The First Army and the Army of the Elbe made a combined attack upon
Count Clam-Gallas at Münchengrätz, the Austrians being assailed in
front and on both flanks. The Austrian commander had begun his retreat
before the Prussian attack commenced; and after a brief resistance,
he fell back upon Gitschin, with a loss of about 2,000 men, killed,
wounded and prisoners. The Prussian loss was only 341. The armies of
Frederick Charles were now completely united. One division was pushed
forward to Rowensko, and the remaining eight, numbering, with the
cavalry, upwards of 100,000 men, were concentrated upon an area of
about twenty square miles. Some distress began to be felt because of
the short supply of food and the difficulty of getting water; for only
part of the provision trains had come up, and the Austrian inhabitants,
when they abandoned their homes, had filled up the wells. Two roads led
east from the Prussian position; one _via_ Podkost, and the other _via_
Fürstenbrück, but both united at Sobotka. The Austrian rear guard was
driven from Podkost during the night, and both roads were open for the
Prussian advance on the following morning.
Frederick Charles has been severely (and it would seem justly)
criticised for his inaction on the 27th of June. His explicit
instructions from Von Moltke should have been enough to cause him to
hasten forward, and so threaten the Austrian left as to relieve the
pressure on the Crown Prince. And there was another reason for prompt
action. As already mentioned, the victory of Podol had opened to
Frederick Charles the shortest line to Gitschin, from which place he
was now distant only fifteen miles, while Clam-Gallas, at Münchengrätz,
was twenty miles away from the same point. The town of Gitschin, like
Ivrea in 1800, or Sombref and Quatre-Bras in 1815, had accidentally
become a strategic point of the first importance by reason of the
relative positions of the opposing armies and the direction of the
roads necessary for the concentration of each. All the roads leading
from the Iser, from Turnau to Jung Bunzlau, center at Gitschin,
whence other roads branch out to Neu Bidsow, Königgrätz, Josephstadt,
Königinhof, and other important points. The possession of Gitschin by
either army would seriously delay, and perhaps eventually prevent, the
concentration of the other. A prompt movement to Gitschin by Frederick
Charles would have cut off Clam-Gallas, who could then have effected
a junction with Von Benedek only by a circuitous march of such length
as to make it probable that his two corps would have been eliminated
altogether from the problem solved on the field of Königgrätz. As the
Austro-Saxons at Münchengrätz, covering the roads to Prague, could
have protected their communications with that city, while menacing the
communications of the Prussians with their base, it was, doubtless,
necessary to dislodge them from that position; but Frederick Charles
might have promptly pushed to Gitschin a force sufficient to seize and
hold the place, and still have kept in hand enough troops to defeat
Clam-Gallas so heavily as to drive him back in complete rout; for
Frederick Charles’ force numbered, at this time, nearly 140,000 men,
while Clam-Gallas had not more than 60,000.
This movement would not have really divided Frederick Charles’ army,
for the force at Gitschin and the one attacking at Münchengrätz would
have been practically within supporting distance, and in direct and
unimpeded communication with each other. Moreover, the nearest troops
available to oppose such a force thrust forward to Gitschin would have
been the single Austrian Corps (the IIId) which was at Miletin, quite
as far from Gitschin as the main body of Frederick Charles’ army would
have been. Frederick Charles’ entire army could have been at Gitschin
quite as soon as Von Benedek could have sent thither any force large
enough to offer respectable opposition; and the necessity of hurrying
troops to that point would have caused the Austrian commander to
relax materially the pressure upon the Crown Prince; a pressure which
Frederick Charles had every reason to believe greater than it really
was. Hozier states that the Prussian commander had formed a plan to
capture the entire army of Clam-Gallas; but Adams truly remarks that
the destruction of the Austro-Saxons at Münchengrätz would not have
compensated for a severe defeat of the Crown Prince. Moreover, as we
have seen, Clam-Gallas was not captured but fell back upon Gitschin,
whence he was able to form a junction with the main army. Had Frederick
Charles pushed a force to Gitschin, and with the rest of his army dealt
Clam-Gallas such a blow as to send him reeling back towards Prague, the
Prussian general would have reaped the double advantage of interposing
between the divided forces of the enemy, and facilitating his own
junction with the Crown Prince. Adams correctly says of Frederick
Charles: “The fault attributable to the Prince is, that with a
superiority of force at his command, which gave him unbounded advantage
over his enemy, he refused to incur risks which that fact reduced to a
minimum, in the general interests of the campaign.”[6]
To return to the Second Army:
The Crown Prince received information, at 1 o’clock in the morning, of
the defeat of the Ist Corps at Trautenau.
The 1st Division of the Guards was at once ordered to move against
Von Gablentz from Eypel, and the 2d Division (which had been intended
to support the Vth Corps) was ordered from Kosteletz to support the
1st Division. The movement was begun at 4 A. M. Anticipating the
attack, Von Gablentz took up a position facing east, with his left in
Trautenau and his right at Prausnitz, about five miles south of the
former village. A brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, ordered to his
assistance from Jaromir, mistook the route, and did not arrive in time
to participate in the action.
The Prussian attack was begun by the 1st Division of the Guards at
9:30 A. M. The Austrian center and right were forced back upon Soor
and Altenbach. The brigade on the Austrian left was contained by two
Prussian battalions until the arrival of the 2d Division, at 12:30 P.
M., when it was driven back upon Trautenau, and the greater part of it
captured. The main body of the Austrians was driven from the field,
and retreated upon Neustadt and Neuschloss. The Prussian loss was
713, killed and wounded; the Austrian loss 3,674, killed, wounded and
prisoners.
[Illustration: No. 6. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE
28TH. JUNE.]
While the Guards were thus engaged in repairing the defeat of the
Ist Corps, the Vth Corps was battling with the Austrians at Skalitz.
Baron Ramming, commanding the Austrian VIth Corps, having called for
reinforcements, Von Benedek ordered the VIIIth Corps to Dolan, about
four miles wrest of Skalitz, and gave the command of both corps to the
Archduke Leopold. Early on the morning of the 28th the VIIIth Corps
relieved the VIth in its position on the east bank of the Aupa, in
front of Skalitz, and the latter took up a position as a reserve in
rear of the right wing. The IVth Corps was stationed at Dolan. On the
Prussian side, Von Steinmetz had been reinforced by a brigade of the
VIth Corps. The Austrians had begun a retrograde movement before the
Prussian attack commenced; and the corps of Baron Ramming was already
too far to the rear to give efficient support to the VIIIth Corps.
After a severe action, the Austrians were driven from their position,
and retreated upon Lanzow and Salney; the IVth Corps, as a rear guard,
holding Dolan. The Prussian loss in the battle of Skalitz was 1,365
killed, wounded and missing; the Austrians lost nearly 6,000 men, of
whom 2,500 were prisoners.
The battles of Soor and Skalitz opened the passes of Trautenau and
Nachod to the unimpeded advance of the Ist and VIth Corps. During these
battles the Crown Prince was stationed at Kosteletz, from which point
he might easily reach either battle field, if his presence should
become necessary. In the night he went to Trautenau.
The distance between the advanced guard of Frederick Charles, at Ztowa,
and that of the Crown Prince, at Burkersdorf (near Soor), was only
twenty-seven miles.