establish the authority of Shah Shoojah, we attempted to
carry out a system of government which could only have been made
successful by a total revolution in the social condition of the people,
and in the relative positions of classes; and as these revolutions are
not effected in a few years, the attempt failed.[17]
[17] The system, unpalatable as it was to the nation, might, no
doubt, have been carried through by an overwhelming military
force, if the country had been worth the cost; but if it was
not intended to retain permanent possession of Affghanistan, it
appears to us that the native government was far too much
interfered with--that the British envoy, the British officers
employed in the districts and provinces, and the British army,
stood too much between the Shah and his subjects--that we were
forming a government which it would be impossible to work in
our absence, and creating a state of things which, the longer
it might endure, would have made more remote the time at which
our interference could be dispensed with.
But if the predominance of our influence and of our military power, and
the effects of the system we introduced, tended to depress the chiefs,
it must have still more injuriously affected or threatened the power of
the priesthood.
This we believe to have been one of the primary and most essential
causes of the revolt--this it was that made the insurrection spread with
such rapidity, and that finally united the whole nation against us. With
the aristocracy and the hierarchy of the country, it must have been but
a question of courage and of means--a calculation of the probability of
success; and as that probability was greatly increased by the results of
the first movement at Cabul, and by the inertness of our army after the
first outbreak, all acquired courage enough to aid in doing what all had
previously desired to see done.
But if there be any justice in this view of the state of feeling in
Affghanistan, even in the moments of its greatest tranquillity, it is
difficult to account for the confidence with which the political
authorities charged with the management of our affairs in that country
looked to the future, and the indifference with which they appear to
have regarded what now must appear to every one else to have been very
significant, and even alarming, intimations of dissaffection in Cabul,
and hostility in the neighbouring districts.
But it is time we should return to Lieutenant Eyre, whose narrative of
facts is infinitely more attractive than any speculations we could
offer.
"At an early hour this morning, (2d November 1841,) the
startling intelligence was brought from the city, that a
popular outbreak had taken place; that the shops were all
closed; and that a general attack had been made on the houses
of all British officers residing in Cabul. About 8 A.M., a
hurried note was received by the Envoy in cantonments from Sir
Alexander Burnes, stating that the minds of the people had been
strongly excited by some mischievous reports, but expressing a
hope that he should succeed in quelling the commotion. About 9
A.M., however, a rumour was circulated, which afterwards proved
but too well founded, that Sir Alexander had been murdered, and
Captain Johnson's treasury plundered. Flames were now seen to
issue from that part of the city where they dwelt, and it was
too apparent that the endeavour to appease the people by quiet
means had failed, and that it would be necessary to have
recourse to stronger measures. The report of firearms was
incessant, and seemed to extend through the town from end to
end.
"Sir William Macnaghten now called upon General Elphinstone to
act. An order was accordingly sent to Brigadier Shelton, then
encamped at Seeah Sung, about a mile and a half distant from
cantonments, to march forthwith to the _Bala Hissar_, or _royal
citadel_, where his Majesty Shah Shoojah resided, commanding a
large portion of the city, with the following troops:--viz. one
company of H.M. 44th foot; a wing of the 54th regiment native
infantry, under Major Ewart; the 6th regiment Shah's infantry,
under Captain Hopkins; and four horse-artillery guns, under
Captain Nicholl; and on arrival there, to act according to his
own judgment, after consulting with the King.
"The remainder of the troops encamped at Seeah Sung were at the
same time ordered into cantonments: viz. H.M. 44th foot, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Mackerell; two horse-artillery guns, under
Lieutenant Waller; and Anderson's irregular horse. A messenger
was likewise dispatched to recall the 37th native infantry from
Khoord-Cabul without delay. The troops at this time in
cantonments were as follows: viz. 5th regiment native infantry,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver; a wing of 54th native
infantry; five six-pounder field guns, with a detachment of the
Shah's artillery, under Lieutenant Warburton; the Envoy's
body-guard; a troop of Skinner's horse, and another of local
horse, under Lieutenant Walker; three companies of the Shah's
sappers, under Captain Walsh; and about twenty men of the
Company's sappers, attached to Captain Paton,
assistant-quartermaster-general.
"Widely spread and formidable as this insurrection proved to be
afterwards, it was at first a mere insignificant ebullition of
discontent on the part of a few desperate and restless men,
which military energy and promptitude ought to have crushed in
the bud. Its commencement was an attack by certainly not 300
men on the dwellings of Sir Alexander Burnes and Captain
Johnson, paymaster to the Shah's force; and so little did Sir
Alexander himself apprehend serious consequences, that he not
only refused, on its first breaking out, to comply with the
earnest entreaties of the wuzeer to accompany him to the Bala
Hissar, but actually forbade his guard to fire on the
assailants, attempting to check what he supposed to be a mere
riot, by haranguing the attacking party from the gallery of his
house. The result was fatal to himself; for in spite of the
devoted gallantry of the sepoys, who composed his guard, and
that of the paymaster's office and treasury on the opposite
side of the street, who yielded their trust only with their
latest breath, the latter were plundered, and his two
companions, Lieutenant William Broadfoot of the Bengal European
regiment, and his brother, Lieutenant Burnes of the Bombay
army, were massacred, in common with every man, woman, and
child found on the premises, by these bloodthirsty miscreants.
Lieutenant Broadfoot killed five or six men with his own hand,
before he was shot down.
"The King, who was in the Bala Hissar, being somewhat startled
by the increasing number of the rioters, although not at the
time aware, so far as we can judge, of the assassination of Sir
A. Burnes, dispatched one of his sons with a number of his
immediate Affghan retainers, and that corps of Hindoostanees
commonly called Campbell's regiment, with two guns, to restore
order: no support, however, was rendered to these by our
troops, whose leaders appeared so thunderstruck by the
intelligence of the outbreak, as to be incapable of adopting
more than the most puerile defensive measures. Even Sir William
Macnaghten seemed, from a note received at this time from him
by Captain Trevor, to apprehend little danger, as he therein
expressed his perfect confidence as to the speedy and complete
success of Campbell's Hindoostanees in putting an end to the
disturbance. Such, however, was not the case; for the enemy,
encouraged by our inaction, increased rapidly in spirit and
numbers, and drove back the King's guard with great slaughter,
the guns being with difficulty saved.
"It must be understood that Captain Trevor lived at this time
with his family in a strong _bourge_ or tower, situated by the
river side, near the Kuzzilbash quarter, which, on the west, is
wholly distinct from the remainder of the city. Within
musket-shot, on the opposite side of the river, in the
direction of the strong and populous village of Deh Affghan, is
a fort of some size, then used as a godown, or storehouse, by
the Shah's commissariat, part of it being occupied by Brigadier
Anquetil, commanding the Shah's force. Close to this fort,
divided by a narrow watercourse, was the house of Captain
Troup, brigade-major of the Shah's force, perfectly defensible
against musketry. Both Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup had
gone out on horseback early in the morning towards cantonments,
and were unable to return; but the above fort and house
contained the usual guard of sepoys; and in a garden close at
hand, called the _Yaboo-Khaneh_, or lines of the
baggage-cattle, was a small detachment of the Shah's sappers
and miners, and a party of Captain Ferris's juzailchees.
Captain Trevor's tower was capable of being made good against a
much stronger force than the rebels at this present time could
have collected, had it been properly garrisoned.
"As it was, the Hazirbash,[18] or King's lifeguards, were,
under Captain Trevor, congregated round their leader, to
protect him and his family; which duty, it will be seen, they
well performed under very trying circumstances. For what took
place in this quarter I beg to refer to a communication made to
me at my request by Captain Colin Mackenzie,[19] assistant
political agent at Peshawur, who then occupied the godown
portion of the fort above mentioned, which will be found
hereafter.[20]
"I have already stated that Brigadier Shelton was, early in the
day, directed to proceed with part of the Seeah Sung force to
occupy the Bala Hissar, and, if requisite, to lead his troops
against the insurgents. Captain Lawrence, military secretary to
the Envoy, was at the same time sent forward to prepare the
King for that officer's reception. Taking with him four
troopers of the body-guard, he was galloping along the main
road, when, shortly after crossing the river, he was suddenly
attacked by an Affghan, who, rushing from behind a wall, made a
desperate cut at him with a large two-handed knife. He
dexterously avoided the blow by spurring his horse on one side;
but, passing onwards, he was fired upon by about fifty men,
who, having seen his approach, ran out from the Lahore gate of
the city to intercept him. He reached the Bala Hissar safe,
where he found the King apparently in a state of great
agitation, he having witnessed the assault from the window of
his palace. His Majesty expressed an eager desire to conform to
the Envoy's wishes in all respects in this emergency.
"Captain Lawrence was still conferring with the King, when
Lieutenant Sturt, our executive engineer, rushed into the
palace, stabbed in three places about the face and neck. He had
been sent by Brigadier Shelton to make arrangements for the
accommodation of the troops, and had reached the gate of the
_Dewan Khaneh_, or hall of audience, when the attempt at his
life was made by some one who had concealed himself there for
that purpose, and who immediately effected his escape. The
wounds were fortunately not dangerous, and Lieutenant Sturt was
conveyed back to cantonments in the King's own palanquin, under
a strong escort. Soon after this Brigadier Shelton's force
arrived; but the day was suffered to pass without any thing
being done demonstrative of British energy and power. The
murder of our countrymen, and the spoliation of public and
private property, was perpetrated with impunity within a mile
of our cantonment, and under the very walls of the Bala Hissar.
"Such an exhibition on our part taught the enemy their
strength--confirmed against us those who, however disposed to
join in the rebellion, had hitherto kept aloof from prudential
motives, and ultimately encouraged the nation to unite as one
man for our destruction.
"It was, in fact, the crisis of all others calculated to test
the qualities of a military commander. Whilst, however, it is
impossible for an unprejudiced person to approve the military
dispositions of this eventful period, it is equally our duty to
discriminate. The most _responsible_ party is not always the
most culpable. It would be the height of injustice to a most
amiable and gallant officer not to notice the long course of
painful and wearing illness, which had materially affected the
nerves, and probably even the intellect, of General
Elphinstone; cruelly incapacitating him, so far as he was
personally concerned, from acting in this sudden emergency with
the promptitude and vigour necessary for our preservation.
"Unhappily, Sir William Macnaghten at first made light of the
insurrection, and, by his representations as to the general
feeling of the people towards us, not only deluded himself, but
misled the General in council. The unwelcome truth was soon
forced upon us, that in the whole Affghan nation we could not
reckon on a single friend.
"But though no active measures of aggression were taken, all
necessary preparations were made to secure the cantonment
against attack. It fell to my own lot to place every available
gun in position round the works. Besides the guns already
mentioned, we had in the magazine 6 nine-pounder iron guns, 3
twenty-four pounder howitzers, 1 twelve-pounder ditto, and 3
5-1/2-inch mortars; but the detail of artillerymen fell very
short of what was required to man all these efficiently,
consisting of only 80 Punjabees belonging to the Shah, under
Lieutenant Warburton, very insufficiently instructed, and of
doubtful fidelity."
[18] Affghan horse.
[19] The detachment under Captain Mackenzie consisted of about
seventy juzailchees or Affghan riflemen, and thirty sappers,
who had been left in the town in charge of the wives and
children of the corps, all of whom were brought safe into the
cantonments by that gallant party, who fought their way from
the heart of the town.
[20] "I am sorry to say that this document has not reached me
with the rest of the manuscript. I have not struck out the
reference, because there is hope that it still exists, and may
yet be appended to this narrative. The loss of any thing else
from Captain Mackenzie's pen will be regretted by all who read
his other communication, the account of the Envoy's
murder.--EDITOR."
The fortified cantonment occupied by the British troops was a quadrangle
of 1000 yards long by 600 broad, with round flanking bastions at each
corner, every one of which was commanded by some fort or hill. To one
end of this work was attached the Mission compound and enclosure, about
half as large as the cantonment, surrounded by a simple wall. This space
required to be defended in time of war, and it rendered the whole of one
face of the cantonment nugatory for purposes of defence. The profile of
the works themselves was weak, being in fact an ordinary field-work. But
the most strange and unaccountable circumstance recorded by Lieutenant
Eyre respecting these military arrangements, is certainly the fact, that
the commissariat stores, containing whatever the army possessed of food
or clothing, was not within the circuit of these fortified cantonments,
but in a detached and weak fort, the gate of which was commanded by
another building at a short distance. Our author thus sums up his
observations on these cantonments:--
"In fact, we were so hemmed in on all sides, that, when the
rebellion became general, the troops could not move out a dozen
paces from either gate without being exposed to the fire of
some neighbouring hostile fort, garrisoned, too, by marksmen
who seldom missed their aim. The country around us was likewise
full of impediments to the movements of artillery and cavalry,
being in many places flooded, and every where closely
intersected by deep water-cuts.
"I cannot help adding, in conclusion, that almost all the
calamities that befell our ill-starred force may be traced more
or less to the defects of our position; and that our cantonment
at Cabul, whether we look to its situation or its construction,
must ever be spoken of as a disgrace to our military skill and
judgment."
_Nov_. 3.--The 37th native infantry arrived in cantonments, as
previously stated.
"Early in the afternoon, a detachment under Major Swayne,
consisting of two companies 5th native infantry, one of H.M.
44th, and two H.A. guns under Lieutenant Waller, proceeded out
of the western gate towards the city, to effect, if possible, a
junction at the Lahore gate with a part of Brigadier Shelton's
force from the Bala Hissar. They drove back and defeated a
party of the enemy who occupied the road near the Shah Bagh,
but had to encounter a sharp fire from the Kohistan gate of the
city, and from the walls of various enclosures, behind which a
number of marksmen had concealed themselves, as also from the
fort of Mahmood Khan, commanding the road along which they had
to pass. Lieutenant Waller and several sepoys were wounded.
Major Swayne, observing the whole line of road towards the
Lahore gate strongly occupied by some Affghan horse and
juzailchees, and fearing that he would be unable to effect the
object in view with so small a force unsupported by cavalry,
retired into cantonments. Shortly after this, a large body of
the rebels having issued from the fort of Mahmood Khan, 900
yards southeast of cantonments, extended themselves in a line
along the bank of the river, displaying a flag; an iron
nine-pounder was brought to bear on them from our southeast
bastion, and a round or two of shrapnell caused them to seek
shelter behind some neighbouring banks, whence, after some
desultory firing on both sides, they retired.
"Whatever hopes may have been entertained, up to this period,
of a speedy termination to the insurrection, they began now to
wax fainter every hour, and an order was dispatched to the
officer commanding at Candahar to lose no time in sending to
our assistance the 16th and 43d regiments native infantry,
(which were under orders for India,) together with a troop of
horse-artillery and half a regiment of cavalry; an order was
likewise sent off to recall General Sale with his brigade from
Gundamuk. Captain John Conolly, political assistant to the
Envoy, went into the Bala Hissar early this morning, to remain
with the King, and to render every assistance in his power to
Brigadier Shelton."
On this day Lieutenants Maule and Wheeler were murdered at Kahdarrah in
Koohdaman; the Kohistan regiment of Affghans which they commanded,
offering no resistance to the rebels. The two officers defended
themselves resolutely for some time, but fell under the fire of the
enemy. Lieutenant Maule had been warned of his danger by a friendly
native, but refused to desert his post.
On this day also Lieutenant Rattray, Major Pottinger's assistant, was
treacherously murdered at Lughmanee, during a conference to which he had
been invited, and within sight of the small fort in which these two
gentlemen resided. This act was followed by a general insurrection in
Kohistan and Koohdaman, which terminated in the destruction of the
Goorkha regiment at Charikar, and the slaughter of all the Europeans in
that district except Major Pottinger and Lieutenant Haughton, both
severely wounded, who, with one sepoy and one or two followers,
succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Affghan parties, who were
patrolling the roads for the purpose of intercepting them, and at length
arrived in cantonments, having actually passed at night through the town
and bazars of Cabul. For the details of this interesting and afflicting
episode in Mr Eyre's narrative, we must refer our readers to the work
itself. Major Pottinger appears on this occasion to have exhibited the
same high courage and promptitude and vigour in action, and the same
resources in difficulty, that made him conspicuous at Herat, and
Lieutenant Haughton was no unworthy companion of such a man.
"_November_ 4.--The enemy having taken strong possession of the
_Shah Bagh_, or King's Garden, and thrown a garrison into the
fort of Mahomed Shereef, nearly opposite the bazar, effectually
prevented any communication between the cantonment and
commissariat fort, the gate of which latter was commanded by
the gate of the Shah Bagh on the other side of the road.
"Ensign Warren of the 5th native infantry at this time occupied
the commissariat fort with 100 men, and having reported that he
was very hard pressed by the enemy, and in danger of being
completely cut off, the General, either forgetful or unaware at
the moment of the important fact, that upon the possession of
this fort we were entirely dependent for provisions, and
anxious only to save the lives of men whom he believed to be in
imminent peril, hastily gave directions that a party under the
command of Captain Swayne, of H.M.'s 44th regiment, should
proceed immediately to bring off Ensign Warren and his garrison
to cantonments, abandoning the fort to the enemy. A few minutes
previously an attempt to relieve him had been made by Ensign
Gordon, with a company of the 37th native infantry and eleven
camels laden with ammunition; but the party were driven back,
and Ensign Gordon killed. Captain Swayne now accordingly
proceeded towards the spot with two companies of H.M.'s 44th;
scarcely had they issued from cantonments ere a sharp and
destructive fire was poured upon them from Mahomed Shereef's
fort which, as they proceeded, was taken up by the marksmen in
the Shah Bagh, under whose deadly aim both officers and men
suffered severely; Captains Swayne and Robinson of the 44th
being killed, and Lieutenants Hallahan, Evans, and Fortye
wounded in this disastrous business. It now seemed to the
officer, on whom the command had devolved, impracticable to
bring off Ensign Warren's party without risking the
annihilation of his own, which had already sustained so rapid
and severe a loss in officers; he therefore returned forthwith
to cantonments. In the course of the evening another attempt
was made by a party of the 5th light cavalry; but they
encountered so severe a fire from the neighbouring enclosures
as obliged them to return without effecting their desired
object, with the loss of eight troopers killed and fourteen
badly wounded. Captain Boyd, the assistant commissary-general,
having meanwhile been made acquainted with the General's
intention to give up the fort, hastened to lay before him the
disastrous consequences that would ensue from so doing. He
stated that the place contained, besides large supplies of
wheat and attah, all his stores of rum, medicine, clothing,
&c., the value of which might be estimated at four lacs of
rupees; that to abandon such valuable property would not only
expose the force to the immediate want of the necessaries of
life, but would infallibly inspire the enemy with tenfold
courage. He added that we had not above two days' supply of
provisions in cantonments, and that neither himself nor Captain
Johnson of the Shah's commissariat had any prospect of
procuring them elsewhere under existing circumstances. In
consequence of this strong representation on the part of
Captain Boyd, the General sent immediate orders to Ensign
Warren to hold out the fort to the last extremity. (Ensign
Warren, it must be remarked, denied having received this note.)
Early in the night a letter was received from him to the effect
that he believed the enemy were busily engaged in mining one of
the towers, and that such was the alarm among the sepoys that
several of them had actually made their escape over the wall to
cantonments; that the enemy were making preparations to burn
down the gate; and that, considering the temper of his men, he
did not expect to be able to hold out many hours longer, unless
reinforced without delay. In reply to this he was informed
that he would be reinforced by two A.M.
"At about nine o'clock P.M., there was an assembly of staff and
other officers at the General's house, when the Envoy came in
and expressed his serious conviction, that unless Mahomed
Shereef's fort were taken that very night, we should lose the
commissariat fort, or at all events be unable to bring out of
it provisions for the troops. The disaster of the morning
rendered the General extremely unwilling to expose his officers
and men to any similar peril; but, on the other hand, it was
urged that the darkness of the night would nullify the enemy's
fire, who would also most likely be taken unawares, as it was
not the custom of the Affghans to maintain a very strict watch
at night. A man in Captain Johnson's employ was accordingly
sent out to reconnoitre the place. He returned in a few minutes
with the intelligence that about twenty men were seated outside
the fort near the gate, smoking and talking; and, from what he
overheard of their conversation, he judged the garrison to be
very small, and unable to resist a sudden onset. The debate was
now resumed, but another hour passed and the General could not
make up his mind. A second spy was dispatched, whose report
tended to corroborate what the first had said. I was then sent
to Lieutenant Sturt, the engineer, who was nearly recovered
from his wounds, for his opinion. He at first expressed himself
in favour of an immediate attack, but, on hearing that some of
the enemy were on the watch at the gate, he judged it prudent
to defer the assault till an early hour in the morning: this
decided the General, though not before several hours had
slipped away in fruitless discussion.
"Orders were at last given for a detachment to be in readiness
at four A.M. at the Kohistan gate; and Captain Bellew,
deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, volunteered to blow
open the gate; another party of H.M.'s 44th were at the same
time to issue by a cut in the south face of the rampart, and
march simultaneously towards the commissariat fort, to
reinforce the garrison. Morning had, however, well dawned ere
the men could be got under arms; and they were on the point of
marching off, when it was reported that Ensign Warren had just
arrived in cantonments with his garrison, having evacuated the
fort. It seems that the enemy had actually set fire to the
gate; and Ensign Warren, seeing no prospect of a reinforcement,
and expecting the enemy every moment to rush in, led out his
men by a hole which he had prepared in the wall. Being called
upon in a public letter from the assistant adjutant-general to
state his reasons for abandoning his post, he replied that he
was ready to do so before a court of enquiry, which he
requested might be assembled to investigate his conduct; it was
not, however, deemed expedient to comply with his request.
"It is beyond a doubt that our feeble and ineffectual defence
of this fort, and the valuable booty it yielded, was the first
_fatal_ blow to our supremacy at Cabul, and at once determined
those chiefs--and more particularly the Kuzzilbashes--who had
hitherto remained neutral, to join in the general combination
to drive us from the country."
"_Nov_. 5.--It no sooner became generally known that the commissariat
fort, upon which we were dependent for supplies, had been abandoned,
than one universal feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison. Nor can
I describe," says Lieutenant Eyre, "the impatience of the troops, but
especially of the native portion, to be led out for its recapture--a
feeling that was by no means diminished by seeing the Affghans crossing
and re-crossing the road between the commissariat fort and the gate of
the _Shah Bagh_, laden with the provisions upon which had depended our
ability to make a protracted defence."
That the whole commissariat should have been deposited in a detached
fort is extraordinary and inexcusable, but that the garrison of that
fort should not have been reinforced, is even more unintelligible; and
that a sufficient force was not at once sent to succour and protect it
when attacked, is altogether unaccountable. General Elphinstone was
disabled by his infirmities from efficiently discharging the duties that
had devolved upon him, but he appears to have been ready to act upon the
suggestion of others. What then were his staff about?--some of them are
said to have had little difficulty or delicacy in urging their own views
upon their commander. Did they not suggest to him in time the
importance, the necessity, of saving the commissariat at all hazards?
At the suggestion of Lieutenant Eyre, it was determined to attempt the
capture of Mahomed Shereef's fort by blowing open the gate, Mr Eyre
volunteering to keep the road clear for the storming party with the
guns. "The General agreed; a storming party under Major Swayne, 6th
native infantry, was ordered; the powder bags were got ready, and at
noon we issued from the western gate." "For twenty minutes the guns were
worked under a very sharp fire from the fort;" but "Major Swayne,
instead of rushing forward with his men as had been agreed, had in the
mean time remained stationary, under cover of the wall by the
road-side." The General, seeing that the attempt had failed, recalled
the troops into cantonments.
"_Nov_. 6.--It was now determined to take the fort of Mahomed Shereef by
regular breach and assault." A practicable breach was effected, and a
storming party composed of one company H.M. 44th, under Ensign Raban,
one ditto 5th native infantry, under Lieutenant Deas, and one ditto 37th
native infantry, under Lieutenant Steer, the whole commanded by Major
Griffiths, speedily carried the place. "Poor Raban was shot through the
heart when conspicuously waving a flag on the summit of the breach."
As this fort adjoined the Shah Bagh, it was deemed advisable to dislodge
the enemy from the latter if possible. This was partially effected, and,
had advantage been taken of the opportunity to occupy the buildings of
the garden gateway, "immediate re-possession could have been taken of
the commissariat fort opposite, which had not yet been emptied of half
its contents."
In the mean time, our cavalry were engaged in an affair with the enemy's
horse, in which we appear to have had the advantage. "The officers
gallantly headed their men, and encountered about an equal number of the
enemy who advanced to meet them. A hand-to-hand encounter took place,
which ended in the Affghan horse retreating to the plain, leaving the
hill in our possession. In this affair, Captain Anderson personally
engaged and slew the brother in-law of Abdoolah Khan."
But the Affghans collected from various quarters; the juzailchees,[21]
under Captain Mackenzie, were driven with great loss from the Shah Bagh
which they had entered; and a gun which had been employed to clear that
enclosure was with difficulty saved. Our troops having been drawn up on
the plain, remained prepared to receive an attack from the enemy, who
gradually retired as the night closed in.
[21] Affghan riflemen.
_Nov_. 8.--An attempt was made by the enemy to mine a tower of the fort
that had been taken, which they could not have done had the gate of the
Shah Bagh been occupied. The chief cause of anxiety now was the empty
state of the granary. Even with high bribes and liberal payment, the
Envoy could not procure sufficient for daily consumption. The plan of
the enemy now was to starve us out, and the chiefs exerted all their
influence to prevent our being supplied.
_Nov_. 9.--The General's weak state of health rendered it necessary to
relieve him from the command of the garrison, and at the earnest request
of the Envoy, Brigadier Shelton was summoned from the Bala Hissar, "in
the hope that, by heartily co-operating with the Envoy and General, he
would strengthen their hands and rouse the sinking confidence of the
troops. He entered cantonments this morning, bringing with him one H.A.
gun, one mountain-train ditto, one company H.M.'s 44th, the Shah's 6th
infantry, and a small supply of attah (flour.)"
"_November_ 10.--Henceforward Brigadier Shelton bore a
conspicuous part in the drama, upon the issue of which so much
depended. He had, however, from the very first, seemed to
despair of the force being able to hold out the winter at
Cabul, and strenuously advocated an immediate retreat to
Jellalabad.
"This sort of despondency proved, unhappily, very infectious.
It soon spread its baneful influence among the officers, and
was by them communicated to the soldiery. The number of
_croakers_ in garrison became perfectly frightful, lugubrious
looks and dismal prophecies being encountered every where. The
severe losses sustained by H.M.'s 44th under Captain Swayne, on
the 4th instant, had very much discouraged the men of that
regiment; and it is a lamentable fact that some of those
European soldiers, who were naturally expected to exhibit to
their native brethren in arms an example of endurance and
fortitude, were among the first to loose confidence, and give
vent to feelings of discontent at the duties imposed on them.
The evil seed, once sprung up, became more and more difficult
to eradicate, showing daily more and more how completely
demoralizing to the British soldier is the very idea of a
retreat.
"Sir William Macnaghten and his suite were altogether opposed
to Brigadier Shelton in this matter, it being in his (the
Envoy's) estimation a duty we owed the Government to retain our
post, at whatsoever risk. This difference of opinion, on a
question of such vital importance, was attended with unhappy
results, inasmuch as it deprived the General, in his hour of
need, of the strength which unanimity imparts, and produced an
uncommunicative and disheartening reserve in an emergency which
demanded the freest interchange of counsel and ideas."
On the morning of this day, large parties of the enemy's horse and foot
occupied the heights to the east and to the west of the cantonments,
which, it was supposed, they intended to assault. No attack was made;
but "on the eastern quarter, parties of the enemy, moving down into the
plain, occupied all the forts in that direction. ... At this time, not
above two days' provisions remained in garrison; and it was very clear,
that unless the enemy were quickly driven out from their new possession,
we should soon be completely hemmed in on all sides." At the Envoy's
urgent desire, he taking the entire responsibility on himself, the
General ordered a force, under Brigadier Shelton, to storm the
Rikabashee fort, which was within musket-shot of the cantonments, and
from which a galling fire had been poured into the Mission compound by
the Affghans. About noon, the troops assembled at the eastern gate; a
storming party of two companies from each regiment taking the lead,
preceded by Captain Bellew, who hurried forward to blow open the
gate--but missing the gate, he blew open a small wicket, through which
not more than two or three men could enter abreast, and these in a
stooping posture. A sharp fire was kept up from the walls, and many of
the bravest fell in attempting to force their entrance through the
wicket; but Colonel Mackerell of the 44th, and Lieutenant Bird of the
Shah's 6th infantry, with a handful of Europeans and a few sepoys,
forced their way in--the garrison fled through the gate which was at the
opposite side, and Colonel Mackerell and his little party closed it,
securing the chain with a bayonet; but, at this moment, some Affghan
horse charged round the corner--the cry of cavalry was raised--"the
Europeans gave way simultaneously with the sepoys--a bugler of the 6th
infantry, through mistake, sounded the retreat--and it became for a
time, a scene of _sauve qui peut_." In vain did the officers endeavour
to rally the men, and to lead them back to the rescue of their
commanding-officer and their comrades; only one man, private Stewart of
the 44th, listened to the appeal and returned.
"Let me here (says Lieutenant Eyre) do Brigadier Shelton justice: his
acknowledged courage redeemed the day." After great efforts, at last he
rallied them--again advancing to the attack, again they faltered. A
third time did the Brigadier bring on his men to the assault, which now
proved successful; but while this disgraceful scene was passing outside
the fort, the enemy had forced their way into it, and had cut to pieces
Colonel Mackerell and all his little party, except Lieutenant Bird, who,
with one sepoy, was found in a barricaded apartment, where these two
brave men had defended themselves till the return of the troops, killing
above thirty of the enemy by the fire of their two muskets.
Our loss on this occasion was not less than 200 killed and wounded; but
the results of this success, though dearly purchased, were important.
Four neighbouring forts were immediately evacuated by the enemy, and
occupied by our troops: they were found to contain 1400 maunds of grain,
of which about one-half was removed into cantonments immediately; but
Brigadier Shelton not having thought it prudent to place a guard for the
protection of the remainder, it was carried off during the night by the
Affghans. "Permanent possession was, however, taken of the Rikabashee
and Zoolfikar forts, and the towers of the remainder were blown up on
the following day."
It cannot fail to excite surprise, that these forts, which do not seem
to have been occupied by the enemy till the 10th, were not either
occupied or destroyed by the British troops before that day.
_Nov_. 13.--The enemy appeared in great force on the western heights,
where, having posted two guns, they fired into cantonments with
considerable precision. At the entreaty of the Envoy, it was determined
to attack them--a force, under Brigadier Shelton, moved out for that
purpose--the advance, under Major Thain, ascended the hill with great
gallantry; "but the enemy resolutely stood their ground at the summit of
the ridge, and unflinchingly received the discharge of our musketry,
which, strange to say, even at the short range of ten or twelve yards,
did little or no execution."
The fire of our guns, however, threw the Affghans into confusion. A
charge of cavalry drove them up the hill, and the infantry advancing,
carried the height, the enemy retreating along the ridge, closely
followed by our troops, and abandoning their guns to us; but, owing to
the misconduct of the troops, only one of them was carried away, the men
refusing to advance to drag off the other, which was therefore spiked by
Lieutenant Eyre, with the aid of one artilleryman.
"This was the last success our arms were destined to
experience. Henceforward it becomes my weary task to relate a
catalogue of errors, disasters, and difficulties, which,
following close upon each other, disgusted our officers,
disheartened our soldiers, and finally sunk us all into
irretrievable ruin, as though Heaven itself, by a combination
of evil circumstances, for its own inscrutable purposes, had
planned our downfall.