"Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive
victory be won."--MARSHAL HAIG.
The formations in which Infantry move to the Attack must be such as
will enable them to achieve their object by the combination of Fire and
Movement. For this purpose, the forward troops must be furnished with
supports belonging to the same unit as themselves, in order that a
connected leading may produce a joint action of the whole.
THE PLATOON.--The smallest unit which can be divided into independent
bodies, each capable of Fire and Movement, is the platoon, the four
sections of which can pin the enemy to his position by fire and can
manoeuvre round his flanks. The normal distribution of the platoon for
the Attack is either the Square or the Diamond Formation. In the
_Square Formation_, two sections are forward covering the frontage
allotted to the platoon, and the remaining two sections are in support,
in such formation as may keep them in readiness for instant manoeuvre
with due regard to the avoidance of unnecessary loss. In the _Diamond
Formation_, one section leads to reconnoitre and to pin down the enemy,
while the remaining three sections are held in readiness to manoeuvre
for the decisive attack at the point in the enemy's defence which
offers the best prospect of success. The Diamond Formation is that
best suited to an Attack in an Encounter Battle, when the nature of the
enemy's dispositions are imperfectly known. It possesses the great
advantage of preserving {71} the power of manoeuvre for three-quarters
of the platoon until the action of the leading section has developed
the situation.
In each case (except when the Attack is launched against a highly
organised defensive position), the forward sections will be preceded by
_Ground Scouts_, to find the most covered line of advance and the best
fire positions, and to guard against ambush. These Ground Scouts
advance until checked, when they remain in observation until joined by
the leading sections. During the early stages of the Attack in an
Encounter Battle _Flank Scouts_ may be required until such time as the
deployment of the platoon renders them unnecessary.
Against a highly organised defensive system platoons may not be able to
advance to the Attack without a barrage, and it is essential that all
movements should conform exactly to the timing of the barrage and that
the troops should keep under the back edge of the shrapnel curtain, so
as to deliver their assault before the enemy has time to bring rifles
and machine guns into play. Under such circumstances, Ground scouts
must be dispensed with. Such a position will not be attacked without
careful previous reconnaissance and the lines of advance will have been
chosen beforehand. The Square Formation will be that usually adopted
for attacks on highly organised defensive positions, with the two rifle
sections forward and the two Lewis-gun sections in support. The
Lewis-gun sections are thus able to protect the flanks of the rifle
sections, and to deal with isolated enemy machine guns, or concealed
bodies of riflemen, which might come into action with reverse or
enfilade fire after the forward sections have passed over the occupied
ground.
THE PLATOON COMMANDER.--The platoon commander must explain the
situation to his subordinates and point out the line of advance. He
should usually move with the forward sections during the preparatory
{72} phase of an Attack, and when the forward sections have been
committed to the Attack he should assume control of the supporting
sections and move with them. If his platoon is in support, he will
thus be with the forward sections before the platoon is involved in the
fight. The success of Infantry in the Attack depends not only on dash,
control, and leading, but upon the intelligent co-operation of support
commanders, who must keep themselves acquainted with the course of the
battle by intelligent observation and will thus possess an
"appreciation of the situation" before involving their men in action,
and can direct the supports to the right spot at the right time, to
influence the battle by fire and by movement, without hesitation or
delay.
THE COMPANY.--The normal distribution of the company, when acting with
other companies of the battalion, is two platoons forward and two in
support. To meet the expectation of a stubborn resistance, or to cover
an unusually extensive frontage, three platoons may be forward, with
one in support; and where information as to the enemy's dispositions is
lacking, but strong opposition is unlikely, one platoon may be forward
with three in support, thus enabling the company commander to use any
or all the supports to influence the attack on obtaining information as
to the point in the enemy's position which offers the best prospect of
success. When the frontage allotted to a company is above the normal,
the leading platoons should not endeavour to cover the whole front, but
gaps should be left between them; otherwise the men will be so widely
extended as to deprive the leaders of the power of control.
When a company is acting independently, the normal formation will be
two platoons forward, with one in support, and one in reserve.
THE COMPANY COMMANDER.--The company commander will allot the tasks and
the frontages of his {73} platoons and give orders as to their
distribution, and must state where he will be himself during the
Attack. His position will be determined by the necessity of keeping
informed throughout the Attack of the situation and of the progress of
his platoons, and he is responsible that all essential information on
these points is passed back to the battalion commander. He must also
keep in touch with companies on his flanks, sending out patrols for
this purpose, if necessary; and must use every opportunity afforded by
the fire or smoke provided by other units or arms to get forward or
round the enemy's flanks. He will use his supporting platoons to push
through where the resistance is weak in order to turn the flank of
those portions of the enemy which are holding up the advance. As soon
as this temporary phase has been brought to a successful conclusion the
company commander must reorganise his platoons and secure their advance
on the objective. When the objective has been gained the position must
be consolidated and patrols sent out to prevent surprise.
THE BATTALION.--The distribution of the battalion depends entirely upon
the nature of the task allotted to it. Where the enemy's dispositions
are known and considerable resistance is anticipated in the earlier
stages of the Attack, the battalion will normally be distributed with
two companies forward, one in support and one in reserve. The forward
body should thus be strong enough to develop the Attack to such a point
that a decisive blow can be delivered by the supports against the main
resistance, and the reserve company is in hand for the completing
stages of the action or for stabilising the local battle. Where the
enemy's dispositions and the degree of resistance are still the subject
of conjecture, one company only may be forward, with two in support, so
that the main strength of the battalion will not be committed to any
definite _rôle_ before it is needed and before the situation of the
enemy is discovered.
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THE BATTALION COMMANDER.--"The powers of personal control of a
battalion commander upon the field of battle are limited, and success
will depend, in a great measure, on the clearness of the orders which
commit his leading companies to the Attack" ("Infantry Training,
1921"). The battalion commander should be supplied with any details
concerning the enemy and of co-operating troops. He must understand
his objective, the limits of his frontage, and the extent of help which
he will receive from the other arms. In addition to such information
as is supplied regarding the enemy's strength and dispositions,
particularly with regard to wire (or other obstacles) and machine guns,
he must ascertain the best positions of assembly for his companies, the
best lines of approach to the objective, the most covered line of
advance for his supports and reserves, and the best position for his
own headquarters during each stage of the Attack. In his orders for
the Attack he will reveal all information concerning the movements and
dispositions of the enemy and of co-operating troops and arms; he will
allot tasks to the companies and to the machine-gun platoon (if not
brigaded) and will define the frontage of the forward companies; he
will also detail the assembly positions, give compass-bearings for the
advance, describe the action of other arms in support, make the
necessary signalling arrangements, notify the zero hour, arrange for
the synchronisation of watches, notify his own position before, during,
and after the Attack, and indicate the point to which reports are to be
sent, notify the medical arrangements, and issue instructions as to the
collection of stragglers, the escort and destination of prisoners, the
supply of ammunition, and the equipment to be worn. The quartermaster
will receive orders as to the bringing up of rations during the battle.
Before issuing to the Attack a proportion of officers and other ranks
will be detailed to remain behind, to replace casualties when the
engagement is over.
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The position of the battalion commander will be chosen with a view to
keeping in touch with the progress of the Attack in all its stages and
of influencing the fight by means of the reserves. Personal control is
difficult to exercise once troops are committed to the fight, but
opportunities for rapid decision were frequently offered to battalion
commanders in the Great War, and seized with a success which
transformed a check into a victory. In 1916 a battalion commander of
the Coldstream Guards, seeing his command disorganised by fire and
resistance, by personal example rallied and reorganised the waves of
the Attack and added the necessary momentum to the assault, which then
reached its objective. On April 14, 1917, the commander of a battalion
of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment witnessed the launching of a local
counter-attack by the Germans on the village of _Monchy-le-Preux_, and
by a rapid advance with the fighting portion of his headquarters,
staved off the attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the 88th
Brigade enabled it to be driven back in disorder. On November 30,
1917, during the German counter-attack from Fontaine Notre Dame to
Tadpole Copse, in the Northern Sector of the _Cambrai_ zone, the
Germans forced their way into our foremost positions, and opened a gap
between the 1/6th and 1/15th London Regiments. Local counter-attacks
led by the two battalion commanders with all available men, including
the personnel of their respective headquarters, once more restored the
situation. In March, 1918, during the most critical period of the
German thrust at Amiens, a battalion commander of the Border Regiment
again and again, on horseback and on foot, personally restored the
situation.
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