On the 27th of June the Crown Prince pushed forward the Ist Corps
against Trautenau, and the main body of the Vth Corps upon Nachod. One
division of the Guard supported each corps.
The Ist Corps, under Von Bonin, marched in two columns from Liebau and
Schomberg, and was to concentrate at Parschnitz, about two miles east
of Trautenau, where it was to rest two hours before moving upon the
latter place.
Contrary to expectation, the left column arrived first at Parschnitz,
the right (with the advanced-guard) being delayed by bad roads.
Trautenau was as yet unoccupied by the Austrians; but instead of
seizing the town and the heights which overlooked it, on the farther
bank of the Aupa river, Von Clausewitz (commanding the left column)
obeyed the strict letter of his orders, and waited at Parschnitz two
hours, from 8 to 10 A. M., until the advanced guard of the right column
arrived.
While Von Clausewitz was thus idly waiting, Mondl’s brigade of the
Xth Austrian Corps arrived, and took up a strong position in the town
and on the heights which commanded it. A stubborn fight took place
before the Austrians could be dislodged; and Mondl fell back in good
order upon the main body of the Xth Corps, which was hurrying towards
Trautenau. Believing himself in complete possession of the field, Von
Bonin, at 1 o’clock, declined the assistance of the 1st Division of
Guards, which had hurried up to Parschnitz, and the division, after a
halt of two hours, marched off to the left, towards Eypel. About half
past 3 o’clock the entire Xth Corps, under Von Gablentz, arrived on
the field, and made a vigorous attack upon the Prussians. Von Bonin’s
left wing was turned; and, after fighting six hours, the Prussians were
driven from the field, and retreated to the positions from which they
had begun their march in the morning.
The Prussian defeat was due to two causes:
1. The delay of Von Clausewitz at Parschnitz, when common sense should
have prompted him to exceed his orders, and seize the unoccupied town
and heights of Trautenau. For two hours these positions were completely
undefended by the Austrians, and could have been occupied by Von
Clausewitz without firing a shot.[4]
2. The fatuity of Von Bonin in declining the assistance of the Guards.
Von Bonin knew that Mondl had not been routed, that he had fallen
back “slowly and fighting,” and he did not know what other force
might be in his immediate front. He had no reason to expect that he
would be allowed to pass through the defile without the most stubborn
opposition. He knew that he had been opposed by a single brigade,
and the plucky resistance of that small force should have made him
suspicious that it had stronger forces at its back. His orders were
to push on to Arnau, some twelve miles from Trautenau, and to carry
out these orders it was necessary to sweep aside the opposition in
his front. His declension of assistance when the firing had scarcely
ceased, and when the aid of the Guards would have enabled him to
clinch his success, was inexcusable. Like Beauregard at Shiloh, Von
Bonin seems to have labored under the delusion that a victory could
be sufficiently complete while the enemy’s army still remained in his
front.[5]
The Austrians had certainly gained a brilliant victory. With a force
of 33,600 men, they had defeated 35,000 Prussians, armed, too, with
breech-loaders, while the victors had only muzzle-loading rifles.
The loss of the Prussians was 56 officers and 1,282 men, while the
Austrians lost 196 officers and more than 5,000 men. This disparity of
loss illustrates the difference in the power of the old and the new
rifles; it also speaks volumes for the pluck of the Austrian soldiers.
But the Austrian victory was doomed to be as fruitless as it was
costly; for Prussian skill and valor on other fields obliterated all
that was gained by Von Gablentz in the bloody combat of Trautenau.
The march of the Vth Corps, under Von Steinmetz, lay through the defile
of Nachod, five miles in length, in which the entire corps was obliged
to march in a single column. The advanced-guard, which had seized
Nachod the night before, pushed forward rapidly, beyond the outlet
of the defile, to the junction of the roads leading to Skalitz and
Neustadt, where it received orders to halt, and thus cover the issue of
the main body through the defile. While the advanced-guard was making
preparations for bivouacking, its commander, General Von Loewenfeldt,
received news of the approach of the Austrian VIth Corps, which, as we
have seen, had been ordered upon Nachod. Hastily forming for action,
the Prussian advanced guard received the attack of a brigade, which was
reinforced until nearly the whole Austrian corps was engaged. It was a
desperate struggle of six and one-half battalions, five squadrons and
twelve guns, against twenty-one battalions, eighty guns and a greatly
superior force of cavalry. For three hours the advanced-guard sustained
the unequal conflict, with no other reinforcement than Wnuck’s cavalry
brigade. The Prussian force, in one line 3,000 paces long, without
reserves, was sorely pressed, until the main body began to issue from
the defile and deploy upon the field. The entire Austrian corps was now
engaged. Finally, after a successful charge of Wnuck’s cavalry brigade
upon the Austrian cuirassiers, and the repulse of a heavy infantry
attack, Von Steinmetz assumed the offensive, and the Austrians,
defeated with great loss, retreated to Skalitz. In the latter part of
this action the Prussians were under the immediate command of the Crown
Prince. The Prussian loss was 1,122, killed and wounded; the Austrians
lost 7,510, of which number about 2,500 were prisoners.
[Illustration: No. 5. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE
27TH. JUNE.]
The 1st Division of the Guards halted this night at Eypel; the 2d
Division at Kosteletz.
This day, which had seen two bloody actions fought by the Second Army,
was one of inaction on the part of the armies of Frederick Charles. The
day was consumed in constructing bridges across the Iser, at Turnau and
Podol, and in concentrating the main body of the army on the plateau
of Sichrow, preparatory to an attack upon the Austrian position at
Münchengrätz.