Intelligence received at the Prussian headquarters of the battles in
which the armies had been engaged, rendered it certain that of the
seven Austrian army corps, the IVth, VIth, VIIIth and Xth were opposed
to the Crown Prince, and that only the Ist Corps and the Saxons were
arrayed against Frederick Charles. The position of the IIId Corps was
unknown; but it was clear that it was the only one that could come to
the assistance of Count Clam-Gallas, as the IId Corps was known to be
far to the rear. The necessity of relieving the Crown Prince from the
overwhelming numbers of Von Benedek,[7] and the prospect of being able
to deliver a crushing blow upon the inferior force in his front, alike
rendered it of the utmost importance that Frederick Charles should move
promptly upon Gitschin. Apparently impatient at the Prince’s delay,
Von Moltke reiterated the instructions already given him, saying,
in a telegram from Berlin on June 29th: “His Majesty expects that a
speedy advance of the First Army will disengage the Second Army, which,
notwithstanding a series of successful actions, is still momentarily in
a precarious situation.”
Frederick Charles, who had already decided to advance without further
delay, at once moved as follows:
The Left, from Turnau, _via_ Rowensko;
The Center, from Podol, _via_ Sabotka;
The Right, from Münchengrätz, _via_ Ober Bautzen and Sabotka;
The Army of the Elbe, from Münchengrätz, _via_ Unter Bautzen and Libau.
The advance of the army was rendered difficult by the small number
of roads available. The leading divisions were started as early as
possible, to make a long march, in order that the other divisions might
march in the evening on the same roads. It was, even then, necessary
for the Army of the Elbe to make a long detour.
Count Clam-Gallas, having been promised the assistance of the IIId
Corps, resolved to make a stand near Gitschin. His position was on a
range of hills west and north of that village, his right resting upon
the village of Eisenstadt, his left on the Anna Berg, near Lochow. In
front of the center were the rocky heights of Prywicin, which, being
almost impassable for ordinary pedestrians, would isolate the attacks
of the enemy, while, terminating in front of the Austrian position,
they could not interfere with the free movements of the troops on the
defensive. In front of the hills were ravines, gullies and broken
ground. The position was thus very strong for an army whose _rôle_ was
a purely defensive one.
Von Tümpling’s division, (5th) leaving Rowensko at 1:30 P. M., came in
contact with the enemy shortly after 3 o’clock. Von Werder’s division
(3d) left Zehrow at noon; but, having a greater distance to march, did
not strike the enemy until 5:30. Von Tümpling immediately attacked
the Austrian right, with a view to cutting off Count Clam-Gallas from
the main army of Von Benedek. The action continued, with varying
fortune, until 7:30, when, Von Tümpling having carried the village of
Dielitz, in the center of the Austrian right wing, Von Werder having
gained ground on the left, and Von Benedek having sent word that the
assistance of the IIId Corps could not be given, Count Clam-Gallas
ordered a retreat. The Austrians retired in good order upon Gitschin;
the retreat of the right wing being covered by an attack of a brigade
upon the Prussians at Dielitz; that of the left by an attack of a
regiment of infantry and a battalion of rifles. Both attacks were
repulsed with heavy loss. Following the enemy, the Prussians, after
a sharp fight with the Austrian rear guard in the streets, occupied
Gitschin after midnight. The Prussian loss was 2,612 killed, wounded
and missing; the Austrians lost about 7,000 men, of whom 4,000 were
prisoners. Count Clam-Gallas reported to Von Benedek that he had been
defeated, that he was no longer able to oppose Frederick Charles, and
that he was retreating upon Königgrätz.
Von Benedek now determined to throw his main force on Frederick
Charles, leaving a containing force to oppose the Crown Prince. But
with this object in view, his dispositions were faulty. Strangely
ignoring the results of the battles of Nachod, Soor and Skalitz, he
seems to have thought that one corps would suffice to hold the Crown
Prince in check; and on the morning of the 29th he issued orders for
the advance of the IIId Corps to Gitschin and the Reserve Cavalry to
Horzitz. The IId, VIth, VIIIth and Xth were to follow on the next day
in the direction of Lomnitz and Turnau. But during the day events
occurred which necessitated a complete change of plan.
In the Second Army the Ist Corps marched _via_ Trautenau to Pilnikau,
and the cavalry division following it halted at Kaile, where the Crown
Prince established his headquarters.
The Guards advanced upon Königinhof, from which place they drove out a
brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, capturing about 400 prisoners.
The Vth Corps (with one brigade of the VIth) marching upon Gradlitz,
encountered the other brigades of the Austrian IVth Corps at
Schweinschädel, and after an action of three hours, drove them from the
field with a loss of nearly 5,000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners.
The Austrians retreated to Salney. The Crown Prince had now reached the
Elbe.
During the day Von Benedek, becoming alarmed at the progress of the
Second Army, countermanded the order for the IIId Corps to move upon
Gitschin, and directed it to remain at Miletin. The Ist Corps and the
Saxons were ordered to join the main army _via_ Horzitz and Miletin;
but the orders, as we have seen, came too late to save them from their
defeat at Gitschin. The rest of the army was concentrated before night
upon the plateau of Dubenetz, against the army of the Crown Prince, as
follows:
[Illustration: No. 7. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE
29TH. JUNE]
The IVth Corps at Salney, with the 1st Reserve Cavalry Division, and
the 2d Light Cavalry Division on its right and rear;
The IId Corps at Kukus, on left of IVth;
The VIIIth Corps near Kasow (one brigade in line on left of IId Corps,
the other brigades as reserve);
The VIth Corps on the left of the VIIIth;
The 3d Reserve Cavalry Division on the left of the VIth Corps;
The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division on the extreme left wing;
The Xth Corps, in reserve, between Stern and Liebthal.
Five army corps and four cavalry divisions were thus concentrated on
a line five and one-half miles long. The nature of the ground was
unfavorable to the interior communications of the line, but it was,
in the main, a strong position, with the Elbe on its front, and the
fortress of Josephstadt protecting its right flank.
The junction of the Prussian armies now seemed assured, and the
strategical situation was decidedly against Von Benedek. His great
fault was his failure to decide promptly in regard to the army which
he should contain while throwing his weight upon the other. Placing
an exaggerated value upon his interior position, he does not seem to
have considered that every hour of Prussian advance diminished his
advantages; and he was, apparently, unable to make his choice of the
two plans of operations which presented themselves. His best move,
if made in time, would have been against Frederick Charles. True,
his communications could have been quickly cut, in this case, by a
successful advance of the Second Army across the Elbe; while in moving
against the Crown Prince, his communications could not so readily have
been seized by Frederick Charles. But, on the other hand, topographical
features made it an easier matter to contain the Second Army than the
First Army and the Army of the Elbe. If the Austrian field marshal had
learned the lesson taught at Atlanta, Franklin and Petersburg, he would
have made use of hasty entrenchments. The Xth Corps and VIth Corps,
strongly entrenched, could certainly have held the passes against
the assaults of the Crown Prince. The ground was admirably adapted
to defense, and the entrenchments would have more than neutralized
the superiority of the needle gun over the Lorenz rifle. To have
invested and reduced the entrenched camps, if possible at all, would
have required much more time than Von Benedek would have needed for
disposing of Frederick Charles. To have advanced by the road leading to
Olmütz or Bömisch Trübau, the Crown Prince would have been compelled to
mask the passes with at least as many troops as garrisoned the camps
at their outlets, or his own communications would have been at the
mercy of the Austrians. This would have left him only two corps; and an
invasion of Moravia with this small force, every step of the advance
carrying him farther away from Frederick Charles, would have been an
act of suicidal madness, which he would not have seriously contemplated
for a moment. When Osman Pasha, eleven years later, paralyzed the
advance of 110,000 Russians, by placing 40,000 Turks in a hastily
entrenched position on their right, at Plevna, he showed plainly
how Von Benedek might have baulked the Second Army with entrenched
positions at the Silesian passes.
Leaving, then, two corps to take care of the Crown Prince, the Austrian
commander would have had (including the Saxons) six corps, and nearly
all of the reserve cavalry and artillery, to use against Frederick
Charles. Count Clam-Gallas, instead of undertaking the task of holding
the line of the Iser, should have destroyed the bridges; and opposing
the Prussians with a strong rear-guard at the different crossings,
obstructing the roads, offering just enough resistance to compel his
adversary to deploy and thus lose time, but avoiding anything like a
serious action, he should have fallen back _via_ Gitschin to form a
junction with Von Benedek. He could thus have gained sufficient time
for his chief to arrive at Gitschin as soon as Frederick Charles; and
the army of the latter, numbering not more than 130,000 men,[8] would
have been opposed by an army of fully 200,000 Austrians. What the
result would have been we can best judge from the course of the battle
of Königgrätz before the Crown Prince arrived upon the field.
Hozier, Adams, Derrécagaix and (above all) the Prussian Official
History of the Campaign of 1866, claim that the best move of Von
Benedek would have been against the Crown Prince. If we consider the
successful passage of the defiles by the Second Army as a thing to be
taken for granted in Von Benedek’s plan of campaign, there can be no
doubt that the Austrian commander should have turned his attention to
the Crown Prince, and that he should have attacked him with six corps,
as soon as the Prussians debouched from the defiles of Trautenau and
Nachod. The line of action here suggested as one that would probably
have resulted in Austrian success, is based entirely on the condition
that the Second Army should be contained at the defiles, by a force
strongly entrenched after the American manner of 1864-5; a condition
not considered by the eminent authorities mentioned above. After the
Crown Prince had safely passed the defiles, Von Benedek had either
to attack him or fall back. The time for a successful move against
Frederick Charles had passed.
Von Benedek had carefully planned an invasion of Prussia. Had he been
able to carry the war into that country, his operations might, perhaps,
have been admirable; but when the superior preparation of the Prussians
enabled them to take the initiative, he seems to have been incapable of
throwing aside his old plans and promptly adopting new ones suited to
the altered condition of affairs. Von Benedek was a good tactician and
a stubborn fighter; but when he told the Emperor “Your Majesty, I am no
strategist,” and wished to decline the command of the army, he showed a
power of correct self-analysis equal to that displayed by Burnside when
he expressed an opinion of his own unfitness for the command of the
Army of the Potomac. The brave old soldier did not seem to appreciate
the strategical situation, and was apparently losing his head.[9] With
all the advantages of interior lines, he had everywhere opposed the
Prussians with inferior numbers; he had allowed the Crown Prince to
pass through the defiles of the mountains before he opposed him at
all; six of his eight corps had suffered defeat; he had lost more than
30,000 men; and now he was in a purely defensive position, and one
which left open the road from Arnau to Gitschin for the junction of the
Prussian armies.
It would have been better than this had the Austrians everywhere
fallen back without firing a shot, even at the expense of opposing no
obstacles to the Prussian concentration; for they could then, at least,
have concentrated their own army for a decisive battle without the
demoralization attendant upon repeated defeats.