Since the day when Lord Auckland, by his famous proclamation in October
1838, "directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the
Indus," we have never ceased to denounce the invasion and continued
occupation of Affghanistan as equally unjust and impolitic[25]--unjust,
as directed against a people whose conduct had afforded us no legitimate
grounds of hostility, and against a ruler whose only offence was, that
he had accepted[26] the proffer from another quarter of that support and
alliance which we had denied to his earnest entreaty--and impolitic, as
tending not only to plunge us into an endless succession of ruinous and
unprofitable warfare, but to rouse against us an implacable spirit of
enmity, in a nation which had hitherto shown every disposition to
cultivate amicable relations with our Anglo-Indian Government. In all
points, our anticipations have been fatally verified. After more than
two years consumed in unavailing efforts to complete the reduction of
the country, our army of occupation was at last overwhelmed by the
universal and irresistible outbreak of an indignant and fanatic
population; and the restored monarch, Shah-Shoojah, ("whose popularity
throughout Affghanistan had been proved to the Governor-general by the
strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities") perished, as
soon as he lost the protection of foreign bayonets, by the hands of his
outraged countrymen.[27]
[25] See the articles "Persia, Affghanistan, and India," in
Jan. 1839--"Khiva, Central Asia, and Cabul," in April
1840--"Results of our Affghan Conquests," in Aug.
1841--"Affghanistan and India," in July 1842.
[26] It now seems even doubtful whether the famous letter of
Dost Mohammed to the Emperor of Russia, which constituted the
_gravamen_ of the charge against him, was ever really written,
or at least with his concurrence.--_Vide_ "Report of the
Colonial Society on the Affghan War," p. 35.
[27] The particulars of Shah-Shoojah's fate, which were unknown
when we last referred to the subject, have been since
ascertained. After the retreat of the English from Cabul, he
remained for some time secluded in the Bala-Hissar, observing
great caution in his intercourse with the insurgent leaders;
but he was at length prevailed upon, by assurances of loyalty
and fidelity, (about the middle of April,) to quit the
fortress, in order to head an army against Jellalabad. He had
only proceeded, however, a short distance from the city, when
his litter was fired upon by a party of musketeers placed in
ambush by a Doorauni chief named Soojah-ed-Dowlah; and the king
was shot dead on the spot. Such was the ultimate fate of a
prince, the vicissitudes of whose life almost exceed the
fictions of romance, and who possessed talents sufficient, in
more tranquil times, to have given _éclat_ to his reign. During
his exile at Loodiana, he composed in Persian a curious
narrative of his past adventures, a version of part of which
appears in the 30th volume of the _Asiatic Journal_.
The tottering and unsubstantial phantom of a _Doorauni kingdom_ vanished
at once and for ever--and the only remaining alternative was, (as we
stated the case in our number of last July,) "either to perpetrate a
second act of violence and national injustice, by reconquering
Affghanistan _for the vindication_ (as the phrase is) _of our military
honour_, and holding it without disguise as a province of our empire--or
to make the best of a bad bargain, by contenting ourselves with the
occupation of a few posts on the frontier, and leaving the unhappy
natives to recover, without foreign interference, from the dreadful
state of anarchy into which our irruption has thrown them." Fortunately
for British interests in the East, the latter course has been adopted.
After a succession of brilliant military triumphs, which, in the words
of Lord Ellenborough's recent proclamation, "have, in one short
campaign, avenged our late disasters upon every scene of past
misfortune," the evacuation of the country has been directed--not,
however, before a fortunate chance had procured the liberation of _all_
the prisoners who had fallen into the power of the Affghans in January
last; and ere this time, we trust, not a single British regiment remains
on the bloodstained soil of Affghanistan.
The proclamation above referred to,[28] (which we have given at length
at the conclusion of this article,) announcing these events, and
defining the line of policy in future to be pursued by the Anglo-Indian
Government, is in all respects a remarkable document. As a specimen of
frankness and plain speaking, it stands unique in the history of
diplomacy; and, accordingly, both its matter and its manner have been
made the subjects of unqualified censure by those scribes of the
Opposition press who, "content to dwell in forms for ever," have
accustomed themselves to regard the mystified protocols of Lord
Palmerston as the models of official style. The _Morning Chronicle_,
with amusing ignorance of the state of the public mind in India,
condemns the Governor-general for allowing it to become known to the
natives that the abandonment of Affghanistan was in consequence of a
change of policy! conceiving (we suppose) that our Indian subjects would
otherwise have believed the Cabul disasters to have formed part of the
original plan of the war, and to have veiled some purpose of inscrutable
wisdom; while the _Globe_, (Dec. 3,) after a reluctant admission that
"the policy itself of evacuating the country _may be wise_," would fain
deprive Lord Ellenborough of the credit of having originated this
decisive step, by an assertion that "we have discovered no proof that a
permanent possession of the country beyond the Indus was contemplated by
his predecessor." It would certainly have been somewhat premature in
Lord Auckland to have announced his ultimate intentions on this point
while the country in question was as yet but imperfectly subjugated, or
when our troops were subsequently almost driven out of it; but the views
of the then home Government, from which it is to be presumed that Lord
Auckland received his instructions, were pretty clearly revealed in the
House of Commons on the 10th of August last, by one whose authority the
_Globe_, at least, will scarcely dispute--by Lord Palmerston himself.
To prevent the possibility of misconstruction, we quote the words
attributed to the late Foreign Secretary. After drawing the somewhat
unwarrantable inference, from Sir Robert Peel's statement, "that no
immediate withdrawal of our troops from Candahar and Jellalabad was
contemplated," that an order had at one time been given for the
abandonment of Affghanistan, he proceeds--"I do trust that her Majesty's
Government will not carry into effect, either immediately or at _any_
future time, the arrangement thus contemplated. It was all very well
when we were in power, and it was suited to party purposes, to run down
any thing we had done, and to represent as valueless any acquisition on
which we may have prided ourselves--it was all very well to raise an
outcry against the Affghan expedition, and to undervalue the great
advantages which the possession of the country was calculated to afford
us--but I trust the Government will rise above any consideration of that
sort, and that they will give the matter their fair, dispassionate, and
deliberate consideration. I must say, I never was more convinced of any
thing in the whole course of my life--and I may be believed when I speak
my earnest conviction--that the most important interests of this
country, both commercial and political, would be sacrificed, if we were
to sacrifice the military possession of the country of Eastern
Affghanistan." Is it in the power of words to convey a clearer
admission, that the pledge embodied in Lord Auckland's manifesto--"to
withdraw the British army as soon as the independence and integrity of
Affghanistan should be secured by the establishment of the Shah"--was in
fact mere moonshine: and the real object of the expedition was the
conquest of a country advantageously situated for the defence of our
Indian frontier against (as it now appears) an imaginary invader? Thus
Napoleon, in December 1810, alleged "the necessity, in consequence of
the new order of things which has arisen, of new guarantees for the
security of my empire," as a pretext for that wholesale measure of
territorial spoliation in Northern Germany, which, from the umbrage it
gave Russia, proved ultimately the cause of his downfall: but it was
reserved for us of the present day, to hear a _British_ minister avow
and justify a violent and perfidious usurpation on the plea of political
expediency. It must indeed be admitted that, in the early stages of the
war, the utter iniquity of the measure met with but faint reprobation
from any party in the state: the nation, dazzled by the long-disused
splendours of military glory, was willing, without any very close
enquiry, to take upon trust all the assertions so confidently put forth
on the popularity of Shah-Shoojah, the hostile machinations of Dost
Mohammed, and the philanthropic and disinterested wishes of the Indian
Government for (to quote a notable phrase to which we have more than
once previously referred) "_the reconstruction of the social edifice_"
in Affghanistan. But now that all these subterfuges, flimsy as they were
at best, have been utterly dissipated by this undisguised declaration of
Lord Palmerston, that the real object of the war was to seize and hold
the country on our own account, the attempt of the _Globe_ to claim for
Lord Auckland the credit of having from the first contemplated a measure
thus vehemently protested against and disclaimed by the late official
leader of his party, is rather too barefaced to be passed over without
comment.
[28] It is singular that this proclamation was issued on the
fourth anniversary of Lord Auckland's "Declaration" of Oct. 1,
1838; and from the same place, Simla.
Without, however, occupying ourselves further in combating the attacks
of the Whig press on this proclamation, which may very well be left to
stand on its own merits, we now proceed to recapitulate the course of
the events which have, in a few months, so completely changed the aspect
of affairs beyond the Indus. When we took leave, in July last, of the
subject of the Affghan campaign, we left General Pollock, with the force
which had made its way through the Khyber Pass, still stationary at
Jellalabad, for want (as it was said) of camels and other means of
transport: while General Nott, at Candahar, not only held his ground,
but victoriously repulsed in the open field the Affghan _insurgents_,
(as it is the fashion to call them,) who were headed by the prince
Seifdar-Jung, son of Shah Shoojah! and General England, after his
repulse on the 28th of March at the Kojuck Pass, remained motionless at
Quettah. The latter officer (in consequence, as it is said, of
peremptory orders from General Nott to meet him on a given day at the
further side of the Pass) was the first to resume active operations; and
on the 28th of April, the works at Hykulzie in the Kojuck, which had
been unaccountably represented on the former occasion as most formidable
defences,[29] were carried without loss or difficulty, and the force
continued its march uninterrupted to Candahar. The fort of
Khelat-i-Ghiljie, lying about halfway between Candahar and Ghazni, was
at the sane time gallantly and successfully defended by handful of
Europeans and sepoys, till relieved by the advance of a division from
Candahar, which brought off the garrison, and razed the fortifications
of the place. Girishk, the hereditary stronghold of the Barukzye chiefs,
about eighty miles west of Candahar, was also dismantled and abandoned;
and all the troops in Western Affghanistan were thus concentrated under
the immediate command of General Nott, whose success in every encounter
with the Affghans continued to be so decisive, that all armed opposition
disappeared from the neighbourhood of Candahar; and the prince
Seifdar-Jung, despairing of the cause, of which he had perhaps been from
the first not a very willing supporter, came in and made his submission
to the British commander.
[29] "The fieldworks _believed to be described_ in the despatch
as 'consisting of a succession of breastworks, improved by a
ditch and abattis--the latter being filled with thorns,' turned
out to be a paltry stone wall, with a cut two feet deep, and of
corresponding width, to which the designation of ditch was most
grossly misapplied.... A score or two of active men might have
completed the work in a few days."--(Letter quoted in the
_Asiatic Journal_, Sept., p. 107.) On whom the blame of these
misrepresentations should be laid--whether on the officer who
reconnoitred the ground, or on the general who wrote the
despatch--does not very clearly appear: yet the political agent
at Quettah was removed from his charge, for not having given
notice of the construction in his vicinity of works which are
now proved to have had no existence!
During the progress of these triumphant operations in Western
Affghanistan, General Pollock still lay inactive at Jellalabad; and some
abortive attempts were made to negotiate with the dominant party at
Cabul for the release of the prisoners taken the preceding winter. Since
the death of Shah-Shoojah, the throne had been nominally filled by his
third son, Futteh-Jung, the only one of the princes who was on the spot;
but all the real power was vested, with the rank of vizier, in the hands
of Akhbar Khan, who had not only possessed himself of the Bala-Hissar
and the treasure of the late king, but had succeeded in recruiting the
forces of the Affghan league, by a reconciliation with Ameen-ullah
Khan,[30] the original leader of the outbreak, with whom he had formerly
been at variance. All efforts, however, to procure the liberation of the
captives, on any other condition than the liberation of Dost Mohammed,
and the evacuation of Affghanistan by the English, (as hostages for
which they had originally been given,) proved fruitless; and at length,
after more than four months' delay, during which several sharp affairs
had taken place with advanced bodies of the Affghans, General Pollock
moved forward with his whole force, on the 20th of August, against
Cabul. This city had again in the mean time become a scene of tumult and
disorder--the Kizilbashes or Persian inhabitants, as well as many of the
native chiefs, resisting the exactions of Akhbar Khan; who, at last,
irritated by the opposition to his measures, imprisoned the titular
shah, Futteh-Jung, in the Bala-Hissar; whence he succeeded after a time
in escaping, and made his appearance, in miserable plight, (Sept. 1,) at
the British headquarters at Futtehabad, between Jellalabad and
Gundamuck. The advance of the army was constantly opposed by detached
bodies of the enemy, and several spirited skirmishes took place:--till,
on the 13th of September, the main Affghan force, to the number of
16,000 men, under Akhbar Khan and other leaders, was descried on the
heights near Tazeen, (where the slaughter of our troops had taken place
in January,) at the entrance of the formidable defiles called the
Huft-Kothul, or Seven Passes. It is admitted on all hands that in this
last struggle, (as they believed, for independence,) the Affghans fought
with most distinguished gallantry, frequently charging sword in hand
upon the bayonets; but their irregular valour eventually gave way before
the discipline of their opponents, and a total rout took place. The
chiefs fled in various directions, "abandoning Cabul to the _avengers of
British wrongs_," who entered the city in triumph on the 15th, and
hoisted the British colours on the Bala-Hissar. The principal point now
remaining to be effected was the rescue of the prisoners whom Akhbar
Khan had carried off with him in his flight, with the intention (as was
rumoured) of transporting them into Turkestan; but from this peril they
were fortunately delivered by the venality of the chief to whose care
they had been temporarily intrusted; and on the 21st they all reached
the camp in safety, with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who was also
liberated, a few days later, by the voluntary act of Akhbar himself.[31]
[30] It was this chief whose betrayal or destruction Sir
William McNaghten is accused, on the authority of General
Elphinstone's correspondence, of having meditated, on the
occasion when he met with his own fate. We hope, for the honour
of the English name, that the memory of the late Resident at
Cabul may be cleared from this heavy imputation; but he
certainly cannot be acquitted of having, by his wilful
blindness and self-sufficiency, contributed to precipitate the
catastrophe to which he himself fell a victim. In proof of this
assertion, it is sufficient to refer to the tenor of his
remarks on the letter addressed to him by Sir A. Burnes on the
affairs of Cabul, August 7, 1840, which appeared some time
since in the _Bombay Times_, and afterwards in the _Asiatic
Journal_ for October and November last.
[31] The kindness and humanity which these unfortunate
_detenus_ experienced from first to last at the hands of
Akhbar, reflect the highest honour on the character of this
chief, whom it has been the fashion to hold up to execration as
a monster of perfidy and cruelty. As a contrast to this conduct
of the Affghan _barbarians_, it is worth while to refer to
Colonel Lindsay's narrative of his captivity in the dungeons of
Hyder and Tippoo, which has recently appeared in the _Asiatic
Journal_, September, December, 1842.
General Nott, meanwhile, in pursuance of his secret orders from the
Supreme Government, had been making preparations for abandoning
Candahar; and, on the 7th and 8th of August, the city was accordingly
evacuated, both by his corps and by the division of General England--the
Affghan prince, Seifdar-Jung, being left in possession of the place. The
routes of the two commanders were now separated. General England, with
an immense train of luggage, stores, &c., directed his march through the
Kojuck Pass to Quettah, which he reached with little opposition;--while
Nott, with a more lightly-equipped column, about 7000 strong, advanced
by Khelat-i-Ghiljie against Ghazni. This offensive movement appears to
have taken the Affghans at first by surprise; and it was not till he
arrived within thirty-eight miles of Ghazni that General Nott found his
progress opposed (August 30) by 12,000 men under the governor,
Shams-o-deen Khan, a cousin of Mohammed Akhbar. The dispersion of this
tumultuary array was apparently accomplished (as far as can be gathered
from the extremely laconic despatches of the General) without much
difficulty; and, on the 6th of September, after a sharp skirmish in the
environs, the British once more entered Ghazni. In the city and
neighbouring villages were found not fewer than 327 sepoys of the former
garrison, which had been massacred to a man (according to report)
immediately after the surrender; but notwithstanding this evidence of
the moderation with which the Affghans had used their triumph, General
Nott, (in obedience, as is said, to the _positive tenor of his
instructions_,) "directed the city of Ghazni, with the citadel and the
whole of its works, to be destroyed;" and this order appears, from the
engineer's report, to have been rigorously carried into effect. The mace
of Mamood Shah Ghaznevi, the first Moslem conqueror of Hindostan, and
the famous sandal-wood portals of his tomb, (once the gates of the great
Hindoo temple at Somnaut,[32]) were carried off as trophies: the ruins
of Ghazni were left as a monument of British vengeance; and General Nott,
resuming his march, and again routing Shams-o-deen Khan at the defiles
of Myden, effected his junction with General Pollock, on the 17th of
September, at Cabul; whence the united corps, together mustering 18,000
effective men, were to take the route for Hindostan through the Punjab
early in October.
[32] The value still attached by the Hindoos to these relics
was shown on the conclusion of the treaty, in 1832, between
Shah-Shoojah and Runjeet Singh, previous to the Shah's last
unaided attempt to recover his throne; in which their
restoration, in case of his success, was an express
stipulation.
Such have been the principal events of the brief but brilliant campaign
which has concluded the Affghan war, and which, if regarded solely in a
military point of view, must be admitted to have amply vindicated the
lustre of the British arms from the transient cloud cast on them by the
failures and disasters of last winter.
The Affghan tragedy, however, may now, we hope, be considered as
concluded, so far as related to our own participation in its crimes and
calamities; but for the Affghans themselves, "left to create a
government in the midst of anarchy," there can be at present little
chance of even comparative tranquillity, after the total dislocation of
their institutions and internal relations by the fearful torrent of war
which has swept over the country. The last atonement now in our power to
make, both to the people and the ruler whom we have so deeply injured,
as well as the best course for our own interests, would be at once to
release Dost Mohammed from the unmerited and ignominious confinement to
which he has been subjected in Hindostan, and to send him back in honour
to Cabul; where his own ancient partisans, as well as those of his son,
would quickly rally round him; and where his presence and accustomed
authority might have some effect in restraining the crowd of fierce
chiefs, who will be ready to tear each other to pieces as soon as they
are released from the presence of the _Feringhis_. There would thus be
at least a possibility of obtaining a nucleus for the re-establishment
of something like good order; while in no other quarter does there
appear much prospect of a government being formed, which might be either
"approved by the Affghans themselves," or "capable of maintaining
friendly relations with neighbouring states." If the accounts received
may be depended upon, our troops had scarcely cleared the Kojuck Pass,
on their way from Candahar to the Indus, when that city became the scene
of a contest between the Prince Seifdar-Jung and the Barukzye chiefs in
the vicinity; and though the latter are said to have been worsted in the
first instance, there can be little doubt that our departure will be the
signal for the speedy return of the quondam _Sirdars_, or rulers of
Candahar, (brothers of Dost Mohammed,) who have found an asylum in
Persia since their expulsion in 1839, but who will scarcely neglect so
favourable an opportunity for recovering their lost authority. Yet
another competitor may still, perhaps, be found in the same quarter--one
whose name, though sufficiently before the public a few years since, has
now been almost forgotten in the strife of more mighty interests. This
is Shah Kamran of Herat, the rumours of whose death or dethronement
prove to have been unfounded, and who certainly would have at this
moment a better chance than he has ever yet had, for regaining at least
Candahar and Western Affghanistan. He was said to be on the point of
making the attempt after the repulse of the Persians before Herat, just
before our adoption of Shah-Shoojah; and his title to the crown is at
least as good as that of the late Shah, or any of his sons. It will be
strange if this prince, whose danger from Persia was the original
pretext for crossing the Indus, should be the only one of all the
parties concerned, whose condition underwent no ultimate change, through
all the vicissitudes of the tempest which has raged around him.
Nor are the elements of discord less abundant and complicated on the
side of Cabul. The defeat of Tazeen will not, any more than the
preceding ones, have annihilated Akhbar Khan and his confederate
chiefs:--they are still hovering in the Kohistan, and will doubtless
lose no time in returning to Cabul as soon as the retreat of the English
is ascertained. It is true that the civil wars of the Affghans, though
frequent, have never been protracted or sanguinary:--like the
Highlanders, as described by Bailie Nicol Jarvie, "though they may
quarrel among themselves, and gie ilk ither ill names, and may be a
slash wi' a claymore, they are sure to join in the long run against a'
civilized folk:"--but it is scarcely possible that so many conflicting
interests, now that the bond of common danger is removed, can be
reconciled without strife and bloodshed. It is possible, indeed, that
Futteh-Jung (whom the last accounts state to have remained at Cabul when
our troops withdrew, in the hope of maintaining himself on the musnud,
and who is said to be the most acceptable to the Affghans of the four
sons[33] of Shah-Shoojah) may be allowed to retain for a time the title
of king; but he had no treasure and few partizans; and the rooted
distaste of the Affghans for the titles and prerogatives of royalty is
so well ascertained, that Dost Mohammed, even in the plenitude of his
power, never ventured to assume them. All speculations on these points,
however, can at present amount to nothing more than vague conjecture;
the troubled waters must have time to settle, before any thing can be
certainly prognosticated as to the future destinies of Affghanistan.
[33] The elder of these princes, Timour, who was governor of
Candahar during the reign of his father, has accompanied
General England to Hindostan, preferring, as he says, the life
of a private gentleman under British protection to the perils
of civil discord in Affghanistan. Of the second,
Mohammed-Akhbar, (whose mother is said to be sister of Dost
Mohammed,) we know nothing;--Futteh-Jung is the third, and was
intended by Shah-Shoojah for his successor;--Seifdar-Jung, now
at Candahar, is the youngest.
The kingdom of the Punjab will now become the barrier between
Affghanistan and our north-western frontier in India; and it is said
that the Sikhs, already in possession of Peshawer and the rich plain
extending to the foot of the Khyber mountains, have undertaken in future
to occupy the important defiles of this range, and the fort of
Ali-Musjid, so as to keep the Affghans within bounds. It seems to us
doubtful, however, whether they will be able to maintain themselves
long, unaided, in this perilous advanced post: though the national
animosity which subsists between them and the Affghans is a sufficient
pledge of their good-will for the service--and their co-operation in the
late campaign against Cabul has been rendered with a zeal and
promptitude affording a strong contrast to their lukewarmness at the
beginning of the war, when they conceived its object to be the
re-establishment of the monarchy and national unity of their inveterate
foes. But the vigour of the Sikh kingdom, and the discipline and
efficiency of their troops, have greatly declined in the hands of the
present sovereign, Shere Singh, who, though a frank and gallant soldier,
has little genius for civil government, and is thwarted and overborne in
his measures by the overweening power of the minister, Rajah Dhian
Singh, who originally rose to eminence by the favour of Runjeet. At
present, our information as to the state of politics in the Punjab is
not very explicit, the intelligence from India during several months,
having been almost wholly engrossed by the details of the campaign in
Affghanistan; but as far as can be gathered from these statements, the
country has been brought, by the insubordination of the troops, and the
disputes of the Maharajah and his Minister, to a state not far removed
from anarchy. It is said that the fortress of Govindghur, where the vast
treasures amassed by Runjeet are deposited, has been taken possession
of by the malecontent faction, and that Shere Singh has applied for the
assistance of our troops to recover it; and the _Delhi Gazette_ even
goes so far as to assert that this prince, "disgusted with the perpetual
turmoil in which he is embroiled, and feeling his incapacity of ruling
his turbulent chieftains, is willing to cede his country to us, and
become a pensioner of our Government." But this announcement, though
confidently given, we believe to be at least premature. That the Punjab
must inevitably, sooner or later, become part of the Anglo-Indian
empire, either as a subsidiary power, like the Nizam, or directly, as a
province, no one can doubt; but its incorporation at this moment, in the
teeth of our late declaration against any further extension of
territory, and at the time when the Sikhs are zealously fulfilling their
engagements as our allies, would be both injudicious and unpopular in
the highest degree. An interview, however, is reported to have been
arranged between Lord Ellenborough and Shere Singh, which is to take
place in the course of the ensuing summer, and at which some definitive
arrangements will probably be entered into, on the future political
relations of the two Governments.[34]
[34] The war in Tibet, to which we alluded in July last,
between the followers of the Sikh chief Zorawur Singh and the
Chinese, is still in progress--and the latter are said to be on
the point of following up their successes by an invasion of
Cashmeer. As we are now at peace with the Celestial Empire, our
mediation may be made available to terminate the contest.
The only permanent accession of territory, then, which will result from
the Affghan war, will consist in the extension of our frontier along the
whole course of the Sutlej and Lower Indus--"the limits which nature
appears to have assigned to the Indian empire"--and in the altered
relations with some of the native states consequent on these
arrangements. As far as Loodeana, indeed, our frontier on the Sutlej has
long been well established, and defined by our recognition of the Sikh
kingdom on the opposite bank;--but the possessions of the chief of
Bhawulpoor, extending on the left bank nearly from Loodeana to the
confluence of the Sutlej with the Indus, have hitherto been almost
exempt from British interference;[35] as have also the petty Rajpoot
states of Bikaneer, Jesulmeer, &c., which form oases in the desert
intervening between Scinde and the provinces more immediately under
British control. These, it is to be presumed, will now be summarily
taken under the _protection_ of the Anglo-Indian Government:--but more
difficulty will probably be experienced with the fierce and imperfectly
subdued tribes of Scindians and Belooches, inhabiting the lower valley
of the Indus;--and, in order to protect the commerce of the river, and
maintain the undisputed command of its course, it will be necessary to
retain a sufficient extent of vantage-ground on the further bank, and to
keep up in the country an amount of force adequate to the effectual
coercion of these predatory races. For this purpose, a _place d'armes_
has been judiciously established at Sukkur, a town which, communicating
with the fort of Bukkur on an island of the Indus, and with Roree on the
opposite bank, effectually secures the passage of the river; and the
ports of Kurrachee and Sonmeani on the coast, the future marts of the
commerce of the Indus, have also been garrisoned by British troops.
[35] Bhawulpoor is so far under British protection, that it was
saved from the arms of the Sikhs by the treaty with Runjeet
Singh, which confined him to the other bank of the Sutlej; but
it has never paid allegiance to the British Government. Its
territory is of considerable extent, stretching nearly 300
miles along the river, by 100 miles average breadth; but great
part of the surface consists of sandy desert.
It has long since been evident[36] that Scinde, by that _principle of
unavoidable expansion_ to which we had so often had occasion to refer,
must eventually have been absorbed into the dominions of the Company;
but the process by which it at last came into our hands is so curious a
specimen of our Bonapartean method of dealing with reluctant or
refractory neutrals, that we cannot pass it altogether without notice.
Scinde, as well as Beloochistan, had formed part of the extensive empire
subdued by Ahmed Shah, the founder of the Doorani monarchy; but in the
reign of his indolent son Timour, the Affghan yoke was shaken off by the
_Ameers_, or chiefs of the Belooch family of Talpoor, who, fixing their
residences respectively at Hydrabad, Meerpoor, and Khyrpoor, defied all
the efforts of the kings of Cabul to reduce them to submission, though
they more than once averted an invasion by the promise of tribute. It
has been rumoured that Shah-Shoojah, during his long exile, made
repeated overtures to the Cabinet of Calcutta for the cession of his
dormant claims to the _suzerainté_ of Scinde, in exchange for an
equivalent, either pecuniary or territorial; but the representations of
a fugitive prince, who proposed to cede what was not in his possession,
were disregarded by the rulers of India; and even in the famous
manifesto preceding the invasion of Affghanistan, Lord Auckland
announced, that "a guaranteed independence, on favourable conditions,
would be tendered to the Ameers of Scinde." On the appearance of our
army on the border, however, the Ameers demurred, not very unreasonably,
to the passage of this formidable host; and considerable delay ensued,
from the imperfect information possessed by the British commanders of
the amount of resistance to be expected; but at last the country and
fortress were forcibly occupied; the seaport of Kurrachee (where alone
any armed opposition was attempted) was bombarded and captured by our
ships of war; and a treaty was imposed at the point of the bayonet on
the Scindian rulers, by virtue of which they paid a contribution of
twenty-seven laks of rupees (nearly £300,000) to the expenses of the
war, under the name of arrears of tribute to Shah-Shoojah,
acknowledging, at the same time, the supremacy, _not of Shah-Shoojah_,
but of the English Government! The tolls on the Indus were also
abolished, and the navigation of the river placed, by a special
stipulation, wholly under the control of British functionaries. Since
this summary procedure, our predominance in Scinde has been undisturbed,
unless by occasional local commotions; but the last advices state that
the whole country is now "in an insurrectionary state;" and it is fully
expected that an attempt will erelong be made to follow the example of
the Affghans, and get rid of the intrusive _Feringhis_; in which case,
as the same accounts inform us, "the Ameers will be sent as
state-prisoners to Benares, and the territory placed wholly under
British administration."
[36] So well were the Scindians aware of this, that Burnes,
when ascending the Indus, on his way to Lahore in 1831,
frequently heard it remarked, "Scinde is now gone, since the
English have seen the river, which is the road to its
conquest."
But whatever may be thought of the strict legality of the conveyance, in
virtue of which Scinde has been converted into an integral part of our
Eastern empire, its geographical position, as well as its natural
products, will render it a most valuable acquisition, both in a
commercial and political point of view. At the beginning of the present
century, the East-India Company had a factory at Tatta, (the Pattala of
the ancients,) the former capital of Scinde, immediately above the Delta
of the Indus; but their agents were withdrawn during the anarchy which
preceded the disruption of the Doorani monarchy. From that period till
the late occurrences, all the commercial intercourse with British India
was maintained either by land-carriage from Cutch, by which mode of
conveyance the opium of Malwa and Marwar (vast quantities of which are
exported in this direction) chiefly found its way into Scinde and
Beloochistan; or by country vessels of a peculiar build, with a
disproportionately lofty poop, and an elongated bow instead of a
bowsprit, which carried on an uncertain and desultory traffic with
Bombay and some of the Malabar ports. To avoid the dangerous sandbanks
at the mouths of the Indus, as well as the intricate navigation through
the winding streams of the Delta, (the course of which, as in the
Mississippi, changes with every inundation,) they usually discharged
their cargoes at Kurrachee, whence they were transported sixty miles
overland to Tatta, and there embarked in flat-bottomed boats on the main
stream. The port of Kurrachee, fourteen miles N.W. from the Pittee, or
western mouth of the Indus, and Sonmeani, lying in a deep bay in the
territory of Lus, between forty and fifty miles further in the same
direction, are the only harbours of import in the long sea-coast of
Beloochistan; and the possession of them gives the British the undivided
command of a trade which, in spite of the late disasters, already
promises to become considerable; while the interposition of the now
friendly state of Khelat[37] between the coast and the perturbed tribes
of Affghanistan, will secure the merchandise landed here a free passage
into the interior. The trade with these ports deserves, indeed, all the
fostering care of the Indian Government; since they must inevitably be,
at least for some years to come, the only inlet for Indian produce into
Beloochistan, Cabul, and the wide regions of Central Asia beyond them.
The overland carrying trade through Scinde and the Punjab, in which
(according to M. Masson) not less than 6500 camels were annually
employed, has been almost annihilated--not only by the confusion arising
from the war, but from the absolute want of means of transport, from the
unprecedented destruction of the camels occasioned by the exigencies of
the commissariat, &c. The rocky defiles of Affghanistan were heaped with
the carcasses of these indispensable animals, 50,000 of which (as is
proved by the official returns) perished in this manner in the course of
three years; and some years must necessarily elapse before the chasm
thus made in the numbers of the species throughout North-western India
can be supplied. The immense expenditure of the Army of Occupation, at
the same time, brought such an influx of specie into Affghanistan, as
had never been known since the sack of Delhi by Ahmed Shah
Doorani--while the traffic with India being at a stand-still for the
reasons we have just given, the superfluity of capital thus produced was
driven to find an outlet in the northern markets of Bokhara and
Turkestan. The consequence of this has been, that Russian manufactures
to an enormous amount have been poured into these regions, by way of
Astrakhan and the Caspian, to meet this increasing demand; and the value
of Russian commerce with Central Asia, which (as we pointed out in April
1840, p. 522) had for many years been progressively declining, was
doubled during 1840 and 1841, (_Bombay Times_, April 2, 1842,) and is
believed to be still on the increase! The opening of the navigation of
the Indus, with the exertions of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce to
establish depots on its course, and to facilitate the transmission of
goods into the surrounding countries, has already done much for the
restoration of traffic in this direction, in spite of the efforts of the
Russian agents in the north to keep possession of the opening thus
unexpectedly afforded them; but it cannot be denied that the "great
enlargement of our field of commerce," so confidently prognosticated by
Lord Palmerston, from "the great operations undertaken in the countries
lying west of the Indus," has run a heavy risk of being permanently
diverted into other channels, by the operation of the causes detailed
above.
[37] Khelat (more properly Khelat-i-Nussear Khan, "the citadel
of Nussear Khan," by whom it was strongly fortified in 1750,)
is the principal city and fortress of the Brahooes or Eastern
Baloochee, and the residence of their chief. It had never been
taken by any of the Affghan kings, and had even opposed a
successful resistance to the arms of Ahmed Shah;--but on
November 13, 1839, it was stormed by an Anglo-Indian force
under General Wiltshire, and the Khan Mihrab was slain sword in
hand, gallantly fighting to the last at the entrance of his
zenana. The place, however, was soon after surprised and
recaptured by the son of the fallen chief, Nussear Khan, who,
though again expelled, continued to maintain himself with a few
followers in the mountains, and at last effected an
accommodation with the British, and was replaced on the musnud.
He has since fulfilled his engagements to us with exemplary
fidelity; and as his fears of compulsory vassalage to the
nominally restored Affghan monarchy are now at an end, he
appears likely to afford a solitary instance of a trans-Indian
chief converted into a firm friend and ally.
Before we finally dismiss the subject of the Affghan war and its
consequences, we cannot overlook one feature in the termination of the
contest, which is of the highest importance, as indicating a return to a
better system than that miserable course of reduction and parsimony,
which, for some years past, has slowly but surely been alienating the
attachment, and breaking down the military spirit, of our native army.
We refer to the distribution, by order of Lord Ellenborough, of badges
of honorary distinction, as well as of more substantial rewards, in the
form of augmented allowances,[38] &c., to the sepoy corps which have
borne the brunt of the late severe campaign. Right well have these
honours and gratuities been merited; nor could any measure have been
better timed to strengthen in the hearts of the sepoys the bonds of the
_Feringhi salt_, to which they have so long proved faithful. The policy,
as well as the justice, of holding out every inducement which may rivet
the attachment of the native troops to our service, obvious as it must
appear, has in truth been of late too much neglected;[39] and it has
become at this juncture doubly imperative, both from the severe and
unpopular duty in which a considerable portion of the troops have
recently been engaged, and from the widely-spread disaffection which has
lately manifested itself in various quarters among the native
population. We predicted in July, as the probable consequence of our
reverses in Affghanistan, some open manifestation of the spirit of
revolt constantly smouldering among the various races of our subjects in
India, but the prophecy had already been anticipated by the event. The
first overt resistance to authority appeared in Bhundelkund, a wild and
imperfectly subjugated province in the centre of Hindostan, inhabited by
a fierce people called Bhoondelahs. An insurrection, in which nearly all
the native chiefs are believed to be implicated, broke out here early
in April; and a desultory and harassing warfare has since been carried
on in the midst of the almost impenetrable jungles and ravines which
overspread the district. The Nawab of Banda and the Bhoondee Rajah, a
Moslem and a Hindoo prince, respectively of some note in the
neighbourhood of the disturbed tracts, have been placed under
surveillance at Allahabad as the secret instigators of these movements,
"which," (says the _Agra Ukhbar_) "appear to have been regularly
organized all over India, the first intimation of which was the Nawab of
Kurnool's affair"--whose deposition we noticed in July. The valley of
Berar, also, in the vicinity of the Nizam's frontier, has been the scene
of several encounters between our troops and irregular bands of
insurgents; and the restless Arab mercenaries in the Dekkan are still in
arms, ready to take service with any native ruler who chooses to employ
them against the _Feringhis_. In the northern provinces, the aspect of
affairs is equally unfavourable. The Rohillas, the most warlike and
nationally-united race of Moslems in India, have shown alarming symptoms
of a refractory temper, fomented (as it has been reported) by the
disbanded troopers of the 2d Bengal cavalry,[40] (a great proportion of
whom were Rohillas,) and by Moslem deserters from the other regiments in
Affghanistan, who have industriously magnified the amount of our
losses--a pleasing duty, in which the native press, as usual, has
zealously co-operated. One of the newspapers printed in the Persian
language at Delhi, recently assured its readers that, at the forcing of
the Khyber Pass, "six thousand Europeans fell under the sharp swords of
the Faithful"--with other veracious intelligence, calculated to produce
the belief that the campaign must inevitably end, like the preceding, in
the defeat and extermination of the whole invading force. The fruits of
these inflammatory appeals to the pride and bigotry of the Moslems, is
thus painted in a letter from Rohilcund, which we quote from that
excellent periodical the _Asiatic Journal_ for September:--"The
Mahomedans throughout Rohilcund hate us to a degree only second to what
the Affghans do, their interest in whose welfare they can scarcely
conceal.... There are hundreds of heads of tribes, all of whom would
rise to a man on what they considered a fitting opportunity, which they
are actually thirsting after. A hint from their moolahs, and the display
of the green flag, would rally around it every Mussulman. In March last,
the population made no scruple of declaring that the _Feringhi raj_
(English rule) was at an end; and some even disputed payment of the
revenue, saying it was probable they should have to pay it again to
another Government! They have given out a report that Akhbar Khan has
disbanded his army for the present, in order that his men may visit
their families; but in the cold weather, when our troops will be
weakened and unfit for action, he will return with an overwhelming
force, aided by every Mussulman as far as Ispahan, when they will
annihilate our whole force and march straight to Delhi, and ultimately
send us to our ships. The whole Mussulman population, in fact, are
filled with rejoicing and _hope_ at our late reverses."
[38] By a general order, issued from Simla October 4, all
officers and soldiers, of whatever grade, who took part in the
operations about Candahar, the defence of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, the
recapture of Ghazni or Cabul, or the forcing of the Khyber
Pass, are to receive a silver medal with appropriate
inscriptions--a similar distinction having been previously
conferred on the defenders of Jellalabad. _What is at present
the value of the Order of the Doorani Empire_, with its showy
decorations of the first, second, and third classes, the last
of which was so rightfully spurned by poor Dennie?
[39] The following remarks of the _Madras United Service
Gazette_, though intended to apply only to the Secunderabad
disturbances, deserve general attention at present:--"We
attribute the lately-diminished attachment of the sepoys for
their European officers to _a diminished inclination for the
service_, the duties whereof have of late years increased in
about the same proportion that its advantages have been
reduced. The cavalry soldier of the present day has more than
double the work to do that a trooper had forty years ago;...
and the infantry sepoy's garrison guard-work has been for years
most fatiguing at every station, from the numerical strength of
the troops being quite inadequate to the duties.... These
several unfavourable changes have gradually given the sepoy a
distaste for the service, which has been augmented by the
stagnant state of promotion, caused by the reductions in 1829,
when one-fifth of the infantry, and one-fourth of the cavalry,
native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, became
supernumerary, thus effectually closing the door of promotion
to the inferior grades for years to come. Hopeless of
advancement, the sepoy from that time became gradually less
attentive to his duties, less respectful to his superiors, as
careless of a service which no longer held out any prospect of
promotion. Still, however, the bonds of discipline were not
altogether loosened, till Lord W. Bentinck's abolition of
corporal punishment; and from the promulgation of that
ill-judged order may be dated the decided change for the worse
which has taken place in the character of the native soldiery."
[40] This corps, it will be remembered, was broken for its
misconduct in the battle of Purwan-Durrah, against Dost
Mohammed, November 2, 1840.
It may be said that we are unnecessarily multiplying instances, and that
these symptoms of local fermentation are of little individual
importance; but nothing can be misplaced which has a tendency to dispel
the universal and unaccountable error which prevails in England, as to
the _popularity of our sway in India_. The signs of the times are
tolerably significant--and the apprehensions of a coming commotion which
we expressed in July, as well as of the quarter in which it will
probably break out, are amply borne out by the language of the
best-informed publications of India. "That the seeds of discontent" says
the _Delhi Gazette_--"have been sown by the Moslems, and have partially
found root among the Hindoos, is more than conjecture"--and the
warnings of the _Agra Ukhbar_ are still more unequivocal. "Reports have
reached Agra that a general rise will erelong take place in the Dekkan.
There have already been several allusions made to a very extensive
organization among the native states[41] against the British power, the
resources of which will, no doubt, be stretched to the utmost during the
ensuing cold season. Disaffection is wide and prevalent, and when our
withdrawal from Affghanistan becomes known, it will ripen into open
insurrection. With rebellion in Central India, and famine in Northern,
Government have little time to lose in collecting their energies to meet
the crisis." The increase of means which the return of the army from
Affghanistan will place at the disposal of the Governor-General, will
doubtless do much in either overawing or suppressing these
insurrectionary demonstrations; but even in this case the snake will
have been only "scotched, not killed;" and the most practical and
effectual method of rendering such attempts hopeless for the future,
will be the replacing the Indian army on the same efficient footing, as
to numbers and composition, on which it stood before the ill-judged
measures of Lord William Bentinck. The energies of the native troops
have been heavily tasked, and their fidelity severely tried, during the
Affghan war; and though they have throughout nobly sustained the high
character which they had earned by their past achievements, the
experiment on their endurance should not be carried too far. Many of the
errors of past Indian administrations have already been remedied by Lord
Ellenborough; and we cannot refrain from the hope, that the period of
his Government will not be suffered to elapse without a return to the
old system on this point also--the vital point on which the stability of
our empire depends.
[41] The Nawab of Arcot, one of the native princes, whose
fidelity is now strongly suspected, assured the Resident, in
his reply to the official communication of the capture of
Ghazni in 1839, that from his excessive joy at the triumph of
his good friend the Company, his bulk of body had so greatly
increased that he was under the necessity of providing himself
with a new wardrobe--his garments having become too strait for
his unbounded stomach! A choice specimen of oriental bombast.
Such have been the consequences, as far as they have hitherto been
developed, to the foreign and domestic relations of our Eastern empire,
of the late memorable Affghan war. In many points, an obvious parallel
may be drawn between its commencement and progress, and that of the
invasion of Spain by Napoleon. In both cases, the territory of an
unoffending people was invaded and overrun, in the plenitude of (as was
deemed by the aggressors) irresistible power, on the pretext, in each
case, that it was necessary to anticipate an ambitious rival in the
possession of a country which might be used as a vantage ground against
us. In both cases, the usurpation was thinly veiled by the elevation of
a pageant-monarch to the throne; till the invaded people, goaded by the
repeated indignities offered to their religious and national pride, rose
_en masse_ against their oppressors at the same moment in the capital
and the provinces, and either cut them off, or drove them to the
frontier. In each case the intruders, by the arrival of reinforcements,
regained for a time their lost ground; and if our Whig rulers had
continued longer at the helm of affairs, the parallel might have become
complete throughout. The strength and resources of our Indian empire
might have been drained in the vain attempt to complete the subjugation
of a rugged and impracticable country, inhabited by a fierce and bigoted
population; and an "Affghan _ulcer_." (to use the ordinary phrase of
Napoleon himself in speaking of the Spanish war) might have corroded the
vitals, and undermined the fabric, of British domination in the East.
Fortunately, however, for our national welfare and our national
character, better counsels are at length in the ascendant. The triumphs
which have again crowned our arms, have not tempted our rulers to resume
the perfidious policy which their predecessors, in the teeth of their
own original declarations, have now openly avowed, by "retaining
military possession of the countries west of the Indus;" and the candid
acknowledgement of the error committed in the first instance, affords
security against the repetition of such acts of wanton aggression, and
for adherence to the pacific policy now laid down. The ample resources
of India have yet in a great measure to be explored and developed, and
it is impossible to foresee what results may be attained, when (in the
language of the _Bombay Times_) "wisdom guides for good and worthy ends,
that resistless energy which madness has wasted on the opposite. We now
see that, even with Affghanistan as a broken barrier, Russia dares not
move her finger against us--that with seventeen millions sterling thrown
away, we are able to recover all our mischances, if relieved from the
rulers and the system which imposed them upon us!"
* * * * *
The late proclamation of Lord Ellenborough has been so frequently
referred to in the foregoing pages, that for the sake of perspicuity we
subjoin it in full.
"Secret Department, Simla,
"Oct. 1, 1842.
"The Government of India directed its army to pass the Indus, in order
to expel from Affghanistan a chief believed to be hostile to British
interests, and to replace upon his throne a sovereign represented to be
friendly to those interests, and popular with his former subjects.
"The chief believed to be hostile became a prisoner, and the sovereign
represented to be popular was replaced upon his throne; but after events
which brought into question his fidelity to the Government by which he
was restored, he lost, by the hands of an assassin, the throne he had
only held amidst insurrections, and his death was preceded and followed
by still existing anarchy.
"Disasters, unparalleled in their extent, unless by the errors in which
they originated, and by the treachery by which they were completed, have
in one short campaign been avenged upon every scene of past misfortune;
and repeated victories in the field, and the capture of the cities and
citadels of Ghazni and Cabul, have again attached the opinion of
invincibility to the British arms.
"The British army in possession of Affghanistan will now be withdrawn to
the Sutlej.
"The Governor-General will leave it to the Affghans themselves to create
a government amidst the anarchy which is the consequence of their
crimes.
"To force a sovereign upon a reluctant people, would be as inconsistent
with the policy, as it is with the principles, of the British
Government, tending to place the arms and resources of that people at
the disposal of the first invader, and to impose the burden of
supporting a sovereign without the prospect of benefit from his
alliance.
"The Governor-General will willingly recognize any government approved
by the Affghans themselves, which shall appear desirous and capable of
maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states.
"Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its empire,
the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment
and maintenance of general peace, to the protection of the sovereigns
and chiefs its allies, and to the prosperity and happiness of its own
faithful subjects.
"The rivers of the Punjab and the Indus, and the mountainous passes and
the barbarous tribes of Affghanistan, will be placed between the British
army and an enemy from the west, if indeed such an enemy there can be,
and no longer between the army and its supplies.
"The enormous expenditure required for the support of a large force in a
false military position, at a distance from its own frontier and its
resources, will no longer arrest every measure for the improvement of
the country and of the people.
"The combined army of England and of India, superior in equipment, in
discipline, in valour, and in the officers by whom it is commanded, to
any force which can be opposed to it in Asia, will stand in unassailable
strength upon its own soil, and for ever, under the blessing of
Providence, preserve the glorious empire it has won, in security and in
honour.
"The Governor-General cannot fear the misconstruction of his motives in
thus frankly announcing to surrounding states the pacific and
conservative policy of his Government.
"Affghanistan and China have seen at once the forces at his disposal,
and the effect with which they can be applied.
"Sincerely attached to peace for the sake of the benefits it confers
upon the people, the Governor-General is resolved that peace shall be
observed, and will put forth the whole power of the British Government
to coerce the state by which it shall be infringed."
* * * * *